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7821. The Contribution of Private Health Insurance to the Financing of Healthcare in Cameroon

Author:
Jean Bruni Essono Oyono
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
By definition, health insurance is part of personal insurance. The purpose of health insurance is to protect the insured against the risks associated with illness, or more precisely, against all events leading to medical intervention. Elsewhere, in the event that a medical intervention is necessary, the health expenditure linked to this intervention is shared between the patient and the social protection system. However, social security does not have the economic capacity to support and reimburse each individual for all the costs related to their personal consumption of medical care. It covers only a percentage of the medical expenses incurred. Health insurance has therefore been set up to allow people to take out a contract that will reimburse them for the share of treatment costs not covered by social security. It is therefore intended, as its name suggests, to insure people against the economic consequences of a state of health that requires treatment.
Topic:
Public Policy, Health Insurance, and Healthcare System
Political Geography:
Africa and Cameroon

7822. Youth Political Participation in Africa: Lessons from the 2023 Nigerian Presidential Elections

Author:
Ngwang Roger
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
African youths have long represented a significant constituency for electoral mobilization across the continent. The question of youth political participation in Africa has continued to gain traction over the years, following the increased rate of electoral violence experienced across the continent since the 1990s. It has been argued that youths have been at the center of these violent electoral encounters because of their demographic majority and hopeless and disadvantaged status (Ojok & Acol, 2017). Although the dominant political elite utilizes youths’ underprivileged and demographic dominance to safeguard their interests, some young men and women still utilize their creativity and agency to maneuver through the bottleneck systems created by states and political elites (Honwana, 2012; Mugisha et al., 2016). In contemporary times where Africa is experiencing a burgeoning youth population, youths’ political engagement is becoming increasingly more important than ever before. It has been argued that African youths tend to vote less and express less interest in partisanship than older citizens (Resnick & Casale, 2011). This correlates with the suggestion that young people are less involved in politics in young democratic systems than matured democracies (Freeman, 2013; Gaby, 2016). Youths’ poor manifestation of civic engagement across the African continent is linked to the democratization process plagued with several political, governance, and socio-economic challenges (UNECA, 2017).
Topic:
Governance, Elections, Democracy, Youth, and Political Participation
Political Geography:
Africa

7823. Visa Digitalization and Tourism in Cameroon: A Promising Future?

Author:
Yollande Meli Tankeu and Boris Andzanga Ndzana
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
Cameroon is endowed with a culture rich in natural reserves and breathtaking landscapes, making it a popular destination for tourists from all over the world. However, the cost and hassle of obtaining a visa have long been one of the main obstacles to the growth of tourism in Cameroon. In order to respond to the growing interest of travelers and to make Cameroon a preferred destination for tourists, the government has recently made significant progress by switching from the manual visa procedure to the electronic visa procedure. By Decree No. 2023/147 of March 2, 2023 (1), the electronic visa application came into force on April 30, 2023, in diplomatic missions, consular posts, international airports, air, land, and sea borders. It could be a potential solution to boost tourism in Cameroon. This transition to a digital visa procedure has many advantages. This article analyses the impact visa digitalization on the tourism sector in Cameroon. In the first part, the paper will present an overview of tourism in Cameroon, and in the second part, the expected effects of visa digitalization on the tourism sector in Cameroon.
Topic:
Economics, Tourism, Visa, and Digitalization
Political Geography:
Africa and Cameroon

7824. Pooling Actions to Raise the Impact of Think Tanks in Central Africa

Author:
Nkafu Policy Institute
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) continues to confront a multitude of challenges spanning human rights abuses, armed conflicts, transnational crime, inadequate governance, food insecurity, poverty, usurpation, corruption, extensive embezzlement, and sluggish economic growth. These issues have dire repercussions on both the well-being of the populace and the economies of ECCAS member states. A significant factor contributing to this situation is the deficiency of robust national and international institutions capable of advocating for reform or making evidence-based policy decisions. In this context, the pivotal role of think tanks in advancing good governance, upholding the rule of law, safeguarding fundamental human rights, fostering inclusive and sustainable conflict resolution, among other objectives, is widely acknowledged on a global scale. Nevertheless, the few think tanks operating within the ECCAS region continue to grapple with multifaceted challenges that hinder their capacity to advocate for evidence-based decisions and carry out their advocacy initiatives without hindrance. These challenges encompass securing sustainable funding, upholding integrity and credibility, as well as difficulties with effective advocacy for various evidence-informed policies.
Topic:
Civil Society, Economics, Human Rights, Think Tanks, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Africa and Central Africa

7825. Economic Impacts of a New Global Financing Aid on Sub-Saharan African Countries

Author:
Bin Meh
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
The world is challenged with multiple shocks, and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is highly affected by these challenges. Due to these challenges, the chances of diverging from set development agendas to achieving sustainable development goals are high. In the presence of the shocks, economic growth in SSA is anticipated to deteriorate from 3.9% in 2022 to 3.6% in 2023 (1). External debts and inflation are on the rise in SSA, attributed to the war in Ukraine, climate change and the ripple effects of Covid-19 on households, businesses and other economic sectors in the region. The purchasing power, household consumption, investments, government revenue and expenditures of SSA countries are falling, thus exposing the SSA economies’ vulnerabilities.
Topic:
Economics, Foreign Aid, and Sustainable Development
Political Geography:
Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa

7826. Energy Efficiency for Sustainable Development in Africa: Challenges and Opportunities

Author:
Larissa Ntoubia
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
Globally, about 940 million people lack access to electricity, accounting for about 13% of the world’s population. Most of these people reside in rural and deplorable areas where this lack of electricity negatively affects their standard of living, the environment and sustainable development (Ahmad, Ali & Basit, 2022). In Africa, at least 645 million people do not have access to electricity. The continent’s electricity access rate stood at 40% in 2017, the lowest in the world. Power shortages and load shedding are on the rise. Even with the implementation of several power pool zones across the continent, Africans still experience a series of blackouts and power rationing that costs an estimated 2-4% of GDP per year. Electricity is necessary for agriculture, communications, healthcare, business and education, which are key drivers of sustainable development. In Tanzania and Ghana, businesses have lost around 15% of the value of their overall turnover due to recurrent power outages (AfDB, 2018). Similarly, in South Africa, economic growth has slowed in recent years due to severe power outages. There is also a decline in human capital as computers and other laboratory equipment cannot be used in schools because of the power cuts. Lives are at risk in hospitals, and life-saving equipment and services cannot be used because of the lack of electricity. An inadequate energy supply hampers economic development, hence the need for affordable, reliable, sustainable and clean energy with lower carbon dioxide emissions (UN SDG 7). This paper aims to examine the challenges faced by the energy sector in Africa and present opportunities for improving the sector to achieve sustainable development. The paper shows how energy providers, policymakers and other stakeholders can ensure an efficient and reliable energy supply and how this can be done to achieve sustainable development in Africa. The paper is structured in two sections; the first presents challenges facing the energy sector in Africa, while the second identifies opportunities for the sector.
Topic:
Economic Growth, Energy Efficiency, and Sustainable Development
Political Geography:
Africa

7827. The Leadership Conundrum in Nigeria and Implications for the Development and Peace of the Niger Delta Region

Author:
Tapuka Gerald and William H. Arrey
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
In 1999, a new political era opened in Nigeria with the inauguration of the Presidency of Olusegun Obasanjo. This marked the beginning of the Fourth Republic. Though a retired military General, Obasanjo’s Presidency was rooted in a civilian platform following Presidential elections organised by the military leader, General Abdulsalami Abubakar. Prior to this, Nigerians had witnessed only one political transition through the ballot box. This occurred in 1979, when General Olusegun Obasanjo relinquished power to a civilian President, Shehu Shagari. Since 1999, Nigerians have unabatedly enjoyed the luxury of political transitions without military intervention or the barrel of the gun. In the past two decades, political transitions in Africa have been a rare phenomenon given the multiplicity of protracted presidencies and constitutional changes to foster the reign of long serving political leaders. For example, in Cameroon, President Paul Biya has ruled unabatedly for forty one (41) years. The multiplicity of elections has rather certified Biya’s protracted presidency. Likewise, though the country has been independent for more than six decades, there has not been a single ballot-based political transition. As such, incumbents have always won every election with a crushing majority. Moreover, within the six countries (Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon) of the Central African Monetary Community (CEMAC), political transitions have been inevitably limited to the dead syndrome and not ballot box. It has paved the way for family succession as in Chad and Gabon and the subsequent unconstitutional change of governments and military coup , respectively in these countries. While ballot box transitions are still a challenge in most African countries, Nigeria’s transition have morphed to the level where an incumbent is defeated in an election by an opposition candidate. Going by this, in 2015 incumbent Goodluck Jonathan was defeated by opposition candidate, Muhammadu Buhari. Since the advent of multiparty elections in most African countries in the early 1990s, such political transitions have been sustainable in few African countries including Zambia, Senegal, Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania and The Gambia. This puts Nigeria in a more comfortable political situation than most African countries. Coupled with its estimated population of 213.4 million persons in 2021 (World Bank, 2023), Nigeria has the second largest crude oil reserves (37 billion barrels) in Africa, after Libya (US Energy Information Administration, 2020). Nigeria ultimately projects itself as a pinnacle of success and an African political giant which should evidently be translated into an Eldorado of peace and development especially in the Niger Delta area. Notwithstanding, the record breaking political successes on paper has not been translated into meaningful stability on the ground. In the last two decades, Nigeria has become one of the most unsafe countries in Africa and Niger Delta in particular even though not officially engaged in any civil war or military takeover as in precedent decades. Daily happenings reveal that the situation is becoming dire and civilians are caught in the web of violence and kidnappings. In 2018 alone, there were 416 violent incidents resulting in over one thousand deaths. In 2018, 351 of such incidences were recorded resulting in 546 deaths (Campbell, 2019). This shows a steady increase in violence in the Niger Delta. Within this period, there was also a significant rise in militant activities mainly against oil companies and Nigeria’s capacity to produced crude oil. Less than a decade after the Federal Amnesty in 2009 which saw a lull in militant activities including the main militant group MEND, another militant group, the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) emerged in 2016. Equipped as MEND with similar tactics and motives, the group succeeded in reducing Nigeria’s oil producing capacity from 2.2 million barrels of oil per day to 1.4 million. The militarisation of the area by Presidents especially Muhammadu Buhari who promised to use his military strategy to put out any uprising in Nigeria instead amplified the violence. Between 1999 and 2022, four Presidents have ruled Nigeria. However, none of these leaders have succeeded in alienating the Niger Delta from a past, rooted in insecurity and acute development challenges. Despite promises of alleviating poverty and curbing the rise of insecurity by successive Presidents, the area has still maintained a negative blueprint. Ethnicity is still rife and politics is decided on ethnic lines and the wealth produced by the area is unable to raise the standard of living of the people. Bamidele and Erameh (2023) argue that despite a flurry of measures, the Niger Delta remains stuck in environmental degradation because the policies of the government and companies is focused on gains at the expense of resource-related environmental utility. A better understanding of the Nigerian situation is sourced from the leadership and culture of violence (I), Nigeria’s leadership and violent resolution of conflicts (II), and the failure to convert Niger Delta’s wealth to national blessings (III).
Topic:
Security, Development, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Africa and Niger Delta

7828. Navigating Migration Risks: The Role of Risk Perception and Information Engagement Among Moldovans

Author:
Ludmila Bogdan
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on Migration and Human Security
Institution:
Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:
This study examines migration risk perception and information engagement by potential migrants from Moldova. Employing a qualitative interview approach (N = 30), it explores the behaviors, intentions, and perceptions that underpin how potential migrants understand labor migration risks. It establishes a robust connection between risk perception and the active pursuit of pertinent information. The study offers a matrix that illustrates the interplay between migration risk perception (high vs. low) and type of risk (individual vs. systemic). It finds that respondents in the High Risk — Systemic group refrain from seeking information, viewing all migration as inherently highly risky due to systemic factors beyond their control. The Low Risk — Systemic group believes migration carries relatively low risks, but that these risks are not individually manageable. The Low Risk — Individual group engages passively with safe migration information because of their perception of low risk. The High Risk — Individual group actively seeks information about safe migration, believing that they can overcome potential risks. In short, the study finds that potential migrants’ perception and understanding of risk shapes their engagement with safe migration information. The study also highlights gender disparities in risk perception and response. While women emphasize concerns tied to sexual exploitation and separation from family, men are more likely to fear fatal accidents and industry-specific exploitation. The study’s findings should inform the development of policy frameworks and migration information campaigns that reflect diverse perceptions and understandings of migration risk. Policy Recommendations: To mitigate migration risks and promote safer practices, policymakers at various levels, including the Moldovan government, international agencies (e.g., IOM, UNHCR, and ILO), non-governmental organizations (like LaStrada), and EU bodies, should: 1. Tailor public education and communication campaigns for diverse risk factors, using different messaging for varying risk perceptions. 2. Address gender-specific concerns with practical advice and resources. 3. Develop comprehensive risk awareness programs covering physical, emotional, and psychological challenges. 4. Use diverse channels (hotlines, online platforms, and workshops) to reach a broader audience. 5. Strengthen embassy services, ensuring staff are informed about migration risks, challenges, and effective outreach and education strategies. 6. Collaborate with mental health professionals to provide psychosocial support. 7. Engage returnee migrants as credible sources of information and advice. 8. Include migration topics in school curricula to enhance migration risk preparedness. By acknowledging risk perception and adapting information strategies accordingly, policymakers at international, regional, and local levels can create effective initiatives and communicating strategies for secure migration.
Topic:
Migration, Labor Issues, Risk, and Gender
Political Geography:
Moldova and Eastern Europe

7829. Will DACA Recipients Return to Their Birth Countries If DACA Is Ended?

Author:
Robert Courtney Smith
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on Migration and Human Security
Institution:
Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:
Will recipients of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) leave the United States if a legal challenge succeeds in ending this important program? The fate of over 600,000 current DACA recipients may depend on answers to this question in one expert report and one online survey question, which a Texas District Court found to show “a quantifiable percentage” would leave. Had the District Court in its DACA ruling not credited these sources, Texas’ lawsuit could have collapsed, and DACA would persist. The issue of whether DACA recipients will leave if DACA is ended will matter as this case is litigated, most likely to be decided by the Supreme Court. Drawing on research on immigrant return, DACA recipients, survey questions, priming, and intention-behavior gap, this paper argues that this expert report and the single online survey question used by the District Court cannot support the inferences regarding the return of DACA recipients to their birth countries. Rather, relevant research points toward DACA recipients staying in the United States, even if DACA were terminated. The paper recommends offering DACA recipients and long term undocumented residents a short path to legal status and citizenship, reassessing whether these two sources can support the conclusions drawn by the District Court; and analyzing the benefits accruing from DACA to Texas and all Texans, including US citizen children of DACA recipients, in assessing the claimed injury to the state.
Topic:
Migration, Supreme Court, Deportation, and DACA
Political Geography:
North America, Texas, and United States of America

7830. An Analysis of Trends in the US Undocumented Population Since 2011 and Estimates of the Undocumented Population for 2021

Author:
Robert Warren
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on Migration and Human Security
Institution:
Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:
In 2021, the undocumented population residing in the United States (US) increased slightly to 10.3 million, compared to 10.2 million the previous year. The gradual decline or near-zero growth of this population has continued for more than a decade. However, the large increases in apprehensions at the southern border in recent years, along with continued legislative gridlock in Congress, could portend a new era of growth of this population. Unfortunately, the data needed to determine whether the population will enter a period of growth after 2021 — or whether the era of near-zero growth will continue — will not be available for at least a year or two. The most accurate demographic estimates of the undocumented population are derived from data collected in the US Census Bureau’s American Community Survey. Estimates of the size of the undocumented population in 2022 will not be available until early 2024. This report focuses on the most significant trend in the undocumented population in the past decade — the remarkable decline of 1.9 million in the undocumented population from Mexico from 2011 to 2021. The decline for Mexico in this period was 600,000 more than the total population increase from the seven countries (in order) with the fastest growing US undocumented populations: Guatemala, Honduras, India, Venezuela, El Salvador, Brazil, and China. This paper finds that: • The long-term decline, or near-zero growth, of the total undocumented population that began in 2008 continued in 2021. • The percent of undocumented residents in the total US population declined from 3.8 percent in 2011 to 3.1 percent in 2021. • The undocumented population from Mexico declined from 6.4 million in 2011 to 4.4 million in 2021, a drop of 1.9 million in 10 years. • A total of 2.9 million, or 47 percent, of the US undocumented population from Mexico in 2011 had left the undocumented population by 2021. • The drop in the undocumented population from Mexico from 2011 to 2021 occurred nationwide, and the decline affected the undocumented population in nearly every state. • The fastest growing undocumented populations by country in the last 10 years were from Guatemala, Honduras, India, El Salvador, Venezuela, and Brazil. The combined undocumented populations from these six countries grew by 1.2 million. • Countries that had declining populations after 2011 included Poland, Peru, Ecuador, Korea, and Philippines, in addition to the large drop for Mexico. • California had the largest decline in undocumented residents — 665,000 from 2011 to 2021. The undocumented population from Mexico living in California during this period declined by 720,000. • The combined undocumented population in California, New York, and Illinois fell by more than one million from 2021 to 2011.
Topic:
Migration, Data, Undocumented Population, and Irregular Migration
Political Geography:
North America, Mexico, and United States of America