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2351. Aligning global military posture with U.S. interests

Author:
Jennifer Kavanagh and Dan Caldwell
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The Pentagon should revise the U.S. global military posture to be consistent with protecting vital national interests based on a grand strategy of realism and restraint. This will mean reducing the size of the military footprint in certain regions and changing the mix and location of military forces in others. A review of the U.S. global military posture should focus on four priorities: defending the homeland, preventing the rise of a rival regional hegemon in key areas, burden shifting to allies and partners, and protecting U.S. economic security. The current military posture in Europe is too large, encouraging free-riding by European allies and preventing them from taking more responsibility for their own security. U.S. troop levels should be reduced to approximately where they were before Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine. This will involve the withdrawal of some ground combat units, multiple fighter squadrons, and several destroyers. Likewise, the military posture in the Middle East is too large given limited U.S. interests and the region’s lack of an existential military threat to the U.S. homeland. Air and naval assets deployed after the 2023 attacks on Israel should be removed, post-9/11 legacy deployments in Iraq and Syria should be ended, and troops in Kuwait and Qatar should be fully withdrawn. The U.S. military posture in East Asia should be realigned to focus on balancing Chinese power and protecting U.S. interests. Recommended changes include removing most ground forces and two fighter squadrons from South Korea, moving U.S. forces away from the Chinese coast, and shifting more frontline defense responsibilities to allies like Japan and the Philippines.
Topic:
Grand Strategy, Strategic Interests, Military, and Pentagon
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

2352. Will the U.S. go to war over Taiwan?

Author:
Jennifer Kavanagh
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The small island of Taiwan is often at the center of U.S. foreign policy discourse. This is thanks to the threat of a Chinese invasion and fears over a resulting loss of U.S. military and economic power in the region. A recent survey by Defense Priorities shows there is substantial disagreement among experts as to how the United States should and would respond to a Taiwan conflict. This suggests the U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity toward Taiwan is working. The experts surveyed largely agreed that China is unlikely to invade Taiwan, a departure from political and military leaders who have inflated the possibility. They also tended to agree that China is unlikely to strike U.S. military bases in East Asia ahead of a Taiwan invasion, which would grant U.S. leaders flexibility in how they respond to this scenario. These experts are divided, however, on what that response should look like. Some say the United States should use direct military force in Taiwan while others argue it should only send military aid. Very few think the U.S. should stay out completely. Even as they acknowledge that a successful seizure of Taiwan would not offer China significant military or economic benefits and recognize the enormous risks and costs to the United States of entering a Taiwan conflict, some experts continue to support a U.S. intervention. This tension is perhaps best explained by a lingering attachment to the pursuit of U.S. hegemony.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Strategic Ambiguity
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

2353. Grand strategy: Deterrence

Author:
Christopher McCallion
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Deterrence is the mobilization of coercive means to convince an adversary not to take an aggressive action. This can mean mobilizing an effective defense—convincing an adversary they will not be able to achieve their goal—or threatening to punish an adversary so even successful aggression doesn’t seem worthwhile. The ability to deter an adversary requires that they perceive both the capability and the will to carry out a deterrent threat—in other words, that they find the deterrent threat “credible.” It also requires an implicit assurance that the adversary will not suffer should they refrain from taking action. The massive and mutually destructive power of nuclear weapons makes leaders especially cautious about taking actions that could escalate to nuclear war, thereby suppressing the incentives for conventional war between nuclear-armed states. Extended nuclear deterrence, such as the “nuclear umbrella” the United States has extended to many of its allies since World War II, puts strain on the credibility underlying nuclear deterrence since it risks annihilation on behalf of allies. Extended deterrence becomes less credible and therefore more likely to fail when the fate of the third party is not vital to the state defending it. Now that its core allies have the latent capability to defend themselves—including with nuclear weapons—the United States should exit unnecessary commitments to extended deterrence.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Grand Strategy, Deterrence, and Great Powers
Political Geography:
Global Focus

2354. No GWOT-Narco

Author:
Daniel Depetris and Christopher McCallion
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The violence perpetrated by Mexico’s drug cartels, their persistent export of drugs into the United States, and the massive toll of fentanyl overdose deaths have prompted the Trump administration to present U.S. military force as a possible solution. Any U.S. military incursion into Mexico will create more problems than it solves. It will disrupt the cartels for a time but drug smuggling will continue given demand and profits. U.S. military action could also raise the risk of the cartels retaliating against Americans inside Mexico and even inside the United States. The diplomatic repercussions would be significant as well: Mexico would view U.S. military force without its consent as an act of war. Various military solutions lack promise. A counterinsurgency operation will sink U.S. troops into a long-term campaign with no concrete end date. Targeting cartel kingpins is likely to splinter the cartels into smaller groups, not eliminate them. A plan to strengthen the presence of the Mexican military inside Mexico is also unlikely to work. There is no silver bullet to stop the cartels. While the United States can take some practical measures to weaken the cartels, like stemming the flow of firearms into Mexico, it can’t achieve much more than this and shouldn’t try.
Topic:
Narcotics Trafficking, Military Intervention, Violence, and Cartels
Political Geography:
Latin America, North America, and Mexico

2355. Target Taiwan: Challenges for a U.S. intervention

Author:
Lyle Goldstein
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
China could attack Taiwan, attempting a fait accompli before the United States could mobilize sufficient forces in theater to defend it. Chinese advantages of proximity and will suggest that the U.S. would pay a heavy price in this scenario. U.S. ground forces would struggle to enter the combat theater in the relevant time because of uncertainties related to the air and sea campaigns. Attempts to insert U.S. ground forces in peacetime could ignite the very conflict they would intend to deter. Chinese missile, air, and drone assaults could damage U.S. airfields in the region and slow U.S. air support, acutely degrading U.S. maritime operations and Taiwan’s ground defenses. Because U.S. Navy surface forces, including aircraft carrier battle groups, are vulnerable to China’s A2/AD systems, combat in a Taiwan scenario would likely be disproportionately borne by the U.S. Navy submarine force. While these submarines could do damage to the Chinese Navy, they probably lack sufficient firepower to affect the overall outcome of a war. Surging forward U.S. air and naval power in a Taiwan scenario would entail incredible risks, including nuclear escalation. Any war or even intensive militarized rivalry between the U.S. and China would entail enormous risks in exchange for little gain.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Armed Forces, Military Intervention, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

2356. Target Taiwan: Prospects for a Chinese invasion

Author:
Lyle Goldstein
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
In a scenario where China attempts an amphibious invasion of Taiwan and the United States does not fight, the invasion will likely succeed assuming Beijing is willing to bear heavy casualties. Taiwan’s vulnerability to China is due to its proximity, since it is located well within range of Chinese missiles, airpower, rocket artillery, helicopters, and paratroopers. All this will reduce Taiwan’s ability to prevent an amphibious landing. Due to its air superiority and the geography of Taiwan, which is mostly urban and mountainous, China can plan for an infantry fight, at least initially, not one dominated by heavy armor. Hence, civilian vessels, including small craft of all types, can help ferry most troops ashore. While an operation to seize Taiwan would be a highly risky endeavor that could result in heavy Chinese losses, Beijing would likely be motivated to bear such costs, since it views national unification as a core interest. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan thus cannot be discounted and Taiwan should prepare by boosting its defense spending, emphasizing its own self-reliance, and engaging in diplomacy.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Armed Conflict, Vulnerability, and Invasion
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

2357. Keep NATO focused on Europe, not China

Author:
Thomas P. Cavanna
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
During the Trump I and Biden presidencies, the United States applied growing pressure on NATO to turn against China. Although focused on protecting Europe, these efforts also attempted to expand the alliance’s prerogatives into the Indo-Pacific. Should this expansion continue, it could distract NATO from Russia, the only real threat that Europe faces. It could also delay the emergence of a more autonomous Europe able to defend itself, thereby perpetuating current U.S. overstretch and reducing Washington’s ability to concentrate on the China challenge in Asia. NATO’s turn against China might generate undue tensions with the PRC, deepen Sino-Russian cooperation, and cause controversy in the Global South, all of which would work against U.S. interests. Instead of trying to fold Europe and Asia together to counter the Sino-Russian axis along the Eurasian rimland, the U.S. should keep NATO focused on Russia and encourage European strategic autonomy. It should refocus its own efforts on the Indo-Pacific and reduce the risk of escalation with Beijing.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, and Expansionism
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Europe, and Asia

2358. China can’t dominate the Middle East

Author:
Rosemary Kelanic
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
A common argument for the United States to remain in the Middle East is that it needs to counter Chinese expansionism. The U.S. is embroiled in a new cold war, this line of thinking goes, and if it withdraws from the Middle East, Beijing will fill the power vacuum and expand its influence. This fundamentally misreads China’s modest aims in the region, which have more to do with hedging against U.S. threats to Chinese oil access. Unlike the Soviet Union, which was proximate to the Middle East, China lacks the military wherewithal to threaten the region. And whereas it was very plausible that the Soviet Union could have captured and weaponized Middle Eastern oil production, China almost certainly could not capture the oil, and even if it did, couldn’t withhold it from the global market. In the Middle East, the United States faces less of a military and economic threat from China than it did from the Soviet Union. It should respond by finally withdrawing from the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Oil, Strategic Competition, and Expansionism
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Asia, and United States of America

2359. Setting Up Uganda’s National Mining Company to Boost Sustainable Development

Author:
Andrew Bauer, Thomas Scurfield, and Paul Bagabo
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI)
Abstract:
A Natural Resource Governance Institute survey of national mining companies (NMCs) provides useful lessons for the newly established Uganda National Mining Company (UNMC), as the Ugandan government and UNMC Board of Directors work to operationalize the company. With a limited commercial mandate, UNMC could play a valuable role in unlocking Uganda’s mineral potential by investing in geological surveys and co-financing exploration to derisk projects for experienced exploration companies. A cautious approach would be beneficial, given the considerable opportunity cost of using public funds and the risky nature of exploration, especially in the early years as the company builds experience. UNMC could learn from other NMCs that have struggled to benefit from minority state equity and reconsider these plans. If it continues to seek minority equity, its strategy for negotiating shareholder agreements and dividend rights will be critical and could involve guaranteed dividends or preferred shares. Regardless of UNMC’s mandate, a clear funding model, along with strong management, oversight and transparency policies and implementation mechanisms, is essential for enabling the company to successfully contribute to Uganda’s sustainable development. The Government of Uganda recently established UNMC as part of its effort to increase the contribution of the nascent mineral sector to sustainable development. In November 2024, the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development appointed the Board of Directors to begin operationalizing the company. To support this process, we have compiled the experiences of other NMCs. Most of the more than 62 other NMCs around the world have a commercial mandate to manage the state’s majority or minority equity participation in mines. Operational mandates are less common, primarily because most NMCs lack the technical or financial capacity to efficiently operate mines. While some governments have assigned both regulatory and commercial mandates to NMCs, most have separated these roles to avoid conflicts of interest and reduce the risk of corruption.
Topic:
Natural Resources, Mining, Critical Minerals, and Sustainable Development
Political Geography:
Uganda and Africa

2360. DONG to Ørsted: Seven Insights to Transform National Oil Companies

Author:
Giovanni Tagliani, Andrea Furnaro, David Manley, and Camilo Romero
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI)
Abstract:
The experience of Denmark’s national oil company (NOC) DONG transforming into Ørsted, the world’s leading offshore wind developer, is a case worth exploring. While aspects of Denmark’s story are unique and not easily replicated, many of the underlying lessons can apply elsewhere. Governments in oil- and gas-exporting countries have long worried about two things: the eventual depletion of reserves and the volatility of global oil and gas prices. In response, many have acknowledged the need to diversify their economies beyond fossil fuels—to create new industries, generate jobs, stabilize government revenues and earn foreign exchange. Yet, despite decades of ambition, few have managed to succeed. And now, the urgency is growing in light of the global energy transition, threatening long-term demand for oil and gas. This shift has not only pushed governments to rethink their economic strategies but also forced national oil companies (NOCs)—along with their private-sector counterparts—to outline their own diversification plans. While these corporate efforts may not be sufficient on their own to shield a country from the impact of declining demand, they matter. Understanding how NOCs attempt to diversify can help governments determine whether these strategies support or undermine broader economic goals. There are reasons to be cautious. Diversification by NOCs could end up wasting public resources if, for example, NOCs invest in poorly planned ventures, politically motivated projects or sectors where the company lacks expertise. Worse, if such efforts are not carefully aligned with national development and decarbonization goals, they can divert capital and attention away from other priority areas.
Topic:
Exports, State-Owned Enterprises, Energy Transition, National Oil Companies, and Natural Resources
Political Geography:
Europe, Denmark, and Global Focus

2361. Copper Sector Expansion in Mongolia: Opportunities and Challenges

Author:
Dorjdari Namkhaijantsan and Zoljargal Naranbaatar
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI)
Abstract:
Copper has long been a pillar of technological and economic progress, and its importance continues to grow with the global energy transition. Its unique properties make it essential for renewable energy technologies, electric vehicles (EVs) and modern power grids. The increasing demand for decarbonization presents a significant opportunity for Mongolia, with its vast copper reserves, to strengthen its position as a key player in the global copper value chain Mongolia’s copper production is currently anchored by two major projects—the Erdenet mine and the Oyu Tolgoi mine—both producing and exporting copper concentrate to China. However, the number of projects in the pipeline remains limited, requiring increased investment in exploration. At the same time, Mongolia exports nearly all of its copper production as raw material or copper concentrate, with limited domestic production of value-added products such as copper cathode. To advance new copper exploration, mining and processing projects, the government must provide clear and targeted policy support. This includes setting clear regulations on ownership, taxation regime, environmental standards, transparency and economic benefits. The government should also address the geopolitical risks and opportunities that come with copper production. Additionally, policies should promote the sector's integration with other sectors, while ensuring infrastructure to support the sector’s growth. Moving forward, the development of the copper sector’s policy should involve open discussions with multiple stakeholders, ensuring that projects are implemented with public oversight. The government and relevant regulatory bodies must pay particular attention to projects involving state ownership or requiring budgetary funding. As the copper sector expands, it is important to balance economic benefits with environmental protection.
Topic:
Copper, Energy Transition, Critical Minerals, and Value Addition
Political Geography:
Mongolia and Asia-Pacific

2362. Priorities for the United Nations High-Level Expert Advisory Group on Critical Energy Transition Minerals

Author:
National Resource Governance Institute (NRGI)
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI)
Abstract:
In December 2024, the Natural Resource Governance Institute convened actors from international agencies, mineral-producing governments, civil society, industry, and academia at the Rockefeller Foundation’s Bellagio Center. The gathering identified steps that actors should prioritize to support equitable economic development in low- and middle-income mineral-producing countries. The group considered the recent United Nations Secretary-General’s Panel on Critical Energy Transition Minerals Report Resourcing the Energy Transition: Principles to Guide Critical Energy Transition Minerals Toward Equity and Justice, particularly the report's Actionable Recommendation 1 to “accelerate greater benefit sharing, value addition and economic diversification” through the establishment of “a High-Level Expert Advisory Group to facilitate a multi-stakeholder dialogue on ‘Accelerating Critical Energy Transition Minerals Value Addition Towards Equity.’” This paper provides recommendations developed by convening participants to help inform the work of the High-Level Expert Advisory Group (HLEAG) on benefit sharing, value addition, and economic diversification, and highlights connections between these policy areas and other actionable recommendations. The paper proposes four priority goals on which the HLEAG’s work should focus: A fair share of benefits from mining that are distributed equitably and managed well. Value-addition projects that benefit people. A diversified economy that benefits from—but does not depend on—minerals. Trade, finance, and investment that supports, rather than hinders, sustainable development and diversification of low- and middle-income mineral-producing countries and regions. The paper also includes a gap analysis of the broader sectoral context and stakeholders relevant to HLEAG actions on the four priority goal areas, as well as covering practical recommendations on the HLEAG's role, structure, and composition.
Topic:
United Nations, Economy, Investment, Energy Transition, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:
Global Focus

2363. Refining the Strategy: The Economics of Lithium Value Addition in Ghana

Author:
Thomas Scurfield and David Sefa Adjei
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI)
Abstract:
Ghana’s plan to refine its lithium domestically should be based on economic feasibility, market outlook and a rigorous cost-benefit analysis. A Ghanaian refinery would currently face limited access to feedstock and high costs compared to global competitors, particularly in China. Excess refining capacity in China and uncertainty about the growth of lithium chemical demand outside China further compound these challenges. A refinery built in the next few years is unlikely to generate much benefit for Ghanaians. NRGI modeling suggests it could cost the government at least USD 500 million in lost revenue, as the refinery would need to purchase Ghana’s concentrate at below-market prices just to break even. It is also unlikely to create more than 200 direct jobs once operational, and the stimulus for other sectors is uncertain. In contrast, the opportunity costs as well as environmental and social harms could be considerable. The government would benefit from a mine-and-monitor approach instead: ensuring that the Ewoyaa mine starts as soon as possible while supporting further lithium exploration, monitoring the evolution of global conditions for lithium refining, and taking domestic steps to improve future refining prospects—such as developing a strategy for byproduct use. Transparency and citizen engagement in the decision-making process are essential to building trust, managing expectations, and fostering a strong investment climate for future lithium refining.
Topic:
Economics, Natural Resources, Mining, and Lithium
Political Geography:
Africa and Ghana

2364. The Energy Dilemma: Energy Transition and Regional Collaboration in the Middle East and North Africa

Author:
Laury Haytayan
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI)
Abstract:
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has abundant hydrocarbon reserves as well as vast renewable energy potential, giving it a unique and profitable position in the global energy transition. Governments in the MENA region are strategically leveraging hydrocarbons and renewables to reduce emissions and enhance energy security. Cooperation between MENA countries is crucial to building an integrated energy infrastructure, boosting competitiveness, and facilitating access to global markets. Engaging the private sector will be vital for advancing MENA’s energy transition. Governments must incentivize participation through partnerships, supportive policies and favorable investment conditions. Strategic policies–such as developing integrated energy infrastructure, fostering regional cooperation, investing in cutting-edge research and development, and developing human capacity–are critical for positioning the region as a leader in green energies.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Private Sector, Hydrocarbons, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:
Middle East and North Africa

2365. EU-North Africa Energy Partnerships: Is a Win-Win Formula Possible?

Author:
Laury Haytayan
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI)
Abstract:
The European Union and North Africa have complementary strengths in the energy transition, with the former harnessing technology and the latter, an abundance of resources. Partnerships between the two regions must prioritize local development, job creation and infrastructure in North Africa. It is essential that the European Union moves beyond the extractivist model for equitable energy partnerships. European Union investments should align with North Africa’s priorities, to ensure sustainable progress. Interconnected grids and renewable energy projects can enhance mutual energy security.
Topic:
Development, European Union, Partnerships, Investment, Energy, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:
Europe and North Africa

2366. A Mountain to Climb: Russia’s Influence in the South Caucasus and EU Policy Options

Author:
Sanshiro Hosaka
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Azerbaijan’s recapture of Nagorno-Karabakh have triggered significant geopolitical shifts and resulted in varied manifestations of Russian influence across the South Caucasus, a region that Moscow has traditionally regarded as its “sphere of influence.” This report examines the implications of these events for Russia’s geopolitical position in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. It analyses Russia’s opportunities and constraints across military, political, economic, cultural, and other domains. Russia’s influence is interpreted broadly, encompassing: Bogus Mediation and Military Deployment: Moscow exploits regional conflicts—such as Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia disputes—to position itself as an indispensable mediator while consolidating its military and political foothold. Non-Military Coercive Levers: Russia leverages asymmetrical trade dependencies, energy resources, media influence, cultural ties, diasporas (both Russian and target nations’), and intelligence connections to coerce target governments. Authoritarian Illiberal Alignment: Moscow supports regional autocrats in resisting democratisation (what they refer to as “colour revolutions”), enacting restrictive legislation modelled after that of Russia, such as foreign agent laws, and promoting “traditional values.” In Georgia, Russia’s indirect influence through authoritarian illiberal alignment has intensified under Ivanishvili’s regime. Armenia has begun to tacitly reduce Russia’s influence in sensitive areas such as intelligence, whereas systemic military and economic dependence persists. Azerbaijan has aligned more closely with Moscow in political-military spheres, although this does not necessarily translate into greater Russian leverage over Baku. The continuation of these trends, particularly for the landlocked and resource-poor Armenia, hinges on the outcomes of Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine and the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace negotiations. This report recommends a multifaceted approach to strengthening resilience against Russia’s malicious influence while promoting democratic development in the region: Block Russia’s “Bogus Mediation”: Prevent Russia from exploiting regional conflicts to entrench its geopolitical influence under the guise of mediation and peacekeeping. The deployment of the EU Monitoring Mission in Armenia is a timely and significant step. Counter “Traditional Values” Narratives: Challenge Russia’s promotion of anti-western “traditional values” narratives by showcasing the compatibility of the EU integration with preserving local traditions and cultures. Diversify Regional Trade Routes: Support initiatives such as Armenia’s “Crossroads of Peace” to revive traditional trade routes and reduce dependence on Russia. Provide Shelter and Support for Civil Society: Offer robust backing for civil society activities that build resilience against Russian influence and promote trust-building in the region.
Topic:
Intelligence, Diaspora, European Union, Geopolitics, Annexation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, South Caucasus, and Nagorno-Karabakh

