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401. Starr Forum: Rethinking Globalization: America First, The World Last?

Author:
Suzanne Berger, Simon Johnson, and Richard Locke
Publication Date:
11-2025
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Starr Forum: Rethinking Globalization: America First, The World Last?: Thursday, November 20, 2025 The Trump administration has reversed decades of US support for globalization by pulling out of multilateral trade deals, imposing tariffs, restricting immigration, and sidelining global institutions. MIT experts analyzed the impact and potential outcomes of such policies for our nation and the world. Speakers: Suzanne Berger is an Institute Professor at MIT. She serves on faculty at the Department of Political Science and is affiliated with the Center for International Studies. Her research focus is on politics and globalization. Additionally, she co-directs the newly launched Initiative for New Manufacturing (INM) which brings engineers, social scientists, and economists together to work on how to transform manufacturing. She also led the MIT Production in the Innovation Economy project (Making in America: From Innovation to Market, 2013). She founded the MIT International Science and Technology Initiative (MISTI) program, which sends hundreds of MIT students abroad each year for internships in labs and companies. Simon Johnson is the Ronald A. Kurtz (1954) Professor of Entrepreneurship at the MIT Sloan School of Management, where he is head of the Global Economics and Management group. At MIT, he is also co-director of the Stone Center Initiative and a research affiliate at Blueprint Labs. In 2024, he received the Sveriges Rsbank Prize in Economic Sciences in memory of Alfred Nobel, joint with Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, “for studies of how institutions are formed and affect prosperity.” Moderator: Richard Locke is the John C Head III Dean at the MIT Sloan School of Management. A scholar of international labor standards and comparative political economy, Locke began his appointment as dean in July 2025. Prior to this, Locke served as the dean of Apple University, which focuses on internal leadership and management education for Apple, Inc. and was Brown University’s provost, a position he held for nearly eight years. Earlier at MIT, he served as the Class of 1922 Professor of Political Science and Management and the Alvin J. Siteman Professor of Entrepreneurship, as well as the head of the political science department and MIT Sloan’s deputy dean.
Topic:
Globalization, Immigration, Multilateralism, Trade, Donald Trump, and America First
Political Geography:
North America, Global Focus, and United States of America

402. Starr Forum: America’s Culture War and its Impact on Universities, Innovation, and National Security

Author:
Agustín Rayo and L. Rafael Reif
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Starr Forum: America’s Culture War and its Impact on Universities, Innovation, and National Security | Wednesday, December 10, 2025 As political battles intensify over academic freedom, diversity initiatives, and immigration policy, US universities find themselves at the center of a national reckoning — one that could reshape the country’s scientific leadership and global competitiveness. From the growing risk of a “brain drain” to the challenges of maintaining open research environments in a polarized era, our speakers explored what is at stake for higher education, the innovation ecosystem, and America’s strategic position in the world. Speakers: L Rafael Reif, President Emeritus, MIT; Ray and Maria Stata Professor of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Nina Srinivasan Rathbun, Professor, Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy, University of Toronto Moderator: Agustín Rayo, Dean, MIT School of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences; Professor of Philosophy
Topic:
National Security, Domestic Politics, Innovation, Polarization, Universities, and Culture War
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

403. Understanding Different Perspectives on International Relations in MENA (Session 2)

Author:
Peter Krause
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Understanding Different Perspectives on International Relations in MENA: US, Gaza, and the Future for Palestinians An online mini course for the MIT community with Peter Krause (PhD '11). Krause is an associate professor of political science at Boston College and a research affiliate with the MIT Security Studies Program. This webinar is hosted by the MIT-MENA program at the MIT Center for International Studies. About the speaker: Peter Krause is an associate professor of political science at Boston College. His research and teaching focus on international security, Middle East politics, terrorism and political violence, nationalism, and rebels and revolution. He currently teaches courses on Middle East politics, terrorism and political violence, research methods, and international relations. He is a faculty associate in the International Studies Program and the Islamic Civilization and Societies Program at Boston College, as well as a research affiliate with the MIT Security Studies Program.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Palestinians, Regional Politics, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, North Africa, and United States of America

404. Navigating US-China technology competition among Middle Powers: study of Chilean response

Author:
Andrés Orlando Bórquez Basáez and Dorotea López Giral
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
Institution:
Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
Abstract:
Amid intensifying US–China rivalry over digital governance, middle powers like Chile face growing pressure to navigate an increasingly fragmented global order. This article examines Chile’s response through expert interviews and analysis of three key technology cases involving Chinese firms. The findings show that Chile has adopted a Hedging Strategy, limiting involvement in sensitive tech projects aligned with US security concerns, while continuing to attract Chinese investment in areas like electromobility and renewables. The study underscores the combined impact of geopolitical tensions, domestic bureaucratic constraints, and the challenges of engaging with China, whose growing presence still requires a process of mutual adaptation. These dynamics raise questions about Chile’s priorities and the limits of its autonomy in this complex context.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Bilateral Relations, Strategic Competition, and Middle Powers
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Latin America, North America, Chile, and United States of America

405. A Costly Illusion of Control: No Winners, Many Losers in U.S.-China AI Race

Author:
Paul Triolo
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:
The aggressive U.S. approach to China risks triggering conflict between the two nations while upending any progress to a global framework for AI safety and security
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, Science and Technology, Bilateral Relations, Innovation, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

406. Tehran’s Red Lines, Trump’s Maximum Pressure, and Regime Survival

Author:
Ali Fathollah-Nejad
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:
Progress toward a potential nuclear deal between the United States and Iran stalls, amid a high-stakes process for Tehran and others
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Donald Trump, and Regime Survival
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

407. Silicon Borders: The Global Justice of AI Infrastructure

Author:
Johannes Himmelreich
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:
Washington uses ‘chokepoints’ to restrict global access to AI development, but this approach may threaten U.S. national security while creating significant moral dilemmas
Topic:
Development, National Security, Infrastructure, Borders, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

408. The Future of Democracy in the Age of Deepfakes

Author:
Hany Farid
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:
AI-generated content has already begun to work against us, rather than for us. To ensure this technology brings benefits rather than harms, we must institute immediate changes
Topic:
Science and Technology, Democracy, Artificial Intelligence, and Deepfakes
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

409. Realigning Protection with Principle: Ethics and Policy for the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) After Suspension

Author:
Nathalia Allenza, Samantha Engst-Mansilla, Nicholas Manetas, Alejandra Ramos, and Reem Saeed
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University
Abstract:
This brief assesses the suspension of USRAP at a moment of global need and institutional strain. It distinguishes refugee resettlement from asylum processing, articulates the ethical and legal foundations of resettlement, and proposes a reform plan grounded in transparency, oversight, and resilience.
Topic:
Reform, Refugees, Ethics, Resettlement, Transparency, and Asylum Seekers
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

410. Iranian Public Opinion Soon After the Twelve-Day War

Author:
Nancy Gallagher, Clay Ramsay, and Ebrahim Mohseni
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
The Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) has been conducting in-depth surveys of Iranian public opinion on nuclear issues, regional security, economics, domestic politics, and other topics since the summer of 2014. This report probes attitudes in late September and early October 2025, a few months after the June 2025 Twelve-Day War. This survey found notable signs of the "rally-round-the-flag effect" that many observers were commenting on at that time, including very positive appraisals of some aspects of their government’s and military’s performance during the war. The findings also include multiple indicators of political and economic discontent, but these measures were largely unchanged from the previous year. Much of the report covers attitudes towards Iran’s nuclear program in the context of broader views on national security. Three-quarters held that President Trump used negotiations with Iran to buy time while Israel and the United States prepared to attack Iran. Large majorities maintained that their military fought back successfully during the Twelve-Day War when no other country provided meaningful assistance. Support for Iran’s missile program has hit a record high, and for the first time, a slim majority of Iranians favored having a nuclear deterrent, not just a peaceful nuclear program. Attitudes regarding the possibilities of more military strikes, tougher sanctions, and further negotiations with the United States indicated both continued resistance to coercion, and some openness to compromise if given credible reassurance.
Topic:
National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Public Opinion, Deterrence, Armed Conflict, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and United States of America

411. As US population growth slows, we need to reset expectations for economic data

Author:
Jed Kolko
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
US population growth has slowed sharply in the last year and a half, as the immigration surge of the early 2020s has ended and the population continues to age. Fewer jobs are needed to keep up with the growth of the labor force, and growth rates of output and consumption will fall even if per capita output and consumption hold steady. The total US population is growing at an annualized rate of 0.5 percent, down from 1 percent in late 2023. Kolko estimates that the breakeven rate of monthly payroll growth in the jobs report needed to keep up with the labor force has fallen from 166,000 jobs in early 2024 to 86,000 jobs in June 2025. Accordingly, policymakers need to lower their targets and forecasts for key economic data and put more weight on per capita and other population-invariant measures. Adjusting expectations in light of slower population growth is essential for setting monetary policy, determining whether the United States is in recession, and other data-driven decisions and interpretations. With slower population growth, any given level of monthly payroll growth, consumption growth, or output growth reflects a stronger economy than it did a year ago. Population growth is not only slowing; it has also become more volatile and harder to estimate. It is likely that current population estimates for 2025 that statistical agencies are incorporating into economic data are too high and will be revised downward; current population estimates imply much higher immigration in 2025 than is likely under current administration policy. Economic data will need to be reinterpreted and revised in line with future adjustments to population estimates.
Topic:
Migration, Labor Issues, Economic Growth, and Population Growth
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

412. The Three Rs of Education Across Chicagoland: Racism, Resistance, & Reform

Author:
Kasey Henricks, Maximilian Cuddy, Amanda E. Lewis, and Iván Arenas
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Research on Race and Public Policy (IRRPP), University of Illinois at Chicago
Abstract:
From the federal government’s stated goal of dismantling the Department of Education and the movement for school choice with its push towards vouchers to the language of parental rights, the language of public education has shifted dramatically in recent years. School policies at the local, state, and federal level have been critical in shaping the landscape of public education; yet, analysis and debates about public education often focus on the achievement gaps of Black, Brown, and other minority students when compared to white students. While important, the focus on inequality in educational outcomes obscures the inequitable inputs that lay the foundation for these outcomes in the first place. In this report, we shift the focus to education policies and our school funding structure, two critical inputs of education, and assess their role as primary drivers of inequity in public schools in Chicago and Illinois.
Topic:
Education, Reform, Inequality, Racism, and Public Schools
Political Geography:
North America, Chicago, and United States of America

413. Fairness and Reciprocity? Reconsidering Trump’s Liberation Day Tariffs on South Korea

Author:
Je Heon (James) Kim and Nils Wollesen Osterberg
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This report evaluates the rationale and implications of President Donald Trump’s “Liberation Day” tariffs on South Korean imports. The administration frames these tariffs as “reciprocal” measures necessary to correct perceived imbalances in the U.S.-South Korea trade relationship. Given that the White House defines reciprocity by matching the tariffs and restrictions imposed by other countries on U.S. goods (i.e., discriminatory taxes, subsidies, burdensome regulatory requirements, exchange rate manipulation, wage suppression, and any other practices that would impose unfair limitations on market access or impedes fair competition), this report investigates whether the Trump administration’s claims about unfair South Korean trade practices are accurate. Drawing on the latest trade data from the Korea Customs Service and tariff schedules from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the report estimates that South Korea’s effective weighted average tariff on U.S. imports in 2024 ranged between 0.19 percent and 2.87 percent, with similar values for 2023. These findings directly challenge the significantly higher figures that the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) and Department of Commerce cite, which appear to be driven largely by the U.S. trade balance with South Korea. Measured in trade value, 95 percent of goods exported from the United States to South Korea are tariff-free under the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA), with most remaining tariffs affecting a narrow range of agricultural products subject to quotas. Of the remaining 5 percent, tariffs will be eliminated from another 4 percent of U.S. exports to South Korea by 2026. The report also reviews non-tariff measures (NTMs), acknowledging their complexity and the absence of any standard, mutually agreed-upon metric for converting NTMs into tariff equivalents. Estimating their economic impact requires difficult and often unreliable methodologies such as business surveys, gravity models, and general equilibrium models, none of which yield robust or timely results. Nonetheless, we take note of the fact that there are bilateral (twenty-one committees and working groups under the KORUS FTA) and multilateral (WTO dispute settlement) mechanisms to address these issues more satisfactorily. Ultimately, this report concludes that there is little need to change the U.S.-South Korea trade relationship. It recommends resolving outstanding concerns—especially those related to non-tariff measures—through established bilateral mechanisms under the bilateral FTA rather than unilateral action. Drawing from historical parallels to failed protectionist policies like the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, the report warns that these tariffs could undermine economic stability, raise prices for U.S. consumers, and damage the vital bilateral relationship. In short, this report finds no compelling economic rationale for the Liberation-Day tariff rate on South Korea. This suggests that the tariffs are better understood as political tools rather than trade policy rooted in sound analysis.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Tariffs, Trade, Donald Trump, and Imports
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

414. Management practices, competition, and multi-product firms in developing countries

Author:
Victor Gimenez-Perales and Alina Mulyukova
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
We study how liberalization and competition affect firms’ output and product scope depending on management practices. In a model of multi-product firms, we show that firms with better management practices specialize in fewer products with lower marginal costs. The model predicts that, under increased competition, firms with better management practices are less adversely affected by competition, especially in heterogeneous sectors. Evidence from India’s de-reservation policy supports these predictions. Our simulations estimate a 0.29% welfare gain in India from the policy. The same policy could increase welfare by 0.39% in an environment with better management practices, such as the US, highlighting the management practices’ role in liberalization outcomes.
Topic:
Development, Economics, Business, Innovation, Management, and Liberalization
Political Geography:
South Asia, India, and United States of America

415. LNG Projects Are a Bad Deal for Germans and Americans

Author:
Milena Pressentin, Josefin Schmidt, and Julian Schwartzkopff
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
Subsidizing fossil gas, especially long-term contracts for liquefied natural gas (LNG), undermines Germany’s energy independence, national security, public health, and climate goals, while also raising energy prices and pollution for Americans. On the other hand, accelerating the deployment of affordable and cleaner technologies across sectors could lower costs and pollution.
Topic:
Climate Change, Diplomacy, Environment, Trade, Donald Trump, and Energy
Political Geography:
Europe, Germany, North America, and United States of America

416. How Democracies Defend Themselves Against Authoritarianism

Author:
Robert Benson
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
Democracies facing authoritarian threats from within have found ways to push back by strengthening institutions, reinforcing democratic norms, and building popular resistance against encroaching autocracy. Understanding these strategies is vital to learning how to fight back.
Topic:
Human Rights, National Security, Authoritarianism, Reform, Elections, Democracy, Transparency, Voting Rights, Donald Trump, Domestic Policy, and Democratic Backsliding
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, India, Israel, North America, and United States of America

417. Bitter Pill for Brussels? Trump’s Fight with Irish Pharma

Author:
Oskar Fairbairn, Lena Fiedler, and Aoife Hanley
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
Around 60% of Irish net exports to US are pharma products. Charging a 200% US tariff would devastate all EU exports, not just Ireland’s. Still, business leaders in Ireland are confident that pharma’s competitiveness will help it survive.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Multinational Corporations, Exports, Trade, and Pharmaceuticals
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, Ireland, and United States of America

418. Syria’s Transition and the Shadow of the Arab Uprisings

Author:
Andrew Miller
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
While the Syrian people should ultimately determine their own future, the United States must learn from its mistakes during the Arab uprisings to best facilitate a democratic transition.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Human Rights, National Security, Islamic State, Syrian War, and Democratic Transitions
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

419. Securing American Competitiveness: Building a Clean and Cyber-Resilient Manufacturing Sector

Author:
Jamie Friedman
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
As the United States invests in transforming its manufacturing sector to reduce emissions and produce clean technologies, it has an opportunity to strengthen cybersecurity simultaneously.
Topic:
Climate Change, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Manufacturing, and Competition
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

420. An Alliance for Open Trade: How to Counter Trump’s Tariffs

Author:
Julian Hinz, Keith Head, Isabelle Mejean, Emanuel Ornelas, and Moritz Schularick
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
Trump’s renewed tariffs on traditional allies—including the EU, Canada, Mexico, and Brazil—signal a return to aggressive protectionism, openly disregarding WTO rules and threatening the stability of the global trade system. The authors argue that unilateral retaliation by individual countries is unlikely to be effective; instead, only a coordinated response by a broad coalition of affected nations—such as the EU, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, and South Korea—can exert meaningful economic pressure on the United States. This policy brief proposes that such a joint response should remain WTO-compliant, target politically sensitive sectors of the U.S. economy (including automobiles, pharmaceuticals, and agriculture), and be framed not as punitive, but as a principled defense of the rules-based international trade order. Timely and coordinated action is critical, as further delays risk deepening fragmentation and inflicting long-term damage on the multilateral trading system.
Topic:
European Union, Economy, Tariffs, Free Trade, Trade Policy, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

421. Transatlantic Ties beyond Goods Trade: Significance and Policy Implications of EU-U.S. Services Trade

Author:
Frank Bickenbach, Holger Görg, and Wan-Hsin Liu
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
Trade in services is an important component of international trade and is becoming increasingly more important with growth rates exceeding the rates with which goods trade increases. This is also true in the bilateral U.S. – EU relationship: Trade in services, and especially trade in digitally deliverable services, is a highly important element of the economic relations between the U.S. and the EU. And it is growing much faster than goods trade between the two economies. Despite its importance, trade in services has received much less attention in political and public discussions on the transatlantic trade relationship – even beyond the current narrow focus on the U.S. goods trade deficit. Against this background this policy brief attempts to explore major developing trends over time in EU-U.S. services trade in general and EU-U.S. trade in digitally deliverable services in particular. In addition to services trade, we analyze the development of services supplied by affiliates of U.S. multinationals in the EU and of those supplied by EU affiliates in the U.S. We provide policy suggestions based on data-driven insights derived from the analysis.
Topic:
Globalization, European Union, Services, Trade, Digitalization, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

422. Trade Wars and Currency Wars – Lessons from History

Author:
Kris James Mitchener and Kirsten Wandschneider
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
Explaining President Trump’s “Liberation-day” tariffs on April 2nd, 2025, Stephen Miran, President Trump’s chairman of the council of economic advisors suggested that countries accept the U.S. tariffs without retaliation to come to a fair “burden sharing”(Miran: 2025). History shows that this assumption is wrong: using a detailed data set of bilateral trade flows constructed for the interwar period, this column shows that in fact the US faced substantial and widespread retaliation from trade partners in response to the U.S. Tariff Act of 1930 (i.e., the Smoot-Hawley Tariff). U.S. exports to retaliating countries fell by as much as 33%, with U.S. trade partners specifically targeting high-end, branded consumer products, such as U.S. autos. The drop in trade contributed to the Great Depression, which in turn triggered a large currency war: between 1929 and 1936, 70 countries devalued their currencies relative to gold. We show that trade was further reduced by more than 21% following devaluation. The currency war destroyed the trade-enhancing benefits of the global monetary standard, ending regime coordination and increasing trade costs. The 1930s are a potent reminder of what can happen when international policy coordination breaks down and countries go it alone when negotiating trade and exchange-rate policies.
Topic:
Debt, Economics, International Trade and Finance, Financial Crisis, Tariffs, Trade Wars, Trade Policy, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

423. Sovereign vs. Corporate Debt and Default: More Similar Than You Think

Author:
Gita Gopinath, Josefin Meyer, Carmen Reinhart, and Christoph Trebesch
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
Theory suggests that corporate and sovereign bonds are fundamentally different, also because sovereign debt has no bankruptcy mechanism and is hard to enforce. We show empirically that the two assets are more similar than you think, at least when it comes to high-yield bonds over the past 20 years. We use rich new data to compare high-yield US corporate (“junk”) bonds to high-yield emerging market sovereign bonds 2002-2021. Investor experiences in these two asset classes were surprisingly aligned, with (i) similar average excess returns, (ii) similar average risk-return patterns (Sharpe ratios), (iii) similar default frequency, and (iv) comparable haircuts. A notable difference is that the average default duration is higher for sovereigns. Moreover, the two markets co-move differently with domestic and global factors. US “junk” bond yields are more closely linked to US market conditions such as US stock returns, US stock price volatility (VIX), or US monetary policy.
Topic:
Economics, Sovereign Debt, Sovereign Default, and Corporate Bonds
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

424. Spatial distribution of housing liquidity

Author:
Francisco Amaral, Mark Toth, and Jonas Zdrzalek
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
This paper examines the relationship between location, liquidity, and prices in housing markets. We construct spatial datasets for German and U.S. cities and show that liquidity and prices decline with distance to the city center. To rationalize these results, we build a structural model with spatial search frictions. We argue that location preferences concentrate buyers in central areas, making markets tighter, more liquid, and driving up prices. Counterfactuals show that suppressing search frictions raises welfare and prices, especially in peripheral areas. Our findings highlight the importance of demand-side preferences and search frictions for understanding liquidity and asset prices.
Topic:
Economics, Financial Markets, Cities, Housing, Real Estate, Liquidity, and Assets
Political Geography:
Europe, Germany, North America, and United States of America

425. The consequences of the Trump trade war for Europe

Author:
Julian Hinz, Isabelle Mejean, and Moritz Schularick
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
• Using the KITE model suite, we study the economic costs of the Trump tariff policy for Europe, and analyze the potential for trade diversion from China. • If the current tariff regime stays in place, trade between the U.S. and China would fall dramatically, hurting mainly the U.S. and the Chinese economies. The direct economic impact for Europe appears limited. • The expected rerouting of Chinese and U.S. exports to third countries is likely to intensify competition between European and Chinese producers in key markets. European consumersstand to benefit from lower prices.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Tariffs, Trade Wars, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
China, Europe, North America, and United States of America

426. Ukraine Aid: How Europe Can Replace US Support

Author:
Giuseppe Irto, Ivan Kharitonov, Taro Nishikawa, and Christoph Trebesch
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
We study how Europe could replace US support for Ukraine both (i) financially, in terms of the fiscal effort required, and (ii) militarily, in terms of weapon production. Financial effort: The financial challenge of replacing US aid is limited. Currently, European governments are spending just 0.1% of their annual GDP on bilateral aid for Ukraine - a minor effort. To replace US aid flows and keep total support at the same level: Europe needs to double its yearly support to an average level of 0.21% of GDP. This is less than half of what Denmark and the Baltics are already doing and on a level of what Poland and the Netherlands do. In short: Europe as a whole would need to follow Scandinavia’s or Poland’s example. In absolute terms (billions of Euro), the biggest European countries and the EU Institutions will be decisive. To replace US aid and get to 0.21% of GDP, Europe as a whole needs to increase its yearly aid flow from currently €44 bn per year to €82 bn per year. The biggest donors for that effort will be the EU institutions (Commission and EIB), who will need to increase their annual support from currently €16 bn to €36 bn per year. Next comes Germany (from currently €6 billion to at least €9 billion per year), then Great Britain (from €5 to €6.5 bn per year), then France (from currently just €1.5 bn to €6 bn per year), Italy (from currently just €0.8 bn to €4.5 bn) and Spain (from just €0.5 bn to €3 bn per year). All remaining European donors would need to move from €14 bn to €16.5 bn per year. To avoid freeriding, we recommend offering financial incentives to those countries giving aid to Ukraine. Big Ukrainian donors (in % of GDP) could get priority access to any new EU-level defense financing scheme. Large Ukraine aid could also be exempt from EU fiscal rules, or deducted from each nation’s contributions to the EU budget. Military effort: On military aid, replacing the US will be more challenging, but is possible in many domains. We show weapon-by-weapon that Europe’s industry has viable alternatives for almost all of the main US heavy weapon systems donated to Ukraine. Europe also accelerated ammunition production and this effort would now need to be intensified at greater speed and scale, especially for howitzer ammunition. Our data show that the biggest dependency from US-produced weapons is in (i) rocket artillery such as HIMARS (86% of weapons for Ukraine are US-produced systems), (ii) Howitzer ammunition (82% US produced), (iii) long-range anti-aircraft systems such as Patriots (70% US produced). In other domains, European weapons play a more important role, in particular regarding Howitzers and battle tanks. Among the heavy weapons, US HIMARS and Patriots are hardest to replace, as is the supply of ammunition for these systems. Also, US intelligence sharing and satellite imagery are decisive. To respond to these challenges: Europe needs to ramp up the production of essential weapons and artillery ammunition quickly and broadly. It is advantageous that European donors already transited away from donating from stocks to procuring new weapons for Ukraine from industry. These procurement efforts would need to be extended considerably by making firm medium- and long-term commitments to weapon-producing firms. For US weapons that are hard to replace, Europe could place orders in the US and beyond. Viable alternatives to HIMARS include the South Korean K239 Chunmoo and Israel’s PULS. In addition, Europe could heavily invest in the development and production of alternative systems such as SAMP/T. European countries could also increase drone production considerably, both by European producers, and, more importantly, by directly investing in the highly successful weapons industry of Ukraine. Finally, Europe would need to move fast to build alternative digital, satellite, and intelligence systems, including accelerated and expanded initiatives such as the satellite internet constellation IRIS2.
Topic:
Foreign Aid, Arms Trade, Fiscal Policy, Military Aid, Geoeconomics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

427. How to Finance Europe’s Military Buildup? Lessons from History

Author:
Johannes Marzian and Christoph Trebesch
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
Europe must rapidly increase its military spending, but how? We collect 150 years of data to study what governments in similar situations have done. How were past military buildups financed? What was the relative importance of debt financing, budget cuts, and taxes? Our main finding is that budget cuts, e.g. on social or foreign affairs, were rarely used to finance military buildups. Instead, governments typically relied on a mix of deficit financing and higher tax revenues. The larger the buildup, the more dominant debt financing has been. In line with history and theory, Germany and Europe should again rely on debt financing to quickly increase its defense spending and military capabilities. To deal with the added debt burden in the medium run, governments could increase taxes, reduce subsidies and tax avoidance, and freeze the growth of social spending. Fiscal rules must not stand in the way of the defence of Europe. A warning example is the case of the UK in the 1930s, which refrained from significantly ramping up military expenditure and instead pursued a policy of balanced budgets and appeasement. Consequently, the UK was ill-prepared when Nazi Germany launched its attack. Germany should not repeat the errors made by Britain in the 1930s and should invest heavily in defense so as to deter Russia. To achieve this, defense spending should be excluded from fiscal rules both in Germany and Europe. A less clear-cut alternative would be the creation of new debt funds, such as a European financing mechanism or another "Sondervermögen" in Germany.
Topic:
Economic Growth, Military Spending, Innovation, Geoeconomics, Fiscal Multipliers, Rearmament, and History
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Germany, and United States of America

428. Four scenarios for the future of transatlantic relations: European autonomy and the American challenge

Author:
Ville Sinkkonen and Garret Martin
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
While concerns about the long-term durability of the US commitment to European security are not new, the unpredictable Trump administration stands out as a serious threat to the foundations of the transatlantic partnership. By analysing the US approach to Europe through the lens of two key variables – investment (whether the US prioritizes Europe) and control (whether the US seeks to dictate Europe’s policy choices) – the Briefing Paper maps out four scenarios for the transatlantic alliance over the next five to ten years. The four scenarios – neglect, partner, vassal, and bloc logic – each present specific challenges and trade-offs for Europe. However, the first two models, neglect and partner, are less thorny on paper because they would preserve European strategic autonomy. Vassal and bloc logic, by contrast, would likely present Europe with far more challenging dilemmas. American pressure to toe the line would compel Europe to choose between unpalatable options, such as surrender or resistance, while testing its ability to preserve autonomy.
Topic:
Power Politics, Governance, Democracy, Transatlantic Relations, and Strategic Autonomy
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

429. Brazil’s split worlds: Navigating between the Global South and the United States

Author:
Lauri Tahtinen
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Brazilian foreign policy, traditionally nonpartisan, is increasingly shaped by domestic political divides, complicating alignment with global powers. This also fuels unpredictability, especially in relation to the United States. Brazil’s political right is looking to align with Washington in a bipolar world order, while its political left still seeks multipolarity through the Global South and with the help of the Global East. If, contrary to many expectations and current Brazilian policy, the world becomes bipolar, Brazil may be forced to pick sides, challenging its tradition of balanced diplomacy. If the world appears to be heading towards multipolarity, this would fulfil a long-held Brazilian foreign policy objective. However, Brazil faces regional dynamics that, perhaps paradoxically, resemble bipolarity, as South America remains only a secondary, or even tertiary, zone for great power competition. Hosting major forums like the G20, BRICS, and COP30 puts pressure on Brazil to deliver more consistent global messaging, limiting its room for strategic flexibility.
Topic:
Global South, Multipolarity, Strategic Autonomy, Great Powers, and Middle Powers
Political Geography:
Brazil, South America, Latin America, North America, and United States of America

430. Geostrategic thinking and quantum technology: How promises of quantum technology breakthroughs shape Sino-US rivalry

Author:
Markus Holmgren
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Disruptive technologies have emerged as key arenas of strategic competition between the United States and China, and, alongside artificial intelligence, quantum technologies are key among them. By influencing current strategies and policies, their implications begin even before innovations materialize. Uncertainty about the future and the promised benefits of these technologies have implications for both nations’ build-up efforts, resilience strategies, and potential for pre-emptive actions. China has made rapid technological advancements in many fields, narrowing the gap with the United States. Examples include the release of an AI application by the Chinese company DeepSeek and China’s lead in quantum communication technologies. Beyond civilian applications, quantum technology promises significant breakthroughs in military applications, such as codebreaking, signal-free submarine navigation, and intrusion-proof communications.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, Strategic Competition, Geoeconomics, and Quantum Computing
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

431. Four lenses for observing the second Trump administration: Reflecting uncertainty

Author:
Charly Salonius-Pasternak and Ville Sinkkonen
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
The global security landscape has evolved in the four years since President Donald Trump’s first term. The new administration aims to usher in a “Golden Age of America”, with impacts on domestic politics and society, as well as foreign policy. Unlike in 2017, the incoming administration appears better prepared, with outlined plans and key appointments. However, chaotic decision-making processes and an emphasis on loyalty to Trump are likely to introduce unpredictability into governance and policymaking. The administration’s unified domestic and foreign policy strategy can be viewed through four lenses: national sovereignty, economic nationalism, devolution, and the unmooring of power. The Trump administration is likely to embrace disruption and chaos to achieve revolutionary rather than evolutionary change. This thinking draws on tech-inspired startup culture and generational-revolutionary philosophies, which perceive the US as being in a moment of crisis that will usher in a new historical epoch. Key uncertainties remain regarding the administration’s long-term effects on democracy, alliances, and great power competition, particularly concerning trade-security linkages and alliance relations with Europe and Asia.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Elections, Democracy, Donald Trump, and Great Powers
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

432. The boom and crash of cooperative security in Europe: Four scenarios for the future

Author:
Sinikukka Saari and Tyyne Karjalainen
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
The post-Cold War European cooperative security order, based on shared liberal norms and institutions, has been challenged by Russia’s revisionism and aggression – and more recently by the alienation and even hostility of the United States. Cooperative security has shrunk in scope to an internal European order, shaped around relations among like-minded European states. To maintain this order, Europe will need to actively defend it, not only in words but also in deeds, and even militarily as a last resort. There is a crucial link between the fate of Ukraine and wider European security: the outcome of the war will effectively either validate or reject spheres of influence in Europe and, by extension, the basic principles on which the future of Europe is being built. Europe’s emerging military posture should be grounded in the key norms of European cooperative security: multilateral cooperation, democratic values and international law. Europe can leverage these strengths to navigate the global context of shifting power dynamics.
Topic:
Defense Policy, War, European Union, Regional Security, and Great Powers
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and United States of America

433. Turkey and Israel – Cooperation through Gritted Teeth

Author:
Joseph Epstein
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
In the shadow of Israel's Operation "Rising Lion" against Iran, the latest edition of Turkeyscope features Joseph Epstein's analysis of recent developments in Israeli-Turkish relations. Azerbaijan's mediation, pragmatic signals from Syria's new leadership, and strong U.S. encouragement are helping both nations identify mutual interests.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Syrian War, and Mediation
Political Geography:
Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Syria, and United States of America

434. Critical Minerals, Rare Earth Elements, and the Challenges Ahead for the United States

Author:
Karl Friedhoff
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs (CCGA)
Abstract:
The race to secure critical minerals (CM) and rare earth elements (REE) has become an area of increasing geopolitical competition, with China and the United States the two key players. The United States is currently behind in that competition. It is being out-invested, out-innovated, and out-educated. Not only is Washington losing, but it is falling further behind by undermining the alliances and cooperative networks that should play a crucial role in overcoming the existing structural deficit. At the same time, current US policy is weakening the domestic green energy market that relies on CMREE inputs and drives technological innovation and investment as much of the world pushes ahead with the energy transition. Solely market-driven solutions are unlikely to materialize to address this challenge in the United States. After all, it was this approach over at least the last two decades that helped to create the current imbalance. The central challenge for the United States, then, is how to build a foundation from which market forces can once again play a leading role in driving financing, research, and labor in the sector. The interlocking web of policies to build this foundation is complex. To be done right, each policy requires others surrounding for support. Completing the puzzle will require broad-spectrum cooperation between government and business. This will include a renewed focus on industrial policy and require setting explicit goals for the United States and its partners to create secure supply chains. This process is not without challenges and will inevitably produce local, and potentially national, opposition. The refineries required to diversify where CMREE are processed will create environmental hazards as well as stress local water resources, among other vulnerabilities. This set of policies will also demand heavy investment in material sciences to develop new technologies that can reduce and replace CMREE inputs where possible. Pursuing these policies will necessitate much deeper investment in education and training to create a workforce capable of meeting the demands in the CMREE mining, processing, and materials science sector. Even with extensive government support, there is no guarantee that private investment will materialize to sustain the industry. China’s virtual cornering of a vast swath of the market means much of the sector does not operate along traditional axes of supply and demand, discouraging private investment in the process. This makes it more likely that long-term government support in the form of subsidies, tax incentives, and price controls will be required. That puts such funding and support at the mercy of shifting political winds. Under previous US administrations, a wide-ranging challenge like CMREE would produce the requisite policy papers calling for deeper coordination, cooperation, and integration between the United States and a consortium of like-minded countries. Some of that cooperation may yet be possible, but with a US administration that views the world through a zero-sum lens, it becomes less likely each day. Rather than coordination, it will be absolute dollar amounts that drive cooperation. That approach may be successful in the short term in establishing the building blocks of a secure CMREE supply chain. But its longer-term prospects are uncertain. This report and its policy recommendations are based on discussions from two seminars and multiple conversations across several countries and continents with policy analysts, industry professionals, and government officials. The first seminar was conducted in cooperation with the Perth USAsia Centre in Perth, Western Australia. This seminar brought together participants from around the Indo-Pacific to share their views on how allies and partners could coordinate their efforts. The second seminar was held in Chicago at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs with industry professionals, minerals practitioners, and academic experts from across the United States. A full list of participants can be found in the appendix.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Rare earth elements (REEs), Critical Minerals, and Global Economy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

435. NATO: The Damage Is Done – So Think Big

Author:
Sven Biscop
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
For seventy-six years, NATO tried to prove Lord Palmerston wrong. Now it turns out that he was right after all: “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow”. The second Trump Administration behaves as Europe’s rival, not as its ally. It is too late for mere damage control. Placating Trump will not work either: unrestrained, he will just go further and further. Europeans must present the US with a clear idea of which NATO they want, and what they will invest to get it. That is the way to salvage the Alliance at the NATO Summit in The Hague in June. The damage is done. Because even if the US were to radically alter course and recommit fully to NATO as we knew it, everyone now knows that a next President may change it back again. The US cannot treat NATO the way it treats the agreements on climate change: it joins, it leaves, it rejoins, and leaves again. Deterrence demands constancy, or there is no deterrence. Unless it is actually tested in war, Article 5 will now never be as credible as before. This has already affected the global balance of power: adversaries who perceive that the US may not stand by Europe may be emboldened and become more aggressive. Against Europe, but also against the US, whose erratic economic and foreign policies Europe will not follow.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

436. The AI Bubble and the U.S. Economy: How Long Do ‘Hallucinations’ Last?

Author:
Servaas Storm
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
The U.S. is undergoing an extraordinary, AI-fueled economic boom: The stock market is soaring thanks to exceptionally high valuations of AI-related tech firms, which are fueling economic growth by the hundreds of billions of U.S. dollars they are spending on data centers and other AI infrastructure. The AI investment boom is based on the belief that AI will make workers and firms significantly more productive, which will in turn boost corporate profits to unprecedented levels. But evidence is piling up that generative AI (GenAI) is failing to deliver. This paper argues that (i) we have reached “peak GenAI” in terms of current Large Language Models (LLMs); scaling (building more data centers and using more chips) will not take us further to the goal of “Artificial General Intelligence” (AGI); returns are diminishing rapidly; (ii) the AI-LLM industry and the larger U.S. economy are experiencing a speculative bubble, which is about to burst (because of the first point); and (iii) the U.S. bet the farm on a future dominated by U.S.-owned AGI, because, for geopolitical reasons, it could not afford to risk to lose the AI-race with China; this geopolitical bet on AGI is now going bad.
Topic:
Water, Geopolitics, Economy, Profit, Artificial Intelligence, Productivity, Energy, Large Language Models (LLMs), ChatGPT, and Speculative Bubbles
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

437. Is Fedwire Still a Subsidy That Fully Recovers Its Cost?

Author:
William Bergman
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
This paper examines the Federal Reserve’s current financial losses—unprecedented in scale—and the questionable accounting practices it uses to downplay their impact. It argues that the Fed’s selfdefined accounting standards, particularly the creation of a “deferred asset” to mask negative equity, obscure the fiscal consequences for the U.S. government and taxpayers. The analysis connects today’s losses to longstanding institutional practices, notably the Fed’s flawed costrecovery accounting for its Fedwire payment system. These issues first emerged in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when the author, then a Fed staffer, challenged the internal logic used to claim that Fedwire guaranteed payments and still avoided subsidies. The paper includes as an appendix the original 2002 draft, “Fedwire: A Subsidy That Fully Recovers Its Cost?”, which helped reveal the moral hazard and accounting inconsistencies that contributed to the 2008 crisis and continue to shape central bank risk and governance today
Topic:
Monetary Policy, Financial Crisis, Federal Reserve, Regulation, Central Bank, and Payment Systems
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

438. Historical American Political Finance Data at the National Archives: A Preface to the INET Edition

Author:
Thomas Ferguson
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
Narratives in American history, politics, and economics — even those by the most accomplished researchers — often resemble donuts: at their core lies a hole that no amount of sweet speculation can truly fill. They say almost nothing about the financing behind even the most pivotal American political campaigns and elections. Both history and the social sciences suffer greatly when facts are missing and wild guesses take their place. INET’s new data archive of historical political finance records at the National Archives marks a major step toward filling this factual void. It assembles all campaign finance reports filed by political parties and presidential candidates up to 1974, the year before the Federal Election Commission was established. A few additional files, including one from the FEC for 1976, are also included, as detailed below. This INET Working Paper outlines what users need to know to navigate the archive effectively and locate the data they require.
Topic:
History, Elections, Regulation, and Political Finance
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

439. Aligning global military posture with U.S. interests

Author:
Jennifer Kavanagh and Dan Caldwell
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The Pentagon should revise the U.S. global military posture to be consistent with protecting vital national interests based on a grand strategy of realism and restraint. This will mean reducing the size of the military footprint in certain regions and changing the mix and location of military forces in others. A review of the U.S. global military posture should focus on four priorities: defending the homeland, preventing the rise of a rival regional hegemon in key areas, burden shifting to allies and partners, and protecting U.S. economic security. The current military posture in Europe is too large, encouraging free-riding by European allies and preventing them from taking more responsibility for their own security. U.S. troop levels should be reduced to approximately where they were before Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine. This will involve the withdrawal of some ground combat units, multiple fighter squadrons, and several destroyers. Likewise, the military posture in the Middle East is too large given limited U.S. interests and the region’s lack of an existential military threat to the U.S. homeland. Air and naval assets deployed after the 2023 attacks on Israel should be removed, post-9/11 legacy deployments in Iraq and Syria should be ended, and troops in Kuwait and Qatar should be fully withdrawn. The U.S. military posture in East Asia should be realigned to focus on balancing Chinese power and protecting U.S. interests. Recommended changes include removing most ground forces and two fighter squadrons from South Korea, moving U.S. forces away from the Chinese coast, and shifting more frontline defense responsibilities to allies like Japan and the Philippines.
Topic:
Grand Strategy, Strategic Interests, Military, and Pentagon
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

440. Will the U.S. go to war over Taiwan?

Author:
Jennifer Kavanagh
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The small island of Taiwan is often at the center of U.S. foreign policy discourse. This is thanks to the threat of a Chinese invasion and fears over a resulting loss of U.S. military and economic power in the region. A recent survey by Defense Priorities shows there is substantial disagreement among experts as to how the United States should and would respond to a Taiwan conflict. This suggests the U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity toward Taiwan is working. The experts surveyed largely agreed that China is unlikely to invade Taiwan, a departure from political and military leaders who have inflated the possibility. They also tended to agree that China is unlikely to strike U.S. military bases in East Asia ahead of a Taiwan invasion, which would grant U.S. leaders flexibility in how they respond to this scenario. These experts are divided, however, on what that response should look like. Some say the United States should use direct military force in Taiwan while others argue it should only send military aid. Very few think the U.S. should stay out completely. Even as they acknowledge that a successful seizure of Taiwan would not offer China significant military or economic benefits and recognize the enormous risks and costs to the United States of entering a Taiwan conflict, some experts continue to support a U.S. intervention. This tension is perhaps best explained by a lingering attachment to the pursuit of U.S. hegemony.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Strategic Ambiguity
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

441. Target Taiwan: Challenges for a U.S. intervention

Author:
Lyle Goldstein
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
China could attack Taiwan, attempting a fait accompli before the United States could mobilize sufficient forces in theater to defend it. Chinese advantages of proximity and will suggest that the U.S. would pay a heavy price in this scenario. U.S. ground forces would struggle to enter the combat theater in the relevant time because of uncertainties related to the air and sea campaigns. Attempts to insert U.S. ground forces in peacetime could ignite the very conflict they would intend to deter. Chinese missile, air, and drone assaults could damage U.S. airfields in the region and slow U.S. air support, acutely degrading U.S. maritime operations and Taiwan’s ground defenses. Because U.S. Navy surface forces, including aircraft carrier battle groups, are vulnerable to China’s A2/AD systems, combat in a Taiwan scenario would likely be disproportionately borne by the U.S. Navy submarine force. While these submarines could do damage to the Chinese Navy, they probably lack sufficient firepower to affect the overall outcome of a war. Surging forward U.S. air and naval power in a Taiwan scenario would entail incredible risks, including nuclear escalation. Any war or even intensive militarized rivalry between the U.S. and China would entail enormous risks in exchange for little gain.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Armed Forces, Military Intervention, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

442. Target Taiwan: Prospects for a Chinese invasion

Author:
Lyle Goldstein
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
In a scenario where China attempts an amphibious invasion of Taiwan and the United States does not fight, the invasion will likely succeed assuming Beijing is willing to bear heavy casualties. Taiwan’s vulnerability to China is due to its proximity, since it is located well within range of Chinese missiles, airpower, rocket artillery, helicopters, and paratroopers. All this will reduce Taiwan’s ability to prevent an amphibious landing. Due to its air superiority and the geography of Taiwan, which is mostly urban and mountainous, China can plan for an infantry fight, at least initially, not one dominated by heavy armor. Hence, civilian vessels, including small craft of all types, can help ferry most troops ashore. While an operation to seize Taiwan would be a highly risky endeavor that could result in heavy Chinese losses, Beijing would likely be motivated to bear such costs, since it views national unification as a core interest. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan thus cannot be discounted and Taiwan should prepare by boosting its defense spending, emphasizing its own self-reliance, and engaging in diplomacy.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Armed Conflict, Vulnerability, and Invasion
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

443. China can’t dominate the Middle East

Author:
Rosemary Kelanic
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
A common argument for the United States to remain in the Middle East is that it needs to counter Chinese expansionism. The U.S. is embroiled in a new cold war, this line of thinking goes, and if it withdraws from the Middle East, Beijing will fill the power vacuum and expand its influence. This fundamentally misreads China’s modest aims in the region, which have more to do with hedging against U.S. threats to Chinese oil access. Unlike the Soviet Union, which was proximate to the Middle East, China lacks the military wherewithal to threaten the region. And whereas it was very plausible that the Soviet Union could have captured and weaponized Middle Eastern oil production, China almost certainly could not capture the oil, and even if it did, couldn’t withhold it from the global market. In the Middle East, the United States faces less of a military and economic threat from China than it did from the Soviet Union. It should respond by finally withdrawing from the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Oil, Strategic Competition, and Expansionism
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Asia, and United States of America

444. Japan Looks Ahead to Trump 2.0

Author:
Bart Gaens
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Today, on the eve of the presidential inauguration in the US, Japan’s current Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba faces a new Trump administration, and, in a more volatile regional and global environment, also more challenges in terms of foreign and security policy.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and United States of America

445. Why the ‘Reverse Nixon’ Strategy Will Fail: The Illusion of Decoupling

Author:
Sanshiro Hosaka
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The second Trump administration has undertaken a peace deal with Russia. This policy may not simply reflect Donald Trump’s personal affinity for Moscow and deal-making style but is also likely informed by a certain strategic perception of the US-China-Russia triangle.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Donald Trump, Strategic Interests, and Decoupling
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

446. EU Defence Series: Military Mobility A Critical Enabler

Author:
Mihai Sebastian Chihaia
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The first months of 2025 witnessed monumental changes for European security. Donald Trump’s return to the White House has created a huge degree of uncertainty, and it is increasingly likely that Europe will need to prepare for much less American commitment to its security and defence. There are serious questions about how large the impact on the EU and NATO will be, the future of NATO’s Article 5, and what the US reaction will be if a NATO Ally is attacked. In any scenario, one of the most important enablers of Europe’s defence is the ability to move troops and equipment swiftly across the continent and ensure that reinforcements can arrive quickly in case of conflict. This brief maps developments at the EU level to enhance military mobility and highlights what is still needed to overcome challenges and bottlenecks.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Military Affairs, European Union, and Mobility
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

447. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Ukraine’s Strategy And Western Military Assistance

Author:
Hennadiy Maksak
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
International partners have provided significant military assistance to Ukraine since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022. The temporary suspension of critical US military assistance in early 2025 raised concerns about Ukraine’s strategy to fend off Russia. While it is difficult to predict how the battlefield will unfold in 2025, strong ties with Western partners will be crucial to continue a war of attrition against an overwhelming enemy.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Armed Conflict, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

448. Obscurity By Design: Competing Priorities for America’s China Policy

Author:
Tanner Greer
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Few notes of concord survive contact with Donald Trump. Trump’s election in 2016 upended settled assumptions; one by one he knocked down the pillars of consensus and convention that held up decades of American diplomacy. The strongest and most consequential of these pillars concerned China. For more than forty years, American diplomats and statesmen worked to integrate China into an American-led economic order. By doing so, they hoped to align Beijing’s behavior (and, if lucky, the entire Chinese political regime) with liberal norms. Their hopes proved in vain. China did not moderate or liberalize. The new president, rejecting both the means and ends of engagement, pushed for a less cataleptic strategy. That was five years ago. Those who see Trump as a champion of the new hawkish “bipartisan consensus on China” have been nonplussed by the first moves of his second administration. Trump invited Xi Jinping—but no other foreign leader—to attend his swearing-in. One of his first acts as president was an executive stay of the TikTok ban. Trump publicly browbeat a dozen countries with threats and blandishments in the week that followed—but not the People’s Republic of China. Contrary to expectation, Trump’s inaugural address barely glanced at China. It does not outline, or even hint at, what Trump’s approach to America’s greatest challenger might be. This obscurity is by design. Trump sees no advantage in giving advance notice. Quite the opposite: he clearly believes that the more inscrutable and erratic he seems, the better off the United States will be. This attitude was expressed neatly when the editorial board of the Wall Street Journal asked Trump about the approach he would take toward Taiwan if elected president. Trump replied that the Chinese would not dare attack Taiwan under his watch. After all, “[Xi Jinping] knows that I am f—ing crazy.” Like Richard Nixon before him, Trump is ready to play the lunatic.[1] If this is one reason Trump’s campaign never published or endorsed any detailed policy proposals regarding China, there are others. As one member of Trump’s transition team puts it, “Trump is a pragmatist, not an ideologue. He does not like tying his hands. He prefers to have strong personalities underneath him with conflicting views. He wants them to fight it out. He wants to pick the winner of each battle.” If this risks strategic incoherence, then so be it: “If you want to see what an ideologically unified administration looks like, look back at Bush and Cheney. That is the sort of disaster we want to avoid.”[2] This leadership style should be considered by any analyst who forecasts the new administration’s future. Trump positions himself as the kingmaker among competing centers of power. He encourages a certain level of disagreement in the ranks. This report provides a framework for thinking about these disagreements—especially in regard to the United States’ relationship with China.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

449. The People Are the Key: Irregular Warfare Success Story in the Philippines

Author:
Steve Lewis
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
After decades of conflict and instability, the US government helped the government of the Republic of the Philippines defeat the Abu Sayyaf Group. This was accomplished through a combination of military and development assistance focused on building local legitimacy and protecting the population. The Abu Sayyaf Group was a terrorist and insurgency group active in Southeast Asia. They were aligned with al Qaeda and sought to create a sharia state in the southern Philippines. The challenge of separating the Abu Sayyaf Group from the populations is a hallmark of irregular warfare. In irregular warfare, the human terrain is the key terrain for success. In this conflict, providing legitimate governance and protecting the population was a far more successful strategy than hunting down individual terrorists. This article describes how this was done in the Philippines and provides specific lessons learned from that operation.
Topic:
Development, Governance, Military Aid, Protection, Irregular Warfare, Human Terrain, and Abu Sayyaf Group
Political Geography:
United States of America and West Philippines

450. Assessing Trump’s Trade and Tariff Policies: The Basics

Author:
John Lee
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
In an April 2025 interview with the New York Times, former United States Secretary to the Treasury Larry Summers argued that Donald Trump’s trade policies are “the most radical trade policies and probably the most radical, rapid change in economic policies that the United States has announced since the Second World War.” Several leaders and commentators argue that, by leveling tariffs against virtually every American trading partner, Trump is relinquishing American global economic leadership, undermining free trade, winding back globalization, and transforming the US from being an outward-looking superpower into an inward-looking and selfish nation. Now that the Court of International Trade has ruled Trump exceeded his powers under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977, the appeals process will address the legality of many of his tariffs. The decision relates specifically to the so-called Liberation Day reciprocal tariffs announced on April 2, tariffs on Canada, Mexico, and China related to fentanyl, and the 10 percent baseline tariffs on many other countries. The ruling does not affect other tariffs on steel, aluminum, and automobiles. Regardless of how the legal appeals process unfolds, one should still consider the logic behind general tariffs and how such measures ought to be assessed as an instrument of policy. In many cases, assessments of Trump’s trade policies reflect analysts’ enduring critical or supportive views of Trump’s broader policies, character, and leadership style. The emotive response to tariffs is also unusual in that a tariff is simply another form of a tax applied to goods entering the US market. True, unlike many other taxes, tariffs target foreign-made rather than domestic goods and tend to trigger more serious diplomatic reactions than a domestic tax would. Even so, many countries levy tariffs and use other restrictions against imports into their economies. One might debate the methodology behind the calculation of so-called reciprocal tariffs against many US trading partners, but virtually all US trading partners are undeniably imposing protectionist measures against American goods. Such measures protect local firms and industries and should not be understood as a diplomatic slight or attack against the US. In this sense, some visceral reactions to Trump’s tariffs seem disproportionate and even hypocritical. Indeed, the European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) will, beginning in 2026, impose a carbon levy on imported emissions-intensive goods based on their quarterly carbon content. The CBAM is designed to incentivize non-EU firms to reduce their carbon emissions if they seek to export their goods into the EU. One purpose of the CBAM is to offer advantages to European firms that have reduced their carbon emissions over firms that have not. Putting aside whether one agrees with the decarbonization project, both the CBAM and Trump’s tariffs change the incentives for firms moving goods into the European and American markets, respectively. As with all other protectionist measures, Trump’s tariffs manipulate the cost-benefit calculations for firms. If a business assesses that the tariff burden is too onerous, it will presumably make a commercially rational decision to either add more US-produced content into the product or abandon the American market. The point is that the imposition of a tariff or any other tax requires a policy debate rather than a moral one. Instinctive outrage that Trump’s trade policies are undermining globalization and free trade, or are an insult to allies and partners, presupposes that globalization is an uncontested virtue, free trade (defined as the absence of tariffs) exists, and a tax on imported goods from a friendly country is an inherently hostile act—all contestable presuppositions. Instead, analysts should assess Trump’s tariffs based on whether they advance the policy objectives the administration is pursuing: reindustrializing America, raising revenue, increasing wages and productivity, and accelerating American leadership and innovation in strategic sectors such as artificial intelligence (AI). Furthermore, the tariffs against China have an explicit geopolitical element, and US tariffs against allied or friendly economies have possible geopolitical ramifications. Therefore, a dispassionate assessment of Trump’s trade policy also requires analysis as to whether the trade policies enhance or weaken America’s geopolitical leverage and standing vis-à-vis China. This policy memo looks at the structural drivers of the changes in US trade policy and why the current administration’s actions should not be dismissed or ridiculed as Trumpian irrationality, vandalism, or malice. Upcoming Hudson Institute briefs will assess whether Trump’s trade policies are achieving the intended policy objectives and outcomes, and whether they are advancing (or hindering) the geopolitical goals of the administration.
Topic:
Sanctions, Economy, Tariffs, Trade Policy, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America