Topic: Democracy - CIAO Search Results

1. Empire Salon | William Smith | Oct 14 2020

Author:: William Smith
Publication Date:: 12-2026
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: The Center for the Study of Statesmanship, Catholic University
Abstract:: William Smith, a distinguished former student of Committee Board member Claes Ryn, has written an insightful book on the realistic and restrained foreign policy tradition of the United States. Smith highlights the great Harvard scholar, Irving Babbitt, with his clear understanding of the crooked timber of man -- especially when acting collectively -- which reduces moral inhibitions against violence. James Madison explained in Federalist 55, “Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates; every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob.”
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Imperialism, and Democracy
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

2. Whom do African election campaigns contact? And does it matter?

Author:: Robert Mattes, Matthias Krönke, and Sarah J. Lockwood
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Afrobarometer
Abstract:: Canvassing is an important way in which political parties around the world raise awareness and connect with voters. Despite this, the literature on parties in new democracies, and Africa in particular, has tended to overlook this form of activity, focusing instead on vote buying, mass rallies, and meetings. In this paper, we use public opinion survey data from Afrobarometer and the Comparative National Elections Project to show that overall rates of canvassing in Africa are similar to other new, as well as many established, democracies. The data also challenge several dominant views of party campaigns in the Africanist literature. First, African parties do not concentrate primarily on turning out their base, rather than reaching across the partisan divide. Indeed, the opposite is the case. African parties expend more energy contacting nonpartisan independents and cross-partisans, and thus make a potentially meaningful contribution to the supply of multiparty competition. Second, the vast majority of contacts occur without any clientelist exchanges of material goods between parties and individual voters. And third, while incumbent parties enjoy canvassing advantages over opposition parties in around one-third of the surveyed countries, opposition parties (viewed collectively) match the party in power in terms of the ground game in another third, and enjoy higher rates of contact in yet another third.
Topic:: Elections, Democracy, Civic Engagement, and Campaigning
Political Geography:: Africa

3. Generative AI, Democracy and Human Rights

Author:: David Evan Harris and Aaron Shull
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:: Disinformation is not new, but given how disinformation campaigns are constructed, there is almost no stage that will not be rendered more effective by the use of generative artificial intelligence (AI). Given the unsatisfactory nature of current tools to address this budding reality, disinformation, especially during elections, is set to get much, much worse. As these campaigns become more sophisticated and manipulative, the foreseeable consequence will be a further erosion of trust in institutions and a heightened disintegration of civic integrity, which in turn will jeopardize a host of human rights, including electoral rights and the right to freedom of thought. In this policy brief, David Evan Harris and Aaron Shull argue that policy makers must hold AI companies liable for the harms caused or facilitated by their products that could have been reasonably foreseen, act quickly to ban using AI to impersonate real persons or organizations, and require the use of watermarking or other provenance tools to allow people to distinguish between AI-generated and authentic content.
Topic:: Human Rights, Democracy, Artificial Intelligence, Disinformation, Generative Models, and Freedom of Thought
Political Geography:: Global Focus

4. A battle against time – and against Putin’s Russia

Author:: Erwan Fouéré
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:: With Putin’s war against Ukraine about to enter its third year, the EU’s enlargement policy remains at the top of its foreign policy priorities, with the focus being on both Ukraine and Moldova. This is following the European Council’s decision to open accession negotiations with both countries. But where does this leave the countries of the Western Balkans and their very long journey towards the EU which began over 20 years ago? Will these countries’ hopes for much needed political momentum in their accession prospects be fulfilled during 2024, despite the repeated delays and the EU’s failure to respect its commitments to the region over the past few years? With elections taking place across Europe offering fertile ground for Russia to deploy its arsenal of disinformation tactics, time is not on the EU’s side. To counter Russian attempts to influence developments in the region, as well as to reverse the dangerous trend of backsliding in democratic and rule of law reforms, the EU will need to adopt a more robust, consistent and determined approach towards the Western Balkans. Without any further delay, it needs to set out a much needed geopolitical and security direction for its enlargement policies in the Western Balkans.
Topic:: Security, European Union, Democracy, Geopolitics, Rule of Law, Regional Integration, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe, Ukraine, Moldova, and Balkans

5. Seeing Tunisia’s Civil Society During Un-civil Times

Author:: Larbi Sadiki and Layla Saleh
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Tunisia’s dramatic democratic reversals since July 2021 warrant an in-depth reflection on how and where its once-promising democratisation momentum went wrong. Much attention is given to the top-down demolition of democratic institutions by the country’s (democratically) elected President Kais Saied. However, just as the popular revolution that ousted the dictator Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and the subsequent democratic transition was to a great extent a bottom-up process, so civil society too is an important piece of the de-democratisation puzzle. In a bid to compare and contrast trajectories of degeneration and regeneration, the paper explores the contributions and constraints of Tunisian civil society vis-à-vis Tunisia’s difficult experiment with democratisation.
Topic:: Civil Society, Democratization, Democracy, Institutions, and NGOs
Political Geography:: North Africa and Tunisia

6. Information Integrity and Information Pollution: Vulnerabilities and Impact on Social Cohesion and Democracy in Mexico

Author:: Anita Breuer
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:: Equal access to reliable information is essential for democracy and social cohesion. The rise of information pollution, particularly in digital spaces, poses significant challenges to democratic societies worldwide. While extensive research has focused on its impact in developed, English-speaking democracies, there is a gap in understanding its effects in younger democracies, conflict zones, and less developed contexts. This study fills that gap by analysing Mexico as a case study. Based on interviews with Mexican media professionals, public sector officials, academics and human rights defenders, the study provides insights on the root causes of the problem and and strategies to combat information pollution, safeguard democracy, and promote social cohesion, underscoring the urgency of proactive measures both within Mexico and on a global scale in Mexico, information pollution significantly threatens the country's social cohesion and democratic principles. Structural conditions like poverty, inequality, violence, corruption, and media landscape issues enable societal vulnerability to digital information pollution. Factors directly driving information pollution include the exploitation of digital spaces by drug cartels, divisive narratives against marginalised groups, an increasingly media-hostile environment as well as the incumbent government’s post-factual approach to reality and politics. Information pollution has fostered a polarised discours, contributed to eroding trust in traditional media and amplified identity-based societal cleavages. It weakens the deliberative, participatory and liberal dimensions of democracy dimensions by decreasing the quality of public debate, damaging civil society watchdog roles, and reducing government transparency and accountability. Recommendations for Mexico encompass enhancing public resilience to information through civic education and targeted communication campaigns, empowering media capacity, and fortifying an open data culture in the Mexican public sector. Internationally, efforts should address elite-driven information pollution by reinforcing independent accountability institutions and leveraging diplomatic and economic incentives against leaders attacking these institutions.
Topic:: Development, Democracy, Media, Social Cohesion, and Information
Political Geography:: North America and Mexico

7. Episode 02: Consistent Partiality: U.S. Foreign Policy on Palestine-Israel

Author:: Sahar Aziz, Peter Beinart, and Sarah Whitson
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Center for Security, Race and Rights (CSRR), Rutgers University School of Law
Abstract:: Although the Biden administration talks about supporting democracy and human rights, it has maintained unconditional US support for Israel even as human rights organizations label it an apartheid state. What are the political and ideological foundations of America’s hostility to Palestinian freedom? And what would it take to change them? Does the US’s unconditional support for Israel serve America’s national interests? Host Sahar Aziz addresses these questions with Professor Peter Beinart and human rights attorney Sarah Leah Whitson.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Apartheid, Human Rights, Politics, Democracy, and Ideology
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, Palestine, North America, and United States of America

8. Foreign Interference Online: Where Disinformation Infringes on Freedom of Thought

Author:: Wesley Wark
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:: “Foreign interference targeting democratic societies works not by the classic Orwellian formula of ruthless powers limiting sources of information and knowledge,” Wesley Wark writes, but by “multiplying and amplifying chosen channels of information, and attempting to corrupt the availability of true information in favour of that which is both false and harmful.” At their most intense, disinformation campaigns amount to “cognitive warfare, a hostile attempt to alter thinking.” In a social media–saturated world, these operations find many and diverse channels for disinformation’s spread, which depends on the inculcation of “fearful unknowing” in the targeted, often vulnerable, audience. A campaign’s objectives might be both direct and indirect: an aim to influence electoral outcomes could overlap with a broader goal to undermine confidence in democratic processes. Public attention to the issue of foreign state interference, as recently experienced in Canada and currently the subject of a judicial inquiry, is the first indicator that freedom of thought principles might be in play. Wark suggests ways to counter these campaigns, beginning with government taking the lead in enhancing public understanding of all national security threats, including those posed by disinformation.
Topic:: Security, Governance, Democracy, Internet, Social Media, Disinformation, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:: Canada and Global Focus

9. New Logics for Governing Human Discourse in the Online Era

Author:: Richard Reisman
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:: The democratization of access to online media tools is driving a transformation of human discourse that is disrupting freedom of thought. This shift in the flow of thought is being encoded into a global infrastructure dominated by commercial platform companies whose operations co-opt individual, collective and governmental agency. In this policy brief, Richard Reisman argues that attempts to govern these tools are relying on “yesterday’s logic.” The new logic, largely unrecognized, relates to acceleration of word-of-mouth propagation, much like rumouring, putting the listener’s freedom of impression, rather than the speaker’s freedom of expression, at the fore. Reisman writes that governance is needed to restore individual and community agency, which could re-energize the vision of technology as “bicycles for our minds,” enabling individuals and society to flourish and maintain resilience in an increasingly challenging world.
Topic:: Governance, Democracy, Internet, Emerging Technology, and Discourse
Political Geography:: Global Focus

10. Credit Rating Agencies versus the ‘Pink Tide’: Lessons from the Experiences of Brazil and Argentina

Author:: Pedro Lange Machado
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Contexto Internacional
Institution:: Institute of International Relations, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro
Abstract:: This paper examines the behaviour of credit rating agencies (CRAs) during the ebbing ‘pink tide’. It claims that the actions of S&P Global, Moody’s and Fitch contributed to dismantling left-wing regimes in Latin America, to the benefit of their right-wing competitors. The methodology draws on case studies of Brazil and Argentina, where the governments of Dilma Rousseff and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner were replaced by those of Michel Temer and Mauricio Macri, respectively. The research is based on sovereign ratings, reports and press releases the agencies issued during those transitions, which are analysed in the light of critical theories of their modus operandi and confronted with the political processes unfolding in both countries. This allows us to draw conclusions that are consistent with the presented argument, thereby contributing to advance the research agenda around the CRAs and to shed light on Brazil and Argentina’s recent critical presidential transitions.
Topic:: Democracy, Economy, Credit Rating Agencies, and Pink Tide
Political Geography:: Brazil, Argentina, and South America

11. Operationalizing the Chain of Harm: Co-design Workshop Guidance

Author:: Lisa Reppell and Matt Bailey
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)
Abstract:: The methodological notes below provide guidance for the implementation of the International Foundation for Electoral System's (IFES's) Chain of Harm to enhance the responsiveness of information integrity programming to the needs and unique circumstances of traditionally marginalized communities. Organizations within the democratic, rights, and governance (DRG) community of practice will be able to consult these notes to replicate, build, and design programming. By following the recommendations outlined in this resource, organizations can plan and execute primary source research on information integrity issues, effectively facilitate program design workshops with relevant local partners, and implement and track new, research-based program interventions. This resource builds on and complements the methodology outlined in IFES's publication, The Chain of Harm: Designing Evidence-based, Locally Led Information Integrity Programming. It begins by describing how to collect the primary research that serves as the foundation of programming through surveys and focus group discussions. Guidance for practitioners to facilitate the Co-design Workshop follows before turning to best practices for program implementation and monitoring and evaluation. As the Chain of Harm centers the perspectives of traditionally marginalized groups, accessibility guidance is included in line with this ethos. This practical use guide is derived from IFES data collected during two pilot implementations of the Chain of Harm in Iraq and Guyana between 2021 and 2023 with support from the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. In both countries, IFES' Center for Applied Research and Learning implemented the approach in close collaboration with local partners. While these methodological notes may often reference collaborations between international and local partners, a local organization implementing directly may also leverage such an approach.
Topic:: Elections, Democracy, and Information Integrity
Political Geography:: Iraq, Guyana, and United States of America

12. Testing Taiwan’s Democracy

Author:: Dimitar Gueorguiev
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: Dr. Dimitar D. Gueorguiev, an associate professor of political science at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs and director of Chinese studies at Syracuse University, asserts that “Taiwan’s new government faces rough seas ahead” and with the loss of the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) legislative majority, new President Lai Ching-te “needs to seek compromise with a divided government...”
Topic:: Government, Elections, Democracy, and Lai Ching-te
Political Geography:: Taiwan and Asia

13. The Evasion of Liberal Democracy in the Proxy Warfare Narrative

Author:: Mansoor Moaddel
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Brown Journal of World Affairs
Institution:: Brown Journal of World Affairs
Abstract:: Much of the thinking about the current political instability in the Middle East has been shaped by sectarianism and proxy warfare between the Islamic Republic and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It is said that the 1979 Iranian Revolution triggered this conflict and pressed on through the mo- bilization of the proxies connected to these regimes. This mobilization was reinforced by the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and the outbreak of the Arab Spring movement in 2011.1 In this narrative, the members of the ordinary public appear as passive bystanders in the making of their country’s future. Considering the current shift in values among the Middle Eastern publics toward secular politics, gender equality, and expressive individualism, this argument tends to obscures the region’s political reality.2 It is true that the ruling mullahs in Iran revived sectarianism. They created the Lebanese Hezbollah in the early 1980s, virtually all the Shia political parties in Iraq before the 2003 invasion, and, more recently, the militant Iraqi Kataib Hezbollah and a militia in Syria to defend the Assad regime. Although Yemeni Ansar Allah, known as the Houthis, belong to a different Shia sect and their raison d’être is a product of recent history, the militant group has lately received extensive aid from the Islamic Republic. Expanding its global influence, Iran also founded Al-Mustafa International University in Qom in 2008. By 2020, the university had 45,000 students and 3,500 teaching staff, ran 50 journals, administered 31 educational institutions, established an online school with 20,000 students from 132 nations, and had produced 40,000 graduates—many of whom served in the Fatemiyoun and Zainebiyon brigades in Syria.3 Moreover, to display its commitment to anti-Western, Islamic supranationalism, every year the regime organized demonstrations against the United States and Israel among Iranian pilgrims during the rites of Hajj in Mecca, Saudi Arabia.4 In 1987, these demonstrations turned deadly as violence broke out between the pilgrims and Saudi security forces during which hundreds were killed.5 In a belligerent response, Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the Islamic Republic, called Saudi leadership “bloodthirsty,” “tyrants,” and “American lackeys.”6
Topic:: Sectarianism, Democracy, Rivalry, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, and Saudi Arabia

14. Resurgence of Military Coups in Africa: Can the African Union and Regional Organizations Defend and Consolidate Democracy?

Author:: Joshua O. Bolarinwa
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Institution:: Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Abstract:: This research evaluates the contemporary increase in military coups in Africa and analyses the effectiveness of the African Union (AU) and other regional institutions in safeguarding and promoting democratic government following existing frameworks and policies. The African Union’s framework for Unconstitutional Changes of Government (UCG) and its subsequent execution have faced significant problems in response to the recent revival. The African Union has garnered commendation for its stance in opposition to military coups. Nevertheless, it has been noted that the organization has exhibited inadequate engagement and delayed responsiveness in addressing instances of the unconstitutional exercise of power. Numerous historical figu-res have exhibited a proclivity for disregarding established institutions that have played a pivotal role in facilitating their ascent to positions of authority.
Topic:: Democracy, Coup, African Union, Military, and Regional Organizations
Political Geography:: Africa

15. Empowering Communities in Kosovo: The Vital Role of Local Government in Advancing Education and Curbing Deviant Behavior

Author:: Islam Hasani and Ferdi Kamberi
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: Local communities play an essential role in developing and organizing their lives for joint betterment. Local self-government, through local democratic mechanisms, involves the community as part of the public policies, showing the sign of the development of the local democracy. This research aims to analyze the communication and collaboration between the local government and local communities in Kosovo, focusing on their role in the development of education and the reduction of deviant behavior, intending to create a better social environment for the community. The research methodology employed for this paper is as follows: library research, qualitative research, and the analysis of the laws in power related to the topic. There will be field research working with two focus groups belonging to the municipality of Prishtina, considering their ethnic component. General results show that communities are still in the development and organization phase, whereas their participation in the process of public policies is still under the average level. Social audits can be mechanisms for development, organizing the community, and involvement in local government policies.
Topic:: Development, Education, Democracy, Public Policy, Behavior, Empowerment, Communities, and Local Self-Government
Political Geography:: Europe, Eastern Europe, and Kosovo

16. Russia’s presidential election: Signalling repression and demobilizing opposition

Author:: Margarita Zavadskaya
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: Autocrats such as Vladimir Putin use elections strategically to demonstrate their capability to secure the necessary votes. This primarily benefits the regime’s inner circle and rent-seeking elites who rely on Putin’s presidency for their wealth. Although a notable proportion of the Russian population regards the election and Putin’s leadership as legitimate, their support for Russia’s military actions in Ukraine is waning. Only a slim majority backs the continuation of the conflict. Despite the oppressive political environment, opposition initiatives such as “Noon against Putin” manifest ongoing resistance. These actions were reflected in vote tallies abroad, where support for Putin was dramatically lower than in Russia. The post-election period is likely to see the persistence of Russia’s current domestic and foreign policies, with the potential for increased societal and economic tensions. The declining support for the war could further complicate the regime’s efforts to maintain a unified front. This could potentially impact Russia’s global standing and internal stability.
Topic:: Authoritarianism, Elections, Democracy, Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

17. Indonesia’s growing clout: Domestic, regional, and global drivers

Author:: Bart Gaens and Olli Ruohomäki
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: While Indonesia still stands out as one of the stronger democracies in Southeast Asia, its democratic credentials remain flawed. Nevertheless, public support for the current administration has remained high thanks to sustained economic growth, welfare measures and large infrastructure projects. Indonesia has continued to bolster its international status through ASEAN, even if its position is one among equals. Within the organization, Jakarta has aimed to play the role of democracy promoter and bridge-builder. While China’s influence in the country has grown, Indonesia has sought a middle ground within the great-power competition, also pursuing partnerships with European countries, Japan, Russia, and the Gulf countries in order to diversify its political and economic relations. This offers opportunities for the EU. However, Europe’s declining image in Indonesia, colonial history and perceived double standards are obstacles to strengthening EU-Indonesia relations. Challenges remain for Indonesia in its quest to become a global player. The country will need to contribute solutions to both regional and global issues, and its hedging game and strategic autonomy in foreign-policy choices may become complicated due to increasing global expectations and responsibilities.
Topic:: Democracy, Geopolitics, Economic Policy, and Strategic Autonomy
Political Geography:: Indonesia and Southeast Asia

18. Russia’s wartime ideology: Radicalization, rent-seeking and securing the dictator

Author:: Jussi Lassila
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: Anti-Western propaganda and the indoctrination of citizens, especially young people, have gradually intensified since the early days of Putin’s rule. However, their radicalization during the war is indicative of the regime’s need for manipulative control rather than reflective of broad support for the regime’s worldview. The most significant shift in the Kremlin’s wartime propaganda has been its codification in school education since the summer of 2022. This timing reveals more about the regime’s need to justify the war and its consequences than it does about any consistent long-term strategy. Key actors behind the ideological codification are opportunistically exploiting the current context. Meanwhile, ideological radicals face little opposition, as most citizens show limited interest in their activities. Despite the regime’s indoctrination practices, the indifference of society suggests that the conditions for a strong anti-Western consensus after Putin will be weak. Such a consensus can only emerge if the future regime, like the current one, is able to maintain satisfactory material conditions and a tolerable daily life alongside its ideological views, whatever they may be.
Topic:: Authoritarianism, Radicalization, Democracy, Ideology, Post-Soviet Space, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

19. Between Tradition and Transformation: The Impact of Illiberal Populism on Georgia’s Democratic Aspirations

Author:: Giorgi Iakobishvili
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: The article examines the role of Georgian far-right illiberal populist groups in Georgian politics and their influence on Georgia’s foreign policy and the ongoing democratization process, emphasizing Euroscepticism, liberal institutional development, and the pro-Russian narrative. Using qualitative research methodology, we analyzed the programs, manifestos, and public speeches of well-known groups active in Georgian politics, such as People's Power, Georgian March, Georgian Idea, Unity, Essence, Hope (ERI), and Alliance of Patriots of Georgia. Analysis of the mentioned material, as well as various scientific studies, shows that the discourse of these groups is dominated by xenophobic, nationalist, populist, and racist rhetoric, which represents a significant challenge to Georgia’s European integration path and in the direction of democratization of its governance system. In the long term, we concluded that the existence and development of these illiberal populist actors threaten Georgia’s aspirations for European integration and democratic development. This study contributes to a broader discourse about populism and illiberal views in the Georgian reality, focusing on the influence of these ideologies on the formation of the country’s foreign policy and orientation.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Democracy, Populism, Domestic Politics, Illiberalism, and Euroskepticism
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Caucasus, and Georgia

20. Georgia’s government is playing with fire: Internal polarisation invites external interference

Author:: Sinikukka Saari
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: Georgia’s government distrusts the West and democratic institutions – despite formally supporting Euro-Atlantic integration. It seeks to merge transactional foreign policy with ultra-conservative values and illiberalism. Current policies are polarising the nation, alienating the West, and making Georgia vulnerable to Russia’s interference.
Topic:: Democracy, Institutions, Polarization, Post-Soviet Space, Euroskepticism, and Eastern Neighborhood
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Caucasus, and Georgia

21. Majority-building in the next European Parliament: The case for a more formal coalition

Author:: Andreas T. Müller
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: The openness of the European People’s Party (EPP) to some far-right parties in the European Parliament has led to mistrust and conflict within the political centre. A written coalition agreement could remedy this – and even improve democracy at the EU level.
Topic:: European Union, Democracy, European Parliament, and Coalition
Political Geography:: Europe

22. Georgia at a Crossroads: An Increasingly Illiberal Domestic Policy is Becoming an Obstacle to EU Accession

Author:: Reinhold Brender
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: Georgia faces a defining moment. The recent adoption of a Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence, modelled on Russian legislation, clashes with Georgia’s goal of EU accession. The law allows for extensive control and elimination of civil society and critical voices, which contradicts the democratic principles required for EU membership. The ruling Georgian Dream party nonetheless claims that EU accession, a goal shared by most Georgians, remains achievable by 2030. As the parliamentary elections on 26 October approach, the party seeks to maintain its grip on power by projecting an image of commitment to democracy and EU integration. But opposition parties, civil society organisations and the media have rallied against the law, which many believe reflects a deeper issue: the efforts of a small elite around billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili to consolidate power and push Georgia towards authoritarianism under the guise of democratic governance. An increasing alignment with Russia has accompanied this trend, potentially enabling Russia to exert some level of control over Georgia through a local proxy instead of direct military intervention. This policy brief argues that the EU should implement the steps that High Representative Josep Borrell announced after the Foreign Affairs Council on 24 June 2024. In light of further developments, consideration should be given to additional measures, including targeted EU sanctions on anti-democratic actors similar to those imposed by the US. Continued EU support for Ukraine’s resistance to Russian aggression will also be vital for the sovereignty of both Ukraine and Georgia, as well as for regional stability.
Topic:: European Union, Democracy, Regional Integration, Domestic Policy, and Illiberalism
Political Geography:: Eurasia and Georgia

23. Defence of Democracy: a Discussion on Democracy and the Path Ahead for a Culture of Participation

Author:: Ward Den Dooven
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: On the occasion of the European Commission’s release of the Defence of Democracy package (DoD) on 12 December 2023, the Egmont Institute – together with the G1000 – organised a debate focused specifically on the recommendation on the participation of citizens and civil society organisations in public policy-making. As part of Egmont’s wider outreach mandate under the Belgian Presidency of the Council of the EU and building upon G1000’s longstanding expertise as an innovator in the Belgian democratic landscape and beyond, the purpose was to explore the road ahead for this recommendation, both under the Belgian Presidency , as well as beyond by adoption of the next strategic agenda by the June European Council and the consequential Commission priorities.
Topic:: Civil Society, European Union, Democracy, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Europe

24. Promoting European Democracy and Solidarity in a Wider EU

Author:: Lila Djait
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: The Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations, with the support of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in collaboration with the Representation of the European Commission in Belgium, has organised a series of three foresight workshops and three working dinners. Each session was dedicated to a key strategic challenge, providing a vital platform for dialogue and expert insight sharing among decision-makers from European Union (EU) institutions, the Belgian administration, and civil society. Far from being just a theoretical exchange, the discussions were a targeted effort to further develop strategic long-term thinking, with a vision extending over the next 5 to 10 years. The third round of foresight workshop and working dinner reflected on ‘Promoting European Democracy and Solidarity in a wider EU’. In recent years, the European Union has faced a pivotal juncture in its history, grappling with internal and external pressures that test its foundational principles of democracy, rule of law, and solidarity. The discourse surrounding the enlargement of the EU, adherence to the rule of law, fiscal stewardship, and the need for a cohesive strategy to confront emerging geopolitical challenges underscores the imperative for a strategic re-evaluation.
Topic:: European Union, Democracy, Economy, Solidarity, Regional Integration, and Institutions
Political Geography:: Europe

25. EU Elections: National Democracy at Its Cornerstone?

Author:: Ward Den Dooven
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: On the eve of the European elections, those who keep a keen eye already know that a big turnaround of the European hemicycle is to be expected, with more than 50% being newly elected. In a recent article, the secondary place occupied by the European elections was highlighted; in Belgium they can even be said to only rank as tertiary due to its collision with national and regional elections on the same day. Although up to 8 member states will see both national and European elections in 2024, this very much gives a unique context to the EU elections in Belgium. Its conclusions however were not new: although the federal government presented itself as radically pro-European, currently holding the Council of the EU’s rotating Presidency, in Belgium as well as abroad, the European election is inherently still very much national in nature: the limited space that is left for it between the other campaigns becomes confused through both themes and politicians being presented at other levels than they (currently) sit.
Topic:: Economics, Elections, European Union, Democracy, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Europe

26. The US Should Support the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan

Author:: Luke Coffey
Publication Date:: 08-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: More than three years ago, the Taliban swept back into power in Afghanistan after a two-decade insurgency against the internationally backed Afghan government. Since then, the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated considerably. The country faces an acute humanitarian crisis affecting millions and has once again become a haven for transnational terrorism. This tragic outcome was not inevitable, and it is worth reviewing recent history. Starting in 2014, United States troops in Afghanistan were no longer leading daily combat operations but were instead primarily training the Afghan military. When President Donald Trump entered office in January 2017, there were only 11,000 US troops in Afghanistan conducting the counterterrorism and training mission. This was down from a peak of 100,000 troops in 2010–11. In February 2020, Trump agreed to a deal with the Taliban that would have seen the phased withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan by May 2021. This agreement was the starting point of the Afghan government’s collapse and the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021. In January 2021, when President Joe Biden entered office, there were only 2,500 US troops in Afghanistan. Crucially, the US still provided close air support for Afghan forces. While this was not enough troops to ensure that the Afghan government could control the whole country, it was enough for the US to meet its counterterrorism objectives and prevent the Taliban from taking power. Instead of canceling the flawed withdrawal agreement with the Taliban—something that was in Biden’s power to do—the president merely delayed the date from May to September. On July 2 the US departed the strategically located and geopolitically important Bagram Airfield in the middle of the night without warning its Afghan partners. Around the same time, the US stopped providing Afghan troops with close air support. By the end of July, almost all US and international forces had left the country. On August 6, 2021, the Taliban captured Zaranj, the capital of Nimroz Province. This was the first time in almost 20 years that the terror group had successfully captured and held one of Afghanistan’s 34 provincial capitals. Soon after, government-controlled capitals started falling like dominos. The Taliban finally captured Kabul on August 15. By September 11—the twentieth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks—the Taliban controlled more of Afghanistan than it did on that day in 2001. Since the Taliban’s return to power, only one credible and non-extremist group has been willing to take up arms in opposition: the National Resistance Front (NRF) of Afghanistan, led by Ahmad Massoud. Based in the Panjshir Province and operating in more than a dozen other provinces, the NRF has continued to fight against the Taliban against all odds and without any international support. Though there is no longer an American presence in Afghanistan, the country remains geopolitically important. Afghanistan’s location in the heart of the Eurasian landmass has made it strategically significant in great power competition throughout the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries. There is no reason to assume this will change anytime soon. The Biden administration’s actions have left the US without many good policy options in Afghanistan. Furthermore, many Afghans remain distrustful of the White House. But a new US administration will have an opportunity to reset American policy toward the country.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Terrorism, Taliban, Democracy, and National Resistance Front
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and South Asia

27. How the US Can Beat the Kremlin in Moldova

Author:: Peter Rough and Luke Coffey
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine was a seismic event for the Republic of Moldova. The war upended Chișinău’s long-held belief that constitutional neutrality would protect the country. Additionally, the invasion focused Brussels’s attention on Moldova, which the European Union has often regarded as an afterthought. Moscow’s war catalyzed Moldova’s politics and forced Chișinău and Brussels to make fundamental choices about their future relationship on an accelerated timetable. If Russia hadn’t launched its full-scale invasion, the EU would have probably not invited Moldova to open accession talks so quickly. Important elections in Moldova and a perilous situation in Ukraine ensure that 2024 will be a pivotal year on Chișinău’s path toward Western integration. United States and European policymakers should proactively shape an outcome that benefits both Moldovans and the Euro-Atlantic community.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, International Organization, Democracy, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Moldova

28. Turkey’s New State in the Making: Transformations in Legality, Economy, and Coercion

Author:: Nurhayat Kavrak
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: Turkey’s political history has seen recurring shifts between democratic ideals and authoritarian tendencies, notably during the two decades of the Justice and Development Party’s (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) rule. This transition marked a departure from a relatively democratic façade that emerged in response to the European Union (EU) accession process towards a more authoritarian regime characterized by increased government control and curtailment of civil liberties.1 It is a shift accentuated after the 2013 Gezi protests which culminated in a significant regime change in 2018. This transformation was marked by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s consolidation of power through constitutional amendments, leading to the transition from a parliamentary democracy to a presidential system. To comprehend this transformation, it is imperative to examine the interplay between economic dynamics and the state within the neo-liberal capitalist system, aligning with Poulantzas’ observations on global trends.2 It can be argued that the accumulation and state crises, exacerbated by the 2008 global economic crisis, have contributed to Turkey’s authoritarian shift in parallel with global developments. Originating from a 2018 workshop at Middle East Technical University, Turkey’s New State in the Making: Transformations in Legality, Economy, and Coercion provides a historical-sociological perspective on Turkey’s state crises, serving as a vital resource for comprehending authoritarianism and class-state relations and offering an in-depth exploration of the AKP regime’s transformation, presenting a continuum of its history rather than a rigid division between democratic and authoritarian phases.
Topic:: International Relations, History, Authoritarianism, Democracy, Economy, Book Review, AKP, and Coercion
Political Geography:: Turkey, Middle East, and European Union

29. Charting the Radical Right’s Influence on EU Foreign Policy

Author:: Rosa Balfour and Stefan Lehne
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: The political landscape in the European Union (EU) is changing rapidly. For decades, the traditional mainstream parties of the center right and center left have been losing ground, while antiestablishment parties have been gaining support. According to research by the University of Amsterdam, 32 percent of voters opted for antiestablishment parties in 2021, up from 12 percent in the early 1990s.1 Radical-right parties make up about half of this share, and their support has risen faster than that of any other group. Many of the fourteen parties examined in this study have achieved vote shares of 20 percent or more. The radical right is now in government, or supports the government, in Finland, Hungary, Italy, Slovakia, and Sweden. In the Netherlands, it is likely that Geert Wilders’s Party for Freedom (PVV) will be part of a governing coalition. In other countries, these parties have become the leading opposition groups. In France, Marine Le Pen’s National Rally (RN) has been carefully preparing to win the 2027 presidential election. Setbacks for the radical right in Poland and Spain in the second half of 2023 have shown that the relentless rise of these parties is not a foregone conclusion. However, current polling for several national elections and the June 2024 European Parliament elections indicates a strong likelihood of their continuing electoral success.2 Chega (Enough), a recently established party that shot to 18 percent of the vote in Portugal’s March 2024 election, ended the country’s exceptionalism as one of the few European nations without a right-wing populist party.3 The June 2024 Belgian federal election may see the Flemish nationalist party Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest), which so far has been strong in Flanders but kept out of national politics, break through at the federal level. Polling for Austria’s September 2024 parliamentary election suggests a surge in support for the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ).4 In contrast with populism, which has a thin ideology focused mainly on fomenting the anger of the so-called pure people against corrupt elites and which has risen on both the left and the right of the political spectrum, the radical-right parties of the 2020s have a more distinct ideological profile.5 All have national specificities, such as rural origins in Northern Europe or ethnonationalism in Central Europe. Several parties are rooted in postwar fascism, such as the FPÖ, RN, Brothers of Italy (FdI), the Alliance for the Unity of Romanians (AUR), and the Sweden Democrats (SD). For some groups, strong connections with society and well-developed party structures compensated for their marginal impact in national politics. Before its landslide victory in Italy’s 2022 parliamentary election, support for FdI hovered at around 5 percent, as it did for the party’s predecessor throughout the period since World War II.6 Other parties, such as Hungary’s Fidesz, gained ground as classic populist or even mainstream parties and benefited from an aura of respectability even as they shifted toward ethnonationalist or nativist positions. Since the 1990s, liberal-democratic parties have started to adopt some of the ideas of the radical right while keeping the parties themselves out of government. In the 2000s, the radical right became normalized, in some countries becoming part of the political mainstream. During this process, as political scientists Cas Mudde and Jan-Werner Müller have argued, liberal-democratic parties have shifted toward the radical right in the hope—mostly in vain—of keeping their traditional electorates. Yet, in practice, this approach has led voters to prefer the real radical right to its imitators. In other words, the tactic of chasing the radical right has not paid off electorally. Voters have moved toward the radical right as a consequence, not as a cause, of liberal-democratic parties’ attempts to contain it.7 Today, the far right is dominated by the radical right, which, unlike the extreme right, accepts the essence of democracy but rejects its liberal elements: minority rights, the rule of law, and the separation of powers.8 The radical-right parties selected for this study all share deep antimigration sentiments, often determined by race or religion; a nationalism that makes these parties Euroskeptic and opposed to what they see as a Brussels-based dictatorship; and skepticism of climate change policies. Many of these parties also espouse deeply conservative family values that go against women’s and LGBTQ rights. Foreign policy is usually not the strong suit of these parties, apart from their keen interest in the external dimension of migration policy. These parties pay close attention to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine but are sharply divided on this issue, with positions ranging from deep mistrust of Russia to close alignment with the Kremlin’s arguments. A future Donald Trump administration could lead to new divisions in the EU, as some member states are likely to align with the United States under any circumstances. This would mean that many of the EU’s current foreign policy positions, such as support for Ukraine, would come to an end. As radical-right parties rise to prominence at the national and the EU level, they are developing views on a range of foreign policy issues, building increasingly influential international networks and think tanks, and learning from each other’s successful tactics in solidifying their control of the state and propagating their values.9 For some radical-right parties that have been established in government, such as Fidesz and, until October 2023, Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS) party, the upgrading of foreign policy on their political agendas can be inferred by the fact that all diplomatic postings in the EU are political appointments. Hungary’s foreign policy machinery is under the direct control of the prime minister.10 Diplomatic colleagues of the Hungarian representatives in Brussels know that the country’s negotiating positions are micromanaged in Budapest.11 Other countries, such as Italy and Finland, have chosen to rely on the credibility of career diplomats to navigate the Brussels machinery, preferring compromise over confrontation and isolation. For a long time, European politicians and EU institutions have assumed the radical right could be contained. Now, the challenge of the radical right needs to be addressed more seriously. Just as this phenomenon has eroded democracy and the rule of law in some EU member states, so foreign policy may become affected at a time when collective action is most needed to address international issues. As the radical right challenges the EU’s attempts to navigate a dangerous world, European politics can no longer afford complacency.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Migration, European Union, Democracy, and Far Right
Political Geography:: Europe, France, and Germany

30. South Africa’s Cyber Strategy Under Ramaphosa: Limited Progress, Low Priority

Author:: Joe Devanny and Russell Buchan
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: During the decades of apartheid, South Africa was an international pariah. Since the country transitioned to majority rule in 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) has dominated politics, and the ANC has itself transitioned from a national liberation movement to a party of government. Domestically, South African cyber strategy should be seen as part of the ANC’s wider political challenge of trying to deliver economic growth, development, and prosperity. Over thirty years, the ANC has struggled to deliver on this agenda in a profoundly unequal society with infrastructure and institutions that have weakened particularly over the past fifteen years. Alongside confronting domestic challenges, the ANC has also tried to reshape South Africa’s global role. This was perhaps most visible under its first president, Nelson Mandela (1994–1999), but it was arguably pursued most systematically under Mandela’s successor, Thabo Mbeki (1999–2008). This reorientation of South Africa in the world was an ambitious and complex project, the foundations of which were the country’s leading role in its region and continent as well as its ties within the wider Global South. The project entailed tensions between the progressive promotion of human rights and freedoms, on the one hand, and the cultivation of instrumental relations with authoritarian and repressive states, on the other. These tensions continue to affect South African foreign policy, including its cyber diplomacy. South Africa identifies cybersecurity as a key national priority and has to this end adopted a national cybersecurity strategy and established a military Cyber Command. The reality, however, is that other issues have been consistently ranked above cybersecurity, such as addressing corruption, poverty, racial and social injustice, and the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Cybersecurity has therefore not been seen as a high priority by successive South African governments. This has left Cyber Command underresourced and unmotivated. This deprioritization means that South Africa is unlikely to emerge as a prominent military or intelligence cyber power anytime soon. The wider lack of national prioritization will also make it harder for so-called like-minded states—which are bound together by a mutual respect for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law—to form an effective partnership with South Africa on the topic of cybersecurity. South Africa’s approach to international cyber governance debates has been cautious and noncommittal, reflecting cyber diplomacy’s relatively low priority in its national strategy. What position South Africa takes in cyber debates is, however, of keen interest to the international community. An important question is whether South Africa will support the existing multistakeholder approach to cyber governance that is championed by like-minded states or join China and Russia in their efforts to recalibrate this approach and push for greater state control over cyberspace. Indeed, under President Cyril Ramaphosa, South Africa has not yet published its national position explaining how international law applies to cyberspace. A related question is whether South Africa will join like-minded states in elaborating how existing international law applies to cyberspace or side with China and Russia to campaign for new, bespoke international law (for example, treaties) to regulate this domain. When examining these questions, it is important to recognize the context of the ANC’s long-standing ties with Russia, both during its thirty years in government and in its previous decades struggling for national liberation. This is helpful for understanding South Africa’s interactions with Brazil, Russia, India, and China (which form the BRICS bloc with South Africa) and forecasting its future positions in cyber governance debates. For example, South Africa has been reluctant to unambiguously condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and it appears to have supported Moscow by covertly supplying it with weapons. In the longer term, South Africa’s positions in cyber diplomacy debates will likely be shaped by trends in both domestic politics—such as the ANC’s waning electoral performance—and the success of digital development. In this context, it is perhaps advisable for like-minded states, such as the United States, to focus on cyber capacity-building assistance and ensure that these efforts play into the wider development agenda in South Africa.
Topic:: Corruption, Poverty, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Democracy, and Racial Justice
Political Geography:: Africa, Iran, and South Africa

31. Latin America’s New Right Wings: Shifting Ideologies, Transnational Ties

Author:: Ernesto Bohoslavsky and Magdalena Broquetas
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA)
Abstract:: New far-right forces pose a growing threat to democracy across Latin America and the Caribbean. Read more in the Spring 2024 issue of the NACLA Report on the Americas.
Topic:: Climate Change, Democracy, Violence, Far Right, Right-Wing Politics, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Latin America and Caribbean

32. The Far-Right Tide Reaches Uruguay

Author:: Magdalena Broquetas and Gerardo Caetano
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA)
Abstract:: A new radical right with links to the dictatorship has made unprecedented gains. So far, the country’s strong democracy has tempered its worst impacts.
Topic:: Democracy, Domestic Politics, Ideology, and Far Right
Political Geography:: South America and Uruguay

33. Tunisia: Public Opinion Report 2023

Author:: Arab Barometer
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Arab Barometer
Abstract:: Over the past dozen years, Tunisia has experienced dramatic political change. In 2011, the Jasmine Revolution led to the fall of its long-standing leader, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, ushering in a period of political instability. Following the rewriting of the constitution, free and fair elections were held but yielded only weak and largely ineffective governments. Although Tunisians enjoyed far greater political rights, economically the country regressed. A decade after the revolution, GDP per capita had declined significantly. Stories of corruption within government institutions remained common, yielding an increasingly frustrated public. Elections may give voters a say, but the outcomes of the system often appeared no better than in the days of Ben Ali. Citizens demanded radical change and looked for a leader who they believed could deliver actual results. In the 2019 presidential elections, many Tunisians turned to Kaïs Saïed as a solution. Saïed ran a populist campaign as a political outsider, calling for ending corruption and reforms to the electoral system. In the final round of voting, he captured nearly three-quarters of the vote for an overwhelming victory and strong electoral mandate. In July 2021, Saïed dismissed the prime minister and suspended parliament. Ruling by decree, many members of the judiciary were dismissed and many opposition politicians were arrested. Despite international criticism of these actions, results from the 2021 Arab Barometer demonstrated that most Tunisians were in favor of his actions.1 Just three months after the events of July 25, 2021, most Tunisians had confidence in the president, a majority were optimistic about their economic future for the first time in years, and most believed the government was finally tackling the problem of corruption. In short, many Tunisians had hope for their country’s future. In late 2023, Tunisians remained more optimistic than they had been before the election of Saïed, but Arab Barometer’s survey suggests that some are starting to lose hope. Promises of economic improvements have not been realized—just one-in-ten rate the economy as good, which is largely unchanged since 2013. Economic optimism has also fallen, dropping by 14 points since 2021. During this period, hunger has also increased dramatically, with twothirds of Tunisians saying they have gone without food at least once in the previous month. Moreover, the most common perception is that government mismanagement is the source of food insecurity. Views of most political institutions are relatively weak. Just over a third have confidence in the government while less than a quarter trust parliament. However, trust in President Saïed remains strong, with about three-quarters expressing confidence in their leader. Still, this level is a six point decrease from 2021.
Topic:: International Relations, Corruption, Environment, Migration, Governance, Public Opinion, Democracy, Economy, Institutions, Freedom, and Gender
Political Geography:: North Africa and Tunisia

34. Mauritania: Public Opinion Report 2024

Author:: Sahel Foundation
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Arab Barometer
Abstract:: Mauritania has begun a new phase of peaceful rotation of power, being an embodiment of democracy. This democratic transition has been seen through the country’s last government. Therefore, we observe the rising trend of citizens’ trust in the current government. Nine percent of Mauritanians say they trust the government to a great extent, and more than a quarter (27 percent) say they trust it. In contrast, 38 percent say they have little trust in the government, while nearly one-fifth (22 percent) have no trust in their government at all. In order to increase citizens’ trust in the government, it may be worthwhile to enhance communication between the government and citizens and transparently explain decisions and plans. Moreover, it could be important to that end to improve the quality of public services such as health, education, and infrastructure; strengthen the role of citizens in decision-making and participation in the political process; and take effective measures to combat corruption and promote good governance.
Topic:: Corruption, Environment, Gender Issues, Public Opinion, Democracy, Economy, and Freedom
Political Geography:: Africa and Mauritania

35. Morocco: Public Opinion Report 2024

Author:: Arab Barometer
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Arab Barometer
Abstract:: Morocco has endured multiple crises in recent years including the Coronavirus pandemic and the earthquake that hit the country on September 9, 2023. The aftermath of these crises produces what could be described as two Moroccos: one for the wealthier and better educated, another for the poorer and less educated. Moroccans are clearly divided in their views of almost all issues based on their socioeconomic status (SES). Economic pressure persists, with only a third of Moroccans rating their economy positively. While optimism about the future of the economy has increased, it is largely driven by those with a higher socioeconomic status. Their less-fortunate compatriots are far less optimistic and more concerned about increasing inequality and food insecurity. Trust in the Moroccan government remains relatively low, but trust in parliament, regional government, judiciary, and civil society organizations has increased. Still, those struggling financially tend to be less trusting of all these bodies. Similarly, satisfaction with government performance on economic issues is low, especially among the poor. Moroccans are more satisfied with the provision of certain services, including security and infrastructure. On the other hand, education in particular is among the public services in which Moroccans exhibit the lowest levels of satisfaction. Corruption remains a major concern, with the government seen as not doing enough to combat it. This view is especially true among people with lower socioeconomic status. Wealthier and more educated Moroccans are more positive in their rating of the government’s work on combating corruption. However, many Moroccans are resorting to bribery or connection to navigate the bureaucracy. Economic conditions and corruption are causing Moroccans to consider emigrating. Youth and those facing financial pressure are far more likely to have a desire to leave their country, mainly in pursuit of better economic opportunities. Western countries remain the preferred destination for most of the potential migrants in Morocco, many of whom are willing to leave even if they did not have the required documents to do so. While support for democracy has fluctuated over the past few years, recent trends suggest an increase in support for democratic governance. Moroccans acknowledge that democratic systems have their shortcomings, yet they maintain a belief that democracy is preferable to other forms of governance and particularly support a multi-party parliamentary system.
Topic:: International Relations, Corruption, Environment, Gender Issues, Governance, Public Opinion, Democracy, Economy, Institutions, and Freedom
Political Geography:: North Africa and Morocco

36. Bolivia: desk study on aid and democracy

Author:: Swetha Ramachandran
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: United Nations University
Abstract:: This study is part of a series of ten country-focused desk studies on aid and democracy prepared under the project The state and statebuilding in the Global South. They are prepared under the guidance of Rachel M. Gisselquist as background to a broader research effort on aid, governance, and democracy promotion. The studies follow a common template and each draws on the research literature and selected cross-national sources to discuss regime type and timeline, findings from the literature on democracy/democratization, findings from the literature on aid and democracy/democratization, aid flows and sources, and specific aid examples. This study addresses the case of Bolivia, with focus on the post-Cold War period.
Topic:: Foreign Aid, Governance, Democracy, and Post-Cold War
Political Geography:: South America and Bolivia

37. Overcoming digital threats to democracy

Author:: Lydia Khalil
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:: The internet was once considered an open door to democracy and liberty. Today, it is seen as an agent of democratic erosion. Digital challenges to democracy include the scale and spread of disinformation and misinformation, the increase in polarisation and extremism that are facilitated and escalated online, and inadequate regulation. Digital platforms are increasingly perceived by the public as serving the needs and interests of the powerful rather than the public good. Average users have few means to influence key decisions and debates about how digital technologies are used and developed. The rules of the digital sphere — whether made by tech companies, regulators, or politicians — often lack public legitimacy. Applying deliberative democracy principles — where small but representative groups of people make decisions after deliberating on issues in depth — can help address the challenges of legitimacy and generate broadly acceptable solutions to the problems that bedevil online spaces and challenge democracy.
Topic:: Democracy, Disinformation, Polarization, and Digital Technologies
Political Geography:: Global Focus

38. Resistance to Authoritarianism: Lessons Learned from Brazilian Civil Society

Author:: Melina Risso, Renata Avelar Gianini, and Camila Nadalini de Godoy
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Case Study
Institution:: Igarapé Institute
Abstract:: This study aims to encourage debate and strengthen democratic organizations and civil society that defend civic space against attempts to weaken the system of checks and balances that sustain democracy, silence dissenting voices and ideas, co-opt law enforcement agencies, and dismantle public policies to consolidate an authoritarian state. It was developed based on a comprehensive literature review, media coverage analysis, and 18 in-depth interviews with key actors involved in the study’s topics, including civil society, funders, and government officials. The work is divided into six parts. The first part presents the definitions used to develop this study and examines the political context. The following four parts analyze four cases encompassing the main tools used by civil society to defend democracy and combat democratic erosion, highlighting the results achieved. The sixth and final part details essential points of attention for maintaining, strengthening, and continuously promoting a robust civic space and a solid democracy in Brazil. As the authoritarian threats to closing the space for civil society participation are still present nationally and internationally, the initiatives cited here are expected to inspire and guide future initiatives of resistance and protection of civic space in promoting democracy.
Topic:: Civil Society, Authoritarianism, Democracy, and Civil Resistance
Political Geography:: Brazil and South America

39. Europe’s Democracy Catch-22

Author:: Richard Youngs
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: The dominant, epoch-making European storyline is now clear: the rise of the far right threatens the European Union (EU)’s future and democracy. This standard view is expressed in countless opinion pieces and political speeches and is now reshaping both national and EU-level politics. Even if the far right did not surge quite as dramatically as widely predicted in either the European Parliament or French parliamentary elections, its growing popularity clearly represents a pressing challenge both at the EU level and in national politics (Ash 2024). However, the continent’s predicament might be more accurately described as a more subtle and complex conundrum: in the immediate short term, what is good for the EU integration project might not be good for democracy, and vice versa. The EU and national governments have been struggling with this democracy catch-22 for several years now, and the election results make it an even sharper challenge. The postelection context has been dominated by the debate over whether to engage or isolate the far right—a debate that has been exhaustively covered and unfolding for many years. Yet, the empirical record suggests that neither engaging with the far right nor ostracizing it has worked especially well. Instead, a third approach might help map a way out of the democracy catch-22: a European democracy pact.
Topic:: Elections, European Union, Democracy, and Far Right
Political Geography:: Europe

40. Mongolia’s Electoral Reform and the State Great Khural (Parliamentary) Elections

Author:: Ganbat Damba and Byambakhand Luguusharav
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: Since the transition to a democratic systеm and market economy in the early 1990s, Mongolia has held its 9th parliamentary election. In a historic first, the election held on June 28 was carried out under the new electoral systеm. A total of 78 members of parliament (MPs) were elected from 13 majoritarian districts, with an additional 48 MPs elected through proportional representation in a nationwide constituency (General Election Commission of Mongolia 2024). The new parliament consists of 126 seats, in accordance with the amendments to the Constitution introduced in 2023. The election results demonstrated that the Mongolian People’s Party (MPP) secured 68 seats, followed by the Democratic Party (DP) with 42 seats, the HUN Party with 8 seats, and both the National Alliance and the Civil Will-Green Party with 4 seats each. It is noteworthy that the MPP won 50 constituency seats and 18 from the party list, thereby ensuring a majority presence in parliament alongside three other parties that surpassed the legal threshold for representation (Oyunchimeg 2024). This distribution of seats underscores the diversity of representation in parliament, reflecting the electorate’s support for multiple political entities and ensuring a legislative body that is balanced and representative of the political spectrum. Over the past 34 years, various electoral systеms have been employed, including majoritarian voting systеms with single or multiple mandates and mixed systеms that combine majoritarian and proportional representation voting elements. Each systеm has its strengths and weaknesses. However, the criticism from both the public and political parties of the contemporary electoral systеm has resulted in frequent changes to it. Before the new systеm was introduced, the Mongolian parliament had maintained 76 seats since 1990. The number of seats in the parliament was increased by approximately 40 percent, from 76 to 126. Since 1990, Mongolia’s population has grown from 2.15 million to 3.5 million, an increase of about 40 percent. As a representative institution of the people, there has been significant debate in recent years regarding the potential expansion of the parliamentary seats. The proposed increase in seats has prompted a considerable number of individuals to seek election. In the first democratic election held after new democratic Constitution in 1992, only 293 individuals representing 10 parties and independents ran for the parliament. The 2024 Election saw the largest number of candidates to date, with the highest number of candidacies. A total of 372 individuals from 22 parties and coalitions contested the election through party lists, while 969 candidates ran in constituencies, resulting in a total of 1,341 candidates, marking a record high.
Topic:: Elections, Democracy, Voting, and Parliament
Political Geography:: Mongolia and Asia

41. Horizontal Accountability Requires More than Legal Checks and Balances Systеm: Ten Asian Country Cases

Author:: Sook Jong Lee
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: Most countries, except closed autocracies, conduct popular elections. However, the quality of global democracy has been deteriorating. One of the most significant illiberal trends is the aggrandizement of executive power led by a popularly elected political leader. Strongmen often bend or simply violate democratic rules by abusing their executive power. The electoral mandate gives them legitimacy, making the efforts to check their executive power difficult. In this context, horizontal accountability based on the checks and balances systеm and oversight institutions is important to prevent the emergence of strongmen. However, horizontal accountability cannot function effectively unless its legal mechanisms are implemented in practice. Ten Asian country cases, presented in previously published ADRN working papers, demonstrated that horizontal accountability perform better when the legislature is not politically captured by the executive power and the judiciary is independent. Oversight institutions also require both political independence and institutional capacity. The electoral accountability of elected elites to voters helps the legislative branch to fulfill its role of constraining the excessive executive power. Independent media and civil society participation always assist both electoral and horizontal accountability.
Topic:: Law, Democracy, Accountability, Civic Engagement, and Political Participation
Political Geography:: Asia

42. Inside the Summit for Democracy: What’s Next?

Author:: Ken Godfrey and Anthony Smith
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: The third iteration of the Summit for Democracy (S4D) in Seoul from March 18 to 20 was an improvement on several elements of previous versions of S4D but still inherited some of the challenges. With this third summit in the rearview mirror, it is a good moment to take stock of the concrete impact of the summit itself and the goals of the S4D process in the future. We argue that the S4D has significant shortcomings but still has added value moving forward if the format can be adjusted in a more pragmatic direction.
Topic:: Civil Society, Democracy, Global South, Cooperation, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Asia

43. South Korea’s Official Development Assistance for Democracy Support

Author:: Sook Jong Lee
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: As of 2022, South Korea provides Official Development Assistance (ODA) amounting to 2.79 billion USD, 0.17% of its gross national income, ranking 16th among the donor countries in the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which includes 30 countries. Since joining the DAC in 2010, South Korea’s ODA has been steadily increasing. The successful transition from a recipient to a donor country is a significant achievement globally. However, in the context of South Korea’s high status in liberal democracy, its level of support for democratic governance is relatively low. There is no clear definition of ‘democracy aid,’ but it generally refers to aid used to advocate and support democracy. Given that democracy aid could be perceived as interference in the internal affairs of recipient countries, it is not prominently emphasized in development assistance where poverty alleviation and socio-economic development are the primary goals. The DAC aims to promote development cooperation and related policies, targeting Sustainable Development 2030, which includes inclusive and sustainable economic development, progress in national and international equality, poverty eradication, and improving living conditions in developing countries. It establishes a standard of assistance policy in various fields such as development, trade, industry, environment, gender equality, anti-corruption, and strengthening civil society. In essence, the DAC does not explicitly state that spreading democracy is the purpose of ODA (OECD n.d.). South Korea’s Framework Act on International Development Cooperation also stipulates the purpose of itself to “enhance the appropriateness of policies for international development cooperation and the efficiency of the implementation thereof, and effectively achieve the policy objectives of international development cooperation by providing for basic matters concerning international development cooperation, thus contributing to the co-prosperity of humanity and to world peace.” This law outlines the principles of international development cooperation, such as “respect for all the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; support for the self-help efforts and abilities of developing countries; respect for the necessity of development of developing countries; increase in sharing of development experiences; and mutual harmony with the international community and promotion of cooperation therewith,” but there is no mention of linking ODA to democracy (OECD 2005; Korea Legislation Research Institute n.d.).
Topic:: Development, Democracy, Civil Society Organizations, and OECD
Political Geography:: Asia and South Korea

44. The Gaza War – Affective Polarization and the Future of Democracy

Author:: Cengiz Günay
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: The terrible terrorist attacks of October 7, 2023, and the subsequent War in Gaza have not only affected the Middle East, but they have also had a disruptive impact on Western democracies. Divisions between those who support Israel’s fight against Islamist terrorism and those who the foreground the sufferings of Palestinian civilians have overlapped with deep affective polarization in many societies. The two positions seem to be irreconcilable and leave little to no room for empathy and dialogue. This report highlights a growing overlap between the perception of international conflicts and domestic polarization over identity issues and values.
Topic:: Democracy, Conflict, Polarization, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

45. Japan’s Approach to the Global South

Author:: Tobias Harris
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, in a January 2023 speech in Washington, DC, stressed that if the G7 countries and their developed-world peers neglect the “Global South”, “we will find ourselves in the minority and unable to resolve mounting policy issues.” These remarks set the stage for a major theme of Japan’s G7 presidency that year, during which Tokyo continued to highlight the importance of more “humility” to strengthen relations between the group’s members and the “Global South”. The G7 leaders’ communiqué at their May 2023 Hiroshima summit did not refer explicitly to the Global South—the United States and other nations did not necessarily share Japan’s preference for the term, which risks treating as monolithic an enormously diverse array of countries—but the document stressed the importance of addressing the needs of middle- and low-income states, including a commitment to “continued efforts to scale up official development assistance (ODA)” and to adopting “innovative financing mechanisms”. This emphasis on outreach to the developing countries assumed greater urgency following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, when they were often reluctant to support Western efforts to isolate and punish the Kremlin for its aggression. Japan’s approach to the “Global South” is not merely rhetorical. The Kishida government inherited a long-standing approach to developing nations, particularly those in Asia, that seeks to leverage Japanese ODA and public and private investment. The approach has two goals: to promote growth and strengthen economic ties with developing countries, and to foster trust and political credibility that can be translated into influence. The strategy is shaped by Japan’s national interests but seeks to address developing countries’ economic needs without drawing them into an anti-Beijing bloc. The approach has worked well in Southeast Asia, where, thanks to decades of efforts by successive governments, Japan is viewed particularly favorably. Tokyo now appears increasingly determined to pursue the same strategy in other parts of the “Global South”, including South Asia, the Pacific island states, and, to a lesser extent, Africa and Latin America. As Japan’s G7 peers seek to undertake their own initiatives to improve relations with the “Global South”, the key principles and successes of the country’s policies are worth examining.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, Democracy, Business, Global South, and Trade
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

46. Democratic Russian Civil Society Outside Russia? A Window of Opportunity for Support

Author:: Nicolas Bouchet
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Russia has large sources of wealth and military power and is controlled by an autocratic, kleptocratic regime willing to devote these to aggression toward its neighbors, most violently in Ukraine. It is in the interest of Europe and the United States to support Russians who can help the country become more peaceful and democratic, alongside anti-regime measures. Repression has made supporting democratic actors in Russia extremely difficult but not impossible. That goal must now be complemented. Around 1 million people have left Russia since it invaded Ukraine in 2022. This opens a window of opportunity for unimpeded access to a large number of Russians to aid the spread of democratic ideas; raising the prospect of a democratic civil society developing outside the country. Europe and the United States need a strategy to support the democratic potential of the recent emigrants. Their largest concentrations are in the South Caucasus, Central Asia, the Western Balkans as well as Israel, Türkiye, the EU and the United States. The bulk of the emigrants are young adults who are richer, more educated, and more politically interested or active than the average citizen in Russia. For most, the motivations for leaving mixed political, economic, and lifestyle factors, and for many also unwillingness to be drafted into the military. The majority have democratic, anti-regime, and antiwar views. The emigrants include long-standing and newly civically and politically active individuals. A large share continue engagement abroad in diverse organizations and initiatives. Their activities focus on rebuilding civil society organizations (CSOs) and media abroad, supporting democratic actors and spreading independent information in Russia, and antiwar initiatives. They provide help to new emigrants and aim to build up their communities. These activities are carried out from one or more host countries, building transnational networks. There are new grassroots actions and initiatives by emigrants who had less or no direct experience of activism in Russia. Emigrant groups mostly operate through horizontal, fluid networks. Many of these are small and informal, but there are larger, more structured ones. Emigrant communities also offer a space for critical debate about the need for democratic change and the link between this and Russia’s colonial/imperial heritage and aggression. The recent emigrants’ activities face many challenges, including those in operating networks reliant on online resources; in connecting digital and non-digital activism; and in planning beyond the short term without sufficient resources. They are hampered by reliance on small (often part-time) core teams and volunteers. Many activists experience financial precarity, employment insecurity, and burnout. Security is a major concern due to the risk of infiltration, destabilization, and cyber and physical attacks by Russia’s security apparatus. The situation for emigrants has become more restrictive or less safe in some host countries. Individuals and organizations that oppose the Russian regime are also affected by restrictive international measures against it, such as ones against money laundering and the monetization of online content, or the denial of access to financial, professional, and commercial services. As Russians have realized that emigration will be for a longer term, the phase of settling in a host country became more prominent than the earlier exit phase. For many, this includes the need to move from the first host country, with those more politically active more likely to look for one with a safer, more enabling environment. This will largely mean seeking to move to an EU or other Western country. The non-EU countries easiest for Russians to access are also the ones where their prospects are more uncertain, whereas the EU countries are harder to access but offer more certain prospects. Russia in the 1990s showed how an unpredicted democratic opening can fail to lead to lasting or deep change. Today, alongside aiding political and nongovernmental actors, democracy-support providers should also try to help Russian society evolve in a democratic direction. The new emigrant activities are seeds for a democratic civil society abroad that is closely connected to, and supportive of, the one in Russia. Three principles should underpin a strategy to support the democratic potential of the recent Russian emigration: shifting emphasis to the settling phase of emigration, prioritizing connectivity within the emigration, and helping weave a civil society abroad. To foster the development of a democratic civil society among Russian emigrants, assistance musttarget the building of a wider community that can be more effective and serve as a model in Russia. For this, the landscape of Russians outside Russia can be seen as four concentric circles, based on their degree of direct political activity: the political opposition in exile; the civil society sector of democracy, human rights, and media organizations; the community of emigrants since 2022, and in particular the new grassroots actors and initiatives emerging within it; and the older, multigeneration Russian diaspora. A democracy support strategy for Russian emigrants should not be open-ended but time-bound, with a pragmatic approach in an uncertain environment. It can be assessed in 2030, when President Vladimir Putin’s current term as president is due to end, which could be a time of political turbulence. The strategy can be initially implemented within the next 12–24 months, with annual review of support offered to civil society, especially at the grassroots, with the potential to grow and to reach out to the apolitical emigrants. Support should consist of mostly small, short-term assistance to actors and initiatives that would have until 2030 to show that they have impact and longer-term potential. It is crucial to support the widest range of diverse, dispersed actors of different sizes so that they can keep operating. The focus should not be only on formal organizations but also on more bounded initiatives and projects. Part of the assistance should focus on enabling politically and civically active emigrants to connect physically and virtually across locations, and to focus on flexible networking suited to their mobility challenges. Funders need to think widely in terms of locations and formats for delivering support. Using different, sometimes unconventional, ways of engaging emigrant actors is a necessity. Support should not rely only on usual formats, not least since new ones for activities are emerging from within the emigrant landscape. Such support is also key for encouraging and amplifying the critical thinking in the emigrant landscape as well as connections to new antiwar and anti-imperialist initiatives—a prerequisite for any democratic progress in Russia. Connections are what make a society more than a collection of groups. For the development of a democratic civil society outside Russia, support should be directed not only within the individual circles of the emigration but also at connections between them. The primary focus should be on relations between the second (established CSOs) and third (new grassroots actors) circles to prevent the diverse civically and politically active emigrants and groups being in silos. Contacts with recent emigrants could also eventually encourage changes in attitudes within the older diaspora toward the Russian regime or democratic civic engagement in general.
Topic:: Civil Society, Democracy, Refugees, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

47. The End of Russia’s “Unipolar Moment” in the South Caucasus

Author:: Irakli Sirbiladze
Publication Date:: 08-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: The war in Ukraine has exposed Russia’s weaknesses and ended its “unipolar moment” in the South Caucasus. This has affected the calculations of the three states in a region where Moscow traditionally had the upper hand over local and competing outside actors. Prior to the war, Russia had been able sustain its security, political, and economic leverage over Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, yet the extent of its influence varied over time and depending on the leadership in each country. Moscow was Armenia’s key ally, bringing the country into its security, political, and economic space. Russia also enjoyed close political and business ties with Azerbaijan, underpinned by shared authoritarianism. Baku joined the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) but stayed out of Russian-led security institutions. Moscow’s role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict gave it particular security leverage over Baku and Yerevan. Russia’s leverage with Georgia has fluctuated. The country joined the CIS but not other Russian-led organizations. Political ties started to erode in the early 2000s, especially following the 2003 Rose Revolution. The 2008 war weakened Russia’s leverage as Georgia left the CIS and cut diplomatic ties. Economic relations have improved since 2012 even as Tbilisi continued to seek EU and NATO membership. The war in Ukraine has weakened Russia’s sway over the region, accelerating what had started with the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War as Moscow sided with Azerbaijan rather than its treaty ally Armenia. This led to growing difference with Yerevan and convergence with Baku. Armenia is now looking for alternative security partners and engaging with the EU and the United States. Azerbaijan is taking advantage of Moscow’s focus on Ukraine to fully achieve its objectives, including the early departure of Russian peacekeepers from its territory. Georgia receiving EU candidate status could have reduced Russia’s leverage but its ruling party’s antidemocratic and anti-West turn keeps favoring Moscow’s influence. Western economic sanctions have further undermined Russia’s hold over the South Caucasus states: it needs them more to connect and trade with Asian markets. The new geo-economic reality favors the three countries and Moscow can now hardly use economic tools against them. Russia’s waning influence has made it one among other players in the South Caucasus. It can no longer ignore the role of China, the EU, Iran, Türkiye, and the United States there. The emerging geopolitical and geo-economic plurality in the region has made Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia more daring and transactional in their engagement with all outside powers. This has implications for the three countries in terms of peace and security, democracy, and geopolitical orientation. Azerbaijan is likely to remain undemocratic and to keep engaging with all powers transactionally to maintain national and regime security. Armenia finds itself in a complicated state of insecurity that affects democratization and makes multi-alignment its default foreign policy orientation. Georgia, whose democratic decline is the result of its own politics, is likely to sustain its multi-aligned and transactional foreign policy posture if the current government stays in power, while an opposition victory in the coming elections might turn the country back to democracy and a West-oriented foreign policy.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Democracy, Geopolitics, and Unipolarity
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, South Caucasus, and Black Sea

48. Disinformation in the City: Response Playbook

Author:: Jessica (Ika) Trijsburg and Paul Costello
Publication Date:: 08-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: As actors responsible for decisions and policies that shape people’s daily lives, and as those most aware of community fault lines that are fertile ground for disinformation, city officials are well positioned to respond. Yet, research, analysis, and policymaking related to disinformation have remained at the national and international levels. GMF, the Melbourne Centre for Cities, and other partners have developed a response playbook to help inform and guide city policies and practices to counter disinformation and ultimately to strengthen democracy. In cities, disinformation sometimes manifests itself in physical events, including protests and disruptions. It also has individual impacts for political, institutional, and community leaders and staff. Disinformation affects the functioning of city administrations and elected bodies, impacting governance and policymaking. It also impacts communities, reducing mutual trust and increasing division and polarization. Disinformation commonly exploits existing social fault lines and polarization. In cities, the fault lines targeted by disinformation center around First Nations, migrants, cultural diversity, gender and sexual diversity, health and wellbeing, sustainability and climate issues, and urban planning. Understanding how disinformation spreads, and how to respond effectively, is critical for city governments. Current knowledge, however, is focused mainly on the national and international realms and not readily accessible and translatable for urban governance needs. This is why GMF Cities, in response to needs expressed by many city governments, developed this playbook in collaboration with a core interdisciplinary research team from the Australian National University, Monash University, Deakin University, and Victoria University, led by the Melbourne Centre for Cities at the University of Melbourne. The playbook was developed with representatives from cities, media, the tech sector, civil society, and academia. The process began with an in-depth survey to understand the current experiences of participating cities and responses to disinformation they employed. The findings informed a series of workshops with 40 participants who together created the content of and recommendations in the playbook. The full draft was reviewed by the participants before it was submitted to other cities, city networks, disinformation experts, and other levels of government for pressure testing.
Topic:: Democracy, Cities, and Disinformation
Political Geography:: Global Focus

49. Teaching Difficult Histories: Key Principles For Democracy

Author:: Stuart Austin
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: This project report details the discussions and findings of the Teaching History Programme of the Ratiu Forum from 2023 to 2024, sitting under the Central and South-East Europe Programme. The workshops and conferences engaged with History teachers of post-communist Europe to address the challenges of politicised History curricula and explore methods for teaching difficult and dark pasts – facilitating and improving cross-border understanding within the region. The report concludes with recommendations for teachers generated by the workshops, geared towards open and democratic societies to counter political extremism and autocratic populism, as well as considering the direction for future workshops.
Topic:: Democracy, Populism, History, Political Extremism, and Post-Communism
Political Geography:: Europe

50. The Past, Present, and Future of Realism: A Conversation with Stephen M. Walt—February 2024

Author:: Stephen M. Walt
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: I liked realism from the start because I thought it did a much better job of explaining how states behave than other theories. It is not perfect, and it’s not that other perspectives don’t make their own contributions to our understanding, but I felt that realism had a much better track record in explaining how countries behaved. It also had extraordinary range across time and space: realist ideas could explain a lot about how empires acted, how city-states acted, how nation-states acted. It had explanations for why wars occur, why alliances form, why some states rise and fall. So it had a very wide applicability. And I thought that the main modern rivals to realist theory just weren’t as persuasive. Liberal theories didn’t predict that well. A good liberal would think that democracies would act fundamentally differently than autocracies, but the evidence that they do is limited. And as we talked about before, realism tells you that international law or norms will be of only limited value in controlling what the most powerful states will do.
Topic:: International Affairs, Democracy, Realism, and State
Political Geography:: Global Focus

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