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2841. Status Recognition and Great Power Conflicts Today: The US, China, and Russia

Author:
Thomas J. Christensen and T.V. Paul
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:
October 17, 2025 — The violent conflict in Ukraine triggered by Russia, China’s drift away from a “peaceful rise” strategy, and America’s near abandonment of liberal leadership have created deep uncertainty. T. V. Paul's new book project asks: Under what conditions do great powers abandon or significantly alter relatively peaceful grand strategies for reasons of status? It examines how strategic interaction between great powers—and the pivotal role of domestic coalitions—shapes expectations of status reciprocity and recognition leading to great power conflicts. The author of multiple books, T. V. Paul is the Distinguished James McGill Professor in the Department of Political Science at McGill University. Moderator Thomas J. Christensen is James T. Shotwell Professor of International Relations at the School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University and the Director of its China and the World Program.
Topic:
Grand Strategy, International Order, Russia-Ukraine War, and Great Powers
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

2842. Bilahari Kausikan: The Cold War, Russia-China Relations, and the Making (and Unmaking?) of SE Asia

Author:
Andrew J. Nathan, Alexander Cooley, and Bilahari Kausikan
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:
April 8, 2025 — For the 2025 Borton-Mosely Distinguished Lecture at Columbia University, veteran Singaporean diplomat Bilahari Kausikan shares his insights into how the Cold War and the rivalry between China and the U.S.S.R. gave rise to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the federation of states that was founded in 1967 to promote regional stability—and how ASEAN, in turn, helped shape the idea of Southeast Asia as a cohesive region with its own identity. Moderators: Andrew J. Nathan, Class of 1919 Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Science, Columbia University; Alexander Cooley, Vice Provost for Research, Libraries, and Academic Centers, Barnard College; Claire Tow Professor of Political Science, Barnard College; Harriman Institute, Columbia University.
Topic:
Cold War, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, ASEAN, Rivalry, and Regional Stability
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, and Southeast Asia

2843. Increasing Taiwan’s Resilience: Policy Options and Debates

Author:
Weatherhead East Asian Institute
Publication Date:
11-2025
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:
November 5 , 2025 — Experts from the Research Institute for Democracy, Society, and Emerging Technology (DSET) deliver presentations on Taiwan’s economic security, national security, democratic governance, and energy resilience; various dimensions of Taiwan’s vulnerabilities in the face of PRC pressure; and policy options to increase societal resilience, as seen by a think tank. The Research Institute for Democracy, Society, and Emerging Technologies (DSET), a think tank established in October 2023 under the National Science and Technology Council, addresses techno-geopolitical challenges facing Taiwan. Its mission is to advise the Taiwanese government and public through report publications and international forums while developing a Track 1.5 think tank diplomacy to facilitate international cooperation with Taiwan. DSET has four research programs: Economic Security, Democratic Governance, National Security, and Energy Security & Climate Resilience.
Topic:
National Security, Governance, Democracy, Resilience, Economic Security, and Energy
Political Geography:
Taiwan and Asia

2844. Bureaucracies at War: China’s Decision-Making in Comparative Perspective

Author:
Tyler Jost and Andrew J. Nathan
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:
October 1, 2025 — When are China’s leaders able to extract quality information from their diplomatic, defense and intelligence bureaucracies during international crises? Tyler Jost studies how China’s leaders deal with the trade-off between institutional designs that offer political security and those that yield quality information. As an illustration, he uses the historical cases of the 1969 Sino-Soviet border conflict and the 1999 India-Pakistan Kargil War. Speaker: Tyler Jost, Watson Institute Assistant Professor of China Studies, Assistant Professor of Political Science, International and Public Affairs, Brown University Moderator: Andrew J. Nathan, Class of 1919 Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Science, Columbia University
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Intelligence, Armed Conflict, and Political Security
Political Geography:
China and Asia

2845. The Question of Postcolonial Fascism in Cold War Korea

Author:
Sungik Yang
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:
October 9, 2025 — Professor Sungik Yang examines how fascist ideologies persisted beyond WWII in postcolonial contexts. Focusing on Korea after 1945, he traces how nationalist discouses emphasizing ethnic purity and rejecting Western liberalism paralleled European and Japanese fascism. These ideas underpinned authoritarian regimes well into the 1980s, offering new insights into fascism as a global and enduring phenomenon. Speaker: Sungik Yang, Assistant Professor, School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies (SHPRS), Arizona State University Moderator: Hetty Ye-Jae Lee, Ph.D. Candidate, Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures (EALAC), Columbia University
Topic:
Nationalism, Post Colonialism, Fascism, and Liberalism
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

2846. Governance Compared: Autocracy and Democracy in Latin America

Author:
Sarah Yerkes, Natalie Triche, and Amr Hamzawy
Publication Date:
11-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The past several years have witnessed a dramatic democratic decline around the world. In both established democracies and hybrid regimes, anti-democratic and populist forces have challenged the notion that democracies are better for their citizens.1 Leaving aside values-driven arguments, authoritarian and populist leaders have touted the narrative that they are better at delivering to their citizens’ needs than democratic leaders. They then use such arguments to justify rolling back the rule of law and eroding checks and balances where they exist, while preventing either from taking root where they are not already present.2 While this narrative may hold weight with some citizens, its legitimacy has not been tested.3 That is, we do not know who is better at governing—autocrats or democrats. Repression and chilling environments for free expression, often found in autocracies, contribute to a lack of critical appraisals of governance deliverables. Thus, comparisons with democratic societies that permit vocal disdain for governance performance can be difficult.4 Additionally, lack of free access to information and limited pluralist deliberations about government policy enable autocracies to mystify their governance performance and hide their failings, thus manipulating the constrained political discussions that do occur among citizens.5 To critically evaluate claims that autocratic states are better at governance than democratic states, especially in the Global South, we designed a project comparing governance outputs in four regions of the world: the Middle East and North Africa; eastern, western, and southern Africa; Southeast Asia; and Latin America. To examine the diversity of governance models and the variance in performance across these regions, we focus on four country case studies from each region. The cases represent both democratic and authoritarian governments, and vary in terms of governance performance—ranging from high to low—in economic, social, and political outputs. In this article, we evaluate the Latin American cases—Bolivia, Colombia, Cuba, and Uruguay—to test whether autocracies or democracies in the region are better at delivering on governance for their citizens. Ultimately, we argue that democracies in Latin America outperform autocracies on governance metrics. To assess how well countries in the Global South are delivering on governance outcomes, we defined four categories of governance indicators. The first includes socioeconomic indicators such as employment, poverty, income disparities, and access to services such as education, healthcare, and subsidies. An important aspect of this type of indicator is exclusion, meaning how access to services is distributed by gender, political group, social group, urban-rural location, and socioeconomic position. A second category describes another important aspect of governance: access to information. This includes variables such as transparency, academic freedom, arrests for free speech and political content, social media use by the public and elites, government internet filtering capacity and practice, government capacity to regulate online content, and government involvement in the dissemination of false information. A third category covers traditional political indicators including rule of law, separation of powers, checks and balances, and control of corruption. This also includes political equality measures like educational equality, health equality, and power distribution by gender, sexual orientation, social group, and socioeconomic position. The fourth category encompasses one of the more intangible aspects of governance—civil liberties, including access to justice, equality before the law, freedom of expression and association, freedom of domestic movement, freedom of foreign movement, freedom of religion, and property rights. In Latin America, we selected two more democratic governments that differ significantly in governance outcomes: Uruguay, which demonstrates high performance, and Colombia, which continues to face economic and social shortcomings and is confronted with political challenges that threaten social cohesion and democratic stability. We also selected two more autocratic governments: Bolivia, which exhibits relatively coherent economic and social performance (when compared to other authoritarian countries in the region), and Cuba, where governance crises are persistent and unresolved. In all four governance categories discussed in this article, both democracies project stronger performance than both autocracies. Importantly, many countries do not neatly fall into one regime type category. Rather, some of our cases (most notably Bolivia in the Latin American context) represent a hybrid model between democracy and autocracy. The 2025 elections in Bolivia are one example. The Movement for Socialism (MAS) candidate—whose party had held power in Bolivia for nearly twenty years—did not advance to the second round of the presidential elections, and the party lost almost all its seats in the legislature, but MAS made clear that it would accept the final election results. These four cases (Bolivia, Colombia, Cuba, and Uruguay) were selected for their individual characteristics as well as their applicability to the wider region. In addition to their different regime types and governance outcomes, we selected the cases to ensure variety. The cases span the region, with a Caribbean case (Cuba) and northern (Colombia), central (Bolivia), and southern (Uruguay) South American cases. They represent large and small countries, in both population and land mass. They include some of the wealthiest (Uruguay) and poorest (Bolivia) in the region. They represent countries that have been ravaged by civil conflict and weak institution-building processes, and those that have experienced a more peaceful history and built strong institutions. Furthermore, they are countries that are underrepresented in the literature.
Topic:
Governance, Reform, Democracy, Domestic Politics, Autocracy, and Democratic Backsliding
Political Geography:
Colombia, Uruguay, Cuba, Latin America, and Bolivia

2847. Climate Clarity: On the Future of Climate Action in the United States

Author:
Leonardo Martinez-Diaz, Noah Gordon, and Milo McBride
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
People in the United States who care about fighting climate change are shellshocked. After four years of insufficient, but nevertheless unprecedented, policy support for climate action, there has been a sudden, abrupt reversal. Under the headline of “Energy Dominance,” President Donald Trump’s administration has scrapped environmental regulations, taken a sledgehammer to the green industrial policy of its predecessor, and removed the United States from international climate diplomacy. Programs of every description addressing or even indirectly touching climate action have been cut, and congressionally appropriated funds for decarbonization and strengthening climate resilience have been cancelled, frozen, or delayed indefinitely. The gutting of IRA tax credits and other support for clean energy this July was a major blow to climate action in the United States, and the Trump administration has followed up by obstructing wind and solar projects, even some that were nearly ready to deliver crucial power to Americans. This dramatic U-turn is the product of electoral outcomes, but it is also the result of an important shift in the battle of ideas, one that is playing out in the United States and also in other countries. Opponents of climate action have pivoted from simply denying that human activity is changing the climate and toward what is best described as a “New Denialism”—a narrative based on convincing the public that climate solutions don’t work or are too expensive, that decarbonization is too difficult and unrealistic a goal, and that everyone should make peace with the fact that fossil fuels will be around forever, so the United States might as well produce more of them. Climate change will inflict some damage, but it’s a small price to pay for progress, New Denialists argue. New Denialism is more subtle and thus perhaps more dangerous than its predecessor. It thrives on the fact that the energy transition is complex and nuanced, and that the scientific consensus, though settled on the fundamentals, is uncertain about the magnitude, cost, and timeline of climate damages. The New Denialism exploits these features to undermine the public’s confidence in the entire decarbonization project, while largely ignoring adaptation (or, in some cases, sophomorically suggesting it will be easy). If these ideas take root, they may prevent the formation of coalitions for meaningful climate action in the future, even if a climate-friendly party eventually takes the White House and Congress. Building a fresh, durable consensus for climate action will require not just confronting the New Denialism but also setting forth a new approach that takes an objective, fact-based view of the promise and limitations of the global energy transition and of what the United States needs to do to adapt to climate impacts. But even more important is building a narrative that relates climate action to two other things that Americans are urgently demanding of their political leadership: an affordable way of life and better health for themselves and their loved ones. Many climate solutions can lower the cost of living and safeguard human health, and it is possible—in fact, imperative—to make life more affordable, longer, and healthier for the people of the United States while addressing climate change at the same time. We call our approach Climate Clarity, and it’s based on four foundational ideas that stem from our research and that of our peers. These ideas may be controversial in some quarters, but we are convinced they will lead to a more constructive, reality-aligned public debate about the future of climate policy and action at a key historical juncture in the United States: Clean energy technologies today are effective and cost-competitive relative to fossil fuel alternatives. That is why the global energy transition, led by China and Europe, is now well under way, and why U.S. policy shifts are unlikely to derail it. A wave of disruptive, clean energy innovations is getting close to maturity and will further accelerate the transition. Out of self-interest, the United States should be part of the energy transition rather than sitting on the sidelines and hitching its star to fossil fuels. This will allow Americans to benefit directly from clean energy markets that are growing much faster than fossil fuel markets, enable the global transition to move faster, and keep the goal alive of reaching net zero emissions. Negative emissions technology needs to advance urgently and is an area where the United States could lead. Americans need to prepare for the impacts of climate change by taking a hard, dispassionate look at climate risk and adopting a risk-management philosophy. That means prioritizing the protection of vulnerable groups, ensuring that Americans have the information they need to make climate-informed decisions, and facilitating the mobility of people across and within different regions of the country. Technological innovation alone won’t be enough. Building lasting support for climate-friendly policies that support those technologies will require forming a new political coalition. And that, in turn, will require linking climate solutions to Americans’ most important everyday concerns, namely affordability and health.
Topic:
Climate Change, Industrial Policy, Regulation, Domestic Politics, Innovation, Donald Trump, Sustainability, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

2848. The Aragalaya Protest Movement and the Struggle for Political Change in Sri Lanka

Author:
David G. Timberman
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
From early 2022 to late 2024, Sri Lanka went through an intermittent, uncertain, but ultimately momentous change in its political leadership. In early 2022, in response to a severe economic crisis, massive protests forced from office then president Gotabaya Rajapaksa and other members of the powerful Rajapaksa political dynasty. He was succeeded by Ranil Wickremesinghe, another member of the discredited political elite, who held office for the next two years. In late 2024, new elections brought to power a leader and political party that had been long opposed to the country’s traditional political and economic elites. Sri Lanka’s political transition is notable both because it is a rare democratic success story in an era marked by democratic backsliding around the world and because it highlights the potency, though also some of the inadequacies, of political protest movements. The 2024 elections, won by Anura Kumara Dissanayake and the National People’s Power (NPP) coalition, represent a dramatic repudiation by Sri Lankan voters of the country’s deeply entrenched political establishment. While it was the electoral process in 2024 that ultimately resulted in the rejection of the government headed by Wickremesinghe, it was the Aragalaya (Sinhala for “struggle”) protest movement during the first half of 2022 that dealt the initial body blow to Sri Lanka’s political establishment by demanding the resignation of Gotabaya Rajapaksa and other members of the political elite and calling for fundamental changes to the country’s political system (what protesters called “system change”). In just four months—between March and July 2022—the Aragalaya movement succeeded in forcing from office first prime minister and former president Mahinda Rajapaksa (the president’s brother) and then president Gotabaya Rajapaksa himself.1 In the wake of these resignations, Ranil Wickremesinghe, a prominent member of Sri Lanka’s political elite, first was appointed by Gotabaya Rajapaksa as prime minister and then was selected by Parliament to succeed him as president.2 Wickremesinghe’s ascendancy to the presidency (technically called the “executive presidency”) was an adept political feat made possible by the political disarray created by Aragalaya as well as the close-knit nature of Sri Lanka’s political elite. As soon as Wickremesinghe came to power, he repressed the protests, arrested protesters, and refused to hold local elections that almost certainly would have weakened his political position. Wickremesinghe’s ascendancy to the presidency in July 2022 diminished the apparent significance of Aragalaya and dimmed hopes for system change. But the outcome of the 2024 elections now makes it clear that the protest movement, despite its brevity, had a lasting and significant impact. Drawing heavily on interviews and published perspectives across Sri Lankan society, this paper examines the protest movement and its impact on Sri Lankan politics.3 While it is principally intended to be of use to scholars, politicians, and activists focused on Sri Lanka, it also seeks to contribute to a wider understanding of protest movements that periodically erupt—and frequently falter—globally.4 It provides insights into the dynamics of protest and civil resistance movements, including: the interplay of protest movements and political parties, the efficacy of what are known as “leaderless” or “horizontal” protest movements, the fickle role of the middle class in protest politics, and the vexing issue of whether and when extra-constitutional political action is justified in response to harmful governance and widespread demands for political change. The paper begins with a brief description of the political and economic conditions that catalyzed Aragalaya. It then describes the key periods during the movement’s short but intense life and how Sri Lanka’s political parties and leaders reacted to the political upheaval. This includes a focus on how Ranil Wickremesinghe was able to become president by capitalizing on the political vacuum created by the ouster of the Rajapaksas and how he sought to repress protests and elections that might pose challenges to his leadership and policies. It then turns to the 2024 presidential and parliamentary elections and briefly shows how their outcomes represented a rejection of the Wickremesinghe government and the political establishment more generally. It concludes with an assessment of Aragalaya that examines seven features of the movement that made it unprecedented in Sri Lanka and relates them to the experiences of other protest movements.
Topic:
Reform, Democracy, Domestic Politics, Protests, Political Movements, and Political Transition
Political Geography:
South Asia and Sri Lanka

2849. U.S. Democratic Backsliding in Comparative Perspective

Author:
McKenzie Carrier and Thomas Carothers
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The global democratic recession of the past twenty years has been marked by numerous cases of elected leaders incrementally dismantling democracy through a steady centralization of power and undercutting of checks and balances—what political scientists label as executive aggrandizement. Under the second Donald Trump presidency, the United States is showing clear signs of following such a path, leading many commenters to draw arresting but often relatively glancing comparisons with other prominent recent cases of democratic erosion, like Hungary, India, Poland, and Türkiye. This paper examines U.S. political developments since the return of Trump to power in an in-depth, comparative light, seeking to illuminate the similarities and differences between the unfolding U.S. context and the experience of other troubled democracies. The paper establishes that the Trump administration’s overall political project conforms to the general model of executive aggrandizement, and is best understood as taking place at three interrelated levels: Establishing the president as supreme within the executive branch: Trump’s team seeks an extreme form of presidential concentration of power within the executive branch. It has weakened accountability institutions and regulations, tightened presidential control over independent agencies and the executive bureaucracy, decreased the political independence of the civil service, and purged perceived opponents from the branch. Making the executive branch dominant over other parts of government: The administration is forcefully seeking dominance over the judiciary, Congress, and states. It has defied court orders, criticized judicial rulings, and constrained individual judges. It has circumvented congressional policies and undermined its powers. And it has attacked and constrained state governments that do not align with administration policies. Weakening societal constraints on executive power: Trump has stymied civil society opposition by attacking independent media, punishing lawyers and law firms perceived to be oppositional, and constraining civic and educational organizations. His team has undermined vertical checks on the executive by weakening voting rights and the independence of election administration. Broadly, Trump is pursuing widespread retribution against perceived opponents and critics. The paper then compares the path of U.S. politics under Trump to seven other recent or ongoing cases of democratic backsliding—Brazil, Ecuador, El Salvador, Hungary, India, Poland, and Türkiye—highlighting distinctive features along three comparative dimensions: Focus: The Trump team’s agenda has several priorities that set it apart from other backsliding cases. These include its unique emphasis on intra-executive dominance, delegitimization rather than institutionalized attacks on horizontal checks, and coercive use of the robust federal funding ecosystem to pressure U.S. civil society. Rapidity: The administration has carried out its political program with striking speed. Compared to other backsliding cases, it has sought to centralize power with greater momentum and rapidity. And while other leaders often eroded democratic checks piece by piece, Trump’s team is working to weaken such checks across multiple levels all at once. Severity: The degree of democratic erosion in the United States is not yet as severe as that of most of its backsliding peers. The country has not yet seen the deep-rooted institutional changes that have characterized many of the comparative cases. And repressive measures like coercive force or criminalization have been limited by U.S. democratic norms and institutions. While some comfort can be taken from the fact that the relatively deeply rooted U.S. democratic norms and institutions compared to those in the other cases have resulted in a less institutionalized process of backsliding thus far, the distinctive speed and aggressiveness of Trump’s aggrandizement agenda is cause for serious concern. Numerous avenues and sources of resistance to democratic erosion continue to exist, but U.S. democracy is being put to the test as never before in the country’s modern history.
Topic:
Government, Domestic Politics, Donald Trump, and Democratic Backsliding
Political Geography:
Turkey, India, Poland, Brazil, Hungary, North America, Ecuador, El Salvador, and United States of America

2850. Securing America’s Critical Minerals Supply

Author:
Allan Bentley and Jonas Goldman
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration has prioritized building a secure critical minerals supply chain to create economic prosperity and geopolitical leverage. This strategy centers on streamlined permitting, legislative support via the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA), and protective tariffs, including a planned 50 percent tariff on copper announced for summer 2025. However, a purely domestic approach will face severe constraints. First, the United States does not have the necessary critical minerals reserves in all cases. This creates fundamental limits to supply that cannot be resolved through domestic policy measures alone. While international agreements, such as the minerals deal with Ukraine, offer potential solutions, mining development requires long lead times, which makes these efforts inherently long-term projects. In addition, there is a tension between domestic mining goals and broader manufacturing competitiveness. Our analysis shows that even under the most optimistic scenarios, by 2035 U.S. domestic production would be able to meet projected demand only for zinc and molybdenum. Even a substantial domestic minerals boom would leave the country requiring substantial imports of copper, graphite, lithium, silver, nickel, and manganese to support industrial expansion and grid modernization. But greater minerals extraction is only half the picture, as a corresponding scaleup of U.S. smelting capacity would also be required. Current policy measures under the OBBBA provide mixed support. While the legislation allocates $2 billion for National Defense Stockpile purchases, $5 billion for the Industrial Base Fund, and $500 million for defense credit programs, it simultaneously phases out the Inflation Reduction Act’s permanent 10 percent production tax credit in 2034. These changes fail to address the structural weaknesses in U.S. mining competitiveness. This analysis identifies two critical pathways. First, a comprehensive domestic industrial strategy must address the entire mining ecosystem—from streamlined permitting and modern equipment to efficient logistics networks and processing economies of scale. Second, a coordinated friendshoring approach must leverage partnerships with allies and developing economies to diversify supply chains away from Chinese dominance. The United States must support value-added processing in these jurisdictions, so that all countries can benefit from a global mining diversification push. One specific policy mechanism is likely to prove crucial. Guaranteed price contracts with miners and processors—modeled on the recent MP Materials rare earths arrangement—could provide investment certainty through shared upside mechanisms rather than blanket import restrictions. Success requires strategically coordinated domestic and international efforts. Tariffs alone will fail. Innovation support, technology standards, and infrastructure development must be integrated in a comprehensive industrial strategy. A balanced approach that strengthens domestic capabilities while securing reliable international partnerships offers the best path toward critical minerals security that enables rather than constrains American manufacturing competitiveness.
Topic:
Development, Natural Resources, Mining, Supply Chains, Offshoring, Critical Minerals, and Onshoring
Political Geography:
North America, Global Focus, and United States of America

2851. The European Radical Right in the Age of Trump 2.0

Author:
Rosa Balfour, Stefan Lehne, and Elena Ventura
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Donald Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025 seemed to herald a revolutionary new era that would reshape not only the United States but also European politics and culture.1 The breathtaking speed and depth with which the second Trump presidency has changed U.S. domestic and foreign policy is reminiscent of former Chinese leader Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution and has caused frantic adaptation across the globe.2 U.S. action in geopolitical theaters that are central to Europe’s security and Washington’s triggering of a global trade war are immensely consequential for Europe. U.S. policy is revealing the ideological detail of the American radical right as it undergoes some solidification and builds an international network in which Europe plays a key role. Europe is high on the agenda of the Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement. Yet, however emboldened the European radical right may feel, and despite growing transatlantic linkages, events of the past year suggest that the continent’s own dynamics and challenges remain the main drivers that shape Europe’s political and policy choices. The European radical right has had some electoral successes but continues to struggle to turn that achievement into action, as it is divided in the European Union (EU) institutions and inconsistent on policy. The primary factor in the radical right’s success is the failure of mainstream politics to find effective responses to political challenges. In April 2024, Carnegie Europe published a report on the foreign policies of the fourteen most significant European radical-right parties and their impact on the EU.3 Now, one year into the EU’s 2024–2029 institutional term, this paper asks: With Trump in the White House, can the radical right—in the words of Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán—“conquer” Europe?4 In fact, the Trump effect on the radical right is more nuanced than is usually assumed. Signals of both empowerment and distance are visible. While the radical right’s electorate is more drawn to Trump in his second term than in his first, most Europeans continue to be skeptical of him, making radical-right parties cautious in their embrace of Trumpism. After all, the Trump administration’s outright anti-EU policies affect radical-right electorates, too. The radical right is as consequential as centrist parties, leaders, and institutions allow it to be. Fears that the radical right with Trump’s support will destroy the EU seem overblown in the short term. However, the right could well be capable of blocking and delaying reforms that are necessary to confront the EU’s current and future challenges. Rather than conquering Europe, the radical right seems set on preventing the EU from becoming what it needs to become.
Topic:
European Union, Donald Trump, Political Parties, Radical Right, Right-Wing Politics, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

2852. Legacy or Liability? Auditing U.S. Alliances to Compete with China

Author:
Christopher S. Chivvis, Kristin Zhu, Beatrix Geaghan-Breiner, Maeve Sockwell, Lauren Morganbesser, and Senkai Hsia
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Allies are essential to U.S. strategic competition with China but carry costs and risks that require continuous, realistic management. Polarization in Washington has unfortunately impeded the correct approach: critics on the right are too narrowly focused on military power while advocates on the left underplay the real costs and risks involved in U.S. defense commitments. Across the political spectrum, experts are now calling on allies to shoulder more of the burden for security in the Indo-Pacific. This is positive, but plans to deepen U.S. alliances also need to weigh allied political will and the danger of being drawn into conflicts that do not serve vital U.S. interests. This report inventories these costs and benefits for seven key alliances across eight core areas of U.S.-China strategic competition. We conclude that: Japan can further U.S. aims with China across all eight categories, especially as its defense spending increases. It is willing to cooperate in several key areas and poses low risk of entanglement. Australia can make contributions at a more modest level. Political will to cooperate with the United States has increased but is not steady. Risk of entanglement is low. South Korea is reluctant to use its economic and military power to counter China but poses a substantial military burden and risk on the United States. Chip manufacturing and other nonmilitary capabilities help strengthen the case for the alliance. Key European allies—France, Germany, and the UK—will have a limited military role in the Indo-Pacific, but can support important technological, diplomatic, and political objectives of U.S. China strategy. The Philippines has advantageous military geography—but lacks other benefits and poses an entanglement risk in the South China Sea. We stress that if Washington consistently pursues a statecraft that undermines allied trust in the United States, allied leaders will not support U.S. global objectives, weakening America’s hand in competition with China. Some recent U.S. policies, such as the Trump administration’s broad tariffs, appear to have eroded trust. The United States does not need a revolution in its alliances, which remain a source of strength for America at a time when U.S. power is under strain globally. But Washington does need to move with greater caution when deepening them. Ensuring alliances serve the needs of American citizens at a time when the world is in flux will require realism, periodic reassessment, and continuous adaptation.
Topic:
Alliance, Strategic Competition, Polarization, Statecraft, and Great Powers
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Europe, Asia, South Korea, Philippines, Australia, North America, and United States of America

2853. Regime Change and Minority Risks: Syrian Alawites After Assad

Author:
Adam Fefer
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Syria’s prospects for improved security and solidarity after the fall of former president Bashar al-Assad remain uncertain, though there are grounds for optimism, including histories of religious coexistence and the multifaceted nature of Syrian identities. The long-term success of Syria’s regime change will depend on the transitional government’s ability and willingness to forge a shared national identity and to protect the rights of minorities, including those regarded as Assad loyalists. However, its unclear commitment to these goals generates considerable uncertainty for Alawites and other vulnerable groups. The security and political inclusion of Alawites will be critical for fostering stable, multiethnic governance in the Levant. To this end, this paper outlines risks facing Syrian Alawites. Taking a comparative and historical approach, it emphasizes the compounded nature of these risks due to years of war and decades of minority rule. It groups the risks under two themes: (1) insecurity, driven not only by fragile and predatory security forces but also by Alawites’ historical ties to the Assad regime and their demographic vulnerabilities, and (2) polarization, fueled by mass grievances and the paucity of strong, moderate organizations, among other factors. Syria’s civil war both deepened insecurity and polarized much of society along sectarian lines. Meanwhile, Alawites are perceived as the enforcers of an extremely repressive regime, making them the target of reprisals.
Topic:
Regime Change, Minorities, Syrian War, Pluralism, and Alawites
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

2854. Leveraging the competencies of people and non-system entities during disaster and rescue operations

Author:
Robert Piec, Antoni Morawski, and Mateusz Banaś
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:
Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:
A disaster is an event that has a negative impact on people and the environment on such a scale that its effects cannot be controlled by the resources of the local community. Managing rescue operations during disasters and major accidents is a major challenge due to their complexity. A flexible and effective rescue system is essential to minimise the effects of a disaster. Based on considerations regarding the complexity of rescue systems, analyses of scientific articles, legal acts, documents of authorities responsible for crisis management and press reports, the research problem can be formulated as follows: whether or how the use of non-system competences during rescue operations will affect the effectiveness of the crisis management process when rescuing people or the environment. The Key Performance Indicators method was used to evaluate rescue operations. The analysis shows that non-systemic competences had a significant impact on improving the effectiveness of rescue operations, particularly in terms of response time and coordination. The greater the support from international experts, non-governmental organisations and technology, the better the results in terms of flexibility, safety and availability of resources.
Topic:
Security, Disaster Relief, Search and Rescue, and Resource Operations
Political Geography:
Global Focus

2855. Natural Resources, Global Power Relations, and Economic Development: Insights from Mongolia

Author:
Tomasz Legiędź
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:
Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:
This article explores the resource curse phenomenon in the Global South, using Mongolia as an example. Mainstream economists and international financial institutions typically attribute the failure to convert resource wealth into prosperity to domestic institutional deficiencies, such as corruption and a weak rule of law. This study challenges this dominant institutional approach by shifting the analytical focus from local pathologies to the transnational context. Drawing on Critical Political Economy, specifically the Murdoch School, it argues that the regulatory frameworks governing mining, often referred to as ‘modes of governance’, are frequently products of global relations of power. These frameworks are designed to align with the accumulation strategies of foreign investors rather than national development goals. The article begins by reviewing the literature on the relationship between natural resource abundance and economic growth. Second, it interrogates the prevailing governance models by highlighting the structural asymmetries and power dynamics that shape extractive industries. Finally, the empirical analysis of Mongolia demonstrates how external pressure, debt dependency, and the imposition of neoliberal norms constrain state sovereignty. Ultimately, the paper concludes that ‘good governance’ reforms can perpetuate an ‘institutional trap,’ facilitating the extraction of surplus by foreign actors while limiting the developmental capacity of resource-rich nations.
Topic:
Political Economy, Institutions, Mining, Economic Development, and Industry
Political Geography:
Mongolia and Asia

2856. The Russian Orthodox Church as an Instrument of Kremlin Influence and a Factor of Destabilisation in Ukraine

Author:
Valentyna Hodlevska
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:
Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:
This article investigates the role of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and its Ukrainian branch—the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP)—as instruments of Russian political influence and destabilization in Ukraine. The study focuses on the UOC-MP’s ideological alignment with the Kremlin and its impact on Ukrainian national security, especially in the context of Russia’s ongoing aggression. Employing a qualitative analysis of official church statements, government documents, legislative acts, and media reports , the research traces the evolving relationship between the UOC-MP and the ROC, including the effects of the 2018 Tomos of Autocephaly and the aftermath of the 2022 full-scale invasion. The findings demonstrate that despite a formal declaration of separation from the ROC, the UOC-MP continued to maintain institutional and ideological ties with Moscow, leading to increased societal distrust and state intervention. The culmination of this process was the 2024 ban on the ROC and its affiliates in Ukraine, which signaled a decisive move toward religious sovereignty and the consolidation of an independent Ukrainian Orthodoxy.
Topic:
Sovereignty, Ideology, Destabilization, Russia-Ukraine War, Russian Orthodox Church, Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, and Orthodox Church of Ukraine
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine

2857. Investment in the Heart of Europe: What Shapes FDI in the Visegrad Countries?

Author:
Andrzej Geise, Małgorzata Jaworek, and Magdalena Kuczmarska
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:
Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:
This study investigates the determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Visegrad Group (V4) countries, focusing on the changing relevance of cost-, market-, and institutional-related factors. The analysis employs a panel Autoregressive Distributed Lag (P-ARDL) model and panel Granger causality tests to examine both the long-run and short-run relationships between FDI and a set of macroeconomic, and institutionalrelated variables. The dataset covers the V4 countries over a time span between 1996 and 2023 and captures both permanent and transitory changes in determinants of FDI. The results show that in the long-run, average wage levels and government effectiveness are significant structural determinants, highlighting the importance of institutional quality and labour costs in FDI location decisions. In the short term, FDI inwards are mainly influenced by GDP growth, R&D expenditure, trade openness, and inflation dynamics. The results indicating the significance of factors determining FDI in the Visegrad Group countries may be of particular importance for policymakers seeking to enhance investment attractiveness in a globally unstable economic environment.
Topic:
Economics, Foreign Direct Investment, and Visegrad Group
Political Geography:
Europe

2858. Corruption in the Republic of Poland and Combating Iit in 2018–2022. Introduction

Author:
Szczepan Stempiński and Jarosław Kopyto
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:
Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:
The phenomenon of corruption – accompanying dynamic economic development – is one of the most socially acute threats. It consists of both normative, organizational and also functional factors. Market demand for certain goods and services also plays an important role in the dynamics of this phenomenon. In this article, the authors used both a qualitative method (analyzing normative and regulatory acts) and a quantitative method (data contained in CBA source materials in 2018-2022). The working hypothesis established assumes that the area most vulnerable to the phenomenon of corruption in the RP is public administration, especially local government administration. Its verification was possible thanks to the identification of the main areas of corruption and the methods established to combat it, particularly in the context of the implementation of the Government Anti-Corruption Program for 2018-2020. In addition, data from Transparency International, the CBA, the Police, the Internal Security Agency and other services were also used. The article, which is the authors’ critical approach to the phenomenon of corruption, also touches on ethical aspects whose observance should be an established corporate standard.
Topic:
Corruption, Economic Development, and Public Administration
Political Geography:
Europe and Poland

2859. Fighting corruption in the Border Guard. Poland’s experience in the context of the EU and Schengen Agreement accession

Author:
Agnieszka Lipska-Sondecka, Monika Lipiec-Karwowska, and Wojciech Pempko
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:
Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:
This paper examines Poland’s approach to combating corruption within the Border Guard before and during its accession to the European Union and Schengen Area. The study is motivated by the critical role of anti-corruption measures in meeting EU membership requirements, especially regarding the uniformed services. The main objective is to analyze the process and outcomes of anti-corruption reforms in the Polish Border Guard as both a direct result of accession negotiations and a necessary step for joining Schengen in 2007. The central research question addresses how legal and institutional changes influenced the effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts in this period. The study employs analysis of EU and national legislation, review of Border Guard internal reports and strategies, and literature review as its primary methods. The findings indicate that, due to limited EU oversight, candidate countries – including Poland – developed their own frameworks for tackling corruption, leading to substantial progress within the Border Guard during the accession process.
Topic:
Corruption, European Union, Borders, and Schengen Agreement
Political Geography:
Europe and Poland

2860. A recipe for longevity? Multi-tenure of provincial marshals as an example of a sustainable actor in a changing party system

Author:
Dawid Pieniężny
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:
Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:
The Polish party system has undergone many significant transformations in the 21st century. Despite this fact, at the highest level of local government it is possible to observe marshals of voivodships, who should be regarded as a durable actor, holding their position for many years. The aim of this text is to verify the assumption that the multicadency of provincial marshals depended on the ability to create a strong political base, the durability of local power conditions, and the adaptability of the marshals themselves – especially in the changing environment of the party system. The conclusions drawn from these considerations indicate that ‘eternal marshals’ are not only an example of a stable political entity in the changing conditions of the party system, but above all an effective ‘regional manager’ distinguished by a range of adaptive, negotiating and managerial skills, with strong ties to the local community and enjoying significant social and political support.
Topic:
Politics, Political Parties, and Local Government
Political Geography:
Europe and Poland