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8591. Salome’s Choice: Europe and Ivanishvili?

Author:
Emma Smeyers
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
While Georgian Dream (GD) has been attempting to normatively balance between the collective West and Russia for years, the latter’s re-invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 brought increased pressure on the ruling party— ultimately resulting in internal shifts among the elite, and bringing about party-wide discursive change. In the most high-profile case, President Salome Zurabishvili—for the first time since she took office in 2018—was seen openly defying the leadership, and directly contradicting the party line. She has since publicly engaged in several quarrels with the party’s leadership, with one causing the announcement of a lawsuit against her for alleged violations of the Constitution. Despite these disputes, Zurabishvili remains willing to side with Bidzina Ivanishvili, GD founder and former Prime Minister. She openly blamed GD leadership for taking insufficient measures to preemptively shield the oligarch from the possibility of personal sanctions. Zurabishvili’s sudden ‘turn’ against Georgian Dream, though creating some intrigue, remains unsystematically explored. This paper engages in a scenario-outlining exercise, wherein three potential explanations are presented. First, Zurabishvili’s ‘turn’ might have stemmed from valuebased disagreement, with the war in Ukraine revealing the incompatibility of the President’s and GD elites’ values. Second, her ‘turn’ could have been part of a communication strategy, orchestrated to create the illusion of a ‘fragmented leadership’ for public legitimation purposes. Finally, the possibility of patterns of intra-regime (dis)loyalty, alliance-forming, and elite defection being at play is explored. Such patterns are expected to supervene in informal, authoritarian modes of governance and are likely to supervene during heightened crises1 .
Topic:
Governance, Leadership, Domestic Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Caucasus, and Georgia

8592. Two Years Of Repression: Mapping Taliban Violence Targeting Civilians in Afghanistan

Author:
Asena Karacalti and Elliott Bynum
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
On 17 August 2021, two days after the fall of Kabul, the Taliban held a press conference promising amnesty for former government officials, respect for women’s rights, and freedom of the press.1 Nearly two years later, it is clear that the Taliban has upheld none of these promises, instead conducting a violent campaign of repression. Since the takeover, the Taliban has targeted former government and security officials, carried out collective punishments in areas where anti-Taliban groups have emerged, and imposed ultraconservative societal restrictions – especially on women and journalists – aimed at maintaining control. ACLED records over 1,000 incidents of violence targeting civilians by the Taliban between the fall of Kabul on 15 August 2021 and 30 June 2023, accounting for 62% of all attacks on civilians in the country. This places the Taliban regime in Afghanistan2 among the world’s top government or de facto state perpetrators of violence targeting civilians domestically since August 2021, behind only the military junta in Myanmar. As Taliban rule reaches the two-year mark, this report examines patterns of violence targeting civilians under the regime, with particular attention to the top four most targeted groups: former government and security officials, prisoners, women, and journalists. Taken together, the Taliban’s retaliatory attacks, use of collective punishment, and broad crackdown on women and the press reveal the scale and severity of repression ongoing in Afghanistan. In particular, this report analyzes the continued targeting of former government and security officials, as well as violence against civilians in the country’s northeast, where armed anti-Taliban groups have been active. Both former officials and resistance forces are subject to violence when detained by the Taliban, accounting for a large number of incidents of prisoner abuse recorded by ACLED. Moreover, this report highlights persistent violence against women who oppose a return to the “gender apartheid” of past Taliban rule.3 Women have responded to increased restrictions on their daily lives by holding protests against Taliban policies, with demonstrations featuring women4 nearly doubling in 2022 compared to 2021. Finally, the report concludes with an accounting of attacks on journalists, who remain among the most targeted groups in the Taliban’s Afghanistan – creating further challenges for documenting violence in the country under the new regime.
Topic:
Human Rights, Taliban, Women, Violence, Journalism, Civilians, and Collective Punishment
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and South Asia

8593. Fact Sheet: Crisis in Ethiopia’s Amhara Region

Author:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
Violence is escalating in Amhara region, prompting the government to declare a state of emergency Nearly 30 clashes between government forces and Fano militias were recorded in Amhara last week, with most concentrated in North Wello and West Gojam zones, though fighting has been spread throughout the region. This marks an almost eightfold increase in armed clashes in the region relative to the weekly average since the start of the crisis in April. While Amhara was among the least volatile regions in the country prior to the start of the northern Ethiopia conflict in 2021, it is now one of the most unstable. Persistent insecurity in Amhara poses a significant threat to the federal government, the Abiy administration, and Ethiopia’s stability at large.
Topic:
Security, Political Violence, Non State Actors, Armed Forces, and Instability
Political Geography:
Africa, Ethiopia, and Amhara

8594. Evolution of Multidimensional Energy Poverty Risk in Bolivia from 2005 to 2019

Author:
Javier Aliaga Lordemann and Sergio Mansilla
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Advanced Development Studies (INESAD)
Abstract:
“Energy poverty” is a multidimensional concept that reflects the need to achieve a variety of wellbeing outcomes, which has been scarcely studied and used in public policy agendas. Considering that the literature on energy poverty is still incipient in Bolivia, this paper’s objective is to generate evidence about energy poverty evolution in the country, approximating measures of incidence (risk) and severity for the period 2005-2019. The methodological approach follows the one proposed by Alkire & Foster (2011), with five equally weighted dimensions (energy expenditure, lighting, cooking fuel and indoor pollution, food equipment, and education and communication) and using different cut-off options, at the urban and rural levels. Also, Multidimensional Energy Poverty results are compared with a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) based weight structure as a robustness exercise. Results show that the risk of being energy poor in Bolivia has decreased, but not structurally. Also, intensity has decreased in both urban and rural areas, but rural energy poor households continue to show at least 50% of deprivation in all dimensions evaluated.
Topic:
Development, Poverty, Rural, and Energy
Political Geography:
South America and Bolivia

8595. Little substance, considerable impact Russian influence in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro

Author:
Wouter Zweers and Niels Drost
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
This Clingendael report explores the role of the Russian Federation in Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. It examines Russia’s objectives in its relations with the three countries, as well the various sources of influence the Kremlin holds in each of the three countries. The report places this analysis within the changed geopolitical circumstances resulting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s main objectives for the Western Balkans are threefold. First, the Kremlin seeks to project great power status globally. Second, it seeks to obstruct the Euro-Atlantic integration of the region by advocating against NATO and EU integration and by raising instabilities. Third, the Kremlin uses the Balkans, especially the Kosovo issue, as an argument for its foreign policy agenda elsewhere, particularly when it comes to defending its perceived dominance over its near abroad. Instead of building a sustainable, all-encompassing, and meaningful relation with Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), and Montenegro, Russia instead pursues an opportunistic approach depending on fragmented entry points for influence in each country. The Kremlin displays moderate ambitions for building positive relationships with the three countries, which is reflected also in the instruments it uses to influence the region. It nurtures contacts with, and influence through, a wide range of individual politicians, the Orthodox Church, the media and malign proxy groups, making use of energy links as well as local tensions and historical memories. Moscow pursues this approach deliberately, and it has proven relatively successful. At the political level, Russia’s clout stretches especially to (pro-)Serb politicians, who often make use of similar narratives and use Russia as an external supporter to promote their own ideas. In particular, its position on Kosovo, Russian support for Republika Srpska leader Milorad Dodik and its Orthodox Church links remain important entry points for Russia’s political influence in the region at large. Of the three countries, entry points for Russian influence are most widespread In Serbia, followed by Bosnia and Herzegovina. Economically, Russia’s influence is outperformed substantially by that of the EU, especially in terms of trade. Russia’s far-reaching influence in the energy sectors of BiH and Serbia, however, yield substantial political leverage, even if its investments often prove economically inviable. When it comes to military influence, Russia seeks to maintain its military cooperation with its main partner, Serbia, while also supporting the militarisation of Republika Srpska. Belgrade is satisfied with its current degree of cooperation with Moscow but seeks to avoid becoming Russia’s foothold in the Balkans. Factually, Russia is only one of multiple security actors in the Balkans, overshadowed by NATO and challenged by China. While presenting itself as a partner to Serbia and Republika Srpska in particular, Russia also resorts to malign instruments which have often proven to be effective in shaping the political environment of the Western Balkans. Lacking a military presence in the region, Russia supports far-right nationalist figures and organisations, which generally better resemble organised crime groups than paramilitary organisations, to attain its goal of destabilisation by stirring up polarisation and anti-Western sentiment. The Kremlin is perhaps most successful in the field of media and disinformation. Russian propaganda penetrates Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina through Russian-funded portals, local media and social media. Russian disinformation and narratives have penetrated the region to such an extent that considerable sections of society hold a positive image of Russia and its political leadership. In all these fields, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has moderately affected but not fully altered Russia’s approach towards Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro. While the invasion has led to sharper dividing lines between Russia and the West and decreases in Russian financial and diplomatic capacities, we observe continuity in terms of Russian strategies and objectives. Russia’s sources of influence in the three countries have been moderately strained, among other causes as a result of BiH and Serbia’s first steps to diversify energy sources and Western pressure to diminish their political and security links with the Russian Federation. For the time being, this has not yet affected Moscow’s ability to act as a spoiler to the Euro-Atlantic integration of the three countries. The extent to which the European Union and NATO are effective in countering Russian influence in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro will be part of a follow-up Clingendael report to be published in fall 2023. As part of the same research project, analyses of societal and political perceptions towards Russia in the three countries will be published in summer 2023 by Clingendael partners the Atlantic Council of Montenegro, the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, and the Atlantic Initiative in BiH.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, Disinformation, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Eastern Europe, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina

8596. Digital Dichotomy: Opportunities and Challenges of Digitalization in Fragile Settings

Author:
Moneera Yassien
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
This policy brief examines the implications of digitalization in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations (FCS). Digitalization has a transformative potential but simultaneously presents distinctive challenges, particularly in FCS characterized by infrastructural limitations, weak governance, and socio-economic disparities. The OECD identifies digitalisation as one of the intensifying factors for the growing inequality between FCS and the rest of the world. However, in FCS the story extends beyond inequalities between countries to inequalities within countries which are more critical for the FCS context as inequalities exacerbate fragility and conflict. This brief highlights three points. The first point explores the dual impact of digitalization on FCS business environments. Digital tools can overcome infrastructure barriers, thereby fostering economic growth and enhancing market dynamics through increased transparency. However, digital technologies create information asymmetry, resulting in widening the gap between those who can participate in the digital economy and those who are left behind, subsequently exacerbating socio-economic inequalities, fostering exploitative working conditions, and potentially escalating instability in fragile and conflict-affected regions.The second point focuses on the labour markets, where digitalization through the online gig economy can create job opportunities and improve labour mobility. However, it can also undermine labour protection and contribute to wage disparity and issues relating to workers’ rights, accentuating inequality and exclusion, particularly in FCS. The third part investigates the role of digitalization in Communications and Information Security. Digital tools can empower communities to resist oppressive regimes but can also be exploited for surveillance and censorship, fuelling conflict and exacerbating social tensions. The brief concludes with policy recommendations aimed at integrating digital inclusion principles in FCS strategies, emphasizing equitable digital initiatives, and adopting conflict-sensitive and equitable digital policies. The recommendations underscore the need for a balanced approach to digitalization, fostering innovation while providing protection from contributing to fragility and conflict.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Fragile/Failed State, Business, Digitalization, and Inclusion
Political Geography:
Global Focus

8597. Promoting diaspora investment in fragile settings: The case of Somalia

Author:
Guido Lanfranchi
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
This policy brief analyses the extent to which diaspora investment can support economic development and livelihoods, with a particular focus on fragile settings. Using the case study of Somalia, the brief explores some of the main advantages and risks associated with this tool. On the one hand, diaspora investment can channel finance into productive activities in the diaspora’s country of origin, supporting the creation of revenue streams, while also generating returns for diaspora investors. On the other hand, particularly in fragile settings, these investments can also undermine social cohesion and even increase the likelihood of violent conflict, especially if they are channelled along identity lines. On the basis of this analysis, the brief offers the following recommendations to donor governments interested in promoting diaspora investment in Somalia and beyond: (i) to ensure effectiveness, donors should gather comprehensive, in-depth data on the needs and preferences of both potential investors in the diaspora and investees in the country of origin; (ii) to avoid exacerbating tensions and conflict, donors should be as inclusive and transparent as possible in their engagement with stakeholders, most notably in the selection of beneficiaries; (iii) any efforts to promote diaspora investment in fragile settings should be grounded in a thorough understanding of the specific context in which they are implemented, in order to understand both the economic and political implications of such investment.
Topic:
Economics, Politics, Diaspora, Investment, and Fragility
Political Geography:
Africa and Somalia

8598. The New Iraqi Opposition: The anti-establishment movement after the 2021 elections

Author:
Marsin Alshamary
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
At the start of Iraq’s longest government formation process in October 2021, one key question on everyone’s mind was whether Iraq might get its first majoritarian government. The Sadrist Movement tried for months, but ultimately Muqtada Al-Sadr conceded defeat by calling on his MPs to resign. The result was another consensus government with all the traditional political parties sharing the spoils, minus the Sadrists. A second key question on everyone’s mind was whether a genuine parliamentary opposition could develop in Iraq given the election of many independent MPs and the rise of reformist parties. This brief outlines the conditions needed for such a parliamentary opposition to emerge, discusses both technical and political elements, and analyses the challenges facing the ‘new Iraqi opposition’, i.e. veteran independent politicians, civil society activists and even former members of established parties. It argues that a sound electoral environment, unification of reformist parties and a higher turnout can contribute to making meaningful opposition a reality, which is needed to confront Iraq’s collusive democracy.
Topic:
Elections, Domestic Politics, Muqtada al-Sadr, and Opposition
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

8599. The war in Ukraine: Adapting the EU’s security and defence policy

Author:
Dick Zandee and Adaja Stoetman
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Russia’s war in Ukraine is violating the rules-based international order and poses a significant threat to European security. The EU and NATO have responded by taking coordinated action. The measures taken have varied from unprecedented sanctions on Russia to assisting Ukraine with the delivery of arms and ammunition. The war in Ukraine has led to an even stronger focus on collective defence, which was already put in motion after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Furthermore, the European security architecture has witnessed a significant change with Finland (and later this year Sweden) joining the North Atlantic Alliance. At the Vilnius Summit (11-12 July 2023), NATO has taken new decisions to strengthen its deterrence and defence posture
Topic:
NATO, European Union, International Order, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

8600. Time to change track Assessing the UN’s conflict mediation strategy for Syria from 2019 to 2023

Author:
Malik al-Abdeh and Lars Hauch
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The United Nations (UN) has become largely irrelevant to diplomatic efforts to resolve the Syria conflict. This report shows that the primary reason has been the fact that the main conflict parties never wanted to resolve the Syrian conflict by other than military means. Yet, the report also highlights secondary reasons within this unfavourable context, namely: the frames, methods and choices of the UN Special Envoy and his team at times misjudged or poorly corresponded with the realities of the conflict. Moreover, the capacity of the Office of the Special Envoy (OSE) remained too limited. The report suggests that the time is ripe for the OSE to reinvent itself as a principled thought leader and to develop an operational framework that brings a safe, calm and neutral environment (SCNE) closer as a practical conflict management modality.
Topic:
Diplomacy, United Nations, Syrian War, and Mediation
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria