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8601. Citizens’ Perceptions on Public Safety and Threats to National Security in Kosovo

Author:
Dea Fetiu and Dorjeta Rukiqi
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
The following Western Balkans Security Barometer (WBSB) report provides a thorough analysis of respondents’ perception of potential threats to their public safety and national security in Kosovo in 2022. Respondents feel generally safe in their close communities. Nevertheless, the sense of safety gradually decreases as the communities grow larger. Around 77 percent of the respondents declared that they feel safe in their houses, while they feel the least safe in their country (around 33 percent). Respondents’ perceptions between 2021 and 2022 indicate a slow decrease in their feeling of public safety; whereby in the previous 2021 WBSB, 79 percent and 40 percent of respondents stated that they feel safe in their homes and in their country, respectively. On the other hand, almost half of the respondents feel safe on the cyberspace. Brain drain is ranked as the highest threat to public safety, with 83 percent of the respondents viewing it as a threat or high threat to their respective communities. Stray animals and drug abuse are also perceived as highly threatening phenomena. Moreover, respondents are generally concerned about shortages of necessities, however, they express the biggest concerns about the shortages of electricity. On the national level, respondents see the increased prices of goods as the highest threat towards Kosovo’s national security, followed closely by the energy crisis. Pollution and climate change, violent extremism, and COVID-19 are seen as the lowest threats to national security. When asked if COVID-19 continues to endanger public health, almost half of the respondents answered negatively. Further, COVID-19 was ranked as the lowest threat to Kosovo’s national security. Opinions are somewhat divided when it comes to the efficiency of the COVID-19 vaccine on hindering the pandemic; yet 45 percent of respondents believe that the vaccine contributed to curb the pandemic. According to the survey data, the main causes of domestic violence in Kosovo are poor economic conditions and low levels of education. Respondents believe that raising the quality of education, and organizing more raising awareness campaigns are some of the measures that need to be taken by institutions to prevent and fight domestic violence.
Topic:
National Security, Public Opinion, and Public Safety
Political Geography:
Europe, Kosovo, and Balkans

8602. Moving on Up: Multilevel Monitoring and Advocacy for Health Rights

Author:
Abrehet Gebremedhin
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Accountability Research Center (ARC), American University
Abstract:
Multilevel approaches to monitoring and advocacy are often used by international development practitioners, particularly in civil society, in efforts to hold governments—from the national to the local—to account for policy implementation. However, such approaches are not yet well understood or identified by many scholars in the social accountability field. This evidence review addresses this gap through a cross-case comparison of multilevel approaches in ten health rights programs across Africa, Asia, and Latin America. It draws on published evaluations, working papers, and peer-reviewed journal articles, as well as insights shared by implementers and researchers. Cases were selected to illustrate health rights initiatives that included monitoring or advocacy activity at a minimum of two different levels: local health facility, district, regional, provincial or national. Four significant findings emerge from this review of evidence: Vertical integration is a relatively common feature of multilevel monitoring and advocacy in these ten cases and is most likely to take place at the lower ends of the health system. However, it is largely implicit, and often not articulated in project design or theories of change. Horizontal organizing—the coordination of civil society action across districts or geographies—is a less visible feature of multilevel approaches to health rights programming than vertical integration. Despite the multilevel nature of health monitoring and advocacy in these ten cases, less than half reported working at the regional or provincial level, indicating a ‘missing middle’ between local and national activity. Escalation—the process by which citizens’ unaddressed claims move upwards to those with greater decision- making powers—is an important mechanism for accountability and one way in which vertical integration can happen. However, escalation is not clearly articulated in much of the gray literature, and therefore merits further research. The findings from this evidence review have implications for strategy, including: the importance of explicitly identifying multilevel tactics for monitoring and advocacy; theorizing the process by which unaddressed claims can be addressed, particularly moving up beyond the local level; emphasizing the importance of the ‘middle’ and ensuring regional and provincial decision-making is leveraged; and looking to link vertical integration with opportunities for horizontal organizing.
Topic:
Civil Society, Health, Accountability, Advocacy, and Monitoring
Political Geography:
Africa, Asia, and Latin America

8603. Local Voices, Global Action: Transnational Organizing in Apparel Supply Chains

Author:
Judy Gearhart
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Accountability Research Center (ARC), American University
Abstract:
This working paper discusses transnational organizing in apparel supply chains. It learns from labor rights advocates in the global South who are building social movements, advocating for national reforms, and promoting new forms of accountability in the apparel industry. In particular, the paper examines how the Bangladesh Center for Worker Solidarity (BCWS) and Cambodia’s Center for Alliance of Labor and Human Rights (CENTRAL) have each played a critical role in advancing new agreements and monitoring their implementation. They have increasingly influenced and become leaders in the Clean Clothes Campaign Network. Based on multiple interviews with CENTRAL’s Tola Moeun and BCWS’s Kalpona Akter, the paper traces how they have worked with international allies to expose flaws in supply chain monitoring in the apparel industry. It discusses how they worked with independent trade unions to build grassroots campaigns that often preceded or inspired international campaigns. At the same time as Moeun and Akter came under threat for their national advocacy, they engaged international allies and became experts on trade policy and global supply chains. They are now not only leading proponents of enforceable, multiparty agreements between multinational corporations (MNCs) and independent trade unions, but also advocates for more effective mandatory human rights due diligence laws (MHRDD). Balancing this international advocacy with organizing for national policy reforms is a strategy made all the more necessary by the context of shrinking civic space in Bangladesh and Cambodia. Many companies are seeking to strengthen their human rights due diligence in supplier countries and to engage stakeholders in that process. At this time, the perspectives and experience of BCWS and CENTRAL help identify what is needed to advance more worker-centered approaches. Three sets of lessons emerge about what is needed to sustain transnational supply chain advocacy movements. Firstly, movement-building and trust are vital ingredients in effective supply chain advocacy. Secondly, it is important for human rights due diligence processes to take into account risks to worker rights. Thirdly, strengthening worker voice in global supply chains requires more effective scrutiny and regulation of MNCs.
Topic:
Reform, Accountability, Industry, Labor Rights, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
Global Focus

8604. The Postcolonial Vortex

Author:
Photis Lysandrou and Yvonne Lysandrou
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
City Political Economy Research Centre (CITYPERC), University of London
Abstract:
The subject of this paper is the contemporary postcolonial condition. Its central argument is that this condition is one of perpetual entrapment in circular motion as any progression registered by postcolonial countries by participating in the global capitalist system as independent states is continually offset by a backward-pulling regression arising out of their subordinate position in that system. This entrapment in 'proregression', to abbreviate the progression-regression nexus, is not in itself a new experience for postcolonial countries. What is new is the primary mechanism that perpetuates proregression: where in the previous eras of colonialism and neo-colonialism that primary mechanism rested on the force of authority, in the current postcolonial era it rests on the force of gravity. It is testimony to the strength of this force that even those emerging capitalist countries that have never been the subject of external control in the colonial era are now also caught in the predicament of proregression. However, the fact that the postcolonial countries have previous experience of proregression makes their present experience going forward even more acute. It is as if their history is caught in an endless series of overlapping cycles, as each mode of progression on a higher plane of development is countered by a mode of regression on an equivalent plane of development. In short, it is as if their whole history is caught in a vortex.
Topic:
Post Colonialism, Political Theory, and Capitalism
Political Geography:
Global Focus

8605. Rethinking Monopoly as a Power Relation: The Shift from Market to Intellectual Monopoly

Author:
Cecilia Rikap
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
City Political Economy Research Centre (CITYPERC), University of London
Abstract:
The critical literature on monopolies, from monopoly capital to recent contributions, focuses on the organization that concentrates either market power, capital or property rights. I complement this literature by conceptualizing monopolies as a power relation, which enables me to integrate different ways in which the term is used, from capitalists’ monopoly over the means of production to intellectual monopolization. As I explain here, some firms have developed greater capacities to systematically monopolize intangibles that are essential for organizing labour beyond their owned assets and for controlling demand. Coupled with institutional, political and technological changes, larger absorptive and management capacities to produce and capture knowledge and information resulted in firms’ technological differentiation. The systematic winners of the innovation race hold persistent intellectual monopolies while other firms become subordinate due to their lack of technical autonomy. From this perspective, (intellectual) monopoly power is essential for understanding the distribution of value in capitalism.
Topic:
Political Economy, Labor Issues, Capitalism, Monopoly, Capital, Power Relations, and Value Capture
Political Geography:
Global Focus

8606. Fossil Fuel Industry Phase-Out and Just Transition: Designing Policies to Protect Workers’ Living Standards

Author:
Robert Pollin
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:
This paper focuses on just transition policies targeted at supporting workers now employed in the fossil fuel industries and ancillary sectors within high-income economies. As a general normative principle, I argue that the overarching aim of such policies should be to protect workers against major losses in their living standards resulting through the fossil fuel industry phase-out. The impacted workers should be provided with three critical guarantees to accomplish this, in the area of jobs, compensation and pensions. Just transition policies should also support workers in the areas of job search, retraining and relocation, but these forms of support should be understood as supplementary. Within the framework of these broad principles, the paper first reviews experiences with transitional policies in Germany, the UK, the EU and, more briefly, Japan and Canada. A critical point that emerges is that these just transition policies do not provide the needed guarantees for assuring workers that they will not experience major living standard declines. The paper then describe an illustrative just transition program for workers that includes reemployment, income and pension guarantees, focusing on a case study for the U.S. state of West Virginia. The results show that the costs of the just transition program for West Virginia’s fossil fuel industry dependent workers will amount to an annual average of about $42,000 per worker, equal to about 0.2 percent of West Virginia’s GDP. I briefly summarize results from the seven other studies of U.S. states and for the overall U.S. economy. For the U.S. economy overall, the just transition program’s costs would total to about 0.015 percent of GDP. These findings demonstrate that providing a generous just transition program does not entail unaffordable levels of public spending. Robust just transition policies should therefore be understood as an entirely realistic prospect for all high-income economies.
Topic:
Political Economy, Labor Issues, European Union, GDP, Economy, and Fossil Fuels
Political Geography:
Japan, United Kingdom, Europe, Canada, and Germany

8607. The Political Economy of the Cost of Living Crisis in the UK: What Is to Be Done?

Author:
Ozlem Onaran
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:
This paper analyzes the political economy of the cost of living crisis in the context of the United Kingdom. The paper presents the long-term trends in the wage share, wealth inequality, labour’s bargaining power, and real wages in the UK. The first and second waves of inflation in 2021-22 are discussed presenting the trends in the profit margins. The policy responses by the conservative governments and the Bank of England are analyzed, and their limitations are assessed. The paper concludes with short-run and medium-run policy alternatives to the cost of living crisis
Topic:
Political Economy, Labor Issues, Inequality, Inflation, and Cost of Living
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

8608. Sellers’ Inflation, Profits, and Conflict: Why Can Large Firms Hike Prices in an Emergency?

Author:
Isabella Weber and Evan Wasner
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:
The dominant view of inflation holds that it is macroeconomic in origin and must always be tackled with macroeconomic tightening. In contrast, we argue that the US COVID-19 inflation is predominantly a sellers’ inflation that derives from microeconomic origins, namely the ability of firms with market power to hike prices. Such firms are price makers, but they only engage in price hikes if they expect their competitors to do the same. This requires an implicit agreement which can be coordinated by sector-wide cost shocks and supply bottlenecks. We review the long-standing literature on price-setting in concentrated markets and survey earnings calls and compile firm-level data to derive a three-stage heuristic of the inflationary process: (1) Rising prices in systemically significant upstream sectors due to commodity market dynamics or bottlenecks create windfall profits and provide an impulse for further price hikes. (2) To protect profit margins from rising costs, downstream sectors propagate, or in cases of temporary monopolies due to bottlenecks, amplify price pressures. (3) Labor responds by trying to fend off real wage declines in the conflict stage. We argue that such sellers’ inflation generates a general price rise which may be transitory, but can also lead to self-sustaining inflationary spirals under certain conditions. Policy should aim to contain price hikes at the impulse stage to prevent inflation from the onset.
Topic:
Political Economy, Inflation, Profit, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Global Focus

8609. Environmental Inequality in Industrial Brownfields: Evidence from French Municipalities

Author:
Charlotte Bez, Michael Ash, and James K. Boyce
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:
Recent research on environmental inequality has extended its focus from ongoing pollution to legacy pollution by examining the geography of industrial brownfields, defined as nonproductive, contaminated land. This article is the first extensive brownfield analysis for a European country from an environmental inequality perspective, exploiting the political momentum in France where brownfield restoration has become a national priority. In doing so, we combine data on over 7,200 industrial brownfields from the 2022 geodatabase ‘Cartofriches’ with socio-economic variables at the municipality level. We demonstrate communities with higher percentages of foreign-born and unemployed persons are disproportionately more likely to be located near brownfields. The social gradient increases significantly in communities that host many brownfields, the so-called hotspots. There is an inverted U-shaped relationship with income, with a positive correlation until the 75th percentile (C23,700 annually). These findings are robust to different controls, including across urban and rural areas, though with regional differences. Further, we also account for the location of noxious industrial facilities sourced from the E-PRTR database to show the existence of cumulative impacts of environmental risks. Our analysis provides crucial entry points for restorative environmental justice considerations and has important implications for Europe’s just transition and cohesion policies.
Topic:
Environment, Inequality, Pollution, Industry, and Municipalities
Political Geography:
Europe and France

8610. Reproductive Injustice? A County-Level Analysis of the Impact of Abortion Restrictions on Abortion Rates

Author:
Raymond Caraher
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:
Since Planned Parenthood v. Casey in 1992, state governments in the United States have been permitted to restrict abortion access up to the point where such restrictions do not place an ‘’undue burden” on those seeking abortion care. Since this ruling, abortion restrictions of various types and intensities have proliferated across the South and Midwest, especially since the 2010s. This paper uses a novel dataset of county-level abortion rates covering 20 years, as well as a database covering four types of restrictions which represent both “demand-side” restrictions (i.e., those which target abortion seekers) and “supply-side” restrictions (i.e., those which target abortion providers), to analyze the effect of abortion restrictions on abortion rates. Using a difference-in-differences design, the analysis finds that while both classes of abortion restrictions reduce the abortion rate, restrictions that target pregnant people seeking an abortion have a substantially larger effect on abortion rates. Leveraging the spatial heterogeneity of the county-level dataset, the analysis further finds that abortion restrictions have a substantially larger negative effect on abortion rates for counties which have a larger share of Black or Hispanic residents. When comparing high and low income counties, the results suggest that poorer counties experience a higher negative effect of abortion restrictions. Further, the study finds significant variation in the effect of different abortion restrictions by state. While demand-side laws consistently cause abortion rates to decrease, the results for supplyside laws are more heterogenous. Overall, the results suggest that repealing Roe v. Wade will have a significant and unequal effect on abortion rates, with marginalized communities experiencing a greater impact.
Topic:
Health Care Policy, Inequality, Legislation, Reproductive Rights, and Abortion
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

8611. The Cross-Border Interbank Payment System: A Case Study in Chinese Economic Leadership

Author:
Aidan Campbell
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:
Investigations seeking to explain the rise of China rarely investigate the many new institutions founded to increase China’s economic success and influence over global affairs. In the economic sector, some better-known projects include the Belt and Road Initiative, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and the New Development Bank. One of the newest and least understood institutions founded to promote international use of the RMB is the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS). The purpose of this research is to examine the development, policies, and goals of CIPS in order to better understand the phenomenon of Chinese-lead international economic institutions. Novel evidence for CIPS’s intention to adopt blockchain technology and provide services for currencies other than the RMB is presented. The conclusion to this research is that CIPS is presently too small to pose a threat to the existing SWIFT network or predominance of US dollar transactions in international trade. At the same time, CIPS evidences a patient and rational strategy designed to reform international norms and patterns of trade to China’s advantage in the long term.
Topic:
Political Economy, Leadership, Economy, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Banking
Political Geography:
China and Asia

8612. Does Project-Level Aid for Water and Sanitation Improve Child Health Outcomes? Evidence from Household Panel Data in Uganda

Author:
Lynda Pickbourn, Raymond Caraher, and Léonce Ndikumana
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:
Empirical studies on the effectiveness of aid to the water, sanitation, and hygiene sector (WASH aid) have focused primarily on access to these services as the benchmark for evaluating the effectiveness of aid in this sector. Given the importance of WASH services for public health outcomes, the effectiveness of WASH aid should also be evaluated in terms of its impact on health outcomes. This is especially important in low- and middle-income countries where achieving sustained improvements in child health outcomes remains a challenge. This paper uses geocoded sub-national data on the location of WASH aid projects in Uganda in conjunction with six waves of nationally representative household-level panel survey data to examine the impact of aid-funded WASH projects on the probability of stunting among Ugandan children and infants. Analysing aid effectiveness at the sub-national level avoids the problems of cross-country heterogeneity in aid effectiveness that plagues other studies. Results of the difference-in-differences regression analysis suggest that proximity to an aid-funded WASH project reduces the probability of stunting by 14–21 per cent. The results suggest that scaling up aid to the WASH sector can help improve child health outcomes in the country.
Topic:
Health, Humanitarian Aid, Water, Sanitation, and Child Care
Political Geography:
Uganda and Africa

8613. Federal Reserve Anti-Inflation Policy: Wealth Protection for the 1%?

Author:
Aaron Medlin and Gerald Epstein
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:
The Federal Reserve has a dual mandate from Congress that directs it to conduct monetary policy as such to achieve “maximum employment” and “stable prices.” Yet the U.S. central bank typically chooses to address inflation as a top priority and focuses on employment only secondarily, if at all. Why? In this paper we argue that an important reason is that the Federal Reserve conducts policy so as protect the real wealth of the top 1% of the wealth distribution. We focus on the Fed’s fight against inflation in 2021-2022, when it rapidly raised its policy interest rates by almost 4 percentage points in the face of more than 6 percent inflation. Using a novel econometric analysis, we provide evidence that shows that this policy serves as a real net wealth protection policy for the 1% by restoring some of the lost wealth that they would otherwise lose due to unexpected inflation. The results of this policy for the top 10% of the wealth distribution are econometrically ambiguous. But to the extent that the Fed’s high interest rates generate higher unemployment or even a recession, this wealth protection for the 1% could have serious income costs for workers who find themselves or another member of their household out of a job.
Topic:
Political Economy, Monetary Policy, Inflation, Elites, and Wealth
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

