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7901. Nigeria’s 2023 Election: Democratic Development and Political Fragmentation

Author:
Sa'eed Husaini
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Nigerians will go to the polls on February 25 to elect a new president and members of the National Assembly. This marks the 7th in an unbroken sequence of presidential elections held since the country’s return to democracy in 1999. With President Muhammadu Buhari unable to compete in the election having served two full terms, the unpopular ruling All Progressives Congress (APC) party will face a formidable challenge, not only from its traditional rival, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), but also from an unprecedented ‘third party’ challenger – a previously marginal but now surging Labour Party. This paper analyzes Nigeria’s 2023 election not only in the context of this unique partisan configuration, but also considering the wider set of factors that will, in all probability, influence the organization and the outcome of the election. These factors include the preparedness of the Independent National Electoral Commission and especially its capacity to properly deploy its newly acquired biometric and result transmission technologies. In addition, the analysis explores the ways in which the voting process and result will also reflect the limitations and risks imposed by Nigeria’s current climate of chronic insecurity, resulting from active armed militia and criminal groups operating across nearly all regions, but particularly in the Northeast, Southeast, and South-south. Insecurity has likewise coincided with rising elite polarization and the breakdown of the “zoning’ consensus ahead of the election, elevating the importance of identitarian political rhetoric in the campaigns. While insecurity appears likely to contribute to the trend of declining voter turnouts observed in previous elections, the apparent increase in political interest, particularly among young voters, as reflected in the spike in the collection of voters cards ahead of the election might mark a countervailing trend. Against this backdrop, the paper also considers the major parties, candidates, their political projects as well as their target constituencies. It finds that the parties articulated moderately divergent emphases while remaining largely consonant on the contentious economic questions of the period. It also considers possible elections scenarios that may result from the varying institutional and political characteristics of the main parties. Ultimately, it finds that the 2023 poll will represent the continued evolution of Nigerian electoral institutions and political participation in a context of lingering social division and insecurity.
Topic:
Development, Democracy, Political Parties, Presidential Elections, and Fragmentation
Political Geography:
Africa and Nigeria

7902. How the War in Ukraine is Changing the Space Game

Author:
Guilhem Penent and Guillaume Schlumberger
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The war in Ukraine has become a showcase for the new commercial paradigm emerging in the space sector (New Space). As such, it seems to confirm the relevance of adaptation efforts led by the United States – more specifically the Pentagon – since the mid-2010s. Thus, it highlights ongoing transformations and announces potential disruptions in the exploitation of orbits, particularly in the fields of satellite connectivity and remote sensing. It also shapes future tensions, while the structuring of international relations around the two poles constituted by the United States and China raises questions about the consequences on the safe, sustainable, secure, and stable use of space. With these developments, Europe is faced with the challenge of remaining relevant.
Topic:
International Relations, European Union, Space, Satellite, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

7903. Japan and the Pacific Islands Countries. Longstanding Strategic Interests, Recent Strategic Engagement

Author:
Celine Pajon
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Japan has recently stepped up its engagement with the Pacific Island Countries (PICs), building on its historical ties and strategic interests in the region. The wealth of these territories in fishery resources and raw materials, the crucial importance of the maritime routes, and the strategic geographical location of PICs in the context of Sino-American rivalry have been key factors behind Tokyo's expanding engagement. Despite these strategic interests, the cooperation with the PICs in the postwar era up until the emergence of the Indo-Pacific narrative has been quite fragmented, reflecting the rather low priority given to the region, the multiplicity of the objectives pursued, and the diversity of engaged actors. Nevertheless, the Japan-Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM) process initiated in 1997 provided an innovative multilateral framework to coordinate with the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) over economic cooperation, improve Japan’s communications and iron out tensions, starting with nuclear. The incorporation of the PICs into Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision cements their position in Tokyo’s efforts to preserve a rules-based international order and counterbalance China’s growing influence. Security issues of Asia have thus started to appear on the agenda of the PALM Summits. In addition, Japan has stepped up its cooperation with its closest allies and partners – the US and Australia – as part of the operationalization of a FOIP in Oceania. Finally, a major provider of development aid, Tokyo has also become a diplomatic and security partner for the Pacific Islands. Japan has stepped up naval diplomacy and defense dialogues in the region, in addition to being very active in maritime capacity-building, as well as humanitarian aid and disaster relief assistance. Despite the rise of Japanese cooperation, which is now truly multidimensional and strategic, Tokyo's ability to influence the Pacific islands and in particular to counterbalance China remains to be seen. Indeed, the PICs feel little concerned by major geopolitical projects and are careful not to create enemies. With the US and its other partners increasing their presence in the area, there is a strong impetus for Japan to reinvest in the Pacific. However, Tokyo has yet to develop a formal strategy or vision for the region. This could be announced at the next PALM summit in 2024, which will mark the 10th iteration of this meeting and could be a significant milestone.
Topic:
Development, Cooperation, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, Indo-Pacific, and Pacific Islands

7904. Reshuffling Value Chains - South Korea as a Case Study

Author:
Françoise Nicolas
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Despite all the talks about the reshuffling of value-chains and the trend to a form of industrial “Desinicization” (or decoupling/disengagement from China), the example of South Korea does not vindicate such assertions. The expansion of Korean direct investment in neighboring countries such as China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) remains a reality and it has not changed in any fundamental way over the past two decades. South Korean companies’ decisions to locate in one country rather than another are still very much based on cost factors, even if security considerations are increasingly factored in. Similarly, reshoring, which has been high on the South Korean government’s agenda for a long time, remains a marginal phenomenon for South Korean companies, despite the incentives provided. Rather than the relocation of production (in the form of reshoring or nearshoring) South Korean companies have turned to more unexpected options, such as the development of complementarity-based partnerships or vertically-integrated production networks with commodity suppliers, as in the case of the production of rare earth-based magnets. Such a strategy is likely to become more popular in the future, as it nicely combines economic and security considerations. Without a doubt, due to the highly politicized nature of the technology involved, the semiconductor industry is the one undergoing the most significant changes. In a context of rising Sino-US rivalry, the US has ramped up pressures on China with far-reaching consequences, leading South Korean semiconductor companies (with the support of the government) to engage in a strategy combining relocation to the US and onshoring in South Korea. While the economic logic is likely to prevail in most sectors thus limiting the scope for supply chain reshuffling, the examples of the semiconductor and rare earth-based magnets suggest that important changes can still be expected in the future in industries that are deemed strategic.
Topic:
Foreign Direct Investment, Supply Chains, Value Chains, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
China, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

7905. The Europeanisation of the Energy Transition in Central and Eastern EU Countries: An Uphill Battle that Can Be Won

Author:
Diana-Paula Gherasim
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Russia’s war in Ukraine, and the brutal decoupling from Russian fossil fuels, is a game changer for the Central and Eastern Europe region which was still heavily dependent on Russia for its energy supply. There are still a few oil, gas, and nuclear fuel supplies, but the sharp decline, and search for alternatives, lead to a shift in paradigm: deploying low-carbon technologies and energy efficiency is now a matter of national security and economic security. Hence, following the 2022 energy crisis, the understanding that the European Union’s (EU) energy security of supply means an acceleration in phasing out fossil fuels and deploying clean energies has become the newest European acquis in energy policy, increasing the importance of the Green Deal at EU, national and local levels. The risk that a carbon wall would be erected within Europe between the West and the Central and Eastern European Member States (CEECs) is no more valid. The concept of Europeanization is at the core of the analysis of the energy transition in the CEECs. The progress on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction observed in these Member States (MS) can be considered as a success of the Europeanization process in this region, as its timing coincides with the implementation of the 2020 agenda for climate and energy, to the establishment of which these countries were part of. Moreover, the Clean Energy Package and the Green Deal seem to have been successful in putting in place a mechanism of cognitive framing pertaining to the Europeanization toolbox, by setting a framework for all Europeans to move in the same direction, of a cleaner and healthier way of living, independently of their starting point. Given the status quo in the ten CEECs, the new ambitious objectives regarding transport decarbonization will translate into important transformation costs for the region, which in turn could increase the risk of renegotiation attempts, as the circular Europeanization theory predicts. The acknowledgment at the EU level that the transition must be just to succeed is one instance of bottom-up Europeanization, where the challenges brought forward by specific Member States shaped the European energy transition agenda and discourse. Large financial support for this end was a first condition for CEECs to support the climate neutrality agenda. The second condition is that CEECs plan to replace their coal fleet at least partially with nuclear power, be they reactor capacity expansions, lifetime extensions, large new reactors, or small modular reactors (SMRs). The third condition has been securing a role for the use of natural gas for the transition, which in 2022 turned out to be a costly choice. With the crisis, CEECs have all taken on board the necessity to boost renewables as a tool to rapidly decrease dependence on imported fossil fuels, to meet the 2030 targets, prepare for the progressive phase-out of free emission allowances while awaiting the new nuclear generation capacities due from 2035 onwards. This strategy is also supported by public opinion, while it remains to be seen how public acceptance of SMRs will be. This gives the CEE region a strong joint interest to push for the inclusion of nuclear energy in EU legislations, alongside France. On gas, countries have switched to liquefied natural gas (LNG) and diversified their pipeline supplies, and where possible, try to boost the domestic supply of natural gas and soon, biomethane. Although being relatively far from alternative gas entry points means that for some CEECs Russia remains, to a certain extent, a necessity, this cannot be used as an excuse for undermining EU unity and should push towards harder EU-level reflections on energy solidarity on which some progress was done during the 2022 energy crisis. It remains to be seen if a new line of fragmentation will not appear between Germany and Austria on the one hand and the CEEs on the other: following the Nord Stream betrayal and denial by Germany of Polish energy security concerns for example, CEECs are concerned about the extraterritorial outreach of Germany’s nuclear phase-out policies, and of Austria’s continued systemic opposition to nuclear. This plays in the hand of the United States, which is the ultimate gatekeeper to pressure Germany and secure the energy technology choices of CEECs through the export of US technologies. Of note is also the shared concern now over the dependence on Russian nuclear fuels and equipment, and efforts to reduce this. A last source of possible tensions comes from some new gas infrastructure investments which can strengthen resilience but risk locking in gas much longer than the EU trajectory allows for. Beyond nuclear energy, however, the interest in accelerating the deployment of renewables, and the concern over a just transition, the note shows that there is little in common between the CEECs which have all their specificities. Last but not least, this note argues that a new risk of fragmentation may emerge, related to the localization of innovation and the volume of state aids and subsidies to industries. While some CEECs appear to be a frontrunner in the deployment of battery cell gigafactories, their financial and budgetary capacities are much more limited compared to Western MSs, and their ability to develop comprehensive, coherent climate plans, and to mobilize EU tools and funding, is also limited. Without an EU Sovereignty Fund, the region will find it hard to keep pace with EU’s objectives in the Net-Zero Industry Act and the Critical Raw Materials Act due to limited fiscal space to be leveraged for state aid purposes, despite more favorable conditions.
Topic:
European Union, Renewable Energy, Fossil Fuels, Transition, and Energy
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, and Central Europe

7906. Balancing Security and Innovation: Opposition's View on Turkey's Digital Policies

Author:
Mesut Özcan and Ussal Şahbaz
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections in Turkey on May 14, 2023, are expected to be closely contested. Polls suggest that the ruling AK Party-led People’s Alliance will lose its majority in parliament, resulting in a hung lower house. This would create an opportunity for multiparty dialogue and temporary alliances on specific policy issues, leading to legislation that is the result of multiparty bargaining rather than the agenda of a dominant party. Against this backdrop, it is crucial to understand the Turkish opposition’s views on a variety of policy issues, with digital policies being a particularly underexplored one. At the intersection of political, economic, and technological issues, digital policies are regulations that have to adapt to a rapidly changing landscape of technological advances on a global scale. Turkey, as a regional power and an upper-middle-income economy, has attempted to take advantage of technological innovations to further promote economic growth and national security purposes. However, the AK Party government's efforts have been met with skepticism from opposition groups as they have fallen short of protecting individual rights and freedoms online. The study is organized into four sections, with an analysis of the political situation on the eve of the upcoming elections, a description of the technological ecosystem in Turkey, an analysis of the evolution of digital policies in Turkey under the AK Party’s successive governments, and a detailed overview of the main opposition parties' digital policy positions. This study thus provides insight into the future of digital policies in Turkey and the potential impact of the upcoming elections on this pivotal issue.
Topic:
Governance, Elections, Digital Economy, Internet, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
Political Geography:
Turkey and Middle East

7907. China in the Race to Low Earth Orbit: Perspectives on the future internet constellation Guowang

Author:
Marc Julienne
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
In April 2021, the Chinese government officially, but rather quietly, established a new state-owned enterprise (SOE) named China SatNet. Its mission: build out China’s “mega-constellation” program for low Earth orbiting internet satellites, known as Guowang (“national network”). Several scattered programs had already been launched in China since 2018, and the establishment of this new SOE appears aimed at streamlining and accelerating the development and deployment of the future national constellation. China's goal is to position itself in the highly strategic sector that is space-based broadband mobile telecommunication networks, so far dominated by the American SpaceX and its Starlink constellation. These constellations promise significant commercial and military outcomes that have aroused the interest of states. In this field, Beijing lags behind SpaceX, but demonstrates a fierce determination to catch up and compete with its rivals. China has already registered a request with the International Telecommunications Union to put 12,992 satellites into orbit, or roughly 1,000 more than what has so far been authorized for Starlink. To achieve its goals, China relies on traditional aerospace and telecommunications SOEs, and now on the newcomer China SatNet. It also relies on an emerging ecosystem of companies and start-ups (GalaxySpace in particular), and encourages local governments to build production parks for the space industry and new launch centers across the country. China is thus gearing up to achieve its ambitions, but will nevertheless have to face multiple challenges, including the financing of its industry in a constrained economic context, the development of a viable business model which has not yet been proven elsewhere, and above all, the growing strategic and technological rivalry with the United States.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Internet, Space, and Satellite
Political Geography:
China and Asia

7908. No Water’s Edge: Russia’s Information War and Regime Security

Author:
Gavin Wilde and Justin Sherman
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
To the extent that any unified theory of Russian information warfare actually exists, its core tenet might well be that regime security has historically been indivisible from information warfare in Russian strategic thought. Rather than an aggressive or expansionist expression of Moscow’s foreign policy, the Kremlin’s so-called information war should primarily be viewed through a domestic and regime security prism—it’s as much a counterinsurgency as an expeditionary strategy, less an escalation than a projection. Analysts and decisionmakers should therefore avoid reflexively casting the United States and the West as Russia’s primary antagonists in its information war, as doing so risks reinforcing these insecurities and exaggerating Moscow’s degree of power in the information ecosystem.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Information Warfare, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and United States of America

7909. European Democracy Support Annual Review 2022

Author:
Richard Youngs, Elena Ventura, Ken Godfrey, Erin Jones, and Zselyke Csaky
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The need to defend democratic values from violent attack was the dominant theme of 2022. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February made democracy’s defense a priority of the highest geopolitical as well as normative order. It propelled commitments to protect democracy to the top of the agenda for Europe, internally as well as in foreign and security policy. European powers responded and a common line gained currency that the war had pulled them through a watershed conversion in their strategic outlook. However, in a year dominated by the imperative of defending democracy, European policies specifically aimed at supporting democracy evolved in only understated fashion. While these policies were adjusted in important ways to the new context, Europe shifted gear much less in this area than in others. In 2021, the European Democracy Hub published the first annual review of European democracy support.1 This second review aims to provide an empirical overview of European democracy support policies in 2022. The review covers policies, strategies, and initiatives at the level of the European Union (EU) as well as those of its member states and of non-EU European countries active in democracy support (Norway, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom). It presents information on European efforts to defend and strengthen democracy around the world while highlighting their shortcomings. The aim is to inform debates about policies geared toward upholding democracy internationally. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine dominated European policy debates in 2022 in many ways. This review examines the democracy-related consequences of the invasion and of the geopolitical changes it unleashed. Western leaders framed the invasion as a threat not only to Ukraine but also to democratic norms and the rules-based order more widely, and as such it galvanized EU institutions and European governments into new commitments to defend democracy. However, these commitments were far from being the main policy responses; for all the rhetoric about a new struggle to defend democratic values, many elements of European democracy policy were second-order priorities. And, in some ways, the security aspects of the strategic landscape diluted European democracy commitments. The invasion did not alter all aspects of European democracy policy, which in many countries was shaped by domestic political developments. In a year of notable protests and other forms of civic activism around the world, the EU and some member states improved the ways in which they engage with local actors in support of political reform. The EU began to roll out many new programs in its democracy toolbox. Though low-profile, this began to add more tactical sophistication to EU policies. Yet the degree of European support for democratic openings remained modest and, in some places, negligible. And, while much attention was on the global consequences of the war in Ukraine, the EU’s democracy activities moved up a gear to a greater extent internally than externally. This review offers a summary of the main changes to the context conditioning European democracy policies before outlining their evolution at the EU and national levels during the year. It then looks at the war in Ukraine and the democracy-related aspects of the European response to it. The review then delves into more specific aspects of democracy support that were pursued, such as democracy funding, the use of sanctions and conditionality, and democracy considerations in conflict interventions. In line with the previous review, we frame democracy support in a broad sense. The concept lacks a firm definition and this review reflects an elastic understanding of it. Broadly, the analysis considers quantitative and qualitative aspects of European strategies relevant to strengthening democratic practices, norms, and institutions. Democracy support in this sense includes the use of funding for democracy projects, decisions over sanctions, the use of political conditionality, and the incorporation of democracy factors into conflict-related policies. The review looks not only at examples of such democracy support but also instances where democratic considerations were absent from EU policy. Democracy support is understood here as including EU and European action around the world, including within Europe, but not the actions of governments in their country’s domestic affairs.
Topic:
European Union, Democracy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe

7910. The People Powering Japan’s Startup Ecosystem

Author:
Kenji Kushida
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Japan’s startup ecosystem is now able to attract human capital in ways that were not possible fifteen years ago. Employment flexibility is critical to a maturing startup ecosystem, and Japan’s startup ecosystem is now enjoying positive feedback loops. Japan’s startup ecosystem now draws from top universities; large, prestigious companies; government ministries; global, foreign multinational corporations; and the startup ecosystem itself. While Japan’s lifetime employment system in large companies is alive and well, the rise of new employment logics has grown in parallel with corporate Japan’s traditional employment system. The rise of foreign firms and the IT industry, along with the declining attractiveness of large companies, has created a new logic of opportunities for top talent. Global linkages are still a challenge, and the government should focus on efforts to remove barriers to all global collaborations, especially given the disruption caused by Japan’s abrupt border closures in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Topic:
Employment, Business, Human Capital, and Startup
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia