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301. Implications of the Inflation Reduction Act for the Biotechnology Industry

Author:
Cody Hyman, Henry Dao, Gregory Vaughan, and Fred D. Ledley
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
The Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 contains landmark provisions authorizing the government to negotiate the price of selected drugs covered by Medicare Part D. The biopharmaceutical industry has criticized these provisions as a threat to innovation arguing that reducing future revenues could disincentivize equity investment in biotechnology. This research examines the sensitivity of private and public equity investment in the biotechnology industry to drug price indices and market conditions from 2000-2022. The analysis shows that equity financing and valuation in the biotechnology industry were strongly associated with equity market conditions but not indices of either producer or consumer drug prices. These results do not support claims of an association between changing drug prices and the availability of equity capital to emerging biotechnology companies, which currently sponsor the majority of all clinical trials. These results add to evidence that the IRA may not have a negative impact on pharmaceutical innovation.
Topic:
Economics, Health, Inflation, Innovation, Biotechnology, Public Investment, and Inflation Reduction Act
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

302. Scale and Scope in Early American Business History: The “Fortune 500” of 1812

Author:
Richard Sylla and Robert E. Wright
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
Fortune magazine began publishing annual rankings of U.S. corporations by revenue in 1955. Ever since, scholars and forecasters have analyzed changes in the Fortune 500 to help inform their judgments about industry concentration and the relative importance of different sectors of the economy. Unfortunately, earlier data are scarce, especially before the Civil War. Through extensive research we have created a sort of historical “Fortune 500” going back to 1812, ranked by corporate capitalization, which we share here. Numerous insights can be drawn from this dataset, including the historical dominance of the banking and finance sectors and the early importance of manufacturing. Perhaps the larger significance of being able to come up with a Fortune 500 for 1812, though, is the fact that even with a population of only about 7.5 million, U.S. already had more business corporations than any other country, and possibly more than all other countries put together, securing its role as the world’s first “corporation nation.” The ease of incorporating businesses released a lot of entrepreneurial energy that helped to build an ever-expanding economy and by the end of the 19th century, the U.S. would be the world’s largest national economy with tens of thousands of corporations.
Topic:
Economics, History, Business, and Industry
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

303. Tesla as a Global Competitor: Strategic Control in the EV Transition

Author:
Matt Hopkins and William Lazonick
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
In this paper, we assess the implications of Elon Musk’s strategic control over Tesla, the pioneering company that has become central to the electric vehicle transition. We document how, as Tesla’s CEO for 16 years, Musk has exercised strategic control to direct the transformation of the company from an uncertain startup to a global leader. Now that Tesla is profitable corporate predators (aka hedge-fund activists) may challenge Musk’s strategic control—a possibility of which the CEO is well aware. To retain his control over Tesla as a publicly listed company, Musk depends on holding a sufficient proportion of Tesla’s shares outstanding to possess the voting power to fend off predatory value extractors. In addition to accumulating Tesla shares by investing $291.2 million at early stages of the company’s evolution, Musk has relied upon massive stock-option grants from the Tesla board, under the guise of “compensation”, in 2009, 2012, and 2018, to boost his shareholding and, with it, his voting power. Hence the Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision in January 2024 to rescind Musk’s 2018 stock-option package—by far the largest ever granted to a corporate executive—poses a threat to Musk’s strategic control at Tesla. As the “Technoking” of Tesla strategizes to maintain his control over the company’s decision-making, anyone concerned with the role that Tesla will play in the evolving EV transition should be asking how CEO Musk might use, or abuse, his powerful position.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Economic Competition, Electric Vehicles, Tesla, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

304. Setting Pharmaceutical Drug Prices: What the Medicare Negotiators Need to Know About Innovation and Financialization

Author:
Öner Tulum and William Lazonick
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
Mandated by the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, the U.S. government through the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) is negotiating with pharmaceutical companies over the “maximum fair price” of ten drugs in wide use by Medicare patients. Over the next few years, the number of drugs whose prices are subject to negotiations will increase. The pharmaceutical companies contend that a “fair” price would be a “value-based price” that enables the companies’ shareholders to capture the value that the drug creates for society. Invoking the dominant “maximizing shareholder value” ideology, the argument for value-based pricing assumes that it is only a pharmaceutical company’s shareholders who make the risky investments that fund drug innovation. Pharmaceutical executives and their lobbyists warn that a lowering of drug prices will reduce investments in new drugs. The purpose of this paper is to enable CMS negotiators to respond to these arguments by showing a) why drug-price regulation is required, given the relation between scale economies in supplying drugs and price inelasticity of drug demand; b) how the pharmaceutical companies with which they are negotiating prices are, in general, not using their profits from unregulated drug prices to fund drug innovation but rather to fund distributions to shareholders in the form of cash dividends and stock buybacks; c) that publicly listed pharmaceutical companies do not typically rely upon investment by shareholders to fund drug innovation; and d) that investment in drug innovation entails “collective and cumulative learning” in foundational and translational research that is both antecedent and external to the investments in clinical research that a pharmaceutical company may make to bring a safe and effective drug to market.
Topic:
Economics, Health, Finance, Innovation, Pharmaceuticals, and Medicare
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

305. Good Policy or Good Luck? Why Inflation Fell Without a Recession

Author:
Thomas Ferguson and Servaas Storm
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
This paper analyzes claims that the Federal Reserve is principally responsible for the decline of inflation in the U.S. We compare several different quantitative approaches. These show that at most the Fed could plausibly claim credit for somewhere between twenty and forty percent of the decline. The paper then examines claims by central bankers and their supporters that a steadfast Fed commitment to keeping inflationary expectations anchored played a key role in the process. The paper shows that it did not. The Fed’s own surveys show that low-income Americans did not believe assurances from the Fed or anyone else that inflation was anchored. Instead, what does explain much of the decline is the simple fact that most workers nowadays cannot protect themselves by bargaining for higher wages. The paper then takes up the obvious question of why steep rises in interest rates have not so far led to big rises in unemployment. We show that recent arguments by Benigno and Eggertson that shifts in vacancy rates can explain this are inconsistent with the evidence. The biggest factor in accounting for the strength in the economy is the continuing importance of the wealth effect in sustaining consumption by the affluent. This arises, as we have emphasized in several papers, from the Fed’s quantitative easing policies. Absent sharp declines in wealth, the continuing importance of this factor is likely to feed service sector inflation in particular.
Topic:
Economics, Monetary Policy, Federal Reserve, Inflation, and Macroeconomics
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

306. Grand Strategy: Shield of the republic

Author:
Christopher McCallion
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Grand strategy is a state’s theory about how to provide for its own security. Leaders must decide how to best translate scarce means into political objectives. Limited resources and the high stakes of national survival force leaders to prioritize. Military power is dependent on wealth, industry, geographical endowments, population size, and effective domestic institutions. The various conditions in which states find themselves help motivate and constrain the grand strategy formulated by their leaders. The United States is still the most powerful, secure, and prosperous country in the world, with a favorable geographic position and many internal advantages. U.S. grand strategy has historically been concerned with preventing the rise of a regional hegemon in Eurasia by maintaining the balance of power. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States became the only great power in the world. Unfortunately, it squandered the “unipolar moment” by pursuing a costly and counterproductive grand strategy of “liberal hegemony,” which has left it overextended. The United States’ secure geostrategic position and the improbability of a Eurasian hegemon allows it to adopt a grand strategy of restraint. This shift will help the United States to preserve its power, minimize risks, and adapt to the rise of new great powers. This strategy requires the United States to adopt a more rigorous definition of its vital interests and to shift to its allies the main burden of defending themselves.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Geopolitics, Grand Strategy, and Unipolarity
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

307. Grand Strategy: The Balance of Power

Author:
Christopher McCallion
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The “balance of power” refers to the distribution of capabilities among states, as well as a possible equilibrium between them. A state’s military power is based on several factors, especially its economy and population. To survive in an anarchic world, states “balance” against rivals that threaten to become overwhelmingly powerful. This can include “internal balancing,” by which states build up their own capabilities, and “external balancing,” where states form alliances. Primacists and restrainers disagree about the balance of power. Primacists believe global hegemony is optimal and stable. Restrainers believe the pursuit of global hegemony is quixotic and self-defeating, leading to overextension and provoking counterbalancing by other powers. The United States is extremely powerful and secure thanks to its economy, geography, population, and military, among other factors. The prospect of a potential Eurasian hegemon emerging is remote. China is a formidable great power that warrants attention, but its geography makes expansion difficult, and it can be counterbalanced principally by other states in East Asia. A rough balance of power exists in both Europe and the Middle East, and therefore there’s no potential hegemon on the horizon in either region. The United States’ pursuit of primacy discourages allies from providing for their own defense to balance against threats, while uniting adversaries seeking to counterbalance the United States. The United States should instead encourage its capable allies to take responsibility for their own defense while seeking to keep its competitors divided through prudent diplomacy.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Grand Strategy, and Balance of Power
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

308. Challenges to Chinese blue-water operations

Author:
Mike Sweeney
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Despite having the world’s largest navy, important questions can be asked about China’s ability to challenge the U.S. Navy on a global scale. A number of factors—geography, logistical infrastructure, force structure, and command culture—all argue that China cannot do so at this time. In particular, China would need to significantly expand the number and caliber of its overseas bases in order to support large-scale, blue-water operations by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). China currently has just two overseas bases—at Djibouti and Cambodia—and both are of limited capacity. Absent such a basing network, the PLAN is reliant on at-sea replenishment, a capability that is inherently vulnerable in wartime. China possesses some quality at-sea replenishment vessels but not nearly in sufficient quantities to support widespread global operations. While Chinese naval aviation has shown important improvements over the last year, the PLAN does not appear to have the logistical capacity to sustain high-tempo carrier operations outside the First Island Chain for an extended period of time. Super-quiet Chinese nuclear submarines would be game-changers in terms of Chinese blue-water operations. But thus far China has not shown mastery of the requisite technologies to build boats with this capability. It would also take China several years to grow a fleet of super-quiet submarines once the necessary technological challenges have been solved. Structural issues with the Chinese economy raise new concerns about Beijing’s ability to fund a blue-water navy over the long term. Such calculations must include the expense of ship construction, but also the massive operations and maintenance budget needed to deploy a potential navy of over 400 ships.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Navy, Economy, and Submarines
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

309. Grand Strategy: Geography

Author:
Christopher McCallion
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Geographic distance and the current state of military technology interact to favor defense while diminishing the threat of conquest. The stopping power of water in particular obstructs the ability of even the most powerful states to project power overseas. Proximate land powers are the most likely to engage in security competition and conflict, while distant or sea powers are relatively isolated from potential adversaries. This strategic insularity is even greater if a state has a large and diversified economy and the resources to be relatively self-sufficient. The United States is separated from other great powers by thousands of miles of ocean to both its east and west, and is the most powerful, prosperous, and secure state in the world. However, many of the same conditions which make the United States secure also make it difficult to project power, carry out wars far abroad, and maintain military primacy on land in Eurasia. The United States should both embrace its abundance of security and accept the limits to its offensive power, using its position as a continent-sized maritime power to act as an offshore balancer rather than a hegemon on the flanks of the Eurasian landmass.
Topic:
Security, Grand Strategy, Geography, and Balance of Power
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

310. No silver bullet: Aid is not a shortcut to victory for Ukraine

Author:
Michael DiMino
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Delayed or insufficient Western aid is often blamed for Ukraine’s lack of success on the battlefield. The truth is more complicated. There is no aid “silver bullet” for what ails Ukraine’s war effort. More aid alone is unlikely to make a decisive difference in the outcome of the war, especially if Ukraine’s structural disadvantages and strategic deficiencies remain unaddressed. More aid is unlikely to fundamentally change the conflict because Ukraine lacks the manpower necessary to use it to generate enough new combat power to retake lost territory. Moreover, the West does not currently possess the industrial capacity needed to fulsomely sustain an indefinite Ukrainian war effort. Russian adaptability and battlefield innovation have successfully blunted the effectiveness of several Western weapon systems. And Ukrainian doctrine and tactics remain suboptimal even in the third year of the war, meaning Kyiv has failed to employ the aid it does receive with maximal effectiveness. Neither Washington nor Kyiv has articulated a clear theory of victory for Ukraine. Western aid was always a stopgap to buy Ukraine time, not a regime-change project to bring about the dissolution of the Russian state. Instead of continuing to placate maximalist fantasies of total victory, the U.S. should advocate for a shift to a defensive strategy and openness to a negotiated settlement that ends the war, such that a sovereign and independent Ukrainian state can be preserved in the face of fighting to collapse.
Topic:
Weapons, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and United States of America

311. A new NATO agenda: Less U.S., less dependency

Author:
Benjamin Friedman
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The United States should aggressively reduce its force presence in Europe. This would be consistent with NATO’s original balancing purpose and U.S. expectations then that garrisoning Europe was a temporary expedient, not a permanent tool of U.S. dominance. The Russian threat, despite being energized by NATO expansion, is insufficient to demand the current defense effort devoted to it in Europe, whether it’s Americans or Europeans making that effort. The results of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine underline this happy point: Russia has proven weaker than conventional wisdom held, and the advantages of defense evident in the war bode well for the territorial status quo NATO defends in Europe. A U.S. drawdown in Europe is unlikely to spark a European defense renaissance, but even so, the balance of power in Europe will remain intact, and the United States will be better off with the freed-up resources and reduced risks.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Russia-Ukraine War, Dependency, Balance of Power, and Burden Sharing
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

312. Grand strategy: Alliances

Author:
Christopher McCallion
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Alliances are usually temporary arrangements among states to counter—or “balance” against—a specific common threat. The United States’ Cold War alliances, by contrast, have become seemingly permanent. States tend to balance power when they face a major threat. Bandwagoning, by contrast, is a particularly poor option for states with the capability to put up a fight. When threatened, states tend to join forces in alliances rather than surrender their national survival to the whims of a more powerful aggressor. Alliances, however, entail costs and risks. These include the dangers of being drawn into war through entanglement and entrapment, the deleterious effect on deterrence by allies that neglect their defense by “free-riding,” and the moral hazard produced by enabling allies to act like “reckless drivers.” Over time, the United States has shifted from a deep skepticism of “entangling alliances” to a global network of security dependents that are treated as an end in themselves, rather than a means to an end. This posture has left the United States overextended, while encouraging allies to neglect their own capabilities and preparedness. The United States can and should significantly reduce its alliance commitments, particularly in Europe and the Middle East, where threats to the U.S. are remote and local powers can balance adversaries. In Asia, the United States should act as a backstop to the regional balance of power rather than a vanguard.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Grand Strategy, Alliance, Balance of Power, and Burden Sharing
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

313. Rethinking Africa Command

Author:
Mike Sweeney
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
As debate grows over U.S. policy towards Africa, consideration should be given to altering the continent’s status under the Department of Defense’s Unified Command Plan (UCP). Eliminating Africa Command (AFRICOM) under the UCP would both signify a policy shift away from a counterterrorism focus and ease the process of implementing that change within the policymaking bureaucracy. Establishing a three-star subcommand, nested under European Command (EUCOM), would still allow the United States to use force in Africa, when necessary, but would reduce the prominence of military power in U.S. policy toward the continent. AFRICOM and EUCOM essentially share much of their force structure; this unique relationship would facilitate the transition to the proposed three-star subcommand. Altering the U.S. military footprint in Africa should also be considered in the context of any changes to policy and command arrangements. Making specific recommendations at this time is complicated by the opaqueness of the current footprint.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Counter-terrorism, Africa Command (AFRICOM), and European Command (EUCOM)
Political Geography:
Africa, North America, and United States of America

314. A defensive approach to Ukraine military aid

Author:
Jennifer Kavanagh
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The next administration is likely to continue U.S. military aid to Ukraine to some degree, yet thus far decisions about what aid to provide have been reactive and not connected to any strategy. The United States should use its military aid to push Ukraine to adopt a defensive strategy that will be more sustainable for the Ukrainians given manpower shortfalls and more responsible and fiscally feasible for the United States, while also reducing the risk of Russian escalation. This would be in line with America’s priorities in Ukraine, including preventing a Russian victory and preserving a sovereign Ukraine at lowest possible cost and without direct involvement in the war. This strategy would also put Ukraine in a good position for a settlement that trades some land for a ceasefire and supports Ukraine’s longer-term defense. A Ukraine aid framework centered on a defensive strategy would see the U.S. provide air defense, anti-tank mines, the material and equipment to build fortifications, short-range artillery and limited short-range missile variants, small uncrewed aerial systems, and some armored vehicles for transport. In many cases, however, quantities would be limited by the needs of U.S. forces or other U.S. partners. The U.S. would not provide most types of aircraft, long-range missiles, tanks, or other weapon systems that are primarily offensive in nature and could cross a redline for Vladimir Putin.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Weapons, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and United States of America

315. The Practice, Promise and Peril of EU Lawfare

Author:
Steven Blockmans
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Power generates law and its interpretation, irrespective of whether it serves the cause of international justice. Despite its many shortcomings, the rules-based international order (RBIO) tries to advance that cause. But as a concept, the RBIO is now being rejected by China, Russia and parts of the so-called “Global South” for what they claim is the Western hegemonism and liberal values that underpin it. The fact that these countries have voluntarily signed up to the international covenants that enshrine the legal doctrines to strengthen the sovereign rights of weaker countries, especially in the context of economic relations, makes it hard to sympathise with the argument that the RBIO should be replaced by another concept, especially one that is advanced by autocracies. The RBIO has been partially shaped by the European Union (EU), a community of law that encodes the aspiration of “good global governance” in its constitutional DNA. With the waning “Brussels effect”—the soft power of EU law in shaping international rules and standards, the EU should consider how to instrumentalise the law to protect and promote its foreign policy interests, first and foremost the protection and promotion of the RBIO. This report unpacks the notion of “lawfare” and conducts a comparative analysis of such practices by the US, China, Russia, Ukraine, Turkey and others to assess the promise and peril of the EU using the power of the law to its strategic advantage.
Topic:
International Law, Sanctions, European Union, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, and United States of America

316. The Washington Summit: NATO-Ukraine

Author:
Henrik Larsen
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
NATO heads of state and government will gather in Washington on 9-11 July to mark the Alliance’s 75th anniversary. While a third year of full-scale war rages in Europe, they will need to guard the tone of their celebrations. But it would be remiss of the Allies not to recognise the importance and success of their organisation. NATO remains the essential transatlantic forum. It has had huge positive impact on security in Europe and elsewhere, built shared understanding and purpose among a growing number of members, and successfully adapted to decades of changing circumstances. There is much to applaud. But there is also work to be done. The summit’s main business will concern Ukraine, defence and deterrence, and burden-sharing. While there are unlikely to be big announcements, the summit should play a significant role in ensuring that the decisions taken in Madrid in 2022, and Vilnius in 2023 are properly implemented. This series of briefs examines some of the key issues for the Washington Summit. In the first brief of the series, Henrik Larsen looks at the additional steps NATO might take in Washington to help Ukraine defeat Russia’s aggression. There is seemingly no common appetite to advance Ukraine’s membership status, but the Alliance is likely to take a new role in coordinating the delivery of lethal aid. It may also agree an initiative to secure more stable longer-term financing of military assistance. Even so, it is hard to see that NATO’s support and solidarity represent a genuine commitment to Ukraine’s future security.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

317. The Washington Summit: Burden-sharing

Author:
Tony Lawrence
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
NATO heads of state and government will gather in Washington on 9-11 July to mark the Alliance’s 75th anniversary. While a third year of full-scale war rages in Europe, they will need to guard the tone of their celebrations. But it would be remiss of the Allies not to recognise the importance and success of their organisation. NATO remains the essential transatlantic forum. It has had huge positive impact on security in Europe and elsewhere, built shared understanding and purpose among a growing number of members, and successfully adapted to decades of changing circumstances. There is much to applaud. But there is also work to be done. The summit’s main business will concern Ukraine, defence and deterrence, and burden-sharing. While there are unlikely to be big announcements, the summit should play a significant role in ensuring that the decisions taken in Madrid in 2022, and Vilnius in 2023 are properly implemented. This series of briefs examines some of the key issues for the Washington Summit. In the third brief of the series, Tony Lawrence looks at the perennial question of burden-sharing. The Allies will probably not agree to raise the 2% of GDP spending guideline. But in any case, their focus on this metric hides the real picture of how responsibility for security is shared across the Alliance. The European Allies certainly need to step up in all areas, but they should also consider reframing the burden-sharing discussion.
Topic:
NATO, Defense Spending, Russia-Ukraine War, and Burden Sharing
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

318. Keeping the Americans In

Author:
Rachel Hoff
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
NATO heads of state and government will gather in Washington on 9-11 July to mark the Alliance’s 75th anniversary. While a third year of full-scale war rages in Europe, they will need to guard the tone of their celebrations. But it would be remiss of the Allies not to recognise the importance and success of their organisation. NATO remains the essential transatlantic forum. It has had huge positive impact on security in Europe and elsewhere, built shared understanding and purpose among a growing number of members, and successfully adapted to decades of changing circumstances. There is much to applaud. But there is also work to be done. The summit’s main business will concern Ukraine, defence and deterrence, and burden-sharing. While there are unlikely to be big announcements, the summit should play a significant role in ensuring that the decisions taken in Madrid in 2022, and Vilnius in 2023 are properly implemented. This series of briefs examines some of the key issues for the Washington Summit. The European Allies will closely watch this year’s US elections, concerned that a second Trump Presidency may have devastating consequences for transatlantic relations. In the sixth brief of the series, Rachel Hoff looks at US rhetoric and attitudes towards NATO. The good news is that polling shows that the majority of Americans are favourable towards NATO and support Article 5. But this support drops if the European Allies fail to meet NATO’s defence spending guidelines. Whoever wins the election in November, Europe will need to pull its weight to keep the US engaged.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Deterrence, Transatlantic Relations, Defense Spending, Russia-Ukraine War, and Burden Sharing
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

319. Ukraine’s Practical Steps towards NATO

Author:
Maksym Skrypchenko
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
NATO heads of state and government will gather in Washington on 9-11 July to mark the Alliance’s 75th anniversary. While a third year of full-scale war rages in Europe, they will need to guard the tone of their celebrations. But it would be remiss of the Allies not to recognise the importance and success of their organisation. NATO remains the essential transatlantic forum. It has had huge positive impact on security in Europe and elsewhere, built shared understanding and purpose among a growing number of members, and successfully adapted to decades of changing circumstances. There is much to applaud. But there is also work to be done. The summit’s main business will concern Ukraine, defence and deterrence, and burden-sharing. While there are unlikely to be big announcements, the summit should play a significant role in ensuring that the decisions taken in Madrid in 2022, and Vilnius in 2023 are properly implemented. This series of briefs examines some of the key issues for the Washington Summit. Ukraine recognises that while it is unlikely to be invited to join NATO any time soon, there is much it can do to prepare itself in advance of a formal invitation. In the final brief of the series, Maksym Skrypchenko describes Ukraine’s progress in implementing its defence reform agenda, focusing on its record of adopting NATO standards, and outlines the challenges of doing so in wartime. The continuing support of NATO Allies will be essential to these efforts.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Reform, Alliance, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

320. Japan, NATO, and the Diversification of Security Partnerships

Author:
Elena Atanassova-Cornelis, Takuya Matsuda, Bart Gaens, and Nele Loorents
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The US-led military alliances remain an integral part of the defence and deterrence strategies of countries in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic regions. Whereas the European security architecture is centred on a multilateral alliance, that is, NATO, the Asian security order is rooted in the hub-and-spokes system – the network of US-led bilateral alliances with key partners in Asia, such as Japan. Bringing in experts from Europe and Japan, this report examines the key shifts in the allies’ threat perceptions and strategic thinking on policy responses. It also explores the rise of informal security alignments designed to address both traditional and hybrid challenges and exemplified by the minilateral-type security cooperation pursued by Japan. Finally, the report zooms in on the growing interlinkages between security in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic regions, as evidenced by the deepened security ties between like-minded partners. The report argues that the Russian invasion of Ukraine should be seen as a critical juncture for alliance politics. Military alliances are now increasingly being operationalised to enhance military readiness and effectively generate combat power in case of a contingency. The US-Japan alliance, the report finds, should be perceived as a manifestation of some of the broad and enduring changes in the role of alliance politics in international security, which are observable both in the Western Pacific and Europe. While the US-led alliance remains a key pillar of the security and defence policies of the ‘junior’ allies, notably Japan, the report highlights the allies’ uncertainties about the sustainability of the American security commitments, both in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic region. Assessing Japan’s updated conceptualisation of security in the context of the Ukraine war and the rise of hybrid threats, the report detects a sense of urgency in Tokyo to develop a diverse set of capabilities and expand security partnerships. Australia, India, and the Republic of Korea remain a priority in terms of alignment cooperation. At the same time, the changing nature of security challenges is steadily raising the importance of cooperation with geographically distant partners, as seen in Tokyo’s evolving security partnership with the EU and NATO. Japan’s strategic partnership diplomacy exemplifies a broader trend of strategic diversification. Tokyo has been successful in utilising alignment policy to promote an interconnected network and accomplish issue-based, functional cooperation in various areas. From NATO’s perspective, addressing hybrid challenges requires collaboration with various actors, including geographically distant players. Minilateral and multilateral formats involving a small group of like-minded countries can provide NATO with the opportunity to work closely with Japan and other Indo-Pacific partners on specific issues, such as cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns.
Topic:
Security, NATO, European Union, Resilience, and Hybrid Threats
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Europe, South Korea, and United States of America

321. Advise, Assist, Enable: A Critical Analysis of the US Army's Security Force Assistance Mission During the War on Terror

Author:
John A. Nagl and Marshall Cooperman
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The U.S. Army struggled to build capable host-nation security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan because it did not give those security force assistance (SFA) missions the priority and support they deserved. Both the selection and training of U.S. advisors were highly flawed. The Army also struggled to ensure the selection of high-quality personnel into the host-nation forces. Much of the SFA effort was conducted in an ad hoc manner, without sufficient funding or strategic prioritization. Today, the Army has corrected many of the issues that plagued its SFA formations during the War on Terror by creating a permanent Security Force Assistance Command and six Security Force Assistance Brigades. It is essential for the Army to maintain and support these formations to ensure that the bitter lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan are not forgotten.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iraq, North America, and United States of America

322. The Realignment of the Middle East

Author:
Lior Sternfeld
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
In the Middle East, reality can change in the blink of an eye. Misconceptions and misrepresentations that dominate the public discourse have it that the region has been embroiled in war since time immemorial. Still, even its most recognizable conflict—the Israel-Palestine dispute—has been going on for only a century. This report will not focus on the history of that conflict but instead will try to analyze the realignment of the key players in the region and beyond and point out several pathways to build on in securing peace. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been the sole global superpower. The change in world politics and the demise of the Soviet Union did not end the perception of alliances as zero-sum games. The War on Terror, the debacle of Iraq and Afghanistan, the rise of movements such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, the Arab Spring, and the collapse of old state structures, somehow fortified this approach over a more nuanced and pragmatic approach. Since the early 1990s, China entered as a secondary force and slowly gained a different status. This report examines the changes the Chinese doctrine might bring to the geopolitics in the region. Furthermore, it will examine the role China has played in the reshaping of the Middle East as a multipolar region, the transformation in the American role, and identify areas where the United States can take advantage of the new multipolarity in the region in light of Chinese activity.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, History, and Realignment
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, and United States of America

323. Critical Minerals and Great Power Competition: An Overview

Author:
Jiayi Zhou and André Månberger
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
With global politics increasingly fractured, states are rushing to secure critical and strategic mineral supply chains. Each state conceptualizes mineral security differently, driven by a mix of imperatives that range from national development and industrial policy to technological and military dominance. Great power competition pervades all of these issue areas, and that competition may also pose risks at the global level: risks for the pace of green transition, risks of geoeconomic escalation and risks of conflict. This report provides an insightful overview of the mineral security policies of four key powers: China, the European Union, Russia and the United States. It describes the distinct ways in which they conceptualize mineral security, comparing their priority lists of critical and strategic minerals. It considers the wider imperatives that motivate their policies and assesses the implications for developing countries. The report concludes by reflecting on the need to mitigate the worst of the resultant risks through expanded dialogue with a wider set of stakeholders. The goal is a form of mineral security that can serve more broad-based, global developmental interests.
Topic:
European Union, Strategic Competition, Green Transition, Critical Minerals, and Great Powers
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

324. Cyber Risk Reduction in China, Russia, the United States and the European Union

Author:
Lora Saalman, Fei Su, and Larisa Saveleva Dovgal
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
This report provides an overview of cyber risk reduction terminology and regulatory measures within China, Russia, the United States and the European Union. It finds, among other things, that China and Russia excel at clear visuals and steps, yet they also tend to lack linguistic clarity. China, the USA and the EU possess interagency and public–private sector coordination, while facing jurisdictional overlap. All four actors are securing their supply chains, yet China and Russia face challenges with burdensome penalties for non-compliance, and the USA and the EU confront obstacles to enforcement at the state and member-state levels. This report is intended to provide a baseline for engagement among China, Russia, the USA and the EU on their respective approaches to cyber risk reduction.
Topic:
European Union, Cybersecurity, Public-Private Partnership, and Risk Assessment
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

325. Getting Ukraine to a Position of Strength: A Strategy for the Trump Administration

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Below are five reasons why Ukraine is important to US interests. 1. Protecting the US economy. North America and Europe account for nearly half of the world’s GDP. Two-thirds of foreign investment into the US comes from Europe, and 48 states export more to Europe than to China. This supports millions of American jobs. European stability, which Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine undermines, benefits the US economy and, by extension, the American worker. Aiding Ukraine helps preserve that stability. 2. Detering Chinese aggression. Russia is China’s junior partner. A weakened or defeated Russia means a weaker China. Beijing is watching how the West supports Ukraine. A strong and victorious Ukraine makes Taiwan appear stronger and deters Chinese aggression. 3. Succeeding in great power competition. Russia’s war against Ukraine is central to America’s great power competition against the Russia–China–Iran–North Korea axis. North Korea has provided 10,000 soldiers, millions of artillery shells, and hundreds of missiles to Russia in exchange for military technology. Meanwhile, Iran provides Russia with drones and ballistic missiles in exchange for fighter jets and other advanced capabilities. China’s technical, economic, and diplomatic support for Russia enables all this as part of Beijing’s strategy to undermine the US. 4. Preparing the US military enterprise for twenty-first-century warfare. Support for Ukraine has exposed major shortcomings in the US defense industrial base that can now be fixed. The war has also tested American-made military hardware in a way not possible in peacetime—with no American casualties. The US is learning what works, what does not work, and how systems evolve in combat. And as Ukraine receives US weapons, America replaces its own weapons stocks with newer, more effective systems. 5. Demonstrating strength. A successful Ukraine demonstrates American strength. However, acquiescing to Putin and abandoning partners shows the world American weakness. Even forcing Ukraine into a deal that lopsidedly benefits Russia would embolden US adversaries and cause America’s allies to hedge toward other security arrangements.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economy, Deterrence, Donald Trump, Strategic Competition, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

326. Key Takeaways: The Future of US and Allied Hypersonic Missile Programs

Author:
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Hudson Institute and Space Foundation cohosted a workshop with Congressmen Doug Lamborn (R-CO), Vince Fong (R-CA), and Donald Norcross (D-NJ), Admiral James A. Winnefeld Jr., and former Office of the Secretary of Defense officials Mike White and John Plumb to discuss the future of the United States military’s hypersonic missile and missile defeat programs.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Missile Defense, and Hypersonic Weapons
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

327. US-India Economic Ties: To the Next Level and Beyond

Author:
Aparna Pande
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
This executive summary outlines the key recommendations for policymakers that emerged from deliberations at the Takshashila Institution–Hudson Institute roundtable series “US-India Economic Ties: To the Next Level and Beyond.” Its recommendations are divided into four proposed areas for collaboration between India and the United States: trade and investment, ideas and human capital, technology, and methods and mechanisms.
Topic:
Economics, Science and Technology, Bilateral Relations, Investment, and Trade
Political Geography:
South Asia, India, North America, and United States of America

328. The Rise of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific and the Challenge of Deterrence

Author:
Kenneth R. Weinstein and William Chou
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The late Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe first introduced the concept of a free and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) in July 2016. Over the past eight years, FOIP has redefined the geopolitics of Asia, becoming central to the strategic visions of Japan, the United States, Australia, India, South Korea, key European nations, and the European Union. Every nation that has adopted FOIP has developed its own version of the concept. But FOIP still repositions the strategic geography of Asia, broadening the region from the Asia-Pacific, which placed a dominant China at the center, to the Pacific and Indian Oceans. This shift highlights the critical role of the four large democracies that comprise the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad)—Japan, India, the US, and Australia—a partnership the states revived with the ascent of FOIP. FOIP, moreover, offers a conceptual counter to the strategy of China’s One Belt, One Road (also known as the Belt and Road Initiative, or BRI) by engaging Australia and Europe on the importance of economic development assistance for, and investment in, Southeast Asia. The Trump administration’s rapid adoption of FOIP—the first time an ally’s strategic concept became central to US grand strategy—deepened America and Japan’s strategic alignment, which encouraged Tokyo to become more engaged in security and encouraged the US to become more engaged in economic development. The concept has made immense contributions to Indo-Pacific connectivity, prosperity, peace, and security. It has also been central to the Biden administration’s efforts to move away from the traditional hub-and-spoke alliance in which US partners worked directly with Washington as the hub but not with not each other, toward a lattice architecture in which like-minded allies (such as Australia, Japan, South Korea and the Philippines) are linked to each other in a mutually reinforcing effort to meet the region’s security challenges. However, a Hudson Institute tabletop exercise conducted for this study showed the limitations of FOIP as a strategic doctrine. Specifically, it cannot induce either friendly or less-friendly ASEAN countries to openly aid Taiwan if the People’s Republic of China seeks either to invade or impose a blockade. FOIP, nonetheless, remains central to promoting prosperity and connectivity in the Indo-Pacific. In the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan refashioned FOIP and focused on promoting agreement around minimal international norms that Russia violated. To enhance regional trust, Kishida highlighted an “Indo-Pacific way,” which would enhance regional resilience by mitigating natural disasters through cooperation under Japanese leadership and enhancing maritime security. Herein lies the security paradox behind FOIP: The concept can extend the network of partners and allies dedicated to Indo-Pacific security. This, in turn, may reduce the burden America bears by shifting it to other nations. But for the time being, FOIP rests upon the foundation of US deterrence.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Alliance, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Japan, India, Australia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

329. Deterring China: Imposing Nonmilitary Costs to Preserve Peace in the Taiwan Strait

Author:
John Lee and Lavina Lee
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The United States, Australia, and other allies have spent decades downplaying the prospect of conflict with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), offering Beijing incentives and concessions to assuage its ambitions, and managing their differences with China by seeking to deescalate tensions when they arose. In more recent times, when there is an emerging consensus that the decades-long approach to China has failed, policymakers have elevated deterrence as the urgent priority. This report makes the following key points. First, the case for urgency in the context of deterring Chinese force against Taiwan is clear.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, Sanctions, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Australia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

330. Strengthening Implementation of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act

Author:
Olivia Enos
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Since 2017, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has carried out a comprehensive campaign against the Uyghurs, a Muslim minority group predominately based in Xinjiang, China. Beijing is holding an estimated 1.8 million Uyghurs in political reeducation camps, subjecting more than 3 million to some form of forced labor, and seeking to reduce the Uyghur population through forced abortions and sterilizations. Because of this and other evidence, the United States issued an atrocity determination declaring that Uyghurs face ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity. The atrocity determination was incredibly important as it spurred follow-on action from the US and other governments. The passage of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) was one of the more powerful actions following the US determination. The UFLPA created a “rebuttable presumption” stating that the government would bar all goods produced “wholly or in part” with Uyghur forced labor from entering US markets. The UFLPA was signed into law in December 2021 and enforcement provisions went into effect in June 2022. Now, more than two years after its passage, trendlines are emerging, and policymakers can now evaluate the law’s effectiveness and ascertain new means for mitigating Uyghur forced labor. The CCP has not stopped targeting Uyghurs, and in fact has subjected even more of them to forced labor. Today, the CCP operates what some analysts believe is the largest state-sponsored forced labor program in the world. Given the CCP’s ongoing exploitation, the onus is on the US and the international community to curtail this egregious practice. At a minimum, democratic leaders need to ensure that citizens of the free world are not inadvertently supporting the continuation of these abuses. For the UFLPA to be maximally effective, Washington should complement it with comprehensive sanctions implementation and a secondary sanctions regime that targets entities aiding and abetting in the CCP’s enslavement of Uyghurs. Moreover, other countries need to close their markets to goods produced with Uyghur forced labor. To that end, the US and other countries can coordinate better to implement strong measures similar to the UFLPA. Perpetrators of Uyghur forced labor need to pay financially for their crimes through fines and forfeiture. Finally, the US should offer financial remedies to help survivors of the CCP’s ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity. While the UFLPA was a notable development in the fight against Uyghur forced labor, more has to be done to ensure the end of Uyghur forced labor. The international community needs to join together to hold the CCP accountable and protect Uyghur rights.
Topic:
Legislation, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Uyghurs, Freedom of Religion, Forced Labor, and Implementation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

331. Effective US Energy Policy Could Strengthen International Security

Author:
Brigham McCown
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
America faces significant geopolitical risk across multiple theaters of operation. With the post–Cold War peace dividend depleted, today’s multipolar political alignment reflects an instability not seen in nearly 100 years. Russia, Iran, and China are directly challenging the American-led world order. Their goal is clear, and the United States cannot allow them to prevail. While Russia’s disregard for the rule of law and internationally established boundaries preoccupies the near term, an emerging great power competition between the West and China looms over Washington’s mid- to long-term foreign policy priorities. Additionally, Iran’s malign influence has led to a resurgence of violence and instability in the Middle East. Closer to home, socialist and anti-democratic governments in the Western Hemisphere are again wooing voters with the failed and discredited policies of yesteryear. As a new geopolitical status quo emerges, the United States will need a secure source of energy. Energy security can be defined as a country’s ability to ensure the uninterrupted availability of reliable and affordable energy sources. It encompasses the stable supply of energy resources, the resilience of energy infrastructure, and a country’s ability to meet its current and future energy demands while also dealing with emergencies, natural disasters, and geopolitical tensions that could disrupt supply. A responsible energy mix promotes national and economic security while providing a realistic pathway to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. This will include hydrocarbons, renewables, nuclear, and lower-emitting energy sources such as geothermal, hydroelectric, and biofuels. However, the glue that binds any stable energy transition is a key bridge fuel: natural gas. Liquified natural gas (LNG) is critical to meet global energy demand and reduce emissions while promoting American energy security and economic stability worldwide. Yet, the Biden administration recently announced plans to restrict US natural gas exports, directly affecting America’s key allies. In this environment, lawmakers should reflect upon their previous missteps before implementing energy policies that will make the regulatory environment more unstable and unpredictable. Lessons from the Past and Present During World War II, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s drive to build an arsenal of democracy required American energy resources. The US supplied 85 percent of the oil and gas the Allies used,1 including 90 percent of aviation fuel by 1944.2 Ever since then, energy security has been necessary for creating and maintaining peace. Recent events have brought the relationship between energy, economics, and national security back into acute focus. Last year marked the fiftieth anniversary of the Arab Oil Embargo, a reminder of the shortsighted energy policies that gave away America’s energy independence and made the US reliant on Middle Eastern oil for decades. The anniversary coincided with Europe’s struggle to sustain itself following the removal of Russian oil and gas from the market.3 That struggle is not over,4 and the collapse of certain European industrial sectors is ongoing as the continent’s energy prices remain elevated (see figure 1). Drawing on these lessons from history and recent events, below are four principles to guide the future of American energy policy.
Topic:
Energy Policy, National Security, International Security, and Natural Gas
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

332. The Western Innovators of the Mobile Revolution: The Data on Global Royalty Flows to U.S. and Europe and Why It Matters

Author:
Adam Mossoff
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The mobile revolution has radically altered our world in ways that were imagined only as science fiction a mere thirty years ago. Western innovators launched this revolution in creating its foundational telecommunications technologies; thus, it is unsurprising that private companies in the United States and Europe receive payments for the use of their telecommunications technologies, which is compensation for the billions in investments and decades of research and development of these inventions. The majority of the commercial implementers—the companies that make and sell consumer products that use these telecommunications technologies like smartphones or connected cars—are in Asia. China in particular has an increasingly growing share of these implementers across all sectors of the global innovation economy. This explains in part China’s domestic industrial policies that seek to lower the royalties paid by its national companies like Huawei or Oppo. Evidence-based policymaking should guide U.S. and European laws and regulations. Data confirm the critical role of reliable and effective patent rights, the rule of law, and courts using due process to resolve disputes have been essential for Western innovators creating the modern world—and will drive the technologies of tomorrow in the internet of things (IoT) and artificial intelligence (AI).
Topic:
Science and Technology, Intellectual Property/Copyright, Innovation, and Telecommunications
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

333. U.S. foreign policy, Cold War history, and history of capitalism: An interview with Fritz Bartel.

Author:
Fritz Bartel and Asensio Robles
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Toynbee Prize Foundation
Abstract:
It is an exciting time for Cold War historiography. Long gone are debates that were once central to the field, such as those about the origins of the Cold War and the responsibilities for its emergence. Perhaps the most important aspect of the Cold War for our present, some historians now argue, was not its outbreak but its end. Why did the Eastern bloc collapse in the late 1980s? How was it possible for this collapse to occur without triggering major international and domestic turmoil (Romania’s case notwithstanding)? And why did neoliberalism prevail over other economic paradigms in the new post-socialist democracies? Answering all these questions has become an urgent task in light of today's war in Ukraine, the continuing rise of populism, the growing delegitimization of liberal democracies, and the exhaustion of neoliberalism and globalization as reliable agents of growth in post-industrial societies. These are precisely the three big questions that Fritz Bartel sets out to answer in The Triumph of Broken Promises: The end of the Cold War and the Rise of Neoliberalism (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 2022). Bartel’s book offers a picture of the end of the Cold War that has at its core a particular interpretation of the nature of the East-West conflict. Eastern communism and Western capitalism shared the same base: the Cold War was a politico-economic contest between two industrial ideologies over how best to ensure the continued social and economic well-being of their own populations. As such, both systems were largely successful during the golden years of post-war economic growth. However, if Western capitalism ultimately won the Cold War, Bartel argues, it was because Western liberal democracies proved to be much more flexible and capable of breaking their socio-economic promises in an increasingly globalized world than the Eastern Bloc after the 1973 oil shock. It was not geopolitics that ultimately decided the end of the Cold War, but rather the different strategies that East and West chose in a world increasingly shaped by oil, international finance, the exhaustion of extensive economic growth, and globalization. I had the pleasure of interviewing Bartel on December 5, 2023. What follows is a summary of our discussion about the origins of The Triumph of Broken Promises, its place in today's literature on U.S. foreign policy and Cold War history, and the lessons this book might have for our turbulent times.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Cold War, History, Capitalism, Neoliberalism, Interview, and Historiography
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

334. Defending Europe with less America

Author:
Camille Grand
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Russia’s war on Ukraine has revealed the sorry state of European militaries and defence industries after decades of peace dividends, as well as their deep reliance on the US. A second Trump presidency could drastically reduce US defence support for Europe. But regardless of the outcome of the US presidential election, the degradation of the European security environment and the shifting priorities of the US mean that Europe needs to be prepared to take more responsibility for its own defence. Europeans require a sustained plan over the next decade that combines immediate efforts to support Ukraine and rebuild readiness, and longer-term goals to develop a “full force package”, including the combat support capabilities and key enablers that are currently provided primarily by the US. Paradoxically, such a deliberate approach to overcoming institutional challenges and strengthening Europe’s defence capabilities may be the best way to preserve a strong transatlantic relationship and a degree of US commitment.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

335. Trump’s tinderbox: US politics and the next war in the Balkans

Author:
Adnan Ćerimagić and Majda Ruge
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Over recent years, Serbia’s government and Serb nationalists elsewhere in the Western Balkans have increased their revisionist agitation in the region. They recently adopted an “all-Serb declaration” that seeks to overturn the post-Dayton settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and claims Kosovo as an inseparable part of Serbia. Though some international observers have criticised the Biden administration for its concessions to Aleksandar Vucic, Serbia’s president, it deserves credit for containing Belgrade’s ability to realise its ambitions and preventing two worst-case scenarios: the disintegration of the Bosnian state and armed escalation between Serbia and Kosovo. That fragile status-quo would come under significant threat from a new Trump presidency in the US. Among other risks, his second administration may seek to reverse sanctions that have constrained separatist appetites among Bosnian Serbs and to revive dangerous proposals for a Serbia-Kosovo land swap. Peace in the region is at stake. Particularly in the event of a Trump victory on 5 November, the EU should prepare a package of new deterrence mechanisms that it can apply in the Western Balkans independently from the US and spoiler member states like Hungary. And in either eventuality, it should take more responsibility for stabilising the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Donald Trump, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Serbia, Balkans, North America, and United States of America

336. Wars and elections: How European leaders can maintain public support for Ukraine

Author:
Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
As Russia’s war on Ukraine approaches its second anniversary, the European Parliament and US presidential elections are also on the horizon. Against this backdrop, Vladimir Putin is banking on war fatigue in the West to help achieve a Russian victory. European public opinion can inform Europe’s leaders about how best to make the case to continue support for Ukraine in this difficult environment. Europeans seem pessimistic about Ukraine’s chances of winning the war, while a plurality think it will end in some kind of settlement. But most Europeans are not in the mood for appeasement either. They would be disappointed if Donald Trump were to be re-elected, and many believe his victory could also be a win for Putin. In most member states, a plurality would want Europe to maintain its current support or increase it in the event of the US scaling down its aid. Leaders in Ukraine and Europe need to adjust their language and define the meaning of a ‘durable peace’ to prevent Putin taking advantage of war fatigue.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Armed Conflict, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

337. Nuclear Danger and the NPT

Author:
Henry Sokolski
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
Next month, the second Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) preparatory review conference will meet in Geneva. In anticipation of this international conference, NPEC is releasing Nuclear Danger and the NPT, an edited volume of research on what nuclear dangers await and how proper enforcement of the NPT can help. The hope is that the volume’s analysis will prompt constructive debate. It certainly is needed. Within ten years, there is a distinct possibility South Korea, Japan, the UAE, Egypt, Turkey, and Iran may decide to acquire nuclear weapons. After that, Algeria, Finland, Sweden, Ukraine, and Australia may be sorely tempted to do the same. More could follow. What is fueling these grim prospects? Several things: Growing Russian, Chinese, and North Korean nuclear capabilities and threats; Russian forward basing of nuclear weapons in Belarus; waning allied confidence in U.S. nuclear security guarantees; and an increasing acceptance of dangerous civilian nuclear activities that bring states to the brink of bomb-making. Legally, the NPT is supposed to prevent these troubles. The question is will it? Much depends on what major nuclear powers choose to do regarding their NPT commitments and how smaller, nonnuclear nations view the treaty. Nuclear Danger and the NPT is designed to help clarify what that requires. Earlier this year, NPEC released an occasional paper on the challenges of creating a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East. Such challenges will surely be considered at the upcoming NPT review conference, but there will be more issues up for discussion. Attendees will likely debate the future of U.S. and Russian nuclear sharing arrangements, as well as the limits of what should be considered “peaceful” under the NPT. Iran’s threatened withdrawal from the treaty will also be a concern, as will China’s worries over the potential for Washington to redeploy nuclear weapons to South Korea or for Seoul to acquire its own nuclear weapons. The U.S. delegation is likely to raise complaints about China’s nuclear weapons build up and Beijing’s unwillingness to enter into good faith negotiations on effective nuclear controls. Finally, Russia’s assaults on Ukraine’s civilian nuclear systems and the legitimacy of such assaults are likely to be discussed. Nuclear Danger and the NPT covers all of these topics in depth. For hawks and doves, Washington insiders, and simply concerned citizens, it’s worth reading.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, Nuclear Energy, and Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, South Korea, Global Focus, and United States of America

338. China, Russia, and the Coming Cool War

Author:
Henry Sokolski
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
As the dust settles on the election, one thing is certain: there is going to be increased interest in expanding America’s nuclear arsenal. Whatever the merits of what that move might be, it’s hardly a complete strategy to cope with a long term strategic contest, Russia, China, and their proxies. That will require far more than any adjustment of our nuclear arsenal. What’s required? At the request of several national security officials and outside experts, NPEC is sharing its answer with today’s release of China, Russia, and the Coming Cool War available as an Amazon book. It consists of four chapters. The first sketches out what a long-term contest with China, Russia, and its proxies will demand. Although building up military might and using threats of massive destruction against our enemies were critical to winning the Cold War, in the coming cool contest, they will no longer serve as our top ace in the hole. Instead, the key levers will be keeping our key military, political, and commercial functions immune to attacks and communicating, protecting, sharing, and analyzing essential information on an unprecedented scale. Wars may be waged against nations but the aim increasingly will be to disable them without physically obliterating them. What, though, should we do about the growing nuclear threat? That’s the focus of the book’s next chapter, “Xi and Putin Are Building More Nukes: How to Compete.” It, in turn, is followed by “What Missile-driven Competition with China Will Look Like,” which was first released three years ago. The Pentagon recently confirmed this chapter’s predictions about China’s development of intercontinental conventional missiles by 2030. The chapter’s other forecasts and military and diplomatic proposals are still timely. This brings us to the book’s last chapter, “Can Self-Government Survive the Next Convulsion?” It examines the domestic political, economic, and social implications of pursuing this volume’s recommendations. What’s needed most is a geographic distribution of America’s critical military and financial infrastructure and demographic capital. Fortunately, this has already begun, driven by the COVID-19 pandemic, and aligns with America’s bent to spread and increase political power and wealth domestically. The book’s final section is an appendix consisting of an introduction Thomas Cochran and I co-authored for “China’s Civil Nuclear Sector: Plowshares to Swords?” — a three-year NPEC study of China’s nuclear weapons production potential. The Pentagon has cited this research in each of its annual Chinese military power assessments for the last three years running. The Pentagon has used the study to help explain why China is likely to acquire as many nuclear weapons in a decade as the United States currently has deployed. It was this projection, perhaps more than any other, that caused national security analysts to focus on what is likely to be a long-term strategic contest with China and its new ally, Russia. Paul Bracken, author of The Second Nuclear Age, reviewed the book: “China and Russia’s military buildups have far-reaching political and strategic consequences. Yet the US is not remotely prepared to cope either intellectually or with appropriate hardware. Henry Sokolski takes a major step forward here by analyzing these challenges and what we need to do about them.”
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, Strategic Competition, and AUKUS
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America

339. Undoing a Hybrid Regime: What Lessons Can Be Extracted from the Case of North Macedonia?

Author:
Nazif Mandaci
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:
International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:
This study primarily aims to draw attention to the role of the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) in North Macedonia’s1 transition from a hybrid regime to a standard democracy from 2015 to the present. The stability of the country has been of paramount importance for the Western interests, thus the EU and US have continuously supported successive governments to uphold the de-facto powersharing system that prevailed since its independence in the early 1990s. By employing Levitsky and Way’s theoretical framework of linkage and leverage, this study aims to elucidate the decisive roles played by the EU and the US in cultivating the conditions necessitated for North Macedonia’s gradual democratic transition after 2015. To do this it addresses political developments in North Macedonia, discusses the problems that aroused during this transition period, which are inherited in a lack of democratic culture and widespread corruption, and finally, suggests that as the Macedonia example demonstrated, EU support and tutelage is critical during such challenging transitions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Corruption, Democratization, European Union, and Hybrid Regime
Political Geography:
Europe, United States of America, North Macedonia, and Western Balkans

340. Nuclear Verification’s Holy Grail: Verifying Nuclear Warheads — a new approach

Author:
Miles Pomper, William Moon, Marshall Brown, Ferenc Dalnkoki-Veress, Dan Zhukov, Dick Gullickson, and Yanliang Pan
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
This study is the culmination of four years of work to think through what would be required to track and monitor nuclear warheads in a verification process. It first began in 2021, shortly after President Joe Biden of the United States and President Vladimir Putin of Russia extended the New START Treaty until February 2026; the two presidents also announced the launch of bilateral strategic stability talks. This positive moment in the U.S.-Russian relationship, which became almost unimaginable after the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, was the original impetus for the project. It also launched in the aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal from the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, commonly known as the INF Treaty. The Russians had been violating the Treaty with the production and deployment of the 9M729 missile, also known in NATO parlance as the SSC-8. All NATO allies concurred with the withdrawal, which the United States completed in August 2019. The effort began with two strands of activity. The study team knew that when the United States and Russia decided to return to the negotiating table, the United States would place a high priority on seeking direct limits on warheads. Prior treaties had focused on controlling and eliminating missiles but had not focused directly on the warheads that armed them. It had long been a goal of the United States to seek direct limits on warheads, in order to more accurately constrain a Russian preponderance in warheads designated for theaterand shorter-range systems.1 However, if such an agreement were negotiated, the European allies would be ill-equipped to participate. On-site inspections under the INF Treaty had ended on May 31, 2001, so it had been twenty years since the allies had had to participate in verification activities. Most had lost expertise and institutional memory; some had never participated at all. “Raising the IQ” of the NATO allies about participating in arms control implementation was thus the first strand of activity. The second strand grew up around a conviction in the study team that the well-practiced verification techniques that had been exercised in INF and strategic arms control treaties since the 1980s could be augmented with new technology and innovative techniques. Thus emerged the emphasis on using cryptography to underpin a unique warhead tracking system. This work took advantage of some of the finest experts in the field of cryptography at Stanford University, and also the extensive experience gained during the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s many years of work to strengthen warhead protection, control and accounting in Russian Ministry of Defense nuclear warhead storage facilities. This work, which spanned a period of over fifteen years from 1995- 2013, provided the study team with a great depth of knowledge about the normal operating procedures in Russian military warhead facilities. This deep knowledge was vital to developing a concept for the tracking system, providing it with a realism and accuracy that otherwise would not have been possible. These two strands of work culminated in 2022 in a significant study, “Everything Counts: Building a Control Regime for Non-Strategic Nuclear Warheads in Europe.”2 However, the team realized that only one element of warhead verification had been touched—the broad outlines of a system for maintaining and exchanging information over the life of an agreement. Other verification elements such as on-site inspections and particular verification technologies had not been considered. They therefore resolved to expand the scope of work to imagine an entire closed system for nuclear warhead verification. With the cryptographic element as its foundation, the team reviewed the extensive experience of treaties, agreements and other activities such as exhibitions and joint experiments that had been built up over the many years of U.S.-Soviet and Russian cooperation on nuclear weapons control. From this, they created a comprehensive menu of measures that could be considered for a future warhead control regime, calibrating the measures according to the level of their intrusiveness.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Russia and United States of America

341. The Future of NATO’s Nuclear Posture and Arms Control in Today’s More Dangerous World

Author:
Miles Pomper, David Santoro, and Nikolai Sokov
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
Since the late 1960s, NATO has sought to balance two objectives—maintaining a strong nuclear deterrent while supporting efforts to buttress strategic stability through arms control and advance nonproliferation and disarmament through the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty process. The success of this strategy was most evident in the dual-track strategy of deployments and negotiations that led to the signing and implementation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987. The end of the Cold War also led to substantial cuts in U.S. and Russian strategic systems. Since then, NATO Allies have regularly voiced their support for continuing to pursue these two objectives, including supporting the goal enunciated by U.S. President Barack Obama in 2009 “to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.”1 In the last decade, however, Russia’s malign behavior has undermined NATO arms control efforts to the point that it appears traditional arms control will be effectively dead when the New START agreement—already suspended by Russia—expires in 2026. Russian’s invasion of Ukraine, its repeated nuclear saber-rattling in that conflict, and the deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons to Belarus has also forced the alliance to look to ways to enhance its deterrence, including its nuclear deterrence. Meanwhile, the massive increase in China’s nuclear arsenal and its growing partnership with Russia, is generating additional pressure to increase U.S. nuclear forces as well as questions about the ability of the U.S. to provide extended deterrence simultaneously to Allies in Europe and Asia. Those doubts have been reinforced by political developments in the United States—and in the war in Ukraine—that have raised anxieties about a decoupling of European and U.S. deterrence and defense and led to fresh discussion of a potential “Eurodeterrent.” Meanwhile, developments in North Korea and Iran—and their increasingly close ties with Moscow—further threaten the viability of the already shaky nuclear and missile nonproliferation regimes and have eroded longstanding cooperation between Washington and Moscow to manage nuclear nonproliferation risks in third countries. In response to these developments, Allies and experts, such as the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, have proposed various adaptations to the alliance’s nuclear posture, including to its nuclear sharing arrangements. This report examines these deterrence proposals, particularly considering how they support the alliance’s other longstanding objectives of arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation. The paper begins with some background on US/NATO nuclear policy from the end of the Cold War to the further invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. It then delves into changes in Russian nuclear doctrine, Moscow’s nuclear behavior during the Ukraine War, and the Kremlin’s views on future arms control. The report next discusses China’s nuclear modernization and views on arms control and the reaction among NATO and Asian Allies and the international community to these changes. It then discusses potential future U.S. and NATO posture options, including those already being undertaken by NATO or proposed by the US. Congressional Strategic Posture Commission and the State Department’s International Security Advisory Board. It concludes with an analysis of the potential impact of various options on arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation and offers some policy recommendations.
Topic:
NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

342. The Great Depression as a Savings Glut

Author:
Victor Degorce and Éric Monnet
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:
New data covering 23 countries reveal that banking crises of the Great Depression coincided with a sharp international increase in deposits at savings institutions and life insurance. Deposits fled from commercial banks to alternative forms of savings. This fuelled a credit crunch since other institutions did not replace bank lending. While asset prices fell, savings held in savings institutions and life insurance companies increased as a share of GDP and in real terms. These findings provide new explanations of the fall in credit and aggregate demand in the 1930s. They illustrate the need to consider nonbank financial institutions when studying banking crises.
Topic:
History, Great Depression, Banking Crisis, Savings, and Thrift
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

343. Kubernetes: A Dilemma in the Geopolitical Tech Race

Author:
Sunny Cheung
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
US-sanctioned Huawei has significant influence in the Cloud Native Computing Foundation and its open-source platform Kubernetes, which underpins US military platforms, including F-16 fighter jets and nuclear infrastructure. The use of open-source technologies in critical systems raises concerns. Despite US efforts to mitigate risks, Kubernetes remains tempting to exploit for attackers. Open source fosters global innovation, from which the United States benefits. But this same openness also strengthens US competitors. The United States should therefore develop a clear framework to understand and mitigate the challenges posed by open source.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Sanctions, Geopolitics, Innovation, Strategic Competition, and Huawei
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

344. Perils of the U.S. Defense Budget: Silver Lining or Dark Abyss?

Author:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
“Don’t tell me what you value. Show me your budget and I’ll tell you what you value.” When President Biden said this in 2022, the world was in a different state. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine was struggling in the face of a surprisingly determined Ukrainian military. The Middle East had its unique but expected challenges, including Iran’s nuclear program. And President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was seeking an unprecedented third term as Communist Party chief. Barely two years later, Ukraine is at best in a stalemate with Russia and, at worst, is faltering. Houthi militants, with materiel support from Tehran, have on a near-weekly basis attacked US and Western ships in the Red Sea. An emboldened Xi is becoming more assertive in the South China Sea, and the PRC has lobbed ballistic missiles over Taiwan for the first time. If the US defense budget in 2022 valued a set of national security priorities—funding Ukraine, countering the PRC, supporting NATO—those priorities are coming under threat in this year’s defense budget.
Topic:
Security, Budget, Geopolitics, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

345. Next-Generation Perspectives on Taiwan: Insights from the 2024 Taiwan-US Policy Program

Author:
Bonnie S. Glaser, Joshua Stone, Alicja Bachulska, Viking Bohman, and Francesca Ghiretti
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The papers in this compendium were written by 11 members of the 2024 Taiwan-US Policy Program (TUPP) delegation: Alicja Bachulska, Viking Bohman, Francesca Ghiretti, Heather Hwalek, Leland Lazarus, Lauren Racusin, Friso Stevens, Joshua Stone, Brian Volsky, Theresa Winter, Adrienne Wu. Transatlantic attention to Taiwan has surged in recent years for several reasons. First, Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has led to increased concern in the United States and Europe that Beijing’s growing military capabilities and declining confidence in its ability to achieve peaceful reunification will soon lead the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to attempt a takeover of Taiwan by force. The cost of such a war would carry a price tag of around $10 trillion, equal to about 10% of global GDP, according to Bloomberg Economics, far higher than the economic impact of the 2008 global financial crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the war in Ukraine. The devastating impact of a Taiwan Strait conflict has provided a wake-up call for leaders in Europe who now echo the Biden administration’s warnings to PRC leader Xi Jinping to refrain from using violence to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. In addition, Taiwan is now a regular agenda item in the US-EU Consultations on the Indo-Pacific and the US-EU Dialogue on China. Second, intensifying US-China strategic competition has increasingly focused on technology with chips at the center. Taiwan produces more than 60% of the world’s semiconductors and more than 90% of the most advanced ones. A single company, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC), manufactures most of those chips. Recognition of Taiwan’s dominant role in the semiconductor supply chain has provided another reason to bolster deterrence. It has also sparked interest in “friendshoring” and “onshoring” semiconductor manufacturing. TSMC plans to start production at its first fab in Arizona in 2025 and will break ground on another in Dresden at the end of 2024 with an estimated completion date of 2027. Recognizing the rising geopolitical risks and their own strategic dependencies, the United States and the EU have made building resilient supply chains a priority, especially in semiconductors. In its 2021 Indo-Pacific Strategy, Brussels explicitly committed the EU to engaging with Taiwan in creating resilient supply chains. Third, rising concern in the United States and Europe about election interference and disinformation have sparked interest in learning from Taiwan’s experience in combatting such threats. In the run-up to the January 13, 2024, presidential and legislative elections, PRC attempts to interfere in Taiwan’s politics surged to unprecedented levels through economic coercion, direct political meddling, displays of military force, and manipulation of social media. As the United States and many European countries prepare for their own national elections this year, they are engaging with experts from Taiwan to better understand PRC tactics and the tools that Taiwan successfully employed to counter PRC interference. Fourth, the United States and Europe increasingly recognize that Taiwan’s vibrant and successful democracy is under threat from an authoritarian regime. Taiwan has received high marks for protecting political rights and holding free and fair elections. Taiwan’s democratic achievements are even more impressive when set against the backdrop of a deterioration in freedom worldwide. Like other industrialized democracies, Taiwan faces a multitude of challenges that are especially difficult to address in the face of PRC efforts that prevent Taiwan’s government and its people from interacting with the world. Taiwan’s exclusion from international organizations also hampers the world’s ability to develop effective solutions to myriad problems. The Taiwan-US Policy Program (TUPP) was launched in 2017 to encourage young professionals from the United States to include Taiwan in their research and help Taipei expand its global networks. In 2022, TUPP was expanded to include young professionals from Europe in support of GMF’s mission of promoting transatlantic cooperation. TUPP enables future leaders to acquire a deeper understanding of Taiwan and its relations with the United States through meetings with officials and experts in Washington, DC, followed by a visit to Taiwan to gain first-hand exposure to its politics, culture, and history. Experiencing Taiwan influences how these future leaders approach their work and their writing. It impacts their worldview by imbuing them with an appreciation for Taiwan’s history and commitment to the principles of democracy and human rights that undergird the existing international order. It also reinforces the importance of maintaining robust bilateral relations and strengthening international support for maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. The 2024 TUPP cohort traveled to Taiwan in February for an intense week of meetings and activities. Each participant gained insights into Taiwan and its role in their respective fields. This year’s delegation comprised five Americans and five Europeans. Over time, TUPP seeks to create a body of global experts with firsthand knowledge of Taiwan who support sustaining and expanding its international ties. I am grateful to the Henry Luce Foundation, the Global Taiwan Institute, and the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy for their support of this goal. The contributions here, written by the entire 2024 TUPP delegation, underscore the importance of deeper study and understanding of Taiwan. I sincerely hope that they stimulate continued transatlantic and global interest in Taiwan and its future.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, Geopolitics, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Taiwan, Asia, Poland, Germany, Latin America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

346. Protecting Undersea Infrastructure in the North American Arctic

Author:
Heather A Conley, Sophie Arts, Kristine Berzina, and Frida Rintakumpu
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
In response to recent incidents damaging undersea energy infrastructure and communication cables in the Baltic Sea and High North, NATO countries have intensified their focus on critical undersea infrastructure (CUI) protection on the national, bilateral, and multilateral levels. Allies in the North American Arctic can build on important NATO initiatives but, given distances and the unique operating environment in this theater, the responsibility for protecting CUI assets in territorial waters will fall primarily to the United States, Canada, and the Kingdom of Denmark. CUI in the North American Arctic is currently limited. But climate change, the green energy transition, and greater reliance on artificial intelligence (AI) will increase the demand and opportunity to expand communication cables and energy infrastructure in the region. At the same time, increased traffic and resource exploration heighten the vulnerability of these assets, especially to deliberate attack from Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Both powers rely on dual-use assets that increase plausible deniability, and they continue to develop undersea warfare capabilities. To enhance resilience and protect CUI in the North American Arctic, the United States and its NATO allies are strongly encouraged to: • urgently upgrade US as well as NATO allies’ situational awareness and presence in the air, space, and undersea domain, cooperating closely with the private sector • prioritize and upgrade the role of NATO’s Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM) to conduct CUI threat assessments and identify assets that are especially vulnerable due to their strategic importance, location, complicated ownership structure, or symbolic value • expand US and NATO response options to counter hybrid threats and deter CUI attacks; consider establishing an additional maritime high-readiness force • increase NATO’s presence to protect and defend nearby assets during and after Russian and PRC naval maneuvers • build on NATO’s Digital Oceans Initiative to enhance and integrate unmanned systems and AI information processing tools into exercises and operations • identify counterparts in other national governments to ensure quick and seamless information sharing following CUI incidents • deepen public-private cooperation as well as government oversight over privately owned CUI to incentivize the private sector’s CUI resilience (e.g. fortifying cables, integrating monitoring capabilities, and ensuring adequate repair capabilities) • clarify responsibilities of CUI protection and defense across the civil, military, and private sectors, including the transition of responsibilities from the Department of Homeland Security to the Department of Defense in crisis situations • train and exercise crisis decision-making processes with the involvement of all relevant actors (including the private sector and state and local authorities) on the national, bilateral (Canada and the Kingdom of Denmark), minilateral, and multilateral levels • clarify and enhance legal frameworks to respond to CUI incidents in territorial and international waters, and share best practices across all sectors • use pro-active strategic communication to outline legal and military authority in responding to CUI incidents, attributing attacks, and enhancing deterrence against future threats.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Infrastructure, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, North America, Arctic, United States of America, and Baltic Sea

347. Time Is Almost Up

Author:
Martin Quencez and Gesine Weber
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The transatlantic partnership has long neglected structural weaknesses. Unless corrected, they could soon doom it. Download PDF 2025 will open a new chapter for the transatlantic relationship. The outcome of the US presidential election will accelerate ongoing changes in the country’s approach to Europe, while a rapidly shifting security environment will compel the partners to reform their alliance. The next year presents an important opportunity to do this, especially as the terms of the European Commission and the US president coincidentally align. When Joe Biden was elected four years ago, many European leaders expressed the hope that, in the president’s words, “the US is back” in the transatlantic relationship. The change of administration in Washington could have constituted an opportunity for the transatlantic partners to “seize the Biden moment”, but critical reforms never took place. Instead, the Democrat’s election relieved many European governments, prompting a continued reliance on muddling through critical challenges rather than developing European responses to them. The US administration, for its part, did not sufficiently pressure Europeans to play a greater role in world affairs. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine forced Europeans and the EU to respond with costly and unprecedented measures, but these policies remain to this day largely disconnected from a broader political discourse of the war as an “existential” threat to the future of the European project. Europe’s avoidance of such big-picture issues has negative implications for its ties to the United States. The current transatlantic relationship suffers from four major challenges that, unless tackled in the next four years, could lead, at best, to its dysfunction and, at worst, to its implosion. These challenges are: security-related structural problems, intra-alliance competition and policy toward China, a European gamble on time, and a widening power gap between the United States and Europe. Transatlantic Security Reform: Ukraine Has Muted The Debate The swift, coordinated, and strong reaction of the United States and Europe to the war in Ukraine is undoubtedly the most significant moment of transatlantic unity in recent years. US military and strategic leadership, and Biden’s personal involvement in overcoming Congressional resistance to supporting Ukraine, will constitute the cornerstones of his legacy in Europe. The continent has also done its part, providing significant military and humanitarian support—at times even surpassing that from the United States. All this has brought the transatlantic partners closer together while bolstering public approval of NATO. Sustaining unity on Ukraine, although an outstanding diplomatic and political success, has, however, overshadowed a more complex picture of the transatlantic relationship. The war’s outbreak put American security guarantees for Europe in the spotlight, but more contentious policy issues have been neglected. Prioritizing Ukraine over other aspects of the transatlantic relationship was justified, but it prevented the allies from preparing for potential future crises. This is unsustainable and dangerous. Persistent security-related structural problems may seem paradoxical. After all, 23 of the 32 NATO allies finally invested, as pledged a decade earlier, at least 2% of GDP in defense in 2024. The EU has also stepped up its efforts in this area. Nevertheless, two underlying problems fester. First, Europe’s chronic capability shortage means the United States still contributes more than 65% of the NATO allies’ total defense spending and 38% of their military personnel. NATO’s so-called European pillar remains underdeveloped, and Europe cannot defend itself on its own. Second, European and transatlantic security suffers from a lack of imagination. The Biden administration has demonstrated that it can defend the European security order, and Europeans have unquestionably overcome many political taboos to support Ukraine, but policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic have been unable, or unwilling, to develop a vision for a needed new security order. A post-Cold War approach to alliance management has led the Biden administration and many European allies to preserve a form of status quo while the world undergoes considerable change. At the same time, there remains in certain political circles a desire to recreate the prewar relationship with Moscow, especially as a chronic lack of political leadership in key Western capitals impedes the development of an ambitious strategic agenda. Transatlantic leaders have repeatedly and rightly stated that Ukrainians will decide when they stop fighting, but this stance hides the lack of transatlantic consensus on a postwar European order.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Transatlantic Relations, and Presidential Elections
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

348. TikTok Tactics: 2024 US Candidates Dance Around Security Risks

Author:
Lindsay Gorman, Caitlin Goldenberg, and Isabella Nieminen
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Despite TikTok’s ongoing national security risks, 2024 candidates in US House, Senate, gubernatorial, and secretary of state races continue to use the platform to reach voters. Since its emergence onto the social media scene in 2016, viral video app TikTok has exploded in popularity, dominating the screentime of a reported one billion monthly active users worldwide today. This year, the app’s user base has made it an all-but-unavoidable tool for US presidential and vice-presidential candidates, who have used TikTok to make their bids to voters. Yet researchers and lawmakers’ initial national security concerns surrounding the potential for malign influence due to TikTok’s ownership ties to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have only become louder as additional voices in Washington and beyond have joined the chorus. To address these concerns, in 2024 Congress passed and President Biden signed House Resolution (HR) 7521 to force TikTok to divest from its PRC-based parent company ByteDance or face a ban in the United States. This was mere months before the president’s campaign joined the platform itself. As election day fast approaches, a wide swath of federal and state candidates are seeking to leverage TikTok’s popularity with GenZ users. In October 2022, the Alliance for Securing Democracy (ASD) at the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) produced a report documenting how US midterm candidates employed TikTok to reach voters and boost campaign visibility. This year, ahead of the 2024 US general elections in November, ASD and the GMF Technology Program researched the question of whether TikTok use among US Senate, House, gubernatorial, and secretary of state candidates has increased, and how candidates have continued to harness TikTok in campaigns. After two years, Democrats still outweigh Republicans on TikTok use, TikTok’s sluggishness in verifying candidate accounts has worsened, and political TikTok styles are beginning to mature.
Topic:
National Security, Social Media, Domestic Policy, and TikTok
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

349. Pivotal Powers 2024: Innovative Engagement Strategies for Global Governance, Security, and Artificial Intelligence

Author:
Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer, Sharinee Jagtiani, Kristina Kausch, Garima Mohan, Martin Quencez, Rachel Tausendfreund, and Gesine Weber
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
States outside the transatlantic alliance have gained leverage in international affairs in recent years and, with that, the potential to significantly reshape the global order. Engagement with these "pivotal powers", which include Brazil, Indonesia, India, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Türkiye, is of paramount importance for Europe and the United States. "Pivotal Powers 2024: Innovative Engagement Strategies for Global Governance, Security, and Artificial Intelligence" offers tactics for enhancing Western cooperation on global challenges with these countries. This report builds on GMF reports from 2012 and 2023.
Topic:
Security, Governance, European Union, Geopolitics, Artificial Intelligence, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Africa, Turkey, Middle East, India, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

350. International Order Strategies: Past and Present

Author:
Aaron McKeil
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
At an important time in foreign policy planning, a new era of “strategic competition” widely noted by policymakers in Washington and allied capitals has produced a new wave of strategic thinking and evolving strategic practices aiming to maintain or modify “international order”. This collected research report aims to clarify how strategies for international order are being understood and formulated today, and how this strategic thinking and planning differs from past eras of strategic competition, toward an assessment of its policy implications today. Dr. Aaron McKeil convenes the International Orders Research Unit at LSE IDEAS. He is Academic Director of the LSE Executive MSc International Strategy and Diplomacy Programme at LSE IDEAS. He holds a PhD International Relations from the LSE. His forthcoming book with the University of Michigan Press explores the collapse of cosmopolitan globalism and rise of strategic competition.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Strategic Competition, and International Order
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America