8614. Inflation and Paid Care Services in the U.S.

Author:
Nancy Folbre
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:
Nancy Folbre offers a number of reasons why increases in average wages among the lowest deciles of the population are not likely to significantly buffer the effects of rapid inflation on families with incomes below the poverty line. It also raises a number of specific questions for future research.
Topic:
Poverty, Economic Inequality, Inflation, and Wages
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

8615. State Capitalism, Imperialism, and China: Bringing History Back In

Author:
Isabella Weber
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:
State capitalism is experiencing a great revival as a term to capture the current capitalist constellations, increasingly replacing neoliberalism. Unlike neoliberalism, however, the term state capitalism has a long history reaching back to the age of imperialism in the late 19th century. While state capitalism has been used as a pejorative term by Marxists, liberals and neoliberals alike, it has served as a programmatic label for developmentalist and neomercantilist projects in reaction to imperialism in the periphery. This paper argues that we need to bring the intellectual history of state capitalism into the ‘new state capitalism’ debate. China has played a major role in the revival of state capitalism in the social sciences, but the long history of China’s engagement with state capitalism as a concept and program dating back to the late Qing reformers has been overlooked for the most part. State capitalism is by no means new to China, from Liang Qichao, Sun Yatsen and Mao Zedong to Deng Xiaoping, the idea that China had to create a modern nation state and industrial capitalism in the name of economic progress and to get ahead in the global competition is a recurring theme. What is new is that for the first time the ambition to use state capitalism as a means to catch up with the West is bearing fruits in ways that could undermine the predominance of Western economies.
Topic:
Imperialism, Political Economy, History, Capitalism, and State Capitalism
Political Geography:
China and Asia

8616. Women, Peace and Security and the 2022 National Security Strategy

Author:
Hans Hogrefe and Cassandra Zavislak
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Our Secure Future
Abstract:
This brief examines the inclusion of the Women, Peace and Security agenda in the Biden Administration’s 2022 National Security Strategy, and compares it to the ways in which the Trump Administration’s 2017 National Security Strategy addresses the full participation of women in our national security interests.
Topic:
Security, National Security, Women, Inequality, Peace, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, China, North America, and United States of America

8617. Monitoring Progress on the Women, Peace and Security Agenda

Author:
Robert U. Nagel, David Guzman, and Carla Koppel
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security (GIWPS)
Abstract:
To advance the WPS Agenda and monitor progress, in 2019 the governments of Finland and Spain initiated Commitment 2025 (C-25). The member countries agreed to track their efforts to increase the meaningful and substantive participation of women along nine specific commitments related to conflict prevention and resolution, negotiation and mediation processes. This agreement currently has 13 signatories: Finland, Spain, Norway, Iceland, Germany, Italy, Belgium, United Kingdom, Bulgaria, Namibia, Canada, Uruguay, and Argentina. The Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security (GIWPS) has partnered with C-25 members to track progress toward the commitments. To increase transparency and accountability while also providing metrics for progress, we collected and analyzed data on women’s representation in political governance, diplomatic, and peace and security institutions. We combined data from various sources to generate analysis and insights about the status of progress on C-25 commitments. Findings indicate that concerted efforts are needed to reach targets by 2025. Despite some progress, women’s participation and meaningful inclusion in matters of peace and security is still lacking. Governments can and must do better including and empowering women in peace and security institutions and processes. The data underscore the importance of continued dedication to women’s empowerment and the importance of holding governments accountable through monitoring progress.
Topic:
Security, Women, Accountability, Peace, Transparency, and Monitoring
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Canada, Finland, Norway, Argentina, Uruguay, Germany, Belgium, Bulgaria, Spain, Italy, Iceland, and Namibia

8618. Toward Inclusive Recovery in Ukraine: Engaging Women and Civil Society in Ukraine’s Relief, Recovery, and Reconstruction

Author:
Jess Keller
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security (GIWPS)
Abstract:
Women’s participation in the design and implementation of Ukraine’s recovery programs is critical to maximize the effectiveness of the reconstruction process, take into account differentiated needs, and bolster post-conflict development. Key recommendations: Promote women’s participation, leadership, and decision-making in Ukraine’s planning frameworks and recovery process. Ensure new funding enables women’s active participation in Ukraine’s recovery and advances gender equality. Establish a gender-sensitive monitoring mechanism for the Ukrainian government to report on recovery progress and collect and analyze sex-disaggregated data. Prioritize the re-establishment of critical social infrastructure and services. Integrate gender equality in Ukraine’s EU accession commitments.
Topic:
Civil Society, Reconstruction, Women, Recovery, Participation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

8619. Can Israel mediate an end to the Ukraine war?

Author:
Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Israel is well positioned to again become a go-between between Russia and Ukraine, an effort that could further elevate its international status
Topic:
Diplomacy, Conflict, Peace, and Mediation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Israel

8620. The Default Policy Option: Chaos

Author:
Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Chaos in the territories poses a security problem to Israel, but such a problem is less acute if the Palestinian militias vying for influence compete with each other.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

8621. Progress toward a breakthrough in Saudi-Israeli relations: ‘Haste is from the Devil’

Author:
Eran Lerman
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
The positive and businesslike approach that marked the meeting of the Negev Forum Steering Committee and Working Groups in Abu Dhabi (January 9-10, 2023) proves that the drive to entrench and deepen the Abraham Accords is still ongoing despite the change of government in Israel. Hopes for a breakthrough in Saudi-Israeli relations are also still being nurtured, reflected in practical steps already taken. Moreover, the issue was raised with Jake Sullivan during his visit to Israel. Still, as the Arab saying goes, al-’ajalah min al-shaytan – haste is from the devil – and premature pronouncements have done more harm than good. The change will not come overnight: the Palestinian issue is still a stumbling block, and political dynamics in the Kingdom are complex, at least as long as King Salman still reins in some of his son’s ambitions.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Leadership, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, and Saudi Arabia

8622. Violating the Temple Mount’s Legal Status? Where is the Violation?

Author:
Yifa Segal
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
The recent visit to the Temple Mount by a government minister raises again the question of the legal status of the Mount, the content and circumstances of the status quo, and the legal questions of Israeli and international law regarding visits there by Jews.
Topic:
International Law, Religion, Territorial Disputes, and Discrimination
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Jerusalem

8623. Poland's Threat Assessment: Deepened, Not Changed

Author:
Mariusz Antoni Kamiński and Zdzisław Śliwa
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
Polish-Russian relations are traditionally difficult, shaped by geostrategic locations in Europe and shared history. Russians have stereotypes about Poland that color their perception of Polish issues. This, combined with ongoing political and economic disputes, creates a situation where hopes for improvement are slim. Poland and Russia’s common history includes a number of painful historical memories that make it challenging to build mutual trust and reconciliation, which outside observers must understand. Although the two nations have been neighbors for more than a thousand years, the critical historical events came between the 16th and 17th centuries, when both countries competed for primacy in Eastern Europe. Poland lost this rivalry, resulting in Austria, Prussia, and Russia partitioning Poland three times between 1772 and 1795, when Russia made Poland a principality within the Russian empire until Poland’s independence in 1918. The result was the compulsory Russification of Polish lands, widespread attempts to convert Catholic Poles to Orthodox Christianity, and the brutal suppression of national uprisings. Together, these meet the modern criteria for ethnic cleansing and form the basis of Poles’ historical consciousness. When Soviet forces sought to invade Europe in the name of communism at the end of the Russian Civil War, they were decisively defeated at the Battle of Warsaw in 1920, which stopped the Soviet advance and frustrated their desire to ignite a global revolution. Stalin, then an officer in the Red Army, was one of the contributors to this disaster and took his revenge in 1940, ordering the execution of some 22,000 Polish officers and intelligentsia at Katyń, after partitioning Poland again with Germany. The Soviets occupied Poland at the end of World War II and imposed a communist regime until 1989, depriving Poland of full political and economic sovereignty, creating elite dependence on the Soviet Union, and enabling Soviet interference in Poland’s internal affairs. Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the ascent of the Law and Justice Party in Poland in 2015 led to a more decisive and negative policy toward Russia. According to Witold Waszczykowski, a former member of Poland’s Parliament and a current member of the European Parliament, NATO’s Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, enacted at a time when “Yeltsin’s Russia was relatively weak and cooperative with the West,” was repudiated in acknowledgment that “Today’s Russia is aggressive and imperialistic, [and so] there’s no reason we should respect that agreement.”
Topic:
Threat Assessment, Bilateral Relations, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Poland and Russia

8624. Denmark's Security Starts in the Baltic States

Author:
Amelie Theussen
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
Danish security and defense policy strongly builds on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as its cornerstone. Since the 1990s, Denmark has pursued an active military role in international missions. In line with its military activism and Atlanticist orientation, the United States, United Kingdom, and France are Denmark’s closest strategic partners. Yet several developments in recent years have forced the country to question its partnerships and re-evaluate its military priorities: the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, the election of Donald Trump as U.S. President in 2016, Brexit, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. These stand out as major external influences on Danish policies. Additionally, a changing threat environment with an aggressive posturing by Russia (and non-military threats in the cyber realm and of hybrid nature) means that Denmark has made moves to strengthen its military capacities, contributing to NATO’s overall deterrence posture as well as its total defense capacities to deter and defend against unconventional threats. While Denmark does not consider Russia a direct military threat against its own territory, it does regard Russia as directly threatening its neighbors and European security, and the rules-based international order through actions which analysts refer to as “political warfare.”1 Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Denmark has joined with the vast majority of European Union (EU) and NATO members in supporting Ukraine and condemning Russia for raging violations of international law.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Security, NATO, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Denmark and Baltic States

8625. Societal Security and Total Defense: The Swedish Way

Author:
Bengt Sundelius and Jan Eldeblad
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
Sweden has recovered from several severe security challenges over the past two decades. In 2004 more than 500 Swedish citizens died in the Boxing Day tsunami in Southeast Asia. During the suddenly escalating Lebanon conflict of 2006, more than 8,000 citizens were hastily, but successfully, evacuated out of harm’s way. Days before Christmas 2010, the first suicide bomber in the Nordic region, luckily prematurely, exploded his bomb near a crowded shopping street in the city center of Stockholm. Sweden’s neighbor Norway experienced a terrible mass murder in July 2011 undertaken by a solo terrorist. In April 2017, terror struck with deadly force in the shopping area of the city center of Stockholm. Dramatic forest fires rampaged in the summers of 2014 and 2018. In the fall of 2015, a massive flow of migrants poured into the country, with major immediate effects and long-term consequences for Swedish society. Most recently, the deadly COVID-19 pandemic, which began in March 2020, became a stress test of endurance and societal resilience for the Swedish population. Compared with the other Nordic states Sweden has suffered much higher rates of infections, and it has seen more than 14,000 deaths, putting into question the Swedish strategy for managing this public health disaster. The close neighborhood of the Baltic Sea region has experienced fundamental security changes since 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea and intruded into eastern Ukraine. Like those of the other nations in the region, Swedish political leaders have responded to this development by placing greater emphasis on defense and security issues, taking measures including significant additions to the defense budget. Total defense planning was reintroduced in 2015, and the conscript system, now for both men and women, was reactivated in 2017. In addition to continuing concerns about new terror attacks, political debate has focused on Russian behavior and on the potential damage of so-called hybrid attacks on Swedish society, including cyber activities and social media campaigns. Further heavy investments in national defense have been made in light of the Russian attack on Ukraine in February 2022. The rearmament of the total defense forces has also been accelerated, to reach higher levels more quickly than previously planned. The Swedish security context appears to be entering a troubling period, with the Baltic Sea region living without peace, but not in full-scale war, either, despite the close-by war in Ukraine. The gray zone between peace and war could be characterized as a state of adversarial interdependencies across the boundaries of Europe. Novel tools must be developed to safeguard the nation against acts of ill will and to promote, both at home and abroad, those values and interests that are dear to the people of Sweden. Joining the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO) is one such tool. This significant step deviates from a 200-year tradition of staying outside of military alliances. A wide consensus across party lines now exists on the necessity of joining this Western defense alliance. Considering the recent experiences of other democracies, special care was taken to safeguard the election process of September 9, 2018. Public awareness campaigns and various training programs were launched for local election officials and for party staffs. No visible manipulations of this election process were found, but the national result was ambiguous. It took four months of party negotiations before a new government was formed in January 2019. This political stalemate, which is unusual for Swedish consensus-style politics, has generated public dismay and considerable uncertainty about the future direction of Sweden’s parliamentary democracy. Then, in the spring of 2020, the pandemic struck and placed the nation in a seemingly endless state of emergency alert, while partisan politics was placed on hold for a period. Also, 2021 became a year of political turbulence, with changes of government and a new Social Democrat prime minister elected in November. After the national election in September 2022, that government resigned, and a non-socialist coalition government was elected, with the prime minister from the conservative Moderate Party. The new government pledged to continue strengthening the revived total defense system and to conclude the country’s application for membership in NATO. One fundamental element of good governance is the ability to manage everyday accidents and emergencies while building the capacity to prevent, manage, and recover from complex disasters including attacks by a foreign state or individuals. The Swedish risk and threat panorama has widened considerably over the past decade, making this leadership task even more difficult. The multipartisan Defense Commission filed its report, Resilience,1 in December 2017 and presented several recommendations to strengthen the national defense and security capacities in response to the wider threat assessment and less hospitable regional setting. These recommendations informed the direction for the reform program for total defense now under way. Parliament passed a major total defense funding bill in December 2020.2 This funding decision covers the period 2021 through 2025 and almost doubles the budget for national defense by the end of this period. The increased Swedish funding will reach the NATO goal of 2 percent of gross domestic product in 2026.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Security, Governance, Resilience, and Society
Political Geography:
Sweden and Europe

8626. Norway Between the "High North" and the Baltic Sea

Author:
Håkon Lunde Saxi
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
This article will discuss contemporary Norwegian security and defense policy within a regional and contemporary historical perspective, with particular emphasis on the relative importance assigned to the North Atlantic and Arctic “High North”2 versus the Baltic Sea area. The main argument is that Norwegian security and defense policy is focused on deterrence and defense in the country’s immediate vicinity. The Russian Federation is identified as the main source of regional insecurity. Furthermore, the Nordic-Baltic region is increasingly perceived as one interconnected strategic space, with the geopolitical fault-line between NATO and Russia running straight through the region. While not divisible, the region arguably has two sub-theaters: the North Atlantic and Arctic “High North” and the Baltic Sea area. Norwegian decisionmakers view the Baltic States as being more at risk from Russian revisionism than Norway itself. This effort is less likely to take the form of overt conventional military aggression than of ambiguous and nebulous “political” and “hybrid” warfare. Therefore, in Norwegian security policy, the Baltic Sea area is today allotted far more attention and resources than before 2014. After years of neglect, Norway realized during the Ukrainian crisis that it had vital security interests in the Baltic Sea region. Nevertheless, the main security priority for Norway remains its maritime High North and Arctic region. The Baltic Sea area, while important, remains a secondary theatre in Norwegian strategy. This article also discusses which allies and partners are considered vital for Norwegian security. Among its security and defense relationships, Norway has long favored building close ties with the larger “maritime powers” to the west over the “continental powers” to the south or the smaller Nordic-Baltic neighbors to the east. To its east, Norway has been linked by shared bonds of common values, histories, and identities to the other Nordic countries and to a lesser extent to the Baltic ones. However, hardnosed calculations of Norwegian interests have continued to favor focusing on developing good and close relations with the maritime Anglo-Saxon powers to the west. As has been the case since Norwegian independence in 1905 and since Norway joined NATO in 1949, the western powers remain the ultimate guarantors of Norwegian security.3 At the same time, Norway has continued to place some limitations on its “integration” into the Euro-Atlantic security structures. These included restrictions on placing nuclear weapons or permanent allied bases in Norway, as well as some limitations on allied activities and exercises in the High North. The main purpose of this “screening” has been to alleviate Russian security concerns.4 This so-called policy of “reassurance” toward Russia aims to maintain the High North as an area of (relative) low tension.5 As one Norwegian Minister of Defense wrote a few years before 2022, the purpose is to combine “deterrence and reassurance” vis-à-vis Russia, in order to achieve “dialogue and cooperation . . . transparency, predictability and good neighborly relations in the High North.”6 The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has reduced dialogue and cooperation with Moscow to a bare minimum, but has so far not led to the fundamental abandonment of Norway’s “reassurance” policy toward Russia.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Norway, and Baltic Sea

8627. Germany and the Baltic Sea Region

Author:
Marcel Hadeed and Monika Sus
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
The security of the Baltic Sea region (BSR) has gained importance for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Germany in the past decade, even prior to the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Since 2014, the Russian Federation has waged continuous political warfare against its neighbors. Actions include the annexation of Crimea and the war in the Donbass region, as well as ongoing disinformation campaigns, cyber attacks, and violations of air and maritime spaces. The BSR is a preferred target of these attacks and provocations, and as attacks on the cyber infrastructure of the German Bundestag in 20151 and the infamous “Lisa” disinformation campaign in 20162 have shown, neither Germany’s size nor its comparatively good relations with Russia guarantees Berlin’s security from Russian political warfare.
Topic:
Regional Security, NATO, Russia-Ukraine War, and European Union
Political Geography:
Germany, Baltic States, Baltic Sea, and Europe

8628. Organized Crime as Irregular Warfare: Strategic Lessons for Assessment and Response

Author:
David H. Ucko and Thomas A. Marks
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
Organized crime both preys upon and caters to human need. It is corrosive and exploitative, but also empowering, and therefore pervasive. Indeed, though often out of sight, organized crime is everywhere: wherever governments draw the line, criminal actors find profitable ways of crossing it; wherever governments fail to deliver on human need, criminal actors capitalize on unmet desire or despair. For those excluded from the political economy, from patronage systems or elite bargains, organized crime can offer opportunity, possibly also protection. On aggregate, it amounts to an illicit form of governance, furnishing alternative services to a wide range of clients—be it the vulnerable and weak or a covetous elite. Reflecting the strength and resilience of this illicit order, those who stand in its way—individuals, institutions, even states—find themselves corrupted, co-opted, or violently eliminated. The breadth of organized crime, its clandestine nature, and its blending of creative and destructive effects present acute analytical and policy-related challenges. Much like the response to the threat of terrorism post-9/11, our efforts to counter organized crime are stymied by 1) conceptual uncertainty of the problem at hand; 2) an urge to address the scourge head-on without acknowledging its socioeconomic-political context; and, therefore, 3) unquestioned pursuit of strategies that miss the point, whose progress is difficult to measure, and which may even be counterproductive. Thus, despite occasional operational success, the global illicit economy continues to grow so that, by 2021, 80 percent of the world’s population lived in countries with high levels of crime and low levels of resilience to its effects.1 In the case of counterterrorism, irregular warfare (IW) emerged as a corrective lens, in that it framed terroristic violence within its essential political context and as a component of a broader struggle of legitimacy. This approach has encouraged a more politically informed understanding of terrorism, insurgency, and other irregular challenges. Might a similar lens also improve our understanding and approach to organized crime? The convergence between the two phenomena suggests a way forward. First, much like terrorism and insurgency, organized crime is a scourge that survives due to the functions and benefits it provides to desperate populations with few other options. Second, both are intensely political—if not in motivation, then certainly in origins, activities, and effects. Third, much like irregular threats, organized crime is oppositional to the rule of law and feeds on the state’s vulnerabilities. Fourth, both problems expose deep cracks in an international system supposedly governed by capable states exercising sovereignty over their peoples and lands. Fifth, both phenomena have a clandestine facet but are enmeshed with the licit world in often unpredictable ways. Thus, much like counterinsurgency, efforts to counter organized crime must operate both underground and above-ground, both counter a threat and address its drivers, and proceed with far greater awareness of what constitutes success—and for whom. Based on these commonalities, this article applies the insight of IW to the study of and response to organized crime. The argument is divided into three parts. First, the paper makes the case that, despite key differences, organized crime shares fundamental features with other irregular challenges—principally insurgency. Second, the paper lays out six major lessons of irregular warfare, informed by the bruising campaigns associated with the “War on Terror.” Third, the paper applies these lessons to various state efforts to counter organized crime. The analysis challenges how organized crime is typically understood—its character, expression, and purpose—and encourages a more politically informed way of assessing and responding to this threat.
Topic:
Security, Organized Crime, and Irregular Warfare
Political Geography:
Global Focus

8629. Russia, Ukraine, and the Future Use of Strategic Intelligence

Author:
Joshua C. Huminski
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
Before Russia’s unprovoked February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the United States and the United Kingdom undertook an aggressive public and private information campaign to attempt to achieve two concurrent objectives. The primary goal was to convince their allies of the threat of Russia’s pending offensive (and to smooth the mobilization of support to Ukraine after the fact) and to a lesser degree a secondary goal was to attempt to deter Moscow from acting. Central to this campaign was the very visible and highly publicized use of intelligence. Indeed, as Dan Drezner wrote in the Washington Post, “The U.S. intelligence community sure has been chatty as of late about what it thinks Russia is doing.”1 The use of intelligence to support policy or diplomatic efforts and to achieve a strategic effect is, in and of itself, not novel. Intelligence is meant to inform policymakers and their decisions. What was novel was the speed, frequency, and extent to which intelligence was disclosed to the broader public—intelligence which demonstrated significant human or digital penetrations into Russia’s political and military hierarchies, and which was designed to achieve a specific effect. These disclosures also benefited from an unplanned development: the existence of an external third-party validator in the open-source intelligence community. This nascent and maturing field offered a means by which some information, though not all, could be validated in near real-time. Tactical-level activity verified by these communities helped to reinforce Washington’s broader message that policymakers were advancing using sensitive intelligence capabilities. This use of intelligence, the perceived success of the effort, and the utility of that information will likely lead to an increase in demands both by politicians and the public writ large. This raises new issues and reaffirms preexisting challenges that affect and influence the use of intelligence. In that sense, the Ukraine campaign reflects lessons from past successes while, more importantly, also reflecting the lessons from past failures and offering warnings of risks for the future. Many of these lessons are not new. The need to protect sources and methods; the risk that politicians will selectively use intelligence for political aims; the importance of tailoring messaging to competing and differing audiences; all of these are familiar themes encountered throughout the history of intelligence. What is perhaps most novel about the use of intelligence in Ukraine, and likely going forward, is that this represents an effort by the United States to recapture the initiative in the information war, which it largely ceded to Russia by omission and commission. This effort brings with it additional policy challenges and new considerations.
Topic:
NATO, Diplomacy, Intelligence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

8630. NATO’s New Center of Gravity

Author:
Michael Miklaucic
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
“Russia considers the Baltic states to be the most vulnerable part of NATO….” This is the conclusion of a recent report by Estonia’s Foreign Intelligence Service.1 The three small Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, have a 1,360-kilometer border with Russia and its client state Belarus. With a joint population of just over 6 million and 47,000 active-duty armed forces the Baltic states are on the frontline of any confrontation with Russia. Their vulnerability is keenly felt having all been under brutally oppressive Soviet occupation until quite recently; many still living recall that oppression that lasted until the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991. Russia’s unprovoked February 2022 invasion of Ukraine has reminded Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians of the horrors of occupation, and rekindled fears of what until recently was considered unimaginable—a land war of territorial aggression in Europe—a contingency for which the Baltic states are urgently preparing. Each of the Baltic states has adopted a national security posture based on the principle of total or comprehensive defense; a whole-of-nation approach to defending their respective homelands with all elements of society mobilized to protect their national sovereignty. In the words of Estonian Minister of Defense Hanno Pevkur, “Every bush shoots!”2 The Baltic three are among the handful of NATO members that have exceeded NATO’s 2 percent target of gross domestic product on defense spending with significant investments in new capabilities and dramatic increases in armed personnel. All three are acutely aware of Russian efforts to subvert social stability using its hybrid warfare toolbox, including influence campaigns, mis- and disinformation, cyberattacks, the weaponization of migration, and economic or energy dependencies. Through total or comprehensive defense Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have been building up social resilience and preparing their respective populations to actively resist occupation.3
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, National Security, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Baltic States

8631. Neutrality After the Russian Invasion of Ukraine: The Example of Switzerland and Some Lessons for Ukraine

Author:
Thomas Greminger and Jean-Marc Rickli
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
In 1956, former American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles stated that “neutrality has increasingly become an obsolete conception.”1 Dulles’s statement seemed to be vindicated after the end of the Cold War as only a handful of countries in Europe identified themselves as neutral. Whereas in the past Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden adopted neutrality, only two countries in Europe—Austria and Switzerland—are considered permanent neutral states under international law after the Cold War. Together with Sweden and Finland, Austria although maintaining a constitutional basis for its neutrality, became a non-allied state when it joined the European Union (EU) on January 1, 1995. With Finland having just joined NATO and Sweden about to do so, these two countries are definitely leaving the camp of the neutral and non-allied European states. Thus, Switzerland remains the only permanent neutral state in Europe with no commitment towards the EU and its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), as the core substance of Austria’s “Neutrality Act equals the status of a non-allied country”2 since Vienna joined the EU. Considering the renewal of the discussion on the relevance of neutrality in European security following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, this article sheds light on the contemporary relevance of the concept. It will do so by first looking at the conceptual and strategic meaning of neutrality, then reviewing the evolution of Switzerland’s understanding and practice of neutrality, and finally recasting the relevance of neutrality, especially regarding Ukraine, in today’s geopolitical and geostrategic environment.
Topic:
NATO, European Union, Neutrality, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Switzerland

8632. Interview with the Honorable Arvydas Anušauskas: Minister of National Defence of Lithuania

Author:
Arvydas Anušauskas and Michael Miklaucic
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
PRISM: Sweden is reviving its Total Defense concept and Finland has Comprehensive Defense. What are the fundamental elements of Lithuania’s national strategy? Anušauskas: Lithuania’s defense policy is based on three pillars. These are the strengthening of the armed forces, a resilient society, and reliance on collective defense. In order to achieve these three, we are increasing our spending on defense. During the last nine years we have increased our spending on defense six times, which now amounts to 2.5 percent of Lithuania’s GDP. Much of that funding goes to modernizing our armed forces; for this purpose, we now allocate 30 percent of our total spending. The second pillar of our national security is societal resilience. For this purpose, we have adopted a civil resilience strategy. To put it briefly the purpose of the strategy is to ensure that citizens are able to operate in times of crisis. When it comes to collective defense, our key interest is enhanced forward defenses and combat credible deterrence. We are really interested in having sufficient NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and also U.S. forces deployed in the region as well as pre-positioning of equipment and air and missile defense. And the regional plans that connect all these in-place forces, reinforcements, command and control elements, capabilities, and enablers across the regions.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and Lithuania

8633. Interview with the Honorable Hanno Pevkur: Minister of Defense of Estonia

Author:
Hanno Pevkur and Michael Miklaucic
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
PRISM: Sweden has Total Defense and Finland has Comprehensive Defense. What are the fundamental principles of Estonia’s strategic paradigm? Pevkur: We are quite like Finland in the sense that we have a clear understanding that everyone must be involved in protecting the country. We have a conscript service for the reserve army. This is mandatory for all men and voluntary for women. What we have changed since the full-scale war in Ukraine is that we have increased the number of wartime structures. We had 31,000 fighters before, but now we have almost 44,000. Most of those come from the Volunteer Defense League. The Estonian army is based on the regular army, the reserve army, and the Volunteer Defense League which at the moment has 30,000 people of which 10,000 are combatants. This will be increased this year to 20,000, which brings us to 44,000 combatants in our wartime structure.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Interview, Regional Security, Russia-Ukraine War, and NATO
Political Geography:
Estonia, Baltic States, and Europe

8634. Situational analysis of climate adaptation in Africa: Opportunities for Capacity Development.

Author:
African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF)
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF)
Abstract:
The main objective of this study was to conduct a “Scoping and Mapping of Climate Change Adaptation Institutions in Africa”. The analysis was commissioned as part of a five-year project on “Strengthening African Leadership for Climate Adaptation (SALCA)” by the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF). The study mapped and profiled key climate adaptation and resilience actors and their roles in sub-Saharan Africa, including identifying actors in climate adaptation in the agricultural sector. It also reviewed existing global and African climate adaptation frameworks and agendas, including policies and initiatives being implemented to promote climate adaptation on the continent. The scope of the study was limited to mapping entities working on climate adaptation in the agricultural sector in 11 focus countries in Africa: Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Uganda. These are also the focus countries where the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) is supporting the transformation of agriculture to improve the livelihoods of the continent’s farming communities. The project will leverage on the already established AGRA consortia model that provides the necessary linkages across the agricultural system as an impact pathway to effective capacity strengthening. This report presents the key findings from the study and a set of recommendations to accelerate climate adaptation in Africa’s agricultural sector. The situational analysis of the climate adaptation ecosystem found that there is a growing climate intervention gap in Africa, with the continent continuing to lag behind all other regions of the world in climate adaptation, despite various initiatives’ efforts. The widening gap is caused, among other factors, by the ever-increasing reliance on external support for climate actions, persistent poverty and socio-economic inequality, low levels of development, limited economic capacity, and poor governance. In addition, the disproportionate impacts of climate change on youth and women remain a challenge needing urgent redress. Adaptation and resilience building remain a priority as the continent prioritizes adaptation over mitigation, but there are huge potential gains if the continent pushes adaptation and unlocks mitigation potential in general.
Topic:
Climate Change, Development, Institutions, and Adaptation
Political Geography:
Africa

8635. Mexico’s Forgotten Mayors: The Role of Local Government in Fighting Crime

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Organised crime in Mexico has gone local, as cartels break up into sub-groups battling over smaller patches of turf. At the same time, the federal government has wrested policing away from town halls. A reset is needed to re-empower municipal officials to protect the public.
Topic:
Organized Crime, Municipalities, Local Government, and Mayors
Political Geography:
Latin America, North America, and Mexico

8636. Tunisia’s Challenge: Avoiding Default and Preserving Peace

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Along with democratic backsliding, Tunisia is facing an economic crunch, magnified by foreign debt it is struggling to repay. Outside actors should keep pressing the government on human rights, while looking for ways – chiefly, a revised IMF loan – to stave off the worst-case scenarios.
Topic:
Debt, Human Rights, Economy, IMF, and Democratic Backsliding
Political Geography:
North Africa and Tunisia

8637. Roundtable on the 2023 Two Sessions

Author:
The University of Sydney China Studies Centre
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
China Studies Centre, The University of Sydney
Abstract:
It is crucial to global prosperity to pay attention to what is happening in China, what China’s political leadership is saying they will do, and how they present these policies. We cannot just consider China solely through a security lens, or we will miss the important stuff; China is moving fast, changing fast, and much of this change occurs because of policy planning, philosophical considerations and coordinated action by Chinese leaders at the national, provincial, municipal, and local levels. China is a country enhancing its domestic situation and reshaping international relationships. Each year the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the National Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (NCPCC) meet simultaneously in Beijing to hear various government work reports, discuss the issues raised, and make crucial decisions. These two meetings are together called the ‘Two Sessions’. This year the Two Sessions were held from 4-13 March 2023. The China Studies Centre at the University of Sydney had a roundtable to discuss this year’s Two Sessions and the outlook for 2023 and beyond. The panels helped us cut through to some of the core debates in China about its future social, economic, and political goals by unpacking the critical features of the Two sessions.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Economic Growth, Domestic Politics, Trade, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

8638. The Baltic Sea Region at an Inflection Point

Author:
Alexander Crowther
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
The unprovoked Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, catapulted conventional military operations to the forefront of Western security thinking, re-kindled serious contemplation of major war in Europe, and galvanized dramatic re-thinking among Western countries about how to secure and protect democratic governance which has become the norm in the transatlantic region. Alarm and fear are perhaps most acutely felt in the Baltic Sea and adjoining regions which share extended borders with Russia and have suffered Russian and Soviet domination for centuries. Russian President Vladimir Putin, seeking to reverse the tide of NATO expansion and to dominate a sphere of influence resembling that of the defunct Soviet Union, has inadvertently catalyzed what German Chancellor Olaf Scholz called “Zeitenwende”—a major inflexion point in global geopolitics resulting in fundamental political re-alignments. The Putin regime uses all the elements of Russian national power to gain its political and strategic objectives. However, the most immediate threat to peace, stability, and security in the Baltic Sea region is Russian political warfare. This warfare is waged in the so-called gray zone, where actions though aggressive do not cross the threshold of armed attack or a use of force as defined and proscribed in the Charter of the United Nations and international law. Russia and its accomplices including China, Iran, and North Korea utilize a variety of deniable and difficult-to-attribute means including information operations, cyber operations, and criminal operations to achieve strategic advantage. The complexity of this challenge can only be fully appreciated by examining the many elements of national power including diplomatic, information, military, economic, finance, intelligence, law enforcement, political, social, and infrastructure. Western analysts commonly refer to this model by the acronym DIMEFILPSI. Putin clearly seeks to destabilize states in the transatlantic alliance and to fracture the two organizations that provide the greatest challenge to Russian influence: the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). While the Baltic states themselves are the most directly threatened by Russia, the Baltic Sea “north shore”—comprised of Sweden, Finland, and Norway—is also challenged: Sweden and Finland are members of the EU but not NATO while Norway is a member of NATO but not a member of the EU. Sweden and Finland have historically cooperated closely with NATO and are currently in the queue to join the alliance while Norway is closely integrated into the EU common market via the European Economic Area (EEA). There remain substantial differences of perspective—though in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine these may be converging. A leitmotif within Russian strategic thinking is that war is the natural state of relations between states and that the West has been at war with Russia—historically and especially since the 1990s—and deploys information operations to achieve regime change in states aligned with Russia and in Russia itself. This perception of a constant state of war justifies doing whatever is necessary to achieve Russian political goals: “the ends justify the means.” This belief obviates any need for separate strategies for different means; there is one comprehensive strategy using techniques ranging from non-violent competition to kinetic operations. Examples include cyber-attacks against Estonia in 2007, conventional warfare against Georgia in 2008, a combination of information and deniable military operations against Ukraine in 2014, and ongoing conflicts in Syria and Libya as proxy attacks on Western interests. Such operations have been described over the years as “active measures,” “reflexive control,” “hybrid warfare,” the “Gerasimov Doctrine,” and “gray-zone operations.” Each term has its advocates and critics. The Russian label for these operations is “New Generation Warfare.” As these operations do not exceed the threshold of armed combat—typically resulting in damage or destruction of property and infrastructure as well as human casualties—international law does not sanction military retaliation. As states committed to the rule of law EU and NATO countries are bound by these constraints of international law. Conversely, authoritarian states such as Russia use law as a tool of oppression—they are sometimes referred to as “rule-by-law” as opposed to rule of law states—and are not so constrained. Prior to Russia’s February invasion of Ukraine, not everyone agreed that the Russian Federation was a strategic threat. Even today, states have diverse perceptions of the Russia threat, and attitudes towards engaging Russia range from “NATO should intervene in Ukraine” to “we should not humiliate Russia.” The three Baltic states, Poland, and Finland feel Russia’s recent bellicosity vindicates their past insistence on focusing on Russia as the main strategic threat. Finland, unlike so many others, never disarmed or dismantled its defense architecture at the end of the Cold War. As might be expected, Russians have a different perspective on the region and its history. The regime sees itself as the victim and the guardian of Christianity, conservative values, and Orthodox civilization. They also believe that the current global system was designed by the West and operates to marginalize them. Putin’s response is to seek to destabilize that system using political warfare.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Baltic Sea, and Baltic States

8639. Estonia: Size Matters

Author:
Tony Lawrence
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
Estonia is a very small state, with limited resources to counter hostile Russian activities. Like any small country, it must concentrate on some instruments of national power more than others and use them as intelligently as possible. Estonia has thus followed two complementary approaches to applying elements of national power since regaining independence in 1991: participating in international frameworks and using elements of national power to insulate itself from hostile Russian actions. Within international frameworks, Estonia uses diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, legal/law enforcement, political, social, and infrastructure (DIMEFILPSI) instruments to counter Russia in two ways. The first is to directly target Russia in coordination with others to create an impact that would be unachievable should Estonia act alone. The second is to enhance Estonia’s profile by influencing allies within the international framework, increasing the chances that these allies will support Estonia’s agenda and interests regarding Russia. Such indirect use of the instruments of national power is frequently seen in small states’ efforts to “punch above their weight” by developing and marketing particular skill sets that may be attractive or useful to others. Estonia’s second, more inward-facing approach to applying elements of national power is to use them to insulate itself from hostile Russian actions.1 This approach might be labeled resilience-building; examples include programs to erase uneven development across Estonia’s regions, as well as strategic communications policies to engage and inform the population about national-security-related activities. The importance of resilience in modern security thinking is evident in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’s recognition that it is “an essential basis for credible deterrence and defence and effective fulfillment of the Alliance’s core tasks.”2 This second approach is more important for Estonia’s security on a day-to-day basis. Resilience-building measures can increase societies’ abilities to deal with a range of risks, making them able to counter Russian political warfare. Russia has a clear, long-term objective to achieve a more prominent place in the European and global security systems, so it acts to weaken the current Western-dominated architecture. It finds and exploits opportunities that challenge Western security structures and Western cohesion, such as its ongoing aggression against Ukraine, 2008 attack on Georgia, military intervention in the Syrian civil war, and probable orchestration of the 2007 cyber attacks against Estonia. Although such major challenges are rare, Russia also pursues its long-term objective by subjecting Western states to a steady stream of low-key antagonistic actions to create uncertainty and confusion, undermining the targeted states’ confidence. Russia’s day-to-day hostile actions against Estonia include regular incursions into its national airspace, cyber intrusions, allegations of discrimination against the 23.7 percent of the Estonian population that is ethnic Russian, and hostile information policies such as alleging that Estonia’s Russophobic attitudes caused the failure to ratify the Estonia-Russia border treaty.3 These actions are well thought out and often well timed. For example, Russian operatives kidnapped an Estonian agent from the Estonian side of the Estonia-Russia border during NATO’s 2014 Wales Summit and just two days after U.S. President Barack Obama’s reassurance-building visit to Tallinn.4 Russia may thus be considered to be waging political warfare—“a form of strategy that leverages all of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic capabilities at a nation’s disposal to achieve its strategic objectives”5—on the West. This malign statecraft has the potential to create unease and undermine security in the target states, requiring vigilance and an appropriate response from state authorities.6 DIMEFILPSI instruments provide a range of possible resources.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Resilience, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Estonia

8640. Finnish Defense "Left of Bang"

Author:
Jyri Raitasalo
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
Finland has a long tradition of combining military and non-military aspects of defense. During the Cold War this crystallized within the concept of “total defense,” the mobilization of the entire society for the potential purpose of war. Throughout the Cold War, the all-penetrating threat from the Soviet Union was felt constantly within Finnish society. This threat was not only military in nature but also contained political, economic, energy-related, and even cultural aspects. In today’s parlance, the Soviet Union prosecuted an aggressive campaign of information warfare, hybrid war, and political warfare against Finland. With the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Finland decided to move from a policy of neutrality toward closer cooperation with the Western security community. The concept of total defense with its military-centric focus began to lose significance and meaning. This did not occur overnight. Rather, it was a process of slow decay. A broader conception of security seemed warranted as the all-pervasive and all-penetrating politico-military threat from the East rapidly waned. This was not only the case in Finland but also throughout the Western world. Western states—Finland among them—have gradually stretched the contours of the concept of security during the last 30 years. Today, the Western—and Finnish—notions of international security are extremely broad—both concerning the different sectors of security (military, economic, environmental, societal, etc.) and different referent objects of security (the state, the nation, individual security, the stability of the international system).1 During the post–Cold War era, the Finnish system of total defense was gradually redefined into a comprehensive security model. This model was first formalized in 2003—more than a decade before the West became obsessed with Russia’s Gerasimov doctrine,2 hybrid warfare,3 the gray zone,4 the weaponization of information,5 and weaponized narratives.6 This model has been developed and practiced ever since, with the Government of Finland issuing official strategy updates in 2006, 2010, and 2017. The model has been based on the increasing cooperation among different authorities, the business community, and the third-sector actors in tackling an ever-widening spectrum of security threats. These threats include information threats, threats to data networks, the threat of large-scale immigration, terrorism, military pressure against Finland, and dozens of other threat scenarios.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Cold War, Regional Cooperation, and Post-Cold War
Political Geography:
Europe and Finland

8641. Lithuania’s Total Defense Review

Author:
Dalia Bankauskaitė and Deividas Šlekys
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
Russian aggression against Ukraine since 2014, and especially after February 2022, was a gamechanger that radically transformed the geopolitical and security environment in the Baltic Sea Region. Russia’s aggressive and unpredictable behavior pushed Western capitals out of their comfort zone, while the Baltic states understood the new reality and reacted swiftly. Lithuania performed the most drastic overhaul of its security and defense policy since independence in 1990. Some say that the real formation and development of the modern Lithuanian Armed Forces (LAF) started then. For several years following independence many did not focus on national defense issues. After joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2004 Lithuanians relaxed, as did the many other NATO allies. At that time the thinking was that liberal democracy would prevail in the region. Also, NATO would help in times of crisis, therefore there was no need for increased spending on defense or LAF development.1 This article describes the development of Lithuania’s total defense policy, which focuses on a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach.2 It discusses the major changes in the Lithuanian security and defense policy during the last 8 years, concentrating on political-military and strategic issues. The article is organized in three parts. The first discusses major conceptual debates concerning the best options for the state defense. These discussions mainly circled around the ideas of hybrid warfare, total defense, and the Suwalki Corridor dilemma. The second part focuses on institutional and political changes in Lithuania’s defense sector with an emphasis on such issues as Lithuania’s international cooperation and conscription. The third part deals with the dilemma of society’s engagement in defense issues and the challenges that presents.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Lithuania, and Baltic States

8642. Understanding Department of National Defence / Canadian Armed Forces (DND/CAF) Research and Capability Needs to Deter and Limit the Impacts of (Adversary) [Dis]information

Author:
Brett Boudreau
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
The three-fold objective of this Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) study is to: Better understand the near- and longer-term research and capability needs of the DND/CAF to more effectively deter and counter adversary disinformation; Improve the resilience of National Defence against disinformation; and, Describe issues germane to achieving greater resilience and more effective deterrence. The report is informed by a broad review of relevant literature, media content and civil society reports about disinformation; unclassified DND/CAF reviews of inform-persuade-influence (cognitive domain) information-related capabilities; and 31 interviews with select serving and retired military officers, senior officials/thought leaders, and subject matter experts in the information field. This report identifies five uncomfortable truths about the informational space: The CAF approach is ad hoc, tactical and bottom-up, not deliberate, strategic and leader-driven; Home-grown disinformation is more dangerous than that which is foreign-inspired and enabled; People are more vulnerable to disinformation because of underlying social issues that remain unaddressed: exposure to false information amplifies vulnerability, but this is not the root cause; More “good” and less “bad” information does not provide immunity to disinformation. A protective measure (not a cure), is a commitment to much more transparent internal and external communications, thereby bolstering public trust and credibility in national institutions; and, There is a real imbalance of resources and effort put toward countering just Russian disinformation. While important, that is a very well researched field and comes at the expense of focus on more serious domestic, and foreign information manipulation and interference threats. The report findings demonstrate that National Defence is poorly placed and inadequately prepared to substantively defend its interests and equities against mis- and disinformation, particularly in the domestic context. Many in the DND/CAF acknowledge the informational space needs to be central to its operations and activities, but this is not yet realized through actions or effort by senior-most leaders and remains an aspirational view. This blatant “say-do” gap is the inevitable outcome over many years of a lack of strategic-level, institution-wide direction and guidance for information-related capabilities, no strategic command HQ, and no institutional champion. The problem set is habitually viewed mainly through a public affairs lens and as an Army Reserve force generation issue, not as a joint, command-led integrated capability requirement. Doctrine and rules that govern public communications are nearly all more than twenty years old, predating the invention of the iPhone (2007) by a decade. The organization in large measure remains allergic to outside advice to help inform the progressive development of fit-for-purpose policy, and is reluctant to “share” or meaningfully collaborate with external partners. Fear of public missteps and further reputational damage stalled important reform initiatives for years, though there is now evidence of some welcome momentum in the key area of policy and doctrine development. This situation should be of particular concern to an organization in a self-described “existential crisis,” which makes the DND/CAF more susceptible to harm by mis- and disinformation wherever the provenance, but especially to domestic forms. On overseas operations as part of a NATO or coalition effort, the CAF is substantively better placed to defend itself and manoeuvre in the information space even if not able to decisively counter and obtain strategic success. There is significant extant DND/CAF capability to more effectively tackle mis- and disinformation, but this remains largely untapped due to an institutional mindset toward the informational space that is rooted firmly in the pre-Internet Cold War. This analysis is explained in 25 key findings grouped in five observations in each of five thematic areas. Situational overview 1. Public (external and internal) trust in the institution is the key variable. 2. Strategic-level direction, guidance, planning and oversight is a prerequisite, but is lacking. 3. Significant extant and prospective capability: problem is mindset and organization, not resources. 4. Treated as a CAF Public Affairs and Army Reserve problem, not an integrated/joint requirement. 5. The institution is spooked: progress on information-related capability reform has atrophied. Mindset 6. Institutional transparency translates to more public and internal trust, and a more resilient force. 7. Identify the “one neck to choke” to lead related reform initiatives. 8. No effective “5F” capability lead to Force Generate, Manage, Develop, Employ, Support. 9. Related policy, doctrine, orders, and legislation are antiquated and unfit-for-purpose. 10. Shift to a proactive deliberate strategy from an ad-hoc reactive approach. Process 11. Know the baseline. 12. Learn from benchmarks. 13. Adopt “open source” information-related policy development. 14. Widen the communications aperture. 15. If you like current outcomes and effects, keep doing the work that way. Capabilities 16. Protect the force and family. 17. Train and educate the force, treating information-related capabilities like a joint enabler. 18. Develop professional information practitioners. 19. Reinforce and amplify success. 20. Leverage inherent civil society advantages to help build resilience. Organization Of Effort 21. Need a federal government strategy, and a DND/CAF strategy. 22. Need effective coordinating bodies at a Central Agency, and at DND/CAF. 23. Need better mechanisms for senior-leader direction, guidance, oversight and governance. 24. Need to re-energize the public affairs (PA) functional authority. 25. Need to publicly explain the need better. Five Key Research Areas This report also suggests five key areas for targeted DND/CAF research-related and capability investments in the short and medium term: A tool to visualize the information environment to assist planners, practitioners, and leaders; A model to replace the broken IO/Influence Activity construct, and formally acknowledge “cognition” as a sixth operational domain (alongside air, land, sea, space, cyber); Guidelines to reduce ambiguities about what DND/CAF information-related activities are permissible, not permissible, and situation-dependant in the informational space; A comprehensive open-source repository of tradecraft, techniques, case study examples, and lessons about military-related counter-disinformation needs and requirements; and, Create appropriate cognitive domain education, training, and talent management for the force.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Armed Forces, Disinformation, and Hybrid Threats
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

8643. The Genocide Convention at 75: An Australian Perspective

Author:
Deborah Mayersen
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA)
Abstract:
As we approach the 75th anniversary of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention), it is important to reflect on it from an Australian perspective. Australia’s ratification of the Convention in 1949 has and continues to have very significant impacts both domestically and with respect to foreign policy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Genocide, and United Nations
Political Geography:
Australia and Oceania

8644. The Struggle for Law and Rights: Dejusticia's Fifteen-Plus Years Working toward Socioenvironmental Justice and the Rule of Law

Author:
Rodrigo Uprimny Yepes and Vivian Newman Pont
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
Dejusticia
Abstract:
This book features two presentations by Rodrigo Uprimny and Vivian Newman, both former directors of Dejusticia, that were delivered in 2020 to mark the occasion of the Tang Prize that was bestowed on Dejusticia that year. The first presentation explores Dejusticia’s relationship with the rule of law. It examines the differences between Dejusticia and other civil society organizations, as well as the action-research methodology that characterizes Dejusticia’s work and allows the organization to connect with the reality around us. It then discusses the role of the rule of law in contemporary society, where urgent social change is needed, and concludes with a discussion of the challenges that organizations such as Dejusticia have dealt with in the past and must tackle in the future. The second presentation explores the potential and limits of one of Dejusticia’s main tools: strategic litigation as an instrument for social and environmental justice. It offers examples of victories achieved by Dejusticia and its allies using litigation and offers some lessons learned during the organization’s fifteen-plus years using the law to change lives.
Topic:
Civil Society, Rule of Law, NGOs, Strategic Litigation, and Action Research
Political Geography:
Global Focus

8645. Luchar contra la corriente: derechos humanos y justicia climática en el Sur global (bilingüe)

Author:
Alejandra Donoso, Seyed Mahdi Khodaei, Bruno Martins Morais, Mildred Meléndez Otero, and Jessica Corredor
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
Dejusticia
Abstract:
"This book is the result of the collective effort of participants from Dejusticia’s seventh annual Global Action-Research Workshop for Young Human Rights Advocates, held in Bogotá and Putumayo, Colombia, in 2019. This encounter brought together seventeen activists from the global South to reflect on the challenges posed by the current climate crisis and possible strategies for addressing this crisis that place human rights at the forefront. The four chapters in this book—which explore cases from Brazil, Chile, Iran, and Puerto Rico—show how even though the picture is bleak with regard to climate change’s impacts on human rights, there is hope when we place communities and their rights front and center. In summary, this book argues that the struggle against climate change must be transversal to other social demands and that it is through collective action around human rights—based on robust research—that we can effectively address the climate crisis."
Topic:
Climate Change, Human Rights, Global South, and Climate Justice
Political Geography:
Iran, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Puerto Rico, and Global South

8646. Stakeholder Submission. Universal Periodic Review 44th Session - Colombia

Author:
Alexandrine Pirlot de Corbion, Daniel Ospina-Celis, and Juan de Brigard
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Dejusticia
Abstract:
This report aims to generate doubts and raise questions about the protection of the rights to freedom of expression and opinion, privacy, personal data protection, the closing of spaces for civil society, and the right to protest, as well as the rights of the Venezuelan migrant and refugee population. Through 52 sections containing information about various cases that demonstrate the excessive use of public force against migrants and protesters, the reality of digital violence against women due to gender-related issues, the existing barriers to access to education for migrant girls, boys, and adolescents, the difficulties in accessing and remaining in the labor market for migrant populations, and other aspects of the lack of human rights protection, Dejusticia, the Karisma Foundation, and Privacy International expose these cases of violence and discrimination. In the end, they propose a list of recommendations to the Colombian government regarding the aforementioned cases.
Topic:
Refugees, Freedom of Expression, Protests, Migrants, Data Protection, and Digital Violence
Political Geography:
Colombia, South America, and Venezuela

8647. State Intelligence Gathering on the Internet and Social Media: The Case of Colombia

Author:
Lucía Camacho, Daniel Ospina Celis, and Ramón Mejía
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Dejusticia
Abstract:
"In this report, we explore this subject by drawing on the “Secret Dossiers” case published in 2020 by Semana magazine, which shows how the Colombian state exploits social media and the internet in order to monitor and profile individuals. Our analysis warns that the safeguards present in existing legislation are rather sparse and that intelligence agencies’ desire to self-regulate on the issue of open source intelligence is almost nonexistent despite these agencies’ surprising clarity about the data on the internet and the social media that interest them. We believe that, in the discussion on desirable limits, the insights that have emerged regarding the passive monitoring of the electromagnetic spectrum and the interception of communications offer valuable lessons for better addressing the impact of online intelligence."
Topic:
Intelligence, Science and Technology, Privacy, Internet, Social Media, and Transparency
Political Geography:
Colombia and South America

8648. Documenting Privacy Dark Patterns: How Social Networking Sites Influence Users’ Privacy Choices

Author:
Dominique Kelly and Jacquelyn Burkell
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Human Capital and Productivity (CHCP), Western University
Abstract:
Dark patterns are user interface (UI) design strategies intended to influence users to make choices or perform actions that benefit online services. This study examines the dark patterns employed by social networking sites (SNSs) to influence users to make privacy-invasive choices. We documented the privacy dark patterns encountered in attempts to register an account, configure account settings, and log in and out for five SNSs popular among American teenagers (Discord, Twitter, Instagram, TikTok, and Snapchat). Based on our observations, we present a typology consisting of three major types of privacy dark patterns (Obstruction, Obfuscation, and Pressure) and 10 subtypes. These strategies undermine the ability of users to make conscious, informed decisions about the management of their personal data – and as prolific users of social media who sometimes demonstrate a lack of knowledge and concern about online privacy, teens are especially vulnerable. We outline the implications of our findings for teens’ privacy on social media and the development of dark pattern countermeasures.
Topic:
Privacy, Internet, Social Media, and Social Networks
Political Geography:
Global Focus