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14802. How to Stop Jihadist Foreign Fighters
- Author:
- Daniel Byman
- Publication Date:
- 09-2021
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Political Science Quarterly
- Institution:
- Academy of Political Science
- Abstract:
- DANIEL BYMAN argues that the threat volunteers for al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and other jihadist groups pose is potentially grave, but that effective policy can profoundly reduce the danger. He argues that governments can disrupt the recruitment and travel of foreign fighters, hinder their time in war zones, and improve policing and intelligence gathering when they return.
- Topic:
- Al Qaeda, Islamic State, Jihad, and Foreign Fighters
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
14803. How to Win a “Long Game”: The Voting Rights Act, the Republican Party, and the Politics of Counter-Enforcement
- Author:
- Adrienne Jones and Andrew J. Polsky
- Publication Date:
- 07-2021
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Political Science Quarterly
- Institution:
- Academy of Political Science
- Abstract:
- ADRIENNE JONES and ANDREW POLSKY examine how the Republican Party engaged in counter-enforcement of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, notably during the Reagan and Bush 43 administrations, in an effort to maximize the voting strength of pro-Republican voting constituencies. They argue that sustained counter-enforcement efforts lead to sharp policy oscillations when parties alternate in power and that if a party pursues the long game of persistent counter-enforcement, it may find itself with the opportunity to achieve lasting results.
- Topic:
- Domestic Politics, Voting Rights, Political Parties, and Republican Party
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
14804. U.S. Geopolitics and Nuclear Deterrence in the Era of Great Power Competitions
- Author:
- Peter Rudolf
- Publication Date:
- 03-2021
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Political Science Quarterly
- Institution:
- Academy of Political Science
- Abstract:
- PETER RUDOLF argues that in the new era of great power competitions the United States is faced with the question of whether to seek some form of geopolitical accommodation based on de facto spheres of influence and buffer zones or to push ahead with strategic rivalries overshadowed by the risk of a military conflict with a nuclear dimension.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Power Politics, Geopolitics, Deterrence, and Strategic Competition
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
14805. Policy or Pique? Trump and the Turn to Great Power Competition
- Author:
- Deborah Welch Larson
- Publication Date:
- 03-2021
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Political Science Quarterly
- Institution:
- Academy of Political Science
- Abstract:
- DEBORAH WELCH LARSON analyzes Donald Trump’s policy toward China and Russia and the return of great power competition. She argues that Trump’s personalization of foreign policy undermined his trade war with China, and efforts to improve relations with Russia and that the Joe Biden administration will continue to compete but seek cooperation in areas of shared interests.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Power Politics, Trade Wars, Donald Trump, Strategic Competition, and Joe Biden
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, North America, and United States of America
14806. The Presidential and Congressional Elections of 2020: A National Referendum on the Trump Presidency
- Author:
- Gary C. Jacobson
- Publication Date:
- 03-2021
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Political Science Quarterly
- Institution:
- Academy of Political Science
- Abstract:
- GARY C. JACOBSON discusses the 2020 presidential and congressional elections. He argues that the elections were above all a referendum on Donald Trump’s presidency, which provoked extreme levels of party loyalty, partisan polarization, and partisan animosity in the electorate, as well as the highest voter turnout in more than a century.
- Topic:
- Elections, Voting, Donald Trump, Referendum, and Polarization
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
14807. Journal of Advanced Military Studies: Political Warfare and Propaganda
- Author:
- James J. F. Forest, Daniel De Wit, Kyleanne Hunter, Emma Jouenne, Glen Segell, Lev Topor, Alexander Tabachnik, Donald M. Bishop, Phil Zeman, Michael Cserkits, and Anthony Patrick
- Publication Date:
- 03-2021
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Journal of Advanced Military Studies
- Institution:
- Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
- Abstract:
- The digital age has greatly expanded the terrain and opportunities for a range of foreign influence efforts. A growing number of countries have invested significantly in their capabilities to disseminate online propaganda and disinformation worldwide, while simultaneously establishing information dominance at home. Each of the contributions to this issue addresses the central theme of influencing perceptions and behavior. First, Daniel de Wit draws lessons from a historical analysis of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), America’s intelligence and special operations organization in World War II. In addition to its efforts to collect intelligence on the Axis powers and to arm and train resistance groups behind enemy lines, the OSS also served as America’s primary psychological warfare agency, using a variety of “black propaganda” methods to sow dissension and confusion in enemy ranks.82 As noted earlier, psychological warfare plays a significant role in the conduct of today’s military operations, so de Wit’s research offers important historical lessons for contemporary campaign planners. Next, Kyleanne Hunter and Emma Jouenne examine the uniquely troubling effects of spreading misogynistic views online. Their analysis of three diverse case studies—the U.S. military, the incel movement, and ISIS— reveals how unchecked online misogyny can result in physical behavior that can threaten human and national security. Glen Segell then explores how perceptions about cybersecurity operations can have positive or negative impacts on civil-military relations, drawing on a case study of the Israeli experience. Lev Topor and Alexander Tabachnik follow with a study of how Russia uses the strategies and tactics of digital influence warfare against other countries, while continually seeking to strengthen its information dominance over Russian citizens. And Donald M. Bishop reveals how other countries do this as well, including China, North Korea, Iran, Cuba, and Venezuela. Each is engaged in these same kinds of efforts to control the information that circulates within their respective societies, while using various forms of propaganda against other countries to strengthen their influence and national power. Phil Zeman’s contribution to this issue looks at how China and Russia are trying to fracture American and Western societies through information, disinformation, economic coercion, and the creation of economic dependencies— in many cases capitalizing on specific attributes and vulnerabilities of a target nation to achieve their strategic objectives. Through these efforts, he concludes, China and Russia hope to prevent the will or ability of American or Western states to respond to an aggressive act. Next, Michael Cserkits explains how a society’s perceptions about armed forces can be influenced by cinematic productions and anime, drawing on a case study comparison of Japan and the United States. And finally, Anthony Patrick examines how social media penetration and internet connectivity could impact the likelihood that parties within a conventional intrastate conflict will enter negotiations. As a collection, these articles make a significant contribution to the scholarly research literature on political warfare and propaganda. The authors shed light on the need for research-based strategies and policies that can improve our ability to identify, defend against, and mitigate the consequences of influence efforts. However, when reflecting on the compound security threats described at the beginning of this introduction—involving both cyberattacks and influence attacks—a startling contrast is revealed: we have committed serious resources toward cybersecurity but not toward addressing the influence issues examined in this issue. We routinely install firewalls and other security measures around our computer network systems, track potential intrusion attempts, test and report network vulnerabilities, hold training seminars for new employees, and take many other measures to try and mitigate cybersecurity threats. In contrast, there are no firewalls or intrusion detection efforts defending us against digital influence attacks of either foreign or domestic origin. Government sanctions and social media deplatforming efforts respond to influence attackers once they have been identified as such, but these efforts take place after attacks have already occurred, sometimes over the course of several years. The articles of this issue reflect an array of efforts to influence the perceptions, emotions, and behavior of human beings at both individual and societal levels. In the absence of comprehensive strategies to more effectively defend against these efforts, the United States risks losing much more than military advantage; we are placing at risk the perceived legitimacy of our systems and institutions of governance, as well as our economic security, our ability to resolve social disagreements peacefully, and much more.83 Further, many other nations are also facing the challenges of defending against foreign influence efforts. As such, the transnational nature of influence opportunities and capabilities in the digital age may require a multinational, coordinated response. In the years ahead, further research will be needed to uncover strategies for responding to the threat of digital influence warfare with greater sophistication and success.
- Topic:
- Security, National Security, Politics, Science and Technology, Military Affairs, Women, Radicalization, Cybersecurity, Internet, History, World War II, Propaganda, Deterrence, Disinformation, Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Digital Policy, Psychological Warfare, and Misogyny
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Japan, China, Israel, Global Focus, and United States of America
14808. Journal of Advanced Military Studies: Wargaming and the Military
- Author:
- Charles J. Esdaile, Sebastian J. Bae, Ian T. Brown, Eric M. Walters, P. C. Combe, Kate Kuehn, Brian W. Cole, Eric M. Walters, Stephen M. Gordon, Walt Yates, Andrew Gordon, and Ian T. Brown
- Publication Date:
- 09-2021
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Journal of Advanced Military Studies
- Abstract:
- Given the rate of change taking place within the Corps and the local activity driving university innovation, the editors felt the need to contribute to the debate with a full issue of the Journal of Advanced Military Studies (JAMS) that focuses on wargaming and the future of the Marine Corps and the U.S. military. The authors of the articles that follow approached the conversation from a broad scholarly spectrum that offers historical and forward-thinking perspectives. The first article by Dr. Charles Esdaile, “ ‘Napoleon at Waterloo’: The Events of 18 June 1815 Analyzed via Historical Simulation,” offers a historical perspective on the importance of wargaming and professional military education (PME). His article examines how products of the game industry can be used to assess battles and draw out wider lessons relating to the conduct of war or to show how historical board games are not just recreational artifacts but also a tool with which to more fully explore, analyze, and understand campaign design and battle execution. Sebastian J. Bae and Major Ian T. Brown then provide a transition into a more modern conversation by offering a brief history of educational wargaming specific to the U.S. Marine Corps. The article reviews and assesses the history of educational wargaming from its tentative engagement before World War I through today. It will also offer recommendations on how the Corps can institutionalize the use of educational wargaming as a tool for honing Marines’ minds against thinking human adversaries. Our next two articles continue this discussion of wargaming and PME. Colonel Eric M. Walters considers the challenges and solutions presented by wargaming and helps orient those unfamiliar with wargaming and advises on proven best practices in using them when teaching military judgment in decision making. Lieutant Colonel P. C. Combe II shifts then into the design and implementation of wargaming for the purpose of teaching or evaluating the extent to which students have learned and can apply material as a means of professional development. Kate Kuehn further highlights the importance of evaluating the use of wargaming with her article, “Assessment Strategies for Educational Wargames.” Kuehn maintains that by examining the perspectives and practices of experienced faculty within wargaming, she can then identify strategies that can serve as useful teaching tools for other faculty as well as contribute to broader theory about designing assessment in such spaces. Colonel Brian W. Cole’s article on the wargame Hedgemony focuses on using wargames to then evaluate the learning objectives within senior Joint PME. His article examines how the Marine Corps War College’s experience with Hedgemony offers active learning for its students while emphasizing resource management and evaluates how well the game met the educational objectives set forth by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for senior-level PME. The final two articles in this issue of JAMS close the loop on the PME continuum by focusing on how wargaming complements military decision making and the future development of wargaming focused on the future of warfare. Colonel Walters’s article “Developing Self-Confidence in Military Decision Making” highlights how extensive practice through wargaming grows selfconfidence in both the individual Marine and in the unit engaged in it. Stephen M. Gordon, Colonel Walt Yates, and Andrew Gordon close out the journal articles by exploring the benefits and challenges of applying successful storytelling techniques to designing wargame narratives that balance creative ambitions with achievable time lines. In the authors’ minds, wargames that incorporate such techniques will generate new trends and better inform future conflict planning. The remainder of JAMS rounds out with a review essay and a selection of book reviews that continues our focus on warfare, but it also highlights continuing challenges in national security and international relations. The coming year will be busy for the JAMS editors as we work to provide journal issues on a diverse range of topics relevant to the study of militaries and defense, including a special issue on strategic culture followed by the Spring 2022 issue.
- Topic:
- Education, War, History, War Games, Decision-Making, Waterloo, Strategy, Resource Management, and Professional Military Education
- Political Geography:
- United States of America
14809. Journal of Advanced Military Studies: Special Issue on Strategic Culture
- Author:
- Ali Parchami, Ofer Fridman, Neil Munro, W. A. Rivera, Evan Kerrane, Matthew Brummer, Eitan Oren, Katie C. Finlinson, Mark Briskey, Ben Connable, Benjamin Potter, Emilee Matheson, Jeffrey Taylor, and Dr. Jose de Arimateia da Cruz
- Publication Date:
- 12-2021
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Journal of Advanced Military Studies
- Institution:
- Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
- Abstract:
- An ironic feature of U.S. strategic culture is a rather distinctive disinterest in the study of our own or others’ strategic cultures. The U.S. security institutions find themselves energized about cultural study during irregular conflicts in which the cost of cultural ignorance is made plain, but they persist in under developing the ability to apply that same cultural acumen to great power conflict and key relationships with allies. During the last 100 years of fighting, U.S. defense institutions have repeated a pattern of investing in cultural study during short bursts of counterinsurgency fighting and then abandoning it along with its lessons learned at the termination of conflict. As a consequence, U.S. planning efforts—including those now being designed for future great power conflict—suffer from an unnecessarily narrow optic and fail to account for the full range of perspectives and plausible courses of action considered by an adversary. America’s allies know it and are frustrated by it. More importantly, U.S. adversaries know it and plan to exploit it. The study of strategic culture accounts for the ways in which the culture of a group, whether it be the constructed culture of a nascent terrorist organization or the enduring culture of a nation, impacts thinking and decision making regarding defensive and offensive approaches to security. Within a complex state like Russia or China, one must account for sweeping national narratives that cultivate collective mentalities and impact decision making but must also include the internal cultures of key organizations within the nation’s security community. These organizations often develop distinctive identities, values, perceptions, and habits of practice that can be consequential in moments when the organization’s leaders wield instruments of state power. In the first section of this special edition of the Journal of Advanced Military Studies (JAMS) on strategic culture, Drs. Ali Parchami, Ofer Fridman, Neil Munro, W. A. Rivera, and Major Evan Kerrane provide strategic culture profiles on key U.S. adversaries: Iran, Russia, and China. Their work reflects the complexity involved in identifying and analyzing the narratives and drivers that compete for dominance across these three strategic culture landscapes. Acquainting ourselves with the multivariate and often-contested internal constructs that produce the behavior of our adversaries helps expand our own thinking about the range of possible and plausible competitive strategies we are likely to see from them. The second section of this issue highlights the utility of understanding not only U.S. adversaries but also American allies and partners. Drs. Matthew Brummer and Eitan Oren examine the effort by Japan’s military leaders to shift their own strategic culture through an influence campaign aimed at altering domestic perceptions concerning the appropriate role for the military and thereby expanding its ability to more actively cooperate with the United States in maintaining peace and stability in Asia. Whether they are successful has direct implications for U.S. alliance constructs in the Pacific and the action that might be reasonably expected from Japan should U.S. conflict with China become kinetic. Katie C. Finlinson offers analysis that benefits U.S. deterrence and nonproliferation efforts. She employs a two-tiered research approach— leveraging both strategic culture and analysis of national role conception—as a useful framework for assessing the propensity of the United Arab Emirates to consider weaponizing civilian nuclear knowledge and infrastructure. Finlinson offers an approach repeatable for other potential over-the-horizon states and demonstrates the interplay between a state’s strategic culture and powerful exogenous factors—like security assurances from the United States and potential nuclear acquisition by Iran—in determining outcomes. Finally, Dr. Mark Briskey offers a look at the aspects of Pakistan’s strategic culture that exist as an outgrowth of its army’s most formative historic experiences and have resulted in deeply entrenched perceptions of self, of key adversaries, and perceptions of the past that must be understood by Western partners seeking Pakistan’s cooperation and partnership in the region. Our third section offers a close look at the ways in which cultural analysis can illuminate policy options on particularly difficult problem sets. One of these is assessing will to fight on the part of both allies and adversaries. Dr. Ben Connable recommends a diagnostic tool developed and trialed by the Rand Corporation that demonstrates promise in advancing the ability of defense institutions to anticipate will to fight in kinetic conflicts but also will to act in consequential ways by great powers engaged in strategic competition. Benjamin Potter, Emilee Matheson, and Jeffrey Taylor follow with applications of the Cultural Topography Framework, an approach to cultural data assessment and application that benefits from the insights supplied by the sort of comprehensive strategic culture profiles offered in section one of this issue and translates these into actionable intelligence against discrete problem sets. Their work, respectively, illuminates policy options for containing a potentially escalatory situation in Transnistria, decreasing violence and looting through a more effective reintegration strategy for former members of the Lord’s Resistance Army in Central Africa, and reexamining the value of technological advances in the U.S. nuclear arsenal, which may be having a deleterious impact on its deterrence strategy. The special issue concludes with a review essay by Dr. José de Arimatéia da Cruz, which offers readers critical analysis of three volumes of strategic culture scholarship. The articles collected for the special issue demonstrate a range of ways in which the study of strategic culture delivers critical insights to policy planners and strategists. Understanding other great powers on their own terms—the identities they seek to establish or defend, the values that inform their policies, the norms of strategic competition or warfighting that they deem acceptable and effective, and the worldview they espouse (whether an accurate fit with objective realities or not)—prepares policy makers to craft plans and strategies in ways that are tailored for maximum advantage vis-à-vis a particular adversary. Given the steady shutdown of cultural inquiry labs and training facilities across the U.S. defense and security community, it is worth issuing a stern reminder that the advantage of knowing one’s enemy is far more consequential when engaged in great power conflict than in the irregular conflicts in which U.S. institutions have learned its worth. This issue of JAMS is provided as a resource to both reinforce that point and supply a wealth of initial material in advancing it.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, War, History, Power Politics, Realism, Strategic Competition, Resistance, Identity, and Strategic Culture
- Political Geography:
- Pakistan, Russia, Japan, Iran, Middle East, India, United Arab Emirates, and United States of America
14810. China’s Digital Silk Road: integration into national IT infrastructure and wider implications for Western defence industries
- Author:
- Meia Nouwens
- Publication Date:
- 02-2021
- Content Type:
- Research Paper
- Institution:
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- The geopolitical dispute between the United States and China is taking place on the fault line of global telecommunications infrastructure and digital technologies. As this competition grows, so too does the likelihood of a potential bifurcation in the global information and security technological ecosystems, split between US-allied liberal democracies on the one side and countries dependent on Chinese-based information and communications technology (ICT) on the other. The impact of this competition reaches beyond telecommunications companies and those involved in their supply chains. Indeed, second and third order of magnitude implications exist for the security and defence sectors. While this competition unfolds, the Chinese Government’s Digital Silk Road (DSR) continues apace and leverages the strengths of Chinese public- and private-sector giants to further integrate Chinese technologies and standards into the digital ecosystems of the least-developed, emerging and developed economies alike. The existing literature on the security and defence implications of the integration of Chinese ICT into national digital ecosystems is primarily concerned with the potential threats posed to intelligence and defence cooperation. However, the implication of China’s global digital investments for US and other Western defence industries is an understudied subject that deserves greater attention. To provide greater clarity to Western defence industries on these issues, this project has sought to answer four forward-looking questions. Firstly, what risks does the possibility of a bifurcated global digital ecosystem pose for the national and industrial security of key Asian, European and Middle Eastern states and economies? Secondly, to what extent does the integration of Chinese information technology and digital infrastructure create challenges for alliance intelligence and defence cooperation? Thirdly, what level of integration should be considered significant and how might security-cooperation efforts (e.g. Western arms exports) be affected? Lastly, can security risks to companies doing business abroad be mitigated when the integration of Chinese digital technology into national digital ecosystems is already high? This report has aimed to address this gap in current analysis by outlining the potential risks posed by China’s global digital and technological investments to defence industries. It follows with an analysis of the extent of Chinese DSR activity in five case-study countries across Asia, the Middle East and Europe that are of high security and defence importance to the US: Indonesia, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Israel, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Poland. In doing so, the report aims to provide greater insight into government decision-making and lessons learned for Western defence industries.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Communications, Infrastructure, Hegemony, Digital Economy, Conflict, Silk Road, and Rivalry
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
14811. The European Union in the COVID-19 storm: economic, political and stability challenges
- Author:
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Publication Date:
- 02-2021
- Content Type:
- Research Paper
- Institution:
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- The COVID-19 shock intensified existing imbalances and divergence trends within the EU as well as underlying societal tensions, with potentially long-lasting consequences for social and political stability. The EU response to the epochal challenge posed by the pandemic has been strong and thorough, with the relaxation of fiscal rules and an unprecedented mobilisation of regional resources. However, implementation challenges abound, amid growing political instability and governance flaws in many member countries. The effectiveness of the long-term response to the pandemic also represents an inflection point for the durability and strength of the European project, offering the opportunity to turn the tide of existing trends of popular dissatisfaction with traditional politics and institutions (including the EU) and rising political risk.
- Topic:
- Economics, International Cooperation, European Union, Pandemic, and COVID-19
- Political Geography:
- Europe
14812. Managing the looming missile-proliferation problem in the Asia-Pacific
- Author:
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Publication Date:
- 03-2021
- Content Type:
- Research Paper
- Institution:
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- In light of the range of capabilities that contemporary missile systems and associated technologies can provide, it is unsurprising that more and more states around the world aspire to acquire them. In the Asia-Pacific, the involvement of the three major nuclear powers – China, Russia and the United States – as well as middle powers make the situation even more complex and unstable. When the US withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty on 2 August 2019, the Asia-Pacific seemed to enter a ‘post-INF’ era in which regional states may face dim prospects for arms control and potentially a fierce theatre-level, missile-led arms race. This essay reviews emerging trends in missile proliferation and analyses the relevant risks of these trends before assessing some of the mechanisms that address proliferation challenges. It then explores ways of curbing and even reversing these trends from a Chinese perspective. It is increasingly clear that since 2010 the world has been undergoing a period of nuclear modernisation and missile proliferation. The US and Russia, which possess the majority of the world’s nuclear weapons, have both recently accelerated efforts to modernise their respective nuclear arsenals. As highlighted in the 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and the subsequent policy and budget decisions of former US president Donald Trump, Washington has abandoned a pledge – made by former president Barack Obama − to abstain from researching and deploying new kinds of nuclear warheads. Since then, the US has deployed a low-yield nuclear warhead (W76-2) on a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) in late 2019 and begun to redevelop a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) as another key component of its nuclear-modernisation plan. For the air-leg of the US triad, the US Air Force received a final proposal for the Long-Range Standoff Weapon (LRSO) in November 2020 ahead of its preparations to seek approval for the system’s development. The LRSO is a nuclear-armed cruise missile intended to serve as a replacement for the AGM-86B air-launched cruise missile (ALCM). Furthermore, the US also tested a groundlaunched cruise missile (GLCM) in August 2019 and a ground-launched intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) in December 2019 following Washington’s withdrawal from the INF Treaty. All these capabilities are deemed by the US to be effective measures to counter a limited nuclear attack from Russia or China. Russia, which maintains a stockpile of approximately 4,310 warheads assigned for use and an estimated further 2,060 awaiting retirement and dismantlement, is in the middle of a decades-long nuclear-forces modernisation programme. This modernisation also incorporates the addition of new types of strategic delivery systems, which were unveiled by Russian President Vladimir Putin in March 2018. These include a new nuclear-armed hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV), Avangard, a nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed cruise missile, Burevestnik, a new anti-ship hypersonic cruise missile, Zircon, and a nuclear-powered and nuclear-tipped uninhabited underwater delivery vehicle, Poseidon.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Missile Defense
- Political Geography:
- Asia-Pacific
14813. The geo-economics and geopolitics of COVID-19: implications for European security
- Author:
- Bastain Giegerich, Fenella McGerty, and Peter Round
- Publication Date:
- 03-2021
- Content Type:
- Research Paper
- Institution:
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- The pandemic was not an unforeseen event. Foresight reports, policy simulations and national risk assessments had long included a similar challenge among the possibilities. Nevertheless, when the coronavirus pandemic came the world was not prepared and despite the existence of a myriad of international organisations, alliances and friendships, the reactions were mostly national and inward-looking. Governments started to spend vast amounts of resources on fighting the pandemic, looking for preventatives and cures, and propping up their own economies when the primary weapon in the arsenal to fight the pandemic was the so-called ‘lockdown’. Many governments will emerge from the coronavirus pandemic laden with debt and a severely depressed outlook for economic growth. It is conceivable that among the second- and third-order effects of the pandemic is an accelerated rebalancing of power away from the Euro-Atlantic community. This could threaten the ability of NATO and EU member states to shape and defend the rules-based international order. The pandemic itself may be a driver of instability and insecurity at a time when the ability to deliver stabilising measures and crisis-management capacity is weakened. Divergent recoveries could create conditions that see an accelerated rebalancing of global power and the development or disintegration of global alliances. While levels of uncertainty caused by the pandemic remain high, it is now possible to attempt a first assessment of the geo-economic and geopolitical implications of the pandemic. In geo-economic terms, it is useful to take stock of the costs of the pandemic and attempt to evaluate who wins and who loses as a result. In geopolitical terms, there are important questions relating to international order and great-power politics, as well as the ability of multinational institutions to contribute to problem solving in the age of COVID-19, especially in the face of a resurgence of nation-state power. From the perspective of security and defence policy, the pandemic further complicates an already challenging picture, straining resources while adding to a long list of relevant threat vectors and risks. Between September and December 2020, the IISS and the Hanns Seidel Foundation convened six web-based discussion meetings, bringing together a group of international experts and officials to pursue three parallel strands of debate – economics, international order, and security and defence. This paper, written by IISS staff, draws on these conversations and is informed by them. It does not represent a shared assessment or a consensus view among the participants, but it hopefully serves to provide some orientation and fuel for constructive debate in a world that very much remains in flux.
- Topic:
- Security, Economics, Geopolitics, Pandemic, and COVID-19
- Political Geography:
- Europe
14814. The Nagorno-Karabakh war: a spur to Moscow’s UAV efforts?
- Author:
- Julian Cooper
- Publication Date:
- 03-2021
- Content Type:
- Research Paper
- Institution:
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- For Russian observers and analysts, the 44-day war in 2020 between Azerbaijan and Armenia highlighted the comparative lack in Russia’s own armed uninhabited aerial vehicle (UAV) inventory, as well as the patchy performance of Russian-made short-range ground-based air-defence systems in countering UAVs. Nearly two decades after the US began to operate armed UAVs and as the number of countries possessing armed UAVs around the world steadily increases, Russia has yet to field a similar capability. Factors contributing to this failing include the collapse of Russian defence spending in the 1990s, the more recent focus on recapitalising in-service capabilities, the neglect of some of the required-technology building blocks for UAV systems, and Western sanctions. In 2009 Russia imported ten small Birdeye 400 and two larger Searcher Mk II UAVs and the associated ground-control and support systems from Israel. In September 2011 the Defence Ministry opened a tender for ISR and armed UAVs, and a far higher-performance uninhabited combat air vehicle (UCAV) with Sukhoi eventually being the preferred UCAV developer. Two medium-altitude long-endurance designs were selected, the Kronstadt Orion (Inokhodets-BLA) single-engine UAV, and the now-UWCA Altius twin-engine platform. As of early-2021, neither project has entered service in significant numbers. Engine-supply issues have been a contributory factor. For Moscow, the task of producing a modern, competitive small piston engine suitable for UAV applications has represented a challenge. This engine-supply problem is rooted in a decades-long focus on advanced propulsion technologies at the cost of the humble piston engine, and – at the time – the capacity to source these from elsewhere within the USSR. By the time the gap was beginning to be recognised in the 1990s funding was not available to revive the domestic development of piston aeroengines. Other contributing factors to the Russian UAV gap include the fact that relatively cheap piston engines for UAVs lack the prestige to command resources and administrative authority, especially in a decision-making system where the development of advanced weapons appears to be in the hands of a relatively small circle of people with little involvement of civilian experts. Inter-service rivalry may also have hindered the introduction of ISR and armed UAVs into the inventory. Given the extended difficulties Russia has had in getting ISR and armed UAVs into service there remains a question as to why it has not turned more to the international market to address the capability gap. While Beijing might have been willing to supply armed UAVs to Russia, this would have required Moscow to purchase from what was previously a client state in terms of weapons sales. It would also be considered a tacit admission it was lagging China in UAV development. In addition, for all its difficulties, Russia may well still view the UAV-export market as one it could enter. In this context China would be a competitor. The Nagorno-Karabakh war and Russia’s experience in Syria have underscored the challenges to current ground-based air-defence systems when defending against UAVs and loitering munitions. Along with gun and missile-based counters the Defence Ministry is looking at electronic countermeasures. A more novel approach has been to look at using certain UAVs as a counter measure. Training now also includes more counter-UAV activities.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Europe
14815. Amidst Anti-COVID Protests, Far-Right Extremists Are Using a New Symbol: An All-Black American Flag
- Author:
- Grace Vaule
- Publication Date:
- 10-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- TRAC: Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium
- Abstract:
- Currently, amidst a backdrop of COVID-related vaccine and mask mandates, far-right extremists in the United States are using another symbol: the all-black American flag.
- Topic:
- Terrorism, Violent Extremism, COVID-19, Political Extremism, and Countering Violent Extremism
- Political Geography:
- United States
14816. The Dual Strategy Behind Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin’s (JNIM) Katiba Macina Territorial Expansion
- Author:
- Frida Bergström
- Publication Date:
- 12-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- TRAC: Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium
- Abstract:
- The takeover of four distinct areas by the AQC affiliate, Jama’a Nusrat ul- Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) reflects an issue that is expanding exponentially into Mali’s neighbouring countries.
- Topic:
- Terrorism, Violent Extremism, Militant Islam, Political Extremism, and Countering Violent Extremism
- Political Geography:
- West Africa and Mali
14817. Open-source analysis of Iran’s missile and UAV capabilities and proliferation
- Author:
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Publication Date:
- 04-2021
- Content Type:
- Research Paper
- Institution:
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- Iran’s ballistic missile systems, supplemented by cruise missiles and UAVs, are intended not only for deterrence, but for battle, including by Iran’s regional partners. In a new report, the IISS provides a detailed assessment of Iran’s missiles, and the manner and purposes for which it has been proliferating them. Nuclear issues are the exclusive focus of the negotiations on the restoration of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which have taken place in Vienna. The Western powers are keen, however, to engage in follow-on talks to address Iran’s missiles and activities in the region. To inform the public policy debate on the latter matters, the IISS has produced a fact-rich technical assessment of Iran’s current missile and uninhabited aerial vehicle (UAV) capabilities and its proliferation of these technologies to Iran’s regional partners.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Strategy, Nonproliferation, and Missile Defense
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
14818. Missile multinational: Iran’s new approach to missile proliferation
- Author:
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Publication Date:
- 04-2021
- Content Type:
- Research Paper
- Institution:
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- How does Iran equip its proxies and allies with increasingly sophisticated and longer-range ballistic missiles and artillery rockets? Fabian Hinz considers Iran’s new missile-proliferation strategy. The proliferation of ballistic missiles and artillery rockets to non-state actors by the Islamic Republic of Iran is a constant source of tension in the Middle East. Yemen’s Houthi rebels conduct ballistic-missile strikes on Saudi Arabian cities, airports and oil installations; Hizbullah’s ever-growing rocket and missile arsenal sparks Israeli consideration of military options; and Iranian proxies rocket the United States’ installations in Iraq on an almost weekly basis. But how does Iran equip its proxies and allies with increasingly sophisticated and longer-range ballistic missiles and artillery rockets? For years, the answer has been through smuggling. In one example, on 19 March 2021 Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Adel al-Jubeir claimed that all Houthi missiles fired at the Kingdom were ‘made in Iran’, and there is ample evidence that Houthis were the recipients of weapons such as Iran’s short-range Qiam ballistic missile. Iran doubtlessly continues to directly transfer missiles outside its borders to some degree. However, in recent years smuggling has been augmented by two other transfer methods: the provision of guidance kits to modify existing stockpiles of artillery rockets, and the wholescale provision of manufacturing capabilities. Iranian support for enabling local rocket production is not new. Reports about the rocket arsenals of Palestinian factions in Gaza regularly cite Iranian assistance for domestic manufacturing, and Hizbullah’s alleged missile factory in the Beqaa Valley became the topic of competing accusations in the Israeli–Hizbullah relationship. However, closer examination of Iranian sources, documents likely leaked by Israeli intelligence and the missiles unveiled by the Houthis reveal a strategy of empowering Iranian proxies that is more comprehensive than previously thought. In cooperation with Iran’s missile industry, the Quds Force (QF) of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) appears intent on enabling all its main proxies to be able to autonomously manufacture artillery rockets and precision-guided missiles. Also, a special development effort seems to be aimed at creating simple artillery rockets and short-range-missile systems and production units custom-tailored for local production.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
14819. Missile developments in South Asia: a perspective from Pakistan
- Author:
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Publication Date:
- 05-2021
- Content Type:
- Research Paper
- Institution:
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- India and Pakistan continue to develop their missile-delivery systems and associated nuclear inventories, raising concerns of a regional arms race. While Indian doctrine appears intended to fight a ‘two-front war’ against Pakistan and China, the extent to which India’s missile inventory is balanced, or otherwise, is a cause of disquiet in Islamabad. Many of the new missile systems being added to India’s inventory appear to be more suited to target Pakistan than China. This disconnect between India’s threat perception and missile developments not only risks eroding the credibility of its deterrence posture vis-à-vis China, but also courts an action–reaction dynamic with Pakistan. Islamabad, in response to how it views Indian developments, is in turn making qualitative improvements to its missile arsenal, with the intention of deterring limited conflict to an all-out war. The resultant arms race in the missile arena, however, is moving on two different trajectories. This paper discusses ongoing missile developments in South Asia, and how India and Pakistan have used different delivery systems as signalling mechanisms during past crises in an attempt to achieve their respective military or political objectives. It is also useful to examine Pakistan’s posture of Full-Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) in the context of India’s Cold Start doctrine, introduced in 2004 and apparently intended to allow India to explore options for a limited war in cases where there is a risk of crossing the nuclear threshold. The paper also reviews whether doctrinal ambiguities can be discerned in India’s declaratory nuclear policies, especially New Delhi’s claim of maintaining a credible minimum deterrence (CMD) and how this can be squared with the goal of being able to cope with a ‘two-front war’.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Missile Defense, and Rivalry
- Political Geography:
- Pakistan, China, India, and Asia
14820. The evolving nature of China’s military diplomacy: from visits to vaccines
- Author:
- Meia Nouwens
- Publication Date:
- 05-2021
- Content Type:
- Research Paper
- Institution:
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- The People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) military-to-military cooperation in response to the global coronavirus pandemic signals a growing role for the military within China’s diplomatic activities. Historically, the PLA played a minor role in Chinese foreign policy. However, in the wake of a more nationalist and assertive Chinese foreign policy, the PLA’s role in national diplomacy and security strategy has grown to serve both strategic and operational goals and has reached new heights in the context of the coronavirus pandemic. Military-to-military COVID-19-related engagement has taken place within a larger context of Beijing’s expanded diplomatic efforts to improve China’s global reputation following its initial delayed and mishandled response at the start of the coronavirus outbreak in 2020. Publicly available data shows that COVID-19 military diplomacy began in March 2020, when the PLA sent protective equipment and clothing to Iran. In February 2021, the PLA began to donate COVID-19 vaccines to overseas militaries. The PLA’s vaccine assistance to 13 countries globally fits within a wider vaccine-centric diplomatic effort by the Chinese government but so far has been far smaller in scale. Between March 2020 and April 2021, the PLA has provided military medical assistance or donations to 56 countries around the world, and a United Nations peacekeeping mission. In all but two cases, the PLA’s medical diplomatic activities were directed at countries belonging to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Geographically, the PLA mostly engaged with countries in the Asia–Pacific and Africa. The focus on the BRI and South–South diplomacy also reflects China’s wider diplomatic narrative and foreign policy objectives. The PLA’s activities were usually framed within the ‘responsible stakeholder’ narrative that China sought to promote through its civilian aid diplomacy. It is likely that the PLA sought to cooperate with militaries wherever it could and focussed on countries with which it already enjoyed established friendly relations, rather than using the PLA’s military diplomacy to establish new strategic relations. The PLA’s military diplomatic activities relating to the coronavirus demonstrate that the PLA will increasingly play a greater role in China’s foreign diplomacy, in line with President Xi’s instructions.
- Topic:
- Security, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Hegemony
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
14821. Nuclear deterrence and stability in South Asia: perceptions and realities
- Author:
- Antoine Levesques
- Publication Date:
- 05-2021
- Content Type:
- Research Paper
- Institution:
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- This IISS report examines nuclear deterrence and stability in South Asia by separating perceptions from facts in order to assess the extent to which India and Pakistan may be at risk from imprudent or mistaken use of nuclear weapons. The authors start from an uncomfortable truth: chance played an important ameliorative role in the February 2019 India–Pakistan security crisis. India and Pakistan risk stumbling into using their nuclear weapons through miscalculation or misinterpretation in a future crisis. This report presents evidence suggesting grave deficiencies and asymmetries in India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear doctrines, which are compounded by mutual disbelief, existing and emerging military capabilities, and the prolonged absence of related dialogue mechanisms. India and Pakistan are seeking new technologies and capabilities that dangerously undermine each other’s defence under the nuclear threshold. Whatever they learn from past crises, the uncharted territory they are now exploring requires enlightened judgement about their doctrines, their nuclear and conventional capabilities, and their unpredictable implications in future crises. India and Pakistan already possess sufficient nuclear weapons to ensure a robust, largely stable mutual nuclear deterrence. Nuclear expansion casts doubt on stated policies of minimalism, risks a high-cost arms race in the post-pandemic era and may put overall deterrence stability at risk. China’s evolving profile as a nuclear-weapons state is compounding India’s security challenges. Yet control over the drivers of the India–Pakistan nuclear-deterrence and stability equation remains almost entirely in the hands of leaders in New Delhi and Islamabad. Only India and Pakistan can choose to creatively overcome the challenges to adopting new risk-reduction measures, as an imperfect but realistic stopgap until trust-building and eventual political dialogue make arms control possible. This report identifies a list of potentially useful confidence-building measures (CBMs) and other practical steps both countries could take early on. It concludes that a robust, trusted, reliable, deniable backchannel between their leaderships is the most promising means by which India and Pakistan could achieve greater strategic and nuclear-deterrence stability. This is in their interests and operationalising it is their decision. Such a mechanism should help avoid or mitigate the costs of any future crisis as well as eventually help India and Pakistan to adopt new CBMs on the way to building greater trust.
- Topic:
- Security, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
- Political Geography:
- South Asia and Asia
14822. Missile developments in Southern Asia: a perspective from India
- Author:
- Manpreet Sethi
- Publication Date:
- 06-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- Credible nuclear deterrence presupposes the availability and integration of certain essential components that collectively constitute a nuclear arsenal. Delivery systems, deployable across a variety of platforms and of requisite range and reliability, are one such critical element. Accordingly, in the last decade the three nuclear-armed states in Southern Asia − China, India and Pakistan − have been engaged in developing missiles that they consider necessary to support their respective deterrent needs. This paper identifies recent trends in missile development in the region, focusing on the above-mentioned states. It captures capability trends, considers the differing capability emphasis among the three countries depending on their approach to nuclear deterrence and assesses the impact of missile developments on strategic stability.
- Topic:
- Security, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Deterrence, and Strategic Stability
- Political Geography:
- Pakistan, China, India, and Asia
14823. Exploring post-INF arms control in the Asia-Pacific: China’s role in the challenges ahead
- Author:
- Bates Gill
- Publication Date:
- 06-2021
- Content Type:
- Research Paper
- Institution:
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- With the demise of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019, much attention has focused on the Asia-Pacific as the locus for a new missile-fuelled arms competition, especially between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Much speculation has also centred on the prospects of avoiding the most dangerous elements of that competition through arms control or other risk-reduction measures. There are good reasons for these concerns. Since the 1990s China has invested enormous resources in the development and deployment of short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Today China fields one of the world’s largest and most diverse arrays of ballistic-missile systems, including both conventional- and nuclear-armed variants. Critically, these missile systems have become an increasingly central feature in the strategic and operational thinking of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and will likely remain so for the decades ahead. At present, Beijing sees little to no value in reductions to these systems. On the contrary, they are valuable for the very reasons Washington and other regional capitals would like to see them limited: they pose a credible deterrent and warfighting threat in and around China’s periphery, not only against the United States, but also against US allies and others in the region such as India. For the United States, China’s steady missile build-up has been a long-standing concern. When the Trump administration announced its withdrawal from the INF – citing Russia’s non-compliance with the treaty – it also cited China’s deployment of intermediate-range missile systems and their threats to US interests in the Asia-Pacific as an ancillary reason for quitting the agreement. Since 2019, the United States has initiated weapons-development programmes with an eye to deploying its own suite of intermediate missiles to the region in order to range Chinese targets, in addition to other offensive and defensive systems to counter Chinese missile threats. Coming in the larger context of deteriorating diplomatic, security and economic relations between Beijing and Washington, these developments are only a small part of an intensifying competition between the two powers.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Hegemony, and INF Treaty
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
14824. DPRK strategic capabilities and security on the Korean Peninsula: looking ahead
- Author:
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Publication Date:
- 07-2021
- Content Type:
- Research Paper
- Institution:
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- Believing that Russian–US cooperation could play an important role in developing and implementing proposals for denuclearisation and creating lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula, the Moscow-based Center for Energy and Security Studies and the IISS undertook a joint assessment of North Korea’s progress in developing nuclear and missile capabilities and an examination of possible international steps towards a solution. The spectre of nuclear war has haunted the Korean Peninsula for nearly seven decades. In November 1950, United States president Harry Truman publicly raised the option of using nuclear weapons in the Korean War. For about 40 years after the war, the US deployed several types of tactical nuclear weapons in the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea). The ROK and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) also launched their own nuclear-weapons programmes. While Seoul abandoned its dedicated weapons effort soon after ROK president Park Chung-hee was assassinated in October 1979, Pyongyang persisted, announcing its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003 and subsequently making rapid progress in building up nuclear and missile capabilities, while enshrining a nuclear-armed status in the country’s constitution. In September 2017, North Korea’s sixth nuclear test achieved a thermonuclear yield. Two months later, the DPRK launched a Hwasong-15 ballistic missile, which Pyongyang says is an intercontinental weapon system that can reach the entire US mainland. At that point, North Korea announced that its mission to build its nuclear forces was accomplished. The year 2017 saw military escalation on the Korean Peninsula reach an unprecedented level in the post-Korean War period. Many analysts believed that the situation had become the most volatile since the 1968 USS Pueblo crisis, or even since the end of Korean War hostilities in 1953. Some experts drew parallels with the Cuban Missile Crisis. Given Russia’s historical relationship with North Korea and the US alliance with South Korea, Moscow and Washington have special roles to play in promoting stability on the Korean Peninsula. As permanent members of the UN Security Council and depository states of the NPT, Russia and the US also bear special responsibility for upholding peace and international security. Their joint efforts, along with other major powers, were instrumental, for example, in resolving the crisis over the Iranian nuclear programme through the adoption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in July 2015. Despite US president Donald Trump’s decision in May 2018 to take the US out of the JCPOA, the deal remains a model of what can be achieved through multilateral diplomacy, especially when US–Russian cooperation is harnessed to promote nuclear non-proliferation. Similarly, should the key players demonstrate the political will to seek a sustainable solution to the security problems on the Korean Peninsula, Russian–US cooperation in a multilateral framework could play an important role in developing and implementing proposals. The opportunities are clear. For example, more than 67 years since the shooting stopped, the Korean War still remains officially unresolved. The Armistice Agreement of 1953 has yet to be replaced by a proper peace treaty or a more comprehensive accord. In these circumstances, the Moscow-based Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) agreed in 2017 to conduct a joint assessment of North Korea’s progress in developing nuclear and missile capabilities. They also undertook to develop proposals on possible international steps to facilitate the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula and create lasting peace and security mechanisms. The two parties began their work in January 2018 and completed it in about 33 months. They received valuable assistance from a Russian working group led by CENESS and a US working group led by the IISS. The two working groups included former military officials, diplomats, nuclear specialists and scholars specialising in Korean studies. The two groups worked independently, then compared and consolidated their drafts. The results are summarised in this joint report prepared by the project co-chairs. All the contributing experts, listed in annexes one and two, participated in a personal capacity. The report does not necessarily reflect the views of all the experts involved in the study, or of the organisations they represent. CENESS and IISS hope that the report will serve as a catalyst for further discussions between researchers and officials on possible measures to reduce tensions and nuclear-related risks and build confidence in the region. We also hope that the report will help to facilitate discussions on how to promote pragmatic and effective Russian–US cooperation, an aim which has also been emphasised by the leadership of the two countries.
- Topic:
- Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America
14825. Missile arms-racing and insecurity in the Asia-Pacific
- Author:
- Masako Ikegami
- Publication Date:
- 08-2021
- Content Type:
- Research Paper
- Institution:
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- Although the INF Treaty was originally intended to reverse the deployment of Soviet and US missiles in Europe, its demise may be felt more keenly in the Asia-Pacific where a missile arms race is arguably already under way. The development of new missile technologies has implications for stability as the region’s nuclear-weapons states could see them as threats to the credibility and survivability of their second-strike systems. This could trigger a diversification of missile systems across different platforms or an increase in the number of warheads and launchers to complicate an adversary’s targeting options. The Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty ended on 2 August 2019 due to the United States’ withdrawal over long-standing concerns of Russian violations. The agreement between Russia and the US had prohibited the development and deployment of ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometres. Although the implementation of the INF Treaty was originally motivated to reverse the deployment of Soviet and US medium-and intermediate-range ground-launched missiles in Europe, its demise may be felt more keenly in the Asia-Pacific. Despite its primary rationale that Russia’s prolonged violation of the treaty rendered it void, then US president Donald Trump’s administration also cited China as an ancillary reason behind its decision to suspend its treaty obligations. As China was not a party to the INF Treaty, Beijing has been free to make substantial quantitative and qualitative improvements in its medium- and intermediate-range missile arsenal as an important part of its strategy to counter the US and allies’ military power in Asia. Following Washington’s decision to withdraw from the INF Treaty, US policymakers made it clear that they intend to counter China’s growing capabilities by deploying to the region additional missile defences and the previously prohibited classes of ground-launched surface-to-surface systems that now are under development. China’s ballistic-and cruise-missile arsenal, however, is viewed with concern beyond just Washington. Other regional states such as Australia and India also regard the expansion of China’s missile forces with unease, resulting in Canberra and New Delhi developing their own missile systems in response. In the case of the latter this could have downstream effects by causing Pakistan to adjust its own nuclear and conventional missile forces in response, illustrating the potential possibilities and consequences of action/reaction dynamics in Asia spiralling into regional arms-racing. Although the erosion of the arms-control architecture provided in part by the INF Treaty could potentially herald the beginning of more sustained arms-racing in the Asia-Pacific, a regional competition is arguably already under way. The proliferation of conventional and nuclear ballistic missiles in the region is not only apparent in China’s force structure, but also across Northeast Asia, which has had immediate and associated implications in the local and wider region. Developments in North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes have been especially destabilising, given fears that Pyongyang could threaten the use of nuclear weapons in a conventional conflict were the survival of the Kim Jong-un regime in question. Cumulatively, North Korea’s strengthened missile forces have caused the US and its allies and partners in the region, especially Japan and South Korea, to pursue countermeasures, including strengthening missile defences and developing counterforce capabilities. Doctrines regarding the use of conventional precision attack have also correspondingly shifted, with South Korea embracing the option of using pre-emptive conventional counterforce strikes to deter missile attacks from North Korea. Japan, however, continues to debate how its armed forces might utilise the long-range strike capabilities that Tokyo is pursuing. Some of these developments, especially improved missile-defence capabilities, have resulted in a diplomatic and economic response from China, as Beijing argued that some of these measures undermine its strategic deterrent. China has also warned US allies in the region of possible repercussions if they decide to host US missiles previously proscribed by the INF Treaty. There is therefore the potential that decisions by some regional states to develop their missile capabilities might not only result in immediate action–reaction responses by the instigator’s adversaries, but also wider cumulative consequences undermining the security of multiple states across the region. Against this backdrop, emerging missile technologies carry additional risks and implications for regional stability. As part of a trend that one analyst has described as a ‘missile renaissance’, hypersonic boost-glide vehicle and cruise-missile technologies are being pursued by several states in the Asia-Pacific region, including Australia, China, India, Japan, Russia and the US. The development of these technologies has implications for regional stability since they could be seen as threats to the credibility and survivability of second-strike systems of the region’s nuclear-weapons states, potentially triggering a diversification of nuclear systems across different platforms or an increase in the number of nuclear warheads and launchers to complicate an adversary’s targeting options
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
- Political Geography:
- Asia
14826. Cruise missiles in the Middle East
- Author:
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Publication Date:
- 09-2021
- Content Type:
- Research Paper
- Institution:
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- While both the proliferation and combat use of ballistic missiles in the Middle East have attracted a lot of attention, cruise missiles remain an often-overlooked regional proliferation challenge. Once the exclusive realm of the Middle East’s sole nuclear power, Israel, the proliferation of cruise-missile systems has steadily picked up pace in the last two decades. Iran and Turkey have joined Israel in the club of nations developing and producing their own cruise missiles, with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) appearing to take first steps in this direction. Other countries, such as Algeria, Egypt, Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, have already purchased cruise missiles from abroad or appear intent on doing so in the near future. This trend is not limited to state actors, however. With strong technical and material support from Iran, Yemen’s Houthi rebels have employed cruise missiles in their ongoing missile and uninhabited aerial vehicle (UAV) campaign against the Saudi-led coalition. The drivers of cruise-missile proliferation in the region are as diverse as the systems themselves. Their ability to evade or overcome defensive systems makes them an attractive option in a region experiencing a proliferation of increasingly advanced surface-to-air missiles as well as ballistic-missile-defence systems. Cruise missiles also give actors that lack modern air forces the ability to strike targets deep inside the territory of better-equipped adversaries. They are therefore well suited to serve as tools of asymmetric warfare as well as asymmetric deterrence. At the same time, however, they have also become an essential piece of weaponry for advanced modern fighter jets and therefore a logical choice for countries already operating highly capable air forces. Naval-based cruise missiles offer a long-range strike capability for expeditionary warfare and serve as a tool for regional power projection. In the case of Israel, submarine-launched cruise missiles also serve as the primary pillar of the country’s nuclear second-strike capability. However, the drivers of cruise-missile proliferation go beyond narrow military needs and considerations. Several Middle Eastern states are engaged in ambitious efforts to develop local arms industries, with precision-guided munitions, aerial stand-off weaponry and UAVs being a particular focus. Benefiting from the existing technological overlap with these systems, cruise missiles represent both an attractive and realistic option for ambitious military-development projects. They are also an advanced weapons system whose production and development was for a long time limited to a small number of highly developed countries, thus lending their producers considerable prestige. There is little doubt that cruise missiles have an impact on regional stability. As with other uninhabited systems, cruise missiles do not entail the risk of human losses for their users, and this factor potentially lowers the threshold for their use. Cruise missiles’ ability to evade detection and interception, and their effectiveness in conducting long-range precision strikes, might also provide incentives for the adoption of pre-emptive strategies, thus lending another element of instability to local crises. Most importantly, however, cruise missiles – like ballistic missiles and, to some extent, UAVs – defy traditional air superiority and by extension the military hierarchies associated with it. They can therefore serve as powerful tools for actors seeking to upend existing military balances, and they incentivise attempts to so.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
- Political Geography:
- Middle East
14827. Emerging Challenges for European Security and Defence
- Author:
- Douglas Barrie and Ben Barry
- Publication Date:
- 09-2021
- Content Type:
- Research Paper
- Institution:
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- The challenges of climate change for the military and the security aspects of space are the latest critical issues explored as part of a joint programme between the IISS and the Hanns Seidel Foundation. On 23 and 24 June 2021 the Hanns Seidel Foundation and the IISS held the fourth meeting of the High-Level Study Group on the Future Defence of Europe. While earlier sessions of the study group had focused on threat perceptions, military capabilities, the implications of intensifying great-power competition, and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on European defence, the growing impact of climate change on defence and security was the focus of the first day’s discussion. The second day considered developments in space exploitation, and the challenges and opportunities this raises for defence and security. The following paper draws on these discussions and includes the key themes and topics that were raised.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Strategic Stability
- Political Geography:
- Europe
14828. Revitalising arms control: the MTCR and the HCoC
- Author:
- William Alberque
- Publication Date:
- 11-2021
- Content Type:
- Research Paper
- Institution:
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- The paper examines the two most important multilateral frameworks for curbing the spread of uninhabited aerial systems (missiles and UAVs) capable of delivering large conventional payloads and weapons of mass destruction – the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC). Specifically, the paper discusses the origins and history of the MTCR and HCoC, their evolution over time (or lack thereof) and seeks to measure them against their intended goals. In the end, it urges for radical reform, but also provides suggested incremental changes that should be enacted immediately. It includes analysis of several specific regional security issues and related action–reaction defence-modernisation trends. This paper was drafted within the framework of the Missile Dialogue Initiative (MDI). The MDI was launched by the German Federal Foreign Office in 2019 and is administered by the IISS. The MDI has created a Track 1.5 dialogue (government and non-government experts working together) to contribute to state-level discussions of potential policy responses to the accelerating spread of missile capabilities to state and non-state actors. The MDI appears in the context of the erosion of the global and regional arms-control architecture and during a period of rapid technological change, which includes the evolution and spread of new, advanced missile systems that have contributed to growing instability.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Conflict, Missile Defense, and Instability
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
14829. Leading edge: key drivers of defence innovation and the future of operational advantage
- Author:
- Simona R. Soare and Fabrice Pothier
- Publication Date:
- 11-2021
- Content Type:
- Research Paper
- Institution:
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- The ability to develop and integrate emerging and disruptive technologies in defence is rapidly becoming a metric of success in the global competition for power. In this paper, Simona R. Soare and Fabrice Pothier provide a systematic conceptualisation of defence innovation. By empirically analysing innovation efforts in five countries – notably, China, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States – the paper identifies and analyses four key drivers of defence innovation, provides a better understanding of how the five nations prioritise among them, and explores how they are linked to future operational advantage.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Innovation, and Strategic Stability
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
14830. Security and the Arctic: navigating between cooperation and competition
- Author:
- Nick Childs
- Publication Date:
- 12-2021
- Content Type:
- Research Paper
- Institution:
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- The Arctic region is undergoing particularly dramatic change, driven chiefly by environmental factors resulting from climate change. This is affecting the Arctic to a greater extent than any other region of the globe, with the region warming twice as fast as other parts of the planet. Consequently, the Arctic has become a region of growing strategic interest and concern. New geostrategic frictions are emerging as a result of increased military activities and the prospect of new maritime routes and greater access to resources; the increased focus on how to respond to the threat to the environment; and the impact of all this on Arctic populations and especially indigenous peoples. This is adding to the complexities of relations between different players and creating new dynamics of cooperation and competition in and around the region, with the increasing interest and potential influence of China one of the most significant developments in play. This is stimulating interest in the region and a perceived requirement for new thinking about how to preserve Arctic stability and mitigate risks, while protecting economic, political and diplomatic opportunities. For much of its recent history, the region has traded on a notion of ‘Arctic exceptionalism’, meaning that it has been uniquely shielded from many of the world’s strategic issues and frictions, and that the states and peoples which inhabit it have been largely able to organise themselves and coexist in peace, with a few general tenets and instruments of the rules-based international order to act as frameworks and guides. However, as the Arctic has become less inhospitable, both climatically and physically, it has also become less benign in a geo-strategic sense. It can be argued that, compared to other regions, the Arctic remains an arena or relatively low tension overall. Nevertheless, the increasing elements of competition of various kinds are raising concern about the defence and security risks, particularly given the absence of a mechanism or a framework to even discuss defence and security issues in the region that includes all the key players.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Territorial Disputes, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Arctic
14831. Armed uninhabited aerial vehicles and the challenges of autonomy
- Author:
- Douglas Barrie, Oskar Glaese, Niklas Ebert, and Franz-Stefan Gady
- Publication Date:
- 12-2021
- Content Type:
- Research Paper
- Institution:
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- Two decades ago, the notion of arming an uninhabited aerial vehicle (UAV) was little more than a niche pursuit. Today, at least 20 countries have weaponised UAV systems in their inventories, with other nations pursuing acquisition, while the capability is also proliferating to non-state actors. The air vehicles range from small, crude, hobbyist-style UAVs favoured by some non-state groups, to large, long-endurance platforms capable of being fitted with a range of sensors and air-to-surface weapons. Technological development continues apace with an increasing emphasis on greater automation and reducing the human workload, along with the emergence of a type of hybrid UAV and air-to-surface munition along side the more established loitering munition. While uninhabited systems are increasingly embraced by many armed forces, they remain an uneasy subject in the wider public realm, where the perceived lack of human control remains an ethical issue. There also continues to be concern in the legal community regarding how increasingly automated – and perhaps one day autonomous – weapon systems fit within the law of armed conflict – legal concept rather than legislation, sometimes also referred to as international humanitarian law. These subjects were the focus of a 21–22 June 2021 seminar organised by IISS Europe to help further the debate and to better understand the implications of weapons-capable uninhabited systems. This paper reflects the discussions and many of the issues raised by the participants.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Innovation
- Political Geography:
- Europe
14832. Changing Alliance Structures
- Author:
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Publication Date:
- 12-2021
- Content Type:
- Research Paper
- Institution:
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- This IISS report seeks to provide an overview of the history of and current outlook for the US-led order and alliance system; to explore Chinese and Russian perspectives on strategic partnerships and alliances; to examine key trendlines, both globally and especially in three vital strategic regions – the Asia-Pacific, Middle East and Europe; and to consider possible implications of these developments for the security policies of leading European states.
- Topic:
- Security, Development, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Alliance, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
14833. Ballistic and cruise missiles in the Middle East: the current landscape and options for arms control
- Author:
- Hassan Elbahtimy
- Publication Date:
- 01-2021
- Content Type:
- Research Paper
- Institution:
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- The determination of regional actors in the Middle East to procure or develop ballistic and cruise missiles shows no immediate signs of abating, and the possibility of even further regional proliferation has driven calls to explore the application of arms controls to manage regional missile developments. This paper surveys the evolving missile landscape in the Middle East and considers some of the possible options for regional missile control. Missiles have long played a key, if relatively understudied, role in Middle Eastern security dynamics. According to Dennis Gormley’s 2017 estimate, over 90% of all missiles used in conflict since the Second World War have been in the Middle East. Today, the determination of regional actors to procure or develop ballistic and cruise missiles shows no immediate signs of abating. Missiles play a growing role in national defence doctrines in the region and many states are driven to acquire them due to the increasing appreciation of their utility as conventional precision-strike systems, as well as symbols of military prowess. Their frequent use by local and external powers in recent and ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and the possibility of even further regional proliferation have driven calls to explore the application of arms controls to manage regional missile developments. This paper surveys the evolving missile landscape in the Middle East and considers some of the possible options for regional missile control. These two themes form the paper’s two parts. The paper starts by exploring some of the key contemporary trends related to missiles in the Middle East. It examines the various regional powers interested in advanced missiles and the emergence of non-state actors as users and developers of missile technology. It also explores the regional appeal of cruise missiles and considers the growing use of advanced missiles as conventionally armed stand-off weapons. Finally, this section explores the regional interplay between offensive and defensive missiles. The second part of the paper charts some of the recent attempts to develop regional arms controls and considers some of the approaches to missile control, including some cross-cutting themes that any missile control efforts might wish to address. While missile holdings in the Middle East have grown in terms of the types, ranges and platforms used, this paper focuses its examination on ballistic and cruise missiles of ranges exceeding 250 kilometres. The value and reach of this range can vary in different sub-regional settings but is used here as a rough metric indicating the ability to target across borders, as well as a reflection of a degree of technical capability. While the paper incorporates land-attack missiles, it excludes missiles that are closely tied with battlefield or tactical missions, such as those with shorter ranges as well as anti-ship and air-defence platforms. Similarly, armed uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) are excluded from the analysis. While their use has grown in prominence, particularly in some regional conflicts including in Syria, Libya and Yemen, they form a separate category of weapons with distinct dynamics, and thus pose different questions for arms control.
- Topic:
- Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Missile Defense
- Political Geography:
- Middle East
14834. Lessons Learned from the COVID-19 Pandemic: Physician Safety and Coverage in Lebanon
- Author:
- Nadim El Jamal, Taghrid Hajjali, and Elie Al-Chaer
- Publication Date:
- 03-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
- Abstract:
- Similar to other countries, Lebanon experienced the challenges that the COVID-19 pandemic imposed on its healthcare system. Physicians, among other healthcare workers, felt the large toll of the pandemic. The growing number of physicians infected with the coronavirus has uncovered gaps in the policies and laws meant to protect and ensure physician safety. These include gaps in physician coverage for healthcare, disability, and death, in addition to particular vulnerabilities of trainee physicians, along with the absence of specific laws, strategies, and agencies to ensure the safety of the healthcare work environment. This paper highlights these gaps and proposes solutions to address them.
- Topic:
- Security, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Lebanon
14835. Without Hassan Abbas, the World Is a Poorer Place
- Author:
- Bassma Kodmani
- Publication Date:
- 03-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
- Abstract:
- It is on purpose that I sidestep my emotions when writing this. I do so in an effort to make this easier for myself and to avoid what follows coming across as a fleeting remembrance or some tiresome duty where I am compelled to write about Hassan Abbas.
- Topic:
- Leadership, Academia, Experts, and Scholarships
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Syria
14836. The Environmental Impact of Syria’s Conflict: A Preliminary Survey of Issues
- Author:
- Roba Gaafar
- Publication Date:
- 04-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
- Abstract:
- The Syrian conflict has had devastating human and economic consequences, but it also greatly damaged the environment in the country. This paper provides a preliminary survey of a set of environmental challenges that impose significant health, social and economic costs, including air pollution, deforestation, soil and vegetation degradation, and water depletion, and suggests green solutions for post-conflict relief and reconstruction.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, Environment, Health, Conflict, Green Technology, and Pollution
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Syria
14837. Environmentalism After Decentralization: The Local Politics of Solid Waste Management in Tunisia
- Author:
- Lana Salman
- Publication Date:
- 04-2021
- Content Type:
- Research Paper
- Institution:
- Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
- Abstract:
- Ten days before the end of 2020, Mustapha Laroui, then Minister of Environment and Local Affairs, was dismissed from his post on suspicion of corruption. Laroui served in Tunisia’s ninth post-revolution government, headed by Hishem Mechichi who also kicked him out of office. He was arrested the same day. The scandal that ended Laroui’s career in government concerns facilitating the transfer of 282 containers equivalent to 480 tons of Italian waste to Tunisia via the port of Sousse.1 The full extent of the scandal was revealed after the investigative TV show “Al Haqa’eq al Arba‘a” (the four truths) ran an episode on 2 November 2020 uncovering the scale of the problem. Twenty-three additional suspects were arrested and questioned in relation to the scandal, including the director of the National Agency for Waste Management (ANGED), who was later released, and a Tunisian diplomat based in Naples. Though it made the news in November, the imported waste had been sitting in the port of Sousse since early 2020. Reports indicate that the deal that brought southern Italian waste to the Tunisian shore was signed between the export-oriented Tunisian firm Soreplast and the Naples-based Italian firm Sviluppo Risorse Ambientali Srl. Contrary to the media narrative – whereby Soreplast had allegedly imported post-industrial plastic waste to process, recycle, and export – the formal contract indicates that the objective was the permanent elimination of the waste in Tunisia, with a price tag of 48 euros/ton, not to exceed 120,000 tons per year, for a total value of 5 million euros. Dirty scandals haunt Tunisia’s solid waste management sector. An investigative report published by Nawaat2 in May 2015 focused on the rampant corruption in the management of the country’s largest controlled landfill, the landfill of Borj Chakir in the municipality of Sidi Hassine, a southern suburb of Tunis with a number of working-class neighbourhoods (quartiers populaires).3 A pithy summary describes the situation: solid waste management is a highly lucrative sector where opacity and corruption are not only endemic but also institutionalized. The report exposes the rigged public tendering process which enabled the French company PIZZORNO Environnement headed by François Léotard to win the contract for the management of the Borj Chakir landfill because of Léotard’s friendship with ousted president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. The infractions were reported in a 350-page investigation prepared by Abdelfattah Amor, 4 which addresses corruption and embezzlement affairs across sectors perpetrated by the authoritarian regime and its cronies. The creation of ANGED in 20055 as a public non-administrative agency responsible for solid waste management (henceforth SWM) seems to have facilitated institutionalized corruption in the sector. Starting in the 1990s with the acceleration of neoliberal policies, a veneer of awareness-raising campaigns to create environmentally conscious citizens hid institutionalized corruption in SWM from public view. Labib (figure 1) was the emblem of these campaigns. The environment mascot whose statues filled roundabouts across Tunisia is associated with the RCD (Constitutional Democratic Rally), the one-party-state of the authoritarian regime. After the revolution, most of these statues were vengefully destroyed in protest. Those still standing are a reminder of the powerful ideas the authoritarian regime ingrained in citizens’ minds about the environment, and which encompass two elements: aesthetics (decorating public spaces with statues) and moral uprightness, measured in terms of conforming to a specific behaviour, such as not littering. Framed like this, environmental protection was a personal moral responsibility rather than a societal political-economy question related to patterns of consumption, the inevitable waste these patterns create, and ways of disposing of the produced waste. Nonetheless, Labib did help raise awareness about environmental protection. Although the removal of most of these statues is a break from the authoritarian regime, no awareness-raising efforts have replaced the mascot.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, Environment, Green Technology, Local, and Waste
- Political Geography:
- Africa and Tunisia
14838. Tunisia: A Revolution Still Without Monuments
- Author:
- Malek Lakhal
- Publication Date:
- 05-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
- Abstract:
- Ten years on, Tunisia has yet to decide on how to publicly commemorate its revolution. This paper looks at the monuments of the revolution – or rather their absence – in the capital Tunis and how public spaces remain a deeply political arena torn between those who believe that the revolution was a breaking point in Tunisian national history and those who view it as no more than a small hiccup along the way.
- Topic:
- Social Movement, Popular Revolt, Revolution, and Remembrance
- Political Geography:
- Africa and Tunisia
14839. The Role of Petitions in Strengthening Citizens’ Participation in Morocco: Stakes and Outcomes
- Author:
- Aberrafie Zaanoun
- Publication Date:
- 05-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
- Abstract:
- Morocco’s 2011 Constitution introduced the right to petition public authorities as a tool to encourage and enhance citizens’ participation in the political process. This paper assesses the Moroccan experience by analysing the petitioning process, its constraints, and the opportunities it offers for advancing public interest. It also suggests recommendations to ensure petitions become a more effective role in entrenching participatory democracy in Morocco.
- Topic:
- Social Movement, Reform, Democracy, Protests, and Participation
- Political Geography:
- Africa and Morocco
14840. After the Fall: Lebanon’s Path towards Monetary Stabilization
- Author:
- Jean Tawile
- Publication Date:
- 05-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
- Abstract:
- Lebanon is suffering the worst economic crisis in its history, caused by an economic model that produced a rentier economy feeding off a corruption-ridden state and preventing any economic growth and social justice. This model is not redeemable. This paper argues that stabilizing the currency is a first step to getting Lebanon’s economy back on the right track and explores possible pathways for doing so.
- Topic:
- Economics, Monetary Policy, Fiscal Policy, Strategic Stability, and Economic Stability
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Lebanon
14841. Which Tax Policies for Lebanon? Lessons from the Past for a Challenging Future
- Author:
- Alain Bifani, Karim Daher, Lydia Assouad, and Ishac Diwan
- Publication Date:
- 05-2021
- Content Type:
- Research Paper
- Institution:
- Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
- Abstract:
- The tax system in Lebanon is unfair and inefficient. As part of rethinking Lebanon’s policies in light of the current crisis, this paper proposes key reforms to make tax incidence more progressive; strengthen tax compliance; and broaden the tax base. It also calls for considering a one-off wealth tax to help resolve the current crisis in a socially fair manner. It posits that the fight for fiscal justice and effectiveness needs to become more central in political debates as a just fiscal system is a requisite of any vision for a “new Lebanon”.
- Topic:
- Economics, Tax Systems, Economic Inequality, Fiscal Policy, and Wealth
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Lebanon
14842. Hirak and Feminism: An equation with two unknowns
- Author:
- Lydia Haddag
- Publication Date:
- 06-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
- Abstract:
- The history of the feminist movement and democratic struggle is that of a crossover. In Algeria, feminism is still perceived as a minority movement; neither the regime nor the opposition gathered under the Hirak seems interested in supporting it. Often subsumed within greater calls for democracy, feminists find themselves a target for slander and accusations of division. This paper explores the interlinkages between the Hirak and feminism and explains how the two can be one movement with a common goal.
- Topic:
- Gender Issues, Social Movement, Democracy, and Feminism
- Political Geography:
- Africa and Algeria
14843. Water Politics in Libya: A Crisis of Management, not Scarcity
- Author:
- Malak Altaeb
- Publication Date:
- 06-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
- Abstract:
- Libya is one of the driest countries in the world. The Great Man-Made River Project, touted by Qaddhafi as a solution to take advantage of Libya’s plentiful natural resources, serves as a case study in social and institutional engineering. This article discusses the defining characteristics and legacies of hydro-politics under Qaddhafi, presents some of the new issues that have emerged since regime change in 2011, and offers some ways forward for water policy in Libya.
- Topic:
- Security, Natural Resources, Water, and Resource Management
- Political Geography:
- Africa and Libya
14844. The Unfinished Revolution: Police Brutality at the Heart of the 10th Anniversary of the Tunisian Revolution
- Author:
- Zied Boussen
- Publication Date:
- 07-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
- Abstract:
- 14 January 2021 marked the 10 anniversary of the Tunisian revolution; it also ushered a wave of police repression against human rights activists and social movements that continues to expand. As a result, over 2000 people were arrested and several died in what many see as the greatest erosion of freedoms since Ben Ali’s ouster. This paper tracks the evolution of police powers in Tunisia over the past decade and provides recommendations for a democratic and inclusive reform.
- Topic:
- Social Movement, State Violence, Revolution, and Police Brutality
- Political Geography:
- Africa and Tunisia
14845. Organizing in Exile: Dynamics of Mobilization and Engagement of New Arab Diasporas
- Author:
- Sarah Anne Rennick
- Publication Date:
- 07-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
- Abstract:
- The phenomenon of mobilization among the diasporas emanating from the MENA region is in many ways not new. Historic diasporas communities, such as the Armenian, Palestinian, Kurdish, and Lebanese, have existed for multiple decades, and their contributions to their homelands has been both documented in the literature and promoted by policymakers and development organizations alike. This includes both the economic impact of MENA diasporas and the critical importance of financial remittances to supporting development and growth back home,1 but also various forms of political mobilization that have been undertaken by diasporic communities for the purpose of contributing to nation/state-building2 and recognition processes3 or, under certain conditions, contesting homeland regimes.4 In this vein, much of the literature has focused on more traditional forms of diaspora political mobilization,5 including lobbying and advocacy work designed to shape international public opinion and pressure foreign governments. The idea that Arab diaspora communities can be viewed not only as an economic actor but also, potentially, a political one is not in itself new. Yet, much of this literature on Arab diasporas has been focused on unidirectional flow of remittance – from those in diaspora back to the homeland. Likewise, the view of diaspora communities as either a resource to be harnessed or a threat to be contained has been largely informed by the political and geopolitical realities of host and home states.6
- Topic:
- Migration, Diaspora, Social Movement, Humanitarian Crisis, and Mobilization
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Middle East, North Africa, and MENA
14846. The Long Shadow of War: Mobilization Dynamics of the Yemeni Diaspora since 2011
- Author:
- Maysaa Suja Al-Deen
- Publication Date:
- 07-2021
- Content Type:
- Research Paper
- Institution:
- Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
- Abstract:
- In the aftermath of the 2011 uprising and ensuing descent into protracted conflict, a new wave of Yemeni migration has transpired, marked by different sociopolitical profiles than previous waves of migration but the transformation in places of destination. As a result, existing Yemeni diaspora communities in countries such as the UK and the US have seen important changes in the economic and political make-up of their members, while new diaspora communities have emerged in countries heretofore largely off the radar of Yemeni migration. Importantly, these transformations in Yemeni migration are also a reflection of conflict dynamics, which pattern the destination of migrants but also the relationships within diaspora communities and their mobilization dynamics towards Yemen. This latest wave of conflict-motivated migration is characterized by the large number of intellectual and political elites; however, this has not necessarily translated into sustained political engagement or mobilization for the sake of peacebuilding and/or reconstruction. Looking at Yemeni diaspora communities in three countries of destination – the UK, Egypt, and Turkey – reveals how the space of freedom for organization that each country provides, as well as conflict dynamics back home, impact the nature and positionality of the particular community in question and shape the forms of and possibilities for diaspora mobilization. Based on more than twenty interviews and a review of the activities of more than twelve Yemeni diaspora organizations working in UK, Egypt and Turkey, this paper assesses the political, cultural, and social roles that the Yemeni diaspora is trying to play both towards the diaspora itself and towards Yemen, and how these are impacted by the long shadow of the conflict in Yemen. While the UK diaspora does engage in political mobilization, this is marked by trends of polarization and the external intervention of parties to the conflict that seek to garner support for their cause through their diasporic communities. Meanwhile, for the Yemeni diasporas in Turkey and Egypt, the constrained civic space and fear of exacerbating internal frictions that mirror those back home has meant that mobilization is geared towards the provision of social services and culture activities rather than political remittances towards Yemen. Thus, while diaspora political organization in support of conflict resolution could in theory be possible, the characteristics of these diaspora communities, along with the political opportunity structures of host societies, have translated to a decreased overall capacity for political mobilization for the purpose of peacebuilding.
- Topic:
- Diaspora, Conflict, Humanitarian Crisis, Mobilization, and Peacebuilding
- Political Geography:
- Yemen and Gulf Nations
14847. Straddling Liminality and Active Engagement: Understanding Mobilization Patterns of the Libyan Diaspora
- Author:
- Houda Mzioudet
- Publication Date:
- 07-2021
- Content Type:
- Research Paper
- Institution:
- Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
- Abstract:
- The NATO campaign to unseat long-time Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 was met largely with support by Libyans living in exile. Many had not set foot in their country in decades – some not even since 1969, the year Gaddafi carried out his coup d'état against King Idris I – and in diaspora they formed a close-knit community of intellectuals, doctors, professors, artists, politicians, and other civil society activists who acted as an opposition force to the regime. With the tragic unfolding of what started as the Libyan uprising in 2011, which morphed into a protracted civil and proxy war, the Libyan diaspora has enlarged to include new categories of activists and political actors seeking refuge abroad but also new socio-economic groups who are fleeing the deteriorating economic and security conditions. Yet despite this diversification in the profiles of those in diaspora, the conflict has never undermined the efforts of Libyans in exile to rebuild a semblance of a community that can mobilize for promoting peace and reconciliation. Building on the rich networks that were made with Western and Arab policymakers during the long years of exile, the Libyan diaspora, which has never been a monolithic entity, has been able to contribute to changes that have occurred in the country since the fall of the Gaddafi regime. This study explores the formation of Libyan exile communities since 2011, the different relationships they harbor vis-à-vis the homeland, and some of the different roles they have assumed in building the imagined community and in participating in the rebuilding of the country. Through exploration of the nature of the diaspora and its geographical distribution, and with particular focus on those in Tunisia vs. those in the UK and US, the study assesses the diasporic character of Libyans in exile. The research finds that issues related to peacebuilding, reconciliation, and the empowerment of women and minority groups act as nodal points for diasporic Libyans who, despite their different ideological, cultural, and tribal affiliations, can find common ground when discussing the future of post-Gaddafi Libya.1 Yet, in exploring the work of Libyan diaspora organizations and contextualizing the different waves and destinations of exodus, the research also observes quite different patterns of diaspora mobilization. More precisely, the research finds that the relationships between those in diaspora and the Libyan homeland differ according to relationship, as do the political opportunity structures, which have an implication on the type of mobilization that occurs. In this way, Libyans in diaspora in Tunisia – who maintain patterns of circular mobility and often harbor hopes of return, and who perceive more threats if engaged in political mobilization – tend to either remain under the radar or to engage through the activities and frameworks of international organizations located in Tunis. On the contrary, those in Western capitals have been able to cultivate relationships with foreign policymakers and international organizations for advocacy and lobbying purposes in favor of transitional processes. In all cases, though, direct political participation of Libyans in diaspora in homeland politics has faced a number of institutional, legal, and perceptional barriers, which nonetheless show signs of being able to be overcome through shared belonging to the Libyan imagined community. Based on structured and semi-structured interviews with four members of the Libyan diaspora, an online questionnaire distributed through a popular Libyan podcast series, a conversation with the Libyan podcast series’ creator and my attendance of two Zoom conferences of a Libyan diasporic organization, and drawing on existing statistical data as well as a qualitative review of social media content of Libyan exile groups, carried out between September 2019-January 2021, the study provides an assessment of how members of the Libyan diaspora relate to the homeland and to each other, and how these relationships contribute to different patterns of mobilization. The study concludes with a few recommendations to Libyan and international policymakers regarding how best to support the Libyan diaspora in the implementation of their efforts designed to promote reconciliation, peacebuilding, institutional reform, and transitional justice for Libya.
- Topic:
- NATO, Development, Nationalism, Military Strategy, Transitional Justice, Conflict, and State Building
- Political Geography:
- Africa and Libya
14848. The UK Iraqi Diaspora and their Mobilization towards Iraq: Homeland Politics, Internal Dynamics, and the Fragmentation of Diasporic Transnationalism
- Author:
- Oula Kadhum
- Publication Date:
- 07-2021
- Content Type:
- Research Paper
- Institution:
- Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
- Abstract:
- In 2003, for the first time in decades, Iraqis in the diaspora were able to return to their former homeland and help in the rebuilding of their country. Many returned in 2003 with ambitious plans and ideas to help in the country’s development, some through political parties and others through civil society. Due to political developments in Iraq however, and the subsequent ethno-sectarian political system installed under the US-led intervention, diaspora mobilization has been affected and shaped by homeland politics and dynamics, privileging some while thwarting others. Indeed, the post-2003 political system contributed to the fragmentation of diasporic mobilization along ethnic and sectarian lines due to homeland political dynamics. This, in turn, has shaped the issues and the type of transnational and translocal mobilization carried out by different groups. Focusing predominantly on the UK context and to a lesser extent the Swedish one,[i] this study explores both top-down and bottom-up approaches to Iraqi diaspora transnational mobilization, and assesses the opportunities and constraints for coordination in diasporic transnationalism. Drawing on 15 semi-structured interviews conducted with community gatekeepers, organizational representatives, and professionals working in specific sectors, as well as numerous informal interviews, and supplemented by interviews conducted from 2013 to 2018 in both London and Stockholm, this study assess the different waves of migration and socio-economic profiles of Iraqi migrants, how pivotal moments in Iraq’s recent history have affected diasporic transnationalism, and underlines the hindrances to mobilization. The study finds that where the first waves of UK migration saw the arrival of political and religious elites, medical professionals, and artists, latter waves saw the arrival of less skilled and educated workers, as well as refugees. This provides the background both to Iraqi diasporic mobilization and links to the post-2003 political system and to the fragmentation that would ensue. While some diasporic elites went on to serve in the Iraqi government, other diaspora individuals worked through civil society, providing development, training, knowledge transfer, and social welfare. The study also finds that the instability in Iraq, homeland dynamics affecting the positionality of groups vis-à-vis the country, and lack of funds are major obstacles to broader mobilization. To this point, while there is no denying the will of the diaspora to help in the rebuilding of Iraq, distrust in the diaspora among ethnic and sectarian groups presents a particular challenge to collaboration and cooperation. Building trust and reconciliation, helping to create a platform between diaspora groups, the wider public, and Iraqi organizations, and focusing efforts on cultural, heritage, health, and developmental issues – and avoiding party politics – could help overcome these obstacles to allow the diaspora to play a greater role in supporting the Iraqi state and society.
- Topic:
- Migration, Diaspora, Immigration, transnationalism, Humanitarian Crisis, and Mobilization
- Political Geography:
- Iraq, United Kingdom, Europe, and Middle East
14849. Introduction: What is New about Post-2011 MENA Diasporas?
- Author:
- Sarah Anne Rennick
- Publication Date:
- 07-2021
- Content Type:
- Research Paper
- Institution:
- Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
- Abstract:
- The phenomenon of mobilization among the diasporas emanating from the MENA region is in many ways not new. Historic diasporas communities, such as the Armenian, Palestinian, Kurdish, and Lebanese, have existed for multiple decades, and their contributions to their homelands has been both documented in the literature and promoted by policymakers and development organizations alike. This includes both the economic impact of MENA diasporas and the critical importance of financial remittances to supporting development and growth back home,1 but also various forms of political mobilization that have been undertaken by diasporic communities for the purpose of contributing to nation/state-building2 and recognition processes3 or, under certain conditions, contesting homeland regimes.4 In this vein, much of the literature has focused on more traditional forms of diaspora political mobilization,5 including lobbying and advocacy work designed to shape international public opinion and pressure foreign governments. The idea that Arab diaspora communities can be viewed not only as an economic actor but also, potentially, a political one is not in itself new. Yet, much of this literature on Arab diasporas has been focused on unidirectional flow of remittance – from those in diaspora back to the homeland. Likewise, the view of diaspora communities as either a resource to be harnessed or a threat to be contained has been largely informed by the political and geopolitical realities of host and home states.6 Our observations of diaspora political mobilization dynamics and the role that Arab diasporas can play in shaping homeland politics have been enlarged since 2011. Over the last decade, the many political, social, and economic upheavals that have transpired in the region – spanning national uprisings challenging the existing order, deepened authoritarianism and the closure of civic space, economic collapse and the undermining of collective morale, and the onset of violent intractable conflict – have produced multiple waves of migration of those seeking safe harbor abroad.7 While the image of Syrian migrants partaking in dangerous journeys to reach European shores dominates the popular narrative, the reality of this exodus from the Arab region over the last decade is much more complex.8 Indeed, what has evolved in the post-2011 period are Arab diaspora communities that have different and more diverse sociopolitical profiles from earlier epochs, with different degrees of attachment, identification to, and engagement with their homeland – both among new arrivals but also, importantly, those who have long since been in diaspora or who are second or third generation abroad. These Arab diaspora communities have also seen increased dispersal in terms of the geographic locations of resettlement, including both the enlargement and heterogenization of existing host sites but also the emergence of new destinations. Alongside these transformations in the profiles and locations of these Arab diasporas has been the emergence of new forms of political remittances, involving the transfer of political ideas, norms, and practices in multidirectional flows that challenge the state-bounded concept of transnational politics.9 These new political remittances and forms of diaspora community organization and mobilization are in many cases actively seeking to make substantive changes to homeland politics and to respond to the cascading crises at home. Yet in other cases, they are instead efforts on the parts of diaspora members to navigate the liminal and uncertain status of being caught somewhere along the spectrum of “here” and/or “there.” This collection of studies, written by Oula Kadhum, Houda Mzioudet, and Maysaa Shuja Al-Deen, seeks to investigate more closely these transformations within Arab diasporas in the post-2011, and to shed light onto what is actually “new” about them. Through three in-depth case studies looking at Iraqi, Libyan, and Yemeni communities in different locations abroad, the studies presented here assess the transformations within these diasporas in terms of profiles of members and locations of exile and how conflict dynamics at home inform not only patterns of migration but also relationships within diaspora communities themselves. The studies also expose new forms and directional flows of political remittances that are taking place, and the various factors that mediate the act of remitting politically. This includes assessing how political identity is formed/transformed through the experience of exile and observation of conflict dynamics from quite different external vantage points, as well as the impact of multiple and overlaying political opportunity structures. Finally, the studies shed light on the impact of these political remittances and offer an assessment of the opportunities and constraints that these new Iraqi, Libyan, and Yemeni diasporas face in their own efforts to contribute to rebuilding, reconstructing, and reimagining their homelands.
- Topic:
- Diaspora, Immigrants, Humanitarian Crisis, Identity, and Emigration
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Middle East, North Africa, and MENA
14850. Constitutional or Unconstitutional: Is That the Question?
- Author:
- Eya Jrad
- Publication Date:
- 08-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
- Abstract:
- On 25 July 2021, Tunisian President Kais Saied dismissed Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi and froze the Assembly of the Representatives of the People, creating a constitutional crisis in a country already embattled by dire COVID-19 conditions. This paper aims to contribute to the ongoing debate on the constitutionality of the measures taken by Kais Saied, by examining both the text of the Constitution and the context to argue that a contextual interpretation is needed in order to adjust to the dynamic nature of societies.
- Topic:
- Democracy, Constitution, State Formation, Legislation, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Political Crisis
- Political Geography:
- Africa and Tunisia