This special issue of Strategic Insights will continue our exploration of extended deterrence that began in our Fall 2009 issue. Its articles reflect the latest research as presented at the workshop on Extended Deterrence, Security Guarantees, and Nuclear Proliferation: Strategic Stability in the Gulf Region held at the Gulf Research Center, held in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, on October 4-5, 2009.
American thinking about extended deterrence has always tended to focus on its nuclear-weapon capabilities. It is no different today. The Strategic Posture Commission of the United States—a bipartisan commission appointed by Congress 'to examine and make recommendations with respect to the long-term strategic posture of the United States'—reached the following conclusion on the requirements needed to fulfill U.S. security guarantees to Japan. In Asia, extended deterrence relies heavily on the deployment of nuclear cruise missiles on some Los Angeles class attack submarines—the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile/Nuclear (TLAM/N). This capability will be retired in 2013 unless steps are taken to maintain it. U.S. allies in Asia are not integrated in the same way into nuclear planning and have not been asked to make commitments to delivery systems. In our work as a Commission it has become clear to us that some U.S. allies in Asia would be very concerned by TLAM/N retirement.
In July 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told reporters during a visit to Bangkok: “We want Iran to calculate what I think is a fair assessment that if the United States extends a defense umbrella over the region, if we do even more to support the military capacity of those in the Gulf, it's unlikely that Iran will be any stronger or safer because they won't be able to intimidate and dominate as they apparently believe they can once they have a nuclear weapon.”
Extended deterrence consists in extending the logic of deterrence to a third party, that is, persuading a potential adversary that the costs of attacking a protected country would exceed its benefits through a security guarantee given to the protected party. To a large degree, it stems from any form of military alliance between a stronger country and a weaker one—although alliances per se generally include a mutual defense commitment, which is not a prerequisite to extended deterrence.
Despite nearly seven decades of Nuclear weapons, (NWs) and four decades of Cold war in which they figured prominently, we still do not know very much about, or with any degree of assurance, what NWs can and cannot do beyond create widespread destruction. Questions about deterrence, extended deterrence and the political utility of NWs and whether these are general propositions/ laws or culturally or state specific, cannot be reliably answered.
Faced with continuing uncertainties about Iran's nuclear weapon ambitions, reassurance and deterrence have figured prominently in our discussions of Gulf and wider Middle East security. During this workshop, presentations also have addressed what may yet be done in an attempt to influence Iran's nuclear weapons calculus as talks begin between the P - 5 + 1 and Iran. My presentation seeks to address issues of strategic reassurance if Iran crosses the nuclear weapon threshold.
This paper focuses on the causal factors, implementation, and side effects of administrative reforms launched within the United Nations system, in the field of HIV and AIDS. It is based on an empirical analysis of the UNAIDS Programme, an interorganizational system bringing together ten UN agencies to combat the worldwide epidemic, with the support of a Secretariat. Firstly, the paper argues that the administrative reform of UNAIDS was unlikely to have come from the UN organizations themselves, although the Programme was expected to lead these organizations to better coordinate and harmonize their AIDS strategies. Secondly, it identifies three external factors that have led UN organizations to reform their governance mechanisms and procedures. Thirdly, it explores the conditions under which the reform of UNAIDS has been implemented since 2005, with particular attention to the Secretariat that has become involved as an active “reform entrepreneur.” Finally, it identifies some of the unexpected effects of the reform, with a particular emphasison competition between UN agencies, organizational complexity, and bureaucratization. The concluding remarks argue that when analyzing administrative reforms within international organizations, one should investigate the interrelations between the external pressures that drive reforms and the activity of reform entrepreneurs.
Topic:
HIV/AIDS, Health, Humanitarian Aid, United Nations, and Infectious Diseases
Dealing with the dynamics of rural violence under the multi-party transition (1991-1994), this paper suggests new points of view on the mobilization of Rwandan peasantry during the genocide (1994). Going through local archives and interviews held in the hills and in four prisons of the country, the analysis focuses on the increasing development of an economy of violence. The multi-party system incited competing rural elites to recruit a growing number of men and ruffians against other contenders in order to assure their access to power. Local elites (re)formed patron-client links previously dried by the spreading of money and wage incomes in the countryside. Particular attention is paid to the dimension of political entrepreneurship and to the relationship between social brokers and rural elites, in the course of the struggle between political parties as well as during the building of the Power coalitions which led the massacres locally.
Topic:
Political Violence, Democratization, Economics, and Genocide
Between 1984 and 1995, the Indian Punjab was the theatre for a separatist insurrectional movement led by Sikh irregular armed groups. Most Sikh militants who picked up the gun against the Indian state were male, but a handful of women also took part in this armed struggle, which also enjoyed some support from Pakistan. Rather than the motivations of the fighters, it is their individual trajectories that are explored here. Following a critical biographical approach, paying attention to the silences of the actors and to the distorting effects of their ex-post testimonies, this paper aims at unraveling the familial genealogies of these militant careers, before identifying their successive sequences. Through this exercise, it is possible to shed light on individual dispositions towards engagement. However, this preliminary exercise must be followed up by an in-depth study of the conditions of actualization of these dispositions into a sustained form of commitment. Therefore, this paper focuses on the modalities of recruitment into clandestine organizations, before turning to the practical and psychological dilemmas induced by the return of these combatants to civilian life, which remain understudied. By introducing gender into the scope of the study, this paper also aims at assessing the variations between masculine and feminine ways of being and having been in clandestinity.
Topic:
Armed Struggle, Insurgency, and Sectarian violence
In his inaugural address, U.S. President Barack Obama told the Muslim world they would be judged by what they build, not what they destroy. But even if those who build far outnumber those who destroy, many governments and societies will continue to be confronted by the specter of violent extremism. The challenge they face is how to devise effective strategies to counter the extremists and encourage long-term solutions that go beyond merely containing the problem to addressing its root causes. This is the challenge we posed to a wide variety of participants in the EastWest Institute's Countering Violent Extremism Initiative.
Topic:
Political Violence, Islam, Terrorism, and Insurgency