Publication Year: within 1 Year and within 25 Years

2101. Tax Avoidance, Tax Evasion and Trade Misinvoicing: Risks to Senegal’s Mining Sector

Author:: William Davis
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Natural Resource Governance Institute
Abstract:: Tax evasion, trade misinvoicing and multinational companies’ efforts to avoid tax are important risks in the extractive sector, especially in developing countries, including Senegal. Senegal’s extractive governance arrangements are strong in many areas, including in preventing multinational tax avoidance. However, there is cause for concern in two areas: misinvoicing of international trade (imports and exports), and cost inflation by subcontractors in the extractive industries. Quantitative estimates of trade misinvoicing suggest the former is a significant problem for Senegal (including for its mining sector), which could lead to the loss of 1–3 percent of the country’s tax revenues. Authorities in Senegal should address such risks, especially before the country begins large-scale oil and gas production. Unless they do so, revenues from the country’s hydrocarbon resources will be at risk. Measures that Senegal can take include strengthening the tax authorities—especially customs and auditing accounts of extractive industry suppliers.
Topic:: Corruption, Government, Gas, Mining, Minerals, Tax Evasion, and Public Finance
Political Geography:: Africa and Senegal

2102. Scoping Study on Contract Transparency in Mongolia

Author:: Dorjdari Namkhaijantsan and Zoljargal Naranbaatar
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Natural Resource Governance Institute
Abstract:: Mongolia’s mining sector plays a crucial role in the economy, contributing to revenue and jobs, but faces significant challenges around governance, corruption and transparency. This scoping study highlights the importance of contract transparency to ensure fair and accountable management of the sector. This report presents the scoping study on Mongolia’s contract transparency, undertaken by the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI). The study was made possible with the support and funding of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) International Secretariat and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).
Topic:: Corruption, Governance, Mining, Transparency, and Contracts
Political Geography:: Mongolia, Asia, and Asia-Pacific

2103. Scoping Study on Extractive Sector State Owned Enterprise Disclosures in Mongolia

Author:: Dorjdari Namkhaijantsan
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Natural Resource Governance Institute
Abstract:: Mongolia’s state-owned mining enterprises are crucial to the economy but face transparency and governance issues. This scoping study examines the need for improved disclosures and stronger accountability in the sector. This report presents the scoping study on the disclosures of Mongolia’s state-owned mining enterprises, conducted by the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI). The study was supported and funded by the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) International Secretariat and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).
Topic:: Corruption, Governance, Economy, Accountability, Mining, Transparency, Contracts, and State-Owned Enterprises
Political Geography:: Mongolia and Asia

2104. Behind the Schemes: Anticorruption Gaps in Mining Sector Certifications

Author:: Susannah Fitzgerald, Robert Pitman, Matthieu Salomon, and Phesheya Nxumalo
Publication Date:: 11-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Natural Resource Governance Institute
Abstract:: Decisionmakers are increasingly looking to certification schemes to provide information on the sustainability of mining operations, yet these schemes have significant room for improvement regarding how they address corruption in their standards. The report assesses the content of the performance standards used by the Aluminium Stewardship Initiative (ASI), the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM), the Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance (IRMA), The Copper Mark, and Towards Sustainable Mining (TSM). Schemes address some topics, such as revenue and payments and anticorruption procedures, relatively well; this may reflect the extent to which legislation and regulations address these topics. Schemes’ standards less frequently covered other issues, such as beneficial ownership and allegations of corruption. Many schemes, and the mining companies that use them, are missing an opportunity to assess the implementation of corporate-level anticorruption policies in mine-site assessments. The quality of certification schemes’ governance and assurance processes is essential to their effectiveness, yet many fall short of best practice. This undermines their credibility. Key governance challenges include the unbalanced representation of different interests within schemes and the risk of conflicts of interest in the auditing process. Decisionmakers risk becoming overreliant on certification schemes as indicators of responsible business conduct, which may be facilitated in part by industry influence over policymaking processes. Certification schemes are not a replacement for ongoing, robust due diligence into the environmental, social, and governance impacts of mining operations, including corruption, and the design and enforcement of robust regulatory frameworks. In a shifting standards landscape where there are efforts to both consolidate and review existing certification schemes, and a moment where the risk of corruption is heightened by growing demand for transition minerals, governments, mining companies, and certification schemes themselves must do more to address the topic of corruption. To do so effectively, they should focus their attention on solutions that will have the most impact in addressing this issue.
Topic:: Corruption, Environment, Governance, Accountability, Mining, Transparency, and Minerals
Political Geography:: Global Focus

2105. AI Unleashed or Tamed? Decoding Europe’s Bold Leap with the AI Act

Author:: Arianna Jater
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: 2023 saw a boom in generative Artificial Intelligence (AI). However, such a rapid expansion revealed the unpreparedness of governments to handle the unprecedented impact AI systems have on the core values of democratic societies. The European Commission’s AI Act has emerged as the first binding legislation of its kind. It is already clear, however, that simply ratifying the Act will not solve the next challenges. Among those, the immediate one is to ensure that the new AI rulebook is enforced on the national level and that Member States have the resources necessary. Then, the Act, and any future AI legislation, will need to constantly adapt to the ever-changing developments in technology, which now seem to move at a faster pace than ever before. Interdisciplinary approaches and new research disciplines will be needed to analyse the correctness and safety of AI systems, as well as to evaluate their impact on society. Last but not least, the private sector — already employing or only exploring the possibility of introducing AI systems — will need strong support to remain compliant. This brief outlines the state of the EU’s AI Act, discusses concerns within Europe, examines the position taken by the Estonian technology sector and government, and explores the future direction the regulation might take.
Topic:: Science and Technology, European Union, Regulation, Legislation, Artificial Intelligence, Private Sector, and European Commission
Political Geography:: Europe and Estonia

2106. The Newest Allies: Finland and Sweden in NATO

Author:: Tony Lawrence, Tomas Jermalavicius, and Jan Hyllander
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Sweden’s flag was raised at NATO headquarters at midday on 11 March 2024, ceremonially marking one of the most surprising outcomes of Russia’s war in Ukraine. In the face of Russia’s aggression and the risks it presented to their own security, Finland, which joined NATO in April 2023, and Sweden had abandoned decades-long policies of neutrality and non-alignment to become the Alliance’s 31st and 32nd member states. Our report examines the consequences of these changes, largely from the perspective of the defence of the Baltic states. Although Finland had developed armed forces to cope independently with any military aggression, the brutality of Russia’s full-scale attack on Ukraine led to a rapid and substantial shift in public opinion in favour of NATO membership, which was quickly embraced by the leadership. Public opinion shifted rapidly in Sweden too, but the debate there was also heavily influenced by Finland’s inescapable move towards the Alliance, which essentially undercut the logic of Sweden’s continued non-alignment. The two countries submitted their applications to join NATO on the same day in May 2022. As Allies, Finland and Sweden will bring great benefits to the security of the Nordic-Baltic region. Politically, their accession will strengthen NATO, including by creating a large bloc of states in northern Europe whose memberships of security organisations are (mostly) aligned and who demonstrate broadly similar security thinking. At the operational level, their accession will plug a large hole in NATO territory, reducing the isolation and vulnerability of the Baltic states and allowing military commanders many more options for preparing for and dealing with a possible conflict with Russia. At the tactical level, they add modern, capable armed forces to NATO’s inventory. Nonetheless, their accession is not without challenges and risks. The most difficult practical challenge for both countries will likely be developing deployable ground forces to meet the requirements of NATO membership. However, perhaps the more difficult challenges related to accession will be mental and cultural. For Finland, these relate to adjusting an independent, highly self-reliant defence model, held in great regard by both the leadership and population, to meet the needs of collective defence; and to the requirement to bolster Allied cohesion by speaking more openly about threats to the Allies’ common security interests, in particular, Russia. For Sweden, neutrality has been fostered not only as a defining element of its self-identity as a distinctive international actor, but also as a necessary vehicle for the development of a unique democracy and welfare state. These ideas are deep-seated and Sweden’s mental transition to Allied status may be difficult and lengthy. Among the risks is that the addition of two strong Allies will encourage other Allies or their publics to believe that deterrence and defence in the Nordic-Baltic region is complete, needing no further attention. A second is that the low-key approach Finland and Sweden expect to take to their membership, at least in the years immediately following accession, may mean that the benefits of their joining will be only partly realised. It would be a missed opportunity, for example, if Sweden declined to take a leadership role in the Nordic-Baltic region. There is also a risk that Finland and Sweden’s commitment to a strong Nordic regional identity, while useful for promoting practical security and defence cooperation, may be disadvantageous to Baltic security if its pull were to result in the diminished engagement of the two countries in the Baltic region. The tension between the two countries northern and Baltic identities has already been apparent in a discussion concerning their place in NATO’s operational-level command structure. Finally, there is a risk that imprecise talk about ‘strategic depth’ that has sometimes been part of the discussion about the benefits that Finland and Sweden bring to NATO may suggest that other parts of Allied territory are somehow less important. This would be unhelpful to coherent deterrence by denial on the north-east flank. While Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO greatly benefits the security and defence of the Baltic states, it is important that such risks and challenges are recognised, in order that they can be mitigated. We make several recommendations to Finland and Sweden as they continue their integration into the Alliance.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, and Enlargement
Political Geography:: Russia, Finland, Sweden, Nordic Nations, and Baltic States

2107. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Mobilisation in Wartime

Author:: Andriy Stavytskyy
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: As Russia’s war in Ukraine enters its third year, we launch a new series of briefs on various aspects of the conflict. Many of the authors of these briefs are based in Ukraine. The war shows little sign of ending. Ukraine is fighting for its survival and is determined to drive Russia from its territory, while Russia continues to hope that it can mobilise sufficient resources to outlast the west’s support for Ukraine. Although there have been important developments at the tactical level—for example, in the increased use of drones by both sides, in Ukraine’s successes in diminishing Russia’s naval power and in its ability to strike targets inside Russia—there has been little movement on the front lines for many months. Both sides have been forced to adjust, operationally and strategically, to the prospects of a drawn-out conflict. In the first brief of the series, Andriy Stavytskyy examines Ukraine’s need to mobilise, prepare and train half a million men to relieve those who have fought since the start of the full-scale war. This will not only challenge the military but will also have profound economic effects.
Topic:: Armed Forces, Economy, Mobilization, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

2108. Russia’s War in Ukraine: The Evolution of Grand Strategy

Author:: Leonid Polyakov
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: As Russia’s war in Ukraine enters its third year, we are publishing a second series of briefs on various aspects of the conflict. Many of the authors of these briefs are based in Ukraine. The war shows little sign of ending. Ukraine is fighting for its survival and is determined to drive Russia from its territory, while Russia continues to hope that it can mobilise sufficient resources to outlast the west’s support for Ukraine. Although there have been important developments at the tactical level—for example, in the increased use of drones by both sides, in Ukraine’s successes in diminishing Russia’s naval power and in its ability to strike targets inside Russia—there has been little movement on the front lines for many months. Both sides have been forced to adjust, operationally and strategically, to the prospects of a drawn-out conflict. In the second brief of the series, Leonid Polyakov observes that while Ukraine’s strategic objectives have remained the same throughout the war, the ways and means to achieve them have shifted. Surprise and mass have become less relevant, but technology must be mobilised through society-wide efforts if Ukraine is to prevail. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s longer-term security requires the construction of a credible deterrence posture.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Grand Strategy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

2109. An Edifying Tale of Keeping the Lights On: Societal Resilience in an Energy Crisis – the Case of Estonia

Author:: Tomas Jermalavicius, Dmitri Teperik, and Karolin Martinson
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: In 2021–23, Europe experienced a major energy shock due to a number of significant factors in the energy market. As a result of Russia’s strategy to take advantage of Europe’s dependency on its energy supply and coerce the EU into acquiescence to Russia’s geopolitical demands, the most important course-changing trigger has been the Russian war against Ukraine. A raft of urgent policy measures passed at the EU and national levels, quick adaptation of the consumers to the price signals, the availability of LNG from the US, suppressed demand in China, and a mild winter meant that a full-scale disaster was averted. However, the previous crisis being less severe than anticipated does not mean the next one will be less challenging. Estonian society’s resilience to future energy crises may determine not only the country’s internal political dynamics but also its relations with key partners, its reputation in the EU, and even the country’s long-term geopolitical prospects. In order to understand how well-prepared Estonian society is for such future crises, this study identifies and analyses the key public narratives that emerged during the 2021–23 energy crisis and investigates how they reflected on Estonian society’s perceptions and actions. The narrative analysis is complemented by survey data, which indicates how the Estonian public viewed various aspects of the crisis and its resolution, as well as the extent to which public sentiment echoes or runs counter to the identified narratives. The study highlights several key shortcomings in Estonian society’s resilience capabilities. Firstly, the lack of constructive responsiveness to warnings about plausible severe risks (i.e., power cuts) and low scores on preparedness for future energy crises show that the Estonian society does not have a mindset of crisis preparedness. Secondly, society’s lack of confidence in the government’s ability to successfully navigate such crises has the potential to undermine the relationship of trust and cooperation in similar episodes in the future. Another breakdown in resilience in the response to the energy crisis was related to the failure to maintain a just and equal distribution of risk, vulnerability, and cost. As the narrative related to the profits of the energy companies—especially state-owned ones—shows, the sense of unfair distribution of costs and benefits was pervasive and highly antagonising. As the survey showed, a responsible and competent media, effective government, and an impartial expert community were the most trusted sources of information with respect to coping with the energy crisis. These actors will have to play an important role in rebuilding the confidence lost during the energy crisis, shaping the narratives that inspire steadfast action for forging a better future for energy and climate security, and improving Estonia’s resilience.
Topic:: Crisis Management, Resilience, and Energy Security
Political Geography:: Europe and Estonia

2110. The Practice, Promise and Peril of EU Lawfare

Author:: Steven Blockmans
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Power generates law and its interpretation, irrespective of whether it serves the cause of international justice. Despite its many shortcomings, the rules-based international order (RBIO) tries to advance that cause. But as a concept, the RBIO is now being rejected by China, Russia and parts of the so-called “Global South” for what they claim is the Western hegemonism and liberal values that underpin it. The fact that these countries have voluntarily signed up to the international covenants that enshrine the legal doctrines to strengthen the sovereign rights of weaker countries, especially in the context of economic relations, makes it hard to sympathise with the argument that the RBIO should be replaced by another concept, especially one that is advanced by autocracies. The RBIO has been partially shaped by the European Union (EU), a community of law that encodes the aspiration of “good global governance” in its constitutional DNA. With the waning “Brussels effect”—the soft power of EU law in shaping international rules and standards, the EU should consider how to instrumentalise the law to protect and promote its foreign policy interests, first and foremost the protection and promotion of the RBIO. This report unpacks the notion of “lawfare” and conducts a comparative analysis of such practices by the US, China, Russia, Ukraine, Turkey and others to assess the promise and peril of the EU using the power of the law to its strategic advantage.
Topic:: International Law, Sanctions, European Union, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, and United States of America

2111. Russia’s War in Ukraine: War and Society

Author:: Mykola Nazarov
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 tested the functioning of both Ukraine’s state apparatus and its entire society. During the period 2022-24, the relationships between civilian society, the political elite, and the military have reflected two distinct phases of the war. The first phase occurred during 2022 when Ukrainians were engaged an existential struggle for their nation and was marked by a surge in civic consciousness, a high level of self-organisation, and a constructive relationship between the military, elite, and civil society. From early 2023, however, the war became ‘routinised’. This second phase has been characterised by war fatigue, habituation to war as the new normal, and a division in society between those who are included in the war’s infrastructure and those who mainly focus on their own lives. In the third brief of the series, Mykola Nazarov writes that the consequent changes in trust in the political and military leadership have significantly complicated cooperation between these parts of Ukrainian society. He concludes that overcoming cleavages in society is essential in building the resilience necessary to resist an aggressor and that the consolidation of power as a response to the challenge of external aggression is to be expected, but it is not the optimal management solution. Political plurality, freedom of speech and the ability of the opposition to criticise the authorities without pressure and propose better solutions are necessary for effective governance in wartime. Also, civil-military relations need to be distanced from personalities and based on a robust culture and a framework of inter-institutional cooperation. The Ukrainian system of power has become hyper-personalised, which negatively affects its effectiveness.
Topic:: Civil Society, War, Resilience, Securitization, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe and Ukraine

2112. Rapprochement Despite Strategic Divergence: The Significance of the 2024 Japan-China-South Korea Summit

Author:: Elena Atanassova-Cornelis
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: After four and a half years of interruption, Japan, China, and South Korea finally held their trilateral summit. Initiated in 2008 and planned to be held annually, the summit has promoted three-way economic, trade, and cross-sectoral cooperation. Over the years, historical grievances, territorial disputes, and strategic divergencies between the three neighbours often derailed mutual engagement, thus disrupting the trilateral framework. In 2024, the timing was ripe for the leaders to meet again. The 9th summit has succeeded in restoring communication among Japan, China, and the ROK and in softening somewhat the rough edges of the trilateral framework. This approach reflects the shared understanding in Tokyo, Beijing, and Seoul that common challenges and goals, including ageing societies and enhanced connectivity of supply chains, require joint responses. As the other regional players in the wider Indo-Pacific, especially the smaller Southeast Asian nations, navigate an increasingly unpredictable strategic environment driven by major power rivalries, the restoration of dialogue among the three Northeast Asian heavyweights sends a positive signal to the whole region. The summit did not lead to major breakthroughs on sensitive matters. Future cooperation between Japan, China and South Korea will likely remain limited to the economic and non-traditional security domains, not crossing over to the more sensitive geopolitical, territorial, and national security issues. At the same time, taking into consideration the continuing divisions over security issues, the strategic significance of restored high-level dialogue among three highly interdependent economies and key geopolitical players in the Indo-Pacific region should not be underestimated.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Rapprochement, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and Indo-Pacific

2113. China’s and Russia’s Aggressive Foreign Policies: Historical Legacy or Geopolitical Ambitions?

Author:: Ivan Ulises Klyszcz, Che-chuan Lee, and James Sherr
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Beijing and Moscow are among the states across the world pursuing aggressive foreign policies, including towards their neighbours. Beyond mere threats, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine demonstrated that deterrence could fail, with catastrophic consequences. How is Russia’s war against Ukraine perceived in Taiwan and in the wider Indo-Pacific region? What are the long-standing strategic goals of the Kremlin and the CCP, and what role do Ukraine and Taiwan play in them? International security must guard against new challenges such as hybrid warfare but also prevent the foremost international crime: wars of aggression. Aggressive foreign policies are not the same as wars of aggression, but they are closely linked, as they share a hostile outlook to the status quo. Deciphering the drivers of aggressive state behaviour—between historical legacies and geopolitical ambitions—will help us better prepare against new threats from rival states. China’s aggressive foreign policy seeks to alter the cross-Strait status quo and achieve “national reunification”. While these ambitions are persistent, they also reflect an evolving understanding of Taiwan’s circumstances. Indeed, Beijing has demonstrated both continuity and change in its approach to cross-strait relations, simultaneously upholding the ‘One China Principle’ and pursuing a hybrid warfare strategy to undermine Taipei’s authority. The recent juncture was the 2016 election of President Tsai Ing-wen from the Democratic and Progressive Party (DPP). From early on, Beijing accused the DPP of pursuing Taiwan’s formal independence from China, followed by a cold peace to a more aggressive policy from Beijing. Many of these techniques draw from Beijing’s decades of confrontation with Taipei, and cover a range of political positions, public relations efforts, and ‘grey zone’ tactics. Given the centrality of cross-strait relations for international security, understanding these shifts is critical for adapting to broader shifts in the Indo-Pacific region. Russia’s aggressive foreign policy draws from entrenched adversarial perspectives about the West, as well as recent political developments inside the Kremlin. Despite the Soviet collapse and the transition to Capitalism, Moscow’s security elites still conceive international security through the idea of the ‘correlation of forces’, a Soviet-era concept to describe international relations as a sum-total of society. This wide understanding goes beyond the idea of the ‘balance of power’ by incorporating other dimensions of international power, such as the economy, the state of societies and even psychological factors. Moreover, Moscow never abandoned a sense of entitlement towards the countries that fall within what the Kremlin calls its “near abroad” and has only evolved in how it pursues and articulates this entitlement. Russia’s enduring interests also point to Europe, Ukraine, and China, as well as the broader international order. Putting the aggressive foreign policy of China and Russia side-by-side will enrich the analytical outlook of those engaged in studying these two countries’ foreign policies and the broader regions they are in. These are large topics, and the two chapters of this report offer a concise though comprehensive look that will be of interest to policymakers, analysts, and anybody concerned with the security challenges of today.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, and Indo-Pacific

2114. The Washington Summit: NATO-Ukraine

Author:: Henrik Larsen
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: NATO heads of state and government will gather in Washington on 9-11 July to mark the Alliance’s 75th anniversary. While a third year of full-scale war rages in Europe, they will need to guard the tone of their celebrations. But it would be remiss of the Allies not to recognise the importance and success of their organisation. NATO remains the essential transatlantic forum. It has had huge positive impact on security in Europe and elsewhere, built shared understanding and purpose among a growing number of members, and successfully adapted to decades of changing circumstances. There is much to applaud. But there is also work to be done. The summit’s main business will concern Ukraine, defence and deterrence, and burden-sharing. While there are unlikely to be big announcements, the summit should play a significant role in ensuring that the decisions taken in Madrid in 2022, and Vilnius in 2023 are properly implemented. This series of briefs examines some of the key issues for the Washington Summit. In the first brief of the series, Henrik Larsen looks at the additional steps NATO might take in Washington to help Ukraine defeat Russia’s aggression. There is seemingly no common appetite to advance Ukraine’s membership status, but the Alliance is likely to take a new role in coordinating the delivery of lethal aid. It may also agree an initiative to secure more stable longer-term financing of military assistance. Even so, it is hard to see that NATO’s support and solidarity represent a genuine commitment to Ukraine’s future security.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

2115. The Washington Summit: NATO and the Baltic Region

Author:: Toms Rostoks
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: NATO heads of state and government will gather in Washington on 9-11 July to mark the Alliance’s 75th anniversary. While a third year of full-scale war rages in Europe, they will need to guard the tone of their celebrations. But it would be remiss of the Allies not to recognise the importance and success of their organisation. NATO remains the essential transatlantic forum. It has had huge positive impact on security in Europe and elsewhere, built shared understanding and purpose among a growing number of members, and successfully adapted to decades of changing circumstances. There is much to applaud. But there is also work to be done. The summit’s main business will concern Ukraine, defence and deterrence, and burden-sharing. While there are unlikely to be big announcements, the summit should play a significant role in ensuring that the decisions taken in Madrid in 2022, and Vilnius in 2023 are properly implemented. This series of briefs examines some of the key issues for the Washington Summit. In the second brief of the series, Toms Rostoks focuses on NATO’s role in defence and deterrence in the Baltic region. There has been good progress through the steps taken by the Baltic states and by their Allies, but substantial shortcomings remain in the Alliance’s posture on the north-east flank. The Baltic region thus remains a vulnerability for NATO.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Eastern Europe, Baltic Sea, and Baltic States

2116. The Washington Summit: Burden-sharing

Author:: Tony Lawrence
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: NATO heads of state and government will gather in Washington on 9-11 July to mark the Alliance’s 75th anniversary. While a third year of full-scale war rages in Europe, they will need to guard the tone of their celebrations. But it would be remiss of the Allies not to recognise the importance and success of their organisation. NATO remains the essential transatlantic forum. It has had huge positive impact on security in Europe and elsewhere, built shared understanding and purpose among a growing number of members, and successfully adapted to decades of changing circumstances. There is much to applaud. But there is also work to be done. The summit’s main business will concern Ukraine, defence and deterrence, and burden-sharing. While there are unlikely to be big announcements, the summit should play a significant role in ensuring that the decisions taken in Madrid in 2022, and Vilnius in 2023 are properly implemented. This series of briefs examines some of the key issues for the Washington Summit. In the third brief of the series, Tony Lawrence looks at the perennial question of burden-sharing. The Allies will probably not agree to raise the 2% of GDP spending guideline. But in any case, their focus on this metric hides the real picture of how responsibility for security is shared across the Alliance. The European Allies certainly need to step up in all areas, but they should also consider reframing the burden-sharing discussion.
Topic:: NATO, Defense Spending, Russia-Ukraine War, and Burden Sharing
Political Geography:: Europe and United States of America

2117. Finland: Integrating a new Ally

Author:: Iro Särkkä
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: NATO heads of state and government will gather in Washington on 9-11 July to mark the Alliance’s 75th anniversary. While a third year of full-scale war rages in Europe, they will need to guard the tone of their celebrations. But it would be remiss of the Allies not to recognise the importance and success of their organisation. NATO remains the essential transatlantic forum. It has had huge positive impact on security in Europe and elsewhere, built shared understanding and purpose among a growing number of members, and successfully adapted to decades of changing circumstances. There is much to applaud. But there is also work to be done. The summit’s main business will concern Ukraine, defence and deterrence, and burden-sharing. While there are unlikely to be big announcements, the summit should play a significant role in ensuring that the decisions taken in Madrid in 2022, and Vilnius in 2023 are properly implemented. This series of briefs examines some of the key issues for the Washington Summit. One of the more surprising consequences of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine was Finland’s accession to NATO in April 2023 (and Sweden’s in March 2024). In the fourth brief of the series, Iro Särkkä looks at Finland’s integration into the Alliance. Over the past year, Finland has found that its initial resistance to changing any aspect of its fiercely independent defence model is not sustainable in the face of the needs of NATO’s collective defence. As it integrates more closely, it has an opportunity to carve out a role as a champion of Nordic-Baltic interests.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, Deterrence, Russia-Ukraine War, and Burden Sharing
Political Geography:: Europe and Finland

2118. NATO’s Regional Defence Plans

Author:: Nele Loorents
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: NATO heads of state and government will gather in Washington on 9-11 July to mark the Alliance’s 75th anniversary. While a third year of full-scale war rages in Europe, they will need to guard the tone of their celebrations. But it would be remiss of the Allies not to recognise the importance and success of their organisation. NATO remains the essential transatlantic forum. It has had huge positive impact on security in Europe and elsewhere, built shared understanding and purpose among a growing number of members, and successfully adapted to decades of changing circumstances. There is much to applaud. But there is also work to be done. The summit’s main business will concern Ukraine, defence and deterrence, and burden-sharing. While there are unlikely to be big announcements, the summit should play a significant role in ensuring that the decisions taken in Madrid in 2022, and Vilnius in 2023 are properly implemented. This series of briefs examines some of the key issues for the Washington Summit. In the fifth brief of the series, Nele Loorents examines progress in implementing NATO’s regional defence plans. These operational plans, adopted at the Vilnius Summit in 2023, are also intended to be a key driver of NATO’s capability planning process. NATO has revealed little about the implementation of the plans in the past year. But it is clear that serious capability gaps need to be addressed if the Alliance’s deterrence and defence posture on the north-east flank and elsewhere is to be credible.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, Deterrence, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe

2119. Keeping the Americans In

Author:: Rachel Hoff
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: NATO heads of state and government will gather in Washington on 9-11 July to mark the Alliance’s 75th anniversary. While a third year of full-scale war rages in Europe, they will need to guard the tone of their celebrations. But it would be remiss of the Allies not to recognise the importance and success of their organisation. NATO remains the essential transatlantic forum. It has had huge positive impact on security in Europe and elsewhere, built shared understanding and purpose among a growing number of members, and successfully adapted to decades of changing circumstances. There is much to applaud. But there is also work to be done. The summit’s main business will concern Ukraine, defence and deterrence, and burden-sharing. While there are unlikely to be big announcements, the summit should play a significant role in ensuring that the decisions taken in Madrid in 2022, and Vilnius in 2023 are properly implemented. This series of briefs examines some of the key issues for the Washington Summit. The European Allies will closely watch this year’s US elections, concerned that a second Trump Presidency may have devastating consequences for transatlantic relations. In the sixth brief of the series, Rachel Hoff looks at US rhetoric and attitudes towards NATO. The good news is that polling shows that the majority of Americans are favourable towards NATO and support Article 5. But this support drops if the European Allies fail to meet NATO’s defence spending guidelines. Whoever wins the election in November, Europe will need to pull its weight to keep the US engaged.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Deterrence, Transatlantic Relations, Defense Spending, Russia-Ukraine War, and Burden Sharing
Political Geography:: Europe and United States of America

2120. Ukraine’s Practical Steps towards NATO

Author:: Maksym Skrypchenko
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: NATO heads of state and government will gather in Washington on 9-11 July to mark the Alliance’s 75th anniversary. While a third year of full-scale war rages in Europe, they will need to guard the tone of their celebrations. But it would be remiss of the Allies not to recognise the importance and success of their organisation. NATO remains the essential transatlantic forum. It has had huge positive impact on security in Europe and elsewhere, built shared understanding and purpose among a growing number of members, and successfully adapted to decades of changing circumstances. There is much to applaud. But there is also work to be done. The summit’s main business will concern Ukraine, defence and deterrence, and burden-sharing. While there are unlikely to be big announcements, the summit should play a significant role in ensuring that the decisions taken in Madrid in 2022, and Vilnius in 2023 are properly implemented. This series of briefs examines some of the key issues for the Washington Summit. Ukraine recognises that while it is unlikely to be invited to join NATO any time soon, there is much it can do to prepare itself in advance of a formal invitation. In the final brief of the series, Maksym Skrypchenko describes Ukraine’s progress in implementing its defence reform agenda, focusing on its record of adopting NATO standards, and outlines the challenges of doing so in wartime. The continuing support of NATO Allies will be essential to these efforts.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Reform, Alliance, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

2121. Russia’s War in Ukraine Series: War and Industry

Author:: Stanislav Zhelikhovskyi
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Since the first days of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine has needed huge volumes of weapons and ammunition for a war that is inherently asymmetrical, largely relying on the capabilities that it had—Soviet and domestically produced weapons—and on donations from partner countries. However, it has become clear that the approach is inadequate, especially if there are interruptions in supplies from outside, and that the restoration of Ukraine’s own military-industrial complex is vital to ensuring its security and defence capability, independence, and victory. In the fourth brief of the series, Stanislav Zhelikhovskyi discusses how ammunition and equipment supply shortages provided the impetus for the revival of the national defence industry and for the repurposing of civilian industry to meet the wartime needs of the armed forces. He also highlights the importance of harnessing the potential of Ukraine’s vibrant high-tech innovation ecosystem, and attracting foreign investments to expand the country’s defence industrial base and integrate it with the European defence industry.
Topic:: Markets, Weapons, Defense Industry, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

2122. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Russia’s Attempts to Undermine Mobilisation

Author:: Maryna Vorotyntseva
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Russia conducts information and psychological operations to undermine and discredit Ukraine’s mobilisation, damage the morale of Ukrainian citizens, and weaken their willingness to defend their state. In support of these efforts, the Russian military and special services distribute both real and fake photographs and video content on social networks. In addition, the Russian special services use current and former male citizens of Ukraine who have voluntarily switched sides to produce malign content. The recent discussions about and promulgation of new laws related to Ukraine’s mobilisation have offered Russia further opportunities to spread disinformation.
Topic:: Armed Forces, Disinformation, Mobilization, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

2123. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Artificial Intelligence in Defence of Ukraine

Author:: Vitaliy Goncharuk
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Russia’s full-scale war in Ukraine is the first international conflict in which the opposing sides have actively developed and used artificial intelligence (AI) for military purposes. AI solutions for geospatial intelligence, operations with unmanned systems, military training, and cyber warfare have been key to success on the battlefield. This brief explores the state of defence AI in Ukraine and highlights the main lessons that can be learned from the Ukrainian experience.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Artificial Intelligence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe and Ukraine

2124. Japan, NATO, and the Diversification of Security Partnerships

Author:: Elena Atanassova-Cornelis, Takuya Matsuda, Bart Gaens, and Nele Loorents
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The US-led military alliances remain an integral part of the defence and deterrence strategies of countries in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic regions. Whereas the European security architecture is centred on a multilateral alliance, that is, NATO, the Asian security order is rooted in the hub-and-spokes system – the network of US-led bilateral alliances with key partners in Asia, such as Japan. Bringing in experts from Europe and Japan, this report examines the key shifts in the allies’ threat perceptions and strategic thinking on policy responses. It also explores the rise of informal security alignments designed to address both traditional and hybrid challenges and exemplified by the minilateral-type security cooperation pursued by Japan. Finally, the report zooms in on the growing interlinkages between security in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic regions, as evidenced by the deepened security ties between like-minded partners. The report argues that the Russian invasion of Ukraine should be seen as a critical juncture for alliance politics. Military alliances are now increasingly being operationalised to enhance military readiness and effectively generate combat power in case of a contingency. The US-Japan alliance, the report finds, should be perceived as a manifestation of some of the broad and enduring changes in the role of alliance politics in international security, which are observable both in the Western Pacific and Europe. While the US-led alliance remains a key pillar of the security and defence policies of the ‘junior’ allies, notably Japan, the report highlights the allies’ uncertainties about the sustainability of the American security commitments, both in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic region. Assessing Japan’s updated conceptualisation of security in the context of the Ukraine war and the rise of hybrid threats, the report detects a sense of urgency in Tokyo to develop a diverse set of capabilities and expand security partnerships. Australia, India, and the Republic of Korea remain a priority in terms of alignment cooperation. At the same time, the changing nature of security challenges is steadily raising the importance of cooperation with geographically distant partners, as seen in Tokyo’s evolving security partnership with the EU and NATO. Japan’s strategic partnership diplomacy exemplifies a broader trend of strategic diversification. Tokyo has been successful in utilising alignment policy to promote an interconnected network and accomplish issue-based, functional cooperation in various areas. From NATO’s perspective, addressing hybrid challenges requires collaboration with various actors, including geographically distant players. Minilateral and multilateral formats involving a small group of like-minded countries can provide NATO with the opportunity to work closely with Japan and other Indo-Pacific partners on specific issues, such as cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns.
Topic:: Security, NATO, European Union, Resilience, and Hybrid Threats
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Europe, South Korea, and United States of America

2125. New Russian Immigration to the EU: The Case of the Baltic States, Finland, Germany & Poland

Author:: Igor Gretskiy
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The political atmosphere in Russia, as well as the September 2022 mobilisation call for military service, made thousands of Russians leave their home country. Although a vast majority of them have settled in post-Soviet countries, a noticeable portion has also taken up residence in EU countries. A recent couple of years have seen significant expert interest in new Russian immigration, so there is no shortage of publications on the phenomenon. However, many of these analyses suffer from substantial flaws. This report aims to provide a better understanding of new Russian immigration to the EU, as well as this group’s prevailing views on the most sensitive political issues. It concludes that the scale of emigration from Russia following the invasion of Ukraine is often overstated. It seems appropriate to distinguish between two waves of new Russian immigration to the EU. The spring wave was apparently more substantial in number and included a higher proportion of political and civil activists, academics, and IT professionals. In contrast, the autumn wave was less “politicised” as many of those leaving Russia were not necessarily opposed to Putin or his war but were primarily motivated by the fear of conscription and the prospect of being sent to the front line. After moving abroad, interest in Russia-related political activities among new Russian immigrants, even seasoned activists, tends to fade. Few remain engaged in political endeavours, instead focusing more on adapting to new realities. Their interactions with associations of Russian migrants from the previous “post-Crimean wave” are sporadic. When it comes to issues related to the politics of EU countries, new Russian immigrants often have a Russia-centric perspective on most of them. This is especially true regarding visa and travel sanctions against Russia. Immigrants remain almost impervious to the argument that for the governments of countries bordering Russia, the absolute priority is their national security and domestic public order, not the transformation of the Russian political regime at any cost. There were several quite sensitive topics that often provoked mixed feelings and even negative emotions among the respondents. The most challenging and almost taboo subject in Russian immigrant communities was donations to support the Ukrainian army. Along with Russian influencers and opposition politicians, most new Russian immigrants are reluctant to get involved in the Russia-Ukraine war, viewing it as not their concern. They largely attribute Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to the Russian government and state-owned media, seeing the Russian population merely as “victims of propaganda” and absolving “average Russians” of responsibility for the war. New Russian émigrés preserve regular contacts with relatives and friends in their homeland but tend to avoid discussing politically charged topics, particularly those related to Ukraine. It appears that they have virtually no impact on the perception of the Russia-Ukraine war and the political attitudes of those who stayed in Russia, and this divide between the two groups is likely to endure. Many admitted that by staying abroad, they are losing touch with developments in Russia. Moreover, most new Russian immigrants see no future for themselves or their children in Russia and are unlikely to return there. A few might consider a temporary return if a trusted leader came to power, but generally, they prefer to live in a free, democratic Russia without taking risks or acting as change agents. Hence, when developing a strategy regarding new Russian immigrants, it is essential to primarily consider the EU’s own security considerations rather than the imagined capabilities of these immigrants. It is crucial to avoid letting the wish for significant socio-political change in Russia cloud objective analysis. In the foreseeable future, Russia will continue to pose serious security threats to Europe, while, as of now, there is no serious indication that new Russian immigration could emerge as a politically influential force back home anytime soon.
Topic:: Security, Diaspora, Immigration, Sanctions, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Finland, Poland, Lithuania, Germany, Estonia, Latvia, and Baltic States

2126. The Joint Expeditionary Force: Baltic Interests

Author:: Tony Lawrence
Publication Date:: 11-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Elements of the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) will spend much of November 2024 in Latvia, taking part in a series of exercises known as Joint Protector 24.[1] Leaders of the JEF countries—Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the UK will then meet in Tallinn on 16-17 December to discuss further cooperation in the framework.[2] What is the JEF, and what does it offer the Baltic region? Despite its name, the JEF is not a force. It is a flexible framework led by the UK, under which the UK itself and at least one other member (a ‘1 + 1’ format) can pool military capabilities for the purpose of conducting specific operations. The UK also provides the backbone of a permanent operational headquarters for the JEF—the Standing Joint Force Headquarters—although other command and control options are available depending on the scale and nature of a particular operation.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, Security Cooperation, and Joint Expeditionary Force
Political Geography:: United Kingdom, Finland, Norway, Lithuania, Estonia, Denmark, Sweden, Latvia, Netherlands, Iceland, and Baltic States

2127. Russia and China in Central Asia: Potential For Direct Competition

Author:: Maximilian Hess
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: China is now undisputedly the leading economic partner for the Central Asia region, with trade and investment continuing to increase despite Beijing’s economic slowdown. Russia is still the dominant political partner for the region, but its influence and ability to strong-arm Central Asian states has been significantly dented by the impact of Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Central Asian states are now able in tacitly criticize Putin’s actions without significant cost and some have taken advantage of the negative impacts of Russia’s international isolation and sanctions to strike beneficial deals, in particular Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Moscow remains content in its position, knowing that the lack of democracy in the region and dominance of elite networks in business and politics mean that regional states are still willing to turn to Moscow for political support, as witnessed in the Kyrgyz Republic in particular since President Japarov came to power in 2020. Tensions between Beijing and Russia have failed to emerge, at least publicly, although if the current trends continue the potential for direct competition may increase.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, Strategic Competition, and Regional Power
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Central Asia, and Asia

2128. China, Russia, and Power Transition in Central Asia

Author:: Robert E. Hamilton
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: Since the days of Thucydides, scholars have written about—and policymakers have wrestled with—the dangers of power transition, which occurs when a rising power challenges the previously dominant power in a system. In the 5th Century BCE, this dynamic led to decades of war between alliance systems led by Sparta and Athens. Though Sparta eventually defeated Athens in the Peloponnesian War, the real winner was the Persian Empire, which snatched up territory from the exhausted states of the Hellenic system after the war ended. Much scholarship on the so-called Thucydides Trap focuses on the United States and China, asking if the powers two can negotiate the latter’s rise without conflict. But there is another, more acute power transition underway: that between Russia and China in Central Asia. In the last decade, and especially since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, Russia’s power and legitimacy in Central Asia has declined in absolute terms. The erosion of Russian power relative to that of China, however, is more important than the decline in Moscow’s absolute power. Power transitions are notoriously hard to navigate and can strain even amicable relationships, turning erstwhile partners into competitors, or worse. The China-Russia partnership is a relatively recent phenomenon after centuries of mostly competitive relations. This means that Beijing and Moscow do not have a reservoir of goodwill built over decades to draw on as they navigate the erosion of Russian power in a region critically important to both. While this power transition is unlikely to lead to outright war between China and Russia over Central Asia, it is already leading to competition between the two, especially in the economic realm. Competition between Beijing and Moscow is made both more likely and more consequential by several unique features of the region. First, it is geographically contiguous to both. Next, both have high-order political, economic, and security interests at stake there. Finally, the US footprint in the region is light, removing a strong incentive for Chinese-Russian cooperation there. The United States is in many ways the binding agent between China and Russia: Where it is present, their shared resistance to Washington’s influence gives them a focal point for cooperation. Where the United States is absent—as it is in Central Asia, at least with respect to China and Russia—that focal point is removed. This report first analyzes Chinese and Russian influence and interests in Central Asia. It then examines how each pursues its political, military, and economic goals in the region. It concludes with an analysis of how and where their interests are most convergent and divergent and the implications for their overall relationship. If Beijing and Moscow can negotiate their power transition in Central Asia and maintain their overall partnership, this implies that the partnership is deep and durable. But it is Central Asia, more than anywhere else in the world, that will test Chinese-Russian ties.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, Strategic Interests, and Regional Power
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and Central Asia

2129. Turning Point or Dead End? Challenging the Kremlin’s Narrative of Stability in Wartime

Author:: András Tóth-Czifra
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: The Russian government expects 2024 to be a turning point in the country’s war against Ukraine. For this expectation to become reality, the Kremlin is using means of reflexive control: It projects an image of a country that has weathered Western sanctions, ramped up its economic performance, and united a society behind its leader and his goals. This strategy was confirmed by personnel changes executed after Vladimir Putin’s inauguration for a fifth presidential term. The Kremlin’s message masks the costly trade-offs that the Kremlin has created by choosing to pursue a long and costly war with an economic and political system that operates in increasingly tight corners. The past months have seen several destabilizing domestic events in Russia, highlighting the risks of the widespread securitization of public politics, diversion of resources from domestic policy targets to the war, and passiveness of Russian society’s support for the Kremlin’s current policies. The ongoing restructuring of Russia’s domestic economy and economic elite, structural weaknesses created by a military-production based economic growth model, threat of the eventual need for social or military mobilization, and the authorities’ relentless tightening of the limits of public politics and acceptable public behavior represent growing risks for a governance whose sole organizing principle is the ongoing war.
Topic:: Sanctions, Economy, Elites, Russia-Ukraine War, and Regime Durability
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

2130. Russian Strategic Culture and the War in Ukraine

Author:: Denys Yurchenko
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: The Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, shocked the world. Currently, the Russian-Ukrainian war is the biggest European war since the end of World War II.[1] The full-scale invasion was a continuation of unlawful actions in 2014 when Russia seized and temporarily occupied Crimea. Russia’s actions sparked heated debates between realists and liberals while every school of international relations tried to explain why Russia used force to change the internationally recognized borders of its neighbor—Ukraine. In September 2014, Professor John Mearsheimer published the article Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault.[2] His work tried to explain the causes of conflict from an offensive realism point of view. Mearsheimer defined the core idea of offensive realism in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.[3] It is as follows: States—especially great powers—are always thinking about how to survive because there is no supranational institution to protect them. In other words, there is nothing to prevent predatory behavior at the international level. This anarchic system creates conditions for states to seek more power.[4] The best way for a state to survive is to become a hegemon. Although global hegemony is the goal, there are powerful forces mitigating any state from achieving it, so most great powers strive for regional hegemony. Through this lens, Russia’s seizure of Crimea and support for separatists in Eastern Ukraine was part of its attempt at regional hegemony.
Topic:: Armed Conflict, Strategic Culture, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

2131. How Sudan's Wars of Succession Shape the Current Conflict

Author:: Alden Young
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: Since fighting broke out between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the government-sponsored paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in April of 2023, according to the International Rescue Committee at least 25 million people out of a total population of roughly 48.7 million are in need of basic humanitarian aid. The crisis is escalating with fighting spreading to new parts of the country. Perhaps 37 percent of the country is confronting acute food insecurity.[1] Other statistics are also dire. Nine million people have been displaced within Sudan, while 1.7 million have been forced to flee to other countries. Most of the receiving countries such as Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, and South Sudan are already vulnerable. Initially the conflict was most intense in the capital of Khartoum and in the western provinces of Darfur and Kordofan, but in the last few months it has also spread to regions like Gezira state, the traditional breadbasket of the country.[2] The International Rescue Committee reports that, “Sudan is now the country with the largest number of displaced people and the largest child displacement crisis in the world.”[3] Many migrants who are able to head to the eastern regions of Sudan hope to eventually transit to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates and from there potentially to other destinations.[4] Ever since the outbreak of the conflict the international community has rallied to negotiate an end to the fighting. The United States and Saudi Arabia have teamed up to negotiate at least sixteen failed ceasefires, while the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and Egypt have all tried to develop alternative ceasefire and negotiating forums. In January, Mariel Ferragamo and Diana Roy assessed that “negotiation efforts were at a standstill.” [5] Despite the magnitude of the crisis in Sudan a year after fighting broke out, the response from the international community has been paltry. The United Nations has asked for $2.7 billion dollars in order to address the dire humanitarian situation in the country. However, the conflict in Sudan, which is already a regional crisis involving neighbors such as Chad, the Central African Republic, South Sudan, Egypt, Libya, and Ethiopia, has largely been overshadowed by the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza. To date, the United Nations says that it has received only $424.9 million dollars to address the situation in Sudan.[6] Some of the worst violence during the conflict has taken place in the state of West Darfur. In what many Darfurians experience as reminders of the violence that broke out nearly two decades ago. There have been many credible reports of sexual violence, mass expulsions, and ethnic cleansing. Notably, members of the Masalit ethnic group have been repeatedly targeted as supporters of the SAF by the RSF and their allied militias.[7] The war in Darfur is in many ways a microcosm of the wider conflict, but it also points to the conflict’s direct origins in the long insurgency and counterinsurgency in Darfur.
Topic:: History, Armed Conflict, and Rapid Support Forces (RSF)
Political Geography:: Africa and Sudan

2132. Russia’s Space Program After 2024

Author:: Pavel Luzin
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: Since 2022, Russia’s space program has been in a state of turbulence and uncertainty. However, the deterioration started in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea and began the first round of the war against Ukraine. Multiple factors have made the sustainable development of the Russian space program impossible: sanctions, an embargo on advanced industrial equipment, workforce shortages, limited financial resources spread among too many projects, cancellation of space cooperation with Western partners except operations on the International Space Station (ISS), and the economic inefficiency of the Russian space industry. The Russian government and Roscosmos are struggling to increase space expenditures, but monetary inflation, cost-plus inflation within the space industry, and devaluation of the ruble do not allow them to reverse the negative trends. Despite these factors, Russia will keep manned spaceflights and the military space program at any cost. Consequently, Russia has two main priorities by the 2030s. First, it must maintain the presence of Russian astronauts in outer space even after the ISS era and without any significant scientific outcomes. Second, it must switch satellite manufacturing from space-grade electronics to relatively simple and cheap consumer-grade electronics. This preference for quantity over quality of satellites would allow Russia to boost its manufacturing of short-lived satellites, which will be replaced quickly and provide the armed forces with communication and intelligence capabilities. In the area of satellite navigation, Russia will struggle to maintain the current architecture of GRusslobal’naya Navigatsionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema, or Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS), and the development of new architecture with less satellites is also questionable. The optimistic scenario is that Russia’s satellite navigation system with new architecture will cover only the Russian and neighboring territories. However, the Russian armed forces use the consumer-grade GPS and BeiDou trackers, so the deteriorating GLONASS is not a crucial problem for them.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Space, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

2133. Advise, Assist, Enable: A Critical Analysis of the US Army's Security Force Assistance Mission During the War on Terror

Author:: John A. Nagl and Marshall Cooperman
Publication Date:: 11-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: The U.S. Army struggled to build capable host-nation security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan because it did not give those security force assistance (SFA) missions the priority and support they deserved. Both the selection and training of U.S. advisors were highly flawed. The Army also struggled to ensure the selection of high-quality personnel into the host-nation forces. Much of the SFA effort was conducted in an ad hoc manner, without sufficient funding or strategic prioritization. Today, the Army has corrected many of the issues that plagued its SFA formations during the War on Terror by creating a permanent Security Force Assistance Command and six Security Force Assistance Brigades. It is essential for the Army to maintain and support these formations to ensure that the bitter lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan are not forgotten.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Iraq, North America, and United States of America

2134. Countering a "Great Jihad" in Central Asia

Author:: Bruce Pannier
Publication Date:: 11-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: Concerns about Islamic extremism are rising in Central Asia. None of the governments in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, or Uzbekistan are commenting publicly about any specific threats. Still, there is a lot of activity aimed at controlling how Islam is practiced and what people say about the religion on social networks in these majority-Muslim countries. Law enforcement agencies are carrying out security operations aimed at rooting out suspected Islamic extremists in their countries, almost certainly spurred by citizens of the Central Asian states’ involvement in terrorist plots and acts outside the region. All this has happened before in Central Asia, but previous extremism or terrorism problems affected only an individual Central Asian country. Now, all five Central Asian governments are taking actions, showing that these fresh concerns are spread across the region. Though these worries are not directly connected to the Taliban, the recent commotion in Central Asia started after the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan in mid-August 2021.
Topic:: Islam, Counter-terrorism, and Countering Violent Extremism
Political Geography:: Central Asia

2135. A "Frozen Conflict" Boils Over: Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023 and Future Implications

Author:: Walter Landgraf and Nareg Seferian
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: This report has two objectives: first, to present an account of the conflict with an emphasis on analytically useful categories and context up to the present, and second, to discuss local, regional, and global consequences of the latest developments of the dispute, including policy implications and recommendations.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Sovereignty, Territorial Disputes, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh

2136. Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in the “Special Military Operation” in Ukraine

Author:: Igor Delanoë
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: Russia’s Black Sea Fleet’s supremacy on the Black Sea naval theater was contested in the early stage of the conflict. Ukraine’s anti-surface and drone capacities have challenged the Black Sea Fleet’s supremacy at sea, creating a form of sea denial. The Black Sea Fleet adapted its posture to a conflict of attrition. The scope of the missions fulfilled by the Black Sea Fleet has increased over time to include more protection and detection tasks, while active defense remains the general posture at sea. The post-conflict Black Sea Fleet should be more littoralized than before the “special operation.” Lessons already learned from conflict, constraints created by the sanctions, and financial priorities should accelerate the littoralization and the kalibrization of the Black Sea Fleet.
Topic:: Armed Forces, Navy, Russia-Ukraine War, and Black Sea Fleet
Political Geography:: Russia and Black Sea

2137. The Realignment of the Middle East

Author:: Lior Sternfeld
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: In the Middle East, reality can change in the blink of an eye. Misconceptions and misrepresentations that dominate the public discourse have it that the region has been embroiled in war since time immemorial. Still, even its most recognizable conflict—the Israel-Palestine dispute—has been going on for only a century. This report will not focus on the history of that conflict but instead will try to analyze the realignment of the key players in the region and beyond and point out several pathways to build on in securing peace. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been the sole global superpower. The change in world politics and the demise of the Soviet Union did not end the perception of alliances as zero-sum games. The War on Terror, the debacle of Iraq and Afghanistan, the rise of movements such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, the Arab Spring, and the collapse of old state structures, somehow fortified this approach over a more nuanced and pragmatic approach. Since the early 1990s, China entered as a secondary force and slowly gained a different status. This report examines the changes the Chinese doctrine might bring to the geopolitics in the region. Furthermore, it will examine the role China has played in the reshaping of the Middle East as a multipolar region, the transformation in the American role, and identify areas where the United States can take advantage of the new multipolarity in the region in light of Chinese activity.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, History, and Realignment
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, and United States of America

2138. Russian Women in the Face of War Against Ukraine

Author:: Egle Murauskaite
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: Consider the following pieces of a puzzle. Russia’s war against Ukraine has revealed stories about the heroic resistance efforts of Ukrainian women[1]: from a grandmother launching a pickle jar against a drone[2] to volunteers with territorial defense units.[3] However, comparable stories have been entirely lacking on Russia’s side: How come? Here is another piece: the stories of rape and abuse in Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories have shaken the world, with male Russian soldiers featured as systematic perpetrators of war crimes.[4] Were there any female soldiers or pro-Russian civilians involved? The historical background of multiple conflicts across continents does suggest an active women’s role as perpetrators of war crimes (including rape) and terrorism, not only victims.[5] Perhaps it is only a matter of time until stories of Russian women involved in these crimes start to emerge. How do these pieces fit together? I delve into these narratives in an information environment that is still extremely limited (particularly in terms of Russian-language sources)
Topic:: Women, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

2139. Paralysis versus Obedience: China’s Local Policymakers’ Strategic Adaptation To Political centralization

Author:: Jessica C. Teets
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: Under the concept of “top-level design,” President Xi Jinping has repurposed institutions to eliminate problems caused by local discretion such as corruption and policy implementation gaps. Increasing centralization of policy and strict penalties for lack of compliance is resulting in local officials no longer experimenting with policy to solve local governance problems and instead focusing more on documenting procedures. These strategic adaptations lead to erratic policy swings between paralysis and overcompliance at the local level, and an increasingly rigid and unresponsive policy process. Although these institutional changes are resulting in less corruption and more standardized governance (rule by law), they also reduce the local feedback and policy autonomy that constructed a more durable system than normally seen in authoritarian regimes (so-called “resilient authoritarianism”).
Topic:: Corruption, Xi Jinping, Centralization, and Strategic Adaptation
Political Geography:: China and Asia

2140. Russia and China in Central Asia

Author:: Bruce Pannier
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: The two countries that have the greatest influence in Central Asia are Russia and China. Moscow and Beijing have common interests in Central Asia, foremost are security interests connected to sharing long borders with a mainly Muslim region that itself borders Afghanistan. However, both these giant neighbors view Central Asia differently. Russia and China each have their own purposes in Central Asia, some of which do not affect the other, but some that at the least make the other country uncomfortable. Since Russia launched its full-scale war in Ukraine, these Sino-Russian rifts are becoming more pronounced. Russia and China want the current status quo in Central Asia, and that is the reason both countries have been concerned by the three revolutions in Kyrgyzstan since 2005. Moscow and Beijing know the top people in the Central Asian governments and have established security and business ties in all five countries. Neither China nor Russia want their relationships with individual Central Asian states to change, and neither wants to see the arrival of strong outside competitors for influence in Central Asia as was the case when the United States and its allies suddenly increased their presence in Central Asia for the campaign in Afghanistan in the years after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Strategic Interests, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Central Asia, Eurasia, and Asia

2141. Kyrgyzstan: Central Asia's Island of Democracy Sinks into Authoritarianism

Author:: Bruce Pannier
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: In the early 1990s, Kyrgyzstan was often referred to as an “island of democracy” in Central Asia. The “island’s” shores have receded over the years, but relative to its neighbors, Kyrgyzstan remained the most democratic country. Three distinguishing features of Kyrgyzstan include an active political opposition, a vibrant civil society, and independent media outlets. The current government is eliminating all three of those distinctions. Political opposition leaders have been jailed, civil society has been intimidated and prevented from holding public meetings, and independent media have been taken to court and their websites blocked. Worse might be coming soon. Domestic and international criticisms and appeals that swayed previous Kyrgyz governments are having no effect in persuading those currently in power to turn away from their present course. Kyrgyzstan is set to join the club of authoritarian governments in the region. The country is almost there already.
Topic:: Authoritarianism, Domestic Politics, and Democratic Backsliding
Political Geography:: Central Asia and Kyrgyzstan

2142. Critical Minerals and Great Power Competition: An Overview

Author:: Jiayi Zhou and André Månberger
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:: With global politics increasingly fractured, states are rushing to secure critical and strategic mineral supply chains. Each state conceptualizes mineral security differently, driven by a mix of imperatives that range from national development and industrial policy to technological and military dominance. Great power competition pervades all of these issue areas, and that competition may also pose risks at the global level: risks for the pace of green transition, risks of geoeconomic escalation and risks of conflict. This report provides an insightful overview of the mineral security policies of four key powers: China, the European Union, Russia and the United States. It describes the distinct ways in which they conceptualize mineral security, comparing their priority lists of critical and strategic minerals. It considers the wider imperatives that motivate their policies and assesses the implications for developing countries. The report concludes by reflecting on the need to mitigate the worst of the resultant risks through expanded dialogue with a wider set of stakeholders. The goal is a form of mineral security that can serve more broad-based, global developmental interests.
Topic:: European Union, Strategic Competition, Green Transition, Critical Minerals, and Great Powers
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

2143. Cyber Risk Reduction in China, Russia, the United States and the European Union

Author:: Lora Saalman, Fei Su, and Larisa Saveleva Dovgal
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:: This report provides an overview of cyber risk reduction terminology and regulatory measures within China, Russia, the United States and the European Union. It finds, among other things, that China and Russia excel at clear visuals and steps, yet they also tend to lack linguistic clarity. China, the USA and the EU possess interagency and public–private sector coordination, while facing jurisdictional overlap. All four actors are securing their supply chains, yet China and Russia face challenges with burdensome penalties for non-compliance, and the USA and the EU confront obstacles to enforcement at the state and member-state levels. This report is intended to provide a baseline for engagement among China, Russia, the USA and the EU on their respective approaches to cyber risk reduction.
Topic:: European Union, Cybersecurity, Public-Private Partnership, and Risk Assessment
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

2144. Navigating Security Dilemmas in Indo-Pacific Waters: Undersea Capabilities and Armament Dynamics

Author:: Tytti Erästö, Fei Su, and Wilfred Wan
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:: This paper examines the drivers and implications of naval build-ups in the Indo-Pacific, considering key actors’ security objectives and threat perceptions, as well as the interplay of regional dynamics and strategic relations between nuclear-armed states. The focus is on undersea armament involving submarines and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities, which constitute a significant focus of military investments. The paper considers the related horizontal and vertical escalation risks, meaning a potential increase in the scope and scale of conflict. Particular attention is paid to nuclear-conventional entanglement related to the counterforce potential of ASW capabilities. In addition to seeking to raise awareness of these dynamics, the paper provides recommendations aimed at mitigating the risks related to the increased undersea activities in the Indo-Pacific.
Topic:: National Security, Strategic Stability, Submarines, and Threat Perception
Political Geography:: Indo-Pacific

2145. Leveraging Livelihood Diversification for Peacebuilding in Climate- and Conflict-affected Contexts

Author:: Farah Hegazi and Katongo Seyuba
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:: Livelihoods are central to the relationship between climate change and conflict. Despite the recognition that climate change related livelihood deterioration is associated with conflict, livelihood interventions are not prominent as a peacebuilding tool and most livelihood diversification is done autonomously. Supporting women’s livelihoods is also overlooked as a peacebuilding tool, with the focus primarily being on addressing the consequences of sexual violence after conflict. This SIPRI Policy Brief offers insights into how building and diversifying livelihoods can contribute to peacebuilding in climate- and conflict-affected contexts. The policy brief recommends: (a) supporting viable and sustainable livelihood diversification interventions to effectively address livelihood insecurity and associated conflict risks, and (b) increasing support for women’s livelihoods to promote women’s empowerment as a peacebuilding tool.
Topic:: Climate Change, Women, Conflict, Economic Development, Livelihoods, and Peacebuilding
Political Geography:: Global Focus

2146. From Conflict to Collaboration: Co-funding Environmental Peacebuilding in South-central Somalia

Author:: Kheira Tarif
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:: Somalia is experiencing significant impacts of climate change. Its climate-related vulnerabilities are exacerbated by the enduring effects of more than three decades of violent conflict and fragmented governance. As the effects of climate change become more pronounced, their interaction with social, economic and political realities threatens to create challenges that are complex and difficult to address. There is a need for policies and programmes that tackle climate change and conflict in tandem, but gaps persist in knowledge and evidence to inform actions under such policies and programmes. This SIPRI Policy Brief explores how the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Somalia uses a co-funding mechanism for facilitating collaboration between groups in conflict on addressing shared local priorities. In south-central Somalia, IOM has applied the co-funding mechanism to projects that aim to address local climate-related vulnerabilities, build relationships between communities in conflict and strengthen the role of district councils. This policy brief finds that elements of this approach to project design can support environmental peacebuilding in contexts exposed to climate change and affected by conflict and offers recommendations for organizations and other donors with relevant mandates.
Topic:: Environment, Conflict, Peacebuilding, and International Organization for Migration (IOM)
Political Geography:: Africa and Somalia

2147. The Image and the Perception: Gender-responsive Strategic Communications in EU Civilian CSDP Missions

Author:: Gretchen Baldwin
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:: The European Union (EU) is doubling down on its efforts to strengthen the civilian dimensions of its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and increase the effectiveness of its civilian crisis management missions. Two thematic areas that receive stronger attention in the newly updated Civilian CSDP Compact from May 2023 are gender equality and strategic communications. Yet in civilian CSDP missions, overlap between these areas—which come together as ‘gender-responsive strategic communications’—remains limited. There has also only been limited research on the overlap between gender expertise and communications in peace operations and crisis management missions. This SIPRI Policy Brief explores the opportunities and challenges of gender-responsive strategic communications in the context of EU civilian CSDP missions. It provides six recommendations which align with ongoing processes towards improving capability development, gender parity, counter-foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), and training. The recommendations address formal guidance, accountability mechanisms, contextual awareness in missions, men in gender work, women’s participation and gendered FIMI threats.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, European Union, Women, and Strategic Communication
Political Geography:: Europe

2148. Reducing the Role of Nuclear Weapons in Military Alliances

Author:: Tytti Erästö
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:: This paper examines the role of nuclear weapons in military alliances, focusing on the perspectives of the so-called umbrella states—that is, allied states that do not have their own nuclear weapons but are part of the ‘extended nuclear deterrence arrangements’ of a nuclear-armed patron. After analysing allied security thinking and highlighting the underlying assumptions about nuclear deterrence, the paper subjects some of those assumptions to critical scrutiny. Taking into account regional military balances and escalation risks related to nuclear deterrence, it challenges the perceived security benefits of forward-deployed non-strategic weapons, continued support for allied nuclear doctrines based on readiness for the first use of nuclear weapons, and the assumed inevitability of nuclear second strike that underlies the practices of nuclear assurance. The goal is to open discussion on the development of a more measured approach to deterrence that would allow for minimizing the role of nuclear weapons in military alliances.
Topic:: Security, Nuclear Weapons, Alliance, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Global Focus

2149. Climate Change Adaptation in Areas Beyond Government Control: Opportunities and Limitations

Author:: Karen Meijer and Ann-Sophie Böhle
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:: Areas beyond government control constitute a highly diverse subgroup of fragile and conflict-affected settings. As a result of conflict and weak governance, many of these areas have become more vulnerable to climate change. Their communities have been left with limited capacity to respond to changing climatic conditions and extreme weather events. These settings pose unique challenges for external engagement and have, therefore, long been overlooked in adaptation efforts. This SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security explores both opportunities for and limitations of climate change adaptation in areas beyond government control. By highlighting the diversity of these settings and the range of possible adaptation measures, the paper proposes a framework with four guiding questions designed to help identify context-appropriate adaptation options.
Topic:: Climate Change, Development, Governance, and Adaptation
Political Geography:: Global Focus

2150. Unveiling Challenges and Gaps in Climate Finance in Conflict Areas

Author:: Karen Meijer and Abeer S. Ahmad
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:: This SIPRI Insights addresses challenges related to climate finance distribution in conflict-affected countries, where vulnerabilities to climate change are significantly exacerbated. Conflict reduces the ability of populations to adapt, making effective climate finance even more critical. Despite increasing global climate finance commitments, conflict-affected countries consistently receive disproportionately low amounts of per capita climate adaptation official development assistance (ODA) compared to non-conflict-affected countries with similar income levels and climate vulnerabilities. The paper’s analysis, covering both bilateral and multilateral ODA flows between 2015 and 2021, highlights significant disparities in per capita climate adaptation funding. For example, small island developing states receive over US$100 per capita annually, while many conflict-affected countries receive less than $1. Methodological challenges such as those related to ‘regional’ or ‘unspecified’ funds and limited data transparency prevent accurate assessments. The paper highlights the need for improved transparency, equitable redistribution of funds and stronger donor–recipient coordination to ensure climate finance reaches the most vulnerable populations, especially in conflict settings.
Topic:: Climate Change, Development, Climate Finance, Conflict, and Transparency
Political Geography:: Global Focus

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS