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8961. Powerful tool or passing trend? Meanings and practices of social accountability in the Arab world, and why they matter

Author:
Sylvia I. Bergh, Francesco Colin, Hicham Jadaoun, Intissar Kherigi, and Ward Vloeberghs
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
Accountable governance has become a frequent demand by ordinary citizens across Arab societies. The region has witnessed a variety of bottom-up citizen-led initiatives in recent years, driven by widespread discontent at the uneven distribution of civil, political and social rights. Various countries have seen the emergence of “participatory” processes such as participatory budgeting, consultative committees, and social audits. These initiatives are often labeled as “social accountability initiatives”, a concept championed by civil society actors and donors alike, to empower citizens and bring about improved public services. What we mean by social accountability here is “any citizen-led action beyond elections that aims to enhance the accountability of state actors”. The concept was promoted by international organizations such as the World Bank, as a “short route to accountability” to strengthen the role of citizens as “service users” and generate greater government responsiveness. But beyond donor strategies, what does social accountability actually mean to local actors in the region? Is it an effective means to bring about improved governance? We studied such initiatives in Lebanon, Tunisia and Morocco to examine how social accountability initiatives are being used by civil society actors in their strategies to make government more accountable to citizens. We found that the concept has many different meanings for people on the ground, and that civil society organizations in the region have developed a range of strategies for pressuring, coercing and cooperating with government to exact accountability. However, our study[1] also shows that doubts remain as to whether such initiatives can lead to systemic change in the region. [1] The study was based on a recent research project funded by the International Institute of Social Study (ISS) at Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR), the Centre of Expertise on Global Governance at The Hague University of Applied Sciences, and Erasmus University College Rotterdam (EUC). It was presented at a recent seminar discussion. We are grateful to Louise Haagh, Elodie Hermsen, and Mark Prins for taking useful notes at this seminar.
Topic:
Civil Society, Accountability, Social Order, and Social Change
Political Geography:
Africa, Middle East, Gulf Nations, and MENA

8962. Financial Analysis of Health System Shifts in Egypt: Searching for “gratuitousness” and the right to health

Author:
Mohamed Gad
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
Throughout the formation and development of the modern state of Egypt,1 health policies played two key roles: First, the state played a powerful and efficient role in the provision of medical services through facilities funded by public treasury revenues. Secondly, it strived to provide these services at the lowest possible costs or free of charge in what is known as the “gratuitousness” policy. Like many other free social policies that took root during the interwar period and were given new impetus with the advent of Arab socialism in the 1960s, the “free public hospital” principle was a subject of conflict between two movements that fiercely competed to control public policy in recent decades. The first movement defended the “gratuitousness” policy through tax-based expansionary fiscal policies targeting the wealthiest segments of society — a model similar to the welfare state adopted in some Western European countries. The second movement believed that tax reduction and redistribution policies in general were of vital importance to help the country attract investments and achieve the highest possible rate of economic growth and capital accumulation — in parallel with the rise of neoliberalism globally. The second movement recommended fiscal policies aimed at reducing the budget deficit, claiming that the latter affects investment opportunities in a multitude of ways. For example, it contributes to the rise of inflation rates, not to mention that public debt crowds out private borrowing opportunities, etc. This movement calls for transforming the interwar and Arab socialism policy legacy into a new pattern relying less on the public treasury and more on middle-class contributions, with “gratuitousness” policies being restricted to the poorest segments of society. This system requires continuous updates to the citizens’ income distribution database to help identify affluent and disadvantaged groups. This movement managed to gain traction in Egypt thanks to two major financial crises in the country. The first took place in the late 1980s with the steep rise in external debt, which led Egypt to adopt economic liberalization policies in the early 1990s known as stabilization and structural adjustment programs, which were supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The second crisis happened when the global financial crisis reached Egypt and political instability following the 2011 revolution, with the subsequent emergency of a black market for hard currency in 2016, leading to a new phase of financial and monetary policies with the support of the IMF and international donors. During the two crises, international financial institutions were reinforcing their policies in Egypt, particularly the scaling down of social protection policy costs covered by the public treasury. In this context, a new health insurance law was introduced and approved in 2018. The provisions of the new law represented a major transformation in the role of the state in the health sector in Egypt. The law is the first piece of legislation aimed at restructuring the health insurance system in Egypt since the 1960s. In essence, it aims to reduce dependency on “gratuitous hospitals funded by the public treasury” model and, instead, to adopt a new model that is more reliant on the middle-class to fund the public health system via deductions from their income. This model could improve public health services, while enabling the state to maintain its social role in supporting the disadvantaged. As the new health insurance law created a major shift in the history of health policies in Egypt, it also sparked widespread controversy. It is likely to stir even more controversy during its 15-year implementation period. So far, the law has only been applied in a small number of the least populated governorates.2 This research paper is not biased towards either of the two abovementioned movements, as both of them entail numerous contradictions. The “gratuitous” hospital model funded by the public treasury has long been criticized for the poor quality of services, even during its beginnings in the 1960s. The movement defending this model also did not propose any broader perceptions on distributive tax policies to increase public treasury resources, and it focused on the improvement of medical services.
Topic:
Health, Health Care Policy, Finance, and Financial Development
Political Geography:
Africa and Egypt

8963. Youth political participation in post-2011 Tunisia: Exploring the impact of the youth quota system through the prism of local municipal councillors

Author:
Malek Lakhal
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
Introduced as way to induct youth into institutional politics, Tunisia modified its electoral code in 2014 to include a youth quota, with a mandatory representation of youth on electoral lists for local elections. In April-May 2018, Tunisia held elections for local councils, representing the first mandatory iteration of these youth quotas in practice. The mandatory character of the quotas has theoretically meant that a greater number of young people ran during these elections and are today participating in institutional politics at the local level. What has been the impact of these youth quotas in stimulating youth meaningful participation in the political process? To answer this question, the Arab Reform Initiative conducted in-depth qualitative interviews with ten young local councillors at the municipalities of Kasserine, Foussana, Medjez El Beb, Kairouan, Hajeb Laayoun,e and Chebika. The research sought to understand what distinguished these young councillors from the rest of their age cohort, and in particular to understand what factors led them to become active in the political realm. The research also sought to explore the impact of political socialization on them, as well as their own values and understandings of politics. Finally, the research explored the difficulties they have encountered or are still encountering as young councillors working in public institutions that are new to them. The research has found that primary and secondary socialization are behind youth’s political participation. Young councillors entered politics with the “help” of their primary socialization (family) and secondary socialization (civil society, volunteering, etc.); nonetheless, all of the councillors we met were solicited by older people in their environment (family, friends, professors) looking for young people to add to their list. In other words, none had initiated their own electoral bids, and only a couple were thinking of running for the elections before being solicited. The research has also found that for these young councillors, age difference and gender are perceived as sources of tension. Age difference among the councillors, as well as with the mayor, are perceived as having a negative impact on the youth’s work at the council. This age difference can also take the shape of an experience gap that plays to the detriment of young councillors, as many of the older councillors held the same positions during the Ben Ali era. Likewise, gender intersects negatively with age for young women councillors. Most women councillors noticed that older male councillors adopt certain attitudes to belittle them during the meetings. Moreover, they state that men tend to take advantage of women’s temporal and spatial limitations (their inability to stay out late at night or sit in men’s cafés, for instance) to take decisions in their absence. Yet, alliances based on age are difficult to create, and the only alliance formed was between three young women in Chebika. Despite the difficulties they encounter because of their age and gender, most councillors are gaining experience and self-confidence, leading them to consider running for re-election. Learning, understanding, and ultimately seeing one’s impact in the local environment have been raised as the most motivational aspects of being a councillor. Nonetheless, youth councillors still harbor distinct ideas regarding electoral politics: all of the councillors reject political parties, even those who ran under party banners. They see the “country’s interest” as their main political compass, yet some consider their mandate to be to fight against their region’s historical marginalization. Currently none of the councillors interviewed is affiliated to a political party, and most expressed clear rejection of parties. They perceive them as inefficient and detrimental to the “country’s interest” which held a central place in the councillor’s evaluation of the political landscape. Political parties were mainly depicted as going against the “nation’s interest,” a notion that transcended political affiliations, ideologies, or social class. The youth quota system thus appears to be efficient in inducting youth into institutional politics to the point where most of the councillors we met are considering renewing and deepening (as in running for legislative elections, for instance) their participation in the political landscape. However, the youth quota reaches a limit given the lack of diversity of the youth whose entrance it permitted. The quota opens the way to the most educated portions of youth, that is university graduates, but does not reach young people who left school early. Moreover, these young people have been for the most part socialized into politics through their family or through affiliations such as student unions and local NGOs. Given this, the youth quota – still in its nascent stage – has only a limited impact as it exclusively reaches young people who have predisposition for entering the political realm in the first place.
Topic:
Politics, Reform, Arab Spring, Youth, and Participation
Political Geography:
Africa and Tunisia

8964. Youth perceptions of politics in the post-2011 Tunisia: Giving the floor to millennials and Gen Z

Author:
Zied Boussen
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
With the annual anniversary of Tunisia’s 2011 Revolution approaching, this study aims to better understand the views of Tunisian youth on politics and the country’s democratic transition, as well as their ambitions and priorities for themselves. In order to understand Tunisian youth today, one must distinguish between two different generations: the generation that led or actively engaged in the revolution (Millennials between 26 and 35 years old), and the generation that only became of age after the start of the political transition (Gen Z, “zoomers,” between 18 and 26 years old). As such, we believe that these two groups of youth show generational differences in terms of their perceptions and interests in politics. To understand generational differences among the youth, 12 focus groups were organized by the Arab Reform Initiative (ARI) across six different municipalities in Tunisia. For Medjez el Bab, Kasserine and Foussana, ARI partnered with the Humetna Association and collaborated with “We Start for Kairouan”, “Hajeb El Ayoun” and “Shabikah”. Youths from each cohort would gather every time to answer questions about what they remember from the pre-2011 and post-2011 periods, about their values and expectations, as well as their priorities and how they assess the services provided by the State. Key findings showed that the sense of belonging to a single generation does not apply to everyone. Millennial respondents seem to identify to a generational group separate from Gen Z, whereas the latter recognizes little to no differences. The differences highlighted by millennials concern lifestyle, spoken language, cultural references, and even the relationship with new technologies. Nonetheless, both groups agree that these differences are far more pronounced among their parents and elders, more so in socio-economic and geographic factors, than age or generational differences. In parallel, the study revealed generational differences with the past. While the two groups share their overall negative assessment of the political situation in the country, Gen Z respondents showed some gaps in their memory of pre-2011 Tunisia and the 2011 events. They also associated the Ben Ali era with more positive aspects than what is present today (calm, security, prosperity). In contrast, millennials had more layered perceptions of the past. Generational differences in terms of social and employment prospects were also detected in the research. Generally, millennials have a bleaker outlook than Gen Z, which is less inclined to leave the country if the opportunity presents itself. However, generational differences are less visible vis-à-vis current politics. Both groups see the role of political parties and leaders in a negative light, with the exception of some atypical figures, namely Kais Saied. For most millennials and zoomers, democracy remains vague, without real impact on their daily lives or foundation in Tunisian academic programs. The main values mentioned are respect, ethics, justice, and equality among all citizens.
Topic:
Politics, Youth, Participation, and Social Order
Political Geography:
Africa and Tunisia

8965. Impacting policies: Waste management and advocacy in Lebanon

Author:
Samar Khalil
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
Since 1994, Lebanon's waste management policy has consisted of implementing a series of emergency plans, each partially and poorly executed, and extended until a new crisis emerged. Devoid of any measures to move to long-term, sustainable planning, these local emergency fixes to the lingering waste crisis have incurred high financial costs for citizens as well as negative environmental, health, and safety impacts. Lebanese citizens are paying a high price for solid waste management (SWM). Lebanon spends $154.5 to manage every ton of solid waste, compared to Algeria, Jordan, and Syria which spend $7.22, $22.8, and $21.55, respectively (Human Rights Watch, 2020). The solid waste sector ranked first in terms of environment-related government spending in Lebanon, with a total of $647 million spent between 1998 and 2008 (Arif & Doumani, 2014). Expenditures on SWM reached $2.2 billion between 1996 and 2015 (Akiki, 2019). Despite these high expenditures, the cost of environmental degradation (COED) from the solid waste sector was around $66.5 million (0.2% of national GDP) in 2012 (Arif & Doumani, 2014), increasing to $200 million (0.4% of GDP) in 2018 (MoE, UNDP, 2019). To date, around 20% of the waste is recovered, out of which only 6% reaches recycling facilities, 36% is landfilled, and 44% is dumped in around 940 open dumps scattered throughout the country (MoE, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, 2020). At the same time, the private company contracted since 1994 to collect and treat much of Lebanon’s waste – Sukleen (part of the Averda Group) – has generated over $170 million in revenues per year, one of the highest waste management revenues in the world (Chaaban, 2016). Sukleen has held a monopoly in waste management in Beirut and Mount Lebanon since the 1990s, when it won a contract for building, testing, and operating a waste incinerator located in the city of Amrousiyeh. Operation at that site was short-lived as angry residents burned the plant down in 1996, but through other contracts, Sukleen came to handle around 50% of the waste generated nationally, serving around 400 municipalities (Chaaban, 2016). The company’s contract was renewed three times by the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) without an open tender. With each contract renewal, collection and processing fees increased, all paid using transfers from the Independent Municipal Fund, an intergovernmental grant system that disburses taxes and fees to municipalities. Successive plans for integrated solid waste management (ISWM) – in 2006, 2010, 2014, 2015 and 2019 – never bore fruit. Instead, Sukleen’s monopoly persisted in Beirut and Mount Lebanon, with its contracts managed by the central government rather than the municipalities. Meanwhile, in other regions, municipalities and federations of municipalities managed their waste following a decentralized approach, with international aid being channelled to finance Mechanical-Biological Treatment (MBT) plants for sorting and composting, achieving low diversion rates from landfills and dumps (Azzi, 2017).
Topic:
Governance, Decentralization, Waste, and Management
Political Geography:
Middle East and Lebanon

