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71. Climate versus trade? Reconciling international subsidy rules with industrial decarbonisation

Author:
David Kleimann
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The vast environmental subsidies that may be required for the transition to net-zero greenhouse gas emissions are starting to generate international trade and political frictions between the world’s largest economies. This puts (supra-)national industrial decarbonisation efforts on a collision course with international subsidies rules and national countervailing duty (ie anti-foreign subsidy) laws and regulations. International cooperation will be essential to defuse such tensions before they escalate and impede effective climate policy rollouts, and before they lead to economic countermeasures that create new barriers to trade in environmental goods. This requires agreement on permissible environmental subsidy practices that minimise distortions. Meanwhile, it will be crucial to provide financial transfers to assist poorer economies with industrial decarbonisation at the same time as those poorer economies are suffering from the cross-border negative economic impacts of otherwise net-global-welfare enhancing environmental subsidies paid out by wealthy countries. Various forums can host the technical and political negotiations necessary to set the parameters of net global-welfare enhancing subsidies. These include the G7, the G20, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the World Trade Organisation’s Trade and Environment Committee and WTO Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions, and the Coalition of Trade Ministers on Climate.
Topic:
Climate Change, Political Economy, Trade, Carbon Emissions, Subsidies, and Decarbonization
Political Geography:
Global Focus

72. The Political Economy of Anti‐​bribery Enforcement

Author:
Lauren Cohen and Bo Li
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
A level playing field for firm competition is a fundamental requirement for any market to maximize its potential and achieve productive efficiency. When government favors a set of firms or individuals over others, distortions arise that reverberate throughout entire industries, affecting sales, production, innovation, and more. This is not to say that barriers to firms may not sometimes naturally arise, but if a finger is placed on the scale by government to allow certain firms to gain some unerodable advantage, this can have large implications on allocation and overall economic development.
Topic:
Corruption, Political Economy, Law Enforcement, Accountability, and Bribery
Political Geography:
Global Focus

73. China's Political-Economy, Foreign and Security Policy: 2023

Author:
Center for China Analysis
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
It has now been three months since the 20th Party Congress convened in Beijing on October 15. While the Congress set Xi Jinping’s ideological, strategic, and economic direction for the next five years, much has happened since then that the Chinese leadership did not anticipate. Principal among these surprises was the spontaneous eruption in late November of public protests across multiple Chinese cities against the economic and social impact of the Chinese Communist Party’s “dynamic zero-COVID” policy. These protests resulted in an unprecedented U-turn on December 8 from China’s relentless pursuit of its three-year-long national pandemic containment strategy to the Party now seeking desperately to restore economic growth and social calm. This shift has in turn generated major public pressures on the Chinese health system as hospitals struggle to cope with surging caseloads and mortalities. All of these developments stand in stark contrast to the political, ideological, and nationalist self-confidence on display at the 20th Party Congress. In October, Xi Jinping swept the board by removing any would-be opponents from the Politburo and replacing them with long-standing personal loyalists. Xi also proclaimed China’s total victory over COVID-19, contrasting the Party’s success with the disarray its propaganda apparatus had depicted across the United States and the collective West. Despite faltering economic growth, Xi had doubled down in his embrace of a new, more Marxist approach to economic policy which prioritized planning over the market, national self-sufficiency over global economic integration, the centrality of the public sector over private enterprise, and a new approach to wealth distribution under the rubric of the Common Prosperity doctrine. At the same time, Xi’s 2022 Work Report, delivered at the Congress, abandoned Deng Xiaoping’s long-standing foreign policy framework that “peace and development are the principal themes of the time” and instead warned of growing strategic threats and the need for the military to be prepared for war. As part of a continuing series on China’s evolving political economy and foreign policy, this paper’s purpose is threefold: to examine the political and economic implications of this dramatic change in China’s COVID-19 strategy; to analyze what, if any, impact it may have on China’s current international posture; and to assess whether this represents a significant departure from the Party’s strategic direction set at the 20th Party Congress last October. The paper concludes that the Party changed course on COVID-19 for two reasons: (1) it feared that not doing so would threaten its unofficial social contract with the Chinese people based on long-term improvements in jobs and living standards; and (2) that a structural slowdown in growth could also undermine China’s long-term strategic competition against the United States. This paper also concludes that the stark nature of the December 8 policy backflip, together with the Chinese health system’s lack of preparedness for it, has dented Xi Jinping’s political armor for the medium term. This setback comes on top of internal criticism of Xi’s broader ideological assault on the Deng-Jiang-Hu historical economic growth formula that Xi has prosecuted since 2017, as well as Xi’s departure from Deng’s less confrontational foreign policy posture that characterized previous decades. Nonetheless, these policy errors remain manageable within Chinese elite politics, where Xi still controls the hard levers of power. Furthermore, many of these changes on both the economy and external policy are more likely to be short-to-medium term and therefore tactical in nature, rather than representing a strategic departure from the deep ideological direction laid out for the long-term in Xi’s October 2022 Work Report. While these changes to current economic and foreign policy settings are significant in their own right, there is no evidence to date that Xi Jinping’s ideological fundamentals have changed.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Political Economy, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China and Asia

74. The political economy of energy production in post-independence Tanzania: A review

Author:
Japhace Poncian and Rasmus Hundsbæk Pedersen
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
In Tanzania, energy production is a matter of great political significance. Despite government commitment to promote non-hydro renewable energy, like solar and wind deployment, so far has been limited. Large, non-hydro, renewable projects have not yet attracted adequate government interest to get implemented. This new DIIS Working Paper suggests that the prioritisation of different sources of energy has been influenced by major shifts in the country’s broader development policy priorities. Access to electricity has in turn been scaled up. These developments point to the importance of political economy factors influencing energy sector development in Tanzania. The paper examines how such factors have influenced government energy source choice and, more importantly, how renewable energy has featured in Tanzania’s energy politics since independence. The paper is based on a review of existing academic and grey literature on energy sector development, reform, and politics throughout the period from independence in 1961 to 2021.
Topic:
Development, Political Economy, Renewable Energy, Independence, and Energy
Political Geography:
Africa and Tanzania

75. Trading short-term gains for long-term costs: the Egyptian political economy under al-Sisi

Author:
Matteo Colombo
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Egypt’s political economy has been operating on the basis of three core principles over the last few decades. First, the country’s political authorities set strategic economic objectives in a top-down manner. Second, the power elite supports the political authorities and, in exchange, tightly supervises homegrown and foreign investment to generate revenues and job opportunities, as well as private benefits. Third, Egyptian citizens acquiesce, willingly or unwillingly, in this division of power that mostly benefits the political authorities and power elites in exchange for improvements in their livelihoods. Since 2014, President al-Sisi has held closely to these principles but relied increasingly on Egypt’s military networks (part of the power elite) to boost economic growth. This strategy has produced short-term gains – informal jobs and an array of consumer goods – at the expense of long-term economic prospects. In particular, the military’s economic influence has deepened some of Egypt’s structural problems: low productivity, inequality, informal unemployment and a suppressed private sector. This limits the future sustainability of the current economic model. Improving Egypt’s economic prospects requires reducing the role of the state – especially the military – in the economy in terms of decreasing the number of associated enterprises and lightening the regulatory framework. However, this is nearly impossible to realise in sectors in which the military already has a dominant profile, such as construction and extractives, because its support is essential for al-Sisi to maintain power. A more promising alternative for European policy makers to consider is influencing the Egyptian government to limit military influence in sectors with growth potential where the military is largely absent, such as manufacturing and Information and Communications Technology (ICT). A government strategy that prevents further military involvement in these sectors, crafts a regulatory framework conducive to private investment and invites foreign funding, can help Egypt realise greater economic growth and higher fiscal revenues.
Topic:
Development, Political Economy, Economy, and Abdel Fattah el-Sisi
Political Geography:
Middle East and Egypt

76. Beyond the deregulation dilemma: the European ‘regulatory state’ at crossroads

Author:
George Kalpadakis
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
A persistent deregulation dilemma is often implied in public discourse that is framed as a trade-off between economic competitiveness and regulatory safeguards, with calls for reducing bureaucracy to spur growth on one side and concerns over maintaining essential protections on the other. However, this tension is not absolute as evidence suggests that well-calibrated regulation can enhance competitiveness when designed strategically. The European regulatory state, shaped by subsidiarity and market-driven governance since the 1990s, now faces growing pressure, accelerated by the aggressive deregulation drive of the new US administration, to simplify rules and reduce compliance burdens. However, over-deregulation could also weaken legal predictability, investor confidence, and key policy goals such as climate resilience and industrial strategy. The EU can embrace targeted regulatory refinement by emphasizing sector-specific flexibility, enforcement proportionality, and regulatory coherence as adaptive regulatory models – particularly in technology, energy, and finance – can support both governance efficiency and long-term economic resilience. The emergence of a ‘European regulatory state’ has been a defining feature of EU governance since the late 1990s, shaped by two fundamental shifts. First, the EU’s growing reliance on subsidiarity – the principle that decision-making should be devolved to the lowest effective level –has stemmed from structural constraints on centralizing political authority. Second, the retreat of Keynesianism, which once legitimized large-scale state intervention, has given way to market-driven economic governance, diminishing the direct role of the state (Majone, 1999). In response, Brussels has compensated for its limited fiscal capacity by governing through regulation, establishing supranational rules implemented at national and sectoral levels while integrating business and stakeholder consultation into policymaking (Yeung et al., 2010; Weimer, 2025). In recent years, however, deregulation has once more gained momentum as a broader global trend, with advanced economies under mounting pressure to streamline governance structures, reduce regulatory complexity, and enhance corporate flexibility. While often framed as a response to economic stagnation and intensifying global competition, this shift raises critical concerns about its consequences for legal predictability, public accountability, and long-term sustainability. The eurozone crisis further complicated this trajectory, expanding the EU’s role beyond market regulation into fiscal oversight and economic stabilization—not through traditional Keynesian intervention, but via financial governance and coordination mechanisms—thus challenging its status as a mere ‘regulatory state.’ Simultaneously, concerns over excessive EU overreach have fueled long-standing calls for regulatory loosening (Caporaso et al., 2014). Rather than dismantling its regulatory capacity outright, the EU has faced intensifying pressure to recalibrate its framework, a debate now amplified by the aggressive deregulatory shift of the new U.S. administration, which has sharpened transatlantic tensions between competitiveness-driven deregulation and the preservation of legal, social, and environmental safeguards. Yet, while the U.S. is leading this push, similar forces are at play in Europe, where business leaders advocate regulatory rollbacks to bolster global competitiveness. As the EU navigates these pressures, its core challenge lies in balancing economic efficiency with the regulatory safeguards necessary to sustain long-term resilience and stability.
Topic:
Political Economy, Regulation, Transatlantic Relations, Strategic Autonomy, and Deregulation
Political Geography:
Europe

77. Rethinking Monopoly as a Power Relation: The Shift from Market to Intellectual Monopoly

Author:
Cecilia Rikap
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
City Political Economy Research Centre (CITYPERC), University of London
Abstract:
The critical literature on monopolies, from monopoly capital to recent contributions, focuses on the organization that concentrates either market power, capital or property rights. I complement this literature by conceptualizing monopolies as a power relation, which enables me to integrate different ways in which the term is used, from capitalists’ monopoly over the means of production to intellectual monopolization. As I explain here, some firms have developed greater capacities to systematically monopolize intangibles that are essential for organizing labour beyond their owned assets and for controlling demand. Coupled with institutional, political and technological changes, larger absorptive and management capacities to produce and capture knowledge and information resulted in firms’ technological differentiation. The systematic winners of the innovation race hold persistent intellectual monopolies while other firms become subordinate due to their lack of technical autonomy. From this perspective, (intellectual) monopoly power is essential for understanding the distribution of value in capitalism.
Topic:
Political Economy, Labor Issues, Capitalism, Monopoly, Capital, Power Relations, and Value Capture
Political Geography:
Global Focus

78. Fossil Fuel Industry Phase-Out and Just Transition: Designing Policies to Protect Workers’ Living Standards

Author:
Robert Pollin
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:
This paper focuses on just transition policies targeted at supporting workers now employed in the fossil fuel industries and ancillary sectors within high-income economies. As a general normative principle, I argue that the overarching aim of such policies should be to protect workers against major losses in their living standards resulting through the fossil fuel industry phase-out. The impacted workers should be provided with three critical guarantees to accomplish this, in the area of jobs, compensation and pensions. Just transition policies should also support workers in the areas of job search, retraining and relocation, but these forms of support should be understood as supplementary. Within the framework of these broad principles, the paper first reviews experiences with transitional policies in Germany, the UK, the EU and, more briefly, Japan and Canada. A critical point that emerges is that these just transition policies do not provide the needed guarantees for assuring workers that they will not experience major living standard declines. The paper then describe an illustrative just transition program for workers that includes reemployment, income and pension guarantees, focusing on a case study for the U.S. state of West Virginia. The results show that the costs of the just transition program for West Virginia’s fossil fuel industry dependent workers will amount to an annual average of about $42,000 per worker, equal to about 0.2 percent of West Virginia’s GDP. I briefly summarize results from the seven other studies of U.S. states and for the overall U.S. economy. For the U.S. economy overall, the just transition program’s costs would total to about 0.015 percent of GDP. These findings demonstrate that providing a generous just transition program does not entail unaffordable levels of public spending. Robust just transition policies should therefore be understood as an entirely realistic prospect for all high-income economies.
Topic:
Political Economy, Labor Issues, European Union, GDP, Economy, and Fossil Fuels
Political Geography:
Japan, United Kingdom, Europe, Canada, and Germany

79. The Political Economy of the Cost of Living Crisis in the UK: What Is to Be Done?

Author:
Ozlem Onaran
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:
This paper analyzes the political economy of the cost of living crisis in the context of the United Kingdom. The paper presents the long-term trends in the wage share, wealth inequality, labour’s bargaining power, and real wages in the UK. The first and second waves of inflation in 2021-22 are discussed presenting the trends in the profit margins. The policy responses by the conservative governments and the Bank of England are analyzed, and their limitations are assessed. The paper concludes with short-run and medium-run policy alternatives to the cost of living crisis
Topic:
Political Economy, Labor Issues, Inequality, Inflation, and Cost of Living
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

80. Sellers’ Inflation, Profits, and Conflict: Why Can Large Firms Hike Prices in an Emergency?

Author:
Isabella Weber and Evan Wasner
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:
The dominant view of inflation holds that it is macroeconomic in origin and must always be tackled with macroeconomic tightening. In contrast, we argue that the US COVID-19 inflation is predominantly a sellers’ inflation that derives from microeconomic origins, namely the ability of firms with market power to hike prices. Such firms are price makers, but they only engage in price hikes if they expect their competitors to do the same. This requires an implicit agreement which can be coordinated by sector-wide cost shocks and supply bottlenecks. We review the long-standing literature on price-setting in concentrated markets and survey earnings calls and compile firm-level data to derive a three-stage heuristic of the inflationary process: (1) Rising prices in systemically significant upstream sectors due to commodity market dynamics or bottlenecks create windfall profits and provide an impulse for further price hikes. (2) To protect profit margins from rising costs, downstream sectors propagate, or in cases of temporary monopolies due to bottlenecks, amplify price pressures. (3) Labor responds by trying to fend off real wage declines in the conflict stage. We argue that such sellers’ inflation generates a general price rise which may be transitory, but can also lead to self-sustaining inflationary spirals under certain conditions. Policy should aim to contain price hikes at the impulse stage to prevent inflation from the onset.
Topic:
Political Economy, Inflation, Profit, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Global Focus