Publication Year: within 1 Year and within 25 Years

2901. Understanding Different Perspectives on International Relations in MENA (Session 1)

Author:: Peter Krause
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:: Understanding Different Perspectives on International Relations in MENA: U.S. Foreign Policy under Trump An online mini course for the MIT community with Peter Krause (PhD '11). Krause is an associate professor of political science at Boston College and a research affiliate with the MIT Security Studies Program. This webinar is hosted by the MIT-MENA program at the MIT Center for International Studies. About the speaker: Peter Krause is an associate professor of political science at Boston College. His research and teaching focus on international security, Middle East politics, terrorism and political violence, nationalism, and rebels and revolution. He currently teaches courses on Middle East politics, terrorism and political violence, research methods, and international relations. He is a faculty associate in the International Studies Program and the Islamic Civilization and Societies Program at Boston College, as well as a research affiliate with the MIT Security Studies Program.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Middle East, North America, and United States of America

2902. Balancing the Grid and the Good: Ethically Navigating Nigeria's Energy Transition

Author:: Sicile Naddeo-Gjergji, Humnah Poonawalla, and Amrita Sahu
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University
Abstract:: This brief examines Nigeria as a critical case for the global energy transition. As one of Africa’s largest fossil-fuel producers and most rapidly growing economies, Nigeria must reconcile the need to expand reliable energy access with the moral imperative to decarbonize. The authors propose pathways for equitable grid modernization, off- grid innovation, and international partnership.
Topic:: Climate Change, Ethics, Fossil Fuels, Decarbonization, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:: Africa and Nigeria

2903. Fault, Responsibility, and Justice: Ethical Solutions to Economic Losses in the Energy Transition

Author:: Preston Ferraiuolo, Mikhail Perminov, Kate Voltz, and Joyce Yang
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University
Abstract:: The final brief widens the lens on climate policy by examining the ethical obligations owed to workers and communities disproportionately harmed by decarbonization. Drawing on distributive, recognition, and procedural justice, the authors develop a roadmap for equitable climate action that strengthens democratic legitimacy rather than eroding it.
Topic:: Climate Change, Economics, Democracy, Ethics, Legitimacy, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:: Global Focus

2904. The Ethics of Externalization in the United Kingdom and Denmark

Author:: Cooper Austen, Noah Eshaghpour-Silberman, Aidan Gouley, and Alexa Marsh
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University
Abstract:: Focusing on the UK’s Rwanda plan and Denmark’s extra-territorial processing legislation, this brief examines whether externalizing asylum procedures can ever meet ethical and legal standards. It introduces the “Ethical Ability to Accept” test as a tool for evaluating state capacity, human rights protections, and integration prospects in receiving countries.
Topic:: Human Rights, Ethics, Migration Policy, Asylum Seekers, and Externalization
Political Geography:: United Kingdom, Europe, Denmark, and Rwanda

2905. Fairness and Safety for Asylum Seekers: Assessing the “Remain in Mexico” (MPP) Policy

Author:: Harrison Fintz, Abigail Leibowitz, and Ila Prabhuram
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University
Abstract:: This brief evaluates the MPP program through an ethical lens emphasizing safety, fairness, due process, and burden sharing. It proposes concrete reforms for any future iteration: enforcement guidelines, safety reporting, expedited processing, legal support, and cross-border cooperation.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Borders, Immigration Policy, and Asylum Seekers
Political Geography:: South America, North America, Mexico, and United States of America

2906. Beyond Its Wildest Dreams: Israel’s Campaign for Geo-Strategic Dominance in the Middle East

Author:: Richard Silverstein
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:: School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:: Not since the Roman conquest of the Middle East has any power imposed itself so thoroughly through military dominance as Israel has in the past three years. It has, during that period, achieved sweeping regional hegemony over virtually all of its neighbors. This is the realization of a decades-old objective Israeli leaders have long coveted, but never dared imagine. Even amidst multi-state wars with its Arab frontline neighbors in 1956 and 1973, it only sought limited objectives (the 1948 and 1967 wars may be seen as exceptions). After multiple attacks over the past year on Iran and its regional Axis of Resistance, Israel has in effect redrawn the geo-strategic map. When Syrian rebels toppled Bashar al Assad and cut off Iranian weapons transshipments to Hezbollah, Israel exploited this opportunity to degrade the latter through repeated attacks against it. First, it severely wounded thousands of Hezbollah’s fighters through pager mass explosions. Then it wiped out its long-time leader and an icon of resistance, Hassan Nasrallah, along with his named successor and others in senior leadership. More recently, it invaded Lebanon and now occupies a considerable portion of the south. In addition, the IDF has eradicated many of the villages and destroyed much of the civilian infrastructure there, rendering it virtually uninhabitable. Hezbollah seems, at least for the time being, to be a spent force. Unlike Israel’s past invasions of Lebanon and its 20-year (1982-2002) occupation of Hezbollah’s southern strongholds, which were met with fierce resistance, its more recent incursion has generated little conflict.
Topic:: Hezbollah, Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Armed Conflict, Strategic Interests, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Lebanon

2907. Israel and Iran: Major Threats to Middle East Stability

Author:: Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:: School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:: For years, Iran has been accused of being the primary source of instability in the Middle East by much of the West, Israel, and a number of Arab states. One point of conflagration is that it maintains a network of armed groups across the region (the “Axis of Resistance”) which it deploys to attack other states in the area, such as Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. The second is that it continues to develop an increasingly sophisticated ballistic missile arsenal, which was brought to bear against the Kurdish areas of Iraq, Pakistan and Israel earlier this year. Iran is also criticized for supporting the regime of former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad (until December 2024). Furthermore, Western and Arab countries believe that Iran has violated article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by enriching uranium beyond the 20% threshold for civilian use. However, perceptions of Tehran as the main agent of regional instability have shifted in the Middle East and beyond during the past 22 months. A growing number of experts and organizations say Israel is committing more and more war crimes in Gaza, including genocide, and launching an unprecedented series of military campaigns.
Topic:: International Law, Armed Conflict, and Regional Stability
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, and Israel

2908. Caught in the Crossfire: Jordan’s Balancing Act in the Iran-Israel Conflict

Author:: Francesca Maria Lorenzini and Kourosh Ziabari
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:: School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:: Jordan’s defensive action to intercept Iran’s retaliatory drones and missiles, slashing through its skies in mid-June, has drawn both approval and criticism, underscoring the kingdom’s struggles to balance strategic alliances with public opinion.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Public Opinion, Drones, Alliance, Armed Conflict, and Strategic Alliances
Political Geography:: Iran, Israel, Palestine, and Jordan

2909. Journalism in Peril: The Gaza Genocide as a Global Test of Press Freedom

Author:: Mohamed Salama, Shahira S. Fahmy, Mona Rafaat Alsaba, and Saif Shahin
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:: School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:: In Gaza, it isn’t only civilians that are being laid to ruin; the freedom to tell the story of its people is being muzzled by successive Israeli strikes targeting and killing Palestinian journalists
Topic:: Genocide, Journalism, Civilians, Armed Conflict, and Freedom of Press
Political Geography:: Middle East, Palestine, and Gaza

2910. What Palestinian Statehood Must Mean to Mean Anything

Author:: Omar Auf
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:: School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:: As more governments prepare to recognize Palestine this September, the gesture risks being performative unless matched with concrete policies such as sanctions and legal obligations, and a decolonial vision of statehood that challenges occupation at its roots
Topic:: Sanctions, Decolonization, Statehood, Palestinians, and Recognition
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

2911. Confederative Futures and the Burden of Leadership in Israel/Palestine

Author:: Klara Vlahčević Lisinski
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:: School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:: The pathway to recognition of Palestinian Statehood does not require the world’s approval through the raising of 192 flags; rather, it requires convincing “one state only—the state of Israel”
Topic:: Leadership, Occupation, Statehood, and Confederalism
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

2912. Israel is Erasing Palestine and the West is Complicit

Author:: Nour Odeh
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:: School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:: The genocide unfolding in the Gaza Strip has allowed Israel to speed up its takeover and ethnic cleansing of the occupied West Bank in stealth mode
Topic:: Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing, Settlements, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and West Bank

