Publication Year: within 5 Years - CIAO Search Results

14101. Situating the role of youth in indigenous African Peacebuilding interventions: The question of spoilers versus menders

Author:: Isabella Osiemo, Florence Maranga, and Ruthie Chepkoech Rono
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: African Journal on Conflict Resolution
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: United Nations Security Council Resolution 2250 (2015) acknowledges that the world cannot attain meaningful peace without including the youth. This is critical in Africa where the youth who constitute the bulk of the continent’s population are involved in armed conflicts as perpetrators, victims and witnesses. Consequently, the youth suffer physical, cognitive and psychosocial impact of conflict, blurring their meaningful participation in peacebuilding processes. This article discusses indigenous African interventions aimed at conflict resolution, peacebuilding, healing and restoration of youth involved in and affected by armed conflicts. Four areas are addressed, namely: introduction, youth, indigenous methods, and finally conclusion and recommendations. It was found that scholars frame youth involvement in armed conflicts as perpetrators, triggers and victims. However, there is an emerging trend which frames youth as peace-builders. Africans have a rich indigenous knowledge reservoir for conflict resolution, peacebuilding and psychosocial interventions. However, the application of these interventions is marginalised. This article therefore advocates for the revitalisation of these interventions in conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and encourages psychological healing and social restoration for the youth amid ever increasing conflicts in Africa. The researcher recommends, as a way forward, the following: greater involvement of youth in conflict resolution, peacebuilding, healing and restoration through indigenous African interventions; research on and inclusion of indigenous African knowledge in our educational system; and integration of indigenous African interventions into police, legal, justice and psychosocial support systems and practices.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Youth, Indigenous, Reconciliation, Social Capital, Marginalization, Peacebuilding, and Adjudication
Political Geography:: Africa

14102. Does Community Saving Foster Conflict Transformation? The Debate and Evidence from Kenya’s ASAL Counties of West Pokot and Turkana

Author:: Caleb Wafula
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: African Journal on Conflict Resolution
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: The worldwide breakthrough of micro-finance has revolutionised lives of traditionally marginalised group; that few will dare dispute. Nowhere are the changes more sweeping than in Kenya, a country where significant adoption of community savings initiatives (Chamaas) is being witnessed.Chamaas builds on the traditional Rotating Savings and Credit Association (ROSCA) methodology and implemented as a social safety net to support communities address livelihood challenges. Despite the centrality of Chamaas in socio-economic strengthening, very little has been studied about their potential to contribute towards social cohesion and conflict transformation. This study sought to examine how Chamaas go beyond fostering economic empowerment, to enhance community member’s interaction, address communal conflicts and strengthen social bonds. This study is based on qualitative field research, undertaken in Kenya’s West Pokot and Turkana counties and focuses on how community savings contribute to conflict transformation, with especial attention to women’s issues. Importantly, it would be remiss of this study if there was no discussion on challenges that confront members of community savings schemes. Ultimately, the research will focus on how community savings can be strengthened and supported to fully integrate peacebuilding in their processes.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Women, Microeconomics, and Peacebuilding
Political Geography:: Kenya and Africa

14103. The curbing of the collective voices of workers in Ethiopia’s state-led industrialisation: The case of the garment sector

Author:: Mohammed Seid Ali
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: African Journal on Conflict Resolution
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: A state-led industrialisation drive inspired by the East Asian ‘developmental state’ ideology is at the core of Ethiopia’s industrial policymaking. Yet, scholarship on the implications of Ethiopia’s state-led industrialisation on the collective voices of local industrial workers is rare. Hence, this article argues that Ethiopia’s state-led industrialisation has firmly stood for strong business-state alliances, thereby curbing the collective voices of local industrial workers. Using qualitative empirical data, the article attempts to address the research gap and contribute to the existing debate by examining why and how the country’s state-led industrialisation has been operating in this context since 2005. Analysis of the findings indicates that facilitating industrial catch-up is at the centre of the country’s industrial development policymaking. Also that, the voice of the workers has been considered as a threat to foreign direct investment (FDI). As a result of the policy, the Ethiopian government employs diverse de facto or de jure labour control mechanisms, exceptionally against the associational rights of workers in the garment exporting industries across the country’s industrial parks (IPs). Moreover, employing industries have enforced various forms of administrative and punitive measures to subdue the collective voices of their workers. Hence, Ethiopia’s activist industrial policy must navigate a reasonable balance between facilitating industrial catch-up and ensuring labour standards for inclusive, peaceful, and sustainable industrial labour relations.
Topic:: Government, Labor Issues, Industrialization, and Garment Industry
Political Geography:: Africa and Ethiopia

14104. The Anglophone problem in Cameroon: The change from crisis to conflict, and a possible way forward to resolution

Author:: Billy Agwanda and Hacer Soykan Adaoğlu
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: African Journal on Conflict Resolution
Institution:: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:: Since the dissolution of the federal system in 1972, Cameroon has been entangled in an internal crisis between the Anglophone region and the government. After four years of violence, the outcome of peace efforts have largely been countered by more incidents of violence. This article traces how the crisis has evolved over the years from a political crisis into a conflict situation. While appreciating the theoretical perspectives of internal colonialism and ethnonationalism in explaining the conflict, the authors highlight that the evolution from a crisis into a conflict has been driven by factors such as the expanding waves of democratisation, the emergence of new actors (militias) and the evolution of the digital space (social media as platform for mobilisation). The article emphasises that whereas grievances over marginalisation form the underlying drivers of the conflict, disagreements over the judicial (common law) and education system in the Anglophone regions exacerbated the crisis, thereby leading to the outbreak of violence. Against this background, the article provides recommendations that may encourage a recourse to peace and stability for a nation previously lauded as one of the (few) stable countries in the Central Africa region.
Topic:: Nationalism, Political stability, Ethnicity, Conflict, Peace, Marginalization, and Anglophone
Political Geography:: Africa and Cameroon

14105. Simultaneous estimation and modeling of nonlinear, non- Gaussian state-space systems

Author:: Josiah Steckenrider and Furukawa Tomonari
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: Department of Social Sciences at West Point, United States Military Academy
Abstract:: This paper presents a framework for simultaneous estimation and modeling of nonlinear, non-Gaussian state-space systems. In the proposed approach, uncertainty in motion model parameters is incorporated to avoid overconfidence in state prediction and better account for modeling inaccuracies. The additional original contribution of a model correction stage improves nonlinear model parameter estimates in order to enhance the accuracy of state estimation. The presented nonlinear/non-Gaussian Simultaneous Estimation And Modeling (SEAM) approach was compared with contemporary estimation techniques using a Monte-Carlo simulation study. This study showed that the proposed method successfully reduces estimation error relative to existing approaches even when substantial model parameter uncertainty and multi-modal sensor noise are present. The framework has potential use in a wide range of applications where state-space estimation is employed, including robotics, signal processing, and controls.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Space, Artificial Intelligence, and Models
Political Geography:: Global Focus

14106. Corrosion Evaluation of a Navy MK50 Weapon Station Friction Brake Assembly

Author:: Ruby L. Romsland and Kenneth McDonald
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: Department of Social Sciences at West Point, United States Military Academy
Abstract:: The presence of corrosion on or within structures is of major concern as corrosion reduces the integrity of the materials which could potentially result in large-scale failures of structures and equipment. The United States Navy is an organization that actively works to prevent large equipment failure due to corrosion. One such problem is the corrosion of the friction brake assembly on the MK50 Weapon Station, which has recently been experiencing corrosion between the friction brake and its set screw preventing it from operating correctly. The friction brake was known to be stainless steel; however, the set screw was of unknown composition. Through elemental analysis it was determined that the MK50 Weapons Station friction brake set screw was similar in composition to commonly available black oxide coated steel screws. Electrochemical polarization measurements of the friction brake assembly components revealed that the set screw and the friction brake were electrochemically dissimilar metals which resulted in the galvanic corrosion of the assembly when out at sea. The electrochemical polarization measurements of a stainless steel screw showed a corrosion potential similar to that of the friction brake; therefore, replacing the current set screw with a stainless steel screw would decrease the galvanic potential difference between the set screw and the friction brake. This proposed solution is expected to slow or prevent further corrosion of the MK50 Weapon Station ensuring the combat readiness of the equipment.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Navy, and Engineering
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

14107. Influence for hire. The Asia-Pacific’s online shadow economy

Author:: Jacob Wallis, Ariel Bogle, Albert Zhang, and Hillary Mansour
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: It’s not just nation-states that interfere in elections and manipulate political discourse. A range of commercial services increasingly engage in such activities, operating in a shadow online influence-for-hire economy that spans from content farms through to high-end PR agencies. There’s growing evidence of states using commercial influence-for-hire networks. The Oxford Internet Institute found 48 instances of states working with influence-for-hire firms in 2019–20, an increase from 21 in 2017–18 and nine in 2016–17. There’s a distinction between legitimate, disclosed political campaigning and government advertising campaigns, on the one hand, and efforts by state actors to covertly manipulate the public opinion of domestic populations or citizens of other countries using inauthentic social media activity, on the other. The use of covert, inauthentic, outsourced online influence is also problematic as it degrades the quality of the public sphere in which citizens must make informed political choices and decisions. The Asia–Pacific region contains many states in different stages of democratisation. Many have transitioned to democratic forms of governance from authoritarian regimes. Some have weak political institutions, limitations on independent media and fragile civil societies. The rapid rate of digital penetration in the region layered over that political context leaves populations vulnerable to online manipulation. In fragile democratic contexts, the prevalence of influence-for-hire operations and their leverage by agents of the state is particularly problematic, given the power imbalance between citizens and the state. A surplus of cheap digital labour makes the Asia–Pacific a focus for operators in this economy, and this report examines the regional influence-for-hire marketplace using case studies of online manipulation in the Philippines, Indonesia, Taiwan and Australia. Governments and other entities in the region contract such services to target and influence their own populations in ways that aren’t transparent and that may inhibit freedom of political expression by drowning out dissenting voices. Several governments have introduced anti-fake-news legislation that has the potential to inhibit civic discourse by limiting popular political dissent or constraining the independence of the media from the state. These trends risk damaging the quality of civic engagement in the region’s emerging democracies.
Topic:: Elections, Labor Market, and Shadow Economy
Political Geography:: Australia and Asia-Pacific

14108. Buying and selling extremism: New funding opportunities in the right-wing extremist online ecosystem

Author:: Ariel Bogle
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: As mainstream social media companies have increased their scrutiny and moderation of right-wing extremist (RWE) content and groups, there’s been a move to alternative online content platforms. There’s also growing concern about right-wing extremism in Australia, and about how this shift has diversified the mechanisms used to fundraise by RWE entities. This phenomenon isn’t well understood in Australia, despite the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) advising in March 2021 that ‘ideological extremism’ now makes up around 40% of its priority counterterrorism caseload. Research by ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre (ICPC) has found that nine Australian Telegram channels that share RWE content used at least 22 different funding platforms, including online monetisation tools and cryptocurrencies, to solicit, process and earn funds between 1 January 2021 and 15 July 2021. Due to the opaque nature of many online financial platforms, it’s difficult to obtain a complete picture of online fundraising, so this sample is necessarily limited. However, in this report we aim to provide a preliminary map of the online financial platforms and services that may both support and incentivise an RWE content ecosystem in Australia. Most funding platforms found in our sample have policies that explicitly prohibit the use of their services for hate speech, but we found that those policies were often unclear and not uniformly enforced. Of course, there’s debate about how to balance civil liberties with the risks posed by online communities that promote RWE ideology (and much of that activity isn’t illegal), but a better understanding of online funding mechanisms is necessary, given the growing concern about the role online propaganda may play in inspiring acts of violence as well as the risk that, like other social divisions, such channels and movements could be exploited by adversaries. The fundraising facilitated by these platforms not only has the potential to grow the resources of groups and individuals linked to right-wing extremism, but it’s also likely to be a means of building the RWE community both within Australia and with overseas groups and a vector for spreading RWE propaganda through the engagement inherent in fundraising efforts. The funding platforms mirror those used by RWE figures overseas, and funding requests were boosted by foreign actors, continuing Australian RWEs’ history of ‘meaningful international exchange’ with overseas counterparts.
Topic:: Internet, Social Media, Far Right, and Political Extremism
Political Geography:: Australia and Global Focus

14109. New beginnings: Rethinking business and trade in an era of strategic clarity and rolling disruption

Author:: John Coyne, Gill Savage, and Michael Shoebridge
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: This special report considers the relationship between our business and trade positioning in the context of the impacts of Covid, natural disasters and the actions of coercive trading partners. Global economic integration has enabled the spread of ideas, products, people and investment at never before seen speed. International free trade has been a goal of policy-makers and academics for generations, allowing and fostering innovation and growth. We saw the mechanism shudder in 2008 when the movement of money faltered; the disruption brought about by COVID-19 has seen a much more multi-dimensional failure of the systems by which we share and move. The unstoppable conveyor belt of our global supply chain has ground to a halt. This time, what will we learn? ASPI’s latest research identifies factors that have led to the erosion of Australia’s policy and planning capacity, while detailing the strengths of our national responses to recent crises. The authors recommend an overhaul of our current business and trade policy settings, with a view to building an ‘agenda that invests in what we’re good at and what we need, values what we have and builds the future we want.’ The authors examine the vulnerabilities in Australia’s national security, resilience and sovereignty in relation to supply chains and the intersection of the corporate sector and government. To protect Australia’s business interests and national sovereignty, the report highlights recent paradigm shifts in geopolitics, whereby economic and trade priorities are increasingly relevant to the national security discussion.
Topic:: Defense Policy, National Security, Business, Trade, COVID-19, and Disaster Management
Political Geography:: Australia and Global Focus

14110. Iron ore futures: possible paths for Australia’s biggest trade with China

Author:: David Uren
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: The iron ore market is wrong-footing forecasters again, as it has throughout the last 20 years. Nobody expected the iron ore price to surpass US$200 a tonne as it did in May and no one predicted it would then plunge to less than US$100 as it has this week. This report argues that Australia’s troubled relationship with China will be influenced by which path the iron ore market takes over the medium term. China’s authorities are determined to reduce their dependence on Australian iron ore, both by seeking alternative supplies and by capping their steel production. However, China has been trying and failing to curb its steel production for the past five years, with many local governments ignoring central orders. In just the first six months of this year, 18 new blast furnaces capable of producing as much steel as Germany’s entire output were approved. Although China will never be able to rid itself entirely of the need for Australian supplies, this report warns that if an iron ore glut emerges, whether by Chinese government design or because of an economic downturn, the commodity may join the list of other Australian exports subject to Chinese coercion. The report also highlights that the effort to reduce its dependence on Australia will come at considerable cost to China. Australia is by far the cheapest and closest source of high-quality iron ore for China’s mills.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Natural Resources, Mining, and Trade
Political Geography:: China and Asia

14111. Economic coercion in Indo-Pacific island states: Building resilience

Author:: Richard Herr and David Brewster
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: Indo-Pacific island states face diverse challenges as they grapple with their own unique vulnerabilities to the geopolitical consequences of growing strategic competition in the region. This report explores the vulnerability of island states to economic coercion and the risks they face in navigating the growing economic power of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In this report, the authors examine four perceived examples of economic coercion within the region that challenge the Quad’s vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific. China’s increasing interest in the island states of the Indo-Pacific has led to concern that the imbalance in those relationships is so large that both domestic and broader regional stability are at risk. This report offers a number of policy recommendations to protect Indo-Pacific island states from economic coercion, including: Island states must be better invested in the rules-based international economic order; Establishing codes of conduct to limit economic duress, limit undue economic influence and strengthen the rules-based international system; Strengthening government institutions so they can resist economic coercion; International partners should work with Indo-Pacific island states to help strengthen the ability of local businesses to take collective action against economic coercion.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Economy, and Resilience
Political Geography:: China, Australia, and Asia-Pacific

14112. The architecture of repression: Unpacking Xinjiang’s governance

Author:: Vicky Xiuzhong Xu, James Leibold, and Daria Impiombato
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: Since the mass internment of Uyghurs and other indigenous groups in China was first reported in 2017, there is now a rich body of literature documenting recent human rights abuses in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. However, there is little knowledge of the actual perpetrators inside China’s vast and opaque party-state system, and responsibility is often broadly attributed to the Chinese Communist Party, Xinjiang Party Secretary Chen Quanguo, or President Xi Jinping himself. For accountability, it is necessary to investigate how China’s campaign against the Uyghurs has been implemented and which offices and individuals have played a leading part. The current knowledge gap has exposed international companies and organisations to inadvertent engagement with Chinese officials who have facilitated the atrocities in Xinjiang. It has also prevented foreign governments from making targeted policy responses. Finally, it is essential to carry out such an investigation now. Amid debate internationally about whether the recent events in Xinjiang constitute genocide, Chinese officials are actively scrubbing relevant evidence and seeking to silence those who speak out.
Topic:: Human Rights, Governance, Repression, and Uyghurs
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Xinjiang

14113. Delivering a stronger Navy, faster

Author:: Marcus Hellyer
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: Serious risks are being realised in the Royal Australian Navy’s twin transitions in its surface combatant and submarine fleets. As Australia’s strategic circumstances become more dangerous, Defence needs to adopt hedging measures to actively address the capability risks in its acquisition plans. The government’s recent announcement regarding the acquisition of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) is about addressing capability risk in the long term, but with delivery of the first future submarine now delayed probably to the late 2030s, in the short to medium term the proposal exacerbates those risks.1 To address those risks, this paper details an approach that will: deliver valuable additional maritime capability to the Navy significantly earlier than the current plan; sustain, and indeed grow, the workforce that will be essential to our long-term ship and submarine plans; develop the industrial ecosystem needed for naval construction in Adelaide and nationally; and provide a timely return on the funding that the Australian government has already planned to invest in naval capability this decade without requiring additional funding.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Navy, and Maritime
Political Geography:: Australia

14114. Sliding-door moments: ANZUS and the Blue Pacific

Author:: Richard Herr and Anthony Bergin
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: The report examines some key ‘sliding-door’ moments that have shaped the trajectory of ANZUS in the Pacific Island region over seven decades, to reach the current confused state within the alliance regarding its aims in the Pacific Islands. Our Pacific neighbours recognise that their security is tied up with the region’s new and complex geopolitical environment and they have made it clear that they have no wish to be a catspaw in any strategic rivalries. The report argues that ANZUS has not been fully functional as an alliance for several decades. If its three members are not unified on Pacific Island regional security, the alliance can scarcely advance the Islands concerns more widely. For these reasons, the report recommends that ANZUS strengthen its internal machinery by finding the accommodation needed to resume ANZUS Council Meetings. It also recommends using the Treaty’s Article VIII provisions to incorporate supportive extra-regional powers into an ‘ANZUS Plus’ While recognising that ANZUS isn’t a humanitarian aid agency, as co-author Dr Anthony Bergin notes, “we can’t ignore the security importance of regional infrastructure.” The report also recommends that the ANZUS allies act proactively through national aid programmes to identify and protect these interests in partnership with the Island states’ public and private sectors to prevent key assets becoming strategic bones of contention.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, ANZUS, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Asia-Pacific

14115. Myanmar’s coup, ASEAN’s crisis: And the implications for Australia

Author:: Huong Le Thu, David Engel, and Hillary Mansour
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: The rapidly unfolding Myanmar crisis is presenting Southeast Asia with one of its most severe security and stability threats in the past three decades. While the region is certainly familiar with military coups and violent changes of government, the ongoing crisis in Myanmar carries risks far more acute than previous coups d’etat in the region. One of them is the risk to the sustained modus operandi of the region’s key institution—the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The outcome of ASEAN’s involvement in the Myanmar crisis is consequential not only for the Myanmar people, but also for the association’s ability to credibly lead efforts to preserve peace and security in the region into the future. In this report, we assess the security situation in Myanmar, ASEAN’s collective response and the individual roles of key ASEAN member states in the mediating process. We focus on the effect that the Myanmar crisis has on the overall ASEAN political and security situation, and highlight Indonesia’s leadership, and limitations, in the process. We also detail the legal instruments and responsibility of ASEAN—in the form of the ASEAN Charter—to uphold the rule of law. The report concludes with some policy implications for the wider region, particularly Australia.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Coup, and ASEAN
Political Geography:: Australia, Southeast Asia, and Myanmar

14116. The Sydney Dialogue: Playbook

Author:: Fergus Hanson, Danielle Cave, and Madeleine Nyst
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: Major advances in technology have always been disruptive. But when they occur against a backdrop of great power competition, the stable development and deployment of these technologies becomes fraught. Few have grasped the enormity of the disruption coming our way as more and more new technologies – from increasingly sophisticated surveillance to quantum and biotechnologies – are deployed across the world. While governments grapple with foreseeing the full impacts and setting policy direction, there’s a growing realisation that emerging and critical technologies will be extraordinarily important for societies, economies and national security. We launched The Sydney Dialogue to support a more stable roll-out of the next wave of transformational technologies. It is a forum allowing for frank debate about the rapidly changing strategic landscape, and a space for governments, business and civil society to come together to focus on solutions, cooperation and policy options. The Sydney Dialogue came about because we saw big gaps in forums on technology, especially in the Indo-Pacific. There were industry events that showcased the latest technical advances and products, but they tended to eschew policy debates, and did not encompass government and civil society. There were important government multilateral discussion and policymaking forums, but these usually lagged well behind technological advances, and because they were primarily for governments, key global players – including those making the technology – weren’t part of the discussion. And there were excellent civil society initiatives, but these often focused on individual topics that were only one piece of a larger puzzle. Few of these initiatives focused on or resonated in the Indo-Pacific – the region that incubates much of the world’s technological innovation and has become a hotbed of strategic technological competition. These gaps drove us towards a dynamic where all the key actors were speaking past one another, while rarely all being in the same room. Tech companies are developing and deploying products that are revolutionary and hugely disruptive. A decade later, governments are scrambling to retrospectively legislate to address issues they did not foresee, and civil society is critiquing from the sidelines. Right now, three major problems must be addressed to ensure the stable development of advanced technologies. First, there’s the large lag between the deployment of new technologies and regulation governing them. With social media, this lag was about a decade. As we’ve seen, this doesn’t lead to good outcomes for individuals, or for societies. Second, there’s a delay between states’ use of new technologies and their consideration of the ethical questions raised by its use. Examples of this can be seen in the global surveillance industry, which has allowed its products to support some of the most egregious human rights abuses of our times. Third, a tense relationship between governments and technology companies is playing out around the world. The negative dynamic that has taken hold is hindering progress and genuine cooperation, leaving democracies at risk of being left behind. The Sydney Dialogue seeks to fill a gap and contribute towards these big challenges. By bringing world leaders, tech company CEOs and the world’s top civil society voices together for an annual dialogue, we hope the roll-out of the next wave of revolutionary technologies over the coming decade can be better managed. This collection of striking essays from some of the world’s top strategic thinkers from across business, government and civil society is a fitting way to start this dialogue. It explores timely debates at the forefront of technology and examines points of crisis and tension in the nexus of society, government and technology. Crucially, it offers innovative ideas to solve these challenges and bring about a brighter, fairer Indo-Pacific. The following pieces bring us all a much-needed dose of optimism and show that in many cases, the solutions already exist – we just need to work together to bring them to life.
Topic:: National Security, Science and Technology, Economy, Surveillance, and Society
Political Geography:: Australia and Global Focus

14117. China’s cyber vision: How the Cyberspace Administration of China is building a new consensus on global internet governance

Author:: Nathan Attrill and Audrey Fritz
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: This report provides a primer on the roots of the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) within China’s policy system, and sheds light on the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) intentions to use cyberspace as a tool for shaping discourse domestically and internationally. The report details the position of the Cyberspace Administration of China in China’s propaganda system. Considering its origins in the former Party Office of External Propaganda, the authors argue that ‘countries that lack comprehensive cyber regulations should err on the side of caution when engaging with the CCP on ideas for establishing an international cyber co-governance strategy.’ By assessing the CCP’s strategy of becoming a ‘cyber superpower’, its principle of ‘internet sovereignty’, and its concept of ‘community of common destiny for cyberspace’, this report seeks to address how the CCP is working to build a consensus on the future of who will set the rules, norms and values of the internet. The report also examines the World Internet Conference - a ‘platform through which the CCP promotes its ideas on internet sovereignty and global governance’ – and its links to the CAC.
Topic:: Governance, Cybersecurity, Internet, and Surveillance
Political Geography:: China and Asia

14118. Collaborative and agile. Intelligence community collaboration insights from the United Kingdom and the United States

Author:: Michael Shoebridge, John Coyne, and Rajiv Shah
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: The central aim of this report is to generate insights from the US and UK intelligence communities’ collaboration efforts. It identifies insights so that members of Australia’s national intelligence community, including the ONI, can use them to enhance the community’s collaboration and agility for the purpose of giving Australian decision-makers an insight edge over others. We acknowledge that agencies must contextualise those insights to Australia’s specific circumstances, and we’ve sought to do some of that in this report. The report isn’t intended as an academic think piece but as a guide-and goad-to actions that can advance and protect Australia’s wellbeing, prosperity and security. This report doesn’t seek to second-guess the internal insights that it explores. Instead, it takes an external perspective, informed by experience in relevant agencies and by perspectives from intelligence-community partners and analysts in the UK and the US.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Intelligence, National Security, and Collaboration
Political Geography:: United Kingdom and United States of America

14119. Benchmarking critical technologies: Building an evidence base for an informed critical technologies strategy

Author:: Kitsch Liao, Samantha Hoffman, Karly Winkler, Baani Grewal, and Cheryl Yu
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: Technology policy formulation has recently gained a renewed importance for governments in the era of strategic competition, but contextual understanding and expertise in deciding where to focus efforts are lacking. As a result, decision-makers might not understand their own national strengths and weaknesses. It’s difficult to judge whether a country’s R&D outputs, no matter how advanced, and its development of production capacity, no matter how significant, align with the country’s intended strategic objectives or can be used effectively to achieve them. The ability to measure the relative strengths and weaknesses of a country by weighing specific strategic objectives against technical achievements is of paramount importance for countries. This is especially true as nations seek to resolve supply-chain resilience problems underscored by the Covid-19 pandemic. China’s rejection of the Quad’s vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific, willingness to use economic coercion and the resulting strategic competition, call further attention to multiple technology sectors’ heavy reliance on a single source. A solution must be found that can exploit synergy across multiple technology sectors among collaborating countries while ensuring supply-chain resilience.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Strategic Competition, COVID-19, Supply Chains, and Research and Development
Political Geography:: China and Indo-Pacific

14120. #StopXinjiang Rumors: The CCP’s decentralised disinformation campaign

Author:: Fergus Ryan, Ariel Bogle, Albert Zhang, and Jacob Wallis
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: This report analyses two Chinese state-linked networks seeking to influence discourse about Xinjiang across platforms including Twitter and YouTube. This activity targeted the Chinese-speaking diaspora as well as international audiences, sharing content in a variety of languages. Both networks attempted to shape international perceptions about Xinjiang, among other themes. Despite evidence to the contrary, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) denies committing human rights abuses in the region and has mounted multifaceted and multiplatform information campaigns to deny accusations of forced labour, mass detention, surveillance, sterilisation, cultural erasure and alleged genocide in the region. Those efforts have included using Western social media platforms to both push back against and undermine media reports, research and Uyghurs’ testimony about Xinjiang, as well as to promote alternative narratives. In the datasets we examined, inauthentic and potentially automated accounts using a variety of image and video content shared content aimed at rebutting the evidence of human rights violations against the Uyghur population. Likewise, content was shared using fake Uyghur accounts and other shell accounts promoting video ‘testimonials’ from Uyghurs talking about their happy lives in China. Our analysis includes two datasets removed by Twitter: Dataset 1: ‘Xinjiang Online’ (CNHU) consisted of 2,046 accounts and 31,269 tweets. Dataset 2: ‘Changyu Culture’ (CNCC) consisted of 112 accounts and 35,924 tweets. The networks showed indications of being linked by theme and tactics; however, neither achieved significant organic engagement on Twitter overall—although there was notable interaction with the accounts of CCP diplomats. There were signs of old accounts being repurposed, whether purchased or stolen, and little attempt to craft authentic personas. Twitter has attributed both datasets to the Chinese government, the latter dataset is specifically linked to a company called Changyu Culture, which is connected to the Xinjiang provincial government. This attribution was uncovered by ASPI ICPC in the report Strange bedfellows on Xinjiang: the CCP, fringe media and US social media platforms.
Topic:: Human Rights, Diaspora, Social Media, Disinformation, Misinformation, and Twitter
Political Geography:: China, United States of America, and Xinjiang

14121. What is AUKUS and what is it not?

Author:: Michael Shoebridge
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: What IS the new AUKUS partnership between the US, the UK and Australia? How does it fit with the Quad, ASEAN and other new forums like the government-tech Sydney Dialogue? This new ASPI Insight sets out what AUKUS is—a technology accelerator that’s’ about shifting the military balance in the Indo Pacific. Just as importantly, it sets out what AUKUS it isn’t, to reset some of the discussion that has made some assumptions here. AUKUS isn’t a new alliance structure, a competitor to the Quad between Australia, India, Japan and the US, or a signal of decreased commitment to ASEAN forums by the AUKUS members. And the Insight proposes some focus areas for implementation of this new ‘minilateral’ technology accelerator, including having a single empowered person in each nation charged with implementation and ‘obstacle busting’. This is to break through the institutional, political and corporate permafrost that has prevented such rapid technological adoption by our militaries in recent decades. As is the case with James Miller in the US, this person should report to their national leader, not from inside the defence bureaucracies of the three nations. On purpose and urgency, the report identifies a simple performance metric for AUKUS implementers over the next three years. On 20 January 2025, when the Australian prime minister calls whoever is the US president on that day, AUKUS has become such a successful piece of the furniture, with tangible results that have generated broad institutional, political and corporate support that, regardless of how warm or testy this leaders’ phone call is (think Turnbull-Trump in January 2016), AUKUS’s momentum continues.
Topic:: Defense Policy, National Security, Alliance, AUKUS, and Quad Alliance
Political Geography:: United Kingdom, Australia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

14122. Borrowing mouths to speak on Xinjiang

Author:: Fergus Ryan, Ariel Bogle, Nathan Ruser, Albert Zhang, and Daria Impiombato
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: This report explores how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) uses foreign social media influencers to shape and push messages domestically and internationally about Xinjiang that are aligned with its own preferred narratives. Our research has found key instances in which Chinese state entities have supported influencers in the creation of social media content in Xinjiang, as well as amplified influencer content that supports pro-CCP narratives. That content broadly seeks to debunk Western media reporting and academic research, refute statements by foreign governments and counter allegations of widespread human rights abuses in Xinjiang. Often, such content is then promoted by party-state media and diplomatic accounts across major international social media networks and in Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) briefings. This trend is particularly notable given the difficulty faced by journalists reporting in Xinjiang. Our research also examines how the CCP’s use of foreign influencers presents a growing challenge to global social media platforms, and in particular their efforts to identify and label state-affiliated accounts. This report focuses on the promotion of foreign influencers who disseminate content about Xinjiang on US-based social media and content networks, including YouTube, Twitter, Facebook and Instagram, as well as on Chinese platforms such as Bilibili. The report analyses this unique online influencer ecosystem and examines three in-depth case studies with a focus on Xinjiang-focused foreign influencer content and the amplification of that content by Chinese state entities. The Chinese party-state continues to deny allegations of human rights abuses in Xinjiang, including forced labour, mass detention and cultural erasure. Previous work by ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre (ICPC) has found Chinese party-state entities using US social media networks in an effort to create greater ambiguity about the situation in Xinjiang, push a counter-narrative and amplify disinformation. It has also found that the CCP uses tactics, including leveraging US social media platforms, to criticise and smear Uyghur victims, journalists and researchers who work on this topic, as well as their organisations. Other tactics have included temporal and narrative alignment between pro-CCP social media influencers and state entities (for example, targeting the BBC over its reporting on allegations of systematic rape in Xinjiang’s internment camps, among other stories) as well as the amplification of content that depicts Uyghurs as broadly supportive of the Chinese Government’s policies in Xinjiang.
Topic:: Social Media, Propaganda, Disinformation, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and Influencers
Political Geography:: China and Xinjiang

14123. Implementing Australia’s nuclear submarine program

Author:: Andrew Nicholls, Jackson Dowie, and Marcus Hellyer
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: On 16 September 2021, the Australian Government announced that it would acquire a nuclear-powered submarine (SSN) capability with support from the UK and the US as the first measure of business under the AUKUS technology sharing partnership. At the same time, it announced that it had established the Nuclear-Powered Submarine Taskforce, which would devote 18 months to determining the ‘optimal pathway’ to establishing this new capability. The taskforce has its work cut out for it, and the signing of an initial nuclear information sharing agreement only two months after AUKUS was announced suggests things are moving fast. Nevertheless this new enterprise will be a massive undertaking and probably the largest and most complex endeavour Australia has embarked upon. The challenges, costs and risks will be enormous. It’s likely to be at least two decades and tens of billions of dollars in sunk costs before Australia has a useful nuclear-powered military capability. Many commentators have suggested that the work of the taskforce is primarily about making a recommendation on the choice of submarine—either the US Virginia class or the UK Astute class. That’s misleading on two counts. First, the most important decision isn’t so much about the submarine, but about the strategic partner most able to work with us on our new SSN capability. Second, Australia will need to make many choices—about the strategic partner, about the submarine design, about the build strategy, about schedule, and more. Those choices will involve hard prioritisation decisions about what’s most important. Is it capability, schedule, Australian industry content, or something else? This report examines the decision space available to the government. The most important decision is the choice of our primary strategic partner. While both the US and the UK will need to provide us with assistance regardless of which submarine design we choose, there’s no point picking a boat if its parent nation doesn’t have the capacity to assist us with all of the fundamental inputs to capability needed to deliver military effects, or its industrial base doesn’t have the capacity to deliver. While we shouldn’t pre-empt the work of the taskforce, initial analysis suggests that the US has more capacity to assist us. Even once we choose a partner, we still have some difficult choices about the submarine design. Do we prioritise schedule and build our partner’s current design, with the result that we’re left with an orphaned and outdated fleet? Do we wait to get into step with our partner’s next class, exacerbating the risk of a capability gap? Or do we start with the current design and transition later to the partner’s future design, with the result that we have multiple classes of boat in our small fleet? Another area of choice is the amount of modification we do to the design. While some modifications will be necessary due to Australia’s regulatory and safety regimes—unless we recognise our partner’s regulatory approaches as fit for purpose and accommodate ours to theirs—others will be discretionary. Every effort must be made to limit the changes, whether they’re motivated by capability or Australian industry content, as every change drives cost and schedule risk regardless of how well intentioned it is. A fundamental choice is the build strategy. The government has stated that the SSNs will be built in Adelaide; however, it hasn’t committed to a continuous build. A continuous-build approach (one driven by a schedule designed to replace the first boat after around 30 years with no break in production) is appealing to Australian industry and current and future workers but would face many challenges—boats would be delivered on an inefficient three- or even four-year drumbeat, driving up cost and increasing the capability gap. Alternatively, an ‘economic’ approach that focused on the most efficient possible approach would deliver capability faster but require massive annual spending and produce the prospect of a ‘valley of death’ at the end of production. Either approach replicates a nuclear-submarine production capability in Australia as our own sovereign cottage-industry version of what the UK and the US already have. Underpinning all of those choices is the issue of schedule. We’re facing the looming spectre of a submarine capability gap as the Collins-class fleet ages out. The government’s stated schedule, delivering at least the first boat by the late 2030s, is feasible, if optimistic, if we build all the boats in Australia. But that may be too late to avoid a capability gap. An alternative that could accelerate delivery would be to open up the aperture of what ‘built in Adelaide’ should look like. One approach we consider is to build the initial boats overseas to accelerate delivery but also to train Australian workers on a mature production line to avoid a ‘cold start’ to local production. But there are also options that approach this enterprise as the embodiment of our AUKUS and alliance partnerships rather than as a large, but traditional, construction project. This could involve a ‘JSF’ (Joint Strike Fighter) approach of feeding components into a joint submarine enterprise that Australia enters with our primary enterprise partner. Such a joint enterprise would span more than just construction and enable Australia to be a ‘first line’ sustainment hub for our AUKUS partners’ submarines as well as for our own. When we consider that just the maintenance of Australia’s SSNs will be likely to require more workforce than the Attack-class build and Collins-class full-cycle dockings combined, there are ways to deliver submarines faster, sustain sovereign capability, contribute to our partnerships and still create jobs that don’t involve assembling submarines here. And this can’t be stated clearly or often enough: successful transition isn’t just about delivering boats but all of the elements of the capability. So, the choice of boat and build approaches aren’t just matters of capability or industry but must be informed by broader inputs to capability. Perhaps the most important of those is the challenge of how the Navy ramps up its uniformed workforce; solving that problem is just as crucial as delivering boats on time. Again, AUKUS has much to offer here. Finally, we’ve provided an estimate of the cost of the enterprise. Such an exercise is inherently hazardous at this stage of the process, with so many assumptions still open and untested. The government has been open in stating that the SSN program will cost more than the Attack-class program, which would have cost around $56–57 billion in current-day constant dollars. We agree: at an absolute minimum, an eight-boat SSN program will cost around $70 billion constant (or $116 billion in out-turned dollars, which account for inflation). However, it’s highly likely that it will cost substantially more once the cost drivers are more clearly understood. Those include both the US and UK moving to bigger submarine designs, our choice of build strategy, and the broader support system and infrastructure needed to operate nuclear submarines. To channel Donald Rumsfeld, there are things we know we don’t know, and things we don’t know we don’t know; both will drive up the estimate.
Topic:: Defense Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, and Military
Political Geography:: Australia

14124. North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: views from The Strategist, Volume 4

Author:: John Coyne
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: The 27 essays in the collection demonstrate that Australia’s north—that great sweep of territory from Rockhampton in the east to Onslow in the west, taking in Townsville, Bamaga, Darwin and Broome—is about a whole lot more than even what makes its way into the national debate (borders, quarantine facilities, mining, agricultural and energy projects, and small but key defence facilities). Between them, the authors of this volume cover proposals for an Indigenous civil defence force to work domestically and in our near region, the opportunities for processing critical minerals and producing rare-earth magnets, a broader way of thinking about and doing nation-building that gets beyond waiting for one big first-mover investor or entrepreneur before anything happens, and, of course, the ways that Australia can better use this huge chunk of the globe’s strategic geography—along with key partners like Japan and the United States. As thinkers who understand the austere environment of our north, the authors are all distinguished by a sense of opportunity, optimism and even that much-maligned, now neglected word ‘vision’—which history shows is what’s needed to advance the development and prosperity of the north of our continent.
Topic:: Defense Policy, National Security, Natural Resources, and Indigenous
Political Geography:: Australia and Asia-Pacific

14125. Is Serbia Still a Troublemaker in the Balkans?

Author:: Faruk Ajeti
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: As one of the largest countries of the Balkans, Serbia’s troubled past also poses big dilemmas for the future. Its latest political and military cooperation with Russia and China appears to be an effort to build a strategic neutrality with “Serbian characteristics.” But at what cost?
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Neutrality, and Cooperation
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eastern Europe, Serbia, and Balkans

14126. The “Scandinavian model” of military conscription: A formula for democratic defence forces in 21st century Europe?

Author:: Sanna Strand
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: In 2017, Sweden reactivated military conscription, only seven years after all-male conscription first was deactivated and an all-volunteer force introduced. While conscription has been critiqued in Europe after the end of the Cold War for being inefficient, unfair and ultimately unmodern, many European countries now appear to be reconsidering conscription or some form of mandatory national service. Others are attempting to update their draft systems by making them more inclusive and attractive. Sweden therefore provides an important case study for understanding how such a shift is motivated and how public support can be gained or strengthened for a modernized conscription model that is considered fit for the 21st century. This policy analysis thus sheds light on Sweden’s new conscription, modelled after the Norwegian version. It finds that this “Scandinavian model” was successfully implemented because it entailed a reimagination of conscription by the Government and defence officials rather than a return to traditional models. This was achieved by consistently arguing that this model was 1) gender-neutral and 2) selective and competitive, and therefore in principle still voluntary. As such, the Scandinavian model holds considerable military and political promise to ensure the armed forces’ access to competent and motivated soldiers, while at the same time garnering high levels of support among both politicians and the population. However, this model also entails inherent tensions and challenges to full implementation that policy-makers and military representatives need to consider when advocating for it: Most prominently, the analysis suggests that the model and its public support is dependent on continued efforts by the armed forces to become an inclusive and attractive professional and educational institution for all. These efforts may include marketing the armed forces in ways which signal that a diversity of young people is welcome and valued within the institution. Yet, it must also include efforts at institutional change and concrete policy initiatives. With regards to gender equality, it is pivotal to ensure that the drafting and selection process – but also the work environment within the armed forces – does not discriminate against women as a group. This entails making sure, for example, that women conscripts are provided with fitting uniforms and equipment. Moreover, given that the model is dependent on making military service competitive and therefore attractive to young people, attempts by the Government to considerably increase the number of people selected for service each year may pose a threat to the ambition of keeping military service voluntary in principle. Countries interested in increasing public support for conscription and implementing a gender-equal, democratic and ultimately modern draft system by adopting the Scandinavian model should therefore pay close attention to these challenges and tensions emerging in the Swedish context.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Democracy, Legitimacy, Equality, Gender, and Military
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Scandinavia, and Baltic States

14127. The Role of Blockchain in Green Hydrogen Value Chains

Author:: Nicola De Blasio and Charles Hua
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: A rainbow of colors currently dominates almost every conversation on the transition to a low-carbon economy: green, grey, blue, turquoise, pink, yellow[1] - an ever-increasing palette to describe the same colorless, odorless, and highly combustible molecule, hydrogen. The only difference is the chemical process used to produce it. The colors of hydrogen are crucial for the energy transition because each production pathway generates different amounts of greenhouse gas emissions. For example, while grey hydrogen, produced from fossil fuels, yields up to 20 tons of carbon dioxide per ton of hydrogen, green hydrogen, produced from renewable energy sources like solar and wind, yields no emissions. Furthermore, although these colors all refer to the same molecule, production costs differ: green hydrogen remains substantially more costly today. With aggressive development and deployment of electrolyzers and other hydrogen technologies at scale, green hydrogen could become cost-competitive with blue hydrogen, produced from natural gas with carbon capture, by 2030 in many countries.[2] Overall, the rate at which green hydrogen costs decrease will also depend on government policies and incentives, such as carbon pricing and tax credits. Therein lies a critical challenge for the successful transition to a low-carbon economy. As energy systems increasingly evolve from centralized to decentralized, from “grey” to “green,” stakeholders will need to efficiently account for and track emissions and green molecules in a transparent, secure, and standardized way, and must be able to do so along value chains from production to consumption.
Topic:: Environment, Science and Technology, Natural Resources, Innovation, Renewable Energy, Hydrogen, and Energy
Political Geography:: Global Focus

14128. The European Union at a Crossroads: Unlocking Renewable Hydrogen’s Potential

Author:: Nicola De Blasio and Alejandro Nuñez-Jimenez
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: European countries are at a crossroads on their path to carbon neutrality. Today, they are at the forefront of the global clean hydrogen race but going forward they would be better served by collaborating instead of working alone. Overall, the European Union (EU) is highly competitive in clean technologies manufacturing and thus well-positioned to benefit from the emergence of global hydrogen markets. But a narrow focus on short-term cost considerations could drive member states to implement national roadmaps with little or no coordination among themselves and hence little or no chance of competing globally. As a bloc, the EU has pledged to reach carbon neutrality by 2050. Clean hydrogen is a cornerstone of this transformational effort; accordingly, in July 2020, the EU adopted its hydrogen strategy with the ambition of deploying open and competitive clean hydrogen markets for all energy sectors and segments by 2050.1 Success hinges around implementing a cohesive long-term strategy to address a fundamental ques- tion and its associated challenges: where could the EU source competitive and secure renewable hydrogen supplies? As our previous research shows, all countries have access to renewable resources (such as solar or wind), to different degrees, and could produce some renewable hydrogen locally. However, while resource-rich countries, such as Spain, could evolve into regional exporters, no EU member state has the potential to become a global export champion. At the same time, North African countries, such as Morocco, are well-situated to act as key suppliers to the EU. Furthermore, imports from resource-rich regions like North America could help to address security of supply concerns.2 Today, EU hydrogen demand stands at 7.8 million tons per year (Mt/yr), equivalent to about 10% of global demand. Germany and the Netherlands are the largest consumers, accounting for over a third of EU demand, followed by Poland, Spain, Italy, Belgium, and France, which consume about 0.5 Mt/yr each.3 According to available projections, as hydrogen use grows across all economic sectors, EU hydrogen demand could reach 76 Mt/yr by 2050. But while the EU strategy sets clear targets on electrolyzer deployment by 2030, it provides very few details on how the bloc could meet demand—and at what cost—by 2050.
Topic:: Economics, Environment, Science and Technology, Natural Resources, European Union, Innovation, Hydrogen, and Energy
Political Geography:: Europe

14129. Offshore Wind in the Eastern United States

Author:: Katie Segal and Henry Lee
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: In the last decade, many states set ambitious goals to decarbonize their energy portfolios. Seven states along the Atlantic coast are pursuing 100% clean electricity targets, while others have adopted stringent emissions reduction targets.1 Realizing these goals requires scaling wind, solar, and other renewable resource electricity generation at rates three to four times recent levels. If wind is to play a significant role in decarbonizing the electricity sector in the densely populated northeast section of the United States, a substantial proportion of the investment must occur offshore, as onshore wind speeds and available land area are limited. Some states have taken an additional step by establishing specific offshore wind targets. For example, New York's 2019 Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act contains a goal of 9,000 MW of offshore wind by 2035.2 This policy brief examines the economic and technical feasibility of substantial wind generation development along the Eastern Seaboard.
Topic:: Environment, Natural Resources, Renewable Energy, and Energy
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

14130. Likely Escalation: Potential war over Syria’s Daraa Province after Russian roadmap

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: Between August 2and August 18, clashes erupted between the Syrian regime army and the armed opposition groups in Daraa province in southern Syria, after the Syrian regime threatened military action against the groups if they do not commit to a roadmap proposed by Russia, which eventually aims to help the Syrian army retake control on the southern parts of the country.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Refugees, Syrian War, Armed Conflict, and Escalation
Political Geography:: Russia, Middle East, Syria, and Daraa

14131. A Shiite Division: The repercussions of the possible postponement of the Iraqi parliamentary elections

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: On August 19, the Iraqi President called for a national dialogue regarding the upcoming elections, expressing his concerns about the challenges holding the elections on time. Thus, Iraq once again faces uncertainty regarding the fate of the upcoming parliamentary elections, scheduled for October 10, 2021. A number of the Iraqi political forces announced their desire to postpone the elections, in support of the position of the leader of the Sadrist movement, while other forces oppose this approach and stand by holding the elections on their scheduled date.
Topic:: Elections, Muqtada al-Sadr, Parliament, and Shiism
Political Geography:: Iraq and Middle East

14132. Eight Reasons: Why did Algeria sever political relations with Morocco?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: On August 24, 2021, during a press conference held in the capital, Algiers, Algerian Foreign Minister Ramtane Lamamra announced the severance of diplomatic relations with Morocco, stating that the recent period has witnessed Morocco committing hostile acts against his country.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Politics, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Algeria and North Africa

14133. Afghanistan’s Ripples: Can the US withdraw from Iraq?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: The Taliban’s control of Kabul and the extension of its sovereignty over the majority of Afghanistan, following the withdrawal of US forces, have raised debates regarding the fate of the US forces in Iraq. Is Washington going to withdraw from Iraq as well, particularly in light of previous US threats to do so, or will the Afghan experience not be repeated in Iraq?
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, and Iraq War
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Iraq, South Asia, Middle East, and United States of America

14134. Potential Cooperation: Iranian Possible Cooperation with Taliban to Curb Threats

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: The situation in Afghanistan, after the Taliban took over the country, is the second key issue that the new Iranian president, Ebrahim Raisi’s, foreign policy agenda, after reviving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
Topic:: Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Taliban, and JCPOA
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Iran, South Asia, and Middle East

14135. Panjshir Resistance: Will the Taliban Fail to Fully Control Afghanistan?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: The Taliban easily succeeded in controlling all Afghan provinces except for one, namely, Panjshir, currently known as the Panjshir Valley, in north-central Afghanistan. Leaders of the resistance in Panjshir, (especially Ahmad Massoud, son of the warlord Ahmad Shah Massoud, and Amrullah Saleh, former vice president), stress that they will never surrender to the Taliban.
Topic:: Security, Armed Forces, Taliban, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, South Asia, and Panjshir

14136. Common Perceptions: Discovering the consensus between King Abdullah and Putin regarding the future of Southern Syria

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: A Jordanian-Russian summit was held on August 23 in Moscow, during which several files pertaining to Lebanon and Palestine were discussed. However, the crisis in Southern Syria was on top of the list of discussions. This summit was preceded by several Jordanian decisions, which are believed to mark the beginning of some change in Jordanian policy toward Syria and toward the region in general.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Syrian War, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:: Russia, Middle East, Syria, and Jordan

14137. Proceeding with Reform: Disclosing the reasons behind the Tunisian President’s decision to extend the exceptional measures

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: On August 23, 2021, Tunisian president Kais Saied issued a presidential decree extending the exceptional measures of the 80th decree (July 25, 2021), whereby parliamentary activities were suspended and immunity on MPs were lifted until further notice. Saied extended these measures just one day before they were supposed to come to an end, as the 80th decree was supposed to be in effect for only one month.
Topic:: Reform, Democracy, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:: North Africa and Tunisia

14138. Limited Repercussions: Implications of the Emergence of Afghan-US Armored Vehicles in Tehran

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: On Wednesday, September 1, Afghan media published pictures of a number of US Humvee tanks and military vehicles affiliated with the Afghan government, transported by an Iranian army truck from Afghanistan to Iran. This came in conjunction with the publication of pictures of US-made armored vehicles in Iran on another Afghan Telegram channel. The vehicles were in the possession of the dissolved Afghan government.
Topic:: Security, Military Affairs, Media, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Iran, South Asia, and United States of America

14139. The Tigray Crisis: The Ethiopian government’s incessant attempts to resolve the internal conflict militarily

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: The conflict in Ethiopia continues despite international appeals to put an end to it. The government forces were able to slow down the progress of the forces of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front over the last two weeks, and to control some areas. However, the main areas of Afar and Amhara remained under the control of the Tigrayan rebels, who managed to form a broader alliance with other rebel groups.
Topic:: Security, Government, Conflict, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:: Africa, Ethiopia, and Tigray

14140. The 7th Round of Talks: Iran’s foot-dragging over the return to nuclear talks

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: French President Emanuel Macron, on September 6, held his sec-ond official phone call with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi since his ascent to presidency, to discuss the future of the Vienna talks aiming to revive the 2015 nuclear deal. Six rounds of talks have been held so far In Vienna.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and JCPOA
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

14141. Mounting Interference: Will Washington push the Tunisian president into restoring the parliament?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: Tunisian President Kais Saied received an American congressional delegation, led by Senators Chris Murphy and Jon Ossoff. In their two-day visit (from September 4 to September 5), the delegation met Saied in the Carthage presidential palace. They also met representatives of Tunisian civil society organizations as well as several MPs.
Topic:: Civil Society, Democracy, Domestic Politics, and Parliament
Political Geography:: North Africa, Tunisia, and United States of America

14142. Mutual Concessions: Did al-Kadhimi’s visit to Tehran achieve its objectives?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: On September 12, 2021, Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, led a high-profile government delegation on an official one-day visit to Tehran that came upon invitation from Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi. Besides Raisi, al-Kadhimi also met Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, and other senior officials.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Domestic Politics, and Energy
Political Geography:: Iraq, Iran, and Middle East

14143. Multiple gains: Saied’s Call for Changing the Tunisian Political System

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: On September 12, during a tour of Habib Bourguiba Street, amid heavy guard, Tunisian President Kais Saied said that the new government would be formed “as soon as possible”, and hinted that Tunisia’s constitution may be amended.
Topic:: Government, Democracy, Constitution, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:: North Africa and Tunisia

14144. Possible Escalation: No Love Lost between Erdogan and Turkish Opposition

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: Turkish opposition pledged to take down President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the June 2023 elections and to restore the parliamentary system. Meral Akşener, leader of the Iyi (Good) Party, promised that the next president will be from the Nation Alliance consisting of her party and the Republican People’s Party ((CHP) - the biggest opposition party in Turkey). It is noteworthy that the Turkish opposition won the 2019 municipal elections in Istanbul and Ankara by following the same strategy of alliances.
Topic:: Reform, Elections, Domestic Politics, Political Parties, and Escalation
Political Geography:: Turkey

14145. Maritime Dispute: Lebanon’s Options for Responding to Israel’s Deal with Halliburton

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: US-based oilfield services group Halliburton said on September 14 that it was awarded a contract to drill as many as five wells off the coast of Israel. Halliburton, which will conduct the work for London-based Energean, will deliver all services including project management, production enhancement, and subsea services. Halliburton previously executed a four-well campaign at Energean’s Karish and Karish North gas fields offshore Israel.
Topic:: Oil, Economy, Business, and Maritime
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, and Lebanon

14146. A Possible Downfall: The implications of the mass resignations within the Ennahda movement in Tunisia

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: Eighteen members of the Ennahda Movement, the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, submitted their collective resignations from the movement’s membership on September 26, 2021, just only three days after 113 others have resigned as well. This brings the total number of members who resigned in two days to 131 members. This is a significant indication of the intensifying disputes and divisions within the movement following the Tunisian President’s announcement of exceptional measures in the country on July 25, 2021.
Topic:: Reform, Democracy, Domestic Politics, and Ennahda Party
Political Geography:: North Africa and Tunisia

14147. The Evolving Rivalry: The future of the relationship between Taliban and ISKP in Afghanistan

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: The ISIS Amaq news agency on September 19 announced on its Telegram channel that the Islamic State Khorasan Province, or ISKP claim responsibility for three bombings in Jalalabad in Afghanistan’s eastern Nangarhar province. The Taliban accused the organization of carrying out a fourth attack in the Afghan capital Kabul. The developments come amid concerns in the West that the next terrorist threat from Afghanistan is this particular militant group.
Topic:: Terrorism, Taliban, Islamic State, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and South Asia

14148. Three Crises: Escalating security threats to the future of the Somali State

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: Somalia is witnessing an escalation in the current political crisis, which is likely to undermine the credibility of the Somali leadership, in addition to threatening the internal stability in Somalia, as concerns heighten regarding the country possibly plunging into civil wars, similar to what happened in previous historical periods due to the clan nature of the Somali society.
Topic:: Security, Leadership, Crisis Management, and Political Crisis
Political Geography:: Africa and Somalia

14149. The UN Support: The implications of postponing Libya’s legislative elections to January 2022

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: On October 2021, Libyan House of Representatives announced that the election dates would be rescheduled, so that presidential elections would be held on December 24, while the legislative elections would take place thirty days later. Originally, the legislative elections were supposed to be held on the same day as the presidential elections. This can be considered a new step taken by the Parliament with the aim of showing commitment to the roadmap by approving the parliamentary election law.
Topic:: Law, Elections, Domestic Politics, and Parliament
Political Geography:: Libya and North Africa

14150. The Reappearance of Consensus: Implications of Israel-Russia Agreements over Syria

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: Russian President Vladimir Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett held their first face-to-face talks on October 22 in Sochi, Russia. The summit talks, called by Putin, were slated for only two hours but lasted for about five hours, reflecting the two sides’ interest in enhancing coordination about several common issues, and warming up the Israeli-Russian relations which cooled down since Bennett rose to power.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Treaties and Agreements, Syrian War, and Consensus
Political Geography:: Russia, Middle East, Israel, and Syria

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS