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41. The US Should Support the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
More than three years ago, the Taliban swept back into power in Afghanistan after a two-decade insurgency against the internationally backed Afghan government. Since then, the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated considerably. The country faces an acute humanitarian crisis affecting millions and has once again become a haven for transnational terrorism. This tragic outcome was not inevitable, and it is worth reviewing recent history. Starting in 2014, United States troops in Afghanistan were no longer leading daily combat operations but were instead primarily training the Afghan military. When President Donald Trump entered office in January 2017, there were only 11,000 US troops in Afghanistan conducting the counterterrorism and training mission. This was down from a peak of 100,000 troops in 2010–11. In February 2020, Trump agreed to a deal with the Taliban that would have seen the phased withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan by May 2021. This agreement was the starting point of the Afghan government’s collapse and the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021. In January 2021, when President Joe Biden entered office, there were only 2,500 US troops in Afghanistan. Crucially, the US still provided close air support for Afghan forces. While this was not enough troops to ensure that the Afghan government could control the whole country, it was enough for the US to meet its counterterrorism objectives and prevent the Taliban from taking power. Instead of canceling the flawed withdrawal agreement with the Taliban—something that was in Biden’s power to do—the president merely delayed the date from May to September. On July 2 the US departed the strategically located and geopolitically important Bagram Airfield in the middle of the night without warning its Afghan partners. Around the same time, the US stopped providing Afghan troops with close air support. By the end of July, almost all US and international forces had left the country. On August 6, 2021, the Taliban captured Zaranj, the capital of Nimroz Province. This was the first time in almost 20 years that the terror group had successfully captured and held one of Afghanistan’s 34 provincial capitals. Soon after, government-controlled capitals started falling like dominos. The Taliban finally captured Kabul on August 15. By September 11—the twentieth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks—the Taliban controlled more of Afghanistan than it did on that day in 2001. Since the Taliban’s return to power, only one credible and non-extremist group has been willing to take up arms in opposition: the National Resistance Front (NRF) of Afghanistan, led by Ahmad Massoud. Based in the Panjshir Province and operating in more than a dozen other provinces, the NRF has continued to fight against the Taliban against all odds and without any international support. Though there is no longer an American presence in Afghanistan, the country remains geopolitically important. Afghanistan’s location in the heart of the Eurasian landmass has made it strategically significant in great power competition throughout the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries. There is no reason to assume this will change anytime soon. The Biden administration’s actions have left the US without many good policy options in Afghanistan. Furthermore, many Afghans remain distrustful of the White House. But a new US administration will have an opportunity to reset American policy toward the country.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Terrorism, Taliban, Democracy, and National Resistance Front
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and South Asia

42. How the US Can Beat the Kremlin in Moldova

Author:
Peter Rough and Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine was a seismic event for the Republic of Moldova. The war upended Chișinău’s long-held belief that constitutional neutrality would protect the country. Additionally, the invasion focused Brussels’s attention on Moldova, which the European Union has often regarded as an afterthought. Moscow’s war catalyzed Moldova’s politics and forced Chișinău and Brussels to make fundamental choices about their future relationship on an accelerated timetable. If Russia hadn’t launched its full-scale invasion, the EU would have probably not invited Moldova to open accession talks so quickly. Important elections in Moldova and a perilous situation in Ukraine ensure that 2024 will be a pivotal year on Chișinău’s path toward Western integration. United States and European policymakers should proactively shape an outcome that benefits both Moldovans and the Euro-Atlantic community.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Organization, Democracy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Moldova

43. Turkey’s New State in the Making: Transformations in Legality, Economy, and Coercion

Author:
Nurhayat Kavrak
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:
International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:
Turkey’s political history has seen recurring shifts between democratic ideals and authoritarian tendencies, notably during the two decades of the Justice and Development Party’s (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) rule. This transition marked a departure from a relatively democratic façade that emerged in response to the European Union (EU) accession process towards a more authoritarian regime characterized by increased government control and curtailment of civil liberties.1 It is a shift accentuated after the 2013 Gezi protests which culminated in a significant regime change in 2018. This transformation was marked by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s consolidation of power through constitutional amendments, leading to the transition from a parliamentary democracy to a presidential system. To comprehend this transformation, it is imperative to examine the interplay between economic dynamics and the state within the neo-liberal capitalist system, aligning with Poulantzas’ observations on global trends.2 It can be argued that the accumulation and state crises, exacerbated by the 2008 global economic crisis, have contributed to Turkey’s authoritarian shift in parallel with global developments. Originating from a 2018 workshop at Middle East Technical University, Turkey’s New State in the Making: Transformations in Legality, Economy, and Coercion provides a historical-sociological perspective on Turkey’s state crises, serving as a vital resource for comprehending authoritarianism and class-state relations and offering an in-depth exploration of the AKP regime’s transformation, presenting a continuum of its history rather than a rigid division between democratic and authoritarian phases.
Topic:
International Relations, History, Authoritarianism, Democracy, Economy, Book Review, AKP, and Coercion
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, and European Union

44. Japan’s Approach to the Global South

Author:
Tobias Harris
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, in a January 2023 speech in Washington, DC, stressed that if the G7 countries and their developed-world peers neglect the “Global South”, “we will find ourselves in the minority and unable to resolve mounting policy issues.” These remarks set the stage for a major theme of Japan’s G7 presidency that year, during which Tokyo continued to highlight the importance of more “humility” to strengthen relations between the group’s members and the “Global South”. The G7 leaders’ communiqué at their May 2023 Hiroshima summit did not refer explicitly to the Global South—the United States and other nations did not necessarily share Japan’s preference for the term, which risks treating as monolithic an enormously diverse array of countries—but the document stressed the importance of addressing the needs of middle- and low-income states, including a commitment to “continued efforts to scale up official development assistance (ODA)” and to adopting “innovative financing mechanisms”. This emphasis on outreach to the developing countries assumed greater urgency following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, when they were often reluctant to support Western efforts to isolate and punish the Kremlin for its aggression. Japan’s approach to the “Global South” is not merely rhetorical. The Kishida government inherited a long-standing approach to developing nations, particularly those in Asia, that seeks to leverage Japanese ODA and public and private investment. The approach has two goals: to promote growth and strengthen economic ties with developing countries, and to foster trust and political credibility that can be translated into influence. The strategy is shaped by Japan’s national interests but seeks to address developing countries’ economic needs without drawing them into an anti-Beijing bloc. The approach has worked well in Southeast Asia, where, thanks to decades of efforts by successive governments, Japan is viewed particularly favorably. Tokyo now appears increasingly determined to pursue the same strategy in other parts of the “Global South”, including South Asia, the Pacific island states, and, to a lesser extent, Africa and Latin America. As Japan’s G7 peers seek to undertake their own initiatives to improve relations with the “Global South”, the key principles and successes of the country’s policies are worth examining.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Democracy, Business, Global South, and Trade
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

45. Democratic Russian Civil Society Outside Russia? A Window of Opportunity for Support

Author:
Nicolas Bouchet
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Russia has large sources of wealth and military power and is controlled by an autocratic, kleptocratic regime willing to devote these to aggression toward its neighbors, most violently in Ukraine. It is in the interest of Europe and the United States to support Russians who can help the country become more peaceful and democratic, alongside anti-regime measures. Repression has made supporting democratic actors in Russia extremely difficult but not impossible. That goal must now be complemented. Around 1 million people have left Russia since it invaded Ukraine in 2022. This opens a window of opportunity for unimpeded access to a large number of Russians to aid the spread of democratic ideas; raising the prospect of a democratic civil society developing outside the country. Europe and the United States need a strategy to support the democratic potential of the recent emigrants. Their largest concentrations are in the South Caucasus, Central Asia, the Western Balkans as well as Israel, Türkiye, the EU and the United States. The bulk of the emigrants are young adults who are richer, more educated, and more politically interested or active than the average citizen in Russia. For most, the motivations for leaving mixed political, economic, and lifestyle factors, and for many also unwillingness to be drafted into the military. The majority have democratic, anti-regime, and antiwar views. The emigrants include long-standing and newly civically and politically active individuals. A large share continue engagement abroad in diverse organizations and initiatives. Their activities focus on rebuilding civil society organizations (CSOs) and media abroad, supporting democratic actors and spreading independent information in Russia, and antiwar initiatives. They provide help to new emigrants and aim to build up their communities. These activities are carried out from one or more host countries, building transnational networks. There are new grassroots actions and initiatives by emigrants who had less or no direct experience of activism in Russia. Emigrant groups mostly operate through horizontal, fluid networks. Many of these are small and informal, but there are larger, more structured ones. Emigrant communities also offer a space for critical debate about the need for democratic change and the link between this and Russia’s colonial/imperial heritage and aggression. The recent emigrants’ activities face many challenges, including those in operating networks reliant on online resources; in connecting digital and non-digital activism; and in planning beyond the short term without sufficient resources. They are hampered by reliance on small (often part-time) core teams and volunteers. Many activists experience financial precarity, employment insecurity, and burnout. Security is a major concern due to the risk of infiltration, destabilization, and cyber and physical attacks by Russia’s security apparatus. The situation for emigrants has become more restrictive or less safe in some host countries. Individuals and organizations that oppose the Russian regime are also affected by restrictive international measures against it, such as ones against money laundering and the monetization of online content, or the denial of access to financial, professional, and commercial services. As Russians have realized that emigration will be for a longer term, the phase of settling in a host country became more prominent than the earlier exit phase. For many, this includes the need to move from the first host country, with those more politically active more likely to look for one with a safer, more enabling environment. This will largely mean seeking to move to an EU or other Western country. The non-EU countries easiest for Russians to access are also the ones where their prospects are more uncertain, whereas the EU countries are harder to access but offer more certain prospects. Russia in the 1990s showed how an unpredicted democratic opening can fail to lead to lasting or deep change. Today, alongside aiding political and nongovernmental actors, democracy-support providers should also try to help Russian society evolve in a democratic direction. The new emigrant activities are seeds for a democratic civil society abroad that is closely connected to, and supportive of, the one in Russia. Three principles should underpin a strategy to support the democratic potential of the recent Russian emigration: shifting emphasis to the settling phase of emigration, prioritizing connectivity within the emigration, and helping weave a civil society abroad. To foster the development of a democratic civil society among Russian emigrants, assistance musttarget the building of a wider community that can be more effective and serve as a model in Russia. For this, the landscape of Russians outside Russia can be seen as four concentric circles, based on their degree of direct political activity: the political opposition in exile; the civil society sector of democracy, human rights, and media organizations; the community of emigrants since 2022, and in particular the new grassroots actors and initiatives emerging within it; and the older, multigeneration Russian diaspora. A democracy support strategy for Russian emigrants should not be open-ended but time-bound, with a pragmatic approach in an uncertain environment. It can be assessed in 2030, when President Vladimir Putin’s current term as president is due to end, which could be a time of political turbulence. The strategy can be initially implemented within the next 12–24 months, with annual review of support offered to civil society, especially at the grassroots, with the potential to grow and to reach out to the apolitical emigrants. Support should consist of mostly small, short-term assistance to actors and initiatives that would have until 2030 to show that they have impact and longer-term potential. It is crucial to support the widest range of diverse, dispersed actors of different sizes so that they can keep operating. The focus should not be only on formal organizations but also on more bounded initiatives and projects. Part of the assistance should focus on enabling politically and civically active emigrants to connect physically and virtually across locations, and to focus on flexible networking suited to their mobility challenges. Funders need to think widely in terms of locations and formats for delivering support. Using different, sometimes unconventional, ways of engaging emigrant actors is a necessity. Support should not rely only on usual formats, not least since new ones for activities are emerging from within the emigrant landscape. Such support is also key for encouraging and amplifying the critical thinking in the emigrant landscape as well as connections to new antiwar and anti-imperialist initiatives—a prerequisite for any democratic progress in Russia. Connections are what make a society more than a collection of groups. For the development of a democratic civil society outside Russia, support should be directed not only within the individual circles of the emigration but also at connections between them. The primary focus should be on relations between the second (established CSOs) and third (new grassroots actors) circles to prevent the diverse civically and politically active emigrants and groups being in silos. Contacts with recent emigrants could also eventually encourage changes in attitudes within the older diaspora toward the Russian regime or democratic civic engagement in general.
Topic:
Civil Society, Democracy, Refugees, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

46. The End of Russia’s “Unipolar Moment” in the South Caucasus

Author:
Irakli Sirbiladze
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The war in Ukraine has exposed Russia’s weaknesses and ended its “unipolar moment” in the South Caucasus. This has affected the calculations of the three states in a region where Moscow traditionally had the upper hand over local and competing outside actors. Prior to the war, Russia had been able sustain its security, political, and economic leverage over Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, yet the extent of its influence varied over time and depending on the leadership in each country. Moscow was Armenia’s key ally, bringing the country into its security, political, and economic space. Russia also enjoyed close political and business ties with Azerbaijan, underpinned by shared authoritarianism. Baku joined the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) but stayed out of Russian-led security institutions. Moscow’s role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict gave it particular security leverage over Baku and Yerevan. Russia’s leverage with Georgia has fluctuated. The country joined the CIS but not other Russian-led organizations. Political ties started to erode in the early 2000s, especially following the 2003 Rose Revolution. The 2008 war weakened Russia’s leverage as Georgia left the CIS and cut diplomatic ties. Economic relations have improved since 2012 even as Tbilisi continued to seek EU and NATO membership. The war in Ukraine has weakened Russia’s sway over the region, accelerating what had started with the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War as Moscow sided with Azerbaijan rather than its treaty ally Armenia. This led to growing difference with Yerevan and convergence with Baku. Armenia is now looking for alternative security partners and engaging with the EU and the United States. Azerbaijan is taking advantage of Moscow’s focus on Ukraine to fully achieve its objectives, including the early departure of Russian peacekeepers from its territory. Georgia receiving EU candidate status could have reduced Russia’s leverage but its ruling party’s antidemocratic and anti-West turn keeps favoring Moscow’s influence. Western economic sanctions have further undermined Russia’s hold over the South Caucasus states: it needs them more to connect and trade with Asian markets. The new geo-economic reality favors the three countries and Moscow can now hardly use economic tools against them. Russia’s waning influence has made it one among other players in the South Caucasus. It can no longer ignore the role of China, the EU, Iran, Türkiye, and the United States there. The emerging geopolitical and geo-economic plurality in the region has made Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia more daring and transactional in their engagement with all outside powers. This has implications for the three countries in terms of peace and security, democracy, and geopolitical orientation. Azerbaijan is likely to remain undemocratic and to keep engaging with all powers transactionally to maintain national and regime security. Armenia finds itself in a complicated state of insecurity that affects democratization and makes multi-alignment its default foreign policy orientation. Georgia, whose democratic decline is the result of its own politics, is likely to sustain its multi-aligned and transactional foreign policy posture if the current government stays in power, while an opposition victory in the coming elections might turn the country back to democracy and a West-oriented foreign policy.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Democracy, Geopolitics, and Unipolarity
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, South Caucasus, and Black Sea

47. Disinformation in the City: Response Playbook

Author:
Jessica (Ika) Trijsburg and Paul Costello
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
As actors responsible for decisions and policies that shape people’s daily lives, and as those most aware of community fault lines that are fertile ground for disinformation, city officials are well positioned to respond. Yet, research, analysis, and policymaking related to disinformation have remained at the national and international levels. GMF, the Melbourne Centre for Cities, and other partners have developed a response playbook to help inform and guide city policies and practices to counter disinformation and ultimately to strengthen democracy. In cities, disinformation sometimes manifests itself in physical events, including protests and disruptions. It also has individual impacts for political, institutional, and community leaders and staff. Disinformation affects the functioning of city administrations and elected bodies, impacting governance and policymaking. It also impacts communities, reducing mutual trust and increasing division and polarization. Disinformation commonly exploits existing social fault lines and polarization. In cities, the fault lines targeted by disinformation center around First Nations, migrants, cultural diversity, gender and sexual diversity, health and wellbeing, sustainability and climate issues, and urban planning. Understanding how disinformation spreads, and how to respond effectively, is critical for city governments. Current knowledge, however, is focused mainly on the national and international realms and not readily accessible and translatable for urban governance needs. This is why GMF Cities, in response to needs expressed by many city governments, developed this playbook in collaboration with a core interdisciplinary research team from the Australian National University, Monash University, Deakin University, and Victoria University, led by the Melbourne Centre for Cities at the University of Melbourne. The playbook was developed with representatives from cities, media, the tech sector, civil society, and academia. The process began with an in-depth survey to understand the current experiences of participating cities and responses to disinformation they employed. The findings informed a series of workshops with 40 participants who together created the content of and recommendations in the playbook. The full draft was reviewed by the participants before it was submitted to other cities, city networks, disinformation experts, and other levels of government for pressure testing.
Topic:
Democracy, Cities, and Disinformation
Political Geography:
Global Focus

48. Teaching Difficult Histories: Key Principles For Democracy

Author:
Stuart Austin
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
This project report details the discussions and findings of the Teaching History Programme of the Ratiu Forum from 2023 to 2024, sitting under the Central and South-East Europe Programme. The workshops and conferences engaged with History teachers of post-communist Europe to address the challenges of politicised History curricula and explore methods for teaching difficult and dark pasts – facilitating and improving cross-border understanding within the region. The report concludes with recommendations for teachers generated by the workshops, geared towards open and democratic societies to counter political extremism and autocratic populism, as well as considering the direction for future workshops.
Topic:
Democracy, Populism, History, Political Extremism, and Post-Communism
Political Geography:
Europe

49. The Past, Present, and Future of Realism: A Conversation with Stephen M. Walt—February 2024

Author:
Stephen M. Walt
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
I liked realism from the start because I thought it did a much better job of explaining how states behave than other theories. It is not perfect, and it’s not that other perspectives don’t make their own contributions to our understanding, but I felt that realism had a much better track record in explaining how countries behaved. It also had extraordinary range across time and space: realist ideas could explain a lot about how empires acted, how city-states acted, how nation-states acted. It had explanations for why wars occur, why alliances form, why some states rise and fall. So it had a very wide applicability. And I thought that the main modern rivals to realist theory just weren’t as persuasive. Liberal theories didn’t predict that well. A good liberal would think that democracies would act fundamentally differently than autocracies, but the evidence that they do is limited. And as we talked about before, realism tells you that international law or norms will be of only limited value in controlling what the most powerful states will do.
Topic:
International Affairs, Democracy, Realism, and State
Political Geography:
Global Focus

50. Electoral Fraud and the Weakening Of Cameroonian Democracy

Author:
Joseph Thierry Okala Ebode
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
The resurgence of democracy in Cameroon, mirroring trends across Francophone sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s, was characterized by electoral system reforms and the introduction of multiparty elections (1). However, the outcomes of these reforms and subsequent elections have often fallen short of expectations. The March 1992 multiparty legislative elections saw opposition parties secure a majority (92 out of 180 seats), yet they were unable to assume power. Since then, despite numerous presidential and local elections, the country has seen neither a transfer of power at the highest levels of government nor the local-level changes citizens have long desired. This aspiration for political alternation continues to be thwarted by a system that consistently reinstates the same leadership. Paradoxically, despite a proliferation of political parties (2), the influence and significance of the opposition continue to wane. This diminishing role of the opposition, coupled with growing democratic disillusionment (3), can be largely attributed to electoral fraud (4). Electoral fraud encompasses any illegal actions aimed at favoring particular candidates or party lists at the expense of others. This raises a critical question: How does electoral fraud, an illegal practice, lead to the disengagement of members of the opposing political landscape, the general public, and particularly the youth, from the political process? To address this, our analysis will focus on two main areas: first, examining fraudulent practices that operate within legal loopholes, and second, investigating overtly illegal fraudulent activities.
Topic:
Elections, Democracy, Domestic Politics, and Fraud
Political Geography:
Africa and Cameroon