2913. The Double Genocide in Gaza

Author:: Gregory H. Stanton
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:: School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:: Israel’s disproportionate response to Hamas’ October 7, 2023 massacre includes genocide against Palestinians in Gaza.
Topic:: Genocide, Armed Conflict, Palestinians, October 7, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

2914. Kuwait Country Report 2024

Author:: Arab Barometer
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Arab Barometer
Abstract:: Since the last Arab Barometer survey in Kuwait, conducted in 2022, major changes have taken place, significantly affecting political stability in the country. While political life in Kuwait was saturated with crises, and its indicators were clearly visible in the dissolution of the National Assembly (Parliament) repeatedly before completing its term, the shifts, changes, and political instability that dominated the public arena, between late 2022 and the current period of 2024, included even more severe events. Kuwait faced the unconstitutional dissolution of the National Assembly and the suspension of some articles in the constitution, now for the third time in Kuwait’s history. The first two such crises were in 1967 and 1986. To summarize the events that took place from June 2022 until the dissolution of the Parliament and the suspension of the constitution in May 2024, they are as follows: On August 3, 2022, the National Assembly was dissolved constitutionally, in response to the sit-in of a number of MPs inside the Parliament and their overnight stay there. The Crown Prince (the current Emir) gave a speech in which he emphasized adherence to the constitution, and also presented initiatives in electoral reform. He emphasized that the government would not vote for the candidate for the speaker of the National Assembly, and that the elections would be through the national ID card (effectively changing electoral circuits). The protesting MPs considered these reforms a victory. As a result, Ahmed al-Nawaf was appointed Prime Minister
Topic:: Corruption, Education, Environment, Gender Issues, Health, Migration, Governance, Democracy, Economy, Discrimination, Institutions, Labor Market, Freedom, and Political System
Political Geography:: Middle East and Kuwait

2915. ASEAN’S Digital Future: Strengthening Malaysia’s Leadership in Submarine Cable Governance and IMO Advocacy

Author:: Raaga Manjari Annathurai
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Maritime Institute of Malaysia
Abstract:: As Malaysia assumes the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) chairmanship in 2025, its leadership comes at a crucial time when digital infrastructure and connectivity are more critical than ever. This coincides with Malaysia’s role in the International Maritime Organization (IMO) Council for the 2024–2025 term, reinforcing its commitment to maritime and digital governance on both regional and global scales. Among the many priorities under Malaysia’s chairmanship, ensuring the resilience, security, and efficient governance of submarine cables is paramount. These cables serve as the Critical Information Infrastructure (CNI) of international telecommunications, driving economic growth, digital transformation, and cross-border connectivity. Malaysia’s strategic geographical position in the region and robust regulatory framework place it in a pivotal role in spearheading efforts to enhance ASEAN’s submarine cable governance and regional connectivity. As home to some of the busiest submarine cable routes in the world, these undersea communication networks in the region play a crucial role in enabling seamless internet access, financial transactions, and cloud computing services. As digitalisation accelerates across the region, the demand for robust and well-protected submarine cable systems continues to rise. However, regulatory inconsistencies, environmental risks, and geopolitical tensions pose significant threats to the uninterrupted functioning of these cables. Malaysia, as the ASEAN 2025 chair, is uniquely positioned to lead regional efforts to address these challenges and establish a more harmonised regulatory framework.
Topic:: Communications, Governance, ASEAN, and Submarine Cable
Political Geography:: Malaysia and Asia

2916. Political System Preference in the Middle East & North Africa (2023-2024)

Author:: Michael Robbins
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Arab Barometer
Abstract:: Ultimately, these findings reveal a region that is still searching for the best system of governance. Citizens want dignity, but years of non-democratic rule have, in much of the region, not led to this outcome. Yet, the limited democratic experiments, as democracy is defined in the technical sense, have also not produced desired outcomes.
Topic:: Governance, Democracy, Survey, and Political System
Political Geography:: Middle East and North Africa

2917. Democracy in the Middle East & North Africa 2023-2024

Author:: Michael Robbins
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Arab Barometer
Abstract:: Findings from Arab Barometer Wave VIII surveys make clear that while citizens across the region have come to realize democracy does not represent a panacea for all their country’s problems, they remain most supportive of it compared with other political systems.
Topic:: Politics, Public Opinion, Democracy, Citizenship, and Survey
Political Geography:: Middle East and North Africa

2918. "Reciprocal" tariffs: What are they really for?

Author:: Robert Z. Lawrence
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:: This Policy Brief evaluates the evolving reasons for and application of the Trump administration’s “reciprocal” tariffs and finds them wanting. The tariffs, adjusted most recently on August 1, 2025, were originally supposed to achieve reciprocity between the United States and its trading partners but were based on a defective measure because bilateral imbalances do not necessarily indicate unfair foreign trade practices; the methodology used to estimate the reciprocal tariffs was biased towards overstatement, particularly for countries producing primary commodities, which will have high pass-through into US final prices, and for countries exporting products with high import content. Given these defects, the reciprocal tariffs are better seen as a dressed-up anchoring ploy to strengthen America’s hand in negotiations rather than credible estimates of the unfair trade practices that the United States faces. Moreover, even if reduced to 15 percent, the application of these tariffs to America’s poorest trading partners would do little to reduce the overall US trade deficit but considerably harm their economic development.
Topic:: Tariffs, Economic Development, Protectionism, and Trade Deficit
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

2919. Does a weak social safety net hold back private consumption in China?

Author:: Nicholas R. Lardy
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:: Many experts see China’s economy as constrained because of a weak social safety net, especially the retirement system, resulting in anemic domestic consumption spending. This view is out of date. Recent data indicate that China has expanded many parts of its social safety net and that consumption spending has accelerated. Social expenditures in China have more than doubled as a share of GDP since 2010 and are on par with Mexico and Turkey. But given China’s aging population, safety net spending and domestic consumption spending will need to expand further to put China’s economy on a more sustainable path. The latest data should clear the cobwebs of misunderstanding that have led to both complacency and unnecessary alarm about China’s economic prospects among observers in the United States and other countries. China’s government is hardly unaware of the importance of stronger household consumption and has announced policies to increase consumer spending, including more generous pension benefits for farmers and rural migrant workers. If these initiatives are implemented, the growth of household consumption is likely to accelerate.
Topic:: Government, Economic Growth, Safety Net, and Consumer Behavior
Political Geography:: China and Asia

2920. Social protection for Mozambique’s elderly: History, structure, and potential effectiveness

Author:: Sara Almeida, Hanna Berkel, Sam Jones, Patricia Justino, and Telça Massingue
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: United Nations University
Abstract:: This study assesses the effectiveness of Mozambique's flagship social pension programme, the elderly component of the Programa de Subsídio Social Básico (PSSB). Focusing on three key criteria— programme targeting, reliability, and materiality—we combine administrative data on the universe of beneficiaries with the complete records of the 2017 Population and Housing Census. Merging these datasets at the localidade level, we provide a highly granular view of programme coverage rates and payment delivery regularity. We estimate that in the best case with zero targeting errors, the PSSB-Elderly programme reaches two-thirds of its target group. However, significant regional disparities persist, including undercoverage in poorer regions. Additionally, we document substantial delays in payments since 2023, as well as various inaccuracies in the beneficiary registry. These findings underscore the importance of simple and robust designs for social protection in resource-constrained contexts. They also suggest that expanding programme coverage towards a quasi-universal subsidy in high-poverty locations merits serious consideration.
Topic:: Poverty, Pension, Coverage Gaps, Payment Delays, and Program Targetng
Political Geography:: Africa and Mozambique

2921. American Public Attitudes on U.S. Foreign Policy in Northeast Asia and on the Korean Peninsula, 2025

Author:: Je Heon (James) Kim
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: This year’s KEI/YouGov survey comes at a moment of profound uncertainty in U.S. foreign policy. The Donald Trump administration has unsettled established trade arrangements, raised questions about the durability of U.S. alliance commitments, and injected unpredictability into U.S. engagement with long-standing partners like South Korea. Against this backdrop, American public opinion provides a clearer sense of continuity. The survey reveals enduring support for South Korea as a partner, stable recognition of the alliance’s value, and consistent preference for more open trade, investment, and cultural exchange, even as geopolitical turbulence and partisan divides complicate policymaking. Yet there are signs that American public opinion may be undergoing a transition in how Americans view other countries suggesting possible shifts in global alignments. Finally, within this evolving perception, the type of state appears to matter: Americans tend to weigh national security, trade, and investment differently depending on whether a country is viewed as an ally, partner, competitor, or adversary.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Trade, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, North America, Northeast Asia, and United States of America

2922. Is inequality always unfair? Experimental evidence on preferences for redistribution in Mozambique and Viet Nam

Author:: Ines A. Ferreira, Rachel M. Gisselquist, and Finn Tarp
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: United Nations University
Abstract:: Knowledge of the factors driving people’s views on redistribution in the Global South remains limited. While these societies occupy top positions in inequality rankings, redistribution levels tend to be lower. We combine survey and experimental data from Mozambique and Viet Nam to test whether redistributive preferences vary depending on the source of inequality, focusing on two channels, fairness views and communication. First, we confirm the finding that inequality resulting from differences in merit is more accepted than inequality due to luck or factors outside of individual control. We also observe heterogeneity in fairness views. Second, we extend the analysis to consider whether allowing for communication between a receiver, who can suggest a distribution, and a dictator, who makes the final decision, affects redistribution preferences. We find that the relevance of the source of inequality remains. However, whether the expectation of the receiver is met by the dictator varies across samples and depends on the source of inequality. Overall, our results provide important insights into the universality of fairness views and point to the need for more analysis across contexts with different institutional and economic backgrounds.
Topic:: Inequality, Global Focus, Redistribution, and Fairness
Political Geography:: Africa, Asia, Mozambique, and Viet Nam

2923. America’s Nuclear Red Line: Trust in Alliances, Not Proliferation

Author:: Yujin Son
Publication Date:: 11-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: On many foreign policy questions, American voters are sharply divided. But on nuclear weapons, a bipartisan consensus still holds. New polling by the Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI) and YouGov shows broad public opposition to letting allies such as South Korea develop nuclear weapons, even as risks from North Korea, Russia, and other countries mount. In short, U.S. voters demonstrate a durable belief that extended deterrence and U.S. alliances remain the most effective tools for safeguarding international security. The survey shows only 20 percent of Americans support South Korea developing its own nuclear weapons. Other long-standing U.S. allies fare only slightly better, with just 24 percent supporting nuclear development for Australia and Japan. In every case, opposition to allied nuclear proliferation far outweighs support. The data shows that most Americans support alliances, not additional bombs.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Alliance, Tariffs, Trade, and Survey
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

2924. Securing data in the AI supply chain

Author:: Justin Sherman
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Underpinning AI technologies is a complex supply chain—organizations, people, activities, information, and resources that enable AI research, development, deployment, and more. The AI supply chain includes human talent, compute, and institutional and individual stakeholders. This report focuses on another element of the AI supply chain: data. While a diversity of data types, structures, sources, and use cases exist in the AI supply chain, policymakers can easily fall into the trap of focusing on one AI data component at one moment (e.g., training data circa 2017), then switching focus to another AI data component next (e.g., model weights in current times), risking a lopsided policy that fails to take account of all the AI data components that are important for AI research and development (R&D). For example, overconfidence about which data element or attribute will most drive AI R&D can lead researchers and policymakers to skip past important, open questions (e.g., what factors might matter, in what combinations, and to what end), wrongly treating them as resolved. Put simply, a “one-size-fits-all” approach to AI-related data runs the risk of creating a regulatory, technological, or governance framework that overfocuses on one element of the data in the AI supply chain while leaving other critical parts and questions unaddressed. Managing the risks to the data components of the AI supply chain—from errors to data leakage to intentional model exploitation and theft—will require a set of different, tailored approaches aimed at achieving a comprehensive reduction in risk. As conceptualized in this report, the data in the AI supply chain includes the data describing an AI model’s properties and behavior, as well as the data associated with building and using a model. It also includes AI models themselves and the different digital systems that facilitate the movement of data into and out of models. The report, therefore, spells out a framework to visualize the seven data components in the AI supply chain: training data, testing data, models (themselves), model architectures, model weights, Application Programming Interfaces (APIs), and Software Development Kits (SDKs). It then uses the framework to map data components of the AI supply chain to three different ways that policymakers, technologists, and other stakeholders can potentially think about data risk: data at rest vs. in motion vs. in processing (focus on a data component within the supply chain and its current state); threat actor risk (focus on threat actors and risks to a data component within the supply chain); and supply chain due diligence and risk management (focus on a data component supplier or source within the supply chain and related actors). In doing so, it finds that many risks to AI-related data are risks to data writ large that existing best practices could mitigate. These include National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and International Organization for Standardization (ISO) specified data access controls, continuous monitoring systems, and robust encryption; the risks at hand in these cases do not require reinventing the wheel. Simultaneously, this report also finds that some security risks to AI data components do not map well to existing security best practices that would adequately mitigate the risk or even apply at all. At least two stand out immediately: bad actors’ attempts to poison AI training data require data filtering mechanisms not well captured by existing measures, and which access controls or encryption would not appropriately mitigate; and emerging, malicious efforts to insert so-called neural backdoors into the behavior of neural networks require new security protections, too, beyond the realm of traditional IT data security. On top of implementing these two categories of mitigations, this report emphasizes that organizations can leverage “know your supplier” best practices to ensure all other entities in their AI supply chains have security best practices for both non-AI-specific and AI-specific data risks.
Topic:: Cybersecurity, Artificial Intelligence, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:: Global Focus

2925. Exploring the global digital ID landscape

Author:: Coley Felt and Will LaRivee
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: In an increasingly digital world, digital identity systems represent a fundamental transformation in how personal information is authenticated and managed, shifting from traditional physical identification methods to electronic credentials that enable access to digital services across government and private-sector platforms. These systems utilize authenticated credentials that verify individual qualifications and personal information to establish trusted digital documentation, spanning use cases from health certificates to mobile identification for travel security and banking verification. The worldwide adoption of digital identity systems varies significantly across regions and implementation approaches. Estonia’s comprehensive e-ID system, mandatory for all residents, demonstrates transformative societal impact by connecting organizations through distributed databases and blockchain technology. India’s Aadhaar program serves a massive population, proving that large-scale digital identity systems can operate in developing countries while bringing previously undocumented populations into formal economic systems, albeit not without criticism. The European Union’s eIDAS framework mandates that all member states offer digital identity wallets to citizens and businesses, creating interoperability across member states. The African Union has faced infrastructure and data protection challenges, while the United States remains fragmented with individual states implementing mobile driver’s licenses without federal coordination. Digital identity systems offer a breadth of benefits including enhanced convenience, improved access for underserved populations, stronger privacy protections through data minimization principles, and significant cost savings for organizations. These systems hold tremendous potential to transform the delivery of government services and industry interactions, though there are potential risks and limitations to be considered.
Topic:: Human Rights, Science and Technology, European Union, Innovation, Digital Policy, and Digital ID
Political Geography:: Africa, North America, and United States of America

2926. Addressing China’s military expansion in West Africa and beyond

Author:: Tressa Guenov
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The next National Defense Strategy (NDS) is being drafted at a critical moment when the United States risks permanently ceding strategic influence to China in Africa—especially West Africa—without a reimagined approach to the continent. With lifesaving foreign assistance drastically reduced due to the current administration’s budget cuts to the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and State Department programs, along with uncertain economic effects from tariffs, the United States has voluntarily weakened its diplomatic and economic tools to influence and support Africa. This reality gives additional weight to the importance of defense diplomacy and military cooperation as critical means by which the United States can exercise strategic influence in the region. While the US administration may be looking to narrow the United States’ role on the continent, Africa is too vast, important, and complex to attempt bilateral defense diplomacy, military-to-military relations, and counterterrorism efforts on the cheap, by proxy, or from afar. Key issues for the Department of Defense (DoD) include acknowledging the looming strategic dilemma posed by China’s increased influence in Africa; developing a cohesive and responsive strategy to counter that influence; managing bilateral defense relationships; and addressing other regional priorities such as Russia’s growing influence and counterterrorism issues, which also have inextricable connections to China. The new NDS needs to lay a foundation to address these challenges. The alternative is over-regionalization of the China challenge to the Indo-Pacific, which could impose short-sighted limitations that will affect the US role in Africa for years to come.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Politics, and Resilience
Political Geography:: Africa, China, and Asia

2927. Chinese fishing in West Africa: Responding to the environmental and social impacts

Author:: Ebimboere Seiyafa, Awa Niang Fall, Ellis Adjei Adams, Kadidia Kane, Isa Elegbebe Olalekan, Kodjo N'Souvi, and Salamatu Joana Tannor
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Chinese companies—including both state-backed firms and private actors—have rapidly expanded into West Africa’s fishing sector, often operating illegally in prohibited coastal waters. Chinese vessels employ bottom trawling and other destructive methods, which—combined with limited oversight and poor enforcement of national and transboundary laws—have caused declining fish stocks, weakened local fishery economies, and deteriorated coastal water quality. This brief examines the ecological and social risks posed by Chinese fishing in West Africa and offers policy recommendations to strengthen legal protections and enhance regional cooperation to safeguard the region’s fisheries and water systems.
Topic:: Climate Change, Corruption, Environment, Politics, Fishing, and Energy
Political Geography:: Africa, China, Asia, and West Africa

2928. Two US policy options for Venezuela: Shaping reform vs. ‘maximum pressure’ toward regime collapse

Author:: Venezuela Solutions Group
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The first Trump administration drafted a framework for encouraging a democratic transition in Venezuela; with a few updates, it represents one policy path the second Trump administration could take. Nicolas Maduro’s recent promotion of a longtime rival may be a sign of how few friends he has left, raising the possibility that he may be more susceptible to the second option: a “maximum pressure” campaign. Whether Washington opts for incentives or a hard line, the goal should be to keep presenting dilemmas that make a democratic transition more appealing than the status quo.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Oil, Politics, Sanctions, Reform, Geopolitics, Energy, and Democratic Transitions
Political Geography:: South America, Latin America, Venezuela, North America, and United States of America

2929. How the US and Europe can deter and respond to Russia’s chemical, biological, and nuclear threats

Author:: Philippe Dickinson, Ryan Arick, and Natasha Lander Finch
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: This report presents the findings and recommendations of the Atlantic Council project, Sustaining Allied Responses to the Threat of Russian Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Escalation. The objective of the project was to analyze the prospects for Russian use of chemical or biological weapons specifically in Europe over the next five to ten years; identify how the United States and its European allies and partners could deter and prevent Russian use of these weapons in Europe; and, should deterrence fail, assess response options.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, National Security, Conflict, Crisis Management, Deterrence, Biological Weapons, Nuclear Weapons, and Chemical Weapons
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and United States of America

2930. Responsible stewardship models can transform Africa’s mineral wealth into prosperity

Author:: Mamadou Fall Kane
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: As the global race for minerals critical to green energy tech heats up, African nations should manage their mineral revenues with sovereign wealth funds applying best practices from funds like Norway’s and Saudi Arabia’s. Well-structured, credible sovereign wealth funds would lower risk, attract liquid capital markets, and facilitate strategic alliances for African nations. By aligning resource wealth management with domestic industrial policy, African countries can move beyond extraction and play a greater role in global supply chains.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Economy, Economic Growth, Renewable Energy, Economic Inclusion, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:: Africa

2931. Homeland defense in an era of new strategic threats

Author:: Clementine G. Starling-Daniels and Amy Cowley
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Threats to the US homeland have fundamentally changed from two decades ago. In the years following 9/11, the most pressing dangers came from terrorist groups intent on carrying out attacks on US soil. Today’s threat landscape is broader, more complex, and more difficult to predict. Peer-state competitors, transnational criminal organizations, and non-state actors now possess the means to target the US homeland through a range of kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities—including long-range missiles, cyberattacks, sabotage, disinformation, and malign foreign influence. Responding to these evolving threats—designed to disrupt critical infrastructure, weaken public trust, and undermine the ability of the United States to project power abroad— requires a comprehensive approach to homeland defense that extends beyond border security. But how should the United States chart this new course, and what must it entail? The forthcoming National Defense Strategy (NDS), published by the Department of Defense (DoD), offers a critical opportunity to lay the groundwork for the next step in strengthening homeland defense. Meeting this challenge requires a focus not only on large-scale air and missile defense and border security but also on the protection of critical defense systems—such as space infrastructure—from cyberattacks and coercive economic activities. The success of these efforts may well determine whether the United States can stay one step ahead of those seeking to do it harm.
Topic:: Defense Policy, National Security, Science and Technology, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

2932. The UAE’s Foreign Policy Anchors and Their Influence on Israel and the Region

Author:: Moran Zaga
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:: This policy paper explores the fast-moving expansion of the UAE’s influence in the Middle East through physical control of territories and assets beyond its borders, analysing the implications for Israel, in particular, and for the regional balance of power as a whole. The paper begins by outlining a conceptual policy framework of so-called “anchors” and “grips” with unique characteristics. It then presents a focused empirical review of the infrastructure, assets, territories and other types of physical property the UAE has acquired to implement its policy in four key arenas: Egypt, Jordan, Israel and the Gaza Strip. The paper then analyzes the regional implications of this process and its specific effects on Israel including its relations with the Palestinians and concludes by proposing guiding principles to address this trend. Scholars and decision makers will find the paper relevant to political and strategic planning for Israel’s regional engagement, particularly concerning Jordan, Egypt, and the Gaza Strip. The importance of the process the paper describes lies in the scope and speed with which this transformative phenomenon is spreading and changing the regional dynamics. This shift disrupts the traditional division between bilateral and regional relations, necessitating a reassessment of how Israel manages its relationships – both with the UAE as an investor and with the neighbouring countries in which it chooses to invest.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Investment, Abraham Accords, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and United Arab Emirates

2933. Building Networks in the Shadows of War: Mapping Challenges and Opportunities

Author:: Eitan Ishai
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:: In September 2023, Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies – and the U.S. Department of State launched a joint project to create a civil-society network of regional thinkers and policy experts. The goal was to foster strategic dialogue, cooperation, and deeper normalization between Israel and its neighbors. However, just two weeks later, the Hamas attack of October 7th and the ensuing war reshaped the regional landscape. This report reflects on the project’s initial challenges, the adaptations made in response to the conflict, and the surprising emergence of real connections and public Israeli-Arab dialogue despite the turmoil.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Normalization, Abraham Accords, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and United States of America

2934. For the US and the free world, security demands a resilience-first approach

Author:: Elizabeth Sizeland
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: This report is the foundational document of the Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative (AANSRI) and outlines a bold vision to embed resilience as a core pillar of US and allied security. As crises compound, the initiative calls for investing across individual, institutional, and international levels of resilience to withstand, adapt, and thrive amid disruption.
Topic:: Cybersecurity, Crisis Management, Resilience, Non-Traditional Threats, and Security Partnerships
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

2935. Private industry should step up to protect the global maritime order

Author:: Elisabeth Braw
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Safe oceans are indispensable for the functioning of modern economies. Ocean safety is under severe strain, like the rest of the rules-based international order, not least because major nations actively undermine it. The maritime industry is directly affected by the deterioration of the maritime order—as demonstrated, for example, by the continued growth of the shadow fleet—and should step up to protect it.
Topic:: Economy, Rule of Law, Norms, Private Sector, Industry, and Maritime Security
Political Geography:: Global Focus

2936. 100 Leaders in Europe’s Economies: Benchmarking Investment, Innovation and Impact in Europe

Author:: Matthias Bauer, Andrea Dugo, Dyuti Pandya, and Elena Sisto
Publication Date:: 11-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: Europe’s competitiveness is built on openness, interdependence, and global embeddedness. Its prosperity depends not on how many firms it “owns”, but on how many choose Europe as a place to invest, innovate, and employ. Both European- and non-European-headquartered multinationals generate vast value added, capital investment, and technological spillovers within Europe – forming the backbone of its industrial renewal, productivity growth, and innovation capacity. Yet the current debate on competitiveness too often turns inward, focusing on the nationality of companies rather than their contribution to Europe’s economy. This framing is outdated and counterproductive. Persisting with it risks depriving Europeans of future economic and technological opportunities, as it diverts political attention from the true drivers of competitiveness: investment, innovation, and integration. If Europe continues to measure success by the passport of a company rather than its productive footprint, it will erode its attractiveness to global investors and talent. The result would be slower technological diffusion, weaker industrial renewal, and fewer high-quality jobs. In an economy where knowledge, data, and capital move seamlessly across borders, a defensive stance will not protect European interests – it will isolate them. To remain a global hub for innovation and advanced production, Europe must replace a politics of ownership with a politics of enablement – one that empowers firms, workers, and innovators to invest and grow within Europe, irrespective of headquarters location. A competitive Europe must remain open, predictable, and globally connected, strengthening both the integrity of its Single Market and its engagement through trade, investment, and multilateral partnerships. Multinational enterprises (MNEs) are the cornerstone of Europe’s competitiveness and technological dynamism. MNEs are consistently the most productive segment of Europe’s economy, driving efficiency gains, technological diffusion, and wage growth that smaller enterprises alone cannot sustain. Although they represent only around 1 per cent of all firms across major European economies, their contribution to output, trade, and employment is disproportionate. Around 151,000 MNE groups operate within the EU and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), employing over 49 million people – roughly 29 per cent of the total business-economy workforce. The majority are European-controlled (73 per cent) and account for 83 per cent of MNE employment, while a small number of very large firms – just 5 per cent with more than 1,000 employees – provide over 80 per cent of all MNE jobs. These firms form the backbone of Europe’s production networks and are the main channels of technology transfer, innovation diffusion, and cross-border investment. This study provides new evidence to inform Europe’s political debate. It analyses 100 of the world’s largest and most research-intensive multinational enterprises with substantial operational footprints in Europe. The sample spans technology, pharmaceuticals, automotive, retail, energy, and manufacturing – comprising 42 European- and 58 non-European-headquartered firms that together generate EUR 10.4 trillion in global revenue and EUR 822 billion in annual capital investment. Their combined presence demonstrates Europe’s enduring appeal as a location to invest, produce, and innovate, as well as its reliance on both domestic and international industrial leaders to sustain competitiveness. Although data gaps remain due to non-standardised corporate disclosures, the findings provide a robust, transparent, and replicable picture of how MNEs shape Europe’s economic fabric – reinforcing its integration into global value chains and its ability to attract frontier industries and talent.
Topic:: Governance, European Union, Investment, Institutions, and Innovation
Political Geography:: Europe

2937. The Services Revolution: Industrial Policy for a Modern Economy

Author:: Andrea Dugo, Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, Philipp Lamprecht, and Erik van der Marel
Publication Date:: 11-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: A ”manufacturing-first” attitude has taken hold in the European economic policy discussion. New strategies and industrial policies are designed with the ambition of boosting development and output in traditional industrial sectors. These policies often build on the assumption that industrial development and jobs are “better” than new growth and employment in the services sector – that industry is a stronger source for innovation and higher productivity growth. This view is outdated. It is also misguided and will make Europe less competitive. A growing services sector is featured in all economies that that have matured and expanded prosperity. Over time, the services sector has grown and professionalized – and is increasingly a sector of innovation and growth in productivity. Technological change has provided new opportunities for services to fuel the entire economy with business dynamism and, of course, to improve the performance of industrial companies. Some of the most R&D intensive sectors in the economy are services: global R&D spending has certainly moved towards services. As a result, the services share of value added in modern economies is rapidly increasing. Equally important, the “manufacturing-first” attitude prevents Europe for pursuing reforms that are necessary for the EU services sector to develop. It has been pointed out in several high-level reports – including Mario Draghi’s report on The Future of European Competitiveness – that Europe trails the US in services sector performance. Because of high and restrictive regulations, innovative services sectors have grown a lot slower in the EU than in the US. Europe’s industrial performance is better than in the US: for instance, EU industrial sector R&D is higher than in the US, when measured as share of Gross Domestic Product. Europe’s big economic challenge is to boost the services sector. For Europe to close the gap with the US, it needs to release the competitive energy of the services sector and incentivize more R&D, innovation, and business dynamism in high value-added services sectors like ICT and scientific research. In the paper, we model a scenario in which the EU would be more like the US as far as the services sector is concerned. It would include a remarkable growth in R&D spending. For example, R&D spending on computer programming would rise from EUR 15 to 66 billion – and in services like scientific and research development it would boost R&D by eight times. If the services sector would be thriving more, the European economy would get a serious boost. Different scenarios for a better-performing services sector are modelled in this study. Using cautious assumptions for a new development of the services sector, we find that the EU could add another 280 billion EUR to its Gross Domestic Product over five years – which equals a 1.6 percent growth. There are several reasons why the European services sector trails the US. Digitalization and technological change are part of the explanation. Generally, US services companies have faced fewer regulations and restrictions when developing new technologies and services that fuse with “older” services and help industries to improve their performance. Boosting the European services sector requires more business and market dynamism – and a regulatory environment that primes service companies for faster growth.
Topic:: Globalization, Industrial Policy, Economy, Services, and Trade
Political Geography:: Europe

2938. The Trade Effects of AI Provisions in PTAs: Does Non-Binding Matter?

Author:: Elena Sisto and Erik van der Marel
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: This paper examines whether non-binding (“soft”) AI-related provisions in preferential trade agreements (PTAs) move trade and how their effects compare with binding (“hard”) provisions. The motivation is straightforward: digital rules are spreading quickly, but legal enforceability is uneven. We ask whether non-binding instruments (standards work, data-innovation clauses, interoperability programmes) can deliver trade gains in AI-intensive sectors even without hard obligations. Drawing from TAPED AI-related provisions in PTAs, we construct a measure of AI-related depth, distinguishing binding from non-binding provisions. To identify where these rules should matter most, we interact agreement depth with a sectoral proxy for AI intensity based on firm adoption. We estimate a structural gravity model using PPML with exporter-year, importer-year, pair, and pair-trend fixed effects, and run extensive robustness checks including pooled sector interactions and leads/lags. Key results: Around 40% of AI-related provisions in PTAs are non-binding. Binding AI-related depth is associated with ~13% higher trade in AI-intensive sectors. Non-binding AI-related depth delivers nearly comparable gains (~12%). Binding provisions bite most on customs-duty/digital goods and data-protection items. Non-binding provisions are especially effective for cross-border data flows and new AI/data issues (interoperability, standards, data-innovation). Pooled sector tests confirm positive, significant effects when depth is interacted with AI intensity. Interpretation and implications: In fast-moving, regulation-heavy domains such as AI, credible soft-law cooperation can reduce coordination frictions and facilitate trade, often approaching the impact of binding rules. Policymakers can sequence: use structured non-binding tools to unlock near-term gains where consensus is still forming, while locking in binding disciplines where norms are mature. Policy directions: (i) deploy cooperation chapters, interoperability work programmes, and open-data initiatives to target data-flow frictions; (ii) consolidate binding disciplines on established areas (digital-goods duties, core data-protection principles) to amplify effects; and (iii) invest in standards and translational mechanisms that support firms in AI-intensive sectors. We thank Daniel Trefler for serving as a discussant at the OECD Conference on Trade in Services and for helpful comments and suggestions. We also thank Hildegunn Nordås and Bernard Hoekman for comments. In addition, we would like to thank Lars Vandelaar for excellent research assistance.
Topic:: Globalization, Trade, Artificial Intelligence, Data, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:: Global Focus

2939. Global Digital Trade Takes Off: Is EU Digital Policy Keeping Pace?

Author:: Elena Sisto and Erik van der Marel
Publication Date:: 11-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: Global digital trade is increasingly shifting toward faster-growing regions outside Europe, driving greater external demand for the EU’s digitally deliverable services. As digital supply chains continue to mature, they present additional opportunities for the EU to expand and strengthen its digital trade. However, recent evidence suggests that the EU’s regulatory environment may be limiting its potential gains. Since its introduction in 2018, the GDPR’s cross-border data transfer rules are estimated to have reduced the EU’s digital services trade, including exports, by up to 10–12 percent. To enhance its digital trade performance, the EU has several paths forward. First, Brussels should revise the GDPR’s cross-border safeguards while retaining provisions where data protection has a positive but limited impact on trade. Evidence indicates that the former constraints are hindering digital trade potential, whereas the latter are not. Second, the EU should expand its adequacy framework to include more trading partners, a step that could further increase digital services trade by up to 9 percent, with additional gains across the network of adequacy-recognised countries when the United States is included. Additionally, as the AI Act intersects with the GDPR, companies that use personal data in AI systems face dual compliance burdens. This highlights the need for a parallel adequacy framework for AI to enhance regulatory coherence and support AI- and data-related trade. Finally, the EU should broaden its Digital Partnership Agreements. Even non-binding cooperation on data, AI, competition, and standards within preferential trade agreements can increase AI-related trade by up to 9 percent, strengthening both digital innovation and competitiveness.
Topic:: Piracy, European Union, Trade, Artificial Intelligence, Industry, Data, Digital Policy, and Single Market
Political Geography:: Europe

2940. Trade Policy 3.0: Three Scenarios for Tomorrowland

Author:: Lucian Cernat
Publication Date:: 11-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: Global trade policy is at a crossroads. For decades, trade liberalisation was guided first by macroeconomic principles – Trade Policy 1.0 – and later by firm-level insights and global value chain integration – Trade Policy 2.0. Both approaches shared a liberal, rules-based logic grounded in comparative advantage and multilateral cooperation. Today, that continuity has been disrupted. A new paradigm – Trade Policy 3.0 – is emerging, marked by resilience, strategic autonomy, and economic security as the guiding objectives of trade policymaking. Three major disruptive forces have driven this shift: the pandemic’s exposure of supply chain fragility and the resulting push for strategic autonomy; the revival of industrial policy amid geopolitical tensions and the weaponisation of trade; and the growing influence of technology, data, and digital governance on cross-border relations. Together, these forces have replaced the efficiency-oriented “win-win” logic of past decades with a precautionary and competitive zero-sum mindset. In Trade Policy 3.0, success is measured not by trade growth or GDP gains but by reduced dependencies and greater resilience. This policy brief outlines three plausible futures. An Immunity scenario sees the rules-based system adapt and absorb new priorities. A Sclerosis scenario leads to institutional stagnation and policy inertia. A Contagion scenario risks a breakdown of multilateral norms and widespread protectionism. Whether Trade Policy 3.0 becomes a stable new equilibrium or a transient phase will depend on how policymakers reconcile openness with security, and whether cooperation can once again anchor the global trading system.
Topic:: Security, Globalization, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:: Global Focus

2941. The Economic Risks of Transposing the EU Product Liability Directive in Germany

Author:: Oscar Guinea, Dyuti Pandya, and Vanika Sharma
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: With the Ministerial Draft (Referentenentwurf) dated 11 September 2025, Germany has embarked on transposing the EU Product Liability Directive (EU PLD) into national law, a step that goes beyond a mere regulatory update and could have far-reaching implications for its economic competitiveness. The most immediate impact will be felt within Germany’s Information and Communication Technology (ICT) industry, which stands as one of the largest in Europe. The Ministerial Draft broadens the definition of a “product” to include software, digital files, and services like AI systems, exposing ICT firms to greater liability risks. As companies prepare to minimise the risk of liability issues, compliance procedures will intensify, leading to higher operational costs. Furthermore, in some cases, the Ministerial Draft overlaps with existing regulations which fuels legal uncertainty and discourages innovation. Beyond the ICT industry, the Ministerial Draft poses risks to Germany’s broader manufacturing base. As digital technologies become increasingly embedded in the manufacturing process, any disruption in the ICT sector will directly affect other industries such as the automotive and medical technology sectors. The implementation of the Ministerial Draft in Germany’s new Product Liability Act may slow digital adoption and make the integration of these technologies more costly, ultimately hampering Germany’s industrial competitiveness. Critically, the Ministerial Draft significantly increases the likelihood of collective actions. By expanding liability to a wider pool of companies – including component suppliers, service providers, and even app developers – the Ministerial Draft amplifies the risk of mass litigation. In addition, both the previous deductible for property damage and the overall liability cap are eliminated. Moreover, the introduction of rebuttable presumptions of defectiveness which significantly lowers the bar for claimants, together with the introduction of evidence disclosure obligations – a notable procedural departure for German law – increases the potential for costly and time-consuming legal battles. To assess these costs, this Occasional Paper draws on empirical evidence from the US, where mass litigation has long been a challenge, to estimate the impact of collective actions on the German economy. While the implementation of EU PLD may not be the sole driver of increased mass litigation in Germany, it is undeniable that it will contribute to this trend. The presence of a well-developed ecosystem of lawyers, litigation funders and claims collectors – combined with a broader regulatory trend facilitating mass litigation in Germany, exemplified by the Consumer Rights Enforcement Act (VDuG) and its representative action mechanisms – makes the rise of representative- and collective actions a tangible economic risk. The economic costs of mass litigation are significant. Private enforcement costs, litigation expenses, and the potential slowdown of innovation all add up. The total cost could amount to billions of euros annually, with the risk of mass litigation diminishing the market value of innovative firms by as much as €10 billion. Such disruptions not only affect businesses but could also impact the wealth of German families, as pension funds and insurance portfolios are tied to the performance of these companies. The implementation of EU PLD may slow down Germany’s digitalisation efforts which would have an impact on the wider economy as ICT has become a cornerstone of Germany’s economic growth, and its role in the wider manufacturing sector is indispensable. The government has made strides to reduce bureaucracy and enhance competitiveness, but the Ministerial Draft may undermine these efforts by adding regulatory complexity and heightening legal risks. Policymakers must carefully weigh these economic consequences when they decide on how exactly they will transpose the EU PLD to avoid unintended setbacks that could hinder Germany’s future economic growth.
Topic:: European Union, Institutions, Industry, Single Market, and Product Liability Directive
Political Geography:: Europe and Germany

2942. Quantum Clusters: Ranking the World’s Deep-Tech Epicentres

Author:: Fredrik Erixon, Andrea Dugo, Dyuti Pandya, and Elena Sisto
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: The ECIPE Quantum Project has so far laid the groundwork for understanding the global quantum landscape. It introduced the fundamentals of quantum technologies, assessed national activity in investment, scientific output, and patents, and charted international collaboration patterns to show that progress relies as much on shared expertise as on scientific breakthroughs. This work has now led to the next phase: identifying the innovation hubs within each country where meaningful quantum advances occur – what we call quantum clusters. Quantum R&D requires ultra-specialised, capital-intensive infrastructure that cannot easily be duplicated. The talent pool is also extremely scarce and concentrated in a small number of physics and engineering groups, creating inherent geographic bottlenecks. Combined with long pre-commercial timelines and immature supply chains, these constraints mean that genuine quantum innovation emerges only where specific capabilities and institutions co-locate. At the same time, the overwhelming complexity of the technology demands extensive inter-regional networking for knowledge integration. Therefore, the successful quantum cluster is not a self-contained hub, but the most effective node in a global and distributed network. This makes quantum clusters especially important for policies aimed at strengthening coordination across industry, research, and government, both locally and globally. This paper presents the first structured ranking of quantum clusters – not to reinforce narratives of supremacy, but to showcase high-performing regions, revealing where real capabilities lie and where gaps persist. This analysis offers a clearer basis for designing targeted policy interventions in investment attraction, talent development, and infrastructure planning. Viewing quantum through a cluster lens can help policymakers understand the external, institutional, and firm-level factors that shape quantum competitiveness, enabling more integrated strategies and stronger collaboration among stakeholders.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Innovation, Data, Emerging Technology, and Quantum Computing
Political Geography:: Global Focus

2943. Openness and Fragmentation in EU Defence Procurement

Author:: Lucian Cernat and Oscar Guinea
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: Europe’s fragmented defence procurement markets undermine Europe’s security efforts. Larger procurement markets, by contrast, deliver sharper competition, lower prices, and stronger incentives for specialisation and technological progress. Using data from the EU’s Tender Electronic Daily (TED), this Policy Brief shows domestic bias in defence procurement: three-quarters of contracts go to national firms, and cross-border awards remain limited outside smaller member states. Two policy steps stand out. First, start small: open competition in non-sensitive products can deliver quick wins. Second, improve data: only around 10 percent of defence spending is captured in TED, far less than total procurement volumes. Better data would allow policymakers to track progress, close information gaps, and take better decisions.
Topic:: Defense Policy, European Union, Fragmentation, and Public Procurement
Political Geography:: Europe

2944. The Impact of Increased Mass Litigation in the UK

Author:: Oscar Guinea, Dyuti Pandya, Vanika Sharma, and Renata Zilli
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: Over the past decade, the United Kingdom has seen a marked rise in collective litigation, transforming what was once a niche legal, rarely employed, tool into a fast-growing business model with wide-ranging economic implications. At a time when the country seeks to boost investment, support innovation and attract global business, the proliferation of mass litigation risks undermining these ambitions. This study takes a closer look at how mass litigation is reshaping the UK’s legal, business and regulatory landscape – and asks whether the balance between justice and economic efficiency is tipping too far. The UK stands out among European countries for the ease with which mass claims can be launched. It has long provided a favourable environment for consumer representation and dispute resolution, with a strong culture of accountability. But recent years have seen the emergence of a new ecosystem: law firms specialising in group actions; litigation funders offering upfront capital in exchange for a share of awards; and Claims Management Companies (CMCs) that recruit claimants en masse and process high volumes of cases. The business model has proved highly successful, making group litigation an asset class in its own right and pushing collective actions far beyond traditional sectors such as banking and pharmaceuticals. Today, a growing portion of the UK economy is in the firing line – with potentially damaging consequences. This shift has been rapid and striking. From fewer than 10 mass litigation cases in the late 2010s, the UK saw 47 such actions in 2024 alone, more than any other European country. On a per capita basis, the UK ranks as one of the most litigious jurisdictions in Europe, well ahead of comparable economies such as France or Germany. The implications for the UK economy are far-reaching: many of the companies targeted by these actions operate in sectors that were included in the UK Government’s latest industrial strategy as critical to the country’s future economic growth. Whereas previously limited to financial and professional services, mass litigation cases are now rising in UK companies working in life sciences, advanced manufacturing and digital services. These are industries where risk-taking, long product development cycles and data-driven innovation are the norm. The threat of mass litigation introduces uncertainty and cost at exactly the moment when these businesses need regulatory clarity and investment stability. Moreover, claims against public sector entities involve a direct transfer of capital from the tax payer to hedge fund litigation funders. The financial burden is also considerable. Legal fees and returns to funders often consume a large share of total settlements, reducing the compensation that actually reaches affected individuals. In the Post Office Horizon scandal, for example, £46 million in legal fees and funders payments were deducted from a £57 million settlement, leaving a paltry sum of just over £20,000 per claimant. In the recent judgment of Merricks v. Mastercard, £100 million have been allocated to compensate consumers. Affected individuals could receive up to £70 each if only 5 percent claim, but as little as £2.5 if the full class of 44 million comes forward. These figures raise questions about who really benefits from mass litigation. The limited benefits for individual consumers stand in stark contrast to the substantial costs that mass litigation imposes on the UK economy as a whole. Our scenario modelling shows that, under a scenario where the costs of mass litigation are just 30 percent of the current costs in the US, litigation costs in the UK could reach more than half of the claim value; the cost of mass litigation for the UK economy could reach close to £18 billion, and the market capitalisation of the UK’s most innovative companies could fall by £11.2 billion, more than half the announced public investment into R&D in the 2025 Autumn Budget. These financial pressures affect the whole country. While many large companies are headquartered in Greater London, their operations, and the jobs they support, are often spread across the wider regions. This means that the impact of a legal challenge is not just a concern for a corporate boardroom in London, but it impacts local economies and communities across the UK. As the Civil Justice Council reviews the framework for litigation funding, this study provides evidence to inform the debate. It does not argue against collective actions per se but urges a careful weighing of their benefits against broader economic costs. If the UK wants to remain an attractive destination for business, investment, and innovation, it must ensure that its legal infrastructure supports rather than stifles those ambitions.
Topic:: European Union, Institutions, Single Market, and Mass Litigation
Political Geography:: United Kingdom and Europe

2945. The Proposed EU Regulation for Standard Essential Patents: Chronicle of a Death Foretold

Author:: Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, and Dyuti Pandya
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: This policy brief critically assesses the European Commission’s withdrawn proposal that would have overhauled the system of licensing and enforcing Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) in the EU. It was a proposal that, had it gone ahead, could have seriously undermined innovation in Europe’s digital economy and reduced the powerful role of Europe in developing key telecom standards. It would have caused legal confusion and unpredictability, which is why important courts and judicial institutions poured cold water on the proposal. Remarkably, it would have reduced European economic interest at a time when technology features prominently in geopolitical rivalry. SEPs, particularly those that underpin standards for advanced mobile communication, are the invisible infrastructure behind today’s digital world. They form the backbone of technical standards such as 5G and are increasingly used across sectors, from mobile networks to cars and household appliances. The Commission’s 2023 proposal aimed to tackle perceived shortcomings in SEP licensing, such as limited transparency, royalty stacking, and disputes over FRAND (Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory) terms. But instead of building on existing solutions, it introduced heavy-handed measures that risked destabilising a functioning system, potentially doing more harm than good, particularly for Europe’s competitiveness and technological leadership. The solutions offered in the SEP proposal are built on a framework that seeks to address issues by establishing a SEP registry, mandating a conciliation process, and introducing royalty benchmarking, all under the authority of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), the body responsible for managing EU trademarks and designs which would represent an institutional overreach. The policy brief highlights three key problems arising from the proposed SEP regulation. Heavy Administrative Burden: the proposed regulation would have required innovators to register their patents with the EUIPO, with lack of compliance potentially undermining their ability to enforce their rights. Despite imposing a substantial administrative burden, the registry would have only offered minimal practical value in resolving licensing disputes. Denial of Access to Justice: the regulation proposed a mandatory pre-litigation process for royalty disputes, effectively introducing a top-down pricing This approach would have disrupted the balance between patent holders and implementers, delay access to judicial remedies, and marginalise the role of the Unified Patent Court (UPC), undermining its purpose in adjudicating complex patent disputes. Flawed Agency Price Setting: the proposal envisioned the EUIPO, an agency lacking patent expertise recommending royalty caps for all patents within a given standard. This raised concerns about the agency’s qualifications to make such determinations and the risk of artificially suppressing prices, potentially harming leading European innovators and deepening the EU’s reliance on foreign technologies. At its core, the proposal reflected a broader misjudgement: heavy-handed regulation is ill-suited to the fast-moving, globally integrated SEP ecosystem. First, the pace of technological innovation far outstrips the speed of regulation. Second, technologies like 5G operate across borders, and any attempt to impose a standalone European framework not only risks fragmenting international licensing practices but also triggering a regulatory race among countries – each seeking to advance its own industrial policy objectives through divergent approaches. Third, regulation overlooked one of Europe’s key strengths: its role as a net exporter of innovation in key sectors such as advanced mobile communication. Fourth, regulation ignores how much progress has already been made through self-correcting mechanisms such as market-based negotiations, flexible licensing, and case law.
Topic:: Intellectual Property/Copyright, European Union, Patents, and European Commission
Political Geography:: Europe

2946. Breaking Barriers, Boosting Growth: Unlocking the Power of Digital Technology for Europe’s Competitiveness

Author:: Oscar Guinea, Vanika Sharma, Erik van der Marel, and Oscar du Roy
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: Europe’s digital economy faces a twin challenge that strikes at the heart of its competitiveness: the continent still lacks homegrown tech champions on the scale of those in the United States or China, and digital technologies are not being fully embedded across its wider economy. Despite years of political focus on digital transformation, the uptake of essential tools – such as cloud services, enterprise software, digital advertising, and customer relationship systems – remains patchy across EU countries, sectors, and firm sizes. This combination of limited scale and sluggish diffusion is quietly undermining the EU’s economic resilience and national security. A major reason for this shortfall lies in the regulatory environment. EU firms navigate a complex web of rules shaped by national and EU-level regulations. Digital-specific obligations often impose heavy compliance costs while market access restrictions limit cross-border business growth. Meanwhile, inconsistent regulations across member states fragment the EU’s Single Market, raising barriers to economic development and draining returns on investment. The result is a constrained business ecosystem, where too few firms scale up and many are deterred from investing in new digital technologies. These regulatory choices carry a measurable economic cost. New empirical analysis in this Policy Brief shows that restrictive regulation, not only holds back firm expansion, but it also depresses digital adoption and, with it, sectoral performance. A 10 percent increase in the combined effect of services trade restrictions and digital technology uptake is associated with a 1.3 percent decline in value added. In other words, red tape is weighing down Europe’s productivity engine. This should be a wake-up call for EU policymakers. While much of the debate has focused on industrial policy and the regulation of emerging technologies like AI, too little attention has been given to fostering the conditions for widespread digital adoption. Yet, without structural reforms to reduce regulatory barriers – both within the EU and externally – and to support the diffusion of digital tools, Europe’s digital transformation will remain incomplete. And unless firms across all sectors are encouraged to adopt digital technologies as a means to scale and compete, the EU will risk falling further behind in the global race for technological leadership and competitiveness.
Topic:: European Union, Digital Economy, Competition, and Digital Technologies
Political Geography:: Europe

2947. NATO After the 2025 Summit: Strength, Doubt, and the Burden of Leadership

Author:: Tengiz Pkhaladze
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: The NATO Hague Summit signalled renewed commitment to transatlantic security, with member states pledging historic increases in defence spending and a broader vision of resilience encompassing cyber, infrastructure, and societal domains. This shift signals more than adaptation; it suggests a serious intent to rearm NATO for a new era of strategic competition. Yet beneath the surface, the challenges are more complex than the headline commitments suggest. The Alliance’s ability to respond to hybrid threats and intensifying geopolitical competition is uneven, constrained by internal disagreements and shifting strategic expectations. NATO’s adversaries are not seeking parity through conventional force. They are exploiting gaps across domains – cyber, economic, political, and cognitive – using tactics designed to undermine cohesion and delay response. While the Alliance’s operational structures remain robust, its political coherence is fragile, and its strategic unity often proves difficult to sustain under pressure. What is missing is not capacity, but bold leadership willing to articulate shared priorities, accept risk, and take responsibility for long-range decisions. Without coherence of vision and the willingness to act with conviction, NATO’s deterrence posture risks becoming reactive rather than resilient. This paper argues that NATO now stands at a pivotal crossroads. Increased spending is a necessary step, but not a sufficient one. The Alliance still lacks a unifying strategy capable of addressing the full spectrum of contemporary threats. To meet this moment, the Alliance must move beyond rhetorical unity and procedural adaptation. It must invest in strategic foresight, develop doctrine fit for 21st-century warfare, and ensure political decision-making can match the speed and ambiguity of modern threats. The Hague Summit may have set a new trajectory, but it is what follows – doctrine, strategy, and credible action – that will determine whether NATO remains a force capable of deterring not just war, but instability itself.
Topic:: NATO, European Union, Transatlantic Relations, and Land Tenure Security
Political Geography:: Europe and North America

2948. Strengthening the Supply-Side Innovation in EU Telecommunications

Author:: Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, and Dyuti Pandya
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: The telecommunications sector is central to the EU’s competitiveness, not only providing the infrastructure that underpins digital connectivity but also serving as a key driver of innovation. Recent EU reports already highlight the persistent structural challenges faced by the EU telecommunication sector: market fragmentation, low investment levels, divergent spectrum policies, and an urgent need to bolster digital sovereignty. However, a critical dimension in this discussion often receives far less attention: the supply of the underlying technologies that power telecommunications infrastructure. In this domain, EU companies remain competitive. In 2023, 27 EU-headquartered firms were among the world’s top 2,000 R&D spenders in telecommunications, accounting for 16 percent of global sectoral investment. These figures underscore that, while Europe may lag in investment and infrastructure, it still holds strategic leadership in telecom innovation and technology development. Central to Europe’s success are standard development organisations (SDOs), technical standards, and Standard Essential Patents (SEPs). SDOs provide collaborative forums where companies jointly develop technical standards that ensure interoperability, reduce fragmentation and foster innovation. Complementing this, SEPs protect the innovations embedded within these standards, granting European companies vital licensing revenues that sustain their research efforts. This system is particularly important for EU firms, which tend to be smaller than their global competitors; it enables them to specialise in cutting-edge technology development and commercialise their innovations globally without needing to dominate manufacturing or end-user markets. As competitiveness in telecommunications increasingly depends on the pace and adoption of innovation, the EU faces both a challenge and an opportunity. European firms have the potential not only to supply critical technologies but to drive breakthroughs in connectivity which are linked to the development of other technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) or quantum technologies. However, to stay competitive, the EU must reinforce its position on the supply side, where its companies still operate at the technological frontier.
Topic:: European Union, Innovation, Supply, and Telecommunications
Political Geography:: Europe

2949. Mapping the Quantum Ecosystems: How Are Economies Positioning Themselves for Innovation Success

Author:: Fredrik Erixon, Andrea Dugo, Dyuti Pandya, and Elena Sisto
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: Quantum technologies are among the most complex and promising innovations of our time. Their advancement relies not only on breakthrough science, but also on the capacity of countries, institutions, and companies to collaborate across borders, sectors, and disciplines, bringing together the expertise and resources needed to turn innovation into market-ready solutions. No country or region alone is in the lead – this is not a race between China and the US. Nor is quantum a development that will elevate one country to “supremacy” or “dominance”: cloaking fields of technology development in the terminology of military strategy rather risks making us less capable of understanding what is going on. For the economic and strategic benefits to be captured, countries and regions need to build structures of collaboration that allow researchers and companies to tap into frontier developments and share the costs of complex knowledge generation. An important way to measure the quantum competitiveness of countries is to benchmark the profile and strength of their collaborative structures. Using the ECIPE Quantum Database, this study analyses over 18,400 bilateral quantum partnerships involving more than 4,100 institutions across over 110 countries between 2018 and 2024. These partnerships encompass universities, research institutes, government agencies, startups, and large firms. Based on the findings these collaboration patterns reveal, we go a step further to not only map the interactions between different players but also identify a scheme of four quantum archetypes that help show where countries stand in the global quantum ecosystem. One dimension of this scheme reflects the level of industry involvement in quantum collaborations relative to a country’s GDP, serving as a proxy for commercial focus and economic prioritisation. The other captures how well-connected a country is internationally through direct quantum partnerships (see Figure a).
Topic:: Economy, Institutions, Innovation, Industry, Specialization, and Quantum Computing
Political Geography:: Global Focus

2950. Breaking Barriers to Cloud Customer Choice: Unlocking Europe’s AI and Innovation Leadership

Author:: Matthias Bauer, Andrea Dugo, and Dyuti Pandya
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: Cloud computing underpins digital transformation and is essential for unlocking the benefits of artificial intelligence (AI), automation, and scalable digital services. Yet Europe continues to lag behind global peers in both cloud and AI adoption. This underperformance is not merely technological; it is structural and it is costly. Without rapid progress, the EU risks missing out on over EUR 1.2 trillion in GDP gains across the private sector by around 2030. In the public sector alone, a shift to cloud particularly via a multi-cloud-first strategy could generate up to EUR 450 billion annually in efficiency and productivity gains across EU governments. A major, yet under-recognised barrier is the lack of cloud customer choice, the ability for businesses and public sector users to freely select, combine, and switch between cloud services. Without this, users face high switching costs, vendor lock-in, and reduced capacity to scale or integrate AI tools effectively. This paper asks: What are the main obstacles to cloud customer choice in the EU and what are the best avenues for advancing it? The analysis focuses on three key domains that shape the market at large – regulation, competition policy, and standard-setting bodies – examining how each can promote broader customer choice rather than be used narrowly to target individual, innovation-driven firms.
Topic:: European Union, Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, Cloud Computing, and Consumer Behavior
Political Geography:: Europe

Search

Search Constraints

Search Results

Refine your search

Topic

Political Geography

Content Type

Journal

Publishing Institution

Author

Publication Year

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS