Publication Year: within 5 Years - CIAO Search Results

15501. The way forward for Turkish-American relations: Partnership à la carte?

Author:: Selin Nasi
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:: In this issue of Turkeyscope, Selin Nasi analyzes how Turkish and American foreign policies have reached an impasse on a number of issues. Despite these differences, she highlights several areas of mutual interest where cooperation can, nevertheless, improve the relationship going forward.
Topic:: International Relations, Partnerships, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Turkey and United States of America

15502. Turkish-Russian Relations: A Puzzle that Shakes the Middle East

Author:: Remi Daniel
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:: In this issue of Turkeyscope, Remi Daniel discusses several contemporary trends in the Russian-Turkish relationship. The dynamics of competition and cooperation between these two states affect the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Central Asia and North Africa in profound ways.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Russia, Central Asia, Turkey, Middle East, Eastern Europe, and North Africa

15503. Afghanistan offers an opportunity to repair Turkey-NATO relations

Author:: Kohei Imai
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:: In this issue of Turkeyscope, Dr. Kohei Imai discusses the context for Turkey's planned involvement in Afghanistan even after the US-led widrawal that is currently underway. Turkey's agreement to handle security for the Kabul airport demonstrates its unique and strategic role in NATO.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, and NATO
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Turkey, and United States of America

15504. The Central Asian Perspective on Turkey: Does Family Come First?

Author:: Oğul Tuna
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:: In our latest issue of Turkeyscope, Oğul Tuna discusses the changing role of Turkey in Central Asia in recent years. This essay argues that ethnolinguistic links have helped improve relations since the collapse of the Soviet Union, but each Central Asian state has its own calculations that factor into separate diplomatic, cultural, and defense deals with Turkey.
Topic:: International Relations, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Culture, Ethnicity, and Language
Political Geography:: Central Asia and Turkey

15505. The “Four Plus One”: The Changing Power Politics of the Middle East

Author:: Joshua Krasna and George Meladze
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:: In this inaugural MDC Occasional Paper, Josh Krasna and George Meladze analyze the structure of power in the Middle East during the past decade, mapping the main regional players and the interrelationships between them, and assessing the potential for future change in the politics of the region.
Topic:: Politics, Regional Cooperation, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

15506. The Responsibility to Protect: A Background Briefing

Author:: Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Abstract:: The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) concept sought to confront both the Rwanda tragedy and the Kosovo dilemma by stipulating that states have an obligation to protect their citizens from mass atrocity crimes; that the international community will assist them in doing so; and that, should the state be “manifestly failing” in its obligations, the international community is obliged to act. R2P seeks to ensure that the international community never again fails to act in the face of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity. By accepting a collective responsibility to protect, the international community issued a solemn pledge that it cannot lightly ignore.
Topic:: International Law, United Nations, Conflict, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and Norms
Political Geography:: Kosovo, Rwanda, and Global Focus

15507. R2P Monitor, Issue 55, 15 January 2021

Author:: Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Abstract:: R2P Monitor is a bimonthly bulletin applying the atrocity prevention lens to populations at risk of mass atrocities around the world. Issue 55 looks at developments in Afghanistan, Cameroon, the Central Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger), China, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Syria, Venezuela, Yemen, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Myanmar (Burma), Nigeria and South Sudan.
Topic:: Crisis Management, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), Norms, Atrocities, and International Humanitarian Law (IHL)
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Africa, China, South Asia, Middle East, Asia, Yemen, Democratic Republic of the Congo, South America, Mozambique, Syria, Venezuela, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Myanmar, South Sudan, Cameroon, Sahel, and Central African Republic

15508. R2P Monitor, Issue 56, 15 March 2021

Author:: Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Abstract:: R2P Monitor is a bimonthly bulletin applying the atrocity prevention lens to populations at risk of mass atrocities around the world. Issue 56 looks at developments in Afghanistan, Cameroon, Central Sahel, China, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Myanmar (Burma), Syria, Venezuela, Yemen, Central African Republic, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Sudan and Sudan.
Topic:: International Law, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), Norms, Atrocities, and International Humanitarian Law (IHL)
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, China, Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, Syria, Venezuela, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Myanmar, South Sudan, Cameroon, Sahel, and Central African Republic

15509. R2P Monitor, Issue 57, 1 June 2021

Author:: Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Abstract:: R2P Monitor is a quarterly bulletin applying the atrocity prevention lens to populations at risk of mass atrocities around the world. Issue 57 looks at developments in Afghanistan, Cameroon, Central Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger), China, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Myanmar (Burma), Syria, Venezuela, Yemen, Mozambique, Central African Republic, Nigeria, South Sudan and Sudan.
Topic:: International Law, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), Norms, Atrocities, and International Humanitarian Law (IHL)
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, China, Sudan, Israel, Yemen, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Palestine, Mozambique, Syria, Venezuela, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Myanmar, South Sudan, Cameroon, Sahel, and Central African Republic

15510. UN Security Council Elections for 2022-2023 and the Responsibility to Protect

Author:: Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Abstract:: Today, 11 June 2021, the UN General Assembly elected Albania, Brazil, Gabon, Ghana and the United Arab Emirates to the UN Security Council for the period of 2022-2023. With their election, 9 of the 15 members of the Council in 2022 will be “Friends of the Responsibility to Protect” – having appointed an R2P Focal Point and/or joined the Group of Friends of R2P in New York and Geneva. Albania, Brazil and Ghana all co-sponsored and voted for the recent UN General Assembly resolution on R2P. The United Arab Emirates also voted in favor of the resolution while Gabon did not participate in the vote. Despite its role as the UN body responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, all too often the Security Council has been unable to take timely action on mass atrocity situations due to deep political divisions inside the Council over human rights, conflict prevention and national sovereignty. In recent years this has had a debilitating effect on the Council’s capacity to respond to atrocities in Myanmar, Syria, Yemen, Ethiopia and elsewhere. It is therefore more important than ever for Council members to work in creative ways to ensure that the international community is able to take timely, practical action to prevent atrocities and protect vulnerable populations. Since 2005 the Security Council has adopted 92 resolutions and 21 presidential statements that refer to the Responsibility to Protect, including with regard to situations in the Central African Republic, South Sudan, Syria and eight other country situations, as well as a number of thematic issue areas. It is our hope that the Security Council will consistently uphold their commitment to R2P by taking decisive action to avert emerging crises and halt atrocities wherever they are threatened. The Global Centre has compiled basic profiles on each of the newly elected Security Council members. These provide an overview of their engagement with R2P, including whether they have appointed an R2P Focal Point, their respective contributions to UN peacekeeping operations, and their status with relevant international legal regimes, including the Genocide Convention and Arms Trade Treaty.
Topic:: United Nations, Elections, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and UN Security Council
Political Geography:: Brazil, Albania, Ghana, United Arab Emirates, Global Focus, and Gabon

15511. R2P Monitor, Issue 58, 1 September 2021

Author:: Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Abstract:: R2P Monitor is a quarterly bulletin applying the atrocity prevention lens to populations at risk of mass atrocities around the world. Issue 58 looks at developments in Afghanistan, Cameroon, Central Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger), China, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Myanmar (Burma), Syria, Venezuela, Yemen, Central African Republic, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Sudan and Sudan.
Topic:: International Law, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), Norms, Atrocities, and International Humanitarian Law (IHL)
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, China, Sudan, Israel, Yemen, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Palestine, Mozambique, Syria, Venezuela, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Myanmar, South Sudan, Cameroon, Sahel, and Central African Republic

15512. UN Human Rights Council Elections for 2022-2024 and the Responsibility to Protect

Author:: Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Abstract:: Today, 14 October, the UN General Assembly elected Argentina, Benin, Cameroon, Eritrea, Finland, The Gambia, Honduras, India, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Montenegro, Paraguay, Qatar, Somalia, United Arab Emirates and the United States of America to the Human Rights Council (HRC) for the 2022-2024 term. With the elections of Argentina, Finland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Paraguay, Qatar and the United States of America, 19 of the 47 Council members in 2022 will be “Friends of the Responsibility to Protect” – having appointed an R2P Focal Point and/or joined the Group of Friends of R2P in New York and Geneva. The Human Rights Council and its mechanisms and procedures – including the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), investigative mechanisms, special procedures and treaty bodies, as well as the technical assistance provided by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) – all play an essential role in providing early warning of the risk factors that can lead to crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and genocide, and provide recommendations to prevent their recurrence. The election of Cameroon, Eritrea and the United Arab Emirates – states that have a history of violating human rights and perpetrating atrocities at home or abroad – undermines the credibility of the HRC. States elected to the HRC are supposed to demonstrate their commitment to the highest standards of human rights, including their full cooperation with all UN mechanisms. These are conditions set forth in UN General Assembly Resolution 60/251. The fact that potential mass atrocity crimes are being perpetrated by a number of HRC member states is deeply disturbing. The Global Centre has compiled profiles on each of the newly elected Human Rights Council members. These provide a basic overview of their commitment to prevent mass atrocities by protecting and promoting human rights.
Topic:: Human Rights, United Nations, Elections, and Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
Political Geography:: Malaysia, India, Finland, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Argentina, Qatar, Somalia, Honduras, Montenegro, Paraguay, Eritrea, United Arab Emirates, Luxembourg, Cameroon, United States of America, Benin, and Gambia

15513. The Relationship Between Violations and Abuses of Human Rights and the Commission of Atrocity Crimes

Author:: Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Abstract:: The Responsibility to Protect is a political commitment made by heads of state and government at the 2005 UN World Summit aimed at preventing and halting four mass atrocity crimes, namely genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. In doing so, states agreed that governments have the primary responsibility to protect populations within their borders from atrocity crimes, that the international community should help states in building the capacity to uphold this responsibility, and that when a state is unwilling or manifestly failing to do so, the international community must be prepared to take timely and decisive collective action in accordance with the UN Charter. Atrocity crimes do not occur in a vacuum, nor are they isolated or random incidents. Rather, they are typically the consequence of a broader process. In order to adequately prevent and respond to the threat of atrocity crimes, there is a need to understand the early warning signs, risk factors and aggravating conditions that may culminate in the perpetration of such grave crimes. Systematic or widespread human rights violations and abuses often serve as one of the key early warning signs of possible atrocity crimes. This briefing paper aims to examine the relationship between mass atrocity crimes and human rights violations and abuses, highlighting that such violations and abuses may precede and significantly elevate atrocity risks and may also constitute atrocity crimes themselves if certain thresholds or conditions are met.
Topic:: Human Rights, United Nations, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and Atrocities
Political Geography:: Global Focus

15514. R2P Monitor, Issue 59, 1 December 2021

Author:: Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Abstract:: R2P Monitor is a quarterly bulletin applying the atrocity prevention lens to populations at risk of mass atrocities around the world. Issue 59 looks at developments in Afghanistan, Cameroon, Central Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger), China, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Myanmar (Burma), Syria, Venezuela, Yemen, Sudan, Central African Republic, Mozambique, Nigeria and South Sudan.
Topic:: International Law, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), Norms, Atrocities, and International Humanitarian Law (IHL)
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, China, Sudan, Israel, Yemen, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Palestine, Mozambique, Syria, Venezuela, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Myanmar, South Sudan, Cameroon, Sahel, and Central African Republic

15515. Pakistan Security Report 2020

Author:: Safdar Sial, Anam Fatima, Ahmed Ali, and Mikail Shaikh
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:: The year 2020 sustained the declining trend in the incidence of terrorist violence in Pakistan that has been ongoing since 2014. The statistics provided by Pakistan Security Report 2020 indicated a 36 percent decrease in the number of terrorist attacks this year, as compared to 2019; the number of people killed in these attacks also plummeted by 38 percent. However, these plummeting numbers do not suggest, in any way, that the threat of terrorism has been completely eliminated. While multiple factors have contributed, including continuous operational and surveillance campaigns by security forces, and some counter-extremism actions taken under the National Action Plan (NAP), in reducing terrorist violence at the tactical and operational levels, but the militant and sectarian groups have been becoming active again of late. Secondly, the underlying factors of religious extremism and persecution persist in the country, which could feed into terrorist violence and/or faith-based violence by individuals and mobs. While the incidence and level of terrorist violence can be measured, it is very hard to measure extremism and extremist trends in a society. Therefore, a reduction in terrorist violence should not be taken as a measure of a reduction in extremism.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Violent Extremism, and Countering Violent Extremism
Political Geography:: Pakistan

15516. Not for patching? Public opinion and the commitment to ‘build back better’

Author:: Karl Pike, Farah Hussain, Philip Cowley, and Patrick Diamond
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Mile End Institute, Queen Mary University of London
Abstract:: Announcing the launch of a ‘Build Back Better Council’ in January 2021, bringing together various business leaders, the Prime Minister Boris Johnson said that ‘as we recover from this crisis it won’t be enough to just go back to normal – our promise will be to build back better and level up opportunity for people and businesses across the UK’. 1 The following month, the Leader of the Opposition, Keir Starmer, said he believed ‘there’s a mood in the air which we don’t detect often in Britain. It was there in 1945, after the sacrifice of war, and it’s there again now. It’s the determination that our collective sacrifice must lead to a better future’. 2 The historian and peer – and the Mile End Institute’s patron – Lord Hennessy similarly argued recently that the Covid-19 experience ‘has sharpened our sense of the duty of care we have one for another, that a state has for all of its people, to a degree we have not felt collectively since World War Two and its aftermath’. 3 These appraisals of the impact of the crisis, and political commitments to change, are giving rise to debate. Are we to experience a moment similar to that of postwar transformation? If so, what is the prospect for the Britain that emerges from the Covid-19 pandemic to be significantly different, in policy terms, from what preceded it? The latter question in particular animates this project – Not for Patching?, of which this report marks our earliest findings, based on an opinion survey.
Topic:: Government, Public Opinion, COVID-19, and Boris Johnson
Political Geography:: United Kingdom

15517. Lebanon’s Pandemic in Context

Author:: Ziad Abu-Rish
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies (CCAS)
Abstract:: ADF Fellow Ziad Abu-Rish takes a deeper look at COVID-19’s spread in Lebanon and how it intersects with the country’s ongoing crises.
Topic:: Poverty, Financial Crisis, Crisis Management, Unemployment, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Middle East and Lebanon

15518. Teaching Science Fiction While Living It in Lebanon

Author:: Nadya Sbaiti
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies (CCAS)
Abstract:: How science fiction can help us escape upside down worlds and empower us to reimagine—and rebuild—better ones
Topic:: Protests, Literature, COVID-19, and Science Fiction
Political Geography:: Middle East and Lebanon

15519. Educating Refugees in Lebanon

Author:: Wissam Fakih
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies (CCAS)
Abstract:: MAAS student Wissam Fakih explores how Lebanon’s triple crises—economic collapse, the port explosion, and the pandemic—have impacted the education of thousands of Syrian refugee children living in the country.
Topic:: Education, Children, Refugees, Crisis Management, and Economic Crisis
Political Geography:: Middle East, Lebanon, and Syria

15520. Beiruti Artists Rebuild & Reimagine Their Communities

Author:: Laila Jadallah
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies (CCAS)
Abstract:: For many of Beirut’s artists, curators, and gallery owners, the devastation of the August 4, 2020 port explosion—which took the lives of 208 people, injured thousands more, and left more than 300,000 families homeless—was both personal and professional. Located in a thriving cultural district, the port area is home to numerous arts venues. As a result, the homes and studios of many artists, as well as galleries and institutions like the Arab Image Foundation, Sursock Museum, Salah Barakat Gallery, and Galerie Tanit, were severely damaged or destroyed in the blast.
Topic:: Arts, Culture, Crisis Management, Community, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Middle East, Lebanon, and Beirut

15521. From Beirut to Brazil

Author:: Diogo Bercito
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies (CCAS)
Abstract:: At Lebanon’s centennial, it’s time for scholars to take a closer look at the country’s historic ties to Brazil, argues MAAS alum Diogo Bercito.
Topic:: Economics, Migration, Politics, History, Diaspora, and Culture
Political Geography:: Middle East, Brazil, South America, and Lebanon

15522. How to Stop Jihadist Foreign Fighters

Author:: Daniel Byman
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Political Science Quarterly
Institution:: Academy of Political Science
Abstract:: DANIEL BYMAN argues that the threat volunteers for al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and other jihadist groups pose is potentially grave, but that effective policy can profoundly reduce the danger. He argues that governments can disrupt the recruitment and travel of foreign fighters, hinder their time in war zones, and improve policing and intelligence gathering when they return.
Topic:: Al Qaeda, Islamic State, Jihad, and Foreign Fighters
Political Geography:: Global Focus

15523. How to Win a “Long Game”: The Voting Rights Act, the Republican Party, and the Politics of Counter-Enforcement

Author:: Adrienne Jones and Andrew J. Polsky
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Political Science Quarterly
Institution:: Academy of Political Science
Abstract:: ADRIENNE JONES and ANDREW POLSKY examine how the Republican Party engaged in counter-enforcement of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, notably during the Reagan and Bush 43 administrations, in an effort to maximize the voting strength of pro-Republican voting constituencies. They argue that sustained counter-enforcement efforts lead to sharp policy oscillations when parties alternate in power and that if a party pursues the long game of persistent counter-enforcement, it may find itself with the opportunity to achieve lasting results.
Topic:: Domestic Politics, Voting Rights, Political Parties, and Republican Party
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

15524. U.S. Geopolitics and Nuclear Deterrence in the Era of Great Power Competitions

Author:: Peter Rudolf
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Political Science Quarterly
Institution:: Academy of Political Science
Abstract:: PETER RUDOLF argues that in the new era of great power competitions the United States is faced with the question of whether to seek some form of geopolitical accommodation based on de facto spheres of influence and buffer zones or to push ahead with strategic rivalries overshadowed by the risk of a military conflict with a nuclear dimension.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Power Politics, Geopolitics, Deterrence, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

15525. Policy or Pique? Trump and the Turn to Great Power Competition

Author:: Deborah Welch Larson
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Political Science Quarterly
Institution:: Academy of Political Science
Abstract:: DEBORAH WELCH LARSON analyzes Donald Trump’s policy toward China and Russia and the return of great power competition. She argues that Trump’s personalization of foreign policy undermined his trade war with China, and efforts to improve relations with Russia and that the Joe Biden administration will continue to compete but seek cooperation in areas of shared interests.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Power Politics, Trade Wars, Donald Trump, Strategic Competition, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, North America, and United States of America

15526. The Presidential and Congressional Elections of 2020: A National Referendum on the Trump Presidency

Author:: Gary C. Jacobson
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Political Science Quarterly
Institution:: Academy of Political Science
Abstract:: GARY C. JACOBSON discusses the 2020 presidential and congressional elections. He argues that the elections were above all a referendum on Donald Trump’s presidency, which provoked extreme levels of party loyalty, partisan polarization, and partisan animosity in the electorate, as well as the highest voter turnout in more than a century.
Topic:: Elections, Voting, Donald Trump, Referendum, and Polarization
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

15527. Journal of Advanced Military Studies: Political Warfare and Propaganda

Author:: James J. F. Forest, Daniel De Wit, Kyleanne Hunter, Emma Jouenne, Glen Segell, Lev Topor, Alexander Tabachnik, Donald M. Bishop, Phil Zeman, Michael Cserkits, and Anthony Patrick
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: The digital age has greatly expanded the terrain and opportunities for a range of foreign influence efforts. A growing number of countries have invested significantly in their capabilities to disseminate online propaganda and disinformation worldwide, while simultaneously establishing information dominance at home. Each of the contributions to this issue addresses the central theme of influencing perceptions and behavior. First, Daniel de Wit draws lessons from a historical analysis of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), America’s intelligence and special operations organization in World War II. In addition to its efforts to collect intelligence on the Axis powers and to arm and train resistance groups behind enemy lines, the OSS also served as America’s primary psychological warfare agency, using a variety of “black propaganda” methods to sow dissension and confusion in enemy ranks.82 As noted earlier, psychological warfare plays a significant role in the conduct of today’s military operations, so de Wit’s research offers important historical lessons for contemporary campaign planners. Next, Kyleanne Hunter and Emma Jouenne examine the uniquely troubling effects of spreading misogynistic views online. Their analysis of three diverse case studies—the U.S. military, the incel movement, and ISIS— reveals how unchecked online misogyny can result in physical behavior that can threaten human and national security. Glen Segell then explores how perceptions about cybersecurity operations can have positive or negative impacts on civil-military relations, drawing on a case study of the Israeli experience. Lev Topor and Alexander Tabachnik follow with a study of how Russia uses the strategies and tactics of digital influence warfare against other countries, while continually seeking to strengthen its information dominance over Russian citizens. And Donald M. Bishop reveals how other countries do this as well, including China, North Korea, Iran, Cuba, and Venezuela. Each is engaged in these same kinds of efforts to control the information that circulates within their respective societies, while using various forms of propaganda against other countries to strengthen their influence and national power. Phil Zeman’s contribution to this issue looks at how China and Russia are trying to fracture American and Western societies through information, disinformation, economic coercion, and the creation of economic dependencies— in many cases capitalizing on specific attributes and vulnerabilities of a target nation to achieve their strategic objectives. Through these efforts, he concludes, China and Russia hope to prevent the will or ability of American or Western states to respond to an aggressive act. Next, Michael Cserkits explains how a society’s perceptions about armed forces can be influenced by cinematic productions and anime, drawing on a case study comparison of Japan and the United States. And finally, Anthony Patrick examines how social media penetration and internet connectivity could impact the likelihood that parties within a conventional intrastate conflict will enter negotiations. As a collection, these articles make a significant contribution to the scholarly research literature on political warfare and propaganda. The authors shed light on the need for research-based strategies and policies that can improve our ability to identify, defend against, and mitigate the consequences of influence efforts. However, when reflecting on the compound security threats described at the beginning of this introduction—involving both cyberattacks and influence attacks—a startling contrast is revealed: we have committed serious resources toward cybersecurity but not toward addressing the influence issues examined in this issue. We routinely install firewalls and other security measures around our computer network systems, track potential intrusion attempts, test and report network vulnerabilities, hold training seminars for new employees, and take many other measures to try and mitigate cybersecurity threats. In contrast, there are no firewalls or intrusion detection efforts defending us against digital influence attacks of either foreign or domestic origin. Government sanctions and social media deplatforming efforts respond to influence attackers once they have been identified as such, but these efforts take place after attacks have already occurred, sometimes over the course of several years. The articles of this issue reflect an array of efforts to influence the perceptions, emotions, and behavior of human beings at both individual and societal levels. In the absence of comprehensive strategies to more effectively defend against these efforts, the United States risks losing much more than military advantage; we are placing at risk the perceived legitimacy of our systems and institutions of governance, as well as our economic security, our ability to resolve social disagreements peacefully, and much more.83 Further, many other nations are also facing the challenges of defending against foreign influence efforts. As such, the transnational nature of influence opportunities and capabilities in the digital age may require a multinational, coordinated response. In the years ahead, further research will be needed to uncover strategies for responding to the threat of digital influence warfare with greater sophistication and success.
Topic:: Security, National Security, Politics, Science and Technology, Military Affairs, Women, Radicalization, Cybersecurity, Internet, History, World War II, Propaganda, Deterrence, Disinformation, Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Digital Policy, Psychological Warfare, and Misogyny
Political Geography:: Russia, Japan, China, Israel, Global Focus, and United States of America

15528. Journal of Advanced Military Studies: Wargaming and the Military

Author:: Charles J. Esdaile, Sebastian J. Bae, Ian T. Brown, Eric M. Walters, P. C. Combe, Kate Kuehn, Brian W. Cole, Eric M. Walters, Stephen M. Gordon, Walt Yates, Andrew Gordon, and Ian T. Brown
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Abstract:: Given the rate of change taking place within the Corps and the local activity driving university innovation, the editors felt the need to contribute to the debate with a full issue of the Journal of Advanced Military Studies (JAMS) that focuses on wargaming and the future of the Marine Corps and the U.S. military. The authors of the articles that follow approached the conversation from a broad scholarly spectrum that offers historical and forward-thinking perspectives. The first article by Dr. Charles Esdaile, “ ‘Napoleon at Waterloo’: The Events of 18 June 1815 Analyzed via Historical Simulation,” offers a historical perspective on the importance of wargaming and professional military education (PME). His article examines how products of the game industry can be used to assess battles and draw out wider lessons relating to the conduct of war or to show how historical board games are not just recreational artifacts but also a tool with which to more fully explore, analyze, and understand campaign design and battle execution. Sebastian J. Bae and Major Ian T. Brown then provide a transition into a more modern conversation by offering a brief history of educational wargaming specific to the U.S. Marine Corps. The article reviews and assesses the history of educational wargaming from its tentative engagement before World War I through today. It will also offer recommendations on how the Corps can institutionalize the use of educational wargaming as a tool for honing Marines’ minds against thinking human adversaries. Our next two articles continue this discussion of wargaming and PME. Colonel Eric M. Walters considers the challenges and solutions presented by wargaming and helps orient those unfamiliar with wargaming and advises on proven best practices in using them when teaching military judgment in decision making. Lieutant Colonel P. C. Combe II shifts then into the design and implementation of wargaming for the purpose of teaching or evaluating the extent to which students have learned and can apply material as a means of professional development. Kate Kuehn further highlights the importance of evaluating the use of wargaming with her article, “Assessment Strategies for Educational Wargames.” Kuehn maintains that by examining the perspectives and practices of experienced faculty within wargaming, she can then identify strategies that can serve as useful teaching tools for other faculty as well as contribute to broader theory about designing assessment in such spaces. Colonel Brian W. Cole’s article on the wargame Hedgemony focuses on using wargames to then evaluate the learning objectives within senior Joint PME. His article examines how the Marine Corps War College’s experience with Hedgemony offers active learning for its students while emphasizing resource management and evaluates how well the game met the educational objectives set forth by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for senior-level PME. The final two articles in this issue of JAMS close the loop on the PME continuum by focusing on how wargaming complements military decision making and the future development of wargaming focused on the future of warfare. Colonel Walters’s article “Developing Self-Confidence in Military Decision Making” highlights how extensive practice through wargaming grows selfconfidence in both the individual Marine and in the unit engaged in it. Stephen M. Gordon, Colonel Walt Yates, and Andrew Gordon close out the journal articles by exploring the benefits and challenges of applying successful storytelling techniques to designing wargame narratives that balance creative ambitions with achievable time lines. In the authors’ minds, wargames that incorporate such techniques will generate new trends and better inform future conflict planning. The remainder of JAMS rounds out with a review essay and a selection of book reviews that continues our focus on warfare, but it also highlights continuing challenges in national security and international relations. The coming year will be busy for the JAMS editors as we work to provide journal issues on a diverse range of topics relevant to the study of militaries and defense, including a special issue on strategic culture followed by the Spring 2022 issue.
Topic:: Education, War, History, War Games, Decision-Making, Waterloo, Strategy, Resource Management, and Professional Military Education
Political Geography:: United States of America

15529. Journal of Advanced Military Studies: Special Issue on Strategic Culture

Author:: Ali Parchami, Ofer Fridman, Neil Munro, W. A. Rivera, Evan Kerrane, Matthew Brummer, Eitan Oren, Katie C. Finlinson, Mark Briskey, Ben Connable, Benjamin Potter, Emilee Matheson, Jeffrey Taylor, and Dr. Jose de Arimateia da Cruz
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: An ironic feature of U.S. strategic culture is a rather distinctive disinterest in the study of our own or others’ strategic cultures. The U.S. security institutions find themselves energized about cultural study during irregular conflicts in which the cost of cultural ignorance is made plain, but they persist in under developing the ability to apply that same cultural acumen to great power conflict and key relationships with allies. During the last 100 years of fighting, U.S. defense institutions have repeated a pattern of investing in cultural study during short bursts of counterinsurgency fighting and then abandoning it along with its lessons learned at the termination of conflict. As a consequence, U.S. planning efforts—including those now being designed for future great power conflict—suffer from an unnecessarily narrow optic and fail to account for the full range of perspectives and plausible courses of action considered by an adversary. America’s allies know it and are frustrated by it. More importantly, U.S. adversaries know it and plan to exploit it. The study of strategic culture accounts for the ways in which the culture of a group, whether it be the constructed culture of a nascent terrorist organization or the enduring culture of a nation, impacts thinking and decision making regarding defensive and offensive approaches to security. Within a complex state like Russia or China, one must account for sweeping national narratives that cultivate collective mentalities and impact decision making but must also include the internal cultures of key organizations within the nation’s security community. These organizations often develop distinctive identities, values, perceptions, and habits of practice that can be consequential in moments when the organization’s leaders wield instruments of state power. In the first section of this special edition of the Journal of Advanced Military Studies (JAMS) on strategic culture, Drs. Ali Parchami, Ofer Fridman, Neil Munro, W. A. Rivera, and Major Evan Kerrane provide strategic culture profiles on key U.S. adversaries: Iran, Russia, and China. Their work reflects the complexity involved in identifying and analyzing the narratives and drivers that compete for dominance across these three strategic culture landscapes. Acquainting ourselves with the multivariate and often-contested internal constructs that produce the behavior of our adversaries helps expand our own thinking about the range of possible and plausible competitive strategies we are likely to see from them. The second section of this issue highlights the utility of understanding not only U.S. adversaries but also American allies and partners. Drs. Matthew Brummer and Eitan Oren examine the effort by Japan’s military leaders to shift their own strategic culture through an influence campaign aimed at altering domestic perceptions concerning the appropriate role for the military and thereby expanding its ability to more actively cooperate with the United States in maintaining peace and stability in Asia. Whether they are successful has direct implications for U.S. alliance constructs in the Pacific and the action that might be reasonably expected from Japan should U.S. conflict with China become kinetic. Katie C. Finlinson offers analysis that benefits U.S. deterrence and nonproliferation efforts. She employs a two-tiered research approach— leveraging both strategic culture and analysis of national role conception—as a useful framework for assessing the propensity of the United Arab Emirates to consider weaponizing civilian nuclear knowledge and infrastructure. Finlinson offers an approach repeatable for other potential over-the-horizon states and demonstrates the interplay between a state’s strategic culture and powerful exogenous factors—like security assurances from the United States and potential nuclear acquisition by Iran—in determining outcomes. Finally, Dr. Mark Briskey offers a look at the aspects of Pakistan’s strategic culture that exist as an outgrowth of its army’s most formative historic experiences and have resulted in deeply entrenched perceptions of self, of key adversaries, and perceptions of the past that must be understood by Western partners seeking Pakistan’s cooperation and partnership in the region. Our third section offers a close look at the ways in which cultural analysis can illuminate policy options on particularly difficult problem sets. One of these is assessing will to fight on the part of both allies and adversaries. Dr. Ben Connable recommends a diagnostic tool developed and trialed by the Rand Corporation that demonstrates promise in advancing the ability of defense institutions to anticipate will to fight in kinetic conflicts but also will to act in consequential ways by great powers engaged in strategic competition. Benjamin Potter, Emilee Matheson, and Jeffrey Taylor follow with applications of the Cultural Topography Framework, an approach to cultural data assessment and application that benefits from the insights supplied by the sort of comprehensive strategic culture profiles offered in section one of this issue and translates these into actionable intelligence against discrete problem sets. Their work, respectively, illuminates policy options for containing a potentially escalatory situation in Transnistria, decreasing violence and looting through a more effective reintegration strategy for former members of the Lord’s Resistance Army in Central Africa, and reexamining the value of technological advances in the U.S. nuclear arsenal, which may be having a deleterious impact on its deterrence strategy. The special issue concludes with a review essay by Dr. José de Arimatéia da Cruz, which offers readers critical analysis of three volumes of strategic culture scholarship. The articles collected for the special issue demonstrate a range of ways in which the study of strategic culture delivers critical insights to policy planners and strategists. Understanding other great powers on their own terms—the identities they seek to establish or defend, the values that inform their policies, the norms of strategic competition or warfighting that they deem acceptable and effective, and the worldview they espouse (whether an accurate fit with objective realities or not)—prepares policy makers to craft plans and strategies in ways that are tailored for maximum advantage vis-à-vis a particular adversary. Given the steady shutdown of cultural inquiry labs and training facilities across the U.S. defense and security community, it is worth issuing a stern reminder that the advantage of knowing one’s enemy is far more consequential when engaged in great power conflict than in the irregular conflicts in which U.S. institutions have learned its worth. This issue of JAMS is provided as a resource to both reinforce that point and supply a wealth of initial material in advancing it.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, War, History, Power Politics, Realism, Strategic Competition, Resistance, Identity, and Strategic Culture
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Russia, Japan, Iran, Middle East, India, United Arab Emirates, and United States of America

15530. China’s Digital Silk Road: integration into national IT infrastructure and wider implications for Western defence industries

Author:: Meia Nouwens
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: The geopolitical dispute between the United States and China is taking place on the fault line of global telecommunications infrastructure and digital technologies. As this competition grows, so too does the likelihood of a potential bifurcation in the global information and security technological ecosystems, split between US-allied liberal democracies on the one side and countries dependent on Chinese-based information and communications technology (ICT) on the other. The impact of this competition reaches beyond telecommunications companies and those involved in their supply chains. Indeed, second and third order of magnitude implications exist for the security and defence sectors. While this competition unfolds, the Chinese Government’s Digital Silk Road (DSR) continues apace and leverages the strengths of Chinese public- and private-sector giants to further integrate Chinese technologies and standards into the digital ecosystems of the least-developed, emerging and developed economies alike. The existing literature on the security and defence implications of the integration of Chinese ICT into national digital ecosystems is primarily concerned with the potential threats posed to intelligence and defence cooperation. However, the implication of China’s global digital investments for US and other Western defence industries is an understudied subject that deserves greater attention. To provide greater clarity to Western defence industries on these issues, this project has sought to answer four forward-looking questions. Firstly, what risks does the possibility of a bifurcated global digital ecosystem pose for the national and industrial security of key Asian, European and Middle Eastern states and economies? Secondly, to what extent does the integration of Chinese information technology and digital infrastructure create challenges for alliance intelligence and defence cooperation? Thirdly, what level of integration should be considered significant and how might security-cooperation efforts (e.g. Western arms exports) be affected? Lastly, can security risks to companies doing business abroad be mitigated when the integration of Chinese digital technology into national digital ecosystems is already high? This report has aimed to address this gap in current analysis by outlining the potential risks posed by China’s global digital and technological investments to defence industries. It follows with an analysis of the extent of Chinese DSR activity in five case-study countries across Asia, the Middle East and Europe that are of high security and defence importance to the US: Indonesia, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Israel, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Poland. In doing so, the report aims to provide greater insight into government decision-making and lessons learned for Western defence industries.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Communications, Infrastructure, Hegemony, Digital Economy, Conflict, Silk Road, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

15531. The European Union in the COVID-19 storm: economic, political and stability challenges

Author:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: The COVID-19 shock intensified existing imbalances and divergence trends within the EU as well as underlying societal tensions, with potentially long-lasting consequences for social and political stability. The EU response to the epochal challenge posed by the pandemic has been strong and thorough, with the relaxation of fiscal rules and an unprecedented mobilisation of regional resources. However, implementation challenges abound, amid growing political instability and governance flaws in many member countries. The effectiveness of the long-term response to the pandemic also represents an inflection point for the durability and strength of the European project, offering the opportunity to turn the tide of existing trends of popular dissatisfaction with traditional politics and institutions (including the EU) and rising political risk.
Topic:: Economics, International Cooperation, European Union, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Europe

15532. Managing the looming missile-proliferation problem in the Asia-Pacific

Author:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: In light of the range of capabilities that contemporary missile systems and associated technologies can provide, it is unsurprising that more and more states around the world aspire to acquire them. In the Asia-Pacific, the involvement of the three major nuclear powers – China, Russia and the United States – as well as middle powers make the situation even more complex and unstable. When the US withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty on 2 August 2019, the Asia-Pacific seemed to enter a ‘post-INF’ era in which regional states may face dim prospects for arms control and potentially a fierce theatre-level, missile-led arms race. This essay reviews emerging trends in missile proliferation and analyses the relevant risks of these trends before assessing some of the mechanisms that address proliferation challenges. It then explores ways of curbing and even reversing these trends from a Chinese perspective. It is increasingly clear that since 2010 the world has been undergoing a period of nuclear modernisation and missile proliferation. The US and Russia, which possess the majority of the world’s nuclear weapons, have both recently accelerated efforts to modernise their respective nuclear arsenals. As highlighted in the 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and the subsequent policy and budget decisions of former US president Donald Trump, Washington has abandoned a pledge – made by former president Barack Obama − to abstain from researching and deploying new kinds of nuclear warheads. Since then, the US has deployed a low-yield nuclear warhead (W76-2) on a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) in late 2019 and begun to redevelop a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) as another key component of its nuclear-modernisation plan. For the air-leg of the US triad, the US Air Force received a final proposal for the Long-Range Standoff Weapon (LRSO) in November 2020 ahead of its preparations to seek approval for the system’s development. The LRSO is a nuclear-armed cruise missile intended to serve as a replacement for the AGM-86B air-launched cruise missile (ALCM). Furthermore, the US also tested a groundlaunched cruise missile (GLCM) in August 2019 and a ground-launched intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) in December 2019 following Washington’s withdrawal from the INF Treaty. All these capabilities are deemed by the US to be effective measures to counter a limited nuclear attack from Russia or China. Russia, which maintains a stockpile of approximately 4,310 warheads assigned for use and an estimated further 2,060 awaiting retirement and dismantlement, is in the middle of a decades-long nuclear-forces modernisation programme. This modernisation also incorporates the addition of new types of strategic delivery systems, which were unveiled by Russian President Vladimir Putin in March 2018. These include a new nuclear-armed hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV), Avangard, a nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed cruise missile, Burevestnik, a new anti-ship hypersonic cruise missile, Zircon, and a nuclear-powered and nuclear-tipped uninhabited underwater delivery vehicle, Poseidon.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:: Asia-Pacific

15533. The geo-economics and geopolitics of COVID-19: implications for European security

Author:: Bastain Giegerich, Fenella McGerty, and Peter Round
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: The pandemic was not an unforeseen event. Foresight reports, policy simulations and national risk assessments had long included a similar challenge among the possibilities. Nevertheless, when the coronavirus pandemic came the world was not prepared and despite the existence of a myriad of international organisations, alliances and friendships, the reactions were mostly national and inward-looking. Governments started to spend vast amounts of resources on fighting the pandemic, looking for preventatives and cures, and propping up their own economies when the primary weapon in the arsenal to fight the pandemic was the so-called ‘lockdown’. Many governments will emerge from the coronavirus pandemic laden with debt and a severely depressed outlook for economic growth. It is conceivable that among the second- and third-order effects of the pandemic is an accelerated rebalancing of power away from the Euro-Atlantic community. This could threaten the ability of NATO and EU member states to shape and defend the rules-based international order. The pandemic itself may be a driver of instability and insecurity at a time when the ability to deliver stabilising measures and crisis-management capacity is weakened. Divergent recoveries could create conditions that see an accelerated rebalancing of global power and the development or disintegration of global alliances. While levels of uncertainty caused by the pandemic remain high, it is now possible to attempt a first assessment of the geo-economic and geopolitical implications of the pandemic. In geo-economic terms, it is useful to take stock of the costs of the pandemic and attempt to evaluate who wins and who loses as a result. In geopolitical terms, there are important questions relating to international order and great-power politics, as well as the ability of multinational institutions to contribute to problem solving in the age of COVID-19, especially in the face of a resurgence of nation-state power. From the perspective of security and defence policy, the pandemic further complicates an already challenging picture, straining resources while adding to a long list of relevant threat vectors and risks. Between September and December 2020, the IISS and the Hanns Seidel Foundation convened six web-based discussion meetings, bringing together a group of international experts and officials to pursue three parallel strands of debate – economics, international order, and security and defence. This paper, written by IISS staff, draws on these conversations and is informed by them. It does not represent a shared assessment or a consensus view among the participants, but it hopefully serves to provide some orientation and fuel for constructive debate in a world that very much remains in flux.
Topic:: Security, Economics, Geopolitics, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Europe

15534. The Nagorno-Karabakh war: a spur to Moscow’s UAV efforts?

Author:: Julian Cooper
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: For Russian observers and analysts, the 44-day war in 2020 between Azerbaijan and Armenia highlighted the comparative lack in Russia’s own armed uninhabited aerial vehicle (UAV) inventory, as well as the patchy performance of Russian-made short-range ground-based air-defence systems in countering UAVs. Nearly two decades after the US began to operate armed UAVs and as the number of countries possessing armed UAVs around the world steadily increases, Russia has yet to field a similar capability. Factors contributing to this failing include the collapse of Russian defence spending in the 1990s, the more recent focus on recapitalising in-service capabilities, the neglect of some of the required-technology building blocks for UAV systems, and Western sanctions. In 2009 Russia imported ten small Birdeye 400 and two larger Searcher Mk II UAVs and the associated ground-control and support systems from Israel. In September 2011 the Defence Ministry opened a tender for ISR and armed UAVs, and a far higher-performance uninhabited combat air vehicle (UCAV) with Sukhoi eventually being the preferred UCAV developer. Two medium-altitude long-endurance designs were selected, the Kronstadt Orion (Inokhodets-BLA) single-engine UAV, and the now-UWCA Altius twin-engine platform. As of early-2021, neither project has entered service in significant numbers. Engine-supply issues have been a contributory factor. For Moscow, the task of producing a modern, competitive small piston engine suitable for UAV applications has represented a challenge. This engine-supply problem is rooted in a decades-long focus on advanced propulsion technologies at the cost of the humble piston engine, and – at the time – the capacity to source these from elsewhere within the USSR. By the time the gap was beginning to be recognised in the 1990s funding was not available to revive the domestic development of piston aeroengines. Other contributing factors to the Russian UAV gap include the fact that relatively cheap piston engines for UAVs lack the prestige to command resources and administrative authority, especially in a decision-making system where the development of advanced weapons appears to be in the hands of a relatively small circle of people with little involvement of civilian experts. Inter-service rivalry may also have hindered the introduction of ISR and armed UAVs into the inventory. Given the extended difficulties Russia has had in getting ISR and armed UAVs into service there remains a question as to why it has not turned more to the international market to address the capability gap. While Beijing might have been willing to supply armed UAVs to Russia, this would have required Moscow to purchase from what was previously a client state in terms of weapons sales. It would also be considered a tacit admission it was lagging China in UAV development. In addition, for all its difficulties, Russia may well still view the UAV-export market as one it could enter. In this context China would be a competitor. The Nagorno-Karabakh war and Russia’s experience in Syria have underscored the challenges to current ground-based air-defence systems when defending against UAVs and loitering munitions. Along with gun and missile-based counters the Defence Ministry is looking at electronic countermeasures. A more novel approach has been to look at using certain UAVs as a counter measure. Training now also includes more counter-UAV activities.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

15535. Amidst Anti-COVID Protests, Far-Right Extremists Are Using a New Symbol: An All-Black American Flag

Author:: Grace Vaule
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: TRAC: Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium
Abstract:: Currently, amidst a backdrop of COVID-related vaccine and mask mandates, far-right extremists in the United States are using another symbol: the all-black American flag.
Topic:: Terrorism, Violent Extremism, COVID-19, Political Extremism, and Countering Violent Extremism
Political Geography:: United States

15536. The Dual Strategy Behind Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin’s (JNIM) Katiba Macina Territorial Expansion

Author:: Frida Bergström
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: TRAC: Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium
Abstract:: The takeover of four distinct areas by the AQC affiliate, Jama’a Nusrat ul- Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) reflects an issue that is expanding exponentially into Mali’s neighbouring countries.
Topic:: Terrorism, Violent Extremism, Militant Islam, Political Extremism, and Countering Violent Extremism
Political Geography:: West Africa and Mali

15537. Open-source analysis of Iran’s missile and UAV capabilities and proliferation

Author:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: Iran’s ballistic missile systems, supplemented by cruise missiles and UAVs, are intended not only for deterrence, but for battle, including by Iran’s regional partners. In a new report, the IISS provides a detailed assessment of Iran’s missiles, and the manner and purposes for which it has been proliferating them. Nuclear issues are the exclusive focus of the negotiations on the restoration of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which have taken place in Vienna. The Western powers are keen, however, to engage in follow-on talks to address Iran’s missiles and activities in the region. To inform the public policy debate on the latter matters, the IISS has produced a fact-rich technical assessment of Iran’s current missile and uninhabited aerial vehicle (UAV) capabilities and its proliferation of these technologies to Iran’s regional partners.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Strategy, Nonproliferation, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

15538. Missile multinational: Iran’s new approach to missile proliferation

Author:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: How does Iran equip its proxies and allies with increasingly sophisticated and longer-range ballistic missiles and artillery rockets? Fabian Hinz considers Iran’s new missile-proliferation strategy. The proliferation of ballistic missiles and artillery rockets to non-state actors by the Islamic Republic of Iran is a constant source of tension in the Middle East. Yemen’s Houthi rebels conduct ballistic-missile strikes on Saudi Arabian cities, airports and oil installations; Hizbullah’s ever-growing rocket and missile arsenal sparks Israeli consideration of military options; and Iranian proxies rocket the United States’ installations in Iraq on an almost weekly basis. But how does Iran equip its proxies and allies with increasingly sophisticated and longer-range ballistic missiles and artillery rockets? For years, the answer has been through smuggling. In one example, on 19 March 2021 Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Adel al-Jubeir claimed that all Houthi missiles fired at the Kingdom were ‘made in Iran’, and there is ample evidence that Houthis were the recipients of weapons such as Iran’s short-range Qiam ballistic missile. Iran doubtlessly continues to directly transfer missiles outside its borders to some degree. However, in recent years smuggling has been augmented by two other transfer methods: the provision of guidance kits to modify existing stockpiles of artillery rockets, and the wholescale provision of manufacturing capabilities. Iranian support for enabling local rocket production is not new. Reports about the rocket arsenals of Palestinian factions in Gaza regularly cite Iranian assistance for domestic manufacturing, and Hizbullah’s alleged missile factory in the Beqaa Valley became the topic of competing accusations in the Israeli–Hizbullah relationship. However, closer examination of Iranian sources, documents likely leaked by Israeli intelligence and the missiles unveiled by the Houthis reveal a strategy of empowering Iranian proxies that is more comprehensive than previously thought. In cooperation with Iran’s missile industry, the Quds Force (QF) of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) appears intent on enabling all its main proxies to be able to autonomously manufacture artillery rockets and precision-guided missiles. Also, a special development effort seems to be aimed at creating simple artillery rockets and short-range-missile systems and production units custom-tailored for local production.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

15539. Missile developments in South Asia: a perspective from Pakistan

Author:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: India and Pakistan continue to develop their missile-delivery systems and associated nuclear inventories, raising concerns of a regional arms race. While Indian doctrine appears intended to fight a ‘two-front war’ against Pakistan and China, the extent to which India’s missile inventory is balanced, or otherwise, is a cause of disquiet in Islamabad. Many of the new missile systems being added to India’s inventory appear to be more suited to target Pakistan than China. This disconnect between India’s threat perception and missile developments not only risks eroding the credibility of its deterrence posture vis-à-vis China, but also courts an action–reaction dynamic with Pakistan. Islamabad, in response to how it views Indian developments, is in turn making qualitative improvements to its missile arsenal, with the intention of deterring limited conflict to an all-out war. The resultant arms race in the missile arena, however, is moving on two different trajectories. This paper discusses ongoing missile developments in South Asia, and how India and Pakistan have used different delivery systems as signalling mechanisms during past crises in an attempt to achieve their respective military or political objectives. It is also useful to examine Pakistan’s posture of Full-Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) in the context of India’s Cold Start doctrine, introduced in 2004 and apparently intended to allow India to explore options for a limited war in cases where there is a risk of crossing the nuclear threshold. The paper also reviews whether doctrinal ambiguities can be discerned in India’s declaratory nuclear policies, especially New Delhi’s claim of maintaining a credible minimum deterrence (CMD) and how this can be squared with the goal of being able to cope with a ‘two-front war’.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Missile Defense, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, India, and Asia

15540. The evolving nature of China’s military diplomacy: from visits to vaccines

Author:: Meia Nouwens
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: The People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) military-to-military cooperation in response to the global coronavirus pandemic signals a growing role for the military within China’s diplomatic activities. Historically, the PLA played a minor role in Chinese foreign policy. However, in the wake of a more nationalist and assertive Chinese foreign policy, the PLA’s role in national diplomacy and security strategy has grown to serve both strategic and operational goals and has reached new heights in the context of the coronavirus pandemic. Military-to-military COVID-19-related engagement has taken place within a larger context of Beijing’s expanded diplomatic efforts to improve China’s global reputation following its initial delayed and mishandled response at the start of the coronavirus outbreak in 2020. Publicly available data shows that COVID-19 military diplomacy began in March 2020, when the PLA sent protective equipment and clothing to Iran. In February 2021, the PLA began to donate COVID-19 vaccines to overseas militaries. The PLA’s vaccine assistance to 13 countries globally fits within a wider vaccine-centric diplomatic effort by the Chinese government but so far has been far smaller in scale. Between March 2020 and April 2021, the PLA has provided military medical assistance or donations to 56 countries around the world, and a United Nations peacekeeping mission. In all but two cases, the PLA’s medical diplomatic activities were directed at countries belonging to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Geographically, the PLA mostly engaged with countries in the Asia–Pacific and Africa. The focus on the BRI and South–South diplomacy also reflects China’s wider diplomatic narrative and foreign policy objectives. The PLA’s activities were usually framed within the ‘responsible stakeholder’ narrative that China sought to promote through its civilian aid diplomacy. It is likely that the PLA sought to cooperate with militaries wherever it could and focussed on countries with which it already enjoyed established friendly relations, rather than using the PLA’s military diplomacy to establish new strategic relations. The PLA’s military diplomatic activities relating to the coronavirus demonstrate that the PLA will increasingly play a greater role in China’s foreign diplomacy, in line with President Xi’s instructions.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Hegemony
Political Geography:: China and Asia

15541. Nuclear deterrence and stability in South Asia: perceptions and realities

Author:: Antoine Levesques
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: This IISS report examines nuclear deterrence and stability in South Asia by separating perceptions from facts in order to assess the extent to which India and Pakistan may be at risk from imprudent or mistaken use of nuclear weapons. The authors start from an uncomfortable truth: chance played an important ameliorative role in the February 2019 India–Pakistan security crisis. India and Pakistan risk stumbling into using their nuclear weapons through miscalculation or misinterpretation in a future crisis. This report presents evidence suggesting grave deficiencies and asymmetries in India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear doctrines, which are compounded by mutual disbelief, existing and emerging military capabilities, and the prolonged absence of related dialogue mechanisms. India and Pakistan are seeking new technologies and capabilities that dangerously undermine each other’s defence under the nuclear threshold. Whatever they learn from past crises, the uncharted territory they are now exploring requires enlightened judgement about their doctrines, their nuclear and conventional capabilities, and their unpredictable implications in future crises. India and Pakistan already possess sufficient nuclear weapons to ensure a robust, largely stable mutual nuclear deterrence. Nuclear expansion casts doubt on stated policies of minimalism, risks a high-cost arms race in the post-pandemic era and may put overall deterrence stability at risk. China’s evolving profile as a nuclear-weapons state is compounding India’s security challenges. Yet control over the drivers of the India–Pakistan nuclear-deterrence and stability equation remains almost entirely in the hands of leaders in New Delhi and Islamabad. Only India and Pakistan can choose to creatively overcome the challenges to adopting new risk-reduction measures, as an imperfect but realistic stopgap until trust-building and eventual political dialogue make arms control possible. This report identifies a list of potentially useful confidence-building measures (CBMs) and other practical steps both countries could take early on. It concludes that a robust, trusted, reliable, deniable backchannel between their leaderships is the most promising means by which India and Pakistan could achieve greater strategic and nuclear-deterrence stability. This is in their interests and operationalising it is their decision. Such a mechanism should help avoid or mitigate the costs of any future crisis as well as eventually help India and Pakistan to adopt new CBMs on the way to building greater trust.
Topic:: Security, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: South Asia and Asia

15542. Missile developments in Southern Asia: a perspective from India

Author:: Manpreet Sethi
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: Credible nuclear deterrence presupposes the availability and integration of certain essential components that collectively constitute a nuclear arsenal. Delivery systems, deployable across a variety of platforms and of requisite range and reliability, are one such critical element. Accordingly, in the last decade the three nuclear-armed states in Southern Asia − China, India and Pakistan − have been engaged in developing missiles that they consider necessary to support their respective deterrent needs. This paper identifies recent trends in missile development in the region, focusing on the above-mentioned states. It captures capability trends, considers the differing capability emphasis among the three countries depending on their approach to nuclear deterrence and assesses the impact of missile developments on strategic stability.
Topic:: Security, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Deterrence, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, India, and Asia

15543. Exploring post-INF arms control in the Asia-Pacific: China’s role in the challenges ahead

Author:: Bates Gill
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: With the demise of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019, much attention has focused on the Asia-Pacific as the locus for a new missile-fuelled arms competition, especially between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Much speculation has also centred on the prospects of avoiding the most dangerous elements of that competition through arms control or other risk-reduction measures. There are good reasons for these concerns. Since the 1990s China has invested enormous resources in the development and deployment of short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Today China fields one of the world’s largest and most diverse arrays of ballistic-missile systems, including both conventional- and nuclear-armed variants. Critically, these missile systems have become an increasingly central feature in the strategic and operational thinking of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and will likely remain so for the decades ahead. At present, Beijing sees little to no value in reductions to these systems. On the contrary, they are valuable for the very reasons Washington and other regional capitals would like to see them limited: they pose a credible deterrent and warfighting threat in and around China’s periphery, not only against the United States, but also against US allies and others in the region such as India. For the United States, China’s steady missile build-up has been a long-standing concern. When the Trump administration announced its withdrawal from the INF – citing Russia’s non-compliance with the treaty – it also cited China’s deployment of intermediate-range missile systems and their threats to US interests in the Asia-Pacific as an ancillary reason for quitting the agreement. Since 2019, the United States has initiated weapons-development programmes with an eye to deploying its own suite of intermediate missiles to the region in order to range Chinese targets, in addition to other offensive and defensive systems to counter Chinese missile threats. Coming in the larger context of deteriorating diplomatic, security and economic relations between Beijing and Washington, these developments are only a small part of an intensifying competition between the two powers.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Hegemony, and INF Treaty
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

15544. DPRK strategic capabilities and security on the Korean Peninsula: looking ahead

Author:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: Believing that Russian–US cooperation could play an important role in developing and implementing proposals for denuclearisation and creating lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula, the Moscow-based Center for Energy and Security Studies and the IISS undertook a joint assessment of North Korea’s progress in developing nuclear and missile capabilities and an examination of possible international steps towards a solution. The spectre of nuclear war has haunted the Korean Peninsula for nearly seven decades. In November 1950, United States president Harry Truman publicly raised the option of using nuclear weapons in the Korean War. For about 40 years after the war, the US deployed several types of tactical nuclear weapons in the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea). The ROK and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) also launched their own nuclear-weapons programmes. While Seoul abandoned its dedicated weapons effort soon after ROK president Park Chung-hee was assassinated in October 1979, Pyongyang persisted, announcing its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003 and subsequently making rapid progress in building up nuclear and missile capabilities, while enshrining a nuclear-armed status in the country’s constitution. In September 2017, North Korea’s sixth nuclear test achieved a thermonuclear yield. Two months later, the DPRK launched a Hwasong-15 ballistic missile, which Pyongyang says is an intercontinental weapon system that can reach the entire US mainland. At that point, North Korea announced that its mission to build its nuclear forces was accomplished. The year 2017 saw military escalation on the Korean Peninsula reach an unprecedented level in the post-Korean War period. Many analysts believed that the situation had become the most volatile since the 1968 USS Pueblo crisis, or even since the end of Korean War hostilities in 1953. Some experts drew parallels with the Cuban Missile Crisis. Given Russia’s historical relationship with North Korea and the US alliance with South Korea, Moscow and Washington have special roles to play in promoting stability on the Korean Peninsula. As permanent members of the UN Security Council and depository states of the NPT, Russia and the US also bear special responsibility for upholding peace and international security. Their joint efforts, along with other major powers, were instrumental, for example, in resolving the crisis over the Iranian nuclear programme through the adoption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in July 2015. Despite US president Donald Trump’s decision in May 2018 to take the US out of the JCPOA, the deal remains a model of what can be achieved through multilateral diplomacy, especially when US–Russian cooperation is harnessed to promote nuclear non-proliferation. Similarly, should the key players demonstrate the political will to seek a sustainable solution to the security problems on the Korean Peninsula, Russian–US cooperation in a multilateral framework could play an important role in developing and implementing proposals. The opportunities are clear. For example, more than 67 years since the shooting stopped, the Korean War still remains officially unresolved. The Armistice Agreement of 1953 has yet to be replaced by a proper peace treaty or a more comprehensive accord. In these circumstances, the Moscow-based Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) agreed in 2017 to conduct a joint assessment of North Korea’s progress in developing nuclear and missile capabilities. They also undertook to develop proposals on possible international steps to facilitate the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula and create lasting peace and security mechanisms. The two parties began their work in January 2018 and completed it in about 33 months. They received valuable assistance from a Russian working group led by CENESS and a US working group led by the IISS. The two working groups included former military officials, diplomats, nuclear specialists and scholars specialising in Korean studies. The two groups worked independently, then compared and consolidated their drafts. The results are summarised in this joint report prepared by the project co-chairs. All the contributing experts, listed in annexes one and two, participated in a personal capacity. The report does not necessarily reflect the views of all the experts involved in the study, or of the organisations they represent. CENESS and IISS hope that the report will serve as a catalyst for further discussions between researchers and officials on possible measures to reduce tensions and nuclear-related risks and build confidence in the region. We also hope that the report will help to facilitate discussions on how to promote pragmatic and effective Russian–US cooperation, an aim which has also been emphasised by the leadership of the two countries.
Topic:: Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

15545. Missile arms-racing and insecurity in the Asia-Pacific

Author:: Masako Ikegami
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: Although the INF Treaty was originally intended to reverse the deployment of Soviet and US missiles in Europe, its demise may be felt more keenly in the Asia-Pacific where a missile arms race is arguably already under way. The development of new missile technologies has implications for stability as the region’s nuclear-weapons states could see them as threats to the credibility and survivability of their second-strike systems. This could trigger a diversification of missile systems across different platforms or an increase in the number of warheads and launchers to complicate an adversary’s targeting options. The Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty ended on 2 August 2019 due to the United States’ withdrawal over long-standing concerns of Russian violations. The agreement between Russia and the US had prohibited the development and deployment of ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometres. Although the implementation of the INF Treaty was originally motivated to reverse the deployment of Soviet and US medium-and intermediate-range ground-launched missiles in Europe, its demise may be felt more keenly in the Asia-Pacific. Despite its primary rationale that Russia’s prolonged violation of the treaty rendered it void, then US president Donald Trump’s administration also cited China as an ancillary reason behind its decision to suspend its treaty obligations. As China was not a party to the INF Treaty, Beijing has been free to make substantial quantitative and qualitative improvements in its medium- and intermediate-range missile arsenal as an important part of its strategy to counter the US and allies’ military power in Asia. Following Washington’s decision to withdraw from the INF Treaty, US policymakers made it clear that they intend to counter China’s growing capabilities by deploying to the region additional missile defences and the previously prohibited classes of ground-launched surface-to-surface systems that now are under development. China’s ballistic-and cruise-missile arsenal, however, is viewed with concern beyond just Washington. Other regional states such as Australia and India also regard the expansion of China’s missile forces with unease, resulting in Canberra and New Delhi developing their own missile systems in response. In the case of the latter this could have downstream effects by causing Pakistan to adjust its own nuclear and conventional missile forces in response, illustrating the potential possibilities and consequences of action/reaction dynamics in Asia spiralling into regional arms-racing. Although the erosion of the arms-control architecture provided in part by the INF Treaty could potentially herald the beginning of more sustained arms-racing in the Asia-Pacific, a regional competition is arguably already under way. The proliferation of conventional and nuclear ballistic missiles in the region is not only apparent in China’s force structure, but also across Northeast Asia, which has had immediate and associated implications in the local and wider region. Developments in North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes have been especially destabilising, given fears that Pyongyang could threaten the use of nuclear weapons in a conventional conflict were the survival of the Kim Jong-un regime in question. Cumulatively, North Korea’s strengthened missile forces have caused the US and its allies and partners in the region, especially Japan and South Korea, to pursue countermeasures, including strengthening missile defences and developing counterforce capabilities. Doctrines regarding the use of conventional precision attack have also correspondingly shifted, with South Korea embracing the option of using pre-emptive conventional counterforce strikes to deter missile attacks from North Korea. Japan, however, continues to debate how its armed forces might utilise the long-range strike capabilities that Tokyo is pursuing. Some of these developments, especially improved missile-defence capabilities, have resulted in a diplomatic and economic response from China, as Beijing argued that some of these measures undermine its strategic deterrent. China has also warned US allies in the region of possible repercussions if they decide to host US missiles previously proscribed by the INF Treaty. There is therefore the potential that decisions by some regional states to develop their missile capabilities might not only result in immediate action–reaction responses by the instigator’s adversaries, but also wider cumulative consequences undermining the security of multiple states across the region. Against this backdrop, emerging missile technologies carry additional risks and implications for regional stability. As part of a trend that one analyst has described as a ‘missile renaissance’, hypersonic boost-glide vehicle and cruise-missile technologies are being pursued by several states in the Asia-Pacific region, including Australia, China, India, Japan, Russia and the US. The development of these technologies has implications for regional stability since they could be seen as threats to the credibility and survivability of second-strike systems of the region’s nuclear-weapons states, potentially triggering a diversification of nuclear systems across different platforms or an increase in the number of nuclear warheads and launchers to complicate an adversary’s targeting options
Topic:: Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:: Asia

15546. Cruise missiles in the Middle East

Author:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: While both the proliferation and combat use of ballistic missiles in the Middle East have attracted a lot of attention, cruise missiles remain an often-overlooked regional proliferation challenge. Once the exclusive realm of the Middle East’s sole nuclear power, Israel, the proliferation of cruise-missile systems has steadily picked up pace in the last two decades. Iran and Turkey have joined Israel in the club of nations developing and producing their own cruise missiles, with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) appearing to take first steps in this direction. Other countries, such as Algeria, Egypt, Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, have already purchased cruise missiles from abroad or appear intent on doing so in the near future. This trend is not limited to state actors, however. With strong technical and material support from Iran, Yemen’s Houthi rebels have employed cruise missiles in their ongoing missile and uninhabited aerial vehicle (UAV) campaign against the Saudi-led coalition. The drivers of cruise-missile proliferation in the region are as diverse as the systems themselves. Their ability to evade or overcome defensive systems makes them an attractive option in a region experiencing a proliferation of increasingly advanced surface-to-air missiles as well as ballistic-missile-defence systems. Cruise missiles also give actors that lack modern air forces the ability to strike targets deep inside the territory of better-equipped adversaries. They are therefore well suited to serve as tools of asymmetric warfare as well as asymmetric deterrence. At the same time, however, they have also become an essential piece of weaponry for advanced modern fighter jets and therefore a logical choice for countries already operating highly capable air forces. Naval-based cruise missiles offer a long-range strike capability for expeditionary warfare and serve as a tool for regional power projection. In the case of Israel, submarine-launched cruise missiles also serve as the primary pillar of the country’s nuclear second-strike capability. However, the drivers of cruise-missile proliferation go beyond narrow military needs and considerations. Several Middle Eastern states are engaged in ambitious efforts to develop local arms industries, with precision-guided munitions, aerial stand-off weaponry and UAVs being a particular focus. Benefiting from the existing technological overlap with these systems, cruise missiles represent both an attractive and realistic option for ambitious military-development projects. They are also an advanced weapons system whose production and development was for a long time limited to a small number of highly developed countries, thus lending their producers considerable prestige. There is little doubt that cruise missiles have an impact on regional stability. As with other uninhabited systems, cruise missiles do not entail the risk of human losses for their users, and this factor potentially lowers the threshold for their use. Cruise missiles’ ability to evade detection and interception, and their effectiveness in conducting long-range precision strikes, might also provide incentives for the adoption of pre-emptive strategies, thus lending another element of instability to local crises. Most importantly, however, cruise missiles – like ballistic missiles and, to some extent, UAVs – defy traditional air superiority and by extension the military hierarchies associated with it. They can therefore serve as powerful tools for actors seeking to upend existing military balances, and they incentivise attempts to so.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:: Middle East

15547. Emerging Challenges for European Security and Defence

Author:: Douglas Barrie and Ben Barry
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: The challenges of climate change for the military and the security aspects of space are the latest critical issues explored as part of a joint programme between the IISS and the Hanns Seidel Foundation. On 23 and 24 June 2021 the Hanns Seidel Foundation and the IISS held the fourth meeting of the High-Level Study Group on the Future Defence of Europe. While earlier sessions of the study group had focused on threat perceptions, military capabilities, the implications of intensifying great-power competition, and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on European defence, the growing impact of climate change on defence and security was the focus of the first day’s discussion. The second day considered developments in space exploitation, and the challenges and opportunities this raises for defence and security. The following paper draws on these discussions and includes the key themes and topics that were raised.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:: Europe

15548. Revitalising arms control: the MTCR and the HCoC

Author:: William Alberque
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: The paper examines the two most important multilateral frameworks for curbing the spread of uninhabited aerial systems (missiles and UAVs) capable of delivering large conventional payloads and weapons of mass destruction – the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC). Specifically, the paper discusses the origins and history of the MTCR and HCoC, their evolution over time (or lack thereof) and seeks to measure them against their intended goals. In the end, it urges for radical reform, but also provides suggested incremental changes that should be enacted immediately. It includes analysis of several specific regional security issues and related action–reaction defence-modernisation trends. This paper was drafted within the framework of the Missile Dialogue Initiative (MDI). The MDI was launched by the German Federal Foreign Office in 2019 and is administered by the IISS. The MDI has created a Track 1.5 dialogue (government and non-government experts working together) to contribute to state-level discussions of potential policy responses to the accelerating spread of missile capabilities to state and non-state actors. The MDI appears in the context of the erosion of the global and regional arms-control architecture and during a period of rapid technological change, which includes the evolution and spread of new, advanced missile systems that have contributed to growing instability.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Conflict, Missile Defense, and Instability
Political Geography:: Global Focus

15549. Leading edge: key drivers of defence innovation and the future of operational advantage

Author:: Simona R. Soare and Fabrice Pothier
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: The ability to develop and integrate emerging and disruptive technologies in defence is rapidly becoming a metric of success in the global competition for power. In this paper, Simona R. Soare and Fabrice Pothier provide a systematic conceptualisation of defence innovation. By empirically analysing innovation efforts in five countries – notably, China, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States – the paper identifies and analyses four key drivers of defence innovation, provides a better understanding of how the five nations prioritise among them, and explores how they are linked to future operational advantage.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Innovation, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:: Global Focus

15550. Security and the Arctic: navigating between cooperation and competition

Author:: Nick Childs
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: The Arctic region is undergoing particularly dramatic change, driven chiefly by environmental factors resulting from climate change. This is affecting the Arctic to a greater extent than any other region of the globe, with the region warming twice as fast as other parts of the planet. Consequently, the Arctic has become a region of growing strategic interest and concern. New geostrategic frictions are emerging as a result of increased military activities and the prospect of new maritime routes and greater access to resources; the increased focus on how to respond to the threat to the environment; and the impact of all this on Arctic populations and especially indigenous peoples. This is adding to the complexities of relations between different players and creating new dynamics of cooperation and competition in and around the region, with the increasing interest and potential influence of China one of the most significant developments in play. This is stimulating interest in the region and a perceived requirement for new thinking about how to preserve Arctic stability and mitigate risks, while protecting economic, political and diplomatic opportunities. For much of its recent history, the region has traded on a notion of ‘Arctic exceptionalism’, meaning that it has been uniquely shielded from many of the world’s strategic issues and frictions, and that the states and peoples which inhabit it have been largely able to organise themselves and coexist in peace, with a few general tenets and instruments of the rules-based international order to act as frameworks and guides. However, as the Arctic has become less inhospitable, both climatically and physically, it has also become less benign in a geo-strategic sense. It can be argued that, compared to other regions, the Arctic remains an arena or relatively low tension overall. Nevertheless, the increasing elements of competition of various kinds are raising concern about the defence and security risks, particularly given the absence of a mechanism or a framework to even discuss defence and security issues in the region that includes all the key players.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Territorial Disputes, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Arctic

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS