Search

Begin New Search Publication Year within 1 Year Publication Year within 25 Years

3051. Building Networks in the Shadows of War: Mapping Challenges and Opportunities

Author:
Eitan Ishai
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
In September 2023, Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies – and the U.S. Department of State launched a joint project to create a civil-society network of regional thinkers and policy experts. The goal was to foster strategic dialogue, cooperation, and deeper normalization between Israel and its neighbors. However, just two weeks later, the Hamas attack of October 7th and the ensuing war reshaped the regional landscape. This report reflects on the project’s initial challenges, the adaptations made in response to the conflict, and the surprising emergence of real connections and public Israeli-Arab dialogue despite the turmoil.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Normalization, Abraham Accords, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and United States of America

3052. For the US and the free world, security demands a resilience-first approach

Author:
Elizabeth Sizeland
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
This report is the foundational document of the Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative (AANSRI) and outlines a bold vision to embed resilience as a core pillar of US and allied security. As crises compound, the initiative calls for investing across individual, institutional, and international levels of resilience to withstand, adapt, and thrive amid disruption.
Topic:
Cybersecurity, Crisis Management, Resilience, Non-Traditional Threats, and Security Partnerships
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

3053. Private industry should step up to protect the global maritime order

Author:
Elisabeth Braw
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Safe oceans are indispensable for the functioning of modern economies. Ocean safety is under severe strain, like the rest of the rules-based international order, not least because major nations actively undermine it. The maritime industry is directly affected by the deterioration of the maritime order—as demonstrated, for example, by the continued growth of the shadow fleet—and should step up to protect it.
Topic:
Economy, Rule of Law, Norms, Private Sector, Industry, and Maritime Security
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3054. 100 Leaders in Europe’s Economies: Benchmarking Investment, Innovation and Impact in Europe

Author:
Matthias Bauer, Andrea Dugo, Dyuti Pandya, and Elena Sisto
Publication Date:
11-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Europe’s competitiveness is built on openness, interdependence, and global embeddedness. Its prosperity depends not on how many firms it “owns”, but on how many choose Europe as a place to invest, innovate, and employ. Both European- and non-European-headquartered multinationals generate vast value added, capital investment, and technological spillovers within Europe – forming the backbone of its industrial renewal, productivity growth, and innovation capacity. Yet the current debate on competitiveness too often turns inward, focusing on the nationality of companies rather than their contribution to Europe’s economy. This framing is outdated and counterproductive. Persisting with it risks depriving Europeans of future economic and technological opportunities, as it diverts political attention from the true drivers of competitiveness: investment, innovation, and integration. If Europe continues to measure success by the passport of a company rather than its productive footprint, it will erode its attractiveness to global investors and talent. The result would be slower technological diffusion, weaker industrial renewal, and fewer high-quality jobs. In an economy where knowledge, data, and capital move seamlessly across borders, a defensive stance will not protect European interests – it will isolate them. To remain a global hub for innovation and advanced production, Europe must replace a politics of ownership with a politics of enablement – one that empowers firms, workers, and innovators to invest and grow within Europe, irrespective of headquarters location. A competitive Europe must remain open, predictable, and globally connected, strengthening both the integrity of its Single Market and its engagement through trade, investment, and multilateral partnerships. Multinational enterprises (MNEs) are the cornerstone of Europe’s competitiveness and technological dynamism. MNEs are consistently the most productive segment of Europe’s economy, driving efficiency gains, technological diffusion, and wage growth that smaller enterprises alone cannot sustain. Although they represent only around 1 per cent of all firms across major European economies, their contribution to output, trade, and employment is disproportionate. Around 151,000 MNE groups operate within the EU and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), employing over 49 million people – roughly 29 per cent of the total business-economy workforce. The majority are European-controlled (73 per cent) and account for 83 per cent of MNE employment, while a small number of very large firms – just 5 per cent with more than 1,000 employees – provide over 80 per cent of all MNE jobs. These firms form the backbone of Europe’s production networks and are the main channels of technology transfer, innovation diffusion, and cross-border investment. This study provides new evidence to inform Europe’s political debate. It analyses 100 of the world’s largest and most research-intensive multinational enterprises with substantial operational footprints in Europe. The sample spans technology, pharmaceuticals, automotive, retail, energy, and manufacturing – comprising 42 European- and 58 non-European-headquartered firms that together generate EUR 10.4 trillion in global revenue and EUR 822 billion in annual capital investment. Their combined presence demonstrates Europe’s enduring appeal as a location to invest, produce, and innovate, as well as its reliance on both domestic and international industrial leaders to sustain competitiveness. Although data gaps remain due to non-standardised corporate disclosures, the findings provide a robust, transparent, and replicable picture of how MNEs shape Europe’s economic fabric – reinforcing its integration into global value chains and its ability to attract frontier industries and talent.
Topic:
Governance, European Union, Investment, Institutions, and Innovation
Political Geography:
Europe

3055. The Services Revolution: Industrial Policy for a Modern Economy

Author:
Andrea Dugo, Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, Philipp Lamprecht, and Erik van der Marel
Publication Date:
11-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
A ”manufacturing-first” attitude has taken hold in the European economic policy discussion. New strategies and industrial policies are designed with the ambition of boosting development and output in traditional industrial sectors. These policies often build on the assumption that industrial development and jobs are “better” than new growth and employment in the services sector – that industry is a stronger source for innovation and higher productivity growth. This view is outdated. It is also misguided and will make Europe less competitive. A growing services sector is featured in all economies that that have matured and expanded prosperity. Over time, the services sector has grown and professionalized – and is increasingly a sector of innovation and growth in productivity. Technological change has provided new opportunities for services to fuel the entire economy with business dynamism and, of course, to improve the performance of industrial companies. Some of the most R&D intensive sectors in the economy are services: global R&D spending has certainly moved towards services. As a result, the services share of value added in modern economies is rapidly increasing. Equally important, the “manufacturing-first” attitude prevents Europe for pursuing reforms that are necessary for the EU services sector to develop. It has been pointed out in several high-level reports – including Mario Draghi’s report on The Future of European Competitiveness – that Europe trails the US in services sector performance. Because of high and restrictive regulations, innovative services sectors have grown a lot slower in the EU than in the US. Europe’s industrial performance is better than in the US: for instance, EU industrial sector R&D is higher than in the US, when measured as share of Gross Domestic Product. Europe’s big economic challenge is to boost the services sector. For Europe to close the gap with the US, it needs to release the competitive energy of the services sector and incentivize more R&D, innovation, and business dynamism in high value-added services sectors like ICT and scientific research. In the paper, we model a scenario in which the EU would be more like the US as far as the services sector is concerned. It would include a remarkable growth in R&D spending. For example, R&D spending on computer programming would rise from EUR 15 to 66 billion – and in services like scientific and research development it would boost R&D by eight times. If the services sector would be thriving more, the European economy would get a serious boost. Different scenarios for a better-performing services sector are modelled in this study. Using cautious assumptions for a new development of the services sector, we find that the EU could add another 280 billion EUR to its Gross Domestic Product over five years – which equals a 1.6 percent growth. There are several reasons why the European services sector trails the US. Digitalization and technological change are part of the explanation. Generally, US services companies have faced fewer regulations and restrictions when developing new technologies and services that fuse with “older” services and help industries to improve their performance. Boosting the European services sector requires more business and market dynamism – and a regulatory environment that primes service companies for faster growth.
Topic:
Globalization, Industrial Policy, Economy, Services, and Trade
Political Geography:
Europe

3056. The Trade Effects of AI Provisions in PTAs: Does Non-Binding Matter?

Author:
Elena Sisto and Erik van der Marel
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
This paper examines whether non-binding (“soft”) AI-related provisions in preferential trade agreements (PTAs) move trade and how their effects compare with binding (“hard”) provisions. The motivation is straightforward: digital rules are spreading quickly, but legal enforceability is uneven. We ask whether non-binding instruments (standards work, data-innovation clauses, interoperability programmes) can deliver trade gains in AI-intensive sectors even without hard obligations. Drawing from TAPED AI-related provisions in PTAs, we construct a measure of AI-related depth, distinguishing binding from non-binding provisions. To identify where these rules should matter most, we interact agreement depth with a sectoral proxy for AI intensity based on firm adoption. We estimate a structural gravity model using PPML with exporter-year, importer-year, pair, and pair-trend fixed effects, and run extensive robustness checks including pooled sector interactions and leads/lags. Key results: Around 40% of AI-related provisions in PTAs are non-binding. Binding AI-related depth is associated with ~13% higher trade in AI-intensive sectors. Non-binding AI-related depth delivers nearly comparable gains (~12%). Binding provisions bite most on customs-duty/digital goods and data-protection items. Non-binding provisions are especially effective for cross-border data flows and new AI/data issues (interoperability, standards, data-innovation). Pooled sector tests confirm positive, significant effects when depth is interacted with AI intensity. Interpretation and implications: In fast-moving, regulation-heavy domains such as AI, credible soft-law cooperation can reduce coordination frictions and facilitate trade, often approaching the impact of binding rules. Policymakers can sequence: use structured non-binding tools to unlock near-term gains where consensus is still forming, while locking in binding disciplines where norms are mature. Policy directions: (i) deploy cooperation chapters, interoperability work programmes, and open-data initiatives to target data-flow frictions; (ii) consolidate binding disciplines on established areas (digital-goods duties, core data-protection principles) to amplify effects; and (iii) invest in standards and translational mechanisms that support firms in AI-intensive sectors. We thank Daniel Trefler for serving as a discussant at the OECD Conference on Trade in Services and for helpful comments and suggestions. We also thank Hildegunn Nordås and Bernard Hoekman for comments. In addition, we would like to thank Lars Vandelaar for excellent research assistance.
Topic:
Globalization, Trade, Artificial Intelligence, Data, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3057. Global Digital Trade Takes Off: Is EU Digital Policy Keeping Pace?

Author:
Elena Sisto and Erik van der Marel
Publication Date:
11-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Global digital trade is increasingly shifting toward faster-growing regions outside Europe, driving greater external demand for the EU’s digitally deliverable services. As digital supply chains continue to mature, they present additional opportunities for the EU to expand and strengthen its digital trade. However, recent evidence suggests that the EU’s regulatory environment may be limiting its potential gains. Since its introduction in 2018, the GDPR’s cross-border data transfer rules are estimated to have reduced the EU’s digital services trade, including exports, by up to 10–12 percent. To enhance its digital trade performance, the EU has several paths forward. First, Brussels should revise the GDPR’s cross-border safeguards while retaining provisions where data protection has a positive but limited impact on trade. Evidence indicates that the former constraints are hindering digital trade potential, whereas the latter are not. Second, the EU should expand its adequacy framework to include more trading partners, a step that could further increase digital services trade by up to 9 percent, with additional gains across the network of adequacy-recognised countries when the United States is included. Additionally, as the AI Act intersects with the GDPR, companies that use personal data in AI systems face dual compliance burdens. This highlights the need for a parallel adequacy framework for AI to enhance regulatory coherence and support AI- and data-related trade. Finally, the EU should broaden its Digital Partnership Agreements. Even non-binding cooperation on data, AI, competition, and standards within preferential trade agreements can increase AI-related trade by up to 9 percent, strengthening both digital innovation and competitiveness.
Topic:
Piracy, European Union, Trade, Artificial Intelligence, Industry, Data, Digital Policy, and Single Market
Political Geography:
Europe

3058. Trade Policy 3.0: Three Scenarios for Tomorrowland

Author:
Lucian Cernat
Publication Date:
11-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Global trade policy is at a crossroads. For decades, trade liberalisation was guided first by macroeconomic principles – Trade Policy 1.0 – and later by firm-level insights and global value chain integration – Trade Policy 2.0. Both approaches shared a liberal, rules-based logic grounded in comparative advantage and multilateral cooperation. Today, that continuity has been disrupted. A new paradigm – Trade Policy 3.0 – is emerging, marked by resilience, strategic autonomy, and economic security as the guiding objectives of trade policymaking. Three major disruptive forces have driven this shift: the pandemic’s exposure of supply chain fragility and the resulting push for strategic autonomy; the revival of industrial policy amid geopolitical tensions and the weaponisation of trade; and the growing influence of technology, data, and digital governance on cross-border relations. Together, these forces have replaced the efficiency-oriented “win-win” logic of past decades with a precautionary and competitive zero-sum mindset. In Trade Policy 3.0, success is measured not by trade growth or GDP gains but by reduced dependencies and greater resilience. This policy brief outlines three plausible futures. An Immunity scenario sees the rules-based system adapt and absorb new priorities. A Sclerosis scenario leads to institutional stagnation and policy inertia. A Contagion scenario risks a breakdown of multilateral norms and widespread protectionism. Whether Trade Policy 3.0 becomes a stable new equilibrium or a transient phase will depend on how policymakers reconcile openness with security, and whether cooperation can once again anchor the global trading system.
Topic:
Security, Globalization, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3059. The Economic Risks of Transposing the EU Product Liability Directive in Germany

Author:
Oscar Guinea, Dyuti Pandya, and Vanika Sharma
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
With the Ministerial Draft (Referentenentwurf) dated 11 September 2025, Germany has embarked on transposing the EU Product Liability Directive (EU PLD) into national law, a step that goes beyond a mere regulatory update and could have far-reaching implications for its economic competitiveness. The most immediate impact will be felt within Germany’s Information and Communication Technology (ICT) industry, which stands as one of the largest in Europe. The Ministerial Draft broadens the definition of a “product” to include software, digital files, and services like AI systems, exposing ICT firms to greater liability risks. As companies prepare to minimise the risk of liability issues, compliance procedures will intensify, leading to higher operational costs. Furthermore, in some cases, the Ministerial Draft overlaps with existing regulations which fuels legal uncertainty and discourages innovation. Beyond the ICT industry, the Ministerial Draft poses risks to Germany’s broader manufacturing base. As digital technologies become increasingly embedded in the manufacturing process, any disruption in the ICT sector will directly affect other industries such as the automotive and medical technology sectors. The implementation of the Ministerial Draft in Germany’s new Product Liability Act may slow digital adoption and make the integration of these technologies more costly, ultimately hampering Germany’s industrial competitiveness. Critically, the Ministerial Draft significantly increases the likelihood of collective actions. By expanding liability to a wider pool of companies – including component suppliers, service providers, and even app developers – the Ministerial Draft amplifies the risk of mass litigation. In addition, both the previous deductible for property damage and the overall liability cap are eliminated. Moreover, the introduction of rebuttable presumptions of defectiveness which significantly lowers the bar for claimants, together with the introduction of evidence disclosure obligations – a notable procedural departure for German law – increases the potential for costly and time-consuming legal battles. To assess these costs, this Occasional Paper draws on empirical evidence from the US, where mass litigation has long been a challenge, to estimate the impact of collective actions on the German economy. While the implementation of EU PLD may not be the sole driver of increased mass litigation in Germany, it is undeniable that it will contribute to this trend. The presence of a well-developed ecosystem of lawyers, litigation funders and claims collectors – combined with a broader regulatory trend facilitating mass litigation in Germany, exemplified by the Consumer Rights Enforcement Act (VDuG) and its representative action mechanisms – makes the rise of representative- and collective actions a tangible economic risk. The economic costs of mass litigation are significant. Private enforcement costs, litigation expenses, and the potential slowdown of innovation all add up. The total cost could amount to billions of euros annually, with the risk of mass litigation diminishing the market value of innovative firms by as much as €10 billion. Such disruptions not only affect businesses but could also impact the wealth of German families, as pension funds and insurance portfolios are tied to the performance of these companies. The implementation of EU PLD may slow down Germany’s digitalisation efforts which would have an impact on the wider economy as ICT has become a cornerstone of Germany’s economic growth, and its role in the wider manufacturing sector is indispensable. The government has made strides to reduce bureaucracy and enhance competitiveness, but the Ministerial Draft may undermine these efforts by adding regulatory complexity and heightening legal risks. Policymakers must carefully weigh these economic consequences when they decide on how exactly they will transpose the EU PLD to avoid unintended setbacks that could hinder Germany’s future economic growth.
Topic:
European Union, Institutions, Industry, Single Market, and Product Liability Directive
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

3060. Quantum Clusters: Ranking the World’s Deep-Tech Epicentres

Author:
Fredrik Erixon, Andrea Dugo, Dyuti Pandya, and Elena Sisto
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The ECIPE Quantum Project has so far laid the groundwork for understanding the global quantum landscape. It introduced the fundamentals of quantum technologies, assessed national activity in investment, scientific output, and patents, and charted international collaboration patterns to show that progress relies as much on shared expertise as on scientific breakthroughs. This work has now led to the next phase: identifying the innovation hubs within each country where meaningful quantum advances occur – what we call quantum clusters. Quantum R&D requires ultra-specialised, capital-intensive infrastructure that cannot easily be duplicated. The talent pool is also extremely scarce and concentrated in a small number of physics and engineering groups, creating inherent geographic bottlenecks. Combined with long pre-commercial timelines and immature supply chains, these constraints mean that genuine quantum innovation emerges only where specific capabilities and institutions co-locate. At the same time, the overwhelming complexity of the technology demands extensive inter-regional networking for knowledge integration. Therefore, the successful quantum cluster is not a self-contained hub, but the most effective node in a global and distributed network. This makes quantum clusters especially important for policies aimed at strengthening coordination across industry, research, and government, both locally and globally. This paper presents the first structured ranking of quantum clusters – not to reinforce narratives of supremacy, but to showcase high-performing regions, revealing where real capabilities lie and where gaps persist. This analysis offers a clearer basis for designing targeted policy interventions in investment attraction, talent development, and infrastructure planning. Viewing quantum through a cluster lens can help policymakers understand the external, institutional, and firm-level factors that shape quantum competitiveness, enabling more integrated strategies and stronger collaboration among stakeholders.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Innovation, Data, Emerging Technology, and Quantum Computing
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3061. Openness and Fragmentation in EU Defence Procurement

Author:
Lucian Cernat and Oscar Guinea
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Europe’s fragmented defence procurement markets undermine Europe’s security efforts. Larger procurement markets, by contrast, deliver sharper competition, lower prices, and stronger incentives for specialisation and technological progress. Using data from the EU’s Tender Electronic Daily (TED), this Policy Brief shows domestic bias in defence procurement: three-quarters of contracts go to national firms, and cross-border awards remain limited outside smaller member states. Two policy steps stand out. First, start small: open competition in non-sensitive products can deliver quick wins. Second, improve data: only around 10 percent of defence spending is captured in TED, far less than total procurement volumes. Better data would allow policymakers to track progress, close information gaps, and take better decisions.
Topic:
Defense Policy, European Union, Fragmentation, and Public Procurement
Political Geography:
Europe

3062. The Impact of Increased Mass Litigation in the UK

Author:
Oscar Guinea, Dyuti Pandya, Vanika Sharma, and Renata Zilli
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Over the past decade, the United Kingdom has seen a marked rise in collective litigation, transforming what was once a niche legal, rarely employed, tool into a fast-growing business model with wide-ranging economic implications. At a time when the country seeks to boost investment, support innovation and attract global business, the proliferation of mass litigation risks undermining these ambitions. This study takes a closer look at how mass litigation is reshaping the UK’s legal, business and regulatory landscape – and asks whether the balance between justice and economic efficiency is tipping too far. The UK stands out among European countries for the ease with which mass claims can be launched. It has long provided a favourable environment for consumer representation and dispute resolution, with a strong culture of accountability. But recent years have seen the emergence of a new ecosystem: law firms specialising in group actions; litigation funders offering upfront capital in exchange for a share of awards; and Claims Management Companies (CMCs) that recruit claimants en masse and process high volumes of cases. The business model has proved highly successful, making group litigation an asset class in its own right and pushing collective actions far beyond traditional sectors such as banking and pharmaceuticals. Today, a growing portion of the UK economy is in the firing line – with potentially damaging consequences. This shift has been rapid and striking. From fewer than 10 mass litigation cases in the late 2010s, the UK saw 47 such actions in 2024 alone, more than any other European country. On a per capita basis, the UK ranks as one of the most litigious jurisdictions in Europe, well ahead of comparable economies such as France or Germany. The implications for the UK economy are far-reaching: many of the companies targeted by these actions operate in sectors that were included in the UK Government’s latest industrial strategy as critical to the country’s future economic growth. Whereas previously limited to financial and professional services, mass litigation cases are now rising in UK companies working in life sciences, advanced manufacturing and digital services. These are industries where risk-taking, long product development cycles and data-driven innovation are the norm. The threat of mass litigation introduces uncertainty and cost at exactly the moment when these businesses need regulatory clarity and investment stability. Moreover, claims against public sector entities involve a direct transfer of capital from the tax payer to hedge fund litigation funders. The financial burden is also considerable. Legal fees and returns to funders often consume a large share of total settlements, reducing the compensation that actually reaches affected individuals. In the Post Office Horizon scandal, for example, £46 million in legal fees and funders payments were deducted from a £57 million settlement, leaving a paltry sum of just over £20,000 per claimant. In the recent judgment of Merricks v. Mastercard, £100 million have been allocated to compensate consumers. Affected individuals could receive up to £70 each if only 5 percent claim, but as little as £2.5 if the full class of 44 million comes forward. These figures raise questions about who really benefits from mass litigation. The limited benefits for individual consumers stand in stark contrast to the substantial costs that mass litigation imposes on the UK economy as a whole. Our scenario modelling shows that, under a scenario where the costs of mass litigation are just 30 percent of the current costs in the US, litigation costs in the UK could reach more than half of the claim value; the cost of mass litigation for the UK economy could reach close to £18 billion, and the market capitalisation of the UK’s most innovative companies could fall by £11.2 billion, more than half the announced public investment into R&D in the 2025 Autumn Budget. These financial pressures affect the whole country. While many large companies are headquartered in Greater London, their operations, and the jobs they support, are often spread across the wider regions. This means that the impact of a legal challenge is not just a concern for a corporate boardroom in London, but it impacts local economies and communities across the UK. As the Civil Justice Council reviews the framework for litigation funding, this study provides evidence to inform the debate. It does not argue against collective actions per se but urges a careful weighing of their benefits against broader economic costs. If the UK wants to remain an attractive destination for business, investment, and innovation, it must ensure that its legal infrastructure supports rather than stifles those ambitions.
Topic:
European Union, Institutions, Single Market, and Mass Litigation
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

3063. The Proposed EU Regulation for Standard Essential Patents: Chronicle of a Death Foretold

Author:
Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, and Dyuti Pandya
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
This policy brief critically assesses the European Commission’s withdrawn proposal that would have overhauled the system of licensing and enforcing Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) in the EU. It was a proposal that, had it gone ahead, could have seriously undermined innovation in Europe’s digital economy and reduced the powerful role of Europe in developing key telecom standards. It would have caused legal confusion and unpredictability, which is why important courts and judicial institutions poured cold water on the proposal. Remarkably, it would have reduced European economic interest at a time when technology features prominently in geopolitical rivalry. SEPs, particularly those that underpin standards for advanced mobile communication, are the invisible infrastructure behind today’s digital world. They form the backbone of technical standards such as 5G and are increasingly used across sectors, from mobile networks to cars and household appliances. The Commission’s 2023 proposal aimed to tackle perceived shortcomings in SEP licensing, such as limited transparency, royalty stacking, and disputes over FRAND (Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory) terms. But instead of building on existing solutions, it introduced heavy-handed measures that risked destabilising a functioning system, potentially doing more harm than good, particularly for Europe’s competitiveness and technological leadership. The solutions offered in the SEP proposal are built on a framework that seeks to address issues by establishing a SEP registry, mandating a conciliation process, and introducing royalty benchmarking, all under the authority of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), the body responsible for managing EU trademarks and designs which would represent an institutional overreach. The policy brief highlights three key problems arising from the proposed SEP regulation. Heavy Administrative Burden: the proposed regulation would have required innovators to register their patents with the EUIPO, with lack of compliance potentially undermining their ability to enforce their rights. Despite imposing a substantial administrative burden, the registry would have only offered minimal practical value in resolving licensing disputes. Denial of Access to Justice: the regulation proposed a mandatory pre-litigation process for royalty disputes, effectively introducing a top-down pricing This approach would have disrupted the balance between patent holders and implementers, delay access to judicial remedies, and marginalise the role of the Unified Patent Court (UPC), undermining its purpose in adjudicating complex patent disputes. Flawed Agency Price Setting: the proposal envisioned the EUIPO, an agency lacking patent expertise recommending royalty caps for all patents within a given standard. This raised concerns about the agency’s qualifications to make such determinations and the risk of artificially suppressing prices, potentially harming leading European innovators and deepening the EU’s reliance on foreign technologies. At its core, the proposal reflected a broader misjudgement: heavy-handed regulation is ill-suited to the fast-moving, globally integrated SEP ecosystem. First, the pace of technological innovation far outstrips the speed of regulation. Second, technologies like 5G operate across borders, and any attempt to impose a standalone European framework not only risks fragmenting international licensing practices but also triggering a regulatory race among countries – each seeking to advance its own industrial policy objectives through divergent approaches. Third, regulation overlooked one of Europe’s key strengths: its role as a net exporter of innovation in key sectors such as advanced mobile communication. Fourth, regulation ignores how much progress has already been made through self-correcting mechanisms such as market-based negotiations, flexible licensing, and case law.
Topic:
Intellectual Property/Copyright, European Union, Patents, and European Commission
Political Geography:
Europe

3064. Breaking Barriers, Boosting Growth: Unlocking the Power of Digital Technology for Europe’s Competitiveness

Author:
Oscar Guinea, Vanika Sharma, Erik van der Marel, and Oscar du Roy
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Europe’s digital economy faces a twin challenge that strikes at the heart of its competitiveness: the continent still lacks homegrown tech champions on the scale of those in the United States or China, and digital technologies are not being fully embedded across its wider economy. Despite years of political focus on digital transformation, the uptake of essential tools – such as cloud services, enterprise software, digital advertising, and customer relationship systems – remains patchy across EU countries, sectors, and firm sizes. This combination of limited scale and sluggish diffusion is quietly undermining the EU’s economic resilience and national security. A major reason for this shortfall lies in the regulatory environment. EU firms navigate a complex web of rules shaped by national and EU-level regulations. Digital-specific obligations often impose heavy compliance costs while market access restrictions limit cross-border business growth. Meanwhile, inconsistent regulations across member states fragment the EU’s Single Market, raising barriers to economic development and draining returns on investment. The result is a constrained business ecosystem, where too few firms scale up and many are deterred from investing in new digital technologies. These regulatory choices carry a measurable economic cost. New empirical analysis in this Policy Brief shows that restrictive regulation, not only holds back firm expansion, but it also depresses digital adoption and, with it, sectoral performance. A 10 percent increase in the combined effect of services trade restrictions and digital technology uptake is associated with a 1.3 percent decline in value added. In other words, red tape is weighing down Europe’s productivity engine. This should be a wake-up call for EU policymakers. While much of the debate has focused on industrial policy and the regulation of emerging technologies like AI, too little attention has been given to fostering the conditions for widespread digital adoption. Yet, without structural reforms to reduce regulatory barriers – both within the EU and externally – and to support the diffusion of digital tools, Europe’s digital transformation will remain incomplete. And unless firms across all sectors are encouraged to adopt digital technologies as a means to scale and compete, the EU will risk falling further behind in the global race for technological leadership and competitiveness.
Topic:
European Union, Digital Economy, Competition, and Digital Technologies
Political Geography:
Europe

3065. NATO After the 2025 Summit: Strength, Doubt, and the Burden of Leadership

Author:
Tengiz Pkhaladze
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The NATO Hague Summit signalled renewed commitment to transatlantic security, with member states pledging historic increases in defence spending and a broader vision of resilience encompassing cyber, infrastructure, and societal domains. This shift signals more than adaptation; it suggests a serious intent to rearm NATO for a new era of strategic competition. Yet beneath the surface, the challenges are more complex than the headline commitments suggest. The Alliance’s ability to respond to hybrid threats and intensifying geopolitical competition is uneven, constrained by internal disagreements and shifting strategic expectations. NATO’s adversaries are not seeking parity through conventional force. They are exploiting gaps across domains – cyber, economic, political, and cognitive – using tactics designed to undermine cohesion and delay response. While the Alliance’s operational structures remain robust, its political coherence is fragile, and its strategic unity often proves difficult to sustain under pressure. What is missing is not capacity, but bold leadership willing to articulate shared priorities, accept risk, and take responsibility for long-range decisions. Without coherence of vision and the willingness to act with conviction, NATO’s deterrence posture risks becoming reactive rather than resilient. This paper argues that NATO now stands at a pivotal crossroads. Increased spending is a necessary step, but not a sufficient one. The Alliance still lacks a unifying strategy capable of addressing the full spectrum of contemporary threats. To meet this moment, the Alliance must move beyond rhetorical unity and procedural adaptation. It must invest in strategic foresight, develop doctrine fit for 21st-century warfare, and ensure political decision-making can match the speed and ambiguity of modern threats. The Hague Summit may have set a new trajectory, but it is what follows – doctrine, strategy, and credible action – that will determine whether NATO remains a force capable of deterring not just war, but instability itself.
Topic:
NATO, European Union, Transatlantic Relations, and Land Tenure Security
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

3066. Strengthening the Supply-Side Innovation in EU Telecommunications

Author:
Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, and Dyuti Pandya
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The telecommunications sector is central to the EU’s competitiveness, not only providing the infrastructure that underpins digital connectivity but also serving as a key driver of innovation. Recent EU reports already highlight the persistent structural challenges faced by the EU telecommunication sector: market fragmentation, low investment levels, divergent spectrum policies, and an urgent need to bolster digital sovereignty. However, a critical dimension in this discussion often receives far less attention: the supply of the underlying technologies that power telecommunications infrastructure. In this domain, EU companies remain competitive. In 2023, 27 EU-headquartered firms were among the world’s top 2,000 R&D spenders in telecommunications, accounting for 16 percent of global sectoral investment. These figures underscore that, while Europe may lag in investment and infrastructure, it still holds strategic leadership in telecom innovation and technology development. Central to Europe’s success are standard development organisations (SDOs), technical standards, and Standard Essential Patents (SEPs). SDOs provide collaborative forums where companies jointly develop technical standards that ensure interoperability, reduce fragmentation and foster innovation. Complementing this, SEPs protect the innovations embedded within these standards, granting European companies vital licensing revenues that sustain their research efforts. This system is particularly important for EU firms, which tend to be smaller than their global competitors; it enables them to specialise in cutting-edge technology development and commercialise their innovations globally without needing to dominate manufacturing or end-user markets. As competitiveness in telecommunications increasingly depends on the pace and adoption of innovation, the EU faces both a challenge and an opportunity. European firms have the potential not only to supply critical technologies but to drive breakthroughs in connectivity which are linked to the development of other technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) or quantum technologies. However, to stay competitive, the EU must reinforce its position on the supply side, where its companies still operate at the technological frontier.
Topic:
European Union, Innovation, Supply, and Telecommunications
Political Geography:
Europe

3067. Mapping the Quantum Ecosystems: How Are Economies Positioning Themselves for Innovation Success

Author:
Fredrik Erixon, Andrea Dugo, Dyuti Pandya, and Elena Sisto
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Quantum technologies are among the most complex and promising innovations of our time. Their advancement relies not only on breakthrough science, but also on the capacity of countries, institutions, and companies to collaborate across borders, sectors, and disciplines, bringing together the expertise and resources needed to turn innovation into market-ready solutions. No country or region alone is in the lead – this is not a race between China and the US. Nor is quantum a development that will elevate one country to “supremacy” or “dominance”: cloaking fields of technology development in the terminology of military strategy rather risks making us less capable of understanding what is going on. For the economic and strategic benefits to be captured, countries and regions need to build structures of collaboration that allow researchers and companies to tap into frontier developments and share the costs of complex knowledge generation. An important way to measure the quantum competitiveness of countries is to benchmark the profile and strength of their collaborative structures. Using the ECIPE Quantum Database, this study analyses over 18,400 bilateral quantum partnerships involving more than 4,100 institutions across over 110 countries between 2018 and 2024. These partnerships encompass universities, research institutes, government agencies, startups, and large firms. Based on the findings these collaboration patterns reveal, we go a step further to not only map the interactions between different players but also identify a scheme of four quantum archetypes that help show where countries stand in the global quantum ecosystem. One dimension of this scheme reflects the level of industry involvement in quantum collaborations relative to a country’s GDP, serving as a proxy for commercial focus and economic prioritisation. The other captures how well-connected a country is internationally through direct quantum partnerships (see Figure a).
Topic:
Economy, Institutions, Innovation, Industry, Specialization, and Quantum Computing
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3068. Breaking Barriers to Cloud Customer Choice: Unlocking Europe’s AI and Innovation Leadership

Author:
Matthias Bauer, Andrea Dugo, and Dyuti Pandya
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Cloud computing underpins digital transformation and is essential for unlocking the benefits of artificial intelligence (AI), automation, and scalable digital services. Yet Europe continues to lag behind global peers in both cloud and AI adoption. This underperformance is not merely technological; it is structural and it is costly. Without rapid progress, the EU risks missing out on over EUR 1.2 trillion in GDP gains across the private sector by around 2030. In the public sector alone, a shift to cloud particularly via a multi-cloud-first strategy could generate up to EUR 450 billion annually in efficiency and productivity gains across EU governments. A major, yet under-recognised barrier is the lack of cloud customer choice, the ability for businesses and public sector users to freely select, combine, and switch between cloud services. Without this, users face high switching costs, vendor lock-in, and reduced capacity to scale or integrate AI tools effectively. This paper asks: What are the main obstacles to cloud customer choice in the EU and what are the best avenues for advancing it? The analysis focuses on three key domains that shape the market at large – regulation, competition policy, and standard-setting bodies – examining how each can promote broader customer choice rather than be used narrowly to target individual, innovation-driven firms.
Topic:
European Union, Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, Cloud Computing, and Consumer Behavior
Political Geography:
Europe

3069. Seeing the Forest and the Trees: Recent Developments in the US Tariff Landscape

Author:
Lucian Cernat
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
This short factual overview paper describes the complexity created by the tariffs imposed by the US, especially for small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The Policy Brief concludes by highlighting the importance of the EU “Access2Market” tool in addressing these new complexities, helping EU exporters gain access to the US market.
Topic:
Markets, European Union, Economy, Tariffs, and Micro-Small-Medium Enterprises (MSMEs)
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

3070. Mass Litigation and the Future of Litigation Funding in Ireland and Europe

Author:
Oscar Guinea, Dyuti Pandya, Vanika Sharma, and Renata Zilli
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Across Europe, collective actions are on the rise. Expanding liability regimes and the rapid growth of third-party litigation funding (TPLF) are fuelling a new wave of lawsuits that reach far beyond traditional consumer claims. Ireland has until now been shielded by common law restrictions on TPLF, but that protection is weakening. The transposition of the EU Representative Actions Directive (RAD) opens the door to new collective claims, including those backed by commercial funders that invest in such litigation in order to make a profit. Ireland is uniquely exposed to these developments. Its economic model relies heavily on foreign direct investment, particularly from the US. Of more than 460 collective action cases tracked in the EU over the past 18 years, 40 involved US companies, many of which operate their European headquarters from Ireland. Information and communication technology and life sciences sectors, two of Ireland’s most important economic engines, are among the most frequent targets of collective lawsuits. If the conditions for launching a collective action and granting access to TPLF become too favourable, Ireland – the only EU country with common law procedures, broad disclosure rules and English-language litigation could become an attractive venue for mass litigation. The supposed benefits of mass litigation are, in practice, limited. Evidence from the US and UK shows that consumers rarely receive meaningful compensation. Lawyers and funders capture the bulk of settlements, while claimants often receive token amounts. By contrast, the costs are large and measurable: higher legal expenses, falling market valuations, and weaker incentives for innovation. For Ireland, the scenario analysis suggests potential economic costs in the billions of euros, exceeding the annual public budget for infrastructure. The negative impact is not confined to domestic cases: collective actions pursued elsewhere against firms headquartered in Ireland also ripple back to the Irish economy through lost growth and reduced investment. These risks cannot be managed through national policy alone. The RAD’s cross-border provisions and the free flow of capital mean that litigation funding can reach Irish courts even if TPLF remains restricted domestically. This underlines the need for a coherent EU-wide framework. The European Parliament and more recently the UK Civil Justice Council (CJC) have called for tighter oversight, including transparency rules, limits on funder returns, judicial scrutiny of funding contracts, and liability for costs if cases fail. Minimum standards cannot be achieved by member states acting alone. Ireland has a chance to lead. As the incoming holder of the EU Council Presidency from July 2026, it will be well positioned to put the regulation of TPLF on the European agenda. A robust framework would not only protect consumers but also safeguard Europe’s competitiveness, reduce the risk of forum shopping, and ensure that litigation funding enables the delivery of justice rather than financial speculation via the courts. For Ireland, the stakes are high: the country has the most to lose if unchecked mass litigation undermines foreign investment and innovative industries upon which its prosperity rests.
Topic:
European Union, Regional Economy, Liability, and Mass Litigation
Political Geography:
Europe and Ireland

3071. Memo to Ursula von der Leyen and António Costa: Make the Right Priorities for the EU-CELAC Summit 2025

Author:
Renata Zilli
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The EU–CELAC Summit in Santa Marta, Colombia, in November comes at a time when both regions need to get down to business. The EU-CELAC cooperation has long offered both sides opportunities to advance their economic and strategic interests, but so far, they have not used them. Past summits have rarely moved beyond lofty declarations and have not matched the level of expectations. Since the first Rio Summit in 1992,[1] successive joint meetings between the two regions have highlighted shared values and cooperation on democracy, economic development, and sustainability. Yet, two decades of summitry have not yielded the tangible progress that citizens and businesses expect. In a world of heightened geopolitical rivalry, technological disruption, and recurring supply shocks, Europe and Latin America should make a deeper investment in their relationship. For the European Union, reducing overdependence on a small number of suppliers has become a strategic priority. For Latin America and the Caribbean, diversifying trade and investment partners is essential to avoid being squeezed between the US and China in their strategic competition. A forward-looking agenda on trade and economic security can transform EU–CELAC relations into a strategic Atlantic partnership. This agenda should prioritise: Deepening EU-CELAC economic security cooperation to mitigate supply chain shocks and the weaponisation of economic dependencies through trade diversification. Promoting the integration of regional value chains by fostering diversified comparative advantages across CELAC countries, enabling each to specialise in different segments of production. Funding digital infrastructure: Utilise the EU-LAC Global Gateway Investment Agenda to plug investment gaps, specifically in digital transformation. Completing trade agreement implementation: Use the cooperation to propel the full implementation of Association and Trade Agreements between the EU and CELAC partners, and accelerate the ratification of signed agreements while pushing ongoing processes like the modernisation of agreements with Mexico Make the EU-CELAC cooperation a springboard for a “Coalition of the Willing” for a rules-based international trade. [1] The first high-level meeting between the European Community and Latin American and Caribbean countries took place in 1999, launching the EU–LAC Strategic Partnership. This dialogue evolved into the current EU–CELAC framework in 2013, when the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States became the EU’s formal counterpart, giving the relationship a more structured and political foundation
Topic:
Security, European Union, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:
Europe, Latin America, and Caribbean

3072. A new kind of cognitive tool: Generative AI and the future of critical and creative thinking in education

Author:
Dominique Kelly and Jacquelyn Burkell
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Human Capital and Productivity (CHCP), Western University
Abstract:
Since the 2022 release of ChatGPT, students have increasingly embraced the use of generative artificial intelligence (AI) in their schoolwork. These tools threaten to fuel misinformation and plagiarism; however, we contend that a deeper concern lies in how students’ use of generative AI could affect their cognitive development. Students can now offload tasks to generative AI that, if completed independently, would require them to build and exercise higher-order cognitive abilities (i.e., critical and creative thinking). Thus, we argue that repeated cognitive offloading through generative AI could hinder the development of students’ fundamental skills and undermine the core aims of educational institutions. We begin by comparing generative AI to two other cognitive tools – calculators and navigation systems – and explaining how the nature of work AI can perform differs from the nature of work that can be offloaded to these prior technologies. We then examine how the use of generative AI could impede the development of higher-order cognitive abilities in three educational use cases: essay writing, idea generation, and explanation of complex concepts. Lastly, we offer practical recommendations for educators concerning generative AI’s role in education. We suggest that educators delay students’ use of generative AI as a cognitive tool for complex tasks until the later stages of their schooling. At the same time, we note that educators could design activities that require students to interact with generative AI as a dialogue partner that asks questions, offers varied perspectives, and challenges assumptions – with potential to support, rather than hinder, students’ cognitive development.
Topic:
Education, Artificial Intelligence, Critical Thinking, ChatGPT, and Generative Models
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3073. What About Us? Consumer Response to the Digital Markets Act

Author:
Matthias Bauer and Dyuti Pandya
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The Digital Markets Act (DMA) was introduced as a landmark piece of EU legislation to change how consumers interact or engage with large online platforms. By restraining the power of the so-called gatekeepers, Brussels aimed to promote greater competition, improve privacy protections and make digital services more affordable. Two years into its application, however, the reality on the ground in EU, especially for the Central and Eastern European (CEE) Member States has proved far more sobering. Consumers have seen little evidence of cheaper or improved digital services. Many report greater friction in their online experience, while confidence and trust in platform privacy remains low. Most strikingly, consumer behaviour itself has hardly shifted: reliance on a handful of dominant players such as Google, Meta, and Apple still prevail. These findings suggest that the DMA, while ambitious in scope, has failed to deliver on its central promise of empowering Europe’s digital citizens. This study concludes that Europe must either consider replacing the DMA with a more flexible case-by-case enforcement or, at the very least, reform it by removing obligations that neither enhance consumer welfare nor improve market contestability.
Topic:
European Union, Regional Economy, Digital Markets Act (DMA), and Consumer Behavior
Political Geography:
Europe

3074. Privacy at a Price? An Empirical Analysis of GDPR’s Impact on EU Trade Flows

Author:
Elena Sisto and Erik van der Marel
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The introduction of the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in 2018 created conditions that could raise the cost of trading services with the EU, especially where cross-border transfers of personal data are required. This paper examines whether the GDPR has truly affected trade in digital services between EU member states and third countries. Using a triple-difference strategy that compares EU trade with partners whose cross-border transfer regimes differ from the EU’s conditional model to a suitable control group, this paper accounts for the fact that, over time, many partners have adopted a similar conditional model (so-called spillovers), following the phenomenon known as the “Brussels effect.” Identification relies on two elements: sectoral data intensity, measured by the share of firms in each sector participating in the EU-US Data Privacy Framework (DPF), and partner regime alignment, distinguishing EU-style conditional regimes from non-aligned regimes. We estimate a structural-gravity PPML model with high-dimensional fixed effects, complemented by robustness checks using input-output-based intensity measures and a non-gravity triple difference on growth.
Topic:
European Union, Privacy, Trade, and GDPR
Political Geography:
Europe

3075. The Challenges of Reconstruction and Recovery: The Day After the War and the Future of Youth in Gaza

Author:
Ali Abdel-Wahab
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pal-Think For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Palestinian youth constitute a vital segment of society, representing approximately 22% of the total population. They live under the weight of chronic political deadlock, a dependent economy, and shrinking civil space. In other words, they are stuck in a constant struggle to redefine their identity and status according to the balance of power and the imposed political reality. In the Gaza Strip in particular, where the burden of the blockade that has been in place since 2007 coincides with modern colonial domination and internal political marginalization, a new generation has grown up knowing nothing but political isolation and division. This generation, which is ambitious and highly educated (unemployment among university graduates reached about 74% before the war), found itself shackled by a stifling economic reality and a political dead end, which eroded its confidence in the political system and its traditional structures. These circumstances produced a strong tendency toward “individual salvation,” with about 37% of young people seriously considering emigration in search of dignity and opportunities lost at home. The recent war, which has been waged on the Gaza Strip since October 2023, was not merely a military escalation, but a systematic military operation aimed at destroying both infrastructure and society, exacerbating existing crises to catastrophic levels. The 2023 war transformed the situation from a chronic crisis to one of total destruction of the urban, educational, and social infrastructure, with hundreds of thousands of displaced persons, the destruction of most universities and schools, and the emergence of the largest generation of people with disabilities in the modern history of Gaza. Thousands of young people have fallen victim, living under the weight of unprecedented collective psychological trauma and educational disruption that threatens to squander human capital. This tragic situation has transformed the issue of youth from a mere developmental challenge to a matter of national, social, and existential security.
Topic:
Reconstruction, Youth, Recovery, Post-Conflict, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Palestine, and Gaza

3076. Preventing Crises in the Post-War Phase: Engineering Transitional Stability in Palestine Between International Recognition and Gaza Reconstruction Plans

Author:
Ali Abdel-Wahab
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pal-Think For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
After a long and devastating war, Palestine stands at a critical crossroads that demands not only reconstruction but also a fortification of its future. The war has left Gaza in ruins—massive human and material losses, with thousands killed, tens of thousands injured, and widespread destruction of homes and essential infrastructure. Joint assessments by the United Nations, the World Bank, and the European Union estimate material damage in Gaza at around USD 30 billion, alongside USD 19 billion in economic losses due to the near-total halt of production and services. The most severely affected sector was housing (53 percent of total damage), followed by commerce and industry (20 percent), and then critical infrastructure—health, water, and transport—accounting for over 15 percent. Consequently, Gaza’s economy has nearly collapsed: prices have risen by more than 300 percent within a year, and the Strip—home to 40 percent of the Palestinian population—now contributes barely 3 percent to the national GDP. Public institutions, already fragile, have been unable to maintain basic services. Continuous power outages, water disruptions, and loss of connectivity have pushed systems to the brink. Gaza’s sole power plant has been completely non-functional since 11 October 2023, while most high-voltage feeder lines from Israel have been destroyed. Residents have been forced to rely on small diesel generators and solar micro-systems—both hindered by fuel shortages and combat damage. According to UN data, large portions of Gaza’s water and sanitation systems are out of service, solid waste has accumulated, and the risk of epidemics has grown sharply.
Topic:
Reconstruction, Institutions, Post-Conflict, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Palestine, and Gaza

3077. Pathways to Peacebuilding and the Promotion of Democracy and Civil Peace in Palestinian Society: Mechanisms and Strategies in the Recovery Phase (Mechanisms and strategies during the recovery phase)

Author:
Mansour Abu Karim
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pal-Think For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Over the past years, Palestinian society has experienced a state of instability resulting from the failure of the political settlement process, the internal Palestinian division, and the recurrence of wars as well as political, security, and economic crises. These factors have led to significant political and societal structural distortions, leaving profound repercussions on the Palestinian democratic experience and civil peace. This reality calls for the adoption of new policies and approaches to strengthen the process of building internal peace, protecting civil peace, and promoting a democratic approach in Palestinian society. ­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­This paper addresses the pathways to building internal Palestinian peace, promoting democratic practices, and safeguarding civil peace during the recovery phase. It is organized into three main themes: the first provides a conceptual framework for peace, democracy, and civil peace; the second examines the key components of peacebuilding, democracy, and civil peace in Palestinian society; and the third explores mechanisms and policies for protecting the internal Palestinian front, resolving crises and disputes, and preserving political and social pluralism.
Topic:
Democracy, Armed Conflict, Peacebuilding, and Civil Peace
Political Geography:
Middle East and Palestine

3078. Displacement, Temporary Survival, and the Transformation of Social Bonds: How War Reshapes Community Networks and Collective Behavior in Gaza

Author:
Pal-Think for Strategic Studies Research and Studies Unit
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pal-Think For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
This paper aims to analyze these disruptive transformations in depth and impartially for the benefit of policy experts, decision-makers, humanitarian actors, and civil society as a whole. The paper reviews the background of Gazan society before the war, then details the manifestations of social fragmentation (family, class, spatial) and their impact on women, children, and the most vulnerable groups in particular. It also addresses the conditions in shelters as hotbeds of tension, violence, and inequality. Finally, the paper offers realistic policy recommendations for dealing with this disruptive reality in the long term, focusing on rebuilding the social contract and supporting psychological and community recovery, rather than merely offering vague rhetoric about community resilience.
Topic:
Displacement, Networks, Resilience, Society, Fragmentation, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Palestine, and Gaza

3079. Humanitarian Aid as a Tool of Domination: The implications of distribution practices on social cohesion, human dignity, and self-agency in the Gaza Strip

Author:
Wessam Abu Amr
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pal-Think For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
At the heart of the protracted humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip, and more than twenty-two months since the outbreak of the war on October 7, 2023, humanitarian aid has become an integral part of the daily landscape for the population of the Strip, not only because of the magnitude of the humanitarian disaster resulting from the blockade, military operations, demolitions, destruction and displacement, but also because more than two-thirds of the population depend on it as the main source of food and basic needs, this growing dependence has made aid transform from short-term emergency interventions into a structural element of everyday survival, with the lives of individuals and families tied directly to the continuity or disruption of aid flows.
Topic:
Humanitarian Aid, Humanitarian Crisis, Social Cohesion, Agency, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Palestine, and Gaza

3080. What if…? Ten Dragon King scenarios for 2030

Author:
Florence Gaub
Publication Date:
11-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
S urprise isn’t just something we like or don’t like (studies show one is neurologically predisposed one way or another)1. Surprise has strategic value.2 When unexpected events unfold, humans need time to respond as their brains update their world view, hence the initial reaction to freeze. Depending on the magnitude of the surprise, this can range from a few seconds to several days or even weeks. And what is true for individuals is also true for groups of all kinds, such as states, military organizations or companies: it can take days or even weeks for the collective to make sense of what is actually happening and how to respond. In war time, this freeze moment can be a real asset. It creates space for operations that would not otherwise be possible – when coupled with low military readiness, the advantage is doubled. Stalin, for instance, allegedly went into shock for over a week when Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union despite a mutual non-aggression pact – a week that the Wehrmacht used to its advantage.3 Other examples of the use of strategic surprise include the Suez War in 1956 or the Hamas attacks of 7 October (it is worth noting that terrorist groups rely overwhelmingly on surprise as they usually have little in the way of hard assets.) Taking an opponent by surprise therefore means buying yourself time to gain an advantage on the battlefield.4 Reducing surprise can happen in two ways. One is early warning: detecting developments early enough to understand, and if necessary, counter them. Most NATO Allies and, of course, NATO bodies possess units that monitor areas of interest and analyse possible scenarios. These units are, by and large, good at what they do, but they cannot catch everything. Where opponents deliberately disguise their intentions and moves, or where powerful biases work against clear analysis, we need a different approach to reduce the impact of surprise: imagination.5 This is not as simple as imagining something preposterous such as aliens landing on planet Earth, but requires thorough research into weak signals that a change may be imminent. Armed with these weak signals, authors then push causalities towards a scenario that may be low in probability but high in impact. The benefit of these scenarios is twofold. They complement early warning systems and intelligence analysis by covering areas that are too fringe, too unlikely to be explored. They therefore close gaps in thinking and anticipation. As a result, the reaction time is shorter when the event in question occurs: reading the scenario creates a “memory of the future,” a cognitive familiarity. Furthermore, even if an event occurs that is not identical, but similar, the benefits of familiarity will be the same. Lastly, all scenarios, regardless of their likelihood, increase preparedness because they train human causality thinking, as well as fringe thinking, thereby reducing bias and increasing cognitive agility. This is one of the reasons why the U.S. Army uses zombie scenarios to train these abilities, as well as more realistic scenarios.6 However, the scenarios in this Insight are not zombie scenarios. As in the previous What If edition, authors were asked to think of a possible development resulting from a weak signal, an indication of a change that they would often have overlooked. Each scenario here has a basis in reality, even if the probability of the scenario occurring may be low. Their utility lies not in their likelihood, but in their capacity to engage you in innovative thinking, which in turn increases your mental preparedness. They are called Dragon Kings: rare, but impactful when they do occur.
Topic:
NATO, Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, Weapons, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Palestine, Romania, Georgia, Egypt, Black Sea, and Suez

3081. Impact of the Humanitarian Crisis in the Gaza Strip on the Marginalized Groups (Women, Children and People with Disabilities) – 7th October 2023 – 15th June 2025

Author:
Wael Fteaha and Omar Shaban
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pal-Think For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
On 7th October 2023, some few thousands Palestinian fighters, led by the military wing of Hamas, and the Islamic Jehad, penetrated north and east borders of the Gaza strip targeted adjacent Israeli communities, killing about 1300 people and taking at least 236 hostages. Two days later, Israel declared a total blockade on Gaza and the Israeli defense minister declared “There will be no electricity, no food, no fuel, everything is closed. We are fighting human animals and we are acting accordingly.” Israel defined its war policy on the Gaza Strip by using collective punishment, dehumanization, and starvation. Aggressive statements against the people of Gaza were released by Israeli officials, especially the finance minister and the Minister of Interior Security who are still playing vital roles in the Israeli cabinet that is leading the war against Gaza. Israel launched aggressive military operation in the first week, started with heavy raids on military and government facilities, open agricultural fields and civilians’ house, and followed by ongoing invasion. More than 54,000 Palestinians were killed, 150 thousand were injured and few thousands stuck under rubbles. Throughout this Israeli aggression, Gaza has been undergoing severe humanitarian crisis.
Topic:
Children, Women, Disability, Humanitarian Crisis, October 7, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

3082. Russia’s naval futures: new horizons 2050

Author:
Andrew Monaghan
Publication Date:
11-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Moscow is launching a large-scale and strategic process to enhance its maritime power. This is designed to overhaul the shipbuilding industry and to shape a new image of the Russian navy. This is changing the characteristics of Russian strategic power. This overhaul characterises Moscow’s strategy making, more generally in terms of the leadership’s priorities and also systemic problems, and more specifi cally in the attempt to connect economic interests and military power. It reveals how the Russian leadership views the future: the process shapes a planning horizon out to 2050. It also includes shorter term scenarios. This is particularly important for NATO, because much of Moscow’s thinking about potential confl ict is in the maritime domain, especially in the Baltic Sea and Arctic.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Navy, and Maritime
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

3083. NATO’s future: a history

Author:
Bruno Tertrais
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
How was the future of NATO envisioned in the past? Is the Atlantic Alliance still faithful to the original intents of its founders? The purpose of this short paper is to take a look back at how NATO’s purpose was conceived and how leaders and experts saw its future, in order to draw lessons for the coming decades. Pessimism about the solidity and survivability of the Alliance turned out to be misplaced, but assumptions about some of its fundamental tenets were not always correct.
Topic:
Security, NATO, History, Alliance, and Pessimism
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

3084. How accurate is forecasting of military technologies?

Author:
Alexander Kott and Philip Perconti
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
We show that the accuracy of military technology forecasts is respectably high, 76% or better, depending on how an accurate forecast is defi ned. Long-term technology forecasting can be quite accurate and can inform NATO’s military research and development management decisions.
Topic:
NATO, Science and Technology, Armed Forces, Research and Development, and Military Technology
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

3085. The Financing of Energy Transition in Senegal: Green promises, unequal gains?

Author:
Steffen Haag, Mohamadou Fadel Diop, and Thialy Faye
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:
Senegal's energy transition is at a critical juncture. While the country has made significant progress in terms of access to electricity and the integration of renewable energies, its energy financing model remains heavily dependent on foreign private investment and favors the latter. This implies debt-based financing and risk mitigation mechanisms that protect investors while risking increased fiscal pressure on the state. The dominant model of independent power producers (IPPs) shows how heavily these projects depend on sovereign guarantees and international financial institutions (IFIs) to attract capital. While these projects increase electricity production, they also reinforce financial dependence, can lead to local socioeconomic inequalities, and create an energy system that primarily serves the interests of investors rather than reducing inequalities. This study examines the financial mechanisms underlying Senegal's energy transition, highlighting their implications for national sovereignty, a just transition, transparency, and accountability. It also explores alternative financing models, such as community initiatives like the “Progrès Lait” project and the “Programme d'accès aux énergies renouvelables” (PAER), which integrate renewable energy into local economies and strengthen energy sovereignty.
Topic:
Finance, Climate Finance, Private Sector, Energy Transition, and Neocolonialism
Political Geography:
Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa

3086. Intersectional Feminism: A Primer

Author:
María del Rosario Castro Bernardini, Namalie Jayasinghe, Sebastián Molano, Paige Castellanos, and Molly Kellogg
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:
This primer introduces the concept of intersectional feminism and serves as a guiding document for Oxfam America staff. Intersectional feminism explores multiple and intertwined systems of oppression such as patriarchy, racism, and capitalism through three core pillars: gender, race/ethnicity, and class. Intersectional feminism is crucial to the work of Oxfam America because of the complexity of the issues the organization engages in with partners and communities. We must increase our ability to make sense of the multiple experiences of gender oppression at the individual, systemic, and structural levels. Throughout this primer, we include examples from the literature and Oxfam’s work to showcase how we are endeavoring to incorporate intersectional feminism in our work. By embedding intersectional feminism in our analyses and approaches, we demonstrate our shared commitment to addressing systemic inequalities and enhancing the effectiveness and integrity of our shared mission.
Topic:
Feminism, Class, Intersectionality, and Gender
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3087. Kenya’s Inequality Crisis: The great economic divide

Author:
Anthony Kamande and Beverly Musili
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:
The Status of Inequality in Kenya 2025 report provides a comprehensive analysis of inequality trends in income, wealth, and access to essential public services such as health and education. It highlights how deepening disparities in public service delivery continue to shape social and economic outcomes and offers bold policy recommendations to advance equality and inclusive growth. This report comes at a critical time, as Kenya grapples with growing economic pressures, rising living costs, and fiscal constraints that affect the provision of quality public services. The findings seek to inform ongoing national debates on economic inequality, tax reform, public finance management, and social protection; key levers for addressing inequality and achieving the Sustainable Development Goals and Vision 2030.
Topic:
Economics, Inequality, Economic Growth, Tax Systems, Public Service, Public Finance, Economic Inclusion, and Social Protection
Political Geography:
Kenya and Africa

3088. Beyond Aid in Ghana

Author:
Godwin Bokpin, Theophilus Acheampong, and Patrick Opoku Asuming
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:
Beyond Aid in Ghana sketches the evolution of aid in Ghana as the country assumed a lower middle-income status in its development agenda. It seeks to understand the realities of this trajectory in a milieu of dwindling aid. The report offers an alternative with a focus on domestic revenue mobilisation and emphasises a shift away from consumption-led borrowing to productive investment in core sectors of the economy.
Topic:
Climate Change, Education, Humanitarian Aid, Natural Resources, Inequality, and Gender
Political Geography:
Africa and Ghana

3089. Not Everyone Is in the Same Boat: Climate and inequality in the Middle East and North Africa

Author:
Barbara Summers, Julie Greenwalt, and Nabil Abdo
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:
The Middle East and North Africa is one of the regions that will be affected the most by climate change, extreme weather events, exacerbating the chronic water scarcity that it suffers from and current dependency on fossil fuels. Climate change impacts are already witnessed in many countries, especially those experiencing conflicts. At the same time the decades-long austerity policies in the region are not only fuelling inequalities but also make it virtually impossible for the countries in the region to spend on climate. The climate threats driven by the richest people, corporations, and rentier economies are existential to the region. Meanwhile, people living in poverty, marginalized communities vulnerable to climate change and those living in conflict-settings are the ones impacted the hardest. Women and girls, refugees and other groups experiencing discrimination, are particularly at disadvantage to current austerity policies and the consequences of climate change. The consequences are felt in all parts of the region and by most people, yet only the richest people have the wealth and the power and influence to adapt from the consequences of climate breakdown. Austerity policies are exacerbating the climate crisis, and the only way to address the climate breakdown is through taxing the wealthy and their polluting consumptions and massively invest in public services and climate mitigation, adaptation and transition.
Topic:
Climate Change, Austerity, Carbon Emissions, Wealth, and Billionaires
Political Geography:
Middle East and North Africa

3090. Unjust Transition: Reclaiming the energy future from climate colonialism

Author:
Mateo Adarve Zuluaga, Natalie Shortall, Hilde Stroot, Naira Wayand, and Valeska Ruiz
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:
The global energy transition stands at a pivotal moment: it can either dismantle the inequalities driving the climate crisis or deepen them. Today, the transition risks reproducing patterns of extractivism and exploitation, with the most marginalized paying the highest price while elites profit. From transition mineral mining to debt burdens and unequal energy access, the current trajectory mirrors centuries of colonial injustice. A just transition must redistribute power and resources, curb overconsumption, and prioritize dignity and rights for all. This report outlines pathways to build an energy system grounded in equality, justice, care and collective wellbeing —where energy serves life, not profit.
Topic:
Climate Change, Debt, Inequality, Renewable Energy, Reparations, Exploitation, Financial Systems, Green Transition, Extractivism, Climate Colonialism, and Energy Inequality
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3091. Africa’s Inequality Crisis and the Rise of the Super-Rich

Author:
Anthony Kamande and Hallum Christian
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:
Africa is facing a double inequality crisis: extreme inequality alongside weak commitment among its governments to fight it. But there is hope. The African Union has urged member states to reduce inequality by 15% in the coming decade and has identified progressive taxation as a key tool to do so. The challenge, though, is the “how” – to achieve this target. Most African countries are not fully leveraging progressive taxation to effectively tax the super-rich and address inequality. The reasons for this are many, including the regressive policies peddled by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the corrosive impact of illicit financial flows, and the lack of political will to confront inequality.
Topic:
Inequality, Tax Systems, Austerity, Public Service, Neocolonialism, and Debt Crisis
Political Geography:
Africa

3092. Emerging Good Practices on Embedding Human Rights into Seafood Procurement

Author:
Lia Hayman and Isabela Lorenzoni
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:
As seafood demand rises, it has been accompanied by a growing understanding of persistent human rights abuses. Recent reports have highlighted how poor procurement practices can contribute to abuses, while stronger practices can reduce them. This report reviews the current landscape and how buyers are enhancing their procurement practices to align with their human rights commitments. It provides examples in areas such as embedding human rights personnel within procurement teams, sustainable costing in price negotiations and preferential sourcing from suppliers that respect human rights. The briefing sets out actions for businesses to ensure alignment of procurement and human rights commitments.
Topic:
Human Rights, Fishing, Procurement, and Seafood
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3093. How to increase taxes on fossil fuel profits

Author:
Martin Brehm Christensen, Ashfaq Khalfan, Anders Sypniewski Dahlbeck, Christian Hallum, and Alex Maitland
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:
Taxing excess profits, both in the fossil fuel industry and the overall corporate sector, is essential to restructure the economy to tackle climate breakdown, reduce inequality and make rich polluters pay. This briefing paper sets out Oxfam’s proposal for two taxes: a Rich Polluter Profit Tax (RPPT) on fossil fuel corporations, and an Excess Profit Tax (EPT) across all other sectors. An RPPT will ensure renewables are always more profitable than fossil fuel investments, and an EPT will reduce market concentration and the concentration of wealth, reducing inequality. Both can be implemented through existing corporate tax systems. Together, they could raise over US $1 trillion in their first year, which could fund vital investments for people and the planet. The paper explains how governments can design, administer and coordinate these taxes nationally and globally, to fund a just, gender responsive climate transition and fairer public finance.
Topic:
Inequality, Climate Finance, Tax Systems, Pollution, Fossil Fuels, and Climate Justice
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3094. Optimizing Azerbaijan’s CICA Chairmanship

Author:
Madina Alasgarova, Aysel Bayramova, Fatima Huseynli, Ashley Nhabete, and Goncha Salahova
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
The Conference on Interaction and Confidence‑Building Measures in Asia (CICA) is a multinational and multilateral platform designed to enhance dialogue and foster cooperation among its 28 member states, including Azerbaijan. With a mission to improve security, stability, and confidence‑building in the region, CICA stands out as a unique format that focuses exclusively on security issues, distinct from frameworks like the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). It is, in fact, the most inclusive pan‑Asian security forum. Currently, the established Western‑centric security formats are experiencing erosion and legitimacy crises that undermine their ability to address the security concerns of Eurasia in general and the Silk Road region in particular. Consequently, CICA’s role as an exclusively non‑Western security platform is gaining prominence across Asia. Azerbaijan’s 2024‑ 2026 CICA chairmanship presents a strategic opportunity to advance regional and pan‑Asian security cooperation—or at least serve as a more effective platform for dialogue, free from the presence of outsiders. Drawing on its successful experience in advancing efforts to institutionalize the Non‑Aligned Movement (NAM), Azerbaijan, with its growing influence in multilateral formats, is well‑positioned to advance the process to transform CICA from a discussion format into a more structured and impactful platform—that is to say, into a fully‑fledged intergovernmental organization. To that end, this paper offers concrete and actionable policy proposals to ensure that Azerbaijan’s chairmanship is productive and beneficial for its member states. None are game‑changing, but taken as a whole, we believe they can help move the needle noticeably forward. Our approach is informed by a conviction that CICA can support Azerbaijan in navigating an increasingly complex geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape, promoting security in Asia through various confidence‑building measures (CBMs), and fostering new partnerships across the continent. Parts of this paper should thus also be understood as contributing to the discourse on the expanding role of the non‑Western regional multilateral frameworks in a changing and highly fragmented international order.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Geopolitics, Multilateralism, International Order, and Confidence Building Measures
Political Geography:
Caucasus and Azerbaijan

3095. Azerbaijan’s Multilateralist Posture

Author:
Yalchin Rafiyev
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
We are honored to feature an interview with Mr. Yalchin Rafiyev, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Republic of Azerbaijan and Lead Negotiator for COP29. The general topic of this conversation is multilateralism and Azerbaijan’s growing involvement in various multilateral forums. Mr. Deputy Foreign Minister, let’s focus the bulk of our time together on the newer multilateral organizations—the ones that are contributing to a transformation of the way that the world sees multilateralism. Perhaps a good starting point is for you to outline Azerbaijan’s overall posture toward multilateralism, which, of course, begins with the UN, the world’s sole universal multilateral, inter‑governmental institution.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Government, Multilateralism, and Interview
Political Geography:
Caucasus and Azerbaijan

3096. The D-8 and Azerbaijan: The “Islamic Eight” and the Ongoing Shift in the Global Balance of Power

Author:
Inara Yagubova
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
The long‑held notion of the rules‑based liberal international order, which may be defined as consisting of globalization and a world order headed by the United States (benignly, in its self‑conception), is progressively waning. A new perspective that acknowledges the Global South’s importance and its increasing prominence on the international scene is beginning to take shape, with a shift from unipolarity to multipolarity. Instead of following the lead of the superpowers, the strong, serious, and ambitious countries that make up the Global South have become outspoken and influential players in international affairs, promoting causes that serve their own interests. In the conduct of foreign policy, one can say that more countries in more parts of the world are putting their countries first. Several key features highlight the growing autonomy of countries in the Global South. Despite their significant differences, they all prioritize economic expansion and strengthening ties with other countries through trade and investment. They are free from the geopolitical ambitions of the leading countries of the developed world and conduct their affairs in an independent (or multivectoral) way. In fact, rather than only reacting to outside forces, they are increasingly establishing new trade, technological, and economic development relationships that fit with their own strategic aims. Global power dynamics are therefore changing, particularly in the areas of commerce, climate diplomacy, and multilateral cooperation. Azerbaijan stands out as a strategic pivot in this context, using its location, political neutrality, and assertive diplomacy to operate as a link between these two international arenas. To that end, Azerbaijan has put forward several initiatives to be a platform for cooperation between the Global South and the Global North by increasing its interaction with developing countries. As President Ilham Aliyev stated on 20 July 2024 at the Shusha Global Media Forum, “We launch initiatives. We now actively work with developing countries in order to build bridges between the Global South and the Global North. Our advantage is that we’ve been chairing the Non‑Aligned Movement for four years.” At an international forum themed “Facing the New World Order” at the ADA University on 25 April 2025, Aliyev stated that “Of course, we played an important role in building bridges between the Global South and the Global North. That was one of the important assignments, which we put in front of ourselves. So, the way how we tackled COVID, the way how we hosted COP29 […], and bilateral contacts with African countries demonstrate clearly our agenda." In the past year or so, this agenda has included the successful organization of COP29, the takeover of the chairmanships of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence‑Building Measures in Asia (CICA) and Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), served as host of the summit of the Economic Cooperation Organization, and completed its chairmanship of GUAM. Next year, it will preside over both the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and so on. Azerbaijan is one of a handful of countries that is a member of European, Asian, Turkic, and Muslim interstate organizations. As an active supporter of multilateralism that pursues an independent foreign policy posture and is situated at the crossroads of flagship connectivity projects, Azerbaijan seeks to enhance its standing as a bridge between East and West, as well as North and South.
Topic:
Globalization, International Cooperation, Islam, Multilateralism, Autonomy, and International Order
Political Geography:
Caucasus and Azerbaijan

3097. Why the U.S. Should Embrace Israel-Azerbaijan Alignment

Author:
Stephen Blank
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
This essay argues that Azerbaijan’s joining the Abraham Accords and formalizing its entente with Israel and the U.S. is eminently in the interests of all three states, particularly in the context of the Middle East, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia. In the wake of the 12‑day Israel‑Iran war and the American strikes on Iran’s nuclear program, as well as the U.S. proposal to oversee and perhaps even guarantee arrangements regarding the Zangezur Corridor to foster peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan, this argument makes even more sense, given that Washington has expressed a clear interest in having peace and a lasting presence in the Caucasus. These events highlight the American presence in both the Middle East and the Caucasus and its de facto alliance with Israel. Given the growing intimacy of Azerbaijan‑Israeli ties and U.S. interest in pacifying the South Caucasus, this move by Washington and Baku to formalize ties among these three states would be all the more logical now. Indeed, President Ilham Aliyev has publicly welcomed this American initiative. This idea of extending the Abraham Accords to Azerbaijan apparently originated in Israel. Still, there is no sign that Azerbaijan opposes this notion. Moreover, as shown below, this tandem acts—and can act even further—in critical areas to further interests congruent with those of the United States. Since this partnership, long a fixture in world affairs, both reflects and can extend trends in world affairs that are beneficial not only to Israel and Azerbaijan but also to the U.S. Washington should encourage Baku to take this step. Although Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu had to postpone his scheduled visit to Baku in May 2025, his postponement letter cited the deepening bond between the two states, which can be seen in increasing economic cooperation, expanded tourism to and from both countries, Israel’s construction of Azerbaijan’s satellites, and two daily flights by Azerbaijani airlines between the two countries. While this partnership, if not a formal alliance, is primarily founded on a shared fear of Iran’s aggressive intentions against both states, this tandem has now strengthened the economic dimension of the relationship. It is thereby forging a broader and deeper foundation that transcends shared anxieties. This can also be seen in Israel’s technology and defense trade with Azerbaijan, where Baku employed Israeli weapons in its campaigns in Karabakh and is buying Israeli radar and aerial detection systems. However, at the same time, this alignment also exemplifies a larger trend towards trans‑regional partnerships between Middle Eastern and South Caucasus states. A similar trend is observed in Central Asia, where Kazakhstan’s President Kassym‑Jomart Tokayev proposed in 2024 that his country establish a strategic partnership with Qatar. Similarly, those Gulf states that are already working with Israel are becoming more entangled with Azerbaijan and the South Caucasus. Consequently, the Azerbaijan‑Israel partnership is no anomaly, but rather an illustration of a discernible trend in world politics that Washington should embrace.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Abraham Accords
Political Geography:
Caucasus, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Azerbaijan, and United States of America

3098. In the Grip of Global Bifurcation: The EU and its Possible Futures

Author:
Robert M. Cutler
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
A dozen years ago, I led a three‑week international scenario‑planning simulation for Wikistrat involving 80 experts across three continents. Our aim was to forecast plausible trajectories for the European Union through 2030. We developed four distinct “Master Narratives,” each representing a structurally coherent future. One scenario, Solidarity in Misery, envisioned the EU maintaining its formal institutional unity while stagnating economically and compensating for this stagnation through increasingly fervent affirmations of symbolic European identity. As of 2025, this scenario most closely resembles the EU’s current condition. The simulation did not just identify static end‑states; it mapped causal sequences—policy pathways and decision‑points—through which the EU might either entrench or escape each scenario. In the case of Solidarity in Misery, there were multiple routes to a more favorable future, marked by both economic dynamism and social cohesion. These routes, while varied in detail, shared broad structural characteristics. The scenario to which they pointed was called Wealthy Europe. Achieving it required a coordinated suite of interventions across fiscal, monetary, migratory, and geopolitical domains. Today, more than a decade later, Mario Draghi’s September 2024 Report on European Competitiveness, and Ursula von der Leyen’s January 2025 programmatic uptake of it, together constitute a partial, incomplete expression of that pivot. The Draghi report accurately diagnoses many of the EU’s structural weaknesses, and von der Leyen’s agenda selectively embraces its headline recommendations. Yet the incomplete nature of this policy uptake, combined with persistent institutional inertia and new external shocks, raises the specter that the system may absorb and neutralize its own attempts at self‑reform, even while ostensibly seeking transformation. This article evaluates whether the Draghi–von der Leyen trajectory can credibly shift the EU out of the Solidarity in Misery trap. It measures current reforms not only against their stated goals but also, more rigorously, against the systemic criteria outlined by the earlier simulation’s projected escape pathways. Using a complex‑systems lens, the analysis explores policy divergence, partial pivots, and latent fracture lines within the EU. It ultimately asks whether the Union is on the verge of meaningful transformation or merely rationalizing its own managed decline.
Topic:
International Relations, Reform, European Union, Institutions, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Europe

3099. Azerbaijan’s Multilateral Green Energy Diplomacy Powering: Regional Integration Through the Caspian-Black Sea Green Energy Corridor

Author:
Ahmad Humbatov
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
In some parts of the world, the global energy transition is accelerating, driven by increased electrification, expanding climate commitments, and the political drive to decarbonize economies. As demand for electricity generated from renewable sources increases—particularly in the markets controlled by the European Union or influenced by its unwavering commitment to climate action—so too does the strategic importance of cross‑border transmission infrastructure that can deliver renewable energy across regions. However, today’s grid systems remain fragmented, constrained by national borders, technical incompatibilities, and insufficient investment in transnational connectivity. In this context, large‑scale regional initiatives have become more important as critical enablers of energy security, economic integration, and climate resilience. Originally known as the Black Sea Submarine Cable, the project— now increasingly referred to as the Caspian–Black Sea or the Caspian–Black Sea–Europe Green Energy Corridor—represents one of the most ambitious and strategically significant responses to this challenge. The broader framing reflects both Azerbaijan’s prospective offshore wind contributions from the Caspian and the corridor’s potential to serve as a conduit for green electricity from Central Asia, including Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Although initially focused on a Georgia–Romania connection, the project has evolved to represent a broader strategic vision that links the South Caucasus and Central Asia, due to a combination of Azerbaijan’s geoeconomic ambition and the EU’s aspiration to lead the world in establishing a future powered by renewable energy systems. This paper explores the Caspian–Black Sea–Europe Energy Corridor, focusing on its structure, governance, and broader regional implications. It analyzes Azerbaijan’s strategic shift from a hydrocarbons exporter to an enabler of renewable energy systems. It examines how the development of this corridor is reshaping regional diplomacy, fostering economic integration, and advancing multilateral cooperation. In doing so, it highlights Azerbaijan’s emerging role as both a green electricity supplier and a facilitator of cross‑regional energy connectivity.
Topic:
Multilateralism, Regional Integration, Decarbonization, Energy, and Green Transition
Political Geography:
Caucasus, Azerbaijan, Caspian Sea, and Black Sea

3100. CICA and Azerbaijan: Does Membership Have Its Privileges?

Author:
Nijat Aliyev
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
Azerbaijan continues to follow an independent (or multivector or balanced) foreign policy strategy, based on the assessment that it represents the best way to protect and even strengthen its sovereignty. After the liberation of Karabakh, Azerbaijan has increased its efforts in multilateral fora in both Asia and Europe. Consequently, in Baku’s conception, the intergovernmental organization Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), established in 1992 and formalized in 1999, is gaining increasing importance as it seeks to enhance its role in fostering security and peace throughout Asia. This paper explores the impact of Azerbaijan’s engagement through CICA, including its ongoing chairmanship (2024‑2026), on its relationships with neighboring countries and, more broadly, its international relations. We aim to understand: How has Azerbaijan’s active involvement in CICA helped it strengthen ties with other Asian countries and boost its role in Eurasia? How does joining CICA align with Baku’s other international efforts? By addressing these questions, the paper highlights the benefits and challenges of CICA participation for Azerbaijan and explains how CICA influences its diplomatic standing in the South Caucasus and farther afield.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Multilateralism, Engagement, and Confidence Building Measures
Political Geography:
Eurasia, Caucasus, and Azerbaijan