Abbas Zaki made the following statement at a ceremony in Beirut marking the 43d anniversary of Fatah. The text, which was published by Majallat al-Dirasat al-Filastiniyya in spring 2008, was translated from Arabic by JPS.
Mahmud al-Zahar, based in Gaza, is a cofounder of Hamas and served as Palestinian Authority foreign minister in PM Ismail Haniyeh's government, elected in January 2006, until that government was ousted in June 2007. This essay appeared as an op-ed in the Washington Post during a regional tour by former president Jimmy Carter, who met informally with Hamas leaders in Damascus, Cairo, and Ramallah (see Carter's trip report in Doc. D4, below). The same day the Washington Post ran Zahar's piece, its lead editorial criticized Zahar for his "hatred of Israel" and Carter for "embrac[ing] Hamas terrorists," denouncing Hamas as "a group that advocates terrorism, mass murder or the extinction of another state [Israel]." Both pieces can be found online at www.washingtonpost.com.
The following excerpts from Minister Livni's welcoming speech to delegates from forty states participating in the Global Forum for Combating Anti-Semitism conference held in Jerusalem on 24-25 February indicate that the Israeli government considers the fight against anti-Semitism to be central to Israeli foreign policy and urges more states to confront anti-Semitism in an urgent and systematic manner. (For comparison, see the U.S. Department of State's "Report on Global Anti-Semitism" in Doc. D3 below.)
In response to criticisms that its military attacks on Gaza following Hamas Qassam rocket strikes in Sederot were causing unnecessary civilian casualties, Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) released a background paper in March, excerpted below, to clarify and justify the Israel Defense Forces' (IDF) understanding of the principle of proportionality. This principle, along with the principle of intentionality, forms the jurisprudence of International Humanitarian Law. Citing a number of international legal scholars and Article 52(2) of the Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions (1977), to which Israel is a signatory, the background paper attempts to redefine proportionality in order to legitimate attacks on targets that are not strictly military, placing the blame for any civilian deaths on Hamas for using civilians as "human shields." Although the IDF and the MFA have advanced this argument in response to international criticism about IDF strikes causing civilian deaths in Lebanon and the occupied Palestinian territories, this background paper represents an attempt to subordinate the need to cause as little harm to civilians as possible to Israel's stated need to preempt future attacks. The report is available online at www.mfa.gov.il.
On 13 April, the Israeli human rights organization Public Committee against Torture in Israel (PCATI) released an extensive report, excerpted below, detailing the Israeli Security Agency's (Shin Bet) use of abuse and threats against detainees' family members in order to extract confessions. PCATI's report also reveals that despite the Israeli High Court ruling against the use of torture in 1999, both physical and psychological torture, assisted by physicians, continues. The report concludes with recommendations concerning both legislation and the supervision of the General Security Services (GSS) that will contribute to preventing the use of this deplorable method. One of six cases presented in the report is excerpted below. The full report is available online at www.stoptorture.org.il.
In 2004, Pres. George W. Bush signed the Global Anti-Semitism Review Act into law, establishing the Office to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism within the State Department and requiring the secy. of state to submit an occasional report to Congress on anti-Semitic activity around the world that covers events; the responses of the respective government, including measures taken to enforce laws that ensure freedom of religion for the Jewish people; efforts of each government to promote anti-bias education; and media that propagate, promote, or justify acts of racial hatred against Jewish people. The first Global Anti-Semitism Report was issued on 15 December 2004. The second report, excerpted below, was released on 14 March 2008 and is available in full at www.state.gov. For comparison, see Israeli Vice PM and FM Tzipi Livni's speech in Doc. C1, above.
From 13-22 April, former U.S. Pres. Jimmy Carter held high-profile meetings with political and civil society leaders in Israel, Palestine, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. The trip occasioned heated debates in the U.S. and Israeli media, largely because Carter planned to meet with Hamas leaders, particularly Khalid Mishal, who agreed in the course of their Damascus talks to put Hamas's position on final status talks with Israel in writing, which Carter formally unveiled at the end of his trip (see excerpts). Initially, Carter intended to make the trip part of a larger delegation led by Nelson Mandela to raise awareness of the urgent need for Israeli-Arab peace and the interlocking nature of the region's conflicts. After Israel denied the group's request to meet with senior officials during the tour to protest the planned meeting with Mishal, the delegation canceled its trip, and Carter opted to go on his own on behalf of the Carter Center. Israel agreed to receive him but denied permission for him to travel to Gaza to meet with Hamas's Ismail Haniyeh. Carter instead met with Hamas officials in Ramallah, Cairo, and Damascus. Israeli PM Ehud Olmert, Vice PM and FM Tzipi Livni, and opposition leader Benjamin Netanyahu, as well as Palestinian pres. Mahmud Abbas, turned down requests to meet. Carter was received 4/13 on behalf of Israel by Pres. Shimon Peres, who reprimanded him for having "caused many problems in recent years with your comments and meetings," and 4/14 on behalf of the PA by PM Salam Fayyad. During the trip, he alsomet with the PA's negotiation advisers, various Israeli MKs, Israeli and Palestinian student groups, U.S. security envoy Lt. Gen. Keith Dayton, Syrian pres. Bashar al-Asad, Jordan's King Abdallah, and Saudi Arabia's King Abdallah. The State Dept. urged (4/10) Carter against meeting with Mishal, arguing that it went against U.S. policy of isolating Hamas. Carter responded that peace could not be achieved without including Hamas and stressed that he was traveling in a personal capacity. The following excerpts from Carter's "Trip Report" cover his meetings with Hamas leaders and President Asad, and his overall impressions regarding the status of the peace process. The full text is available online at www.cartercenter.org.
Political Geography:
Israel, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Cairo, and Damascus
George W. Bush visited Israel from 13 to 16 May in celebration of the country's 60th anniversary. His speech to the Knesset, which was noted in both the U.S. and Israeli press for its hawkishness, was boycotted by Palestinian MKs. The speech is available online at www.whitehouse.gov.
UN Security Council Resolution 242 endorsed the "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war" and called for "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied" in the June 1967 war. Since then, a debate has raged over whether these provisions call for a complete Israeli withdrawal, a minor revision of borders, or license for Israel to retain sovereignty over some of the conquered lands. This article argues that the resolution must be read through the lens of international law. A principled legal interpretation clarifies 242's ambiguities on withdrawal and re-establishes the importance of universal rights to a just and durable peace in the Middle East.
This essay offers an assessment of the extent to which UNSC Resolution 242's procedural and substantive recommendations have facilitated a negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The historical record of each of the mechanisms of the Middle East peace process demonstrates that the mediation mechanism established in 242 was too feeble for the task assigned to it. The resolution's ambiguities and omissions further diminished its value as a tool of dispute resolution, creating confusion about what acceptance of 242 signified, encouraging hard bargaining by the parties, and denying leaders the political cover for necessary compromise.