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2352. What Comes Next? Reflections on the BRICS Rio Declaration and the Path to COP30
- Author:
- CEBRI
- Publication Date:
- 07-2025
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
- Abstract:
- This webinar is one of several initiatives promoted by the Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI) to explore Brazil’s role within the BRICS and assess the bloc’s influence on key global issues. This particular event focused on the synergies between the BRICS agenda and the expectations surrounding the upcoming COP30, which will take place in November this year. This is a pivotal moment for Brazil. Following its presidency of the G20 last year, the country now holds the dual chairmanship of the BRICS Summit and COP30. In this sense, this report summarizes the main discussions regarding the Rio Declaration and its possible implications for COP30.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, G20, BRICS, and Conference of the Parties (COP)
- Political Geography:
- Brazil, South America, and Global Focus
2353. Psychology in Peacemaking: A Guide for Mediators and Negotiators
- Author:
- Charlotte Hamm
- Publication Date:
- 06-2025
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Berghof Foundation
- Abstract:
- In an era of shifting geopolitics, fragmented conflicts, and fast-track peace deals, the human dimension of peacemaking is too often overlooked. At the heart of any negotiation lies the human factor: a complex interplay of emotions, trust, trauma, and other psychological elements. Drawing on over 40 interviews with negotiators, mediators, and psychologists, this guide offers practical strategies and psychological insights to support those involved in peace processes, bridging the gap between psychological understanding and peacemaking. Designed as a hands-on toolbox, the guide provides adaptable tools to help negotiators and mediators navigate the emotional and relational complexities of peacemaking, from managing trauma and difficult personalities to fostering trust, mindset transformation, and rehumanisation.
- Topic:
- Emotions, Psychology, Peacemaking, and Negotiation
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
2354. Entry points for climate finance and peacebuilding in Afghanistan
- Author:
- Dima Reda
- Publication Date:
- 11-2025
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Berghof Foundation
- Abstract:
- This report examines the current climate finance landscape in Afghanistan, analysing funding trends before and after 2021 and identifying entry points for action under current political constraints. It explores how political constraints and institutional gaps have reshaped access, delivery, and co-financing dynamics, while identifying emerging models for indirect implementation through UN agencies, NGOs, and regional mechanisms. Comparative case studies from Haiti, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo illustrate how other fragile states have mobilised climate finance amidst instability.
- Topic:
- United Nations, Climate Finance, Domestic Politics, NGOs, Donors, Instability, and Peacebuilding
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan, South Asia, Haiti, Somalia, and Democratic Republic of the Congo
2355. Accountability mechanisms in Yemen: Insights from Taiz, Aden, Hadhramawt, and Al Mahra
- Author:
- DeepRoot Consulting
- Publication Date:
- 06-2025
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Berghof Foundation
- Abstract:
- Yemen has long ranked low on global corruption indices but has fallen to even lower levels since the outbreak of the war in 2014. Given a renewed interest by the internationally recognised government of Yemen in reforming formal accountability structures – and by international donors in the systems in place in Yemen as they mull options for more direct support – this study looks into de jure and de facto accountability mechanisms in Yemen and explores concrete governorate-level examples of accountability structures in Taiz, Aden, Hadhramawt, and Al Mahra.
- Topic:
- Corruption, Accountability, Armed Conflict, and Donors
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Yemen
2356. The Venezuelan labyrinth: A crisis reframed
- Author:
- Eduardo Massieu Paredes
- Publication Date:
- 11-2025
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
- Abstract:
- Venezuela’s crisis has long been narrated through an opposition prism: crowds in the streets demanding democracy, negotiations or contested ballots. In 2025, the spotlight has shifted. The decisive question is not how hard Venezuelans push but what the United States is prepared to do, and why. A draft defence review proposes a major redeployment. Led by under‑secretary Elbridge Colby, it calls for concentrating military power on the homeland and the Americas. The plan envisages shifting forces away from Europe and the Indo‑Pacific and expanding air and naval operations along the southern U.S. border and throughout the Caribbean. It revives the logic of the Monroe Doctrine: prevent rival powers from embedding in Latin America. For the architects of Washington’s new Venezuela campaign, success will be judged less by what happens in Caracas than by how it plays in Washington DC or Florida. By measuring success in domestic terms, the United States may very well leave Venezuelans no closer to the democracy they seek. Washington’s handling of the Venezuelan crisis could be a preview of a wider strategic realignment. Colby’s “homeland first, hemisphere next” doctrine would pull military assets from the East and surge them into the Americas. Latin America’s response reflects both caution and fatigue. They will hedge: criticise the optics of U.S. gunboat diplomacy while quietly ignoring any weakening of the Maduro regime. The regime’s only remaining legitimacy is the loyalty of its security apparatus and the fear it can instill. The opposition, meanwhile, still holds the moral mandate. That legitimacy now carries even more weight after María Corina Machado was awarded the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize. Against that backdrop, four trajectories remain on the table for the crisis itself: 1) Ruling‑party managed transition; 2) Negotiated exit; 3) Forced removal; 4) Regime endurance. Venezuela’s impasse is fast becoming a proving ground for Washington’s “America first” doctrine and a primary focus on the Western Hemisphere in their foreign policy in decades. The backdrop is a country with its people exhausted, and its institutions hollowed out so internally in Venezuela very little should be expected. A purely theatrical strike may consolidate the status quo rather than topple it. If the United States genuinely wants systemic change, it will need more than sinking boats and slogans, it will need a strategy that endures beyond the next news cycle. Whether that is what President Trump actually seeks remains an open question.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Democracy, and Political Crisis
- Political Geography:
- South America and Venezuela
2357. The European Union’s Pact for the Mediterranean: Opportunity for a reset in the region?
- Author:
- Constantine Capsaskis
- Publication Date:
- 10-2025
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
- Abstract:
- The European Union’s Pact for the Mediterranean: Opportunity for a reset in the region? The European Union’s new Pact for the Mediterranean arrives on the 30th anniversary of the Barcelona Process, representing a renewed impetus to forge a working relationship with the ten countries of its Southern Neighbourhood. To achieve this and allow the EU to full unlock the region’s many opportunities, the Pact is called upon to address a complex set of circumstances, which will require it to confront several key structural challenges. Challenges Internal EU Disunity: The competing interests of member-states in the Mediterranean (e.g., France and Italy in Libya) undermine the EU’s ability to act as a unified bloc. Geopolitical Considerations: The EU must either confront or accommodate Turkey’s regional aspirations, including its Mavi Vatan maritime doctrine. Turkey’s demeanour directly obstructs key EU energy and connectivity projects, while challenging the rights of Greece and Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean. Trust Deficit: The EU faces the conundrum of both overcoming reservations over its values-oriented approach, often perceived as veiled neocolonialism, that hinder cooperation while not appearing as overtly transactional, and thus alienating its partners. It must offer an attractive solution to its leading Southern partners and pre-empt them from seeking new alliances (e.g., Egypt joining BRICS). However, there are several opportunities that the European Union can pursue in the region across several fields including energy, migration, and increased geopolitical influence in an area that directly impacts its interests. Opportunities Energy Hub: The Mediterranean is critical for the goal of EU energy independence from Russian fossil fuels, both by harnessing the region’s energy reserves and as a point of entry for energy from North Africa, Asia, and the United States. This includes a strategic role for Greece as a key port of entry for American LNG via the Revithoussa LNG Terminal and the Alexandroupolis FSRU. Migration Management: The Pact must reform the EU’s externalization model to address migration flows, a process complicated by internal divisions and ethical concerns following incidents like the Pylos shipwreck. Agency: The Pact is the EU’s chance to assert its own strategic autonomy in a critical region, in which power has been traditionally wielded by those far from the Mediterranean shore. With the prevalence of competing corridors (e.g., China’s BRI and the proposed IMEC) in a critical waterway, the European Union must (to) ensure it is not a spectator in its own neighbourhood.
- Topic:
- Migration, European Union, Geopolitics, Institutions, Trust, Energy, and Regional Politics
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Mediterranean
2358. Having your cake and eating it too? Can and should Turkey’s defence industrial technological base benefit from the European Union’s Rearmament?
- Author:
- Antonis Kamaras
- Publication Date:
- 10-2025
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
- Abstract:
- Since landing ships, made in Turkish shipyards in order to enable the invasion of Cyprus, reached their designated beachheads on the 20th of July of 1974, the Turkish defence technological industrial base (TDTIB) has been locked in a see saw pattern. From the late 1960’s to today the TDTIB has advanced in order to enable Turkey to exercise strategic autonomy. The very exercise of this strategic autonomy has recurrently caused ruptures with Turkey’s western allies. These ruptures have, in turn, disrupted the industrial partnerships on which the TDTIB depends. This pattern is experiencing a historic high currently with the TDTIB’s product range, which includes sophisticated UAVs and naval ships being employed by Turkey in support of an aggressive challenge of European interests, and most prominently in a comprehensive challenge of Greek rights, solidly established under UNCLOS, to an exclusive economic zone and to the laying of a subsea electricity cable linking Greece with Cyprus. At the same time, due to the European Union’ s (EU) rearmament effort, and the possibility of third countries participating in it, already provided from in the SAFE funding facility, the TDTIB has the opportunity to further grow in volume and sophistication. This policy paper will argue that this opportunity should be denied to the TDTIB both on the basis of past behavior of Turkey but also on solid evidence of the current and future priorities of the Erdogan regime. As in the past nearly sixty years, it is clear that the current Turkish leadership prioritises the exercise of its strategic autonomy, facilitated by the TDTIB, and not the TDTIB’s participation in the EU’s rearmament. Such a prioritization makes structurally unstable the relationship, and in particular highly prone to disruption, between the TDTIB and the EU’s rearmament effort. Additionally, the participation of the TDTIB in the EU’s rearmament effort by boosting the capacity of Turkey to challenge Greece’s and Cyprus’ sovereign rights, corrodes the principles of collective security, and thus undermines the ability of the EU to mobilise the collective resources necessary for its own strategic autonomy. Thus the TDTIB neither can nor should participate in the EU’s rearmament effort.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, European Union, Defense Industry, Strategic Autonomy, and Rearmament
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Turkey, and Middle East
2359. Indispensable Enemies: The Shifting Dynamics of Israeli–Turkish Relations
- Author:
- Ioannis N. Grigoriadis and Electra Nisidou
- Publication Date:
- 10-2025
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
- Abstract:
- This study explores the dynamics of Israeli–Turkish relations amidst two pivotal conflicts: the war in Gaza, where Turkey has vocally supported the Palestinian side, and the Syrian crisis, where both countries maintain significant territorial and strategic stakes. While Turkey and Israel operate from distinct ideological and strategic positions, their interactions are neither those of allies nor outright adversaries, but rather of two regional powers navigating overlapping challenges. The analysis highlights how these conflicts reveal a duality in their relationship characterized by ideological divergence in Gaza and pragmatic considerations in Syria, offering insights into their complex coexistence within the rapidly shifting Middle Eastern landscape. Turkey was among the first Muslim-majority countries to recognize Israel in 1949, establishing early diplomatic ties grounded in Turkey’s pro-Western orientation and NATO ambitions. The rise of the AKP and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in the 2000s gradually transformed Turkish foreign policy, emphasizing solidarity with the Muslim world and a more vocal defence of the Palestinian cause. Divergences over Gaza, Syria, and energy politics in the Eastern Mediterranean further strained relations, while shared economic interests and US mediation prevented a complete breakdown. The 2023–2025 Gaza war became a defining moment, with Turkey’s strong condemnation of Israel paired with pragmatic economic continuity and, later, participation in the peace process. For the first time, many Israelis and Turks saw Turkey and Israel respectively as one of their country’s key security threats. The likelihood of direct conflict between Israel and Turkey has substantially decreased, as both states prioritize stability, reconstruction, and regional influence over open rivalry. While ideological and rhetorical tensions persist, Israeli–Turkish relations are entering a new phase characterized by pragmatic coexistence, mutual recognition, and shared regional responsibilities.
- Topic:
- Security, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Regional Power, and 2023 Gaza War
- Political Geography:
- Turkey, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine
2360. From an Archipelago of Alliances to a Brussels Nexus: the Role of Military Agreements between EU member-states to the Evolution of EU Defence
- Author:
- Spyros Blavoukos and Panos Politis-Lamprou
- Publication Date:
- 10-2025
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
- Abstract:
- This paper presents the dynamically evolving web of military agreements among EU member-states concluded by EU member-states outside the EU framework, identifying two distinct categories of such agreements: a) defence partnerships/agreements, which contain explicit mutual defence clauses, and b) defence industrial or operational cooperation schemes, focusing primarily on capability development, joint military structures or operational readiness. After briefly outlining why such agreements remain relevant and necessary in today’s security environment, the paper develops four future scenarios for EU defence cooperation: Scenario 1: An archipelago of alliances, characterised by fragmentation and the presence of ad-hoc alliances between EU member-states (and possibly like-minded third countries), where national governments take the lead. Scenario 2: A pragmatic adaptation to diversity, with the emergence of defence clusters, within the EU political and institutional framework, based on existing bilateral and plurilateral agreements, where national governments retain control. Scenario 3: A Brussels nexus, where Europe progresses towards defence integration through layering and developing a defence mosaic, which gradually unites under an EU umbrella, fostering a more coordinated network of partnerships led by both the European Commission and national governments. Scenario 4: An EU common defence, entailing full operationalisation of Article 42.7 TEU and the EU upgrade as a security provider. The paper concludes with a set of policy recommendations, tailored to each potential trajectory. To move from Scenario 1 to Scenario 2: Foster regional defence clusters for niche capabilities To transition from Scenarios 1 and 2 to Scenario 3: Create a European Defence Agreements Register Invest in Defence Projects of Common Interest Render bilateral/plurilateral agreements compatible with Article 42.7 TEU To advance toward Scenario 4: Operationalise Article 42.7 TEU
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, and Partnerships
- Political Geography:
- Europe
2361. Polarization as a result of crises and the rise of radicalization leading to violent extremism in Western societies
- Author:
- Triandafyllos Karatrantos
- Publication Date:
- 11-2025
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
- Abstract:
- Polarization as an impact of crises and its connection to radicalization leading to violent extremism through the study of two crises: a) the migration/refugee crisis of 2015-2016 and b) the pandemic. An important part of the problem is the political mainstreaming of extremist narratives, that is, the choice of politicians to increasingly exploit far-right and conspiratorial narratives that have been supported by segments of the population in recent years. Polarization is an issue that concerns groups of individuals and not lone actors the risk of conflict is magnified when society is divided into two equal groups with competing goals” Multiple crises are more dangerous, as on the one hand they exert greater pressure on the management mechanisms of states and on the other hand they expand the vulnerability of societies, groups and individuals. A broad sense of democratic deficit and two successive processes of questioning have been created that lead to a crisis: a) of trust and b) of representation. Prolonged polarization has led to the radicalization of a large number of citizens, without necessarily resulting from the support of a specific ideology Disinformation, the spread of fake news and the dissemination of conspiracy theories constitute a threat to democracy and have caused significant problems in electoral processes and fuel polarization. The pandemic acted as a catalyst and influenced radicalization, but also the way extremist groups operate.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Migration, Violent Extremism, Radicalization, Refugees, and Polarization
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Global Focus
2362. Science Diplomacy in Horizon Europe Program: Taiwan’s TSMC as an Example for strengthening EU-Taiwan Relations
- Author:
- Adolfo Yinshi Wu
- Publication Date:
- 05-2025
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
- Institution:
- Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
- Abstract:
- In this article, the author first introduces Taiwan's science diplomacy and its initial involvement in the EU's Horizon Europe programme, the EU's current flagship initiative for scientific innovation. Given the requirements of the programme and the market — namely, that the EU seeks to secure the semiconductor supply chain and that Taiwan is a major semiconductor manufacturer — closer cooperation between the EU and Taiwan could enhance the competitiveness and logistical resilience of EU chip production and supply in the global market. Given the current relationship, the Taiwanese government could develop significant research programmes under Horizon Europe and adopt regulations such as the EU Chip Act to gain access to the European market. The author concludes that Taiwan's TSMC could boost the EU's digital innovation and play a role as a science diplomacy tool in Taiwan–EU relations..
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Science and Technology, European Union, Innovation, Supply Chains, and Semiconductors
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Taiwan, and Asia
2363. Temporary Guests or City Residents? Governing Migrant Inclusion in Athens amid Political Dependence and Structural Barriers
- Author:
- Sofia Ntaliou
- Publication Date:
- 11-2025
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
- Abstract:
- This policy brief examines Athens’ approach to migrant inclusion within Greece’s highly centralised governance system. It finds that the municipality lacks clear mandates and stable funding for migrant integration. The local authority tends to treat migrants as temporary guests rather than long-term residents. Migrant policies remain fragmented, reactive, and short-term, largely shaped by shifting political leadership. Civil society and migrant communities play an important yet mostly symbolic role, with limited participation in decision-making. Sustainable inclusion requires institutionalised responsibilities, multi-annual funding, and stronger participatory mechanisms to ensure policy continuity and protect progress from political change.
- Topic:
- Civil Society, Migration, Integration, and Inclusion
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Greece
2364. Between humanitarian imperatives and political legitimacy: a critical analysis of United Nations engagements with the Afghan Taliban (2021–2025)
- Author:
- Abdul Wasi Popalzay and Bawa Singh
- Publication Date:
- 10-2025
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
- Institution:
- Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
- Abstract:
- This study analyzes the United Nations’ engagement with the Taliban in Afghanistan between 2021 and 2025, examining how they navigated the tension between humanitarian imperatives and concerns about political legitimacy. The UN's efforts mitigated suffering amid economic collapse and poverty, achieving successes in disaster relief and maintaining the participation of female aid workers through a gender-sensitive approach. However, the Taliban’s human rights violations, including restrictive gender edicts, arbitrary detentions and repressive morality laws, jeopardise these gains and risk delegitimising the regime, which is bolstered by increased revenues despite sanctions. Sanctions have failed to drive policy change due to being weakened by regional actors such as China and Russia. Critiques from civil society highlight the UN’s limited inclusion of Afghan women and the lack of accountability mechanisms, and urge the establishment of an independent investigative body. While counterterrorism cooperation has yielded security benefits, donor fragmentation and funding shortfalls undermine the humanitarian impact.
- Topic:
- Humanitarian Aid, United Nations, Taliban, Humanitarian Crisis, and Political Legitimacy
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan and South Asia
2365. Resilience Factors of Islamic State Supporter Movements in Indonesia: A Mixed-Methods Analysis
- Author:
- Aprison Mandela, Arthur Josias Simon Runturambi, Margaretha Hanita, and Muhammad Syauqillah
- Publication Date:
- 10-2025
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
- Institution:
- Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
- Abstract:
- Since emerging as a global extremist movement, the Islamic State has expanded its influence in Indonesia, where its supporters persist despite intensive counter-terrorism efforts. IS-related recruitment and attacks have been ongoing since 2014. Through in-depth interviews with 33 convicted or active IS supporters, as well as insights from Indonesian security personnel, including representatives from BIN, BNPT, Densus 88 AT and BAIS, the study has identified thirteen factors that enable these networks to endure. These factors fall into two main categories: nine dominant factors that directly underpin the organisational and ideological survival of the group, and four supporting factors that provide flexibility and localised adaptability. The findings emphasise the importance of shifting counterterrorism strategies from a reactive approach to proactively disrupting ideological, technological and community-based support systems.
- Topic:
- Terrorism, Violent Extremism, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, and Resilience
- Political Geography:
- Indonesia and Southeast Asia
2366. Instruments of Hybrid Warfare: Dissemination of Pro-Russian Propaganda Narratives Through Populist Politicians in the Slovak Republic
- Author:
- Martin Solik, Dalibor Velký, and Jan Graf
- Publication Date:
- 10-2025
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
- Institution:
- Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
- Abstract:
- This article uses thematic discursive analysis to examine selected pro-Kremlin populist politicians in Slovakia. The enforcement of one-sided propagandist thoughts and opinions, primarily through radical anti-system politicians and 'alternative' media outlets freely available on the internet, has become one of the most important aspects of hybrid warfare in today's world. This paper aims to identify the specific goals of Russian propaganda and clarify how populist politicians spread propaganda on social media through language resources. The results of the analysis are presented at the end of the paper, along with the word resources used by these politicians. The results prove that pro-Kremlin populist politicians use word and language manipulation to help spread unilaterally focused and distorted information in Slovakia. This article aims to build on and complement existing research on pro-Kremlin anti-system politicians and their role in Russia's hybrid warfare in Europe.
- Topic:
- Politics, Media, Populism, Propaganda, and Hybrid Warfare
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Eastern Europe, and Slovakia
2367. Aproximación a las estrategias y políticas de la Unión Europea en el Sahel: el dilema pendiente de Bruselas
- Author:
- Francisco José Marcos Martín
- Publication Date:
- 10-2025
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
- Institution:
- Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
- Abstract:
- Este artículo analiza las políticas y los documentos estratégicos dentro del área de seguridad y defensa elaborados por la Unión Europea para el Sahel, estudiando su evolución y el estado de ejecución en el que se encuentran. El análisis de los documentos estratégicos y de la actuación de la Unión Europea concluye que ha habido diversas etapas en la ejecución de estas estrategias europeas. Algunas etapas fueron fructíferas y prometedoras; otras han estado marcadas por desencuentros, algunos de los cuales no se han superado aún. La situación actual en el Sahel es extremadamente complicada ya que no se han alcanzado los objetivos principales que se marcaron desde Bruselas en sus distintas estrategias y la región corre el riesgo de entregarse a terceros actores o incluso de colapsar. Sería, por tanto, deseable abrir el debate sobre el diseño e implementación de las estrategias de la Unión Europea y la actuación de los estados miembros.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Treaties and Agreements, Bilateral Relations, and European Union
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Europe, Mali, and Sahel
2368. International Diplomacy at the Rambouillet Conference (6 February –18 March 1999)
- Author:
- Armand Krasniqi
- Publication Date:
- 10-2025
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
- Institution:
- Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
- Abstract:
- The Rambouillet Conference, which took place from 6 February to 18 March 1999, was a pivotal moment in international diplomacy during the Kosovo crisis. Convened by the Contact Group, the conference aimed to negotiate a settlement between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Albanian leadership amid escalating violence and mounting humanitarian concerns. The proposed agreement included provisions for substantial autonomy for Kosovo and the deployment of NATO forces to oversee its implementation. It was accepted by the Kosovo Albanian delegation, but rejected by the Yugoslav authorities. Led by Slobodan Milošević, Yugoslavia opposed the presence of foreign troops on its territory, viewing it as a violation of sovereignty. Ultimately, the failure of the negotiations resulted in NATO's military intervention on 24 March 1999, marking a pivotal moment in the Kosovo conflict..
- Topic:
- NATO, Diplomacy, Sovereignty, Humanitarian Intervention, Negotiation, and Rambouillet Conference
- Political Geography:
- Eastern Europe, Kosovo, and Yugoslavia
2369. Turkish Foreign Policy and the Kosovo War: Discussions on the Kosovo Issue in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (1998-1999)
- Author:
- Majlinda Misini and Ibrahim Gashi
- Publication Date:
- 10-2025
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
- Institution:
- Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
- Abstract:
- The Balkans were one of the most important issues on Turkey's foreign policy agenda during the 1990s. When the war in Kosovo began, Ankara adopted an active policy, demonstrating that, as a Balkan country, Turkey embraced the Kosovo issue, took responsibility for it, and fulfilled its moral obligations. In line with its geostrategic partners, the Turkish state emphasised the need to reduce tensions and balance the demands of the parties involved, initially adopting a moderate stance in relation to other potential political solutions for Kosovo. However, as Serbian repercussions in Kosovo increased, Turkey reconsidered its foreign policy, adopting a tougher stance on the Kosovo issue. This article examines the influence of these actors on the final positioning of Turkey, highlighting discussions on the Kosovo issue in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, NATO, History, Media, and Kosovo War
- Political Geography:
- Turkey, Kosovo, and Balkans
2370. Transición Geopolítica Global: Conectividad, Competición y Fragmentación. Introducción
- Author:
- Soledad Segoviano and Antonio Marquina
- Publication Date:
- 05-2025
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
- Institution:
- Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
- Abstract:
- Este número especial de la Revista UNISCI se centra en una de las cuestiones relvantes de la trasnformación que está aconteciendo en el sistema internacional, la transformación geopolítica y la rivalidad creciente entre Estados. Se puede decir que el orden internacional creado tras la segunda guerra mundial y reforzado tras el fin de la guerra fría se está disipando en medio de una profunda división y fragmentación geopolítica.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, European Union, Geopolitics, Maritime, Space, Strategic Competition, BRICS, Connectivity, International Order, and Energy Transition
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, United States of America, and Global South
2371. US-China Rivalry: Constructing Virtual Borders in Cyberspace Through War of Narratives
- Author:
- Dibakar De, NagaLaxmi M Raman, and Sitakanta Mishra
- Publication Date:
- 10-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
- Abstract:
- Cyberspace has redefined national borders, prompting a rethink of traditional concepts of territoriality. In this digital realm, nations can leverage technological advancements to expand their influence beyond physical borders. This article begins by discussing the rapid emergence of narratives in cyberspace, before exploring the concept of territoriality in a virtual landscape and the roles played by both state and non-state actors. The rest of the article explores a range of aspects, including covert operations, fintech policies, divisions in emerging technologies such as AI, tech diplomacy, export control, and space-based digital infrastructure, to establish the notion of ideological and political fragmentation within cyberspace. Finally, it discusses the various strategies employed by the US, China and other actors to exploit the fragmentation of cyberspace for their own national benefit.
- Topic:
- Borders, Digital Revolution, Rivalry, Cyberspace, Public Diplomacy, and Great Powers
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
2372. Facing off Trump’s coercive bargaining: Preparing Europe’s response and retaliation to ‘Liberation Day’
- Author:
- Ian Hernandez, Varg Folkman, and Georg Riekeles
- Publication Date:
- 04-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- European Policy Centre (EPC)
- Abstract:
- President Trump’s ‘Liberation Day’ tariff announcements must be understood not simply as a trade war but as an attempt to reshape the global economic system and to coerce partners through a logic of coercive bargaining. On par with all other countries, Europe is a target and a prey to the US. In this paper, we suggest that there are two fundamental aims the EU must pursue: taking leadership in salvaging the open economic order and increase its capacity to withstand coercive bargaining in defence of own interests. We also consider what the US negotiation strategy entails. While Trump struck a considered ‘madman’ pose to frighten trade partners into making unfavourable deals, he also postponed the tariffs in response to the spectre of a market crash and credit crunch. In the face of fundamental uncertainty, the EU’s tightrope act consists of preparing to negotiate through the threat of retaliation but also preparing for negotiations to fail. We argue for holding off and buying time, letting the Americans reap what they sow, while preparing a vigorous “one date, one strike”- retaliation together with a term sheet for a reciprocal economic deal, making clear European red lines in any rapprochement. We map out various tools and instruments the EU can avail of to push back against US trade aggression. The Union is not without means to fight back against Trump’s coercive approach. The bloc’s Trade Enforcement Regulation allows for a wide set of responses to the trade measures we are seeing from the US. Even more far reaching is the Anti-Coercion Instrument. Additionally, the EU can strike US services trade by tightening digital rules and addressing intellectual property and tax shifting. While increasing trade barriers with partners is a sticking point, the EU must also consider safeguard measures to protect European domestic industries from Chinese overcapacities and trade diversion. Although unlikely at the moment, we also suggest further opportunities, such as pursuing economic security deals with the US. Along with like-minded partners, the EU could also take action to counter Trump, including reinvigorating ideas around a ‘WTO 2.0’. The gravity of the moment should not be lost on us. Europe faces the prospect of a fundamental shift in global economic flows and systems, along with the risk of an international economic crisis. Facing this onslaught will take effort, unity and collective action.