8966. Iraqi youth in contexts of conflict: Fragmentation, divergent strategies, and the impossibility of inclusion

Author:
Adel Bakawan
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
What are the various consequences on a young person’s life trajectory when she or he comes into adulthood in a context of conflict? What happens to anticipated plans for the future – education, marriage, first employment – when they are profoundly disrupted by the eruption of conflict, and what types of coping mechanisms and strategies are adopted by youth in the face of such disruptions? And how does the transition into adulthood in a fluid normative context – where violence can be abundant, gender traditional roles can be upended, and trauma widespread – shape individual political values and beliefs as well as social relations with the community and within the family? In exploring how youth navigate their own lives and construct themselves when the transition to adulthood occurs in a context of conflict, evidence shows that conflict acts as both an opportunity and a constraint to youth in terms of livelihood opportunities, pathways for wellbeing, experiences of political inclusion, and feelings of empowerment and disempowerment. At the same time, though, youth trajectories during contexts of conflict are neither linear nor strictly dependent on the structure of available opportunities. Indeed, how youth make decisions with regards to their own lives, and the factors that influence their decision-making, demonstrate complex processes involving specific contextual factors, the configuration of social relations, and positionality within conflict dynamics, among others. In this sense, youth trajectories in contexts of conflict are both highly diverse and often unexpected but also, critically, can shift repeatedly. Unpacking this complexity is of critical importance, though, if we are to grasp the multiple and even contradictory ways in which conflict impacts the trajectories of young adults. It also critical to understanding the broader implications at the societal level in terms of future patterns of political participation, beliefs, and attitudes as well social and gender relations within and between communities and generations. From 2020-2021, the Arab Reform Initiative undertook a broad research program to investigate the personal trajectories of youth in conflict, focusing on those who have come into adulthood since 2011 in Libya, Iraq, and Syria. This research, based on 75 qualitative semi-structured interviews in each country and, where possible, focus group discussions, has investigated the perceptions and decision-making processes of youth and broader-term implications in political, economic, social, and personal terms. More precisely, this research investigated youth trajectories and broader social and political implications through analysis at three distinct levels. At the micro-level, the research investigated the personal narratives of youth and how they view the impact of the conflict in terms of personal self-construction. This included investigating their decision-making matrices and aspirations, the coping strategies they have found, as well as how they have felt empowered/disempowered in the context of conflict. At the meso-level, the research explored the contextual factors mediating youth’s decision-making and their margins of maneuver, including war and peacebuilding economies, existing programming and external aid for youth, shifting power structures and social hierarchies, and normative fluctuations, conducting intersectional analysis to understand how different social positions (ethnicity, religion, gender, class, etc.) shape different narratives and strategies. Finally, at the meta-level, the research sought to assess the diverse political and peacebuilding content with regards to youth values, agency, and forms of engagement, focusing in particular on youth meaningful political participation, everyday practices of peacebuilding, and the establishment of gender equality if and where it occurred. The study presented here relays the outcomes of the research undertaken with Iraqi youth, where field interviews took place in 2020 in the cities of Mosul and Basra, sites where different types of conflict have occurred, ranging from the violent conflict with ISIS to the transformative social conflict of the Tishreen protest movement. In taking stock of these in-depth and highly personal interviews, this study contributes new knowledge and insights regarding how the transition to adulthood under conflict has impacted the acquisition of experiences and skills, needs and aspirations, and changes in perceptions and perspectives of Iraqi youth. The research presented here thus explores how youth narrate their personal trajectories and the impact of events on their own lives, but also how they understand the country’s political evolution and the nature of the conflict itself. The study explores what factors (moral, ideological, political, social, economic, personal, or other) motivate or drive their decisions, how they perceive of opportunities and constraints for their own pathways, and how they find or create opportunities for themselves. The study also investigates how gender norms and gender performative roles been transformed as a result of the conflicts and the impact of these changes in their own social relations and aspirations for the future. Finally, the study sheds light on Iraqi youth’s personal attitudes towards violence and non-violence, what concepts such as peace, justice, and reconciliation actually mean to them and what they look like in practice, and the extent to which youth perceive of agency in their own lives and the roles they seek to play in renewing the political order and social contract of Iraq.
Topic:
Youth, Youth Movement, Identity, and Inclusion
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

8967. Freedom, justice, and dignity in movement: Mobility regimes in the Grand Tunis

Author:
Bedirhan Erdem Mutlu
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
Mobility is one of the many areas where Tunisians are still waiting to achieve their revolutionary demands for justice, freedom, and dignity. This paper focuses on the modes of transportation in Grand Tunis to understand the persistence of unjust mobility regimes. It finds that decades of state policies favoring private car ownership coupled with structural and management problems in public transportation have affected the underprivileged communities the most. Therefore, treating the question of movement as social justice issue is key to envisioning viable long-term solutions.
Topic:
Mobility, Justice, Freedom, and Freedom of Movement
Political Geography:
Africa and Tunisia

8968. The 25 July 2022 Scenarios in Tunisia: Uncertainty after the Referendum

Author:
Zied Boussen
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
The referendum on 25 July 2022 will mark yet another important date in Tunisia’s history. This paper seeks to examine these different scenarios, analyze their consequences, study their stakeholders, and determine their likelihood.
Topic:
Politics, Reform, Elections, Referendum, and Participation
Political Geography:
Africa and Tunisia

8969. War in Ukraine and food insecurity in Tunisia: Where is reform most needed?

Author:
Khouloud Ayari
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
Since February 2022, food insecurity due to the war in Ukraine has become a key issue of public debate in Tunisia, shedding light on the country’s food dependence, given that it imports more than half of its needs. This paper analyzes the significant changes concerning agriculture and food in terms of dependency and sovereignty in the contemporary agricultural history of Tunisia.
Topic:
Security, Poverty, Food, and Reform
Political Geography:
Africa and Tunisia

8970. Lessons from Morocco’s women’s rights movement: Overcoming divisions to push for reforms

Author:
Hamza Bensouda
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
*This paper is the winning submission of our 2022 Student Essay Contest. It has been slightly edited for style; the arguments, tone and content are those of the author. The history of the women's movement in Morocco is that of a social movement that has emerged as a significant actor in the socio-political reform context of the country thanks to the effectiveness of its lobbying for feminist reforms. This is evidenced by the Women's March (2000), the change of the Family Code (2004) or the proclamation of gender equality in the new Constitution (2011). The Moroccan women’s movement is composed of different associations, collectives and initiatives that have managed to come together at key moments to lobby for reforms. This essay analyzes the women's movement in Morocco with an eye to drawing lessons on how can movements overcome social divisions when lobbying for feminist policies.
Topic:
Reform, Women, Feminism, Equality, and Gender
Political Geography:
Morocco

8971. Youth participation in Tunisia’s elections: Some possible solutions

Author:
Lamia Zargouni
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
Tunisian youth’s limited participation in political life dates back to before the January 2011 revolution, and recent elections also provide clear examples of the lack of youth participation both as voters and as candidates. This article examines the reasons behind this lack of political participation and presents several ways forward to ensure more inclusive participation for Tunisian youth.
Topic:
Politics, Elections, Youth, Voting, and Participation
Political Geography:
Africa and Tunisia

8972. Unpacking solid waste management policies in Lebanon: Public policies based on power-sharing politics rather than evidence-based decision-making

Author:
Cynthia Kreidy
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
iles of garbage have again been accumulating on the streets of major Lebanese cities.1 2 A scenario that is all too familiar and takes us back to 2014 when Sukleen – the company contracted to manage solid waste in Beirut and Mount Lebanon – halted its operations and streets were filled with piles of garbage for months. 3 Once again Lebanon is on the verge of another waste crisis, but this time from a more vulnerable and dire state. Solid waste has been ravaging the streets of Beirut and Mount Lebanon for numerous reasons. These include the contractor not getting paid, the high cost of transportation which reduces the frequency of collection,4 the closure of landfills which are at capacity, or even the obstruction of works at the landfills due to trespassers waiting to collect metals and other valuable materials to sell them amid Lebanon’s heaviest economic and financial crises.5 The absence of sustainable and integrated solid waste management (SWM) in Lebanon has denied citizens their right to health.6 Open dumping and burning, which have been occurring due to the inaction of regulatory authorities, have negative health impacts on nearby residents. Some individuals have reported respiratory illnesses and skin problems, while others complain about bad mental health.7 Additionally, open burning could be linked to cancer and heart disease. These practices have disproportionately affected poor communities, given that burning sites are often in their vicinity and that they cannot afford health care.8 Moreover, the cost of environmental degradation due to the lack of a comprehensive SWM plan was equivalent to $66.5 million in 20129 ) and $200 million in 201810 . The cost of environmental degradation is reflected by a loss of welfare demonstrated by the degradation in the quality of life, economic losses, and environmental losses, among others.11 The solid waste sector contributed to around 10% of the country’s greenhouse gas emissions in 2011, largely due to open dumping and burning across the country.12 13 An integrated solid waste management strategy at the national level is the only long-term solution to the solid waste problem. In the absence of such a plan, and following the solid waste crisis in 2015, several grassroots movements, civil society organizations and municipalities have tried to remedy the absence of a national plan by leading small-scale interventions based on sorting at source and waste valorization in order to minimize volumes of waste sent to landfills.14 15 16 However, none of these projects is implementable at the national level, since these initiatives rely on a municipality’s rare, and voluntary will. This paper employs a systems analysis to explore how solid waste mismanagement has been an intentional political decision-making process tailored to nurture and protect dysfunctionality through elite capture and clientelism. The hypothesis will be presented using a Causal Loop Diagram (CLD) which will then be analyzed and validated via case studies involving the municipalities of Beit Mery, Dhour Choueir, and Brih.
Topic:
Leadership, Waste, and Resource Management
Political Geography:
Middle East and Lebanon

8973. Tunisia in the wake of the referendum: A new divisive Constitution

Author:
Zied Boussen and Malek Lakhal
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
On 25 July 2022, Tunisian President Kais Saied organized a referendum for the adoption of a new constitution, clearly carrying his signature. A first look at the situation by our researchers Zied Boussen and Malek Lakhal sheds light on a so-far unstable Tunisian context.
Topic:
Politics, Reform, Constitution, and Referendum
Political Geography:
Africa and Tunisia

8974. Tunisia’s Parliament: A Series of Post-Revolution Frustrations

Author:
Saida Ounissi
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
Following the 25 July 2021 coup, Tunisia’s parliament has been the focus of President Kais Saied’s frustration and anger – not missing an opportunity in his speeches to point out that he speaks on behalf of the people when criticizing the parliament. This paper focuses on the logistics of the parliament’s everyday life to identify the multiple transformations of the parliamentary political landscape between imposed consensus and progressive fragmentation.
Topic:
Politics, Reform, Arab Spring, and Parliament
Political Geography:
Africa and Tunisia

8975. Perceptions and Trajectories of Youth in Baghdad, Al-Basra, and Mosul after the 2014 Conflict with ISIS

Author:
Farah Al Shami
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
This infographics report analyzes and interprets quantitative data that was collected by the Arab Reform Initiative (ARI) in Summer 2021 using an extensive in-person/face-to-face survey targeting 676 youth (aged 18-28) in three Iraqi cities (Baghdad, Al-Basra, and Nineveh-Mosul). By doing so, the report aims at assessing the impact of the 2014 conflict with ISIS in Iraq on the perceptions, aspirations, and actual trajectories of youth living in these three cities, namely in terms of education, employment and livelihoods, political participation, civic engagement and peacebuilding efforts, as well as choices for personal life. The survey is part of the Arab Reform Initiative’s broader work on how youth in Iraq and other Arab countries have navigated armed conflicts in the last decade. We find that the conflict has had a significant negative impact on Iraqi youth’s education and employment, and that this impact is more pronounced on education compared to employment. This impact happened mainly through the channel of economic hardship and – to a lesser extent – the channel of fear, uncertainty, and security concerns. This impact has also largely shaped the surveyed youth’s personal lives and choices. Moreover, surveyed youth expressed apathy towards formal politics and fear of engaging in politics or expressing political views/affiliations/support because of security concerns. The 2014 conflict has had a significantly more negative impact on Iraqi youth’s political participation than on their civic engagement. Although our data shows that the overall impact of the conflict on these different dimensions is significant, the magnitude of this impact is substantially less than one may have expected. We found that the negative impact of the conflict is of a higher magnitude on the actual status quo of Iraqi youth compared to their aspirations and their perceptions of its actual impact. For instance, when asked general questions about the factors affecting their trajectories, Iraqi youth did not or rarely chose “the Iraqi ISIS conflict,” whereas when they were directly asked about the impact of this conflict on their trajectories, their answers exhibited a significant importance given to the conflict. In our report, we present various reasons that explain these observations and discrepancies, some of which come from our data and others from our understanding of the Iraqi context.
Topic:
Security, Youth Culture, ISIS, Youth, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

8976. On the Experience of the Sudanese Professional Association: Personal Testimonial

Author:
Mohamed Nagi Alassam
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
Despite the divisions that plagued the SPA, trade unions and professional associations have since the coup retained a complementary and supportive role to the resistance committees. However, they remain marginal. Despite continuous strikes in various sectors, the collective and joint action of unions has remained underwhelming and failed to meet the hopes and expectations of the Sudanese.
Topic:
Labor Issues, Community, Professionalism, and Labor Unions
Political Geography:
Africa and Sudan

8977. Youth and the Future of Libya

Author:
Asma Khalifa
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
When young people took to the streets during the 2011 uprisings, they set in motion a shift in Libyan socio-economic dynamics that remains partially captured or understood. Chief among our collective blind spots are the consequences of war on young people that have had to survive through difficult circumstances. Building on discussions with Libyan youth, this paper sets out the obstacles to their political integration and puts forward what they see as priorities and recommendations for reconstruction and reconciliation in Libya.
Topic:
Reform, Arab Spring, Youth, and Youth Movement
Political Geography:
Africa and Libya

8978. Who Benefits from Tunisia's Green Hydrogen Strategy?

Author:
Aida Delpuech
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
As the global energy sector sought to revamp itself over recent years, several countries around the world have joined a race toward green hydrogen –labelled “energy of the future”. Unlike grey hydrogen, made by fossil fuels (natural gas) and a significant source of greenhouse gases,1 2 green hydrogen is generated by electrolysis whereby water is split using electricity from renewable energy sources. The combustion of 1kg of this gas produces almost four times more energy than one kilogram of gasoline.3 In 2021, the production of green hydrogen produced represents only 5% of the 94 million tons of overall produced hydrogen globally.4 However, this quantity is bound to rise, given the various strategies developed in the post-Covid economic recovery plans or by strategies to power Europe with alternatives to Russian gas.5 While a global market for green hydrogen is being shaped, Tunisia launched in early 2022 the development of its very own national strategy for green hydrogen to be finalized by 2024. The country has already announced that it will prioritise export6 of this green fuel over local use.7 “Promoting green hydrogen, a growing market in today’s world, is very important to Tunisia,” affirmed GIZ, 8 the Tunisian government’s lead partner in this strategy development project. Although the Tunisian Ministry of Energy has made green hydrogen one of its projects of high importance, civil society, scientists, and potentially affected communities have so far been left out of all conversations. Hence, the country misses a chance to map out eventual risks, environmental and social concerns and to address emerging concerns from the outset. The large-scale production – powered by solar and wind energy megaprojects – requires vast mobilization of several types of resources along the entire production chain of this fuel. When the Ministry of Energy asserts that: “these projects do not entail obvious negative impacts on the environment,” nothing is less verified than such statement. Current discussions focus mainly on Tunisia’s position in this emerging global market, but they rarely touch on the social and environmental costs of this type of major projects. Nonetheless, multiple studies9 were published more recently, warning of the impact of these projects on natural resources – water, land, etc. – in countries heavily affected by climate change. In addition, the benefit of this new sector is questionable in terms of Tunisia’s climate commitments. To this day, the country depends as much as 97% on Algerian gas to produce electricity10 and the energy transition has stagnated. However, it plans to export the bulk of the green hydrogen potentially produced on Tunisian soil mainly to Europe, This was confirmed in interviews and meetings in the context of this report While green hydrogen is a more preferable alternative than more polluting options, its mass production would primarily benefit the energy needs of Europe. This raises another fundamental issue as it is replicating an extractivist model oriented towards international export markets and build on the overexploitation of natural resources. To develop a green hydrogen production strategy, Tunisian authorities along with their European partners, namely Germany, seek to prolong the exploitation of resources of neighbouring countries without sufficiently considering the energy needs of locals, the social and environmental risks, the fact that Tunisia is a water stressed country or the financial debt resulting from such investments.
Topic:
Climate Change, Environment, Green Technology, and Green Transition
Political Geography:
Africa and Tunisia

8979. Why Elections Won’t Happen in Libya

Author:
Asma Khalifa
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
The 2021 agreement on holding elections was perceived by many Libyans as the light at the end of the dark tunnel of civil war and a reset to the political stagnation and the legal crisis. More than 2.5 million Libyans registered to vote, only for them to watch on the media a deliberate sabotage by those who were trusted in the process to commit to the agreement. While Libya is again setting the ground for future elections, this paper puts forward three points on why elections will not happen in Libya.
Topic:
Government, Democracy, Conflict, and Voting
Political Geography:
Africa and Libya

8980. Qualitative Synthesis Maps for Data-Driven Urban Governance A Methodological Evaluation

Author:
Murat Güvenç
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV)
Abstract:
Prof. Dr. Murat Güvenç explains the methodology of maps produced within the scope of projects carried out by TESEV since 2016, including The Empowering Civil Society and Municipalities for Data-Driven Participatory Gender Equality Policies.
Topic:
Governance, Sustainability, Digital Policy, Mapping, and Methodology
Political Geography:
Turkey and Middle East