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8641. China, climate change and the energy transition

Author:
Professor Xu Yi-Chong
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
This report surveys China’s enormous energy transition to renewables. It begins by sketching the energy challenges China faces and its climate-change-related energy policies, in the context of the global geopolitics of the energy transformation. Next the report focuses on conventional energy sources (oil and natural gas), followed by electricity, and energy technologies. Although the report is intended primarily to survey developments to date, it concludes with some brief observations about the considerable energy challenges China faces in the years ahead.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Development, Energy Policy, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:
China and Asia

8642. China, climate and conflict in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Anastasia Kapetas
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
This paper surveys the current reporting and analysis on climate and security to explore the implications that climate change may have for China’s ability to prosecute its security goals in the region’s three major hotspots: the SCS, Taiwan and the India–China border conflict. Those three hotspots all involve longstanding border and territorial disputes between China and other nations and may draw in various levels of US involvement should China continue to escalate tensions.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

8643. Quad Technology Business and Investment Forum outcomes report

Author:
ASPI
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The Quad has prioritised supporting and guiding investment in critical and emerging technology projects consistent with its intent to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific. Governments cannot do this alone. Success requires a concerted and coordinated effort between governments, industry, private capital partners and civil society. To explore opportunities and challenges to this success, the Quad Critical and Emerging Technology Working Group convened the inaugural Quad Technology Business and Investment Forum in Sydney, Australia on 2 December 2022. The forum was supported by the Australian Department of Home Affairs and delivered by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI). The forum brought together senior Quad public- and private-sector leaders, laid the foundations for enhanced private–public collaboration and canvassed a range of practical action-oriented initiatives. Sessions were designed to identify the key challenges and opportunities Quad member nations face in developing coordinated strategic, targeted investment into critical and emerging technology. Attendees of the forum overwhelmingly endorsed the sentiment that, with our governments, industry, investors and civil society working better together, collectively, our countries can lead the world in quantum technology, artificial intelligence, biotechnology and other critical and emerging technologies. This report reflects the discussions and key findings from the forum and recommends that the Quad Critical and Emerging Technology Working Group establish an Industry Engagement Sub-Group to develop and deliver a Quad Critical and Emerging Technology Forward Work Plan.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Alliance, and Quad Alliance
Political Geography:
Asia-Pacific

8644. Gaming public opinion: The CCP’s increasingly sophisticated cyber-enabled influence operations

Author:
Albert Zhang, Tilla Hoja, and Jasmine Latimore
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) embrace of large-scale online influence operations and spreading of disinformation on Western social-media platforms has escalated since the first major attribution from Silicon Valley companies in 2019. While Chinese public diplomacy may have shifted to a softer tone in 2023 after many years of wolf-warrior online rhetoric, the Chinese Government continues to conduct global covert cyber-enabled influence operations. Those operations are now more frequent, increasingly sophisticated and increasingly effective in supporting the CCP’s strategic goals. They focus on disrupting the domestic, foreign, security and defence policies of foreign countries, and most of all they target democracies. Currently—in targeted democracies—most political leaders, policymakers, businesses, civil society groups and publics have little understanding of how the CCP currently engages in clandestine activities online in their countries, even though this activity is escalating and evolving quickly. The stakes are high for democracies, given the indispensability of the internet and their reliance on open online spaces, free from interference. Despite years of monitoring covert CCP cyber-enabled influence operations by social-media platforms, governments, and research institutes such as ASPI, definitive public attribution of the actors driving these activities is rare. Covert online operations, by design, are difficult to detect and attribute to state actors. Social-media platforms and governments struggle to devote adequate resources to identifying, preventing and deterring increasing levels of malicious activity, and sometimes they don’t want to name and shame the Chinese Government for political, economic and/or commercial reasons.
Topic:
Public Opinion, Cybersecurity, Social Media, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

8645. Smooth sailing? Australia, New Zealand and the United States partnering in–and with–the Pacific islands

Author:
Joanne Wallis and Anna Powles
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Australia, New Zealand and the United States should help create an ASEAN-style forum for Pacific island nations to discuss security and manage geopolitical challenges. The call for a dialogue, modelled on the ASEAN regional forum, is one of several recommendations to improve security partnerships and coordination in the region, reducing the risk that the three countries trip over one another and lose sight of the Pacific’s own priorities as they deepen their Pacific ties out of strategic necessity amid China’s growing interest. While focussing on those three countries, this report stresses that wider partnerships should be considered, including with France, India, Japan, South Korea, the United Kingdom and European Union. The report states that the three countries will have to get used to greater Chinese involvement in the Pacific, even if they don’t accept it, much less like it.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Alliance, ASEAN, AUKUS, and ANZUS
Political Geography:
Australia, New Zealand, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

8646. Impactful mateship: Strengthening the US–Australia defence relationship through enhanced mutual understanding

Author:
Alan W. Throop
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
AUKUS, and the Australian Government’s release of the 2023 report of the Defence Strategic Review (DSR), reinforce to Canberra and Washington DC that there’s an urgent need to continue strengthening the US–Australia alliance. Those efforts underpin allied cooperation within the Indo-Pacific, which is an increasingly complex security environment. This report highlights 9 opportunities for both US and Australian defence decision-makers at a vital time in the relationship as it develops in complexity and builds towards the ambitions of AUKUS over the coming decade. A series of ‘quick wins’ for the US DoD are recommended, including arranging more training for inbound DoD personnel and conducting allied-centric training for relevant US-based action officers and planners at US headquarters. US DoD Funding should be provided for US action officers to visit Australia to build rapport with their counterparts and facilitate appreciation for the relationship in person. Broadly, US professional military education at every level should incorporate Australian Defence-centric views when appropriate, and the DoD can better leverage its US liaison network throughout Australia earlier in planning and when considering new initiatives. Recommended quick wins for Australian Defence to include further leveraging of US-based Australian Defence personnel and encouraging greater transparency with US counterparts regarding capacity. Enhanced transparency would provide maximum clarity on capacity challenges at all echelons, especially regarding the potential impacts of a future crisis within the Indo-Pacific. It’s also recommended that Australian Defence provide greater clarity regarding sovereignty and security concerns for the US DoD. Finally, this report also makes a major long-term recommendation that will require more resourcing, coordination and focus from US and Australian defence decision-makers, and that’s to establish and empower a US Forces Australia headquarters (USFOR-A) to synergise US DoD efforts with the Australian defence establishment. It’s inevitable that the US–Australia defence relationship will grow in scope and complexity. That will quickly outgrow and challenge the current coordination structure, which was built and implemented decades ago. This report also notes that there are lessons to be learned from the US–Japan bilateral coordination mechanisms, especially in the light of the US–Japan–Australia defence relationship, as it is set to grow in importance in the coming years.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Alliance, and AUKUS
Political Geography:
Australia, Australia/Pacific, and United States of America

8647. Chinese foreign policy in 2023: Stepping back from the brink

Author:
Thomas Eder
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
When it comes to Chinese foreign policy in 2023, decision-makers in Austria and Europe have to most importantly consider three partly interrelated and highly topical questions that are and should be preoccupying China researchers. Will China escalate its support for Russia during the war in Ukraine? Will China invade Taiwan? How will China’s protest movement and exit from Zero-COVID impact foreign policy? Further trends in China research will address the need to employ digital methods due to a lack of access for fieldwork (COVID or political restrictions) (BCCN 2022), the importance of protests more broadly (labour issues or Hong Kong democracy) (Wei and Chan 2022; Cheng et al 2022), and the fragility of a centralized system around Xi Jinping with no succession plan as Xi enters his third term as president in March 2023 (Tsang and Cheung 2021). Following Russia’s full invasion of Ukraine, Beijing has supported Moscow in the informational and diplomatic domain, but has remained self-interested in the economic domain, and has not shifted from previous policies in the military domain (Chestnut Greitens 2022, 751). China needs Russia as a partner in mounting a (normative) challenge to US power and the liberal international order (Johnston 2022, 1307), gaining influence in multilateral institutions (Wang and Sampson 2022, 374), and preserving the Communist Party regime (Pavel, Kirchberger and Sinjen 2022, 295). The Chinese leadership would like to see a Russian victory, and dreads a defeatinduced regime collapse in Moscow (Lo 2022). Beijing has condemned the West for provoking the war and for imposing sanctions. In the UN, China abstained or voted for Russia. At the same time, since the beginning of the war, bilateral trade has grown significantly. Yet, Chinese companies and banks have partly withdrawn or broken off ties with Russian counterparts to steer clear of secondary sanctions. Moreover, while joint military exercises continue, there is no clear evidence for arms or equipment deliveries.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Economy, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China and Asia

8648. East Asia’s Worsening Security Situation

Author:
Nina C. Krickel-Choi
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
2022 was not a good year for security in the Asia Pacific Region, with multiple crucial relationships hitting a new low, and 2023 does not promise to be much better. While all-out military confrontation is not likely, it is also not off the table and care needs to be taken that contingency events and hasty decisions do not trigger a full-blown escalation. The following highlights three of the most critical flashpoints: the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, and the reemergence of Cold War blocs in East Asia.
Topic:
Security, Military, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
East Asia and Asia

8649. Military recruitment and conscription in the 21st century

Author:
Sanna Strand
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
Military and security scholars have long argued for a trend in military recruitment policy and practice away from conscripted forces based on compulsory service towards professional forces based on voluntary service. Against the backdrop of dramatic societal changes and a new geopolitical order emerging after the end of the Cold War, the republican tradition of forcing young men to serve the nation in arms in exchange for citizenship not only seemed “out of date” (Haltiner 1998); mass armies composed of conscripted soldiers appeared increasingly redundant. Yet, in recent years, several countries in Eastern Europe and the Baltic Sea region have reintroduced compulsory national service systems as a repose to Russian military aggressions. We have also seen an upswing in presumably out-dated republican ideals; with France reintroducing a limited service scheme to improve national integration and cohesion (Gheciu 2020) and Qatar, Kuwait & the UAE all announcing male conscription as a means to foster a collective of productive and patriotic citizens (Barany 2018). These recent developments have led prominent voices to declare a “return” (Braw 2017) or “comeback” (The Economist 2021) of conscription.
Topic:
Politics, Geopolitics, Conscription, and Military
Political Geography:
Global Focus

8650. Trends in the Disengagement-, Rehabilitation-, and Risk-Assessment-Process of extremist and terrorist offenders

Author:
Daniela Pisoiu and Anna Maria Hirschhuber
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
The genuine reintegration of terrorist and extremist offenders is one of the biggest challenges of our times. Because in many cases, only an alleged reintegration into society takes place (u.a. Cherney, 2021; Jawaid, 2017). This mistake can cost lives as we have sadly seen in Vienna 2020. The Vienna attacker was in fact a terrorism recidivist, as he had already been convicted on terrorism counts (Lehberger et al. 2020). This is not just a problem specific to Austria, but it impacts a number of countries within and outside of Europe.
Topic:
Terrorism, Violent Extremism, Rehabilitation, and Deradicalization
Political Geography:
Europe and Austria