2367. Trump-Brokered Azerbaijan-Armenia Peace Deal: Breakthrough or Another Geopolitical Conundrum?

Author:
Sanshiro Hosaka
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The footage of US President Donald Trump linking the hands of Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev and Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan during their summit at the White House surprised many observers. After more than three decades of conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh—recaptured militarily by Azerbaijan in 2023—the two South Caucasus rivals appeared to be on the path to peace. The White House hailed the event as a “historic peace deal,” dubbing Trump the “President of Peace.”[1] Both leaders flattered Trump and even promised to jointly nominate him for the Nobel Peace Prize. Notably, Russia—long accustomed to exploiting its mediator role in the South Caucasus to cement geopolitical influence—was effectively sidelined.[2] However, whether Trump’s peace deal proves to be a genuine milestone for regional peace and stability will depend on its implementation. Significant uncertainties remain, raising the risk of renewed geopolitical turmoil.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Treaties and Agreements, Geopolitics, Peace, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Armenia, Azerbaijan, South Caucasus, and Nagorno-Karabakh

2368. Ukrainian War Refugees in Estonia: Sociodemographic Portrait and Support Policies

Author:
Mykola Nazarov
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Demographics will be one of the most difficult challenges for post-war Ukraine. Depopulation, combined with emigration, poses significant risks to the country’s socio-economic recovery.[1] In July 2025, Ukraine’s government adopted a decision to merge the Ministry of National Unity with the Ministry of Social Policy.[2] The Ministry will now be responsible for the respective state policies, as well as the protection of the rights of Ukrainians abroad. Estonia has a significant proportion of Ukrainian citizens relative to its population. Understanding the sociodemographic profile of Ukrainian refugees and the level of support from the host country can be useful for adjusting the strategy for their return from abroad.
Topic:
Refugees, Displacement, Russia-Ukraine War, and Temporary Protection Status (TPS)
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

2369. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Drone-Centric Warfare

Author:
Mykhailo Samus
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In December 2024, Major Robert ‘Madyar’ Brovdi, a key figure in Ukraine’s drone warfare development, announced that his strike drone regiment would become a separate uncrewed systems brigade within the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). Since 2022, Ukraine’s drone capabilities have expanded rapidly. Over a million drones have now been deployed. But this is not simply a question of numbers—the AFU has embraced a fully drone-centric military strategy.
Topic:
Weapons, Drones, Armed Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, and Warfare
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

2370. Russia’s War in Ukraine: The Resonance of Ukraine’s Resistance

Author:
Ben Heap
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Ukraine’s messaging resonates because it reflects the audience’s values, beliefs, and historical experiences. Its power lies not only in President Zelenskyy’s skilled communication, social media savvy, and emotional appeals, but in the deeper principles it expresses—justice, sovereignty, and the rule of law. These liberal democratic values define what we are willing to defend.
Topic:
Democracy, Resistance, Narrative, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

2371. Japan Looks Ahead to Trump 2.0

Author:
Bart Gaens
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Today, on the eve of the presidential inauguration in the US, Japan’s current Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba faces a new Trump administration, and, in a more volatile regional and global environment, also more challenges in terms of foreign and security policy.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and United States of America

2372. A New but Ambiguous Momentum in EU Enlargement

Author:
Steven Blockmans
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
EU enlargement usually happens in fits and starts. Currently, there is an important new dynamic in the EU’s enlargement policy. Driven by geopolitical forces, the risk is that it will soon come to a stop.
Topic:
European Union, Geopolitics, Regional Politics, and Enlargement
Political Geography:
Europe

2373. Estonia’s Role in the Changing Architecture of Development Cooperation

Author:
Merili Arjakas, Hille Hanso, Ivan Ulises Klyszcz, Kai Kaarelson, and Solveig Niitra
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Development cooperation is a tool of soft power for states that enables them to promote their values, build relationships with partner states, and reduce global poverty. Since development cooperation is impacted by changes in the norms and power dynamics of international politics, it is essential to analyse Estonia’s use of development cooperation up to now and the directions it may take in the future. Firstly, bilateral development cooperation is becoming more interest- and business-based, with development cooperation by western countries also being increasingly shaped by the goal of promoting their own goods and services. For example, Sweden – one of the European Union’s key donor countries – is increasingly focusing on its exports. At the same time, it is hoped that economic growth in the global south will offer solutions to the global north’s security and welfare challenges, including migration. Another significant trend in the area is the growing influence of non-democratic donor countries that use development cooperation not to empower local populations but to consolidate or expand their spheres of influence. This shift is exacerbated by substantial cuts in development aid budgets in several western countries, including the United States – the largest contributor to aid – which leaves more room for China and other states offering an alternative to western governance models. Estonia has primarily focused its development cooperation on sharing its transition experience with countries such as Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, who have shown interest in the lessons Estonia’s example can offer and whose development directly affects Estonia’s security. These reform efforts include the promotion of democracy, the rule of law, and a favourable business environment, along with a strong emphasis on education-related development cooperation. More recently, Estonia has expanded its efforts to share its expertise in digital governance and digital education, particularly with African countries. A new area of focus is the export of Estonia’s education model, which might help address the high global demand for quality education, though there is still no national consensus on what the priorities in this sector should be and who the suitable actors are. The overarching aim of Estonian development cooperation has been to support target countries and their populations. At the same time, it has also served as a means to advance Estonia’s own security, reputation, and economic interests. Compared to larger donor countries, Estonian development cooperation resources are very limited, yet it has distinct strengths that should be better recognised internally and more widely promoted internationally. Estonia conducts strong bilateral development cooperation with relatively little fragmentation, in which it takes advantage of its strengths: digitalisation, flexibility, personal engagement, low coordination costs, and reform expertise. Thus far, Estonian development cooperation has focused on so-called smart cooperation (reforms, IT, and education) and supporting human development in middle-income countries. This approach should continue, rather than shifting towards infrastructure development in the world’s poorest nations. The reconstruction of Ukraine is an exception, where Estonia is both taking a leading role that sets an example for others and supporting a key security partner.
Topic:
Development, International Cooperation, Poverty, and Soft Power
Political Geography:
Europe and Estonia

2374. Deterrence and Hybrid Warfare: Lessons from Russia’s War in Ukraine for Taiwan and the Nordic-Baltic Region

Author:
Ivan Ulises Klyszcz, Eric Chan, Tony Lawrence, and Jyun-yi Lee
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Deterrence is once more at the centre of discussions on national security. Faced with larger revisionist neighbours driven by aggressive foreign policies, Taiwan and states in the Nordic-Baltic region are drawing lessons from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine to understand how to enhance deterrence in their respective theatres. These lessons, properly executed, drastically raise the costs for any aggressor. By involving both the military and civil society in the defence of the nation, territorially small states can redesign defence in depth to deter an aggressor across the entire spectrum of conflict.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Taiwan, Asia, Nordic Nations, and Baltic States

2375. Kenya’s Foreign Policy Towards Europe and Estonia

Author:
Stephen Kimoita
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Kenya’s foreign policy towards Europe is largely motivated by the need to promote its national interests through trade and investment, as reflected in its 2014 Foreign Policy document (revised 2024). This paper explores Kenya’s relations with Europe and Estonia in areas of security, multilateralism, education, culture, and the diaspora. Despite having already achieved a close partnership, there is room for growth in Europe-Kenya relations. To maximise foreign policy gains, Kenya should fully leverage existing bilateral and multilateral frameworks for cooperation. Meanwhile, Europe needs to customise its exports to Kenya’s needs and pursue well-targeted trade and investment opportunities in areas like manufacturing.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Multilateralism, Investment, Manufacturing, and Trade
Political Geography:
Kenya, Africa, Europe, and Estonia

2376. EU Defence Series: Strengthening the Industry

Author:
Marianne Paire
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
With the March 2022 Strategic Compass, the EU “set out a common strategic vision and concrete objectives for strengthening the EU's security and defence policy by 2030.” [1] The Compass noted the deterioration in the strategic environment as a result of the return of war to Europe, increased competition between powers, the complexity of threats to the continent's security, and the undermining of the principles of the international order. In defence, the member states (MS) recognised the need to invest “more and better in innovative capabilities and technologies, fill strategic gaps, and reduce technological and industrial dependencies.” [2] This brief considers the EU’s progress in the defence industrial domain.
Topic:
Defense Policy, European Union, Defense Industry, and International Order
Political Geography:
Europe

2377. The EU’s Dilemmas in the Black Sea Region: Security and Enlargement

Author:
Koen Claessen
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The Black Sea region has gained renewed strategic importance for the European Union following Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. As an area of considerable economic and geopolitical significance, as well as a focal point for potential future EU enlargement, its stability is now an urgent concern for European policymakers. Russia’s sustained efforts to undermine security in the Black Sea necessitate a coherent EU vision, moving beyond the fragmented scope of earlier initiatives such as the Black Sea Synergy and aspects of the Eastern Partnership.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Geopolitics, Russia-Ukraine War, and Enlargement
Political Geography:
Europe and Black Sea

2378. Why the ‘Reverse Nixon’ Strategy Will Fail: The Illusion of Decoupling

Author:
Sanshiro Hosaka
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The second Trump administration has undertaken a peace deal with Russia. This policy may not simply reflect Donald Trump’s personal affinity for Moscow and deal-making style but is also likely informed by a certain strategic perception of the US-China-Russia triangle.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Donald Trump, Strategic Interests, and Decoupling
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

2379. EU Defence Series: PESCO Must Step Up

Author:
Maxime Cordet
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), established by the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007, was intended to create a framework for the most willing and able Member States (MS) to cooperate on defence within the EU. It was activated by 23 of them in 2017. Today, all MS except Malta participate. This brief examines PESCO’s contribution to the EU’s growing defence ambitions and sets out the challenges ahead.
Topic:
Defense Policy, European Union, and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)
Political Geography:
Europe

2380. Russia’s Self-Serving Aid Policy: Influence, Opacity, and Propaganda

Author:
Ivan Ulises Klyszcz
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Discussions on international development assistance tend to contemplate the role of colonial legacies and the power imbalances between donors and recipients. Russian humanitarian aid and development cooperation stands out in this debate, as Moscow uses aid as part of its aggressive foreign policy based on spheres of influence.
Topic:
Foreign Aid, Russia-Ukraine War, International Development, and Foreign Policy
Political Geography:
Russia

2381. The Staying Power of Ukrainian Lights. Lessons of Wartime Resilience of the Electricity Sector

Author:
Tomas Jermalavicius, Henry Rõigas, Oleksandr Sukhodolia, and Dmitri Teperik
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Ukraine continues its struggle to maintain the supply of electricity across the country, as Russia ramps up its aerial campaign, shifting the focus towards the destruction of power generation facilities. Ukraine’s remarkable energy sector resilience is attributed to multiple factors: redundancies in and adaptiveness of the power system, pre-invasion preparedness measures, and the capacity to restore damaged or destroyed facilities. This report identifies and analyses some key lessons in physical protection, energy policy, cybersecurity, and strategic communication domains when ensuring the functioning of the power generation, transmission, and distribution system in wartime. It examines how Ukraine responded to the kinetic attacks against its power system. The report also outlines the protection and recovery policies and the practical measures implemented by its government, local authorities, and power companies. It then analyses the nature of cyber threats and how Ukraine has countered them during two distinct periods — in 2014-22 and 2022-24. It also shows how Ukraine mounted effective crisis and strategic communication efforts and dealt with the attempts by Russia and its proxies to use disinformation to undermine public self-confidence, trust, and cooperation — all while managing the consequences of the attacks against the power system. The report argues that wartime resilience of power system requires active and sustained contribution from a broad range of stakeholders — domestic and foreign, civil and military, as well as governmental, corporate, and societal — and provides another convincing case of how valuable and important the whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches are under such severe conditions, including in cyber and cognitive warfare domains. It outlines a set of recommendations for defence planners, energy policymakers, electricity producers, transmission and distribution system operators, cybersecurity managers, and strategic communicators that could be applied to enhancing the war preparedness of the power systems of NATO Allies.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, Cybersecurity, Critical Infrastructure, Energy Security, Strategic Communication, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

2382. Independent report on the Future of the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS)

Author:
Toomas Hendrik Ilves and Gabrielius Landsbergis
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Under the auspices of the Estonian presidency of the Council of Baltic Sea States, Toomas Hendrik Ilves and Gabrielius Landsbergis were appointed as the independent Wise Persons to produce a report on the future of the CBSS to look into the need to reform and restructure the Council and better respond to the current challenges of the region. The decision to commission a report was born at the CBSS Porvoo ministerial meeting in June 2024, where the foreign ministers enjoyed an open, like-minded discussion on the hybrid threats in the region. The organisation has been dealing with the issues of democracy building, as well as economic and social challenges, since 1992. Over the last 33 years, however, times have changed significantly, and an urgent need for a different platform has arisen. The Wise Persons, accompanied by the ICDS research fellow, Kai Kaarelson as the penholder, visited all 10 capitals of the CBSS, as well as Brussels, and reported back about their vision. What they discovered was a common plea for a Council that would address the hybrid security threats of the Baltic Sea States on a regular basis. If the Wise Persons’ recommendations are implemented, a new permanent strategic discussion forum on hybrid threats will be established. As an avant-garde in the EU and NATO, and advancing the unity in both organisations, it will enhance the security architecture of the region. This work could be further supported by a strong civil protection pillar. Should the security situation in the world continue to deteriorate, a regional organisation with a stronger military dimension could be considered. The regional cooperation on other issues could proceed under a different framework.
Topic:
NATO, European Union, Hybrid Warfare, Hybrid Threats, Civil Protection, and Critical Infrastructure
Political Geography:
Europe and Baltic Sea

2383. Returning Ukrainians Home: Mission Possible?

Author:
Mykola Nazarov
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In 2025, about 6.9 million Ukrainians remain abroad due to the war, while migration dynamics in Ukraine in the fourth year of the war are still negative. Returning people from abroad is a challenging task for the authorities and a crucial issue for society. To motivate people to repatriate, it is necessary to create both effective institutional mechanisms and a favourable psychological atmosphere. Post-war Ukraine will be confronted with all the negative consequences of depopulation, such as shortages in the labour market and an increasing tax burden on businesses. Regardless of how Ukrainian citizens come back, the state will need to attract significant numbers of labour migrants, which will, in turn, pose new integration challenges. The government’s policy framework to encourage the return of Ukrainians home is a work in progress, with only several strategic documents already developed. A ministry of national unity has been tasked with coordinating the efforts of other government agencies and designing a unified approach to repatriation policy. It is likely that the end of the hot phase of the war will become a trigger for the start of intensive reconstruction in Ukraine and the implementation of the strategy to bring Ukrainians home.
Topic:
Civil Society, Migration, Refugees, Resilience, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

2384. EU Defence Series: Military Mobility A Critical Enabler

Author:
Mihai Sebastian Chihaia
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The first months of 2025 witnessed monumental changes for European security. Donald Trump’s return to the White House has created a huge degree of uncertainty, and it is increasingly likely that Europe will need to prepare for much less American commitment to its security and defence. There are serious questions about how large the impact on the EU and NATO will be, the future of NATO’s Article 5, and what the US reaction will be if a NATO Ally is attacked. In any scenario, one of the most important enablers of Europe’s defence is the ability to move troops and equipment swiftly across the continent and ensure that reinforcements can arrive quickly in case of conflict. This brief maps developments at the EU level to enhance military mobility and highlights what is still needed to overcome challenges and bottlenecks.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Military Affairs, European Union, and Mobility
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

2385. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Prospects for an American Peace

Author:
Laurynas Jonavičius
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
As Russia’s war in Ukraine grinds on, international attention has turned toward the prospect of a negotiated settlement, with a US-backed framework among the most prominent initiatives. Reports suggest this might include a ceasefire, security guarantees for Ukraine, tacit recognition of Russia’s existing territorial control, and a long-term halt to Ukraine’s NATO aspirations. On the surface, these terms may appear pragmatic, offering a potential off-ramp from a costly and protracted conflict. However, below this is a complex dilemma, shaped by structural asymmetry, political mistrust, and fundamentally divergent national priorities.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, NATO, Armed Conflict, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

2386. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Ukraine’s Strategy And Western Military Assistance

Author:
Hennadiy Maksak
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
International partners have provided significant military assistance to Ukraine since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022. The temporary suspension of critical US military assistance in early 2025 raised concerns about Ukraine’s strategy to fend off Russia. While it is difficult to predict how the battlefield will unfold in 2025, strong ties with Western partners will be crucial to continue a war of attrition against an overwhelming enemy.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Armed Conflict, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

2387. EU Defence Series: The White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030

Author:
Marianne Paire
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The Commission presented its White Paper on defence on 19 March at a press conference with the Commissioner for Defence and Space, Andrius Kubilius, and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas. [1] This document is part of a dynamic that has been at work since the outburst of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, namely the greater priority given to defence within the EU.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, European Union, and Readiness
Political Geography:
Europe

2388. More Than a Systemic Rival: China as a Security Challenge for the EU

Author:
Tauno Tõhk
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The EU's ties with China rank just behind its transatlantic ones in significance. With China being a major trading partner, the focus has long been on economic opportunities. In recent years, there has been a shift in how the EU frames its relationship with China. Yet, despite increasing emphasis on systemic rivalry and economic security, security risks remain underrepresented in EU China policy.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

2389. Obscurity By Design: Competing Priorities for America’s China Policy

Author:
Tanner Greer
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Few notes of concord survive contact with Donald Trump. Trump’s election in 2016 upended settled assumptions; one by one he knocked down the pillars of consensus and convention that held up decades of American diplomacy. The strongest and most consequential of these pillars concerned China. For more than forty years, American diplomats and statesmen worked to integrate China into an American-led economic order. By doing so, they hoped to align Beijing’s behavior (and, if lucky, the entire Chinese political regime) with liberal norms. Their hopes proved in vain. China did not moderate or liberalize. The new president, rejecting both the means and ends of engagement, pushed for a less cataleptic strategy. That was five years ago. Those who see Trump as a champion of the new hawkish “bipartisan consensus on China” have been nonplussed by the first moves of his second administration. Trump invited Xi Jinping—but no other foreign leader—to attend his swearing-in. One of his first acts as president was an executive stay of the TikTok ban. Trump publicly browbeat a dozen countries with threats and blandishments in the week that followed—but not the People’s Republic of China. Contrary to expectation, Trump’s inaugural address barely glanced at China. It does not outline, or even hint at, what Trump’s approach to America’s greatest challenger might be. This obscurity is by design. Trump sees no advantage in giving advance notice. Quite the opposite: he clearly believes that the more inscrutable and erratic he seems, the better off the United States will be. This attitude was expressed neatly when the editorial board of the Wall Street Journal asked Trump about the approach he would take toward Taiwan if elected president. Trump replied that the Chinese would not dare attack Taiwan under his watch. After all, “[Xi Jinping] knows that I am f—ing crazy.” Like Richard Nixon before him, Trump is ready to play the lunatic.[1] If this is one reason Trump’s campaign never published or endorsed any detailed policy proposals regarding China, there are others. As one member of Trump’s transition team puts it, “Trump is a pragmatist, not an ideologue. He does not like tying his hands. He prefers to have strong personalities underneath him with conflicting views. He wants them to fight it out. He wants to pick the winner of each battle.” If this risks strategic incoherence, then so be it: “If you want to see what an ideologically unified administration looks like, look back at Bush and Cheney. That is the sort of disaster we want to avoid.”[2] This leadership style should be considered by any analyst who forecasts the new administration’s future. Trump positions himself as the kingmaker among competing centers of power. He encourages a certain level of disagreement in the ranks. This report provides a framework for thinking about these disagreements—especially in regard to the United States’ relationship with China.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

2390. Partners or Rivals? Areas of Convergence and Divergence of Interests in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Alexander Korolev and Thomas J. Shattuck
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China announced that their friendship had “no limits” and “no ‘forbidden’ areas of cooperation” in 2022.[1] That summit between President Vladimir Putin and Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping occurred before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but the two leaders have since doubled down on their cooperation and partnerships. However, the limits of their “no limits” partnership have not necessarily been tested, particularly within the context of the Indo-Pacific region. How close are the two countries’ priorities and interests in the Indo-Pacific? Are the two partners or prospective rivals? Do their interests converge or diverge? The Foreign Policy Research Institute’s report series for the US European Command’s Russia Strategic Initiative has utilized the instruments of statecraft to analyze the interests, influence, and relationships of Moscow and Beijing across the vast Indo-Pacific region. The first report provided a general overview of the strengthening of the bilateral relationship and specific and joint interests in the region. The second report focused specifically on China’s diplomatic, military, and economic interests across the Indo-Pacific region and gave Moscow’s perspectives on these interests. The third report homed in on the two countries’ relationship with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the prospect of the three forming a trilateral axis, concluding that such an arrangement is unlikely to occur. The fourth report analyzed Russia’s use of diplomatic, military, and economic instruments of statecraft to advance its interests in the Indo-Pacific region and examined how China perceived it. This report seeks to bring the elements of the series together and provide a forward-looking approach to Moscow and Beijing’s foreign policy trajectory in the Indo-Pacific region. It will first analyze how there is a systemic convergence of joint interests at the global level. Given the context of the Ukraine war and a general Western anti-China push, the two countries and their interests are quite close at the systemic level. However, at the regional level, some divergences emerge in the security and economic realms. Russia’s historic relationships with Vietnam and India, in particular, could put Moscow and Beijing at odds, and the negative historical memories and economic imbalances of their own relationship have the potential to create new cleavages among their populations and hinder alignment formation. The report will then attempt to investigate the future trajectories of the bilateral relationship and where convergences and divergences may emerge. While specific tensions may erupt at the regional level, such as those related to a greater Russian defense presence in Southeast Asia or a Taiwan conflict, the deep structural interests and convergences will likely prevail.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Rivalry, Strategic Interests, Regional Politics, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Indo-Pacific

2391. Russia-China-North Korea Relations: Obstacles to a Trilateral Axis

Author:
Elizabeth Wishnick
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Russia and China have had diplomatic relations with North Korea and each other for more than 75 years, but Russian and Chinese relations with North Korea could not be more different. North Korea is China’s sole military ally, but—as PRC historian Shen Zhihua has cautioned—since the normalization of ties between Beijing and Seoul, the PRC-North Korea alliance was really just a “scrap of paper.”[1] By contrast, Sino-Russian military ties have been deepening; however, both countries claim they are uninterested in replicating Cold War era alliances and have committed instead to a priority partnership “for the new era.”[2] In June 2024, Russia and North Korea signed a strategic partnership agreement with a mutual defense clause. China’s 1961 treaty with North Korea (renewed most recently in 2021) also contains a mutual defense clause, raising questions about the existence of a trilateral axis. Claims about the existence of such an axis also point to the anti-Western positions these states share and their potential to undertake coordinated action directed against Western interests.[3] Critics of this view argue that there is scant evidence for the existence of such an axis beyond the current (albeit very different) assistance by China and North Korea (plus Iran) for the Russian full-scale war in Ukraine.[4] They also contend that trilateralism will not endure beyond this war.[5] Others argue that such an axis would not be in Chinese interests.[6] What is lacking in this discussion is an understanding of the indicators of a China-Russia-North Korea axis. How do we know if they are choosing to form an axis? Or not? This paper begins by examining the history of Russia-China-North Korea interactions, highlighting Sino-Russian differences in emphasis regarding North Korea prior to the full-scale war in Ukraine. To assess whether a trilateral axis formed after 2022, the paper examines evidence of institutionalized cooperation, coordination of Chinese and North Korean military aid to Russia for Ukraine, and Russian and Chinese expert perspectives. The paper then addresses the obstacles to the formation of a trilateral axis. Although authoritarian states share an overriding interest in regime security and political survival, this does not necessarily mean that we should expect solidarity among similarly disposed regimes or believe that they would inevitably form an anti-Western axis. Considerable research has been done on the reasons why authoritarian states choose to support one another,[7] but it is important to understand what factors might limit their cooperation.[8] This paper examines how the historical experience of trilateralism, reputational concerns, foreign policy considerations, and domestic factors make a new China-Russia-North Korea axis unlikely.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, Regional Politics, and Trilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and North Korea

2392. Russia’s Use of the Instruments of Statecraft in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Alexander Korolev
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
This report analyzes Russia’s use of diplomatic, military, and economic instruments of statecraft to advance its interests in the Indo-Pacific region and examines how China perceives it. As with all reports in this series, this one defines the Indo-Pacific region as the Area of Responsibility (AOR) of the US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). Within the AOR, it examines Russia’s activity in the subregions most significant for Russia’s strategic interests: China, the Southeast Asia and South China Sea (SCS) region, India, and the Korean Peninsula. Russia has utilized instruments of statecraft to maintain a two-level engagement pattern in the region—systemic balancing and regional hedging. At the level of systemic balancing, Russia unequivocally embraces China as an economic, military, and political ally to balance the United States or the West more broadly. However, at the level of regional hedging, Russia diversifies its economic, political, and security bets by engaging with China’s actual or potential adversaries and avoids explicitly taking one side at the obvious expense of another in regional disputes: Moscow hedges its bets between different states, including China, to maximize cooperation opportunities. This two-level engagement pattern does not undermine Russia’s systemic alignment with China, but it reduces Moscow’s dependence on Beijing and makes the regional aspects of China-Russia relations more complex. The intensification of US-China rivalry and the deterioration of China’s relations with India, Vietnam, and other Southeast Asian states are conducive to Russia maintaining this two-level pattern. The worsening US-China relations incentivize Beijing to consolidate its alignment with Russia. Simultaneously, Beijing’s growing capabilities and aggressive pursuit of its territorial claims in the region make regional powers proactively seek closer ties with Moscow, recognizing that unequivocal alignment with the US will irreversibly antagonize China, which is not in their interests. China, while concerned about Russia’s strategic partnerships in the region, needs Moscow for its confrontation with the US and quietly accepts these developments, worrying that if Russia withdraws from its partnerships with countries like India and Vietnam, the US will fill the void, which is more detrimental to Beijing. These criss-crossing geopolitical pressures give Russia an extra hedge in its relations with China without undermining China-Russia strategic alignment. As a result, Russia can develop strategic alignment with China (balancing) while enhancing strategic cooperation with whomever is available (hedging). The new Trump administration’s foreign policy toward the US’s traditional allies has increased geopolitical uncertainty and undermined the Indo-Pacific states’ trust in the US as a regional security guarantor, forcing them to diversify their external relations, which provides Russia with more regional hedging possibilities.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Statecraft, Regional Politics, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

2393. Prometheism: A Polish Covert Action Program

Author:
Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Between World War I and II, Poland conducted a covert action program known as Prometheism to undermine the Soviet Union by supporting the national independence movements of non-Russian peoples within its borders.[1] Poland hoped this program could blunt Russian imperialism, then with a Communist veneer, by redirecting Moscow’s attention internally toward irredentism within its own borders. Prometheism had four dimensions: political, military, intelligence, and cultural/ educational. It supported governments in exile and émigré groups from states that had temporarily gained independence during the Russian Civil War only to lose it once the Bolsheviks reconquered much of the former Russian empire. The program created two secret armies of Ukrainians and Georgians in case the Soviet Union imploded or another world war broke out. To penetrate the veil of secrecy regarding the domestic situation in the Soviet Union, Poland used Promethean contacts to conduct intelligence operations, and the Soviets conducted their own intelligence activities to penetrate the program and assassinate key leaders. Prometheism included a massive covert influence campaign supported by journals, clubs, news outlets, and publishing houses to spread Promethean messages inside the Soviet Union and around the world. Prometheism failed to achieve Poland’s national security objectives, partly due to the massive Soviet police state apparatus and use of terror during Joseph Stalin’s era. However, its activities did help preserve the languages, literatures, and cultures of non-Russian nationalities during this period. When the Kremlin’s willingness to use repression and terror dissipated in the 1980s, what followed vindicated the Promethean vision as the Soviet empire broke apart into its basic ethno-national constituent parts and Poland and other satellites on its periphery regained their sovereignty.
Topic:
Intelligence, National Security, Sovereignty, History, and Soviet Union
Political Geography:
Europe and Poland

2394. The People Are the Key: Irregular Warfare Success Story in the Philippines

Author:
Steve Lewis
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
After decades of conflict and instability, the US government helped the government of the Republic of the Philippines defeat the Abu Sayyaf Group. This was accomplished through a combination of military and development assistance focused on building local legitimacy and protecting the population. The Abu Sayyaf Group was a terrorist and insurgency group active in Southeast Asia. They were aligned with al Qaeda and sought to create a sharia state in the southern Philippines. The challenge of separating the Abu Sayyaf Group from the populations is a hallmark of irregular warfare. In irregular warfare, the human terrain is the key terrain for success. In this conflict, providing legitimate governance and protecting the population was a far more successful strategy than hunting down individual terrorists. This article describes how this was done in the Philippines and provides specific lessons learned from that operation.
Topic:
Development, Governance, Military Aid, Protection, Irregular Warfare, Human Terrain, and Abu Sayyaf Group
Political Geography:
United States of America and West Philippines

2395. Humiliation and Transformation: The Islamic Republic After the 12-Day War

Author:
Saeid Golkar
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The 12-Day War between Iran and Israel in June 2025 exposed critical weaknesses in the Islamic Republic’s military, strategic, and ideological frameworks, marking a turning point for the regime. The Iranian government’s failure to achieve its political and military objectives undermined the regime’s credibility, revealed the limits of its deterrence, and intensified internal debates about its future. This paper examines the war’s causes, conduct, and consequences, analyzing its impact on Iran’s governance, ideology, and regional standing. I argue that the conflict accelerated the regime’s loss of strategic coherence, prompting increased repression, a nationalist pivot, and institutional restructuring, while leaving Iran vulnerable to future crises.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Hezbollah, Armed Conflict, and October 7
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

2396. Atlantic Bastion: The Future of Anti-Submarine Warfare

Author:
Emma Salisbury
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Atlantic Bastion represents the Royal Navy’s future plan for anti-submarine capabilities, defending the North Atlantic against the threat from the Russian submarine fleet. First formally revealed in the United Kingdom’s recent Strategic Defence Review, the program brings in emerging technologies to achieve persistent situational awareness in what is an extremely complex maritime domain. While the Russian threat in the North Atlantic is persistent and tackling it requires innovative thinking, a successful Atlantic Bastion will require the solution of a range of technological challenges and the answering of questions that have not yet been resolved in the brief plans that have emerged.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Maritime, Submarines, and Warfare
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Atlantic Ocean

2397. Balancing the Scales of Trade: Zambia-China Relations in a Dynamic Global Economy

Author:
Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis & Research (ZIPAR)
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis and Research (ZIPAR)
Abstract:
Over the past two and a half decades, Sino-Zambian trade relations have transformed into a multifaceted economic partnership, evolving from foundational political alliances to a dynamic framework of economic collaboration. The diplomatic ties established on October 29, 1964, between Zambia and China provided the initial platform for engagement, exemplified by landmark projects like the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA). However, the turning point in bilateral economic relations occurred following China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, which marked a new era of global economic integration and elevated trade and investment between the two countries In this context, this paper examines the evolving bilateral trade and investment relationship between Zambia and China, highlighting key findings regarding the structural features and composition of trade. China has emerged as Zambia’s top trading partner, with Zambia mainly exporting raw mineral commodities and primary goods while importing Chinese manufactured products. Furthermore, the trade and investment structure reveal a high degree of sectoral concentration, particularly in the mining sector, which has dominated both Chinese investments and imports from Zambia. This has positioned China as a major source of foreign direct and portfolio investment, particularly in the mining sector, leaving a small fraction of their total investments going to other economic sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing and tourism. Global developments such as, Climate change, the global clean energy transition and shifting geopolitical alignments are reshaping the relationship between Zambia-China trade and investment frameworks. These developments challenge traditional trade frameworks, such as the comparative advantage and gravity theory of international trade, to explain the evolving trade dynamics. China’s structural changes in its real estate market and demographic pressures from an aging population, is projected to continue shaping its future economic growth trajectory. Consequently, the second section of this paper assesses the implications of China’s economic performance on Zambia, with particular attention to shifts in Chinese investment strategies. Emerging trends suggest that policy swing toward global clean energy transition agenda will shape the future economies, especially mineral resource dependent countries. Likewise, the analysis identifies risks and opportunities associated with resource-dependent economies like Zambia, given the changing scales of trade arising from China’s gradual shift in trade and investment priorities. Therefore, this paper begins by assessing the economic relationship between Zambia and China, focusing on bilateral trade, investment flows, and auxiliary connections such as construction projects and the role of Chinese investments in Zambia. It then examines recent trends and forecasts for Zambia-China economic relations, balancing short-term cyclical factors with long-term structural developments. Finally, we conclude by outlining policy recommendations to enable Zambia to adapt to the evolving dynamics of its engagement with China, with the aim of promoting favorable balance of trade.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Investment, Trade, and Economic Development
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Asia, and Zambia

2398. Beyond Zambia's 2020 Sovereign Debt Default

Author:
Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis & Research (ZIPAR)
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis and Research (ZIPAR)
Abstract:
This paper provides an analysis of Zambia’s 2020 debt default, its economic aftermath, and the policy and institutional responses that have shaped the country’s recovery. The study situates the default within a broader global and domestic context of rising debt vulnerabilities, fiscal indiscipline, and external shocks, highlighting how years of high borrowing, exchange rate volatility, and weak public financial management culminated in the crisis. Following the default, Zambia faced acute liquidity challenges, rising inflation, and restricted access to international capital markets. In response, the government pursued fiscal consolidation and institutional reforms under the IMF’s Extended Credit Facility (ECF), alongside a debt restructuring process guided by the G20 Common Framework. These measures sought to restore stability, rebuild confidence, and create space for inclusive growth while prioritising social spending and debt transparency. The study analyses the debt restructuring agreements with the Official Creditor Committee and Eurobond holders, noting the inclusion of state-contingent instruments, particularly the Value Recovery Instrument (VRI) embedded in the B-bond. This clause links Zambia’s future debt service obligations to improvements in its Composite Indicator (CI)—a metric combining the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), import coverage of reserves, and global growth trends. If Zambia’s CI exceeds a threshold of 2.69, the upside payment mechanism would be activated, triggering higher coupon rates and accelerated repayments. While this offers creditors a share in Zambia’s potential recovery, it also raises sustainability concerns, as it could increase the country’s debt service burden precisely when fiscal buffers remain fragile. It, however, does not provide any safeguards against adverse shocks or unexpected macroeconomic volatility, leaving the Government exposed to budgetary stress in the event of slower-than-expected growth or external disruptions. The paper, therefore, emphasises that durable debt sustainability depends on more than restructuring; it requires sustained reforms in domestic revenue mobilisation, prudent fiscal management, and institutional capacity building. It also calls for improvements to the Common Framework to enhance timeliness, predictability, and equitable burden-sharing among creditors, thereby reducing delays, improving fairness in repayment obligations, and providing more explicit guidance for future debt restructuring efforts.
Topic:
Debt, Economics, Sovereign Debt, Debt Restructuring, and Sovereign Default
Political Geography:
Africa and Zambia

2399. Climate, Peace and Security in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo

Author:
Katongo Seyuba
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
Local communities in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) face the combined challenge of climate change and violent conflict, which exacerbates vulnerabilities, poverty, displacement and human insecurity. This SIPRI Insights Paper examines how climate change interacts with existing vulnerabilities in North Kivu and South Kivu to heighten human insecurity and conflict risks. The findings highlight that the link between climate change and conflict is shaped by the governance and accessibility of natural resources such as land and water. Changes in the availability and quality of such resources may increase the risks of tensions and intercommunal conflicts, especially in areas where such resources are already contested. Climate-related security risks present both immediate and long-term challenges to an already fragile peacebuilding environment in the region. Consequently, this paper recommends integrating climate and environmental considerations into peacebuilding and stabilization efforts.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Development, and Peace
Political Geography:
Africa and Democratic Republic of the Congo

2400. Addressing Fragility through Integrated Peacebuilding

Author:
Dylan O'Driscoll, Ottilia Anna Maunganidze, and Markus Mayer
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
The world today is facing unrelenting and interrelated environmental, ecological, demographic, socio-economic and political pressures that challenge resources at local, national, regional and global levels. Addressing these crises requires integrated approaches that respond to their compounding nature as well as new funding modalities to spur effective collaboration. This SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security paper explores both the opportunities and processes for reforming aid provision in fragile settings. The paper advocates for an integrated peacebuilding approach that tackles multiple complex issues together in a collaborative, long-term and interlinked manner. It outlines necessary changes at the political, donor and organizational levels to make this approach a reality.
Topic:
Development, Crisis Management, Peacebuilding, and Fragility
Political Geography:
Global Focus