Topic: Democracy - CIAO Search Results

51. The Fragility of Democracy | Interview with the Georgian first female president Salome Zourabichvili

Author:: Salomé Zourabichvili and Tomáš Sedláček
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Vaclav Havel Library
Abstract:: Salome Zourabichvili, a Georgian politician and the first female president of her country, is set to visit the Czech Republic at the invitation of the Václav Havel Library and of Pavel Fischer, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security of the Senate of the Czech Parliament. Following parliamentary elections in Georgia in October 2024, the pro-Western president said the result had been manipulated by Russia, pledging to remain in office until new elections were held. However, MPs from the ruling Georgian Dream party, which has a majority in parliament after October’s elections, installed Mikheil Kavelashvili as the country’s new president. The director of the Václav Havel Library, Tomáš Sedláček, conducted an interview with Salome Zourabichvili on recent developments in the country, the backsliding of democracy and Georgia’s geopolitical importance at the Václav Havel Library on Wednesday 9 April 2025.
Topic:: Politics, Elections, Democracy, Democratic Backsliding, and Foreign Influence
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Caucasus, and Georgia

52. Deep Down in the Stack: China's Entrenchment in Serbia's Technology Landscape

Author:: Sharinee Jagtiani
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Serbia, a land-locked nation with a population of under seven million, has emerged as a key player in the PRC’s Digital Silk Road (DSR) initiative within the Western Balkans. Its strategic location, connecting Southeastern Europe to Central and Western Europe, coupled with its role as a regional hub for internet traffic, has positioned Serbia as a valuable springboard for the PRC to market its technologies to the EU. Since 2012, Serbia has been an EU accession candidate and has prioritized digital transformation in its international engagements, notably with the PRC. The country’s commitment to digital advancement is also evident through its participation in the European Commission’s Digital Agenda for the Western Balkans in 2018 and the Digital Europe Program in 2023. Building on previous research conducted at GMF, this report delves into the evolution of the PRC’s DSR in Serbia, employing a technology stack (tech stack) framework to analyze the PRC’s presence. This framework encompasses five layers: network infrastructure, data infrastructure, device, application, and governance. By mapping the involvement of PRC-based entities within each layer, the report offers a detailed overview of the PRC’s technological engagement in Serbia, complete with illustrative examples. The report finds that the PRC and its affiliated entities have emerged as key players in Serbia’s rapid digitalization and modernization of its technology ecosystem. Many PRC technology firms such as Huawei, Nuctech, NetDragon, and BGI (formerly Beijing Genomics Institute)—are present across Serbia’s tech stack. Huawei, in particular, has made notable inroads into Serbia’s foundational network infrastructure. This includes its partnership with Serbia’s largest internet service provider (ISP), the state-owned Telekom Srbija and its positioning as a key partner in the country’s 5G rollout anticipated in 2026. Huawei’s involvement also extends to Serbia’s national and municipal data infrastructure—as a commercial tenant in the national data center and as a financer in Kragujevac’s city data center. These roles, coupled with limited transparency regarding the data stored in state-run facilities, have raised alarm among journalists, activists, and civil society actors about data security and the potential for state-enabled digital surveillance. These concerns have deepened with the introduction of surveillance systems supplied by PRC vendors, particularly under Serbia’s smart and “safe city” initiatives. The PRC’s deepening technological engagement exists in the context of weak implementation of Serbia’s data protection regulation. Serbian political leaders have consistently praised the PRC’s role in supporting their country’s technological ambitions, reflecting a broader strategic partnership that now also includes military cooperation—evident in the procurement of PRC-manufactured military drones and related technology transfers. The PRC’s growing technological footprint also coincides with Serbia’s democratic backsliding, as evidenced by its declining democracy score and its reclassification by Freedom House in 2019 as a “transitional or hybrid regime,” down from a “semi-consolidated democracy”. Collectively, these developments, have created an enabling environment for the emergence of digital surveillance in Serbia.
Topic:: Science and Technology, European Union, Democracy, Digitalization, and Democratic Backsliding
Political Geography:: China, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Serbia

53. Europe’s Moment of Truth: A Democracy Shield for Today and Tomorrow

Author:: Vassilis Ntousas and Etienne Soula
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Democracy in Europe is under growing pressure. Authoritarian regimes like Russia and the People’s Republic of China are conducting increasingly sophisticated foreign interference campaigns that blend information manipulation, cyberattacks, malign finance, economic coercion, and kinetic operations. Internally, illiberal actors are eroding the rule of law and civic freedoms as democratic norms deteriorate in the EU’s immediate neighborhood. The EU’s current response often remains fragmented and reactive, exposing it to external interference and internal backsliding. The European Democracy Shield, announced in 2024 and expected in 2025, presents a unique opportunity to consolidate democratic defense. If designed as more than a symbolic initiative, the Shield can equip the EU with a credible, coordinated, and enforceable framework to safeguard democratic integrity at home and project protection outward. The aim of this report is to support the development of an effective and resilient European Democracy Shield. To this end, Part 1 maps the current threat landscape, highlighting the main challenges to democratic systems across the EU. Part 2 identifies key institutional and policy gaps that limit the EU’s capacity to respond to these threats. Part 3 sets out ten actionable recommendations designed to ensure the Shield is not only politically resonant but also operationally impactful. These are: See the forest: Treat authoritarian interference as a longitudinal threat and forge an integrated, cross-domain response. Standardize language to strengthen strategy: Adopt clear and consistent terminology across institutions to support unified strategy and action. Enhance situational awareness: Build a real-time “Democracy Radar” combining EU-wide monitoring, foresight, and national-threat reporting. Maximize enforcement of existing tools: Fully implement and coordinate use of existing tools, most notably the Digital Services Act. Preserve information integrity: Address the financial and regulatory drivers of manipulation and reinforce safeguards around elections. Reinforce national democratic foundations: Link EU support to democratic reform and institutional capacity-building across member states. Develop national anti-foreign information manipulation and interference defenses: Ensure each member state has processes or institutions dedicated to the detection of, and response to, interference. Elevate the defender network: Recognize and protect the foundational role for civil society, media, and citizens in democracy protection. Invest in core support for democratic resilience: Move from short-term grants to strategic, long-term support for core democratic functions. Project protection outward: Support partner democracies with adaptable tools and deepen democratic cooperation globally. Taken together, these steps would transform the Shield into a strategic, whole-of-Union response to both external and internal challenges while positioning Europe as a global leader in demonstrating how democracy can be safeguarded by design, today and tomorrow.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Authoritarianism, European Union, Democracy, Foreign Interference, and Information Manipulation
Political Geography:: Europe

54. How To Help Georgia Out of Its Growing Democracy Crisis

Author:: Irakli Sirbiladze
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Georgia is fighting for its political future. The ruling Georgian Dream party now governs through an expansive repertoire of repressive tools to stifle dissenting political voices. Pro-democracy actors are mounting a resilient resistance to autocratization, seeking to defend a vision of politics in which the country is governed democratically and strong independent institutions guarantee that politicians serve the public and are held to account when they do not. Georgian Dream’s incremental anti-democratic turn became more pronounced as the war in Ukraine and the EU accession process forced it make a choice. It chose an anti-West stance in response to the war and anti-democratic measures to derail EU accession. The result was unprecedented Western sanctions on political figures and the deterioration of ties with the West, especially since the fraudulent parliamentary elections in 2024. At the same time, the government has sought closer ties with China and Russia. Georgian Dream’s hope for business as usual with the West is proving futile, whether regarding the EU or the new administration in the United States. This leaves Georgia increasingly isolated and weakened on the international stage. Georgia’s foreseeable future seems likely to be one of protracted political uncertainty rather than clear-cut autocratic consolidation or democratic comeback. Neither the government nor its opponents have the capabilities to fully achieve their goals. Georgian Dream is constrained by growing societal dissatisfaction with its governance while pro-democracy actors are hampered by the disunity among opposition parties and the increasingly hostile environment for democracy at home and globally. In this context, its Western partners can and must take steps to help Georgia back toward a more democratic path, which would also aid their geopolitical objectives. These include using targeted economic and personal sanctions against figures in Georgian Dream to curtail its repressive apparatus, providing flexible support for Georgian civil society to help it maintain democratic resilience, engaging with public-opinion leaders and the private sector across the country to stress the opportunities that the EU membership offers and to counter anti-West disinformation, and undertaking close-door and public diplomacy efforts, backed up by the credible threat of consequences in case of no action on the part of the government.
Topic:: Civil Society, Democracy, Domestic Politics, and Democratic Backsliding
Political Geography:: Caucasus, Georgia, and Black Sea

55. Russia and China in Central Asia’s Technology Stack

Author:: Dylan Welch
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Central Asia’s role as a geopolitical battleground among Russia, China, Europe, and the United States has grown in recent years as Western countries seek trade and digital connectivity routes that bypass Russian infrastructure. While Western discourse on a “Middle Corridor” through Central Asia has focused on railways, ports and pipelines, China’s Digital Silk Road is quietly reshaping the region’s digital landscape and deepening strategic dependencies on Beijing. At the same time, Central Asian governments are drawing primarily on PRC technologies and Russian regulatory models to strengthen their own digital authoritarian regimes, risking joint domination by the increasingly aligned governments in Beijing and Moscow. China’s increasing control over the region’s “technology stack” could have an outsized impact on the future of digital connectivity, cybersecurity, and geopolitical competition across Eurasia. Russia’s regulatory influence on the region’s governments could shape digital governance norms across Eurasia. For Central Asian actors and Western policymakers invested in preserving the region’s strategic autonomy, it is crucial to understand these vulnerabilities and offer viable alternatives in the information and communications technology (ICT) sector. Ensuring a resilient and diversified digital landscape in Central Asia is therefore not only a regional concern but a vital issue for global security. This report seeks to shed light on the influence of Russia and China on the ICT sectors of three Central Asian countries: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. It uses the “technology stack” method adapted from two previous reports by GMF’s Alliance for Securing Democracy (ASD) on the future internet and the digital information stack released in 2020 and 2022. The framework is used to examine one country’s presence in and penetration of another country’s technology and regulatory ecosystem. The analysis of the resulting dependencies provides an indicative, rather than exhaustive overview of Russia and China’s technological footprint in Central Asia, offering key examples and highlighting areas where policymakers can focus their attention with the goal to de-risk digital technologies and governance in Central Asia.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Democracy, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Central Asia, Eurasia, and Asia

56. The EU’s New Black Sea Security Strategy: Right Goals, Unclear Means

Author:: Bogdan Cozma and Laurențiu Pleșca
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: The Black Sea region has always been a strategic battlefield of ideologies and influence, not least during the Cold War. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it experienced a period of relative tranquility as the geopolitical focus shifted toward other hotspots such as the Middle East and the South China Sea. In more recent times—notably after the 2008 Russia-Georgia war and Russia’s 2014 illegal annexation of Crimea and its war in eastern Ukraine—the region and its importance for the security architecture of Europe slowly re-emerged on the agenda of policymakers in the EU and the United States. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 then pushed it to the forefront of transatlantic security concerns. Today there is a clear consensus among the EU, NATO, and the United States that they need a fundamental rethink toward a strong, long-term strategy for the Black Sea. Having expressed its willingness to become more of a geopolitical actor, the EU has now reiterated its commitment to the region by adopting a strategy on Black Sea security, which was published on May 28. The strategy identifies five countries as key players in the region and calls for closer cooperation with them: member states Bulgaria and Romania, candidate countries Moldova and Ukraine, and Türkiye, a NATO member with a substantial military presence and strategic influence in the region. Unfortunately, however, the EU’s new strategy does not contain a concrete action plan, a clear implementation timeline, or, most importantly, a dedicated budget. Without these, the EU’s ability to translate its political intentions into concrete outcomes for the security of the Black Sea states will remain significantly limited. If its strategic approach remains largely declarative, this increases the risk of ceding influence to Russia in the immediate region and beyond it. A more concrete, robust, and coordinated EU security presence there is still urgently needed.
Topic:: Security, European Union, Democracy, Geopolitics, Domestic Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe and Black Sea

57. Democratic by Design: Implementing and Innovating Democracy-Affirming Technologies

Author:: Caitlin Goldenberg, Adrienne Goldstein, Sharinee Jagtiani, and Lindsay Gorman
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: The emergence of critical new technologies, from quantum information tools to Artificial Intelligence (AI), has ushered in a new digital era. While these technologies promise greater efficiency and innovation to the benefit of society, if misused they can also help entrench repression and autocratic control. What is needed instead is a positive, rights-respecting vision of democratic innovation. GMF’s AI and Democracy programming, including its 2024 Elections Content Credentials Repository and 2024 AI and Democracy Hackathon, aimed to advance the development, use, and public understanding of democracy-affirming technologies (DATs)—that is, technologies that are intentionally designed to protect and promote democratic values. This report features insights from two pilot projects aimed at advancing the implementation of existing DATs and the innovation of new ones.
Topic:: Democracy, Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, Digital Technologies, and Quantum Computing
Political Geography:: Global Focus

58. How To Help Armenia Navigate Its Democracy-Security Nexus

Author:: Narek Sukiasyan
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: The 2018 Velvet Revolution was a breakthrough for Armenia’s democracy, but progress has since stalled. The June 2026 parliamentary elections will be a decisive test in a polarized environment dominated by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party and an opposition tied to former presidents Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan. This dominant dichotomy, fueled by both sides, frustrates the attempts of alternative forces to come to the fore. Support for Civil Contract is stable, but the majority of voters are undecided, disengaged, or disillusioned by the trauma of the 2020 war in Nagorno-Karabakh and the 2023 ethnic cleansing there as well as by the lack of credible political alternatives. Civil Contract’s political dominance over the last seven years has led to unilateral lawmaking and some controversial actions against opposition figures, media, civil society, and the judiciary. However, recent municipal elections saw the party fail to secure majorities in major cities. While the diplomatic breakthrough in the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, marked by the White House deal in August, sets a path for stability in the near term, it is crucial to follow up and to push for a final agreement. Azerbaijan’s continued demands and rhetoric cast doubt as to the extent of its commitment to the process. Similarly, Türkiye still does not meet its commitment to end its blockade of Armenia. Meanwhile, Armenia’s drift away from Russia and pivot to the West has been characterized by its increased ambition to join the EU. It also seeks to diversify its security with the help of its Western partners, advancing with reforms and political alignment with Euro-Atlantic priorities. Until the next elections, Armenia is likely to continue deepening its ties with the West while maintaining cautious cooperation with Russia, while peace talks with Azerbaijan drag on, and relations with Türkiye remain complex. It is likely that Civil Contract will campaign on defending Armenia’s sovereignty and on Western alignment while the fragmented opposition struggles to broaden its support. The most probable scenario is another Civil Contract government with a reduced majority, which will continue efforts toward peace with Azerbaijan and balancing engagement with the West and Russia. Two other scenarios (in descending order of likelihood) are a government coalition of Civil Contract and smaller pro-West parties, which will push a more confrontational stance toward Russia, or an opposition-led government realigning the country with Moscow and further undermining democratization. The EU, its member states, and the United States should support Armenia by helping it strengthen its democratic institutions and its security in order to preserve the public’s confidence in democracy. The country needs a combination of financial, technical, and political assistance to facilitate democratization, to resist external pressures, and to maintain its sovereignty. This includes backing the consolidation of democratic institutions, promoting electoral integrity, encouraging a diversity of democratic actors, and empowering civil society, all against the background of addressing the country’s security challenges. By providing Armenia with the tools to defend its territorial integrity and to pursue democratic reforms, the West can help revive the optimism sparked by the Velvet Revolution and overturn a public disillusionment that could weaken Armenia’s democracy and its ties with Europe.
Topic:: European Union, Democracy, Geopolitics, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:: Caucasus, Eastern Europe, Armenia, and United States of America

59. Decoupling EU Enlargement From Liberal Democracy: The Engagement of Hungary’s Government in Georgia and Serbia

Author:: Anastasia Mgaloblishvili
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 prompted the EU to revitalize its enlargement policy by granting candidate status to Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. After decades of “enlargement fatigue”, the EU sought to reassert itself as a normative actor in its neighborhood. Because accession depends on candidate countries’ compliance with liberal-democratic criteria, enlargement has significant potential to advance democratization. Not all member-state governments, however, see enlargement as a way to promote liberal democracy. Since coming to power in Hungary in 2010, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party have positioned themselves as challengers of liberalism at home and abroad, with the openly stated goal of transforming the EU from within. Together with potentially helping in the future to protect themselves from sanctions, which became a realistic scenario after the EU froze some of Hungary’s funding in 2022, decoupling enlargement from liberal democracy also served their goal of strengthening illiberalism internationally. The revival of enlargement coincided with Hungary’s government temporarily holding important institutional levers to challenge the EU’s normative agenda—a Hungarian diplomat as enlargement commissioner and the presidency of the Council of the EU—in addition to its permanent veto power in the council. As well as to obstruct Ukraine’s accession, Orbán and Fidesz have used these and other tools to undermine the EU’s approach to two candidate countries with autocratizing governments: Georgia and Serbia. In Georgia’s case, Hungary’s government diluted EU pressure on the Georgian Dream government, which has accelerated the country’s democratic backsliding. It did so through high-level visits and supportive statements, blocking sanctions, and helping entrench illiberal values that violated the EU’s Copenhagen Criteria. Orbán and Fidesz built close ties with Georgian Dream. They helped it maintain a pro-EU veneer for the sake of its electorate as well as deflect the blame for Georgia’s lack of accession progress onto the EU and the West. In Serbia’s case, where the EU applied less pressure on President Aleksandar Vučić and his Serbian Progressive Party government for strategic reasons, most of Budapest’s efforts have aimed to accelerate the country’s accession. Before 2022, Orbán and Fidesz promoted this goal through, for example, deploying a high-level “EU integration adviser” to Belgrade and through the softening of critical reports in the European Commission. This intensified after 2022, with Hungary’s government using its council presidency to advance Serbia’s membership and accusing the EU of penalizing the country. This reinforced Vučić’s narrative portraying the EU as responsible for reforms and the accession process stalling. With enlargement back on the EU agenda, Hungary’s actions shed light on the challenges facing the EU’s strongest democracy-promotion tool. This aligns with the growing calls for limiting the veto power of member-state governments when they undermine the union’s liberal-democratic foundations, as well as for shifting key foreign policy and enlargement decisions from unanimity to qualified majority voting.
Topic:: European Union, Democracy, Regional Politics, and Enlargement
Political Geography:: Europe, Serbia, Hungary, and Georgia

60. Poland’s Rule-of-Law Repair: Trapped in Institutional Paralysis?

Author:: Anna Wójcik
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Two years since taking office in Poland, the governing coalition led by Prime Minister Donald Tusk has made limited progress in repairing the rule of law following the backsliding under the previous government led by the Law and Justice (PiS) party. The change of government in December 2023 raised hopes of democratic repair but legislative reformsremain at an early stage. This reflects not only the depth of institutional damage done by PiSbut also political constraints. The Tusk government has been operating under the conditions of cohabitation with PiS-backed presidents, first with Andrzej Duda and since August with Karol Nawrocki. The constitutional framework grants significant powers to the president, including the authority to veto statutes and to refer them for constitutional review. Cohabitation has drastically curtailed the ability to pursue rule-of-law reforms, particularly in judicial governance. Moreover, the preparation of draft legislation in several key fields has proceeded more slowly than expected. In 2024, the parliament passed three acts aimed at restoring constitutional standards: two concerning the Constitutional Tribunal and one reforming the National Council of the Judiciary, but none has entered into force. Duda referred the three acts to the Constitutional Tribunal, which remains an illiberal enclave aligned with PiS, and in the course of this year ithas invalidated all three. Consequently, legislative change regarding the institutions central to judicial independence is effectively paralyzed. The government also pledged to separate the offices of minister of justice and prosecutor general, a reform long demanded by European monitoring bodies. Despite repeated commitments, this change has not yet been implemented. The most sensitive challenge for repairing the rule of law concerns judges appointed througha politicized procedure introduced under PiS. Addressing their status is necessary to restore judicial independence and to protect legal certainty. However, it involves difficult decisions affecting accountability, individual rights, and systemic stability. Although a legislative proposal is now ready, Nawrocki has indicated that he will veto any major judicial reform. He has also announced the creation of a new advisory body under the presidency to draft proposals for reforming the justice system, a move widely seen as an attempt to stymie the government’s initiatives. Overall, the effort to repair the rule of law in Poland is constrained by polarization, institutional stalemate, and a political context that is increasingly dominated by the approach of the parliamentary elections scheduled for 2027. While the government remains committed to reform, presidential obstruction and the continued role of the Constitutional Tribunal as a veto player limit progress. Poland therefore finds itself in a prolonged phase of limited rule-of-law repair.
Topic:: European Union, Democracy, Domestic Politics, Rule of Law, and Institutions
Political Geography:: Europe and Poland

61. EU Enlargement and Democracy

Author:: Emiliano Alessandri
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has put enlargement back at the top of the EU agenda. After a long hiatus—Croatia was the last country to join in 2013—the enlargement process is now being revived. Albania and North Macedonia finally opened accession negotiations in 2022, but only after a long wait. That same year, Bosnia and Herzegovina was granted candidate status, and Kosovo, Moldova, and Ukraine submitted applications for membership. The latter two have since started accession talks. Geopolitics is clearly the main driver behind the momentum and is one reason behind member states’ new support for enlargement, at least in principle. Only a short time ago, many national governments expressed reservations, particularly regarding the EU’s “absorption capacity”. The prevailing logic today, given the return of strategic rivalry and conflict, is that EU enlargement can help anchor unstable Western Balkan and Eastern European countries that could otherwise fall under Russian or Chinese influence. A December 18 European Council statement clearly noted that enlargement is “a geostrategic investment”. Prioritizing such considerations, however, means that traditional economic arguments take a back seat. The same trend increasingly applies to concerns about meaningful political and societal transformation in candidate states. But this is a mistake that needs to be addressed now to avoid more serious problems later.
Topic:: European Union, Democracy, Regional Politics, and Enlargement
Political Geography:: Europe

62. Fortifying the Essence of Democracy and Inclusive Representationin the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan:Envisioning a New Agenda for the Future

Author:: Hina Habib
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Political Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: The constitution of Pakistanisthe most significantand crucial pillar ofPakistan’s governance, which upholds democracy,facilitates public representation, and encourages the participation of minorities and other segments in thepolitical structureof a state.Although various amendmentsand positive developmentshave been made, it has stillbeen criticizedregarding its lack of flexibility,owing to the subjugation of therightsof ethnic minoritiesandrepeated coups.Politicians have exploited itfor short-term goals that underminenational cohesion and harmonyamong diverseactors.This paper exploresthe themesof democracy and public representation by considering Pakistan’s Constitution.In addition,it emphasizes the participation of marginalized segments and minorities in the political process. It also commentson the current political structure’s effectivenessand identifiesareas for improvement,as the nation has successfully ended50years under this apex law. Theresearch usesexploratory researchusingqualitative method to conduct the study.Across the board, this research envisions a future scenario for Pakistan marked by inclusivity and better public representation. It does so byshapinga strategy for a more prosperous Pakistanin the coming decades.
Topic:: Governance, Minorities, Democracy, Constitution, and Representation
Political Geography:: Pakistan and South Asia

63. Elections, Power Transitions and the Risk of Atrocity Crimes

Author:: Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Publication Date:: 11-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Abstract:: Genuine and credible elections present a crucial opportunity to reaffirm democratic norms, uphold the rule of law and ensure that people’s voices are heard. Yet, all too often elections shift from being a positive expression of democratic will to flashpoints for political violence and polarization. In 2024, a record number of people voted in elections – with more than 60 countries, representing nearly half of the world’s population, electing local, national and international representatives. However, many elections were marred by intimidation, violence and serious human rights violations, severely undermining the right to vote and to be elected. This policy brief draws on insights from a June 2024 event co-hosted by the European Union and the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. It examines how electoral processes, particularly when held in conflict-affected, repressive or polarized environments, can exacerbate existing tensions and increase the risk of serious human rights violations and atrocity crimes. The brief outlines long-standing structural vulnerabilities and short-term triggers that often emerge throughout the electoral process. A rights-respecting, inclusive and transparent electoral process is essential not only for electoral integrity but also for preventing identity-based violence and atrocity crimes. The policy brief provides concrete recommendations to help national and international actors prevent and respond to election-related violence and atrocity risks.
Topic:: Elections, Democracy, Risk, Atrocities, and Transition of Power
Political Geography:: Global Focus

64. Democracy at a Crossroads: How Americans View Trump’s First 100 Days in Office

Author:: PRRI Staff
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: PRRI: Public Religion Research Institute
Abstract:: Executive Summary Relatively few voters regret their decision in November; however, three in ten non-voters regret not turning out to vote last fall. Nearly all Americans who voted for Kamala Harris (95%) and Donald Trump (92%) are satisfied with their decision to vote or how they voted, as well as 85% of those who voted for another candidate. Thirty-one percent of non-voting Americans say they regret their decision not to vote, compared with 56% who say they are satisfied. Just around four in ten Americans (43%) approve of the job that Trump is doing as president. Roughly four in ten Americans (43%) approve of the job that Trump is doing as president, while a majority (54%) disapprove. White Christian groups are the most likely to approve of the job that Trump is doing as president, including three in four white evangelical Protestants (76%), compared with one-third or fewer of other religious Americans. While Trump gets slightly higher marks for his handling of immigration (48% of Americans approve), just four in ten approve of his handling of the economy (41%) and Russia’s war with Ukraine (40%). White Christian groups are significantly more likely than Christians of color, non-Christians, and unaffiliated Americans to approve of the job that Trump is doing handling immigration, including most white evangelical Protestants (78%), Latter-day Saints (65%), white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants (64%), and white Catholics (63%). While just four in ten Americans have favorable views of Trump, fewer view either Vice President JD Vance or presidential advisor Elon Musk favorably. Four in ten Americans (40%) express favorable views of Trump, including 83% of Republicans, 35% of independents, and 8% of Democrats. White Americans, men, older generations, and those who do not have a four-year degree hold significantly more favorable views of Trump than non-white Americans, women, millennials, Gen Zers, and those who are college-educated. Roughly one-third of Americans have a favorable view of Vance (35%), compared with half of those who hold an unfavorable opinion (50%). Most Americans (58%) view Musk unfavorably. Musk holds less favorable views among Republicans than Trump, 71% vs. 83%. Americans are more likely to view Trump as a dangerous dictator than a strong leader restoring America’s greatness, although such views are polarized along partisan and religious lines. A majority of Americans agree that “President Trump is a dangerous dictator whose power should be limited before he destroys American democracy” (52%), compared with 44% who agree that “President Trump is a strong leader who should be given the power he needs to restore America’s greatness.” Most Democrats (87%) agree with the first statement, while most Republicans (81%) agree with the second statement. Around seven in ten Christian nationalism Adherents (73%) and Sympathizers (70%) view Trump as a strong leader who should be given the power to restore America’s greatness, compared with 46% of Christian nationalism Skeptics and just 15% of Rejecters. Among Americans who voted for Trump and regret their decision, 55% agree that Trump is a dangerous dictator; agreement that Trump is a dangerous dictator is even higher among non-voters who regret their decision not to vote (68%).
Topic:: Public Opinion, Authoritarianism, Democracy, Domestic Politics, Voting, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

65. Charting the Radical Right’s Influence on EU Foreign Policy

Author:: Rosa Balfour and Stefan Lehne
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: The political landscape in the European Union (EU) is changing rapidly. For decades, the traditional mainstream parties of the center right and center left have been losing ground, while antiestablishment parties have been gaining support. According to research by the University of Amsterdam, 32 percent of voters opted for antiestablishment parties in 2021, up from 12 percent in the early 1990s.1 Radical-right parties make up about half of this share, and their support has risen faster than that of any other group. Many of the fourteen parties examined in this study have achieved vote shares of 20 percent or more. The radical right is now in government, or supports the government, in Finland, Hungary, Italy, Slovakia, and Sweden. In the Netherlands, it is likely that Geert Wilders’s Party for Freedom (PVV) will be part of a governing coalition. In other countries, these parties have become the leading opposition groups. In France, Marine Le Pen’s National Rally (RN) has been carefully preparing to win the 2027 presidential election. Setbacks for the radical right in Poland and Spain in the second half of 2023 have shown that the relentless rise of these parties is not a foregone conclusion. However, current polling for several national elections and the June 2024 European Parliament elections indicates a strong likelihood of their continuing electoral success.2 Chega (Enough), a recently established party that shot to 18 percent of the vote in Portugal’s March 2024 election, ended the country’s exceptionalism as one of the few European nations without a right-wing populist party.3 The June 2024 Belgian federal election may see the Flemish nationalist party Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest), which so far has been strong in Flanders but kept out of national politics, break through at the federal level. Polling for Austria’s September 2024 parliamentary election suggests a surge in support for the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ).4 In contrast with populism, which has a thin ideology focused mainly on fomenting the anger of the so-called pure people against corrupt elites and which has risen on both the left and the right of the political spectrum, the radical-right parties of the 2020s have a more distinct ideological profile.5 All have national specificities, such as rural origins in Northern Europe or ethnonationalism in Central Europe. Several parties are rooted in postwar fascism, such as the FPÖ, RN, Brothers of Italy (FdI), the Alliance for the Unity of Romanians (AUR), and the Sweden Democrats (SD). For some groups, strong connections with society and well-developed party structures compensated for their marginal impact in national politics. Before its landslide victory in Italy’s 2022 parliamentary election, support for FdI hovered at around 5 percent, as it did for the party’s predecessor throughout the period since World War II.6 Other parties, such as Hungary’s Fidesz, gained ground as classic populist or even mainstream parties and benefited from an aura of respectability even as they shifted toward ethnonationalist or nativist positions. Since the 1990s, liberal-democratic parties have started to adopt some of the ideas of the radical right while keeping the parties themselves out of government. In the 2000s, the radical right became normalized, in some countries becoming part of the political mainstream. During this process, as political scientists Cas Mudde and Jan-Werner Müller have argued, liberal-democratic parties have shifted toward the radical right in the hope—mostly in vain—of keeping their traditional electorates. Yet, in practice, this approach has led voters to prefer the real radical right to its imitators. In other words, the tactic of chasing the radical right has not paid off electorally. Voters have moved toward the radical right as a consequence, not as a cause, of liberal-democratic parties’ attempts to contain it.7 Today, the far right is dominated by the radical right, which, unlike the extreme right, accepts the essence of democracy but rejects its liberal elements: minority rights, the rule of law, and the separation of powers.8 The radical-right parties selected for this study all share deep antimigration sentiments, often determined by race or religion; a nationalism that makes these parties Euroskeptic and opposed to what they see as a Brussels-based dictatorship; and skepticism of climate change policies. Many of these parties also espouse deeply conservative family values that go against women’s and LGBTQ rights. Foreign policy is usually not the strong suit of these parties, apart from their keen interest in the external dimension of migration policy. These parties pay close attention to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine but are sharply divided on this issue, with positions ranging from deep mistrust of Russia to close alignment with the Kremlin’s arguments. A future Donald Trump administration could lead to new divisions in the EU, as some member states are likely to align with the United States under any circumstances. This would mean that many of the EU’s current foreign policy positions, such as support for Ukraine, would come to an end. As radical-right parties rise to prominence at the national and the EU level, they are developing views on a range of foreign policy issues, building increasingly influential international networks and think tanks, and learning from each other’s successful tactics in solidifying their control of the state and propagating their values.9 For some radical-right parties that have been established in government, such as Fidesz and, until October 2023, Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS) party, the upgrading of foreign policy on their political agendas can be inferred by the fact that all diplomatic postings in the EU are political appointments. Hungary’s foreign policy machinery is under the direct control of the prime minister.10 Diplomatic colleagues of the Hungarian representatives in Brussels know that the country’s negotiating positions are micromanaged in Budapest.11 Other countries, such as Italy and Finland, have chosen to rely on the credibility of career diplomats to navigate the Brussels machinery, preferring compromise over confrontation and isolation. For a long time, European politicians and EU institutions have assumed the radical right could be contained. Now, the challenge of the radical right needs to be addressed more seriously. Just as this phenomenon has eroded democracy and the rule of law in some EU member states, so foreign policy may become affected at a time when collective action is most needed to address international issues. As the radical right challenges the EU’s attempts to navigate a dangerous world, European politics can no longer afford complacency.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Migration, European Union, Democracy, and Far Right
Political Geography:: Europe, France, and Germany

66. South Africa’s Cyber Strategy Under Ramaphosa: Limited Progress, Low Priority

Author:: Joe Devanny and Russell Buchan
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: During the decades of apartheid, South Africa was an international pariah. Since the country transitioned to majority rule in 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) has dominated politics, and the ANC has itself transitioned from a national liberation movement to a party of government. Domestically, South African cyber strategy should be seen as part of the ANC’s wider political challenge of trying to deliver economic growth, development, and prosperity. Over thirty years, the ANC has struggled to deliver on this agenda in a profoundly unequal society with infrastructure and institutions that have weakened particularly over the past fifteen years. Alongside confronting domestic challenges, the ANC has also tried to reshape South Africa’s global role. This was perhaps most visible under its first president, Nelson Mandela (1994–1999), but it was arguably pursued most systematically under Mandela’s successor, Thabo Mbeki (1999–2008). This reorientation of South Africa in the world was an ambitious and complex project, the foundations of which were the country’s leading role in its region and continent as well as its ties within the wider Global South. The project entailed tensions between the progressive promotion of human rights and freedoms, on the one hand, and the cultivation of instrumental relations with authoritarian and repressive states, on the other. These tensions continue to affect South African foreign policy, including its cyber diplomacy. South Africa identifies cybersecurity as a key national priority and has to this end adopted a national cybersecurity strategy and established a military Cyber Command. The reality, however, is that other issues have been consistently ranked above cybersecurity, such as addressing corruption, poverty, racial and social injustice, and the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Cybersecurity has therefore not been seen as a high priority by successive South African governments. This has left Cyber Command underresourced and unmotivated. This deprioritization means that South Africa is unlikely to emerge as a prominent military or intelligence cyber power anytime soon. The wider lack of national prioritization will also make it harder for so-called like-minded states—which are bound together by a mutual respect for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law—to form an effective partnership with South Africa on the topic of cybersecurity. South Africa’s approach to international cyber governance debates has been cautious and noncommittal, reflecting cyber diplomacy’s relatively low priority in its national strategy. What position South Africa takes in cyber debates is, however, of keen interest to the international community. An important question is whether South Africa will support the existing multistakeholder approach to cyber governance that is championed by like-minded states or join China and Russia in their efforts to recalibrate this approach and push for greater state control over cyberspace. Indeed, under President Cyril Ramaphosa, South Africa has not yet published its national position explaining how international law applies to cyberspace. A related question is whether South Africa will join like-minded states in elaborating how existing international law applies to cyberspace or side with China and Russia to campaign for new, bespoke international law (for example, treaties) to regulate this domain. When examining these questions, it is important to recognize the context of the ANC’s long-standing ties with Russia, both during its thirty years in government and in its previous decades struggling for national liberation. This is helpful for understanding South Africa’s interactions with Brazil, Russia, India, and China (which form the BRICS bloc with South Africa) and forecasting its future positions in cyber governance debates. For example, South Africa has been reluctant to unambiguously condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and it appears to have supported Moscow by covertly supplying it with weapons. In the longer term, South Africa’s positions in cyber diplomacy debates will likely be shaped by trends in both domestic politics—such as the ANC’s waning electoral performance—and the success of digital development. In this context, it is perhaps advisable for like-minded states, such as the United States, to focus on cyber capacity-building assistance and ensure that these efforts play into the wider development agenda in South Africa.
Topic:: Corruption, Poverty, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Democracy, and Racial Justice
Political Geography:: Africa, Iran, and South Africa

67. Latin America’s New Right Wings: Shifting Ideologies, Transnational Ties

Author:: Ernesto Bohoslavsky and Magdalena Broquetas
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA)
Abstract:: New far-right forces pose a growing threat to democracy across Latin America and the Caribbean. Read more in the Spring 2024 issue of the NACLA Report on the Americas.
Topic:: Climate Change, Democracy, Violence, Far Right, Right-Wing Politics, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Latin America and Caribbean

68. The Far-Right Tide Reaches Uruguay

Author:: Magdalena Broquetas and Gerardo Caetano
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA)
Abstract:: A new radical right with links to the dictatorship has made unprecedented gains. So far, the country’s strong democracy has tempered its worst impacts.
Topic:: Democracy, Domestic Politics, Ideology, and Far Right
Political Geography:: South America and Uruguay

69. Tunisia: Public Opinion Report 2023

Author:: Arab Barometer
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Arab Barometer
Abstract:: Over the past dozen years, Tunisia has experienced dramatic political change. In 2011, the Jasmine Revolution led to the fall of its long-standing leader, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, ushering in a period of political instability. Following the rewriting of the constitution, free and fair elections were held but yielded only weak and largely ineffective governments. Although Tunisians enjoyed far greater political rights, economically the country regressed. A decade after the revolution, GDP per capita had declined significantly. Stories of corruption within government institutions remained common, yielding an increasingly frustrated public. Elections may give voters a say, but the outcomes of the system often appeared no better than in the days of Ben Ali. Citizens demanded radical change and looked for a leader who they believed could deliver actual results. In the 2019 presidential elections, many Tunisians turned to Kaïs Saïed as a solution. Saïed ran a populist campaign as a political outsider, calling for ending corruption and reforms to the electoral system. In the final round of voting, he captured nearly three-quarters of the vote for an overwhelming victory and strong electoral mandate. In July 2021, Saïed dismissed the prime minister and suspended parliament. Ruling by decree, many members of the judiciary were dismissed and many opposition politicians were arrested. Despite international criticism of these actions, results from the 2021 Arab Barometer demonstrated that most Tunisians were in favor of his actions.1 Just three months after the events of July 25, 2021, most Tunisians had confidence in the president, a majority were optimistic about their economic future for the first time in years, and most believed the government was finally tackling the problem of corruption. In short, many Tunisians had hope for their country’s future. In late 2023, Tunisians remained more optimistic than they had been before the election of Saïed, but Arab Barometer’s survey suggests that some are starting to lose hope. Promises of economic improvements have not been realized—just one-in-ten rate the economy as good, which is largely unchanged since 2013. Economic optimism has also fallen, dropping by 14 points since 2021. During this period, hunger has also increased dramatically, with twothirds of Tunisians saying they have gone without food at least once in the previous month. Moreover, the most common perception is that government mismanagement is the source of food insecurity. Views of most political institutions are relatively weak. Just over a third have confidence in the government while less than a quarter trust parliament. However, trust in President Saïed remains strong, with about three-quarters expressing confidence in their leader. Still, this level is a six point decrease from 2021.
Topic:: International Relations, Corruption, Environment, Migration, Governance, Public Opinion, Democracy, Economy, Institutions, Freedom, and Gender
Political Geography:: North Africa and Tunisia

70. Mauritania: Public Opinion Report 2024

Author:: Sahel Foundation
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Arab Barometer
Abstract:: Mauritania has begun a new phase of peaceful rotation of power, being an embodiment of democracy. This democratic transition has been seen through the country’s last government. Therefore, we observe the rising trend of citizens’ trust in the current government. Nine percent of Mauritanians say they trust the government to a great extent, and more than a quarter (27 percent) say they trust it. In contrast, 38 percent say they have little trust in the government, while nearly one-fifth (22 percent) have no trust in their government at all. In order to increase citizens’ trust in the government, it may be worthwhile to enhance communication between the government and citizens and transparently explain decisions and plans. Moreover, it could be important to that end to improve the quality of public services such as health, education, and infrastructure; strengthen the role of citizens in decision-making and participation in the political process; and take effective measures to combat corruption and promote good governance.
Topic:: Corruption, Environment, Gender Issues, Public Opinion, Democracy, Economy, and Freedom
Political Geography:: Africa and Mauritania

71. Morocco: Public Opinion Report 2024

Author:: Arab Barometer
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Arab Barometer
Abstract:: Morocco has endured multiple crises in recent years including the Coronavirus pandemic and the earthquake that hit the country on September 9, 2023. The aftermath of these crises produces what could be described as two Moroccos: one for the wealthier and better educated, another for the poorer and less educated. Moroccans are clearly divided in their views of almost all issues based on their socioeconomic status (SES). Economic pressure persists, with only a third of Moroccans rating their economy positively. While optimism about the future of the economy has increased, it is largely driven by those with a higher socioeconomic status. Their less-fortunate compatriots are far less optimistic and more concerned about increasing inequality and food insecurity. Trust in the Moroccan government remains relatively low, but trust in parliament, regional government, judiciary, and civil society organizations has increased. Still, those struggling financially tend to be less trusting of all these bodies. Similarly, satisfaction with government performance on economic issues is low, especially among the poor. Moroccans are more satisfied with the provision of certain services, including security and infrastructure. On the other hand, education in particular is among the public services in which Moroccans exhibit the lowest levels of satisfaction. Corruption remains a major concern, with the government seen as not doing enough to combat it. This view is especially true among people with lower socioeconomic status. Wealthier and more educated Moroccans are more positive in their rating of the government’s work on combating corruption. However, many Moroccans are resorting to bribery or connection to navigate the bureaucracy. Economic conditions and corruption are causing Moroccans to consider emigrating. Youth and those facing financial pressure are far more likely to have a desire to leave their country, mainly in pursuit of better economic opportunities. Western countries remain the preferred destination for most of the potential migrants in Morocco, many of whom are willing to leave even if they did not have the required documents to do so. While support for democracy has fluctuated over the past few years, recent trends suggest an increase in support for democratic governance. Moroccans acknowledge that democratic systems have their shortcomings, yet they maintain a belief that democracy is preferable to other forms of governance and particularly support a multi-party parliamentary system.
Topic:: International Relations, Corruption, Environment, Gender Issues, Governance, Public Opinion, Democracy, Economy, Institutions, and Freedom
Political Geography:: North Africa and Morocco

72. Bolivia: desk study on aid and democracy

Author:: Swetha Ramachandran
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: United Nations University
Abstract:: This study is part of a series of ten country-focused desk studies on aid and democracy prepared under the project The state and statebuilding in the Global South. They are prepared under the guidance of Rachel M. Gisselquist as background to a broader research effort on aid, governance, and democracy promotion. The studies follow a common template and each draws on the research literature and selected cross-national sources to discuss regime type and timeline, findings from the literature on democracy/democratization, findings from the literature on aid and democracy/democratization, aid flows and sources, and specific aid examples. This study addresses the case of Bolivia, with focus on the post-Cold War period.
Topic:: Foreign Aid, Governance, Democracy, and Post-Cold War
Political Geography:: South America and Bolivia

73. Overcoming digital threats to democracy

Author:: Lydia Khalil
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:: The internet was once considered an open door to democracy and liberty. Today, it is seen as an agent of democratic erosion. Digital challenges to democracy include the scale and spread of disinformation and misinformation, the increase in polarisation and extremism that are facilitated and escalated online, and inadequate regulation. Digital platforms are increasingly perceived by the public as serving the needs and interests of the powerful rather than the public good. Average users have few means to influence key decisions and debates about how digital technologies are used and developed. The rules of the digital sphere — whether made by tech companies, regulators, or politicians — often lack public legitimacy. Applying deliberative democracy principles — where small but representative groups of people make decisions after deliberating on issues in depth — can help address the challenges of legitimacy and generate broadly acceptable solutions to the problems that bedevil online spaces and challenge democracy.
Topic:: Democracy, Disinformation, Polarization, and Digital Technologies
Political Geography:: Global Focus

74. Resistance to Authoritarianism: Lessons Learned from Brazilian Civil Society

Author:: Melina Risso, Renata Avelar Gianini, and Camila Nadalini de Godoy
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Case Study
Institution:: Igarapé Institute
Abstract:: This study aims to encourage debate and strengthen democratic organizations and civil society that defend civic space against attempts to weaken the system of checks and balances that sustain democracy, silence dissenting voices and ideas, co-opt law enforcement agencies, and dismantle public policies to consolidate an authoritarian state. It was developed based on a comprehensive literature review, media coverage analysis, and 18 in-depth interviews with key actors involved in the study’s topics, including civil society, funders, and government officials. The work is divided into six parts. The first part presents the definitions used to develop this study and examines the political context. The following four parts analyze four cases encompassing the main tools used by civil society to defend democracy and combat democratic erosion, highlighting the results achieved. The sixth and final part details essential points of attention for maintaining, strengthening, and continuously promoting a robust civic space and a solid democracy in Brazil. As the authoritarian threats to closing the space for civil society participation are still present nationally and internationally, the initiatives cited here are expected to inspire and guide future initiatives of resistance and protection of civic space in promoting democracy.
Topic:: Civil Society, Authoritarianism, Democracy, and Civil Resistance
Political Geography:: Brazil and South America

75. Europe’s Democracy Catch-22

Author:: Richard Youngs
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: The dominant, epoch-making European storyline is now clear: the rise of the far right threatens the European Union (EU)’s future and democracy. This standard view is expressed in countless opinion pieces and political speeches and is now reshaping both national and EU-level politics. Even if the far right did not surge quite as dramatically as widely predicted in either the European Parliament or French parliamentary elections, its growing popularity clearly represents a pressing challenge both at the EU level and in national politics (Ash 2024). However, the continent’s predicament might be more accurately described as a more subtle and complex conundrum: in the immediate short term, what is good for the EU integration project might not be good for democracy, and vice versa. The EU and national governments have been struggling with this democracy catch-22 for several years now, and the election results make it an even sharper challenge. The postelection context has been dominated by the debate over whether to engage or isolate the far right—a debate that has been exhaustively covered and unfolding for many years. Yet, the empirical record suggests that neither engaging with the far right nor ostracizing it has worked especially well. Instead, a third approach might help map a way out of the democracy catch-22: a European democracy pact.
Topic:: Elections, European Union, Democracy, and Far Right
Political Geography:: Europe

76. Mongolia’s Electoral Reform and the State Great Khural (Parliamentary) Elections

Author:: Ganbat Damba and Byambakhand Luguusharav
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: Since the transition to a democratic systеm and market economy in the early 1990s, Mongolia has held its 9th parliamentary election. In a historic first, the election held on June 28 was carried out under the new electoral systеm. A total of 78 members of parliament (MPs) were elected from 13 majoritarian districts, with an additional 48 MPs elected through proportional representation in a nationwide constituency (General Election Commission of Mongolia 2024). The new parliament consists of 126 seats, in accordance with the amendments to the Constitution introduced in 2023. The election results demonstrated that the Mongolian People’s Party (MPP) secured 68 seats, followed by the Democratic Party (DP) with 42 seats, the HUN Party with 8 seats, and both the National Alliance and the Civil Will-Green Party with 4 seats each. It is noteworthy that the MPP won 50 constituency seats and 18 from the party list, thereby ensuring a majority presence in parliament alongside three other parties that surpassed the legal threshold for representation (Oyunchimeg 2024). This distribution of seats underscores the diversity of representation in parliament, reflecting the electorate’s support for multiple political entities and ensuring a legislative body that is balanced and representative of the political spectrum. Over the past 34 years, various electoral systеms have been employed, including majoritarian voting systеms with single or multiple mandates and mixed systеms that combine majoritarian and proportional representation voting elements. Each systеm has its strengths and weaknesses. However, the criticism from both the public and political parties of the contemporary electoral systеm has resulted in frequent changes to it. Before the new systеm was introduced, the Mongolian parliament had maintained 76 seats since 1990. The number of seats in the parliament was increased by approximately 40 percent, from 76 to 126. Since 1990, Mongolia’s population has grown from 2.15 million to 3.5 million, an increase of about 40 percent. As a representative institution of the people, there has been significant debate in recent years regarding the potential expansion of the parliamentary seats. The proposed increase in seats has prompted a considerable number of individuals to seek election. In the first democratic election held after new democratic Constitution in 1992, only 293 individuals representing 10 parties and independents ran for the parliament. The 2024 Election saw the largest number of candidates to date, with the highest number of candidacies. A total of 372 individuals from 22 parties and coalitions contested the election through party lists, while 969 candidates ran in constituencies, resulting in a total of 1,341 candidates, marking a record high.
Topic:: Elections, Democracy, Voting, and Parliament
Political Geography:: Mongolia and Asia

77. Horizontal Accountability Requires More than Legal Checks and Balances Systеm: Ten Asian Country Cases

Author:: Sook Jong Lee
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: Most countries, except closed autocracies, conduct popular elections. However, the quality of global democracy has been deteriorating. One of the most significant illiberal trends is the aggrandizement of executive power led by a popularly elected political leader. Strongmen often bend or simply violate democratic rules by abusing their executive power. The electoral mandate gives them legitimacy, making the efforts to check their executive power difficult. In this context, horizontal accountability based on the checks and balances systеm and oversight institutions is important to prevent the emergence of strongmen. However, horizontal accountability cannot function effectively unless its legal mechanisms are implemented in practice. Ten Asian country cases, presented in previously published ADRN working papers, demonstrated that horizontal accountability perform better when the legislature is not politically captured by the executive power and the judiciary is independent. Oversight institutions also require both political independence and institutional capacity. The electoral accountability of elected elites to voters helps the legislative branch to fulfill its role of constraining the excessive executive power. Independent media and civil society participation always assist both electoral and horizontal accountability.
Topic:: Law, Democracy, Accountability, Civic Engagement, and Political Participation
Political Geography:: Asia

78. Inside the Summit for Democracy: What’s Next?

Author:: Ken Godfrey and Anthony Smith
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: The third iteration of the Summit for Democracy (S4D) in Seoul from March 18 to 20 was an improvement on several elements of previous versions of S4D but still inherited some of the challenges. With this third summit in the rearview mirror, it is a good moment to take stock of the concrete impact of the summit itself and the goals of the S4D process in the future. We argue that the S4D has significant shortcomings but still has added value moving forward if the format can be adjusted in a more pragmatic direction.
Topic:: Civil Society, Democracy, Global South, Cooperation, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Asia

79. South Korea’s Official Development Assistance for Democracy Support

Author:: Sook Jong Lee
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: As of 2022, South Korea provides Official Development Assistance (ODA) amounting to 2.79 billion USD, 0.17% of its gross national income, ranking 16th among the donor countries in the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which includes 30 countries. Since joining the DAC in 2010, South Korea’s ODA has been steadily increasing. The successful transition from a recipient to a donor country is a significant achievement globally. However, in the context of South Korea’s high status in liberal democracy, its level of support for democratic governance is relatively low. There is no clear definition of ‘democracy aid,’ but it generally refers to aid used to advocate and support democracy. Given that democracy aid could be perceived as interference in the internal affairs of recipient countries, it is not prominently emphasized in development assistance where poverty alleviation and socio-economic development are the primary goals. The DAC aims to promote development cooperation and related policies, targeting Sustainable Development 2030, which includes inclusive and sustainable economic development, progress in national and international equality, poverty eradication, and improving living conditions in developing countries. It establishes a standard of assistance policy in various fields such as development, trade, industry, environment, gender equality, anti-corruption, and strengthening civil society. In essence, the DAC does not explicitly state that spreading democracy is the purpose of ODA (OECD n.d.). South Korea’s Framework Act on International Development Cooperation also stipulates the purpose of itself to “enhance the appropriateness of policies for international development cooperation and the efficiency of the implementation thereof, and effectively achieve the policy objectives of international development cooperation by providing for basic matters concerning international development cooperation, thus contributing to the co-prosperity of humanity and to world peace.” This law outlines the principles of international development cooperation, such as “respect for all the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; support for the self-help efforts and abilities of developing countries; respect for the necessity of development of developing countries; increase in sharing of development experiences; and mutual harmony with the international community and promotion of cooperation therewith,” but there is no mention of linking ODA to democracy (OECD 2005; Korea Legislation Research Institute n.d.).
Topic:: Development, Democracy, Civil Society Organizations, and OECD
Political Geography:: Asia and South Korea

80. The Gaza War – Affective Polarization and the Future of Democracy

Author:: Cengiz Günay
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: The terrible terrorist attacks of October 7, 2023, and the subsequent War in Gaza have not only affected the Middle East, but they have also had a disruptive impact on Western democracies. Divisions between those who support Israel’s fight against Islamist terrorism and those who the foreground the sufferings of Palestinian civilians have overlapped with deep affective polarization in many societies. The two positions seem to be irreconcilable and leave little to no room for empathy and dialogue. This report highlights a growing overlap between the perception of international conflicts and domestic polarization over identity issues and values.
Topic:: Democracy, Conflict, Polarization, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

81. A battle against time – and against Putin’s Russia

Author:: Erwan Fouéré
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:: With Putin’s war against Ukraine about to enter its third year, the EU’s enlargement policy remains at the top of its foreign policy priorities, with the focus being on both Ukraine and Moldova. This is following the European Council’s decision to open accession negotiations with both countries. But where does this leave the countries of the Western Balkans and their very long journey towards the EU which began over 20 years ago? Will these countries’ hopes for much needed political momentum in their accession prospects be fulfilled during 2024, despite the repeated delays and the EU’s failure to respect its commitments to the region over the past few years? With elections taking place across Europe offering fertile ground for Russia to deploy its arsenal of disinformation tactics, time is not on the EU’s side. To counter Russian attempts to influence developments in the region, as well as to reverse the dangerous trend of backsliding in democratic and rule of law reforms, the EU will need to adopt a more robust, consistent and determined approach towards the Western Balkans. Without any further delay, it needs to set out a much needed geopolitical and security direction for its enlargement policies in the Western Balkans.
Topic:: Security, European Union, Democracy, Geopolitics, Rule of Law, Regional Integration, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe, Ukraine, Moldova, and Balkans

82. Seeing Tunisia’s Civil Society During Un-civil Times

Author:: Larbi Sadiki and Layla Saleh
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Tunisia’s dramatic democratic reversals since July 2021 warrant an in-depth reflection on how and where its once-promising democratisation momentum went wrong. Much attention is given to the top-down demolition of democratic institutions by the country’s (democratically) elected President Kais Saied. However, just as the popular revolution that ousted the dictator Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and the subsequent democratic transition was to a great extent a bottom-up process, so civil society too is an important piece of the de-democratisation puzzle. In a bid to compare and contrast trajectories of degeneration and regeneration, the paper explores the contributions and constraints of Tunisian civil society vis-à-vis Tunisia’s difficult experiment with democratisation.
Topic:: Civil Society, Democratization, Democracy, Institutions, and NGOs
Political Geography:: North Africa and Tunisia

83. Information Integrity and Information Pollution: Vulnerabilities and Impact on Social Cohesion and Democracy in Mexico

Author:: Anita Breuer
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:: Equal access to reliable information is essential for democracy and social cohesion. The rise of information pollution, particularly in digital spaces, poses significant challenges to democratic societies worldwide. While extensive research has focused on its impact in developed, English-speaking democracies, there is a gap in understanding its effects in younger democracies, conflict zones, and less developed contexts. This study fills that gap by analysing Mexico as a case study. Based on interviews with Mexican media professionals, public sector officials, academics and human rights defenders, the study provides insights on the root causes of the problem and and strategies to combat information pollution, safeguard democracy, and promote social cohesion, underscoring the urgency of proactive measures both within Mexico and on a global scale in Mexico, information pollution significantly threatens the country's social cohesion and democratic principles. Structural conditions like poverty, inequality, violence, corruption, and media landscape issues enable societal vulnerability to digital information pollution. Factors directly driving information pollution include the exploitation of digital spaces by drug cartels, divisive narratives against marginalised groups, an increasingly media-hostile environment as well as the incumbent government’s post-factual approach to reality and politics. Information pollution has fostered a polarised discours, contributed to eroding trust in traditional media and amplified identity-based societal cleavages. It weakens the deliberative, participatory and liberal dimensions of democracy dimensions by decreasing the quality of public debate, damaging civil society watchdog roles, and reducing government transparency and accountability. Recommendations for Mexico encompass enhancing public resilience to information through civic education and targeted communication campaigns, empowering media capacity, and fortifying an open data culture in the Mexican public sector. Internationally, efforts should address elite-driven information pollution by reinforcing independent accountability institutions and leveraging diplomatic and economic incentives against leaders attacking these institutions.
Topic:: Development, Democracy, Media, Social Cohesion, and Information
Political Geography:: North America and Mexico

84. Episode 02: Consistent Partiality: U.S. Foreign Policy on Palestine-Israel

Author:: Sahar Aziz, Peter Beinart, and Sarah Whitson
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Center for Security, Race and Rights (CSRR), Rutgers University School of Law
Abstract:: Although the Biden administration talks about supporting democracy and human rights, it has maintained unconditional US support for Israel even as human rights organizations label it an apartheid state. What are the political and ideological foundations of America’s hostility to Palestinian freedom? And what would it take to change them? Does the US’s unconditional support for Israel serve America’s national interests? Host Sahar Aziz addresses these questions with Professor Peter Beinart and human rights attorney Sarah Leah Whitson.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Apartheid, Human Rights, Politics, Democracy, and Ideology
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, Palestine, North America, and United States of America

85. Foreign Interference Online: Where Disinformation Infringes on Freedom of Thought

Author:: Wesley Wark
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:: “Foreign interference targeting democratic societies works not by the classic Orwellian formula of ruthless powers limiting sources of information and knowledge,” Wesley Wark writes, but by “multiplying and amplifying chosen channels of information, and attempting to corrupt the availability of true information in favour of that which is both false and harmful.” At their most intense, disinformation campaigns amount to “cognitive warfare, a hostile attempt to alter thinking.” In a social media–saturated world, these operations find many and diverse channels for disinformation’s spread, which depends on the inculcation of “fearful unknowing” in the targeted, often vulnerable, audience. A campaign’s objectives might be both direct and indirect: an aim to influence electoral outcomes could overlap with a broader goal to undermine confidence in democratic processes. Public attention to the issue of foreign state interference, as recently experienced in Canada and currently the subject of a judicial inquiry, is the first indicator that freedom of thought principles might be in play. Wark suggests ways to counter these campaigns, beginning with government taking the lead in enhancing public understanding of all national security threats, including those posed by disinformation.
Topic:: Security, Governance, Democracy, Internet, Social Media, Disinformation, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:: Canada and Global Focus

86. New Logics for Governing Human Discourse in the Online Era

Author:: Richard Reisman
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:: The democratization of access to online media tools is driving a transformation of human discourse that is disrupting freedom of thought. This shift in the flow of thought is being encoded into a global infrastructure dominated by commercial platform companies whose operations co-opt individual, collective and governmental agency. In this policy brief, Richard Reisman argues that attempts to govern these tools are relying on “yesterday’s logic.” The new logic, largely unrecognized, relates to acceleration of word-of-mouth propagation, much like rumouring, putting the listener’s freedom of impression, rather than the speaker’s freedom of expression, at the fore. Reisman writes that governance is needed to restore individual and community agency, which could re-energize the vision of technology as “bicycles for our minds,” enabling individuals and society to flourish and maintain resilience in an increasingly challenging world.
Topic:: Governance, Democracy, Internet, Emerging Technology, and Discourse
Political Geography:: Global Focus

87. Credit Rating Agencies versus the ‘Pink Tide’: Lessons from the Experiences of Brazil and Argentina

Author:: Pedro Lange Machado
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Contexto Internacional
Institution:: Institute of International Relations, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro
Abstract:: This paper examines the behaviour of credit rating agencies (CRAs) during the ebbing ‘pink tide’. It claims that the actions of S&P Global, Moody’s and Fitch contributed to dismantling left-wing regimes in Latin America, to the benefit of their right-wing competitors. The methodology draws on case studies of Brazil and Argentina, where the governments of Dilma Rousseff and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner were replaced by those of Michel Temer and Mauricio Macri, respectively. The research is based on sovereign ratings, reports and press releases the agencies issued during those transitions, which are analysed in the light of critical theories of their modus operandi and confronted with the political processes unfolding in both countries. This allows us to draw conclusions that are consistent with the presented argument, thereby contributing to advance the research agenda around the CRAs and to shed light on Brazil and Argentina’s recent critical presidential transitions.
Topic:: Democracy, Economy, Credit Rating Agencies, and Pink Tide
Political Geography:: Brazil, Argentina, and South America

88. Operationalizing the Chain of Harm: Co-design Workshop Guidance

Author:: Lisa Reppell and Matt Bailey
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)
Abstract:: The methodological notes below provide guidance for the implementation of the International Foundation for Electoral System's (IFES's) Chain of Harm to enhance the responsiveness of information integrity programming to the needs and unique circumstances of traditionally marginalized communities. Organizations within the democratic, rights, and governance (DRG) community of practice will be able to consult these notes to replicate, build, and design programming. By following the recommendations outlined in this resource, organizations can plan and execute primary source research on information integrity issues, effectively facilitate program design workshops with relevant local partners, and implement and track new, research-based program interventions. This resource builds on and complements the methodology outlined in IFES's publication, The Chain of Harm: Designing Evidence-based, Locally Led Information Integrity Programming. It begins by describing how to collect the primary research that serves as the foundation of programming through surveys and focus group discussions. Guidance for practitioners to facilitate the Co-design Workshop follows before turning to best practices for program implementation and monitoring and evaluation. As the Chain of Harm centers the perspectives of traditionally marginalized groups, accessibility guidance is included in line with this ethos. This practical use guide is derived from IFES data collected during two pilot implementations of the Chain of Harm in Iraq and Guyana between 2021 and 2023 with support from the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. In both countries, IFES' Center for Applied Research and Learning implemented the approach in close collaboration with local partners. While these methodological notes may often reference collaborations between international and local partners, a local organization implementing directly may also leverage such an approach.
Topic:: Elections, Democracy, and Information Integrity
Political Geography:: Iraq, Guyana, and United States of America

89. Testing Taiwan’s Democracy

Author:: Dimitar Gueorguiev
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: Dr. Dimitar D. Gueorguiev, an associate professor of political science at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs and director of Chinese studies at Syracuse University, asserts that “Taiwan’s new government faces rough seas ahead” and with the loss of the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) legislative majority, new President Lai Ching-te “needs to seek compromise with a divided government...”
Topic:: Government, Elections, Democracy, and Lai Ching-te
Political Geography:: Taiwan and Asia

90. The Evasion of Liberal Democracy in the Proxy Warfare Narrative

Author:: Mansoor Moaddel
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Brown Journal of World Affairs
Institution:: Brown Journal of World Affairs
Abstract:: Much of the thinking about the current political instability in the Middle East has been shaped by sectarianism and proxy warfare between the Islamic Republic and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It is said that the 1979 Iranian Revolution triggered this conflict and pressed on through the mo- bilization of the proxies connected to these regimes. This mobilization was reinforced by the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and the outbreak of the Arab Spring movement in 2011.1 In this narrative, the members of the ordinary public appear as passive bystanders in the making of their country’s future. Considering the current shift in values among the Middle Eastern publics toward secular politics, gender equality, and expressive individualism, this argument tends to obscures the region’s political reality.2 It is true that the ruling mullahs in Iran revived sectarianism. They created the Lebanese Hezbollah in the early 1980s, virtually all the Shia political parties in Iraq before the 2003 invasion, and, more recently, the militant Iraqi Kataib Hezbollah and a militia in Syria to defend the Assad regime. Although Yemeni Ansar Allah, known as the Houthis, belong to a different Shia sect and their raison d’être is a product of recent history, the militant group has lately received extensive aid from the Islamic Republic. Expanding its global influence, Iran also founded Al-Mustafa International University in Qom in 2008. By 2020, the university had 45,000 students and 3,500 teaching staff, ran 50 journals, administered 31 educational institutions, established an online school with 20,000 students from 132 nations, and had produced 40,000 graduates—many of whom served in the Fatemiyoun and Zainebiyon brigades in Syria.3 Moreover, to display its commitment to anti-Western, Islamic supranationalism, every year the regime organized demonstrations against the United States and Israel among Iranian pilgrims during the rites of Hajj in Mecca, Saudi Arabia.4 In 1987, these demonstrations turned deadly as violence broke out between the pilgrims and Saudi security forces during which hundreds were killed.5 In a belligerent response, Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the Islamic Republic, called Saudi leadership “bloodthirsty,” “tyrants,” and “American lackeys.”6
Topic:: Sectarianism, Democracy, Rivalry, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, and Saudi Arabia

91. Resurgence of Military Coups in Africa: Can the African Union and Regional Organizations Defend and Consolidate Democracy?

Author:: Joshua O. Bolarinwa
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Institution:: Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Abstract:: This research evaluates the contemporary increase in military coups in Africa and analyses the effectiveness of the African Union (AU) and other regional institutions in safeguarding and promoting democratic government following existing frameworks and policies. The African Union’s framework for Unconstitutional Changes of Government (UCG) and its subsequent execution have faced significant problems in response to the recent revival. The African Union has garnered commendation for its stance in opposition to military coups. Nevertheless, it has been noted that the organization has exhibited inadequate engagement and delayed responsiveness in addressing instances of the unconstitutional exercise of power. Numerous historical figu-res have exhibited a proclivity for disregarding established institutions that have played a pivotal role in facilitating their ascent to positions of authority.
Topic:: Democracy, Coup, African Union, Military, and Regional Organizations
Political Geography:: Africa

92. Empowering Communities in Kosovo: The Vital Role of Local Government in Advancing Education and Curbing Deviant Behavior

Author:: Islam Hasani and Ferdi Kamberi
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: Local communities play an essential role in developing and organizing their lives for joint betterment. Local self-government, through local democratic mechanisms, involves the community as part of the public policies, showing the sign of the development of the local democracy. This research aims to analyze the communication and collaboration between the local government and local communities in Kosovo, focusing on their role in the development of education and the reduction of deviant behavior, intending to create a better social environment for the community. The research methodology employed for this paper is as follows: library research, qualitative research, and the analysis of the laws in power related to the topic. There will be field research working with two focus groups belonging to the municipality of Prishtina, considering their ethnic component. General results show that communities are still in the development and organization phase, whereas their participation in the process of public policies is still under the average level. Social audits can be mechanisms for development, organizing the community, and involvement in local government policies.
Topic:: Development, Education, Democracy, Public Policy, Behavior, Empowerment, Communities, and Local Self-Government
Political Geography:: Europe, Eastern Europe, and Kosovo

93. Russia’s presidential election: Signalling repression and demobilizing opposition

Author:: Margarita Zavadskaya
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: Autocrats such as Vladimir Putin use elections strategically to demonstrate their capability to secure the necessary votes. This primarily benefits the regime’s inner circle and rent-seeking elites who rely on Putin’s presidency for their wealth. Although a notable proportion of the Russian population regards the election and Putin’s leadership as legitimate, their support for Russia’s military actions in Ukraine is waning. Only a slim majority backs the continuation of the conflict. Despite the oppressive political environment, opposition initiatives such as “Noon against Putin” manifest ongoing resistance. These actions were reflected in vote tallies abroad, where support for Putin was dramatically lower than in Russia. The post-election period is likely to see the persistence of Russia’s current domestic and foreign policies, with the potential for increased societal and economic tensions. The declining support for the war could further complicate the regime’s efforts to maintain a unified front. This could potentially impact Russia’s global standing and internal stability.
Topic:: Authoritarianism, Elections, Democracy, Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

94. Indonesia’s growing clout: Domestic, regional, and global drivers

Author:: Bart Gaens and Olli Ruohomäki
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: While Indonesia still stands out as one of the stronger democracies in Southeast Asia, its democratic credentials remain flawed. Nevertheless, public support for the current administration has remained high thanks to sustained economic growth, welfare measures and large infrastructure projects. Indonesia has continued to bolster its international status through ASEAN, even if its position is one among equals. Within the organization, Jakarta has aimed to play the role of democracy promoter and bridge-builder. While China’s influence in the country has grown, Indonesia has sought a middle ground within the great-power competition, also pursuing partnerships with European countries, Japan, Russia, and the Gulf countries in order to diversify its political and economic relations. This offers opportunities for the EU. However, Europe’s declining image in Indonesia, colonial history and perceived double standards are obstacles to strengthening EU-Indonesia relations. Challenges remain for Indonesia in its quest to become a global player. The country will need to contribute solutions to both regional and global issues, and its hedging game and strategic autonomy in foreign-policy choices may become complicated due to increasing global expectations and responsibilities.
Topic:: Democracy, Geopolitics, Economic Policy, and Strategic Autonomy
Political Geography:: Indonesia and Southeast Asia

95. Russia’s wartime ideology: Radicalization, rent-seeking and securing the dictator

Author:: Jussi Lassila
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: Anti-Western propaganda and the indoctrination of citizens, especially young people, have gradually intensified since the early days of Putin’s rule. However, their radicalization during the war is indicative of the regime’s need for manipulative control rather than reflective of broad support for the regime’s worldview. The most significant shift in the Kremlin’s wartime propaganda has been its codification in school education since the summer of 2022. This timing reveals more about the regime’s need to justify the war and its consequences than it does about any consistent long-term strategy. Key actors behind the ideological codification are opportunistically exploiting the current context. Meanwhile, ideological radicals face little opposition, as most citizens show limited interest in their activities. Despite the regime’s indoctrination practices, the indifference of society suggests that the conditions for a strong anti-Western consensus after Putin will be weak. Such a consensus can only emerge if the future regime, like the current one, is able to maintain satisfactory material conditions and a tolerable daily life alongside its ideological views, whatever they may be.
Topic:: Authoritarianism, Radicalization, Democracy, Ideology, Post-Soviet Space, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

96. Between Tradition and Transformation: The Impact of Illiberal Populism on Georgia’s Democratic Aspirations

Author:: Giorgi Iakobishvili
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: The article examines the role of Georgian far-right illiberal populist groups in Georgian politics and their influence on Georgia’s foreign policy and the ongoing democratization process, emphasizing Euroscepticism, liberal institutional development, and the pro-Russian narrative. Using qualitative research methodology, we analyzed the programs, manifestos, and public speeches of well-known groups active in Georgian politics, such as People's Power, Georgian March, Georgian Idea, Unity, Essence, Hope (ERI), and Alliance of Patriots of Georgia. Analysis of the mentioned material, as well as various scientific studies, shows that the discourse of these groups is dominated by xenophobic, nationalist, populist, and racist rhetoric, which represents a significant challenge to Georgia’s European integration path and in the direction of democratization of its governance system. In the long term, we concluded that the existence and development of these illiberal populist actors threaten Georgia’s aspirations for European integration and democratic development. This study contributes to a broader discourse about populism and illiberal views in the Georgian reality, focusing on the influence of these ideologies on the formation of the country’s foreign policy and orientation.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Democracy, Populism, Domestic Politics, Illiberalism, and Euroskepticism
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Caucasus, and Georgia

97. Georgia’s government is playing with fire: Internal polarisation invites external interference

Author:: Sinikukka Saari
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: Georgia’s government distrusts the West and democratic institutions – despite formally supporting Euro-Atlantic integration. It seeks to merge transactional foreign policy with ultra-conservative values and illiberalism. Current policies are polarising the nation, alienating the West, and making Georgia vulnerable to Russia’s interference.
Topic:: Democracy, Institutions, Polarization, Post-Soviet Space, Euroskepticism, and Eastern Neighborhood
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Caucasus, and Georgia

98. Majority-building in the next European Parliament: The case for a more formal coalition

Author:: Andreas T. Müller
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: The openness of the European People’s Party (EPP) to some far-right parties in the European Parliament has led to mistrust and conflict within the political centre. A written coalition agreement could remedy this – and even improve democracy at the EU level.
Topic:: European Union, Democracy, European Parliament, and Coalition
Political Geography:: Europe

99. Georgia at a Crossroads: An Increasingly Illiberal Domestic Policy is Becoming an Obstacle to EU Accession

Author:: Reinhold Brender
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: Georgia faces a defining moment. The recent adoption of a Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence, modelled on Russian legislation, clashes with Georgia’s goal of EU accession. The law allows for extensive control and elimination of civil society and critical voices, which contradicts the democratic principles required for EU membership. The ruling Georgian Dream party nonetheless claims that EU accession, a goal shared by most Georgians, remains achievable by 2030. As the parliamentary elections on 26 October approach, the party seeks to maintain its grip on power by projecting an image of commitment to democracy and EU integration. But opposition parties, civil society organisations and the media have rallied against the law, which many believe reflects a deeper issue: the efforts of a small elite around billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili to consolidate power and push Georgia towards authoritarianism under the guise of democratic governance. An increasing alignment with Russia has accompanied this trend, potentially enabling Russia to exert some level of control over Georgia through a local proxy instead of direct military intervention. This policy brief argues that the EU should implement the steps that High Representative Josep Borrell announced after the Foreign Affairs Council on 24 June 2024. In light of further developments, consideration should be given to additional measures, including targeted EU sanctions on anti-democratic actors similar to those imposed by the US. Continued EU support for Ukraine’s resistance to Russian aggression will also be vital for the sovereignty of both Ukraine and Georgia, as well as for regional stability.
Topic:: European Union, Democracy, Regional Integration, Domestic Policy, and Illiberalism
Political Geography:: Eurasia and Georgia

100. Defence of Democracy: a Discussion on Democracy and the Path Ahead for a Culture of Participation

Author:: Ward Den Dooven
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: On the occasion of the European Commission’s release of the Defence of Democracy package (DoD) on 12 December 2023, the Egmont Institute – together with the G1000 – organised a debate focused specifically on the recommendation on the participation of citizens and civil society organisations in public policy-making. As part of Egmont’s wider outreach mandate under the Belgian Presidency of the Council of the EU and building upon G1000’s longstanding expertise as an innovator in the Belgian democratic landscape and beyond, the purpose was to explore the road ahead for this recommendation, both under the Belgian Presidency , as well as beyond by adoption of the next strategic agenda by the June European Council and the consequential Commission priorities.
Topic:: Civil Society, European Union, Democracy, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Europe

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS