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  • Author: Vinod K Aggarwal, Andrew Reddie
  • Publication Date: 09-2018
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: Berkeley APEC Study Center
  • Abstract: This paper evaluates the role of firms, governments, and other key stakeholders in the rise of industrial policy in the United States toward the cybersecurity sector. Our goals are as follows: 1) to examine the motivation for government promotion of the cybersecurity industry in the United States; 2) to inventory existing measures employed by the U.S. government; 3) to understand the driving forces of cybersecurity industrial policy in the United States; and 4) to examine the likely conflicts that will arise from the competitive pursuit of these industrial policies and to consider how they might possibly be resolved through international cooperation. To this end, we use a “market failure”-based analytical framework to serve as the structure for this project, drawing on a variety of approaches to understand industrial policy in the United States as well as the variety of intervention strategies and instruments used by the U.S. government.
  • Topic: Government, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Industry
  • Political Geography: North America, United States of America
  • Author: Tai Ming Cheung
  • Publication Date: 09-2018
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: Berkeley APEC Study Center
  • Abstract: This paper examines China’s cybersecurity industrial development over the past two decades since the arrival of the internet in that country. This analysis takes place from a primarily security and technology perspective because the national security apparatus occupies a powerful presence in China’s cyber affairs. Moreover, the development of the cybersecurity industry is significantly driven by the development of technological capabilities. Key issues explored include: 1) Chinese decision-making and thinking on cybersecurity development within the context of the Chinese leadership’s general approach to development, national security, and technology advancement; 2) the nature and characteristics of recent Chinese cybersecurityrelated development strategies and plans; 3) the drivers behind the development of China’s cybersecurity industry, looking especially at market failures, national security rationales, and government intervention; 4) the proliferation of principal actors and coalitions in the Chinese cybersecurity industry and how this influences its development; and 5) the nature of the relationship between the state and cybersecurity firms, in particular examining four types of interactions: the state as a customer; state hiring of talent; the state’s direct regulatory power, and the state as an investor. The paper concludes by considering the international implications of China’s rise as an increasingly capable and confident cybersecurity power.
  • Topic: Development, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Industry
  • Political Geography: China, Asia
  • Author: Paul Timmers
  • Publication Date: 09-2018
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: Berkeley APEC Study Center
  • Abstract: Since 2013, EU cybersecurity policy has quickly developed, with many implications of an industrial policy nature, even if there is no fully articulated EU cybersecurity industrial policy. In parallel, the private sector has organized itself to better respond to cybersecurity challenges, influence policy making, and benefit from the rapidly growing cybersecurity market. EU policymakers, within a mandate constrained by national security which is the remit of its Member States, have sought to make the EU Single Market, internal security, and external relations coherently address the rapidly evolving and uncertain world of cybersecurity. To do this, they use policy tools ranging from defining common political visions to written law. The EU model for political and practical cooperation of a large number of countries on shared public, economic, and security objective, serves as an example of wider international cooperation, providing insight on positioning cybersecurity industrial policy in a wider policy context, defining governance for related policy development, and suggesting an international agenda
  • Topic: Science and Technology, European Union, Cybersecurity, Private Sector, Industry
  • Political Geography: Europe
  • Author: Danilo D'Elia
  • Publication Date: 09-2018
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: Berkeley APEC Study Center
  • Abstract: The 2008 ‘White Paper on Defense and National Security’ was the first major document to focus directly on national cyber threats as a key risk to France’s sovereignty. It defined new priorities – such as cyberattack prevention and response – and established, in July 2009, the National Agency for the Security of Information System (ANSSI) as an inter-ministerial agency with national authority for the defense of information systems. In 2013, a new version of the White Paper reiterated that the capacity to detect and protect against cyberattacks was ‘an essential component of [French’s] national sovereignty and economic well-being’. The same year, the French government launched an ambitious program and invested considerable efforts and expenditure on cybersecurity industrial policy. This article captures structural characteristics of public-private partnerships and stylizes the different conflicts behind the industrial movements in the 2009-2015 period: representation of digital sovereignty versus corporate interest in global market, national defense champions versus start-up ecosystem.
  • Topic: Industrial Policy, Cybersecurity, Geopolitics, Risk, Territory
  • Political Geography: Europe, France
  • Author: Benjamin Bartlett
  • Publication Date: 09-2018
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: Berkeley APEC Study Center
  • Abstract: This paper explores Japan’s industrial policy toward cyber security. I begin by describing the perceived market failures with regard to cyber security, and the Japanese government’s rationales for intervention. Next, I briefly describe the institutions involved in Japan’s cyber security policy-making. I follow by discussing three models of Japanese intervention: government as provider, government as facilitator, and government as promoter. Then, I examine the factors that have led to this particular constellation of measures. Finally, I look at the effectiveness of these measures as well as make some concluding remarks about likely future trends.
  • Topic: Government, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Public Policy
  • Political Geography: Japan, Asia
  • Author: Melissa Griffith
  • Publication Date: 09-2018
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: Berkeley APEC Study Center
  • Abstract: Finland, at the easternmost border of the European Union (EU), has set itself apart as a global leader in cybersecurity technology. However, there is a distinction between the presence of technical expertise and the effective deployment of that technology throughout industry, government, and the broader civilian population. This broader deployment is essential because for advanced industrial economies, the ability to protect and defend their use of cyberspace is just as vital to a flourishing economy as it is to mounting an effective national defence. How has Finland leveraged existing cybersecurity expertise in a manner that protects both civilian and government use of cyberspace? The government has approached this task by utilizing an existing logic for market intervention: Finland’s geopolitical position and its corresponding defence doctrine’s emphasis on defence of society by maintaining society-wide resilience in the event of a crisis. In comprehensive security (kokonaisturvallisuus), which includes cybersecurity, the responsibility for and the safeguarding of the vital functions of society are jointly held by private and public actors, industry and government, defence forces and citizens. Given this focus on industry and civil society’s role within the provision of security, Finland’s approach is well suited to the realities of addressing cybersecurity.
  • Topic: Security, Defense Policy, Markets, Cybersecurity, Geopolitics, Industry
  • Political Geography: Europe, Finland
  • Author: Hsini Huang, Tien-Shen Li
  • Publication Date: 09-2018
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: Berkeley APEC Study Center
  • Abstract: Viewing cyber security as a matter of national security, the Taiwanese government established the National Information and Communication Security Taskforce (the Taskforce) in 2001 to actively implement ICT security infrastructure policies and strengthen national capacity against threats to the country’s increasing cyber security issues. A series of national strategy programs and action plans followed the founding of the Taskforce and were carried out over the last fifteen years. Authorities in Taiwan are deliberating over the draft of “Information and Communication Management Act (ICM Act)” in response to the increasing awareness of potential malicious cyberattacks targeting the public and private sector. Under this Act, both government and nongovernment bodies will have to comply with the new legislation with the hope that the coded regulations and new management scheme will have a positive impact on enhancing national security and increasing the domestic market. This article aims to provide a thorough review of the proposed national information security policies in Taiwan between 2001 and 2017, as well as deliver a case for the comparative study of industrial policies employed to bolster domestic cyber security markets.1 By summarizing the government’s industrial policy in developing a cyber security market and identifying key stakeholders involved in the policy-making process, we describe the major rationale and drivers behind the government’s plan of action and aim to push for a more comprehensive understanding of the proposed policy tools used by the authorities to boost the development of the cyber security industry in Taiwan.
  • Topic: National Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity
  • Political Geography: Taiwan, Asia
  • Author: Madeline Carr, Leonie Tanczer
  • Publication Date: 09-2018
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: Berkeley APEC Study Center
  • Abstract: The UK has the largest internet economy in the G20 and has the stated ambition of making the UK the ‘safest place in the world to live and work online’. Cyber security has been elevated to a ‘tier one’ threat and is regarded by the government as both a challenge and as an opportunity for exporting UK expertise. Since the publication of the UK’s National Cyber Security Strategy (NCSS) in November 2011, the government has implemented many proactive as well as reactive measures to enhance both its cyber security capabilities as well as its market power. This article provides an analysis of the shift away from a reliance on market forces that dominated Western approaches to cyber security over the early years of this century. Specifically, it highlights three ‘market failures’ that have prompted UK policy responses: ongoing data breaches, the skills gap and inadequate private investment in cyber security. An analysis of these drivers as well as the responses demonstrates that the UK’s cyber security strategy has evolved from an initial heavy reliance on market forces and the public-private partnership to mitigate against threats into what is now a confident, rounded approach to balancing threats and opportunities.
  • Topic: Government, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity
  • Political Geography: United Kingdom, Europe
  • Author: Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, Soraya Kamali-Nafar
  • Publication Date: 09-2018
  • Content Type: Policy Brief
  • Institution: Women In International Security (WIIS)
  • Abstract: For over 30 years, Women In International Security (WIIS) has worked to advance the role of women in national and international security. While much progress has been made, the number of women occupying prominent positions in foreign and defense policy remains limited. As a result, the role of women in decision making in foreign and defense policies is under-developed. Indeed, while women constitute 40 percent of the Foreign Service officer corps, they hold only one-third of the chief of mission positions.1 Women make up 33 percent of the Department of Defense civilian staff and 18 percent of the DOD active duty officer corps, and they remain grossly under-represented at the highest ranks—less than 8 percent have the rank of general or flag officer.2 Women also remain under-represented as expert commentators in the media. Women accounted for just 24 percent of foreign affairs and national security experts invited to speak on major political talk shows.3 Manels— that is, event panels with only men—remain common in the United States, including in Washington, DC.4
  • Topic: Gender Issues, Intelligence, National Security, Women, Think Tanks
  • Political Geography: United States
  • Author: Pearl Karuhanga Atuhaire, Grace Ndirangu
  • Publication Date: 03-2018
  • Content Type: Policy Brief
  • Institution: Women In International Security (WIIS)
  • Abstract: The international community has taken a strong stance against conflict-related sexual violence, deeming it a war crime. However, international actors are paying scant attention to sexual- and gender-based violence (SGBV) in refugee settings. Urban refugee women and girls and those in refugee camps often grapple with SGBV in their countries of asylum, long after they have fled their homes and communities. Our research among refugees from the Democratic Republic of Congo currently in Kenya and Uganda has unearthed a high incidence of SGBV against refugee women and girls. Research by the International Rescue Committee (IRC) indicates that one in five refugee and displaced women experience sexual violence. Many of the survivors often have no one to turn to for protection and resort to sex work and other risky means to survive. In this policy brief, we examine the extent of the problem, identify obstacles to progress, and recommend actions governments and humanitarian organizations can take to better protect refugees. In short, we argue that refugee settlements are not safe spaces for refugee women. Humanitarian officials, governments, and the international community must do more to address this problem.
  • Topic: Gender Issues, Women, Gender Based Violence , Violence, Sexual Violence
  • Political Geography: Uganda, Kenya, Africa