1041. Privatization and Regulation: Lessons from Argentina and Chile
- Author:
- Luigi Manzetti
- Publication Date:
- 04-1997
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The North-South Center, University of Miami
- Abstract:
- Some economists have argued that before governments privatize state-owned monopolies in public utilities, they should first try to promote competition. If this is not done, privatization does not produce gains in economic efficiency; instead, it fosters rent-seeking behavior by the new private ownership. Few empirical analyses of rent-seeking behavior for Latin America in post-privatization environments have been done — those that exist concentrate on economic issues and neglect important political motivations. The purpose of this paper is to fill that gap and address key issues of public policy by examining the cases of Chile and Argentina and providing a political explanation for why the Chilean and Argentine governments allowed rent-seeking behavior in important public utility markets. Based upon an analysis of these experiences, the paper then discusses the types of institutions most likely to avoid such negative consequences.
- Topic:
- Economics, Government, and Political Economy