- Topic:
- European Union, Tariffs, Trade, Transatlantic Relations, Donald Trump, and Coercion
- Political Geography:
- Europe, North America, and United States of America
2373. From umbrella to arsenal: boosting Europe's nuclear deterrence
- Author:
- Juraj Majcin
- Publication Date:
- 06-2025
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Policy Centre (EPC)
- Abstract:
- Europe is entering its most dangerous decade since the Cold War. The post-Cold War peace has been shattered by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and an escalating campaign of hybrid aggression aimed at destabilising the continent. Military and intelligence leaders are sounding the alarm with growing urgency: within the next three to five years, Russia could be in shape to launch a direct attack on a NATO member, plunging the Alliance into open war. To prevent such a catastrophe, deterrence must remain the bedrock of Europe’s defence strategy. In response to these threats, frontline states along NATO’s eastern and northern flanks have begun unprecedented rearmament efforts. However, deterrence without a nuclear dimension is incomplete—and, in the face of a nuclear-armed adversary, potentially ineffective. Nuclear deterrence has long been central to European security. During the Cold War, it was the US nuclear umbrella, combined with forward-deployed conventional forces, that held the Soviet threat in check. Today, however, cracks are emerging in the transatlantic bond, as the current US administration’s mixed signals on NATO commitments have deepened European anxieties about the reliability of American security guarantees. Even more concerning, Russia has developed and deployed new intermediate-range nuclear missiles on NATO’s doorstep, while intensifying its nuclear sabre-rattling through explicit threats and provocative rhetoric aimed at undermining allied resolve. Against this backdrop, Europe must confront a pressing question: how can it strengthen its own nuclear arsenal to ensure a credible deterrent against Russia—with or without the backing of the US umbrella?
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Deterrence
- Political Geography:
- United Kingdom, Europe, and France
2374. Multicrimen, Economías Ilícitas y su Impacto en la Gobernanza y Democracia. Caso Nariño, Cauca y Valle del Cauca.
- Author:
- Germán Nicolás Pataquiva
- Publication Date:
- 10-2025
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
- Institution:
- Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
- Abstract:
- Colombia evidencia un patrón de reconfiguración patológica de la gobernanza en regiones como Nariño, Cauca y Valle del Cauca, donde el crimen organizado viene desarticulando el tejido social, imponiendo regímenes locales de terror y desplazando las autoridades legítimas. Estas dinámicas reflejan que se enfrenta una amenaza asimétrica hibrida, en el que estructuras trasnacionales del crimen y de economías ilícitas penetran el Estado, acelerando la erosión democrática. Tal como ocurre en otros contextos iberoamericanos, la convergencia entre violencia armada, cooptación de instituciones y debilitamiento del Estado de derecho generan escenarios en los que actores ilegales disputan con enormes ventajas el monopolio estatal de la fuerza, la tributación y el imperio de la ley. Con lo que se plantea un desafío critico a la seguridad ciudadana y la gobernabilidad por lo que se propone implementar un enfoque multinivel y la creación de una “Fuerza Intermedia”
- Topic:
- Non State Actors, Governance, Armed Forces, Democracy, Violence, Organized Crime, and Illicit Financial Flows
- Political Geography:
- Colombia and South America
2375. Diálogos con las Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia -AGC-. De clan a ejército ¿paz para todos?
- Author:
- Deborah Presta Novello
- Publication Date:
- 10-2025
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
- Institution:
- Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
- Abstract:
- Las Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia -AGC-, también conocidas como Clan del Golfo y, recientemente autodenominados Ejército Gaitanista de Colombia -EGC-, pueden ser consideradas como el actor armado más importante en el escenario criminal de Colombia, tras la firma de los Acuerdos de paz con la extinta guerrilla de las FARC-EP. En agosto de 2024 se hizo pública la exploración de diálogos con este grupo por parte del Gobierno colombiano, abanderando su política de Paz Total, bajo la que pretende negociar con cada uno de los grupos armados que operan en el país. En este estudio, se pretende resaltar la importancia de este diálogo, así como abordar las incertidumbres que presenta el futuro de las negociaciones con este grupo, debido a la notable expansión del mismo, sus enormes recursos financieros y su falta de estatus político reconocido.
- Topic:
- Non State Actors, Armed Forces, Peace, Paramilitary, Dialogue, and Social Control
- Political Geography:
- Colombia and South America
2376. Cohesion policy’s mid-term review: Stress-testing regional development in a new EU era
- Author:
- Alison Hunter
- Publication Date:
- 04-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- European Policy Centre (EPC)
- Abstract:
- The European Commission’s Communication on the mid-term review of cohesion policy (MTR) signals the need for accelerated reform. It comes as the EU musters its response to complex transitions, including a first-of-its-kind security and defence agenda. There is much to commend in the MTR. Its core themes are strongly linked to regions’ transition efforts, including the EU’s comprehensive security needs. The latter’s visibility in cohesion policy has come not before time. Positively, the wider cohesion community seems to have caught up with this direction, acknowledging the need for cohesion to play a role in responding to the EU’s existential security needs. However, beyond a broad vision for action, the MTR offers no transitions-driven framework for regions to mobilise and connect their related challenges – whether green, digital, social or security-related. The Commission should come forward with a framework to expedite the roll-out of the re-oriented cohesion policy for the remainder of the current programming period, while supporting regions to prepare beyond 2027. Amid a turbulent period of change for the EU, a strongly centralised cohesion policy shift is unfolding. This risks diminishing the Union’s place-based policy commitments, while worsening inequalities. A whole cohesion community response is needed to counter this direction, with concerted, corrective action to ‘stress-test’ the vision set out in the MTR, and the extent to which all regions have the means to rise to the challenges ahead.
- Topic:
- Reform, European Union, European Commission, and Cohesion
- Political Geography:
- Europe
2377. Ready to negotiate? The difficulty of peace talks with the National Liberation Army in Colombia
- Author:
- Leidy Bedoya and Jerónimo Ríos
- Publication Date:
- 10-2025
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
- Institution:
- Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
- Abstract:
- This article examines the factors that influenced the ELN's readiness to commit to a settlement during the Colombian peace process of 2023–24. By analysing structural changes within the ELN between 2016 and 2024, the study identifies four key variables: territorial occupation, resources and capabilities, internal cohesion, and alliances. Using a comparative conflict research design and qualitative approach, the study highlights the ELN's transformation following the FARC-EP's demobilisation in 2016, and assesses the implications of these changes for President Gustavo Petro's “Paz Total” peace initiative. The study concludes that the ELN is not yet structurally prepared for unified peace negotiations, which casts doubt on the success of the 'Paz Total'.
- Topic:
- Non State Actors, FARC, Peacemaking, National Liberation Army (ELN), and Demobilization
- Political Geography:
- Colombia and South America
2378. Directed Energy Weapons and the Future of European Defence
- Author:
- Chris Kremidas-Courtney
- Publication Date:
- 06-2025
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Policy Centre (EPC)
- Abstract:
- Europe stands at the edge of a new defence frontier defined by beams of light and pulses of energy. As warfighting evolves into the age of mass precision, the weapons that will shape tomorrow’s battlefield may not make noise or leave shell casings behind. Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs) are no longer science fiction, since they are rapidly becoming a vital element of European air defences. As Europe faces intensifying threats ranging from drone swarms to missile attacks, DEWs offer rapid-response, low-cost-per-shot solutions that can intercept threats at the speed of light. DEWs, which include high-energy lasers, high-power microwaves (HPM) and particle beam systems are emerging as transformative capabilities in 21st-century defence. They employ electromagnetic or photonic energy to disable or destroy multiple targets with remarkable precision, unlike kinetic munitions that rely on ballistic interception. Lessons from the invasion of Ukraine and the Red Sea Crisis tell us that Europe requires these capabilities now.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Innovation, and Directed Energy Weapons
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Ukraine
2379. Beyond Confederation: a wider and deeper Union
- Author:
- Andrew Duff
- Publication Date:
- 06-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- European Policy Centre (EPC)
- Abstract:
- Fast-track entry into the EU for Ukraine will break the logjam over enlargement and force the pace of internal reform. For this to happen, the Commission and Council must decide to ditch the recently adopted accession process that gives any member state a unilateral veto. At least four other candidates can be brought in swiftly in the wake of Ukraine, with future reform programmes agreed post-accession. A more federal approach will give the Union the flexibility it needs to cope with increased diversity. Although a larger rewrite of the constitution would be preferable, only a few treaty amendments are required to allow a federal tier to step forward while eurosceptic members choose to stay back. An independent group of experts should be commissioned to draft these treaty changes.
- Topic:
- European Union, Regional Integration, Enlargement, Lisbon Treaty, and Treaty of Rome
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Ukraine
2380. Towards a fairer EU asylum policy: Lessons from the Dublin system for the EU’s Solidarity Mechanism
- Author:
- Florian Trauner, Philipp Stutz, and Philipp Lutz
- Publication Date:
- 11-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- European Policy Centre (EPC)
- Abstract:
- On 11 November 2025, the European Commission released its first European Annual Asylum and Migration Report as part of the new policy cycle introduced by the EU’s Pact on Migration and Asylum. The Commission examined the asylum, migration and reception situation across the EU and found that four member states are under ‘migratory pressure’, and 14 others either ‘at risk’ or facing a ‘significant migration situation’. This Discussion Paper examines how member states have cooperated under the Dublin system to draw lessons for the implementation of the New Pact, including the functioning of the solidarity mechanism. It highlights the persistent disparity between requested and actual Dublin transfers, showing how this raises doubts about future compliance with the reformed CEAS. At the same time, the results presented in this Paper hold important lessons for the future functioning of the reformed rules, pointing to the need to strengthen the redistributive effects of all transfers of responsibility and the benefits for compliance and trust that would derive from this. The forthcoming solidarity contributions should therefore be guided by a fairness principle, focusing on how to distribute asylum seekers more fairly among member states overall under the CEAS.* The Paper begins by examining the approximately 260,000 executed Dublin transfers that took place between 2008 and 2024, establishing whether and which states have processed a number of asylum applications that could be considered as ‘fair’ based on their size and wealth. The data1 shows that Dublin transfers mostly had positive redistributive effects, outweighing ‘unfair’ transfers by a factor of roughly 2.5 to 1 and improving rather than undermining the overall fairness of the EU asylum system. This is a rather surprising finding given the system’s reputation for placing responsibility for asylum seekers disproportionately on only a few member states. However, the Paper also emphasises that this fairness has to be understood within a partially implemented system where EU-wide allocation remained limited and most transfers did not change the asymmetry between member states. Results also varied across time and countries. The Pact reforms, which will become fully applicable as of mid-2026, retain the ‘first country of entry’ principle to establish responsibility over asylum seekers as well as transfers. Yet the new rules will also tighten compliance, among others aiming to reduce the gap between requested and executed transfers. This gap has increased in recent years, threatening mutual trust between member states and putting the CEAS at risk before the new rules even enter into application. One of the Pact’s major innovations is the mechanism for mandatory but flexible solidarity, which foresees the possibility for member states to receive financial contributions and operational support alongside relocations. However, member states that face persistent secondary movements may be reluctant to come forward with solidarity pledges, particularly relocations, if there is no guarantee that border states will comply with their obligations. In parallel, border states may continue to flout their obligations if they fear a disproportionate burden that the solidarity mechanism fails to correct. Transfers of responsibility can take multiple forms under the reformed CEAS, including Dublin transfers, relocations or ‘responsibility offsets’. The latter is another innovation introduced by the Pact that allows member states to take responsibility for asylum applicants on their own territory, similar to the (unilateral) sovereignty clause under the Dublin III Regulation. Yet what may be overlooked is the risk that such transfers will benefit some member states at the expense of others, instead of improving the overall fairness of the EU asylum system. This is because the reform expands the range of responsibility transfers invoked in the name of solidarity but lacks an overarching fairness principle. Looking ahead, this gap could be transformed into a strength of the new system, improving implementation and mutual trust within the reformed CEAS by focusing on the redistributive outcome of all responsibility transfers. To achieve this, clear principles and transparent assessments will be needed. To this end, this Discussion Paper recommends to: - increase overall transparency in the assessment of transfers, using the principle of fairness as part of the assessment; - improve the assessment of which countries are under pressure, or are at risk thereof, by considering the distributive impact of all transfers that shift responsibility over asylum seekers, including relocations; - ensure that responsibility transfers enhance the overall fairness of the reformed CEAS by prioritising movements from more pressured to less pressured states. Embedding these principles in the implementation of the new rules would make the reformed CEAS fairer, more effective and more resilient. It would strengthen mutual trust between member states and open opportunities for further improvements, including practices that secure asylum seekers’ acceptance and thus benefit all stakeholders.
- Topic:
- Migration, European Union, Refugees, Solidarity, Asylum, and Forced Migration
- Political Geography:
- Europe
2381. EU Migration and Asylum at a Crossroads: Planning for Uncertainty
- Author:
- Virginie Jacob and Alberto-Horst Neidhardt
- Publication Date:
- 10-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- European Policy Centre (EPC)
- Abstract:
- Following the adoption of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum reforms, the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) is about to formally begin its new life, with the policy machine now in motion. The policy cycle officially starts in October 2025 when the European Commission presents its first Annual Asylum and Migration Report and transmits to the Council a proposed allocation and distribution of solidarity, based on the needs identified in the Annual Report. It will then be up to the Commission to secure buy-in from member states and the Council to reach an agreement on the “Solidarity Pool”. Since the reforms’ adoption, the Commission’s mantra has been clear: “implement, implement, implement”. The immediate focus is on ensuring operational preparedness and rallying member states behind the new architecture. Once the Annual Report is published and discussions on the Solidarity Pool begin, national administrations and EU systems will have to be implementation-ready by mid-June 2026, when the reformed rules become fully applicable. Beneath the surface, uncertainty looms on two fronts: whether member states will have the capacity – people, infrastructure, resources – and the political will to implement, and how resilient the system will be to external shocks – from geopolitical instability and displacement dynamics in nearby regions to potential rises in irregular arrivals that test both administrative and political resilience. This Discussion Paper aims to steer an informed conversation about the risks and possible failures linked to implementation. It adopts a foresight-inspired approach to stress-test assumptions and identify pressure points before they harden into crises. The Paper sets out four fictional but plausible scenarios. The scenarios are based on a two axis-matrix which reflects different political priorities: implementing the new rules in full and preserving the CEAS. In the first scenario, implementation is ensured and the CEAS preserved until geopolitical instability threatens both. The second scenario features a phased, control-first rollout that preserves the CEAS but leaves the overall system fragile. In the third, a coalition of willing states aims to form an ‘Open Supra-governmental Avantgarde’ (OSGA). The OSGA promotes cooperation and implementation via mini-Schengen and mini-Dublin arrangements while the CEAS comes to an end. In the fourth, non-implementation cascades into the collapse of the CEAS and threatens the EU as such. The Paper presents these scenarios via an experimental and journalistic register to maximise accessibility and policy salience. Each fictional report is set in late December 2026 – six months after the Pact’s entry into application and roughly a year after the Solidarity Pool’s scheduled adoption – to illustrate how early decisions and external events could combine in practice. None of the four scenarios is intended to predict how the future will unfold. In fact, the scenarios are not based on an accurate stocktaking of member states’ capacity or will to implement the new rules. However, each reveals specific vulnerabilities – from limited commitments to solidarity and capacity bottlenecks, political polarisation and over-reliance on externalisation – that policymakers should factor into implementation choices. While the paper does not advance recommendations, it argues that a foresight function should be built into the CEAS through regular and system-wide assessments. Doing so is essential to strengthen preparedness, maximise the reforms’ potential benefits while avoiding strategic risks.
- Topic:
- Borders, Asylum, European Commission, and Forced Migration
- Political Geography:
- Europe
2382. Dual-use innovation: Confronting the challenges and delivering EU security and competitiveness
- Author:
- Alison Hunter
- Publication Date:
- 11-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- European Policy Centre (EPC)
- Abstract:
- The EU is navigating a complex security and defence (S&D) transition. Responding with speed and certaint is difficult at a time of geopolitical upheaval. Europe is meeting the sharp wake-up call heralding the end of the peace dividend with a significant absence of preparedness. At the same time, the Union must confront new global threats to its economic competitiveness. It stands at an inflection point, where security and defence ambitions are no longer peripheral – they are existential. Defence innovation must be understood as a lever for the EU to respond to this new reality, allowing the Union to position Europe’s industrial defence as the driver of its global competitiveness and the key to determining its future. Despite many new instruments – such as the SAFE1 facility, the Defence Industrial Strategy (2024) and the Readiness Roadmap 2030 – Europe’s defence production and technological agility lag significantly behind the United States and key global competitors. The EU’s industrial defence bottlenecks are deep- rooted and structural. National sovereignty concerns and disharmony among the EU27 impede collective action, while Single Market deficits prevent the scale and direction of the industrial response needed. This has resulted in security incrementalism, where siloed, short- term actions replace systemic and long-term strategic direction. There is no amount of financing, smart policy or political rhetoric that can compensate for the decisive and collective action needed. This paper advocates for the design of an EU dual- use innovation framework spanning technologies, infrastructures and financing frameworks that serve both civilian and military purposes. This will help the Union overcome the current impasse and drive its international security and competitiveness. Achieving this is a complex endeavour. It involves fundamental changes to the regulatory environment and reforms to the Union’s approach to trans-national collaboration across the entire innovation spectrum – from industry, to investment, to infrastructures. Dual-use innovation must permeate all EU territories. Delivery depends on more than higher defence-related spending. It requires a ‘whole of government’ and ‘dual-use by design’ approach, through upgraded governance systems, legislation and institutional capacity, navigated by a high level of ‘buy-in’ from political, policy, industrial and civil society actors. In short, dual-use innovation must be re-positioned from being part of the EU’s innovation agenda to acting as its driving force. A new arsenal of EU, industrial, defence-driven policy and investment measures have taken shape, with more on the way to respond to the Union’s industrial defence-readiness needs and production capacity deficits. Success requires a clearer understanding of the trade-offs associated with an industrial effort of this magnitude. Improved strategic coordination is underway but must be strengthened under the new Readiness Roadmap and proposed Defence Semester. The European Commission’s proposals related to the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) seek to embed defence spending across key policy instruments. However, the scope for defence-related innovation to serve a broader range of EU objectives (e.g. targeting the EU’s multiple transition challenges and boosting sub-national preparedness efforts) has, so far, been vastly under-acknowledged. A dual-use innovation approach can help to bridge solutions – across military and non-military contexts – thereby confronting a range of societal challenges and strengthening the mileage of innovation defence investments. It could unlock political, societal and financing tensions.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, European Union, Innovation, and Dual Use Items
- Political Geography:
- Europe
2383. Beyond the Action Plan: Towards a Holistic Strategy for a Competitive and Secure Subsea Infrastructure in Europe
- Author:
- Ian Hernandez, Varg Folkman, and Mihai Sebastian Chihaia
- Publication Date:
- 10-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- European Policy Centre (EPC)
- Abstract:
- Once an invisible backbone of global connectivity, subsea cables are quickly becoming a strategic concern. As demand for internet services rises, investment in new fibre-optic infrastructure is accelerating – and with it, geopolitical attention. The seabed has emerged as a new frontier of hybrid warfare among Europe, Russia and other actors. Ownership dynamics in the sector are also shifting. Just four US cloud providers now control 71% of global subsea fibre capacity, overtaking traditional telecom carriers and driving most new projects. Europe lags behind in new seabed infrastructure, as its carriers struggle to keep up with their counterparts across the Atlantic. Although the EU funds strategic projects, its investment is dwarfed by cloud hyperscalers. Awareness of cable networks’ strategic value is growing. Concerns over vendors from unreliable countries in subsea and other critical infrastructure and vulnerabilities to hybrid attacks are prompting the EU and NATO to coordinate more closely. But more needs to be done, particularly in public-private cooperation: Europe’s capacity to repair damaged cables is limited, and private repair and maintenance agreements are not scaled to respond to coordinated seabed attacks. Furthermore, there are few global standards ruling the subsea industry. Few laws cover modern issues like acts of hybrid warfare, and international governing bodies remain private initiatives. To respond, the EU must follow and go beyond the European Commission’s 2024 Action Plan on Submarine Cable Security. A comprehensive strategy should accelerate cross-border mapping and risk assessment. This includes identifying vulnerabilities and strengthening repair and resilience capabilities across jurisdictions. This paper sets out 10 proposals to advance the EU’s Action Plan on Cable Security and strengthen Europe’s strategic position. As the seabed becomes a new arena of economic and military rivalry, Europe must act to protect its links, resilience and global edge.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, NATO, Infrastructure, European Union, Economic Security, and Subsea Cables
- Political Geography:
- Europe
2384. Additive Manufacturing and the Future of European Defence
- Author:
- Chris Kremidas-Courtney
- Publication Date:
- 09-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- European Policy Centre (EPC)
- Abstract:
- Additive manufacturing is rapidly becoming central to how Europe supplies, repairs, and sustains its armed forces, giving it an edge over adversaries like Russia who are struggling with sanctions and supply chain constraints. This policy paper explores how AM is reshaping logistics, strengthening strategic autonomy, and recommends steps European leaders must take to maximize this advantage. To transform AM from a tactical novelty to a strategic capability, Europe and NATO must act decisively in six areas: 1. Standardize and certify. Finalize one set of interoperable AM standards via EDA and NATO Standards Agreements (STANAGs), aligning material properties, testing, and digital workflows. 2. Build secure digital infrastructure. Develop federated digital part libraries compatible with NATO’s RAPID–e system and protect them within cyber-secure IP frameworks. 3. Reform procurement. Shift defence acquisitions to value AM’s lifecycle benefits and not just unit cost. Enable flexible contracting for digital files and fieldable AM printers. 4. Accelerate joint R&D and training. Expand EDF and DIANA-supported AM projects; launch a European AM Centre of Excellence for training, best practice exchange, and field trials. 5. Reduce external dependencies. Invest in Europeancontrolled software platforms, advanced materials R&D, and open-access design libraries to reduce reliance on US-held intellectual property and supply chains. Prioritize the development of sovereign feedstocks, firmware, and precision AM systems tailored to EU operational and certification needs. 6. Invest in industry and skills development. Support SMEs and academic partners to scale AM capacity. Establish EU-wide training pathways to build a qualified military-industrial AM workforce.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Manufacturing, and Industry
- Political Geography:
- Europe
2385. Accept, prepare, leverage: How Europeans can manage a changing transatlantic security partnership in the Trump era
- Author:
- Iana Maisuradze
- Publication Date:
- 10-2025
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Policy Centre (EPC)
- Abstract:
- The transatlantic security partnership is entering a new phase. Europeans must assume greater responsibility for their own defence as the United States under President Donald Trump no longer prioritises Europe. Trump’s approach to trying to end the war in Ukraine, including attempts at direct negotiation with Russian President Vladimir Putin and ambiguous security guarantees for Kyiv, pose significant challenges that risk undermining the transatlantic security relationship. For the foreseeable future, however, European security will continue to depend on the United States. To manage that reality, European governments face three main tasks: first, to understand and accept Trump’s political calculations and interests; second, to prepare NATO’s European members and the EU to take the lead on their continent’s security; and third, to ensure that guarantees for Ukraine are credible enough to deter renewed or enhanced Russian aggression.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, and Transatlantic Relations
- Political Geography:
- Europe, North America, and United States of America
2386. Regulating General Purpose AI in the EU: An Analysis of the AI Code of Practice
- Author:
- Samuel Goodger and Giulia Torchio
- Publication Date:
- 09-2025
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Policy Centre (EPC)
- Abstract:
- The EU stands at a pivotal moment for the future of digital governance. The implementation of the AI Act (AIA), one of the world’s first comprehensive and democratically legitimised pieces of Artificial Intelligence (AI) legislation, has started, and is due to be completed by 2027. Aiming to support companies with this staggered process, the European Commission has recently published a Code of Practice (CoP) for providers and developers of General Purpose AI (GPAI) models. The tool is meant to facilitate compliance with the AIA while external bodies develop the technical standards. Despite the seemingly technical nature and limited scope of the CoP, ensuring that companies adhere to it is of the utmost importance in order to boost the safety of AI in the EU. This policy brief outlines the development of the Code and explains its political relevance. This research aims to kickstart a process of reflection on necessary amendments to the text ahead of future revisions of the CoP;
- Topic:
- European Union, Regulation, Artificial Intelligence, Digital Policy, and Digital Governance
- Political Geography:
- Europe
2387. Ukraine and the United Kingdom: how the EU should address the challenge of enlargement to the east and west
- Author:
- Andrew Duff
- Publication Date:
- 11-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- European Policy Centre (EPC)
- Abstract:
- This paper contrasts the challenges faced by the United Kingdom and Ukraine as they each try to level with the European Union. It recommends a change of methodology to accelerate Ukraine’s accession and overcome a veto. Fast-tracking Ukraine’s membership should jolt the British government out of its complacency and trigger the first full-scale public enquiry into the future of UK-EU relations. The EU, for its part, will be bolstered by welcoming the membership of its two big neighbours to the east and west.
- Topic:
- European Union, Brexit, and Enlargement
- Political Geography:
- United Kingdom, Europe, and Ukraine
2388. Cyber Crossroads in the Indo-Pacific: Navigating Digital Potential and Cyber Peril
- Author:
- Vivek Chilukuri, Lisa Curtis, Janet Egan, Morgan Peirce, Elizabeth Whatcott, and Nathaniel Schochet
- Publication Date:
- 06-2025
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- The Indo-Pacific faces a cyber crossroads. Down one path lies deeper military, intelligence, and economic ties between Washington and its key allies and partners in this strategically vital region. Down another, rising cyber threats from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), North Korea, Russia, and a growing shadow industry of cybercriminals and hacktivists derail these ambitions by compromising critical infrastructure, weakening data security, and undermining democratic institutions. The outcome will depend on the choices Washington and its Indo-Pacific partners make—or fail to make—in the coming years. The U.S.-China rivalry has long extended to the cyber domain, but in recent years, Beijing has increasingly exploited the gray zone of cyberspace to test, probe, and push other nations as part of a broader campaign to gain influence and shape regional norms and power structures.1 In recent years, the PRC has sharply escalated its cyber aggression in a dangerous new game that combines traditional operations focused on espionage, intellectual property theft, and data exfiltration with newly assertive disinformation, influence operations, and pre-positioning in critical infrastructure. Adding to the uncertainty, rapid advances in artificial intelligence (AI) could further tilt the balance toward offense in cyberspace in unpredictable and potentially dangerous ways. Against this backdrop, Indo-Pacific governments have taken historic steps to strengthen their resilience in a cyber landscape that has grown more varied, volatile, and dangerous than ever. To assess how Washington and its Indo-Pacific partners are navigating this cyber crossroads, the Center for a New American Security’s Technology and National Security Program and Indo-Pacific Security Program led a year-long research project that combined extensive desk research with in-person field research and expert workshops in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. This report draws on this research to offer in-depth assessments of the cyber landscapes in all four countries to identify key trends, challenges, and opportunities to strengthen cybersecurity and resilience in partnership with the United States. The findings offer cause for both optimism and concern. On the one hand, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines have all undergone notable shifts in elevating cybersecurity as foundational to national security. Japan’s 2022 National Security Strategy made cybersecurity a pillar for the first time, and the government has passed reforms to facilitate information sharing with the United States and shift toward active cyber defense.2 South Korea updated its National Cybersecurity Strategy to adopt a Defend Forward cyber posture, mirroring the U.S. shift in 2018.3 Taiwan established a National Institute of Cybersecurity within its Ministry of Digital Affairs, and the Executive Yuan approved a four-year plan to boost digital resilience.4 The Philippines finalized a five-year National Cybersecurity Plan.5 For its part, the United States has elevated cybersecurity in its foreign policy with expanded information sharing, capacity building, and diplomacy anchored in a new Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy within the U.S. Department of State. Recent years have seen Washington both strengthen its proactive cyber capacities and embrace a “name and shame” approach to call out malign cyber operations from foreign adversaries like Russia and the PRC. Still, these laudable efforts to bolster cyber policies, personnel, and partnerships have failed to keep pace with rising threats. Washington’s finger-wagging statements and targeted sanctions in the wake of cyber incidents have failed to stem rising threats. To confront growing cyber dangers across the Indo-Pacific, the United States and its partners need a more assertive and coordinated approach that intensifies efforts on two fronts: (1) building capacity within each country to strengthen cybersecurity and resilience, and (2) strengthening cooperation to enable more integrated, proactive cyber defense, collective signaling, and cost inflicting on malign cyber actors. To that end, this report offers recommendations to government leaders in the United States, along with both country-specific and cross-cutting recommendations for government leaders in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. Although many of the recommendations directed toward the four countries could fairly apply to the United States, strengthening domestic cybersecurity and resilience is beyond the scope of this report. Summary of Recommendations
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Artificial Intelligence, Strategic Competition, and Rivalry
- Political Geography:
- China, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific
2389. Global Compute and National Security: Strengthening American AI Leadership Through Proactive Partnerships
- Author:
- Janet Egan
- Publication Date:
- 07-2025
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- The current pathway to breakthrough artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities relies on amassing and leveraging vast “compute”—specialized chips housed within massive data centers that generate the computational power to train, enhance, and deploy advanced models. If current AI development trends continue, securing and extending U.S. access to a robust compute ecosystem will play a decisive role in whether the United States leads the world in AI or cedes its leadership to competitors. The nation that leads in deploying compute worldwide will wield critical leverage over the rules and norms governing its use. Most importantly, U.S. leadership can crowd out China’s expanding sphere of technology influence and ensure the AI transition is underpinned by trusted democratic technologies. This goal necessitates a strategy with two key components: maintaining U.S. control of the most capable compute infrastructure in the world to ensure leadership at the AI frontier, while simultaneously providing subfrontier levels of compute to partners around the world. Recent advances in AI efficiency, as demonstrated by Chinese AI models like DeepSeek-R1, have not negated the fundamental importance of compute for AI leadership.1 The nation with the most robust compute ecosystem will retain key advantages: the ability to train the most advanced systems, enhance and deploy those systems at scale, and run the experiments necessary to drive new breakthroughs in model efficiency and training.2 These advantages are likely to generate a self-reinforcing cycle of AI development, making it increasingly difficult for other nations to close the gap. If current technical trends hold, and as chip export controls increasingly hinder China’s capabilities, the AI capability gap between the United States and China should widen. However, the United States cannot afford to be complacent. Washington’s efforts to protect America’s AI leadership have relied heavily on controlling the export of advanced AI chips. Controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment going to China were imposed as early as 2019, followed by AI chip export controls targeting U.S. adversaries in 2022, which were strengthened in 2023, 2024, and 2025.3 In January 2025, the Biden administration’s Framework for Artificial Intelligence Diffusion went a step further, placing caps on compute exports to most countries in the world.4 While now rescinded, this unprecedented action sent a clear signal to other nations that the United States is willing and able to control AI compute access. However, a heavily protectionist approach faces challenges. Abroad, chip smuggling has provided China with illegal access to advanced chips, eroding the U.S. lead.5 At home, permitting and regulatory constraints threaten to limit America’s ability to meet the energy demand for large-scale AI data centers and chip fabrication. Nondemocratic countries that possess the regulatory flexibility, capital, and readily available energy now seek to rapidly build frontier-scale AI data centers, with the potential to surpass the United States’ own compute ecosystem, absent adequate safeguards. Meanwhile, China’s ongoing investments in its compute capacity could eventually create a viable alternative supply chain beyond U.S. control, while growing concerns over reliance on U.S. technology among traditional partners may fuel demand for non-U.S. compute offerings.
- Topic:
- Partnerships, Leadership, Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, and Strategic Competition
- Political Geography:
- China, North America, and United States of America
2390. Countering AI Chip Smuggling Has Become a National Security Priority: An Updated Playbook for Preventing AI Chip Smuggling to the PRC
- Author:
- Erich Grunewald and Tim Fist
- Publication Date:
- 06-2025
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- BBased on the available evidence, artificial intelligence (AI) chip smuggling has likely been occurring at a scale that significantly undermines U.S. attempts to restrict the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) access to advanced AI. This is indicated by four lines of argument: Smuggling should be expected based on historical precedent. The PRC has a long history of smuggling U.S. technology despite export restrictions, which has rarely resulted in criminal or civil penalties.1 Smuggling of U.S. AI chips is highly incentivized by their superior performance, higher supply, and more mature software ecosystem relative to chips legally available to Chinese AI labs.2 Based on publicly available data, of the 22 notable models that had been developed exclusively in the PRC by 2025, only two were trained with Chinese chips.3 Six news outlets have independently reported evidence of large-scale AI chip smuggling, totaling tens to hundreds of thousands of chips smuggled in 2024. One smuggler reportedly handled an order of for servers containing 2,400 NVIDIA H100s—worth $120 million—to a customer in the PRC.4 Another facilitated an order worth $103 million.5 Singapore authorities arrested three individuals suspected of diverting AI servers worth $390 million.6 Within this reporting, multiple chip resellers and start-ups in the PRC have claimed that gaining access to export-controlled AI chips is straightforward, with one Chinese start-up founder estimating in 2024 that there were more than 100,000 NVIDIA H100s in the PRC.7 Most of the Chinese chip sellers interviewed in these reports confirm that they work with multiple distributors, use shell companies based overseas, and employ simple tactics to avoid detection, such as relabeling shipments as tea or toys.8 There are many online listings for export-controlled AI chips available for purchase in the PRC. The authors conducted a non-exhaustive search of three Chinese online marketplaces and found 132 domestic listings for export-controlled chips, along with many photos of supposedly smuggled goods.9 Where sellers provided information on stock, the average quantity of export-controlled graphics processing units (GPUs) per listing was around 1,200 for GPU server listings and 400 for GPU card listings. Though this data is patchy and likely unreliable, the total stock implied is around 100,000 H100 GPUs, as of December 2024.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Intellectual Property/Copyright, Artificial Intelligence, Smuggling, and National Security
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
2391. Global Swing States and the New Great Power Competition
- Author:
- Richard Fontaine and Gibbs McKinley
- Publication Date:
- 06-2025
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- International politics is undergoing a period of rapid, significant change. China and Russia are working together more closely and alongside Iran and North Korea in opposition to what they view as a U.S.-dominated international order.1 The current U.S. administration has in its early days pursued a form of upheaval, altering key policies, relationships, and arrangements. Policymakers in Washington represent a mix: Some see the rules-based international order as key to U.S. security, prosperity, and liberty, while others argue that any such order exists only to enrich other countries at America’s expense. In contrast to broad, vague notions of what constitutes international order, five concrete pillars have benefited the United States over recent decades. The territorial order aims to protect national sovereignty and discourage wars of conquest; the global trade order aims to regularize an open international trading system in which prosperity can increase; the financial order aims to facilitate international trade and investment, promote monetary stability, and avoid crises; the nonproliferation order attempts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons; and the human rights order seeks to preserve the basic rights and liberties of individuals everywhere. Despite the many doubts about them, these core pillars of the international order enhance the security, prosperity, and freedom of Americans. As a result, the overarching goal of U.S. policy should be to preserve them, even as specific rules and institutions change and adapt. Policymakers should work with allies and against adversaries in this attempt, focusing on six “global swing states”—Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Türkiye—that together will exert disproportionate influence over the future of international order. Each of these countries is multi-aligned and determined to maintain ties with the United States, Russia, and China. They all seek to reform existing rules and institutions. Together, they possess the geopolitical weight to sway the future of global order. This report offers a multifaceted path for engaging with global swing states, aiming U.S. policy at a vision of world order favorable to American interests and values. Informed by more than a year of research and consultations, it offers a set of cross-cutting and country-specific policy recommendations.
- Topic:
- Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, International Order, and Great Powers
- Political Geography:
- China, Iran, North Korea, and United States of America
2392. The Axis of Upheaval: Gauging the Growing Military Cooperation Among Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea
- Author:
- Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Nicholas Lokker
- Publication Date:
- 07-2025
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was a critical catalyst for cooperation among Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea—what the authors call the “axis of upheaval.” Already, defense cooperation between these countries has enabled Russian aggression against Ukraine, increased their military capabilities in ways that make each country a more formidable threat, emboldened their more brazen and destabilizing actions, and magnified gray zone actions against the United States and its allies. Although much of this cooperation occurs bilaterally among specific dyads of the axis, that cooperation is increasingly beneficial to the overall group. Russian advancements on the battlefield in Ukraine and experience in modern warfare, for example, are diffusing to each axis country. Iranian drone technology now flows through Russia to North Korea and China, and Russian defense officials frequently travel from one axis capital to the next, creating connectivity among multiple members of the axis that would not otherwise exist. The cooperation among the axis of upheaval will persist, despite some claims that Russia’s and China’s limited support for Iran amid Israeli and U.S. strikes spell the end of their ties. China, Iran, and North Korea deliberated for months on the sidelines of Russia’s war before moving to more fully support Moscow after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. China gave little more than its diplomatic support to the Kremlin in the first months after Russia’s invasion, and it was nearly six months until public reports documented the arrival of Iran’s drones in Russia. While these countries are reticent to incur unnecessary costs on behalf of their partners, they will seek out opportunities to support one another, especially in ways that help them withstand Western pressure. The incentives fueling their cooperation have not changed since Israel’s actions against Iran, and, if anything, Russia, China, and North Korea are likely to see value in helping Tehran reconstitute its capacity to antagonize the United States and create policy dilemmas for Washington.
- Topic:
- Security, Military Affairs, Cooperation, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea
2393. Countering the Digital Silk Road: Kenya
- Author:
- Vivek Chilukuri and Ruby Scanlon
- Publication Date:
- 07-2025
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- This year marks the 10th anniversary of the Digital Silk Road (DSR), China’s ambitious initiative to shape critical digital infrastructure around the world to advance its geopolitical interests and technology leadership. A decade after its launch, digital infrastructure and emerging technologies have only grown more vital and contested as demand for connectivity, digital services, and emerging technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) expand. Against this backdrop, the DSR has become increasingly central to China’s broader strategy to challenge and ultimately supplant the U.S.-led digital order, and in doing so, reap potentially vast security, economic, and intelligence advantages. To assess the DSR’s impact 10 years after its inception—and explore how the United States and its allies can offer a more compelling and coherent alternative—the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) Technology and National Security team has undertaken a major research project that produces in-depth case studies of four diverse and geostrategically critical nations—Indonesia, Brazil, Kenya, and Saudi Arabia—and culminates in a full-length report. The third case study focuses on Kenya. For the study, researchers from the CNAS Technology and National Security team spent a week in the country interviewing U.S. and Kenyan policymakers, journalists, technology firms, civil society, and academics. Drawing on these interviews and desk research, this case study seeks to shed light on the current dynamics and stakes of the U.S.-China competition to shape Kenya’s digital ecosystem. It assesses the effectiveness of China’s DSR campaign vis-à-vis U.S. and allied efforts to align Kenya’s digital ecosystem with theirs in a way that advances U.S. security, economic interests, and values.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Digital Silk Road (DSR), and Digital Infrastructure
- Political Geography:
- Kenya, Africa, and China
2394. Quad: The Next Phase
- Author:
- Lisa Curtis, Kareen Hart, Ryan Claffey, Keerthi Martyn, and Thomas Corel
- Publication Date:
- 06-2025
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- T The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) among the United States, Australia, India, and Japan is becoming the focal point for economic and technological cooperation in the Indo-Pacific as the competition between the United States and China intensifies and regional power dynamics continue to evolve. The Quad nations share democratic values and seek to advance an affirmative vision for the region that promotes an inclusive regional architecture and offers options for regional partners, which are charting their economic and security futures in the face of growing great power competition. The second Trump administration is signaling its commitment to deepening Quad cooperation to counter China’s efforts to dominate the region and to ensure other countries in the region remain prosperous, peaceful, and free from coercion. However, the administration also has indicated that it wants to streamline the work of the Quad and whittle down its dozens of different working groups to focus on a handful of priorities. With the need to deliver tangible results, the administration is interested in maintaining fewer—yet more active—working groups that produce substantial outputs.1 While the Quad has made notable progress since it was revived nearly eight years ago, there is opportunity to expand and deepen its work to fulfill its promise of promoting a free, open, peaceful, and prosperous Indo-Pacific. To
- Topic:
- Security, International Cooperation, Economy, Strategic Competition, and Quad Alliance
- Political Geography:
- Japan, China, India, Australia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific
2395. Game Over? How the United States Could Have Won the Trade Wars
- Author:
- Emily Kilcrease and Geoffrey Gertz
- Publication Date:
- 08-2025
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- The Center for a New American Security's Energy, Economics, and Security (EES) Program designed and conducted an economic wargame to explore possible pathways to resolve the trade wars sparked by historic levels of U.S. tariff escalation. This trade wargame was designed to examine foreign government responses to U.S. tariffs, including whether they would retaliate, negotiate, and/or make concessions. After being punished by U.S. tariffs, would foreign governments have the appetite to engage in dealmaking with the United States and, if so, under what conditions? The trade wargame was conducted on March 17, 2025, two weeks before President Donald Trump made his real-world announcement of shockingly high tariff rates on a day he deemed “Liberation Day.”
- Topic:
- Economics, Tariffs, Trade Wars, and Trade
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
2396. The Global State of al-Qa`ida 24 Years After 9/11
- Author:
- Colin Clarke and Clara Broekaert
- Publication Date:
- 09-2025
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- CTC Sentinel
- Institution:
- The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
- Abstract:
- Al-Qa`ida has evolved considerably over the past four decades. Today, it is no longer a hierarchical organization with charismatic leadership, but rather a decentralized network of franchise groups dispersed throughout Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and beyond. The group has not conducted spectacular external operations (EXOPS) for many years, but instead has been focused on patiently rebuilding, dedicating its resources and manpower to forging relationships with regional affiliates and championing their grievances, which are often locally focused. Al-Qa`ida Central, including its senior leadership, has been attenuated, but the organization’s branches in Somalia and the Sahel are gaining momentum, and there is growing concern that al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is also looking to rebound. All of this is occurring against a backdrop of decline in the overall tempo of Western counterterrorism efforts, signaling the end of more than two decades of the Global War on Terrorism. Even in its diminished form, 24 years after the 9/11 attacks, al-Qa`ida and its global network of affiliates pose a serious latent security threat, including to the West, which takes these groups for granted at its own peril.
- Topic:
- Security, Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, and Al Qaeda
- Political Geography:
- Africa, South Asia, Middle East, and Global Focus
2397. Hamas Plots in Europe: A Shift Toward External Operations?
- Author:
- Matthew Levitt
- Publication Date:
- 10-2025
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- CTC Sentinel
- Institution:
- The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
- Abstract:
- Hamas has never carried out a successful terrorist attack outside of Israel, the West Bank, or Gaza—but not for lack of plotting. Over the years, the group came close to carrying out attacks abroad several times, but these were either thwarted or aborted before execution. Now, recent criminal cases in Germany and Denmark reveal that Hamas set in motion contingency planning for possible attacks in Europe several years before the October 7 massacre, including stashing small arms in weapons caches in multiple European countries. In the context of planning for the October 7 attacks, Hamas planned to make these weapons available to operatives in Europe, according to German authorities. Following the October 7 attacks, leaders of Hamas’ Qassam Brigades based in Lebanon sent operatives to find these weapons, while others in Denmark were tasked to work with a European organized crime group to procure drones and plot attacks in Denmark or Sweden. With Hamas’ operational capabilities in Gaza decimated, and the group looking to find other ways to carry out attacks, European and Israeli officials fear that Hamas has taken the decision to go global and carry out plots abroad, marking a significant departure from the group’s prior modus operandi.
- Topic:
- Terrorism, Non State Actors, Counter-terrorism, and Hamas
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine
2398. Inside Hamas: How It Thinks, Fights, and Governs
- Author:
- Magnus Ranstorp
- Publication Date:
- 10-2025
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- CTC Sentinel
- Institution:
- The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
- Abstract:
- Hamas has evolved from a Muslim Brotherhood-rooted social-religious movement into a hybrid actor that governs, polices society, and wages organized violence. The October 7, 2023, terrorist attack marked a watershed for Israel and the world. Against that backdrop, this article maps how Hamas thinks, operates, fights, and governs—from its origins to the present—showing how a religious structure and social-welfare dawa network hardened into an organized war machine. Based on first-hand interviews with senior figures, including its founder Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, it details the ideology, organizational architecture, and decision-making that drive both the dawa apparatus and the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades. The analysis tracks pivotal inflection points—from the First Intifada and Marj al-Zuhr deportations through Gaza’s 2007 takeover, successive wars, and Iranian/Hezbollah backing—to October 7. It concludes by assessing Hamas’ degraded yet durable capabilities, internal factional dynamics, and implications for Gaza’s ‘day after.’
- Topic:
- Ideology, Hamas, October 7, and Armed Resistance
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza
2399. A View from the CT Foxhole: Zohar Palti, Former Director, Policy & Political-Military Bureau, Israel’s Ministry of Defense
- Author:
- Assaf Moghadam and Don Rassler
- Publication Date:
- 10-2025
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- CTC Sentinel
- Institution:
- The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
- Abstract:
- Zohar Palti is the Andrew Viterbi Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy in Washington, D.C.; Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University; and a consultant for private companies in the United States. Palti retired from Israeli government service in 2022 after four decades in some of the most sensitive positions in Israel’s national security establishment. These included serving as the Director of the Policy & Political-Military Bureau at Israel’s Ministry of Defense, where his responsibilities included conducting and leading Israel’s defense ties with strategic partners around the world. Prior to that, Palti led the Mossad Intelligence Directorate (in a rank equivalent to a major general), and before that, he was the counterterrorism chief of the organization. Prior to his service in the Mossad, he served for 25 years in the intelligence corps of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Counter-terrorism, Interview, and Hamas
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Israel, and Palestine
2400. Rise of the E-Militias: Designated Terrorist Groups Infest Iraq’s Digital Economy
- Author:
- Michael Knights
- Publication Date:
- 12-2025
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- CTC Sentinel
- Institution:
- The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
- Abstract:
- Iraq’s digital economy is one of its fastest-growing sectors, driven by an expanding youth population, a transition to e-governance services, and the potential for Iraq to become a regional data transit hub. As with militia monetization of Iraq’s oil sector, the telecommunications industry is attracting the attention of U.S.-designated terrorist groups. They have two motives: to generate threat finances and to control and monitor data to strengthen their grip on the population and on Western diplomatic, military, and commercial entities inside Iraq. In the year before Iraq’s November 2025 elections, the outgoing government of Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani revealed the extent of militia penetration of the sector by awarding sensitive telecoms contracts to a now-sanctioned militia economic conglomerate, while also offering U.S.-origin equipment to militias and channeling lucrative 5G mobile telephony licenses exclusively to militia businessmen.
- Topic:
- Terrorism, Digital Economy, Telecommunications, and E-Government
- Political Geography:
- Iraq, Iran, and Middle East