Search

Begin New Search Publication Year within 3 Years Publication Year within 5 Years

131. Beyond the Hype: Assessing Hyperscaler Nuclear Commitments Against U.S. Energy Realities

Author:
John Pendleton and Mackenzie Schuessler
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Electricity demand is rising rapidly, along with growing enthusiasm for nuclear power. In addition to climate concerns and the desire for secure energy, these needs are driven in large part by the planned expansion of data centers for artificial intelligence and cloud computing. The United States is home to the world’s largest data center market and the leading global cloud service providers, including Alphabet (Google), Amazon, Meta (Facebook), and Microsoft. These firms—or “hyperscalers”—design, build, and operate massive data center facilities that support skyrocketing AI demands, but require large amounts of firm, scalable, and always-available power. This puts new pressure on electricity grids already facing capacity, reliability, and affordability challenges. As technology companies pursue aggressive AI buildouts, they are seeking innovative ways to meet their energy demands. Nuclear power has thus entered the conversation as one of the few energy sources capable of delivering the kind of firm, high-density electricity that data centers need while simultaneously allowing companies to maintain public climate commitments.1 The entry of hyperscalers into a rapidly evolving nuclear energy market introduces new dynamics to what has been a highly regulated and slow-moving industry. Since 2024, a series of high-profile agreements have been announced between hyperscalers and nuclear utilities, vendors, and reactor designers. These deals signal enthusiasm for the sector, but it is still unclear whether big tech is willing to make big bets on nuclear power. This paper explores how large U.S. technology companies are approaching nuclear power in the context of their energy strategies to meet the escalating demands from AI. The first section describes the approaches hyperscalers are using to secure nuclear energy. To date, their efforts reflect their preference to be energy offtakers (customers) over direct nuclear ownership or project development. The second section then assesses why these approaches have remained cautious, considering factors such as priorities, timing, and costs. Additionally, it considers key entanglement risks that big tech will need to confront including potential reputational exposure, nonproliferation concerns, and management of long-term nuclear waste.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Nuclear Energy, and Energy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

132. AI and Democracy: Mapping the Intersections

Author:
Rachel George and Ian Klaus
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
AI poses substantial threats and opportunities for democracy in an important year ahead for global democracy. Despite the threats, AI technologies can also improve representative politics, citizen participation, and governance. AI influences democracy through multiple entry points, including elections, citizen deliberation, government services, and social cohesion, all of which are influenced by geopolitics and security. All of these domains, mapped in this paper, face threats related to influence, integrity, and bias, yet also present opportunities for targeted interventions. The current field of interventions at the intersection of AI and democracy is diverse, fragmented, and boutique. Not all AI interventions with the potential to influence democracy are framed as “democracy work,” demonstrating the imperative for democracy advocates to widen the rhetorical aperture and to continue to map, identify, and scale interventions. Diverse actors who are relevant to the connections between AI and democracy require tailored expertise and guardrails to maximize benefits and reduce harms. We present four prominent constellations of actors who operate at the AI–democracy intersection: policy-led, technology-enabled; politics-led, technology-enabled; civil society–led, technology-enabled; and technology-led, policy-deployed. Though each brings advantages, policy-led and technology-led interventions tend to have access to resources and innovation capacity in ways that enable more immediate and sizable impacts.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Democracy, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
Global Focus

133. This Warming Planet Should Learn How to Talk About Migration

Author:
Alejandro Martin Rodriguez
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The places where people can live—with or without dignity—are changing. Extreme heat, droughts, floods, coastal erosion, and sea level rise, among other climate impacts, are reducing the area of the human climate niche, that is, the part of the world most suited for human life. Regardless of how much societies reduce their carbon dioxide emissions today, the locked-in effects of climate change will continue to impact them for decades, if not centuries. In this context, the World Bank estimates that more than 200 million people globally could be forced to leave their homes by 2050. Governments all over the world must design and deliver effective policy responses to the risks associated with this large-scale movement of people. However, policymakers are limited in their options by the prevalence of misinformed narratives on migration (see box 1) that can make the sensible policy paths seem unattainable.
Topic:
Climate Change, Migration, Mobility, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
Global Focus

134. Getting Debt Sustainability Analysis Right: Eight Reforms for the Framework for Low-Income Countries

Author:
C. Randall Henning
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Assessing the sustainability of developing countries’ debt is an essential task of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, but it is also a controversial one. The two institutions are currently reviewing the debt sustainability framework for low-income countries (abbreviated as LIC-DSF). This paper provides a primer on the framework’s basic elements, an overview of critiques from a variety of perspectives, and analysis of selected issues, including the endogeneity of analysis of sustainability, analysis of debtors’ institutional strength, analysis of domestic political conditions, role and exercise of staff judgment, and collaboration between the World Bank and the IMF. The paper recommends eight improvements, including streamlining the institutional indicators, better separating economic analysis from political judgment, adopting certain procedures for applying judgment, and selectively introducing climate considerations.
Topic:
Debt, World Bank, Sustainability, IMF, and Global Economy
Political Geography:
Global Focus

135. Implementing the Biden Administration’s China Strategy

Author:
Christopher S. Chivvis and Senkai Hsia
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
When Joe Biden’s administration took office in January 2021, U.S.-China relations were in free fall. The era of presumed convergence had ended, mutual trust had collapsed, and the risk of escalation was real. The COVID-19 pandemic was raging. The central question was whether the relationship would harden into open and dangerous hostility or settle into a more durable form of rivalry. Biden officials viewed the inheritance of the first Trump administration to be a sharpened awareness of the China challenge but an underdeveloped national strategy and limited institutional capacity for that challenge. They set out to impose greater coherence, discipline, and durability on the U.S. approach to this crucial problem of American statecraft. At the heart of Biden’s approach was the consolidation of a framework for strategic competition with an eye toward coexistence. These officials accepted that China and the Chinese Communist Party are permanent features of the geopolitical landscape and that neither America nor China could meaningfully defeat the other without catastrophic cost. Their objective was therefore not dominance, but competitive coexistence—preserving U.S. advantages while avoiding war. That framing now shapes Washington’s statecraft and has endured even in the second Trump administration, albeit with some adjustments. The Biden team looked to technology as the center of gravity of their strategy. Building on but systematizing earlier efforts, they deployed export controls, industrial policy, and alliance coordination to protect U.S. leadership in semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and advanced manufacturing. For the first time in decades, technological advantage was treated as the decisive arena of great-power rivalry. This shift represents one of their most consequential legacies. The Biden administration also paired competition with sustained diplomacy—especially in the second half of its term. Rather than treating dialogue as a concession, the White House aimed to use it to reduce misperception and manage risk. Strategic communications channels were restored and military-to-military contacts resumed. This produced tangible gains, including improved crisis management and renewed Chinese cooperation on fentanyl enforcement. Biden’s diplomats did not aim to eliminate rivalry, only to stabilize it by convincing Beijing that strategic competition was the appropriate framing for the U.S.-China relationship. Without this diplomatic track, the competitive strategy would have been more dangerous. The administration also emphasized U.S. alliances, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. Security ties with Japan, Australia, India, and the Philippines deepened, and the administration worked to improve military coordination. At the same time, the administration was cautious about market opening, judging the domestic costs to outweigh the alliance building benefits. The alliance network thus grew stronger on defense but less integrated economically than long-term competition may require. On military strategy, the administration took a maximalist approach that bolstered deterrence, but they did so without fully resolving a fundamental question: how much is enough? Investments in regional posture and advanced capabilities were substantial, yet the strategy leaned toward maximizing capability rather than defining sufficiency from a strategic perspective. A competition framework does not require primacy at all costs. Future administrations will need to determine how to balance deterrence with flexibility, fiscal sustainability, and escalation risk—especially as the depth of U.S. support for conflict with China can be questioned. Biden’s China policy was calibrated realism—neither naive nor warlike. It recognized that long-term competition will be decided more by American domestic vitality than by military deployments. The strategy’s enduring insight is that diplomacy is an important complement to sustaining technological leadership, economic resilience, political stability, and capable alliances. These ultimately matter more than rhetorical confrontation and maximizing military advantage. The U.S.-China relationship remains fraught and unsettled, but Biden established a structured rivalry that avoided collapse and created a baseline from which future leaders—of either party—can operate.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Strategic Competition, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

136. Duterte’s Populist Foreign Policy as Illiberal Defiance: Consequences and Prospects

Author:
Aries A. Arugay
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Barely two months into his presidency of the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte attended the 2016 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit in Vientiane, Laos. The former mayor of Davao City had just swept the presidential election to become the first executive from outside of the Manila-based political establishment. Rather than reading a scripted speech, he launched into an impromptu tirade about colonial atrocities by the United States. Duterte went on to defend his violent war on drugs and rebut the criticisms of his equally violent purge of suspected criminals.1 The world was shocked by the bad manners exhibited by Duterte, especially his insult to then U.S. president Barack Obama.2 This was the beginning of the shift in Philippine foreign policy toward a more populist, illiberal, and revisionist posture—one that would last until Duterte’s presidency ended in 2022. This essay advances two core arguments about how Duterte’s right-wing populism shaped Philippine foreign policy. First, Duterte’s foreign policy was not motivated by an ideology, so much as by a performance anchored in symbolic defiance, personalized diplomacy, and selective norm rejection.3 Second, Duterte’s populist revisionism ultimately collided with entrenched structural constraints, including the country’s enduring security dependence on the United States, institutional resistance within the bureaucracy, and the democratic political succession that brought the nonpopulist President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. to power. Taken together, these constraints exposed the limits of populist foreign policy in a small and militarily vulnerable state situated on the front lines of the U.S.-China rivalry. Since Duterte was elected, there has been widespread recognition that populism’s impact goes beyond national borders. In Europe, for instance, populists tended not to touch traditional foreign policy and security issues until the 2015 refugee crisis. The wave of populism that followed was marked by a contempt for the cosmopolitan European outlook that had long underpinned support for the European Union, liberal migration policies, and Europe’s reliance on the United States for its security.4 Populists on both the left and right are often skeptical of multilateral institutions because they restrain state power. Venezuela’s former president Hugo Chávez, for example, attempted to form alternative regional institutions in the Americas to counter U.S. hegemony.5 The revisionist impulse inherent in populism inclines its leaders toward foreign policy adventurism, even though abrupt shifts are uncommon given the durability of national strategic interests. Populist leaders also often exhibit a high risk tolerance—especially personalist leaders in command of highly concentrated state power.6 Moreover, they often see foreign policy as a means of weakening their political opponents and consolidating power at home. They also crave international recognition, which they pursue through “megaphone diplomacy” that foregrounds their personality and charisma.7 The burden of managing foreign relations is bearable for the populist up to the point that strategic reality intervenes, imposing itself in ways that leave scant room for performance. Populist politics, therefore, are unable to resist the water’s edge. This essay proceeds by tracing the right-wing populist currents in Philippine foreign policy under Duterte through three major international issues: disputes with China in the South China Sea, the attempted abrogation of the Visiting Forces Agreement with the United States, and the country’s withdrawal from the International Criminal Court (ICC). Respectively, each of these issues foregrounds one of the foundations of Philippine foreign policy that Duterte attempted to undermine: international law, the Philippines’ alliance with the United States, and human rights. The essay goes on to analyze how these foreign policy stances resonated with the revisionist orientations of countries that Duterte sought inspiration from—namely China and Russia. These revisionist narratives were reinforced in the Philippines through domestic disinformation networks that learned strategies from Russia and China.8 Finally, the essay highlights the implications of Duterte’s populist policies under the Marcos Jr. administration and examines the prospects of their revival in the future.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Populism, and Illiberalism
Political Geography:
Asia and Philippines

137. The French Far Right’s Foreign Policy: Big Ambitions, Uncertain Direction

Author:
Catherine Fieschi
Publication Date:
05-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
France occupies a singular position in Europe when it comes to right-wing populist and far-right politics. The country is home to one of the oldest and most electorally successful far-right and populist traditions in Western Europe—from its pre–Second World War thinkers such as Charles Maurras and groups such as Action Française to the tax revolt movement of Pierre Poujade in the 1950s and now the political party known as the Rassemblement National (National Rally)—yet no right-wing populist or far-right party has captured the presidency since the Second World War. At the same time, in France of all European countries, such a takeover would have the most immediate and consequential foreign policy effects, given the extraordinary concentration of diplomatic and military authority vested in the French presidency itself. The case of the National Rally offers a useful window into the intersection of populism, foreign policy, and strong presidentialism. Specifically, it highlights the difficulties populist leaders encounter in building alliances, both globally and within Europe, and helps explain why populists may end up hedging on key foreign policy positions. The possibility of a Marine Le Pen or Jordan Bardella presidency, moreover, underscores a broader risk: that right-wing populism in middle powers could erode the very international order that has enabled middle powers to attain and sustain their influence. The differences between the National Rally’s two leaders—Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella—are also emblematic of a broader divide among right-wing populists in Europe: On the one side, there are those who aim to reshape Europe from within by steering EU institutions in a conservative-national direction. Hungary’s ousted Viktor Orbán and Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni loosely embody this side, which in France is represented by Jordan Bardella. On the other side, there are those who reject the EU’s supranational constraints altogether. Matteo Salvini, Italy’s deputy prime minister, represents the latter, which in France is closer to Le Pen. What makes France distinctive is that this divide exists within a single party and between its two potential presidential candidates for 2027—with Le Pen retaining the loyalty of much of the party’s cadre, but with Bardella, despite internal resistance, also commanding broad electoral support.1 In France, the question of who will campaign for the presidency will therefore be critical.2 Le Pen—and her “brand”—remains the party’s strongest electoral asset and would likely have a better chance of winning a presidential election than Bardella. Yet her instincts remain more confrontational toward Europe and multilateral institutions. By contrast, while Bardella is more market-friendly and potentially less disruptive internationally, he remains—despite his popularity with voters—untested in the uniquely demanding environment of French presidential campaigning.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Populism, Domestic Politics, and Far Right
Political Geography:
Europe and France

138. From Digitalization to Forest Pedagogy: Innovative Educational Pathways for Sustainable Development in Poland

Author:
Szymon Godawa
Publication Date:
05-2026
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:
Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:
Education for sustainable development (ESD) requires new forms of teacher preparation that combine theoretical knowledge with practical experience. The aim of this study was to analyze and evaluate the effectiveness of workshop-based classes designed to develop micro-competences – understood here as narrowly defined, measurable components of professional competences that can be certified through micro-credentials in accordance with European Commission guidelines (2022). The research was qualitative in nature and was conducted within the interpretive paradigm. Participant observation and document analysis were applied, including thematic analysis of didactic commentaries following Braun & Clarke’s (2006) procedure. The study involved 70 fifth-year students of preschool and early school pedagogy, who participated in 15 hours of lectures and 15 hours of exercises dedicated to the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the UN 2030 Agenda. The results show that students significantly developed social competences (teamwork, empathy, communication), the ability to integrate theory with practice, and critical thinking regarding socio-ecological challenges. They demonstrated high readiness to implement educational innovations and to apply the principles of Universal Design for Learning (UDL). However, deficiencies were observed in entrepreneurial competences, particularly in planning and initiating micro-enterprises, which indicates the need to strengthen economic and career education in teacher training. These findings confirm that well-structured, experiential ESD activities are an effective means of preparing future teachers for the challenges of the 21st century. They also highlight the need to supplement curricula with elements developing entrepreneurial and systemic thinking, which are crucial for building ecological social capital and promoting lifelong learning.
Topic:
Education, Pedagogy, Innovation, Digitalization, Sustainable Development, Credentials, and Experiential Learning
Political Geography:
Europe and Poland

139. Resilience and Cross-Border Cooperation in Cultural Heritage Protection: The Lublin Triangle’s Response to Ukraine’s Cultural Crisis

Author:
Elżbieta Olzacka and Katarzyna Pasternak
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:
Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:
The article examines how Poland and Lithuania supported Ukraine’s cultural heritage during Russia’s full scale invasion and clarifies the Lublin Triangle’s primarily political, solidarity building function rather than an operational delivery role. Drawing on qualitative analysis of official documents, institutional reports, public communications, and stakeholder interviews, it evaluates cultural sector responses in 2022–2023 with attention to delivery capacity, coordination, and sustainability. The study finds that targeted aid to museums, archives, and memory institutions was provided chiefly through bilateral and institution to institution mechanisms, while the Lublin Triangle consolidated political messaging without generating rapid tools for cultural protection. Across cases, core contribution areas included logistics (protective materials and transport), training (emergency safeguarding and evacuation), documentation (damage assessment and digitization), and international advocacy (UNESCO aligned actions and anti trafficking guidance). The analysis underscores the need to institutionalize hybrid, apolitical arrangements that couple governmental legitimacy with the flexibility and resilience of civil society networks, mitigating vulnerability to political cycles and sustaining cultural heritage protection under wartime conditions.
Topic:
Museums, Resilience, Heritage, Cooperation, Protection, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, and Lublin Triangle

140. Ecological Statecraft in the Midst of War: Water, Regeneration, and the Future of Gulf Security

Author:
Olivia Lazard and Ali Bin Shahid
Publication Date:
05-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The 2026 U.S.-Iran war is radiating through the Gulf’s energy systems, maritime routes, supply chains, food corridors, financial flows, and regional diplomacy—and its effects will be long-lasting. In energy markets, the war is accelerating demand toward more autonomous sources like renewables. On food, the world is bracing for a compound crisis: a convergence of disrupted fertilizer supply chains, inflationary pressures, and El Niño–induced crop failures. These are cascading trends that will demand sustained attention for years to come. But one long-tail effect has already slipped out of view. The war has crossed a dangerous threshold: Infrastructure essential to civilian survival, including desalination facilities, has been directly targeted. Water infrastructure is emerging as a strategic target in kinetic warfare against a background of structural scarcity. This marks a qualitative shift in the Gulf’s security landscape. In a region defined by extreme aridity, collapsing groundwater reserves, and deep structural dependence on manufactured water, desalination infrastructure is not merely a technical utility; it is part of the region’s survival architecture. Millions depend on a relatively concentrated set of energy-intensive coastal plants for drinking water, industry, and urban continuity. The exposure of this infrastructure reveals that ecological fragility and military escalation are no longer parallel crises: They are becoming fused within a single battle space.
Topic:
Security, Infrastructure, Ecology, Statecraft, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America