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251. Food Defence: The Securitisation of the Food Supply

Author:
Elaine Leão Inácio de Melo Andrade, Gilberto Carvalho de Oliveira, and Otniel Freitas-Silva
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Contexto Internacional
Institution:
Institute of International Relations, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro
Abstract:
The notion of food defence emerged in the USA following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, reflecting the idea that the food sector constitutes a critical infrastructure for national security and that the food system must be defended against intentional acts, motivated by political or ideological reasons, that could cause large-scale damage to public health or the economy. This study draws on primary documentary sources on food defence, including government guidelines, laws, norms and regulations issued mainly in the USA, as well as secondary bibliographic sources related to the topic, and draws on insights from securitisation theory in order to show that food defence discourses, norms, guidelines and practices connect to a process of social construction of threats and risks, linked to the frameworks of bioterrorism and biodefence, subjecting the food sector to a process of securitisation. Based on this analysis, we aim to contribute, firstly, by deepening the problematisation of food defence, adding to the debate a political and security dimension. Without this discussion, we argue it is not possible to understand, rigorously and accurately, food defence’s defining core and its specificities within the conceptual constellation of food protection. Secondly, by resorting to the food defence case, we hope to contribute empirically to illustrate an expanded version of securitisation, drawing attention to the importance of a more eclectic and integrated look at the discursive and non-discursive aspects and the different logics that operate in the social construction of security.
Topic:
Food Security, Bioterrorism, Biodefense, Securitization, and Protection
Political Geography:
United States of America and North America

252. ‘Maximum pressure’ sanctions on Venezuela help US adversaries, hurt Venezuelans

Author:
William Tobin
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The “maximum pressure” strategy employed from 2018 to 2022 against the illegitimate Nicolás Maduro regime in Venezuela did not serve US interests. Stringent oil sanctions imposed on Venezuela forced the retreat of Western oil firms from the country, principally benefitting adversaries. During the maximum pressure campaign, Venezuela’s oil production was rerouted to China at discounted prices, Iran supplied the diluent Venezuela required for oil production, and Russian investors became more critical amid a dearth on Western investment. A democratic transition remained elusive while repression and human rights violations continued. Venezuelans suffered, US adversaries expanded their influence, and Maduro remained. The current system of issuing specific licenses for Western oil producers to operate in Venezuela has yielded superior results. The benefits of this policy have been the following: Venezuelan oil exports have been diverted to friendly nations. Treasury has increased visibility on all oil-related transactions, decreasing the clandestine shipment of oil through shadow tanker fleets operated by the Chinese defense establishment, Iran, or PDVSA. Compensation to the regime is limited to taxes and royalties, which are required by Venezuelan law. The system has enabled the return or reemployment of qualified engineers and technicians to restore production from degraded oilfield infrastructure. The incoming US administration should prioritize inflicting more harm on the regime and its enablers than the Venezuelan people—or US interests. To do so, sanctions must be linked to clear objectives. An uncalibrated reapplication of maximum pressure would cede influence to China, Russia, and Iran, while doing little to loosen the regime’s grip on power. Instead, the existing system of specific licenses should be maintained and expanded. To punish Maduro, the administration should continue to target individuals who enable his illegitimate rule, adding to the 180 individuals already sanctioned by the Treasury. A targeted sanctions policy—not maximum pressure—is the only way to ensure that US actions to confront the Maduro regime impose their desired effect, and do not play into the hands of Beijing, Moscow, or Tehran.
Topic:
Markets, Governance, Sanctions, Geopolitics, Economy, and Energy
Political Geography:
South America, Latin America, Venezuela, and United States of America

253. Open-Source AI is a National Security Imperative

Author:
Mike Sexton
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
America’s footprint in artificial intelligence is prodigious, and it is hard to overstate how consequential this is for the American national interest if it further develops with the right balance between innovation and guardrails. Into this new technology are two divergent directions on the basic structure of the innovation: open-source or company controlled. ChatGPT is the latter model and was developed and licensed by OpenAI. Meta’s LLaMa is an example of open-source AI.1 In this paper, we explore the benefits and drawbacks of open-source AI and conclude that open-source can help balance the safety and security we want from AI with the innovation necessary to set the standard for the world. Both models are right for innovation, safety, and competition. The increasing sophistication of AI raises concerns about risk. One of the chief issues is open-source AI, which a user can run without the developer’s supervision. History shows us that the benefits of open-source software are real but diffuse and nebulous; meanwhile its greatest risks are tangible but mostly hypothetical. Encryption is an example of an open-source success. It is an open-source dual-use technology that vexes the US government. But accepting and adapting to it has been more farsighted than fighting it. Almost every smartphone in the world runs an American-made operating system thanks in large part to Android being open-source. We should not assume the development of open-source AI will necessarily follow the same trajectory. Open-source AI increases the likelihood that no single AI chatbot corners the consumer market and that America remains the innovation leader in AI.
Topic:
National Security, Artificial Intelligence, Science and Technology, ChatGPT, OpenAI, and Innovation
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

254. 10 Years of Observing US-Russia Relations (09/18/2025)

Author:
Timothy Frye, Samuel Greene, Nina Khrushcheva, Maria Snegovaya, Joshua Tucker, and Alexander Cooley
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
The Harriman Institute
Abstract:
Please join the New York University Jordan Center for the Advanced Study of Russia and Harriman Institute at Columbia University for the concluding event in the New York-Russia Public Policy series, held in person at NYU. This panel of four distinguished researchers and commentators on Russia will reflect on a decade of observing U.S.-Russia relations, how the two countries represent their relations and understand their interests, and the challenges inherent in communicating the many nuances of these relationships. Our panelists will also speculate on what we are likely to see in the next decade to come.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Bilateral Relations, and Democracy
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

255. Hegemony and International Alignment

Author:
Fernando Broner, Alberto Martin, Josefin Meyer, Christoph Trebesch, and Jiaxian Zhou Wu
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
This article explores the interplay between economic hegemony and political alignment. Using theoretical and empirical insights from Broner et al. (2024), we posit that hegemonic states, such as the U.S., foster political alignment, which enhances globalization. We use UN voting data to proxy for international alignment and show that hegemons induce alignment. This data has shortcomings, however. UN voting only covers the post-WWII period, refers to a narrow set of issues, and displays little time variation. As for military alliances, they were not widely used before the mid-20th century. We propose an alternative measure of alignment based on international treaties.
Topic:
Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Political Economy, Treaties and Agreements, Hegemony, Multipolarity, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

256. Minerals diplomacy as geoeconomic statecraft: Implications for resource security priorities in a rapidly changing world

Author:
Cordelia Buchanan Ponczek
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Critical raw materials (CRMs) and rare earth elements (REEs) are essential for defence, emerging technologies, and the energy transition. However, supply chains remain highly concentrated, with China dominating much of the refining and processing. Asymmetries and choke points highlight the need to control these resources. Minerals diplomacy has become a central tool for geoeconomic actors, including the US and the EU, to secure CRMs and REEs, often through deals with resource-holding third countries. This creates new partnerships while heightening competition to bind third-party countries, which, in turn, seek to assert their agency. Minerals diplomacy blends cooperative, coercive, and binding elements, as governments combine bargaining, leverage, and deals to maintain access to critical resources. States are also deploying creative solutions, such as recycling and reusing mining waste, to reduce external dependencies and enable more self-reliant systems, but this requires effective public-private cooperation. The intensifying contest for CRMs and REEs exposes governance gaps. Accounting for local perspectives, establishing stronger international oversight and global benchmarks, and ensuring equitable outcomes could ease competition, give third-party countries a greater voice, and serve as a tool of geoeconomic soft power.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Economy, Trade, Supply Chains, Minerals, Energy, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

257. The geoeconomic turn in the Americas: The Dominican Republic at the centre of Washington’s return

Author:
Lauri Tähtinen
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
The tide is turning rapidly as the United States shifts its response to China’s industrial rise, with Washington returning to the Western Hemisphere in search of not only new trade relationships but also industrial, foreign, and security policies. This shift reflects a geoeconomic turn in the Americas, where economic actors – from drug cartels to critical supply-chain partners – are increasingly treated as security concerns, blurring the line between commerce and security. The Dominican Republic is positioning itself as a partner in both the joint development of the Americas and US security. Its growing alignment with the United States reflects global shifts elsewhere, such as in Finland’s relationship with Washington. The Dominican Republic’s sustained economic growth and its location between the US territory of Puerto Rico and the region’s security challenges place it at the centre of Washington’s attempt to re-engineer hemispheric value chains and security partnerships.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Economic Growth, Trade, Supply Chains, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
Latin America, North America, and United States of America

258. Global development in crisis: Responding to America’s retreat

Author:
Sarah S. Stroup
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
A definitive shift in both resources and rhetoric has upended the global development sector. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the policies of the new US administration, although many European states had already started reducing foreign aid budgets earlier. Beyond its vicious rhetoric and wrecking-ball approach, the Trump administration’s arguments echo three long-standing critiques that development professionals have made themselves. Development experts in the US and Europe argue that development goals have become too broad, aid has failed to reach local actors, and the sector is too technocratic and removed from the concerns of Northern publics. A renewed focus on poverty reduction, combined with power-sharing abroad and public engagement at home, may provide answers to these critiques. Achieving development outcomes may require focusing less on providing direct assistance and more on reducing the harms created by Western states in other arenas, including trade and finance.
Topic:
Development, Foreign Aid, and Budget
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

259. Jordan and the October 7th War: Between National Interests and Palestinian Solidarity

Author:
Ronen Yitzhak
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
In the latest issue of Tel Aviv Notes, Ronen Yitzhak examines the effects of the October 7 war on the politics and stability of Jordan.
Topic:
Politics, Bilateral Relations, October 7, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Jordan, and United States of America

260. Safeguarding U.S. interests in a Ukraine war settlement

Author:
Jennifer Kavanagh
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The United States should pursue a peace deal in Ukraine that serves America’s best interests, even when these diverge from its European partners. The primary U.S. objective should be to achieve a “lasting peace” that endures over the long term. A final settlement of the Ukraine war should address five key issues: territory; ceasefire terms; arrangements for Ukraine’s future security; stabilizing relationships between Russia and NATO and Russia and the United States; and mutual assurances between Russia and Ukraine. Full resolution of all five dimensions would not be required to end a “hot war,” however. Issues of territory will be determined on the battlefield, and any ceasefire should be maintained with a demilitarized zone and some combination of a neutral, international monitoring force and remote and autonomous technologies, lke drones and sensors. Offering Ukraine a binding security commitment is not in U.S. interests, whether through NATO or otherwise. Instead, the best option is “armed neutrality,” which would leave Ukraine without external guarantees but help it build a credible, self-sufficient deterrent—with Europe leading the provision of military aid. Mutual security assurances between Ukraine and Russia, including restrictions on locations of forces and weapons, can reduce the risk of renewed conflict. The Trump administration should use willingness to talk about the future U.S. role in Europe’s security as a bargaining chip to get Russia to make necessary concessions. The United States gives up little by discussing these issues of high political value to Russia. Some changes in U.S. posture in Europe may also advance U.S. efforts to shift defense burdens to allies and partners.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

261. Grand strategy: The limits of military force

Author:
Christopher McCallion
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Since the Cold War, the United States has engaged in a number of military conflicts abroad, yet despite its preponderant military power, it has been unable to translate force into political success, especially when it comes to nation-building. In the absence of another great power to constrain it, the United States initiated regime change wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, but by the same token it lacked an external imperative to devote the resources needed to achieve its ambitious nation-building goals. As costs and casualties mounted, public opinion soured. Policymakers thought U.S. technological superiority would keep casualties in these conflicts low and the attractiveness of liberal values would make nation-building easier. They underestimated how much coercive power would be needed on the ground to maintain order and the popular consent necessary for legitimate governments to emerge. Later attempts to intervene abroad with limited or no boots on the ground, as in Libya and Syria, were similarly unsuccessful, leaving vacuums of power, failed states, and long-term civil wars. Policymakers need to become more sober about the limits of military power. The United States’ abundant security means that it would benefit from more diplomacy and deal-making with adversaries, rather than threatening to overthrow or sanction their regimes.
Topic:
Security, Cold War, Regime Change, Grand Strategy, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

262. Achieving burden-sharing: Retrenchment vs. conditionality

Author:
Brian Blankenship
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Observers and practitioners are frequently frustrated at the level of defense burden-sharing in U.S. alliances—alliance members’ contributions to collective defense objectives—and particularly at allies’ low level of investment in their own defense. This paper compares two approaches to soliciting burden-sharing in U.S. alliances: retrenchment and conditionality. Retrenchment refers to reductions in the amount or timing of wartime assistance the United States will provide to allies, including troop withdrawals. Conditionality, in turn, relies on threats to abandon allies unless they increase their defense efforts and does not necessarily entail reducing protection. Retrenchment may offer the greatest chance of success, particularly in cases where allies doubt the credibility of the United States’ threats to abandon them. Conditionality is likely to be nearly as effective as retrenchment in many other cases, particularly those in which allies take the U.S. threat of abandonment seriously and there is a compelling external threat. Retrenchment and conditionality can be complementary strategies. Retrenchment is effective in cases where conditionality is likely to fail, while conditionality is effective in cases where the United States might be unwilling to retrench due to fears that a revisionist power might seek regional hegemony. Burden-sharing is not without its downsides, including allies potentially desiring nuclear weapons. These risks might be greater if the United States retrenches but may not materialize in practice and are not necessarily insurmountable.
Topic:
NATO, Alliance, Defense Spending, and Burden Sharing
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

263. On Limited Nuclear Use in the Western Pacific

Author:
Mike Sweeney
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Introduction Would China or the United States use nuclear weapons in a conflict over Taiwan? If so, what would that look like in practice? This paper examines that dark prospect. It unfolds as a series of queries designed to highlight the key factors that could influence limited nuclear use in a war in the Western Pacific. Firm answers to these questions are not always forthcoming. The exact decision-making calculations related to nuclear employment—from both the Chinese and U.S. side—are impossible to state definitively in advance of the actual moment when such weapons might be utilized. Rather, the paper’s intent is to provide the reader insight into the issues that come into play when debating nuclear use in a Taiwan contingency. The goal is less hard answers and more a basis for further conversation. Examining nuclear use in the Western Pacific obviously should not be conflated with endorsing it. But avoiding nuclear employment in practice might hinge, in part, on better understanding the circumstances where it could come into play in advance. At a minimum, realistic examinations of nuclear use in the Western Pacific can further raise awareness of the escalation risks in any conflict over Taiwan.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Weapons, Armed Conflict, Escalation, and Firms
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

264. Target Taiwan: Limits of allied support

Author:
Lyle Goldstein
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The United States is counting on its allies for assistance in defending Taiwan, but alliances are hardly a cure-all for Taiwan’s defense. Australia has fought alongside America in every war for the last century, but there is little reason to think Canberra’s participation in a Taiwan scenario would make a serious difference, even taking into account the much-heralded AUKUS deal of 2021. South Korea is a powerful U.S. ally, and India is a growing and important partner, but neither is likely to meaningfully participate in a prospective Taiwan war. While certain East Asian countries, such as the Philippines, can offer access to advantageous locations, they will add no genuine military capability. Nor will European forces be involved at any more than a symbolic level. Japan is far and away the most important of America’s allies with respect to Taiwan, and Tokyo has been pushing hard for Washington to more fully embrace Taiwan’s defense. However, it’s unlikely Tokyo is ready to pull its weight in a war with China over Taiwan. Instead, Japan would likely opt for a middle way, refraining from dispatching military forces while allowing U.S. forces to use its bases.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Partnerships, Alliance, and AUKUS
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, South Korea, Philippines, and United States of America

265. The New Geopolitics and South Asia’s Trade Architecture – What Next?

Author:
Ganeshan Wignaraja, Amit Bhandari, and Aliasger Bootwalla
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations
Abstract:
Geopolitics is increasingly intertwined with the economic destiny of South Asia. Even before the U.S. tariffs were rolled out, growing polycrises had hit the global economy, which has been struggling since the pandemic. South Asia seems a relatively bright spark of regional trade and growth. This paper analyses South Asia’s trade architecture in the backdrop of a sluggish world economy in the 2020s, and makes recommendations for closer regional economic integration.
Topic:
Economics, Geopolitics, Economic Growth, Tariffs, and Trade
Political Geography:
South Asia and United States of America

266. Hague Summit Series: Recalibrating Relations with Russia

Author:
Katarzyna Zysk
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
At their 2024 Summit in Washington, NATO leaders reiterated that Russia “remains the most significant and direct threat” and that “the possibility of an attack against Allies’ sovereignty and territorial integrity” could not be excluded. They committed to reassess and overhaul NATO’s strategy and policy towards Russia in the light of the radically altered security environment.[1] In the run-up to the Hague Summit, debates have intensified over whether to declare the 1997 NATO–Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security (NRFA) void.[2] Russia’s blatant violations of the act, including repeated acts of military aggression, extensive nuclear coercion and escalation in the grey-zone, large-scale military build-up, and, in particular, its brutal war against Ukraine have made the document increasingly untenable as a foundation for mutual relations. Moscow has openly declared itself at war with the west for years, yet it has simultaneously exploited the reassurance measures embedded in the document to undermine NATO’s security and cohesion.
Topic:
International Relations, Defense Policy, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and United States of America

267. Hague Summit Series: NATO-Ukraine

Author:
Tony Lawrence
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Russia's war in Ukraine shows few signs of ending. Across Europe, there is a widely held view that the outcome of the war will be critically important to determining the continent's future security: Ukraine must prevail. This view, however, does not appear to be shared by the second Trump administration which, after a brief attempt to negotiate a (unjust) solution, seems unable to deliver on the president's campaign promise to bring peace, in particular if this involves being tough on Russia. Differences between the US and most European Allies regarding both the conditions for ending the war and Ukraine's longer-term integration into Euro-Atlantic security structures present one of the greatest dangers to the transatlantic relationship in the years ahead. More immediately, uncertainty about how to handle these differences presents the greatest risk that NATO's forthcoming summit in The Hague will not be seen as a success.
Topic:
NATO, European Union, Peace, Armed Conflict, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and United States of America

268. Hague Summit Series: The Central Issue. Defence Spending

Author:
Felix Gasper
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In 2014, the NATO Allies agreed that within a decade, they would spend at least 2% of their GDP on defence. Following Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and war in the Donbas, and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the European Allies have focused more on strengthening their military posture. Donald Trump's insistence that Europe should take larger responsibility for its own security and the doubts he has sown regarding America’s commitment to its NATO obligations have strengthened European resolve and emphasised the need for the continent to foster greater military independence, including from the US. Trump’s vigorous return to these ideas at the start of his second term will make defence spending, in particular the Secretary General’s proposal for a new NATO target, the key agenda item for The Hague Summit.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

269. Hague Summit Series: Trump and the Rebalancing of NATO

Author:
Joshua C. Huminski
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The perception that the US has turned its back on or is in the process of separating from Europe and continental defence and security is certainly understandable. Naturally, there is a focus on the noise of President Donald Trump’s rhetoric rather than the signal of his policy intentions. While there remains and will remain significant transatlanticism at nearly every level of government, Congress, and across the ecosystem of policy institutions and industry, there is a growing appreciation of the drivers of the president’s policies within these circles. In many ways, the Trump agenda towards NATO is a practical recognition of new realities, and more a long overdue re-balancing of the transatlantic relationship to reflect the administration’s geostrategic worldview and domestic priorities.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

270. Small Drones, Big Problems: Managing the Unmanned Threat to the Homeland

Author:
Aaron Stein
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Drones are everywhere. From the battlefields of Ukraine to the suburbs of New Jersey, it has become increasingly common to find small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) in the sky. In the United States, there are now over one million lawfully registered sUAS platforms. The proliferation of sUAS in the civilian population has created a flood of reporting to law enforcement agencies across a variety of scenarios. Quite often, a civilian hobbyist simply flies their sUAS “too close to the sun” and encroaches upon restricted airspace around either civilian or military critical infrastructure. However, there have also been cases of foreign actors operating sUAS in an attempt to reconnoiter specific targets or locations. There are now so many sUAS incidents occurring that it makes for an easily exploitable environment for malign activities by state or non-state actors. Making things even more dangerous, our research shows that quite often, no one knows who to call when a sUAS incident occurs. While officially the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has primacy over sUAS incidents, our research (and the FAA’s own database) shows that local law enforcement is often contacted after sUAS incidents, and cases are often closed as soon as they are opened, without confirmed reporting to the FAA. As a result, Department of Defense (DoD) entities charged with homeland defense, such as US Northern Command (NORTHCOM), are often left without knowledge of sUAS incidents, and cannot observe and monitor trends adequately to support development of adequate countermeasures. They also do not have the authorities to counteract the threat, even when sUAS activity upends military training exercises. To mitigate this threat, the US government should consider: Establishing a Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF). Maintaining a single, consolidated reporting database for any sUAS activity over critical infrastructure on an unclassified network. Mandating NORTHCOM to lead DoD efforts within this new JIATF and work with Congress on updated legislation to codify proper authorities for US agencies and the military to thwart UAS intrusions.
Topic:
Weapons, Drones, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), Warfare, and National Security
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

271. Nuclear Weapons In Space: Orbital Bombardment and Strategic Stability

Author:
Aaron Stein
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
In 2015, a new space race began. Blue Origin, a privately owned company, landed a booster on a launch pad back on earth, after lifting an object 100 kilometers into the atmosphere. SpaceX quickly followed suit, landing its own Falcon booster back on a pad for use again for later space flight. The dramatic drop in the cost of space launch has revolutionized how humans now use space. SpaceX now operates thousands of satellites in large constellations and a bevy of private companies have hundreds of privately owned satellites now circling the globe taking images of every surface of the planet. Ukrainian soldiers, fighting against the Russian army, use satellite internet to coordinate fires and fly small drones over the front lines. In response to this revolution in space, American adversaries have invested in the tools to hold these satellites at risk. Russia is reportedly experimenting with a nuclear-armed co-orbital satellite, a program that has links back to the early days of the Cold War. China has invested in anti-satellite weapons and, in yet another throwback to Soviet Cold War behavior, invested in an orbital bombardment system to overcome any future deployment of space-based missile defenses. The United States is in an advantageous position. Its space private sector has no true competitor. The dramatic decrease in the cost of space launch has made space-based missile defense more feasible than ever before. However, the moves by U.S. adversaries to hold at risk U.S. assets in space require new thinking about how to protect those same assets, deter the use of nuclear weapons to target large constellations, and to defend against the novel ways adversaries are now experimenting with to defeat space-based missile defense. The U.S. should consider how to repurpose current missile defense interceptors to hold any Russian co-orbital satellites at risk, make explicit that any nuclear attack on U.S. origin satellites would invite retaliation, continue to invest in sensors to detect missile launch from adversary nations (including those fired south to travel over the South Pole), and to be the insurer of last resort for private satellites that could be destroyed by a hostile act.
Topic:
National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Space, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
North America, United States of America, China, and Russia

272. Seven Inaccuracies about US Support for Somaliland

Author:
Joshua Meservey
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Amid reports that President-elect Donald Trump’s administration may consider recognizing the self-governing coastal region of Somaliland as independent from Somalia, Somali Ambassador to the United States Dahir Hassan Abdi wrote an op-ed arguing that the US should support a unified Somali state. But the ambassador’s argument relies on numerous inaccuracies. Those are detailed below. 1. Somalia currently has territorial integrity, and recognizing Somaliland would break that integrity. The Somali government does not currently have territorial integrity. Islamist terror group al-Shabaab still controls parts of the country. Somaliland has not been functionally a part of Somalia for decades. And Puntland and Jubaland frequently defy Mogadishu. Arguments premised on fictions are irretrievably broken. 2. The US-Somalia partnership has “bolstered regional stability.” The region is as unstable as it has been for decades. 3. “Clan-based ambitions threaten to fracture Somalia’s national cohesion.” There is no national cohesion to fracture, in part because clans remain the fundamental ordering principle of Somalia’s society. Rather than denying that reality, Somalis should build a highly decentralized order that accounts for their preeminent loyalty to clan. The US and its partners should stop pretending that a strong centralized government can work in Somalia. 4. “The United States must remain committed to Somalia’s sovereignty within its recognized 1960 borders—an enduring policy that has helped stabilize one of the world’s most strategically vital regions.” This is one of Abdi’s strangest claims. Somalia has consistently been among the least stable countries in the world since 1969, and it has in turn caused massive regional unrest. US policy built on the fiction that Somalia is a unified nation with territorial integrity has demonstrably failed. 5. “A divided Somalia would distract the central government from counterterrorism operations and disrupt the successes already achieved.” Again, Somalia is already divided. Also, Mogadishu already allows all sorts of things, usually petty political squabbles, to distract it from fighting al-Shabaab. The Somali government’s easily distracted nature has proven time and again that it is not a competent counterterrorism partner for the US. 6. “A unified Somalia . . . can foster transparency, attract responsible investment, and ensure its people benefit from [the country’s] resources—all while reinforcing the stable environment in which US interests can flourish.” The Somali government cannot achieve these lofty goals because Somalia is not unified. Decades of experience demonstrate the country will continue to be divided for the foreseeable future. And it is not clear that unity in Somalia would lead to transparency or competent governance. Mogadishu currently demonstrates neither of those things. There is no reason to believe it will magically improve, even if Somalia somehow, for the first time in its people’s history, becomes unified. 7. “By helping Somalia strengthen its institutions, enhance security forces, and foster inclusive political dialogue, the United States ensures that clan affiliations enrich national identity rather than fracture it into competing states.” The US and others have formed policy based on this belief for over a decade. It has not worked. Why should it suddenly begin working now? What has changed? Fundamentally, the ambassador’s arguments—and Washington’s current policy toward Somalia—rest on fictions: (a) that Somalia is united, politically or societally, (b) that the government in its current form contributes to regional stability, and (c) that Mogadishu’s actions are a net positive for the US. Washington cannot achieve its goals in the Horn of Africa without first acknowledging reality and building policies that reflect that reality, rather than comforting fictions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Partnerships, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Africa, Somaliland, and United States of America

273. Concrete Sky: Air Base Hardening in the Western Pacific

Author:
Timothy A. Walton and Thomas Shugart
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The United States’ airfields face a threat of severe Chinese military attack. People’s Liberation Army (PLA) strike forces of aircraft, ground-based missile launchers, surface and subsurface vessels, and special forces can attack US aircraft and their supporting systems at airfields globally, including in the continental United States. The US Department of Defense (DoD) has consistently expressed concern regarding threats to airfields in the Indo-Pacific, and military analyses of potential conflicts involving China and the United States demonstrate that the overwhelming majority of US aircraft losses would likely occur on the ground at airfields (and that the losses could be ruinous). But the US military has devoted relatively little attention, and few resources, to countering these threats compared to developing modern aircraft. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) expects airfields to come under heavy attack in a potential conflict and has made major investments to defend, expand, and fortify them.1 Since the early 2010s, the PLA has more than doubled its hardened aircraft shelters (HASs) and unhardened individual aircraft shelters (IASs) at military airfields, giving China more than 3,000 total aircraft shelters—not including civil or commercial airfields. This constitutes enough shelters to house and hide the vast majority of China’s combat aircraft. China has also added 20 runways and more than 40 runway-length taxiways, and increased its ramp area nationwide by almost 75 percent. In fact, by our calculations, the amount of concrete used by China to improve the resilience of its air base network could pave a four-lane interstate highway from Washington, DC, to Chicago. As a result, China now has 134 air bases within 1,000 nautical miles of the Taiwan Strait—airfields that boast more than 650 HASs and almost 2,000 non-hardened IASs. In contrast, US airfield expansion and fortification efforts have been modest compared to US activities during the Cold War—and compared to the contemporary actions of the PRC. Since the early 2010s, examining airfields within 1,000 nautical miles of the Taiwan Strait, and outside of South Korea, the US military has added only two HASs and 41 IASs, one runway and one taxiway, and 17 percent more ramp area. Including ramp area at allied and partner airfields outside Taiwan, combined US, allied, and partner military airfield capacity within 1,000 nautical miles of the Taiwan Strait is roughly one-third of the PRC’s. Without airfields in the Republic of Korea, this ratio drops to one-quarter, and without airfields in the Philippines, it falls further, to 15 percent. Overall, this creates an imbalance in which PLA forces would need to fire far fewer “shots” to suppress or destroy US, allied, and partner airfields than the converse (see figure 1). This imbalance ranges from approximately 25 percent if the US employed military airfields in Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan to as great as 88 percent if it employed only military airfields in Japan.2 Operationally, this could make air operations in a conflict significantly easier to sustain for the PRC than for the United States; strategically, this destabilizing asymmetry risks incentivizing the PRC to exercise a first-mover advantage. China could initiate a conflict if it sees an opportunity to nullify adversary airpower on the ramp.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Armed Forces, and Air Force
Political Geography:
China, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

274. Beyond the Nuclear Balance: A Strategic Forces Net Assessment

Author:
Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr.
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Senior American policymakers and military leaders want and need to know how the United States stands in key military competitions relative to its rivals. This net assessment examines the balance of strategic forces (the strategic balance) between the United States and its two principal rivals, the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or “China”) and the Russian Federation (“Russia”). The assessment examines the current balance as well as trends that may alter the balance significantly over the planning horizon, defined as the 2025–40 time frame. During the Cold War, the term strategic forces referred to nuclear weapons deployed on strategic delivery systems: intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and long-range bombers (LRBs). This taxonomy was codified in the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) and in the SALT I and II agreements negotiated between the United States and Soviet Union. Strategic defenses were those forces capable of defending effectively against attacks by these forces. This assessment retains this taxonomy with two important additions. First, following the Cold War, new capabilities emerged that could, under certain circumstances, perform some strategic strike operations1 that were once the exclusive domain of strategic nuclear forces. This is the case with respect to long-range delivery systems armed with precision-guided munitions, or non-nuclear strategic strike (NNSS) forces. Second, cyber weapons were introduced. Many believe they have the potential to threaten a state’s critical infrastructure (CI), its strategic force command, control communications, and computer (C4) systems, and its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems. Combined with strategic nuclear systems, NNSS and cyber forces constitute an expanded strategic triad, supplementing the nuclear triad of land-based, sea-based, and airborne delivery systems. That said, given their proven ability to inflict prompt catastrophic destruction against the full range of strategic counterforce and countervalue targets, nuclear weapons remain far and away the most important strategic force. Consequently, they are this assessment’s principal focus.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, National Security, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America

275. Nonproliferation in Great Power Competition

Author:
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs and Yashar Parsie
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
For decades, the United States has sought to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons among friends and foes alike. This goal, however, may be at risk. While global challenges multiply, regional adversaries like North Korea pose an increased threat to US allies. In particular, South Korea appears to doubt the credibility of US extended deterrence. Seoul has sought to strengthen deterrence and even weighed the benefits of acquiring its own nuclear weapons. This report uses international relations theory, historical research, survey data, and original interviews with South Korean experts to examine (a) nonproliferation’s role in US grand strategy, (b) the relationship among nonproliferation, extended deterrence, and assurance, and (c) growing challenges to these three missions, particularly on the Korean Peninsula. It then suggests an approach for the United States to address these challenges. Nonproliferation remains important to national security. But the United States should consider it among other national security priorities. Managing priorities is a matter of continually evaluating risks and benefits. The United States can best do so through a series of measures that improve extended deterrence and assurance to manage the risk that allies pursue nuclear weapons.
Topic:
Nonproliferation, Missile Defense, Strategic Competition, and Great Powers
Political Geography:
South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

276. Next Steps for Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
History was made at the White House on August 8, 2025, when President Donald Trump hosted Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev for a landmark meeting. Against all odds, and after more than three decades of failed diplomacy by the international community, the two leaders from the Caucasus signed a joint declaration committing to a final peace treaty that will normalize relations between their countries. Their foreign ministers also initialed a draft version of that treaty, which the countries plan on fully ratifying within the next 12 months. Diplomats brokered this breakthrough not in Moscow, Paris, or Brussels—but in Washington. For decades, the South Caucasus has been a flashpoint for regional competition, unresolved wars, and missed diplomatic opportunities. Now, with US reengagement, real peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan may finally be within reach. It is reasonable to assume that President Trump’s instinctive urge to cut deals—along with his desire to go down in history as an international peacemaker and statesman—drove his determination to lead efforts to end the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. The deal also gave him the chance to tie up a loose end from his first administration. Despite Trump’s frequent claims that no new wars started under his watch, the 2020 Second Karabakh War erupted in the final year of his presidency. His administration made no meaningful effort to bring it to a close, creating a vacuum that Moscow filled by brokering a ceasefire agreement—one it ultimately proved unable to enforce. But President Trump could also recognize an opportunity when presented with one. In many ways, he was pushing at an open door. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan understand the importance of normalization and peace. Both are also exhausted by Moscow’s failed mediation efforts and its waning regional clout. The White House would be mistaken in assuming that since the headlines have passed, the cameras have stopped recording, and the signing ceremony is complete, the job is finished. Three big challenges are still on the horizon: Questions remain about Prime Minister Pashinyan’s political stability, which could be undermined, especially in the lead-up to Armenia’s parliamentary elections next June, as hardline nationalists and Moscow-backed groups inside Armenia challenge his authority and the legitimacy of the peace process. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan should expect Russia and Iran to try to discredit the peace process by launching disinformation campaigns. Many questions remain unanswered about how the regional transport links envisioned in the peace agreement—including the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP)—will be funded and financed. Without a resolution of these challenges, President Trump might lose interest in the peace initiative. Only his direct oversight can ensure its success.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, and Peace
Political Geography:
Armenia, Azerbaijan, South Caucasus, and United States of America

277. Putting US-India Trade Negotiations Back on Track

Author:
Aparna Pande and Bill Drexel
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
On April 2, 2025, which the White House dubbed “Liberation Day,” President Donald Trump announced broad, sweeping tariffs on over 90 countries. While the president’s announcement caused anxiety in foreign capitals, officials in New Delhi remained relatively calm. United States–India relations had been improving for more than two and a half decades, and the US had become India’s largest trading partner. By most accounts, President Trump respected Prime Minister Narendra Modi—even going so far as to refer to his Indian counterpart as his “good friend.” Furthermore, during an official visit in February 2025, President Trump and Prime Minister Modi announced a series of trade targets suggesting that a wider trade deal was imminent. The two leaders pledged to pursue $500 billion in bilateral trade by 2030—more than double the current volume—and promised to deepen US arms sales to India, including by laying the groundwork for future acquisitions of F-35 fighter jets. Prime Minister Modi committed to increasing energy imports from the US and reducing tariffs on American goods. India, by most accounts, was eager to address the Trump administration’s concerns about trade imbalances, and the two sides set fall 2025 as a target for finalizing a bilateral trade agreement. Meanwhile, due to strong messaging from the Trump team against production based in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Apple announced plans to shift all assembly of its US-bound iPhones to India. Prime Minister Modi also spoke with Elon Musk to discuss providing Tesla with access to Indian markets. Vice President JD Vance even visited India in late April 2025, and lauded the country’s “sense of infinite possibility.”
Topic:
Economics, Bilateral Relations, Negotiation, and Trade
Political Geography:
South Asia, India, and United States of America

278. Implications of Chinese Nuclear Weapons Modernization for the United States and Regional Allies

Author:
John Lee and Lavina Lee
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Based on current trends, China will become a quantitative and qualitative nuclear weapons peer of the United States by the early to mid-2030s with a diversified, accurate, and survivable force that will rival America’s. Rather than having only high-yield nuclear missiles as a strategic deterrent against nuclear attack, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is developing a range of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, the latter being lower-yield weapons usable in a conflict theater. Why is China seemingly going beyond its long-standing nuclear weapons approach of maintaining only a minimal deterrent or assured retaliation? Why has it chosen to rapidly develop its nuclear arsenal and related delivery system in a deliberately opaque manner? This report argues that Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) decided to embark on such a rapid nuclear modernization not primarily because China wants to “win” a nuclear exchange against the US. Rather, Beijing wants to create political and psychological effects that lead to enormously important strategic and military effects. As the report explains, the CCP and PLA are using the rapid development of nuclear capability and related delivery systems to subdue the adversary and win without fighting. The following are components of achieving this: Degrade the adversary’s decision-making. Weaken the adversary’s will to fight. Undermine the adversary’s public support for war. Undermine the resolve of the adversary’s government from within. Support and enhance deterrence. The report assesses that there are three ways in which China uses nuclear modernization to change the material and psychological environment with important strategic effects that work to its advantage.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Missile Defense, and Modernization
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

279. Alone in a Trumpian world: The EU and global public opinion after the US elections

Author:
Timothy Garton Ash, Ivan Krastev, and Mark Leonard
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
A new survey for ECFR reveals people in many countries around the world are upbeat about the second Trump presidency. Many think Trump will not just be good for America but that he will bring peace or reduce tensions in Ukraine, the Middle East and US-China relations. In contrast, US allies in Europe and South Korea are notably pessimistic about the incoming president—suggesting a further weakening of the geopolitical “West”. Ukrainians are slightly more positive than not about the impact Trump might have on ending the conflict with Russia. But they are deeply conflicted about what could be an acceptable compromise settlement with Moscow. Europeans will struggle to find internal unity or global power in leading an outright resistance to the new administration. But the survey reveals that many in the world regard the EU as a player equal to the US and China—a strength European leaders should draw on as they enter the turbulent new presidential term. Rather than harking back to a post-cold war liberal order, Europeans should focus on understanding and seeing opportunities in the new world.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Elections, European Union, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

280. Transatlantic twilight: European public opinion and the long shadow of Trump

Author:
Jana Puglierin, Arturo Varvelli, and Pawel Zerka
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
ECFR polling reveals the gloom that has fallen over European perceptions of the transatlantic relationship since early November. Respondents are more likely to call the US merely a “necessary partner” rather than an “ally”. But views of Donald Trump’s return vary markedly according to country and political outlook. That, and intra-European differences on both Russia-Ukraine and China, create ample opportunities for Trump to split Europeans. Building a broad coalition of “Euro-optimists” along with more cautious groups can help European leaders resist any such attempts—and even forge a new dawn in transatlantic relations.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Transatlantic Relations, Donald Trump, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

281. Ride the wave: A big, beautiful European strategy for Trumponomics

Author:
Agathe Demarais
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Eight months into the second term of Donald Trump, Europeans are still struggling to craft a coherent response to American geoeconomics policies in the trade, investment and financial spheres. The Trump administration poses massive challenges to Europe. It has imposed tariffs on nearly all US imports from the EU. It is also considering applying pressure on investors to pick sides between the US and China. Finally, it could soon try to engineer a forced depreciation of the dollar against other major currencies like the euro. For the EU, the best response to baffling Trumponomics is to keep calm and carry on. European policymakers should adopt a self-help mindset—resisting the urge to impose retaliatory measures that could damage European economies, avoiding futile fights over US policies that will not change, and above all, holding the bloc together. Europeans should also use this turbulent moment to push through controversial economic reforms. Such policies include deepening the single market to support those EU exporters that will lose market share in the US; leveraging access to the EU market for digital services; boosting innovation financing through regulatory changes; increasing the global role of the euro; and bracing for the coming currency wars. Europe’s ability to implement much-needed reforms will shape the bloc’s economic prospects, global standing and resilience long after Trump leaves the White House.
Topic:
Economics, European Union, Investment, Trade, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

282. Reality show: Why Europe must not cave in Trump’s culture war

Author:
Pawel Zerka
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Europe is in a culture war with Trump’s America. Part of this involves Trumpists propping up their ideological allies in European politics. A deeper level involves humiliating Europeans in their dealings with the US. The two intertwine to tell a single story. Trump and his acolytes can only do this because Europeans let them. At the first level Trumpists exploit polarisation in societies and the rise of Europe’s “new right”. At the second they take advantage of division and hesitation among European leaders. It doesn’t have to be this way. A decade of crises has strengthened European sentiment among the public. Almost all member states still have mainstream-led, pro-European governments. This should give the EU’s politicians the courage to act—and defend a Europe that writes its own script. That would also help preserve a strong transatlantic alliance; one in which the EU and European countries are America’s peers, not its subordinates.
Topic:
Politics, European Union, Donald Trump, and Culture War
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

283. Nuclear Deterrence Explained: Strategic Implications for Europe in the Absence of U.S. Extended Deterrence

Author:
Iakob Dadvani
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
Recent developments in U.S. foreign policy discourse indicate two potential future directions: prioritization or retrenchment.1 Trump’s foreign policy rhetoric clearly reflects a tendency toward retrenchment, particularly with respect to Europe. The most prominent indicators of this shift include the potential U.S. withdrawal from NATO European command, or a significant downsizing of its role2 , which would reduce the alliance’s overall combat effectiveness. This change would necessitate increased defense spending from European countries to maintain credible conventional deterrence, as the aggregate military power must remain constant despite reduced American involvement. Further to this are the moves to solve the Russia-Ukraine war by pressuring Ukrainians into negotiations that result in an unjust peace without security guarantees.3 Such an outcome would likely lead to long-term instability across the European continent.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Deterrence, Donald Trump, Regional Security, Russia-Ukraine War, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

284. Policing Alternatives: A Public Opinion Survey

Author:
The Carter Center
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Carter Center
Abstract:
Since 1980, incarceration in the U.S. has increased by about 400%, despite crime largely decreasing from the 1990s to the present.8 Currently, taxpayers are footing an annual bill of more than $80 billion, and yet recidivism rates in the U.S. are as high as 83%. An estimated one in six people in local jails and state and federal prisons are serving time for public order offenses, generally defined as charges that violate societal norms, such as charges relating to homelessness or disorderly conduct. Over 40% of incarcerated individuals have been diagnosed with a mental health condition — almost double that of the general population. As the human and financial costs of incarceration rise, alternative solutions are urgently needed in communities across the U.S. to address the needs of those struggling with mental health conditions, substance use concerns, and extreme poverty. For more than 10 years, activists and organizations in Atlanta have been developing ways to support and care for vulnerable members of their community. PAD was created in response to decades of heavy reliance on the criminal legal system to manage social issues such as poverty, homelessness, mental health conditions, and substance use concerns. In 2013, a group of Atlanta activists began advocating for the decriminalization of a variety of public order offenses disproportionately impacting low-income individuals and people of color. In 2015, these activists formed a broad coalition to advocate for the creation of the Atlanta Fulton Pre-Arrest Diversion Design Team, which was authorized by the Atlanta City Council and Fulton County Board of Commissioners to begin planning diversion services. The resulting PAD Initiative, originally implemented in two police precincts, has since evolved into a citywide, nationally recognized model for community-based, non-police response to quality-of-life concerns.
Topic:
Public Opinion, Rule of Law, Mental Health, Peace, Police, and Law Enforcement
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

285. Ukraine and Beyond: Shaping Europe’s Security Future

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
What’s new? Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has upended European security and created a reality in which EU and NATO member states, on one side, and Russia, on the other, view each other as fundamental threats, even as the United States is poised to become a less reliable partner for its allies. Why does it matter? An unstable Europe has economic and security repercussions globally, not least given the nuclear capabilities of Russia, on one hand, and NATO on the other. A deeper understanding of assumptions and threat perceptions on both sides can help key players manage the risks of an increasingly militarised region. What should be done? Diplomacy and deterrence are both required. Kyiv’s backers should seek a settlement to the war that ensures Ukraine’s continued capacity to defend itself. European allies should reduce reliance on the U.S. and – together with Washington – pursue risk mitigation with Russia through limits on weapons deployments and other activities.
Topic:
NATO, Diplomacy, Multilateralism, Deterrence, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

286. Regulating Digital Fintech: How States Navigate Power and Geopolitics

Author:
Bipul Biplav Mukherjee
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
This study explores the evolving role of fintech regulation as a strategic tool of geopolitical influence, highlighting how states leverage digital finance, data governance and artificial intelligence to reshape global power structures. It contrasts the regulatory models of the United States, China, and the European Union, each guided by distinct imperatives of innovation, state control, and digital sovereignty. The analysis underscores the growing politicization of fintech and the intensifying race for digital supremacy among major powers. Within this context, the article engages with issues of data decentralization, cross-sectoral data-sharing, and open banking—developments that promote financial inclusion and innovation but also generate complex governance challenges. The study concludes that coordinated transnational regulatory frameworks are essential to safeguarding financial stability and mitigating systemic risks in an increasingly contested and fragmented digital financial ecosystem.
Topic:
International Relations, Governance, European Union, Regulation, Finance, Artificial Intelligence, Banking, and Power Structure
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

287. Cambio Climático y Transición Energética: Una Transformación Geopolítica en Marcha

Author:
Xira Ruiz
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
El artículo analiza la dimensión geopolítica del cambio climático y de la transición energética, en un contexto internacional marcado por la rivalidad entre grandes potencias y la fragmentación del orden global. Se exploran los efectos que estas transformaciones generan en la reconfiguración de las interdependencias materiales, el acceso a recursos críticos y la redefinición de la seguridad energética. El texto se centra especialmente en el papel de Estados Unidos, China y la Unión Europea, así como en las implicaciones para el Sur Global. También analiza el desplazamiento del liderazgo climático desde los marcos multilaterales tradicionales hacia nuevas formas de diplomacia orientadas a la competencia por el liderazgo tecnológico y el control de cadenas de valor. El artículo concluye que la transición energética implica una reorganización estratégica de las relaciones internacionales, que genera nuevas formas de dependencia, redefine las prioridades de seguridad y plantea desafíos para la equidad global y la gobernanza compartida.
Topic:
Climate Change, European Union, Geopolitics, Energy Transition, Energy Security, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:
China, United States of America, and Global South

288. Delivering on Draghi after Munich: A quantum perspective

Author:
Ulrich Mans
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
In light of shifting transatlantic relations, Europe must assert greater technological sovereignty, with quantum technology emerging as a key strategic domain. The EU already has a strong foundation in quantum, but risks falling behind due to fragmented policies, low private investment, and supply chain dependencies. While recent public investments and initiatives like the Quantum Flagship and Quantum Pact are promising, Europe needs a bold commercialisation strategy and coherent regulatory framework. To secure leadership, the EU must accelerate industry adoption, align member state efforts, and foster global partnerships, including with the US, UK, and Switzerland. Quantum presents a defining test for Europe’s innovation agenda – and a critical opportunity to deliver on the Draghi Report’s call for strategic autonomy.
Topic:
European Union, Economy, Innovation, Transatlantic Relations, and Quantum Computing
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

289. Countering the Digital Silk Road

Author:
Vivek Chilukuri and Ruby Scanlon
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
he year 2025 marks the 10th anniversary of the Digital Silk Road (DSR), China’s effort to strengthen its global ties and influence through technology. In the decade since the initiative’s launch, technology has moved to the center of emerging market priorities, China’s domestic and foreign policy, and the U.S.-China competition. Rapid digitalization, spurred by emerging market policies seeking to harness technology’s potential, has led to surging global demand for the connective infrastructure and cutting-edge services that will power the modern world. But even as technology vaults to the top of government and corporate agendas, the DSR’s origins, goals, and tools remain obscured, complicating U.S. and allied efforts to assess its effectiveness and mobilize a response. Those seeking official strategies and plans behind the DSR will be disappointed. Its nature is amorphous, expanding alongside Beijing’s growing interest in strategic technologies and receding as commercial and political interests require. Ten years after its inception, the Digital Silk Road is, paradoxically, at once less visible and more ubiquitous than ever. Launched in 2015 as the digital arm of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the DSR grew into its own effort as technology leadership became increasingly important to Beijing. Rising backlash against the BRI and the DSR abroad, however, made formal affiliation with a state-led initiative a liability, and Chinese officials and companies now rarely tout official linkages. Domestic economic headwinds and fiscal pressures also caused Beijing to retrench from the earlier years of massive state-backed infrastructure projects in favor of a “small yet smart” approach that emphasized technology as a low-cost, high-impact avenue of continued developmental support. At home, Beijing embraced technology as a path to economic diversification, development, and security consistent with the Made in China 2025 initiative. Private and semiprivate companies—Huawei, ZTE, Alibaba, and Tencent—led the way, with considerable success. Huawei is now the world’s top provider of telecommunications equipment and operates in over 170 countries. Beijing’s public retreat from the DSR should not be mistaken for failure. On the contrary, the DSR’s ambition—to strengthen China’s economic and geopolitical leadership through technology—has now suffused Beijing’s broader domestic and foreign policy. The DSR has largely disappeared because it has succeeded and become subsumed. The DSR may not be state directed, like the BRI, but it is undoubtedly state enabled. At every stage, government support drives the innovation, deployment, and scale needed within China to underprice and outcompete in the wider world—in 5G telecommunications equipment, facial recognition cameras, legacy semiconductors, and, more recently, commercial drones and electric vehicles. Over the past decade, U.S. and allied policymakers have slowly awoken to the varied, overlapping dangers of the DSR. Concern has focused on how the diffusion of Chinese-linked digital infrastructure could create cybersecurity and espionage risks and avenues of coercive influence for Beijing over emerging markets, akin to the dynamics of the BRI. Others have focused on the spread of techno-authoritarianism. All these concerns are valid and troubling. At the same time, it is neither realistic nor desirable to arrest, let alone reverse, the diffusion of all Chinese-linked digital infrastructure and services everywhere. China remains the top trading partner for most of the world, and technology represents an increasing share of that trade. Not all Chinese-linked technology diffusion is inherently nefarious; indeed, much of it involves innocuous consumer goods that pose little or no risk. Hysteria about Chinese technology diffusion is not a strategy. U.S. and allied policymakers must therefore prioritize the key countries and technology domains that both implicate core economic and security interests and represent credible opportunities to outcompete Chinese offerings.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Strategic Competition, and Digital Silk Road (DSR)
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

290. Stuck in the Cul-de-Sac: How U.S. Defense Spending Prioritizes Innovation over Deterrence

Author:
Carlton Haelig and Philip Sheers
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
or more than a decade, the United States has sought to modernize its military to deter China, but it has become stuck in a developmental cul-de-sac that has allowed China to steadily shift the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific in its favor. Recent U.S. defense budgets have disproportionately invested in long-term developmental programs at the expense of producing sufficient capabilities available for the near term. As a result, today’s Joint Force is smaller, older, and less capable than at any other time in recent history. Over the past 15 years, the average time and cost the Pentagon has taken to field major weapon systems has grown significantly, and the share of research, development, test, and evaluation (RDTE) spending within the broader defense budget has continued to steadily grow. Despite extended periods of very expensive research and development, major weapon systems have frequently failed to enter production on time or in numbers large enough to make a difference for U.S. warfighters. RDTE cost growth has also affected mature programs, where unexpected modernization challenges have interfered with plans to expand production of available capabilities. Bolstering deterrence involves a challenging balance of time horizons: The Department of Defense (DoD) must expand procurement of today’s capabilities to support near-term deterrence but cannot risk sacrificing next-generation modernization programs that sustain America’s long-term military advantage in doing so. As China’s accelerated conventional military buildup places significant pressure on today’s Joint Force, the urgency to close near-term capability gaps has become critical. Reductions in the Joint Force’s overall size and relative conventional capability have opened a dangerous window of opportunity for China. This report finds that the fiscal year (FY) 2026 budget request and one-time reconciliation funding from the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (BBB) ultimately fail to make the needed investments to strengthen deterrence in both the near and long term. Instead, the current administration appears to be falling into the same mistake as many previous administrations by prioritizing costly development of next-generation systems at the expense of purchasing and fielding capabilities that are available to fill deterrence gaps today. Moreover, by pursuing modernization through reconciliation, the FY 2026 budget risks subjecting future modernization priorities to the political outcomes of nondefense debates. Absent a return to standard defense budgeting processes, modernization programs that received a down payment from the BBB will likely stall or fail entirely. There are some opportunities in future defense budgets to produce greater numbers of existing high-end capabilities that can meaningfully contribute to deterrence in the near term while pursuing critical long-term modernization investments. This report’s analysis highlights five major capability areas where existing or near-ready capabilities, such as ground-based fires or combat aircraft, can be procured in meaningful quantities and contribute to important missions in the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, this analysis highlights important areas, such as hypersonic weapons, in which extensive developmental timelines and exorbitant procurement costs likely preclude near-term contributions to deterrence and in the long term will only be fielded in small quantities. Expanding the U.S. military’s capacity and capability in the near term will likely require both larger budgets and the rapid development and production of complementary, less expensive capabilities. The United States faces a generational inflection point in how it approaches its defense investments. Rather than continue the disproportionate focus on next-generation technologies, the White House, Congress, and the DoD must budget a sustained pivot to purchasing existing capabilities that close near-term deterrence gaps. While this pivot must be balanced with continued investments in long-term modernization, the United States can no longer afford to sacrifice near-term procurement imperatives. Breaking out of the developmental cul-de-sac will require future defense budgets to emphasize procurement and accelerated RDTE across major defense programs.
Topic:
Budget, Innovation, Deterrence, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

291. Prepared, Not Paralyzed Managing AI Risks to Drive American Leadership

Author:
Janet Egan, Spencer Michaels, and Caleb Withers
Publication Date:
11-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The Trump administration has embraced a pro-innovation approach to artificial intelligence (AI) policy. Its AI Action Plan, released July 2025, underscores the private sector’s central role in advancing AI breakthroughs and positioning the United States as the world’s leading AI power.1 At the Paris AI Action Summit in February 2025, Vice President JD Vance cautioned that an overly restrictive approach to AI development “would mean paralyzing one of the most promising technologies we have seen in generations.”2 Yet this emphasis on innovation does not diminish the government’s critical role in ensuring national security. On the contrary, AI advances will yield significant threats alongside unprecedented potential in this domain. Experts warn of advanced AI introducing more autonomous cyber weapons, bestowing a broader pool of actors with the know-how to develop biological weapons, and potentially malfunctioning in ways that cause massive damage.3 Private and public sector leaders alike have echoed these concerns.4 The urgent task for policymakers is to ensure that the federal government can anticipate and manage the national security implications of AI with advanced capabilities—without resorting to blunt, ill-targeted, or burdensome regulation that would undermine America’s innovative edge. In other words, the government must prepare at once for potential risks from rapidly advancing AI without imposing onerous regulations that unduly stifle the technology’s vast potential for good. The status quo is insufficient: Technical expertise in advanced AI remains concentrated in a handful of companies, and the government is playing catch-up. Existing voluntary information-sharing commitments between AI labs and the federal government already face hurdles and likely will prove insufficient over time as the costs of providing transparency increase. Meanwhile, the private sector lacks both the national security expertise and the commercial incentives to manage these risks to the national interest. The United States cannot afford policies built solely on speculative fears. Yet in the face of real and rapid progress in national security–relevant capabilities, neither can it risk allowing an AI-driven disaster or a regulatory vacuum to derail technological progress. While much of the policy debate rightly focuses on innovation and accelerating adoption, this report concentrates on a less developed but equally vital counterpart: managing the risks that could undermine those ambitions without stifling AI’s innovative potential. Effective risk management is not a brake on progress but a prerequisite for it, playing an essential role in sustaining public trust, preventing setbacks, shaping global standards, and ensuring that American leadership in AI endures over the long term.
Topic:
Regulation, Leadership, Risk, Innovation, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

292. Countering the Swarm: Protecting the Joint Force in the Drone Age

Author:
Stacie L. Pettyjohn and Molly Campbell
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
fter decades of air dominance and a near monopoly on precision strike, the United States now faces a dramatically different, more hostile world as the proliferation of cheap drones has democratized mass precision fires. It is likely that in any future conflict, drones will pose an unavoidable threat to American forces. As this report’s analysis of U.S. defense spending reveals, the Department of Defense (DoD) has invested in both legacy and emerging counter–uncrewed aerial systems (C-UAS) capabilities for nearly a decade. However, these efforts have been hindered by insufficient scale and urgency. Despite the Pentagon’s shortfalls in procuring purpose-built C-UAS capabilities, U.S. counter-drone operations in the Middle East have been notable. The United States views China as its foremost strategic threat, and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is rapidly advancing its drone capabilities by developing more autonomous systems and acquiring them at scale. Without deep magazines of substantially enhanced counter-drone capabilities, the United States risks having its distributed warfighting strategies overwhelmed by massed Chinese drone attacks, and the United States could lose a war over Taiwan. This is a complex challenge with no silver bullet solution. The DoD must act swiftly. The stakes are not theoretical—without adequate defenses, even the most advanced systems and tactics will be rendered irrelevant in the face of overwhelming drone attacks. Overall Recommendations for the Department of Defense Prioritize counter-drone defense and extend capabilities beyond the air defense community. Drone defense cannot be siloed to dedicated air defense units. Every unit will need the ability to defend itself against small uncrewed aerial systems (UAS). Expand counter-drone training across the Joint Force. The Pentagon needs to develop and share best tactics, techniques, and procedures and ensure that all forces are trained in drone self-protection. Improve the rigor and realism of counter-drone prototype testing. The current test and evaluation process fosters a false sense of confidence in prototype counter-UAS, as they are often assessed using unrealistic facsimiles of enemy drones and low-fidelity tests of electromagnetic weapons.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Weapons, and Drones
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

293. Atomic Advantage: Accelerating U.S. Quantum Sensing for Next-Generation Positioning, Navigation, and Timing

Author:
Costanza M. Vidal Bustamante
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
O One of the most consequential national security contests now unfolds on battlefields invisible to the naked eye—across the faint radiofrequency signals of the Global Positioning System (GPS) and within the quantum states of individual atoms. At stake are America’s positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) capabilities, the foundation for precise geolocation, trajectory planning, and time synchronization across military, civilian, and commercial domains. For decades, the U.S.-invented GPS has served as the backbone of the world’s PNT, but the system’s inherent vulnerabilities have come into stark relief as adversaries increasingly jam and spoof its weak signals and build weapons to take down its satellites. GPS interference already undermines military operations and disrupts up to thousands of commercial flights daily; broader attacks could trigger catastrophic mission failures and widespread disruption of critical infrastructure, inflicting economic losses exceeding $1 billion a day.1 In the face of rising threats to traditional PNT, quantum sensors offer a compelling alternative. Leveraging the immutable properties of atoms, these devices offer unmatched measurement precision, long-term accuracy, and reliable operation in contested environments—capabilities that can back up and even outperform current GPS-based services. Quantum sensors could enable resilient U.S. PNT within a few years—from the navigation of submarines, drones, and munitions to the synchronization of telecommunications networks, power grids, and financial systems—but only if America continues to develop and deploy the technology. While atomic clocks—the most mature quantum technology today—already power GPS, emerging quantum sensing capabilities are beginning to show their promise as local sources of high-precision, resilient PNT. Next-generation atomic clocks can sustain timing accuracy over longer durations. Quantum accelerometers and gyroscopes can measure a moving platform’s velocity and rotation with greater precision. Quantum gravimeters and magnetometers can reference the Earth’s unique gravitational and magnetic fields for stealthy positioning. All of these technologies offer enhanced performance without relying on vulnerable radiofrequency signals. Although early quantum sensors are beginning the move from lab to field, many prototypes remain too fragile and bulky for widespread deployment. To deliver real operational value, these devices must be hardened so their delicate quantum states can survive harsh environments and continuous use on dynamic platforms. At the same time, developers must further miniaturize and integrate the sensors’ atomic, optical, and control subsystems into compact devices.
Topic:
National Security, Science and Technology, Innovation, and Quantum Computing
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

294. Feature Commentary: An Assessment of Operation Rough Rider

Author:
Gregory Johnsen
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
On March 15, 2025, the United States launched an offensive against the Houthis in Yemen with the stated goal of restoring “freedom of navigation” in the Red Sea and ending Houthi attacks on commercial shipping. Fifty-two days later, on May 5, the United States ended its operations in Yemen following an agreement with the Houthis that the group would no longer target U.S. military vessels or U.S. flagged ships. This article provides an assessment of that campaign, known as Operation Rough Rider, looking at what the United States hit, who was killed, and what it cost as well as how the Houthis have rebounded and regrouped, the current situation on the ground in Yemen, and what is likely to come next.
Topic:
Counter-terrorism, Houthis, Shipping, Military Operations, and Operation Rough Rider
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and United States of America

295. The Escalation of U.S. Airstrikes in Somalia and the Role of Perceived Threats to the U.S. Homeland

Author:
David Sterman
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
In 2025, the United States substantially increased the pace of its airstrikes in Somalia. At the same time, it increasingly cited not just regional security rationales for the increased pace of strikes but also rationales rooted in an assessed potential threat to the U.S. homeland from Somalia—in particular from the Islamic State-Somalia’s recruitment of foreign fighters. This article examines the increased pace of strikes, the rationales that have been cited to explain the increase, and what existing evidence reveals about the potential threat to the U.S. homeland. It also underscores the need for greater clarity from the U.S. government regarding its assessment of the extent of such a threat.
Topic:
Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, Al Shabaab, Airstrikes, and Military Operations
Political Geography:
Africa, Somalia, and United States of America

296. Feature Commentary: Confronting Cartels: Military Considerations South of the Border

Author:
Brian Michael Jenkins
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
Possible U.S. military action against Mexico’s drug cartels poses unique challenges. The situation is complicated, and the United States must be prepared for possible counteractions. The cartels are not a single actor. If attacked, they may avoid direct confrontation, accepting temporary losses, anticipating that the United States will not sustain a long campaign. Or Mexico’s cartels may respond violently, exploiting U.S. vulnerabilities in Mexico—and possibly north of the border. The government of Mexico is a separate actor. It can assist or undermine U.S. efforts. Past government campaigns against the cartels led to soaring rates of criminal violence. Chaos in Mexico could have serious implications for U.S. homeland security. The United States needs a ‘Red Team’ to examine a range of scenarios. The article proceeds in six parts: Part I contrasts recent U.S. military actions in Yemen and Iran with possible military action in Mexico. Part II examines perceptions of the threat. Part III examines how the history of U.S.-Mexico relations will shape the battlefield. Part IV reviews our own experience in combating foreign drug traffickers, offering some preliminary takeaways. Part V examines possible options. Part VI looks at how the cartels might react, how the United States might be forced to respond—and how other adversaries of the United States might attempt to exploit the situation.
Topic:
Counter-terrorism, Borders, Organized Crime, Cartels, and Military Operations
Political Geography:
Latin America, North America, Mexico, and United States of America

297. Tehran’s Homeland Option: Terror Pathways for Iran to Strike in the United States

Author:
Matthew Levitt
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
The 12-day Iran war may be over, but the threat of Iranian reprisal attacks now looms large, and will for the foreseeable future. European authorities exposed plots in Sweden and Germany even as the war was being waged, and Israeli authorities issued a warning over potential attacks in the United Arab Emirates a couple of weeks later, specifically citing heightened concerns in the wake of the war with Iran. Iranian operatives or their agents could also attempt to carry out attacks inside the United States, leveraging what U.S. counterterrorism officials have describe as a “homeland option” developed over years. Given the U.S. role in bombing the Fordow nuclear complex, it should not be a surprise that U.S. authorities quickly issued a terrorism advisory warning of potential Iranian plots in the homeland. Drawing on past cases of Iranian plots in the United States and elsewhere, this article explores the primary pathways available to Iran conduct or enable a terrorism act in the United States. These include deploying Iranian agents, criminal surrogates, terrorist proxies, or actively seeking to inspire lone offenders to carry out attacks within the homeland.
Topic:
Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Armed Conflict, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, North America, and United States of America

298. The Changing Character of Terrorism and U.S. Counterterrorism

Author:
Don Rassler, Kristina Hummel, Brian Dodwell, and Ned Curry
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
The competition between terror movements and counterterrorism forces is an interactive and iterative game, as the actions taken by one side are designed to defeat, circumvent, or shape the activity taken by the opposing players. To better understand these interactive dynamics, it is important to evaluate how terrorism and counterterrorism have been evolving. This article first takes high-level stock of how the spread, structure, scale, and speed of terrorism have been changing in recent years and highlights key challenges and implications for counterterrorism. It then evaluates the United States’ ongoing effort to find a sustainable counterterrorism path, a journey that has been filled with challenges, benefits, dilemmas, and opportunities, and discusses how key factors have been shaping the direction, reach, and pace of change. An important takeaway from these reviews is that while the threat of international terrorism is not what it used to be, there is a lot of change occurring across the terrorism landscape. U.S. counterterrorism has also been undergoing some important shifts, and there are open questions about whether U.S. CT forces and assets will be spread further. If not managed carefully, change taking place across these two ‘systems’ could interact in ways that may disrupt CT progress.
Topic:
National Security, Terrorism, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

299. Armenia and Azerbaijan: Peace or Pause?

Author:
Marina Ohanjanyan
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
At the White House in Washington, on August 8th, Armenia and Azerbaijan initialled a peace deal and signed an agreement on the establishment of the Trump Route for Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP): a transport link connecting Azerbaijan-proper with its exclave Nakhchivan through Armenian territory, which had been a contentious issue in the peace negotiations. While the imagery and potential positive consequences of this should not be underestimated, much is still unclear about what the agreements actually mean, including certain formulations and their interpretation as well as the question of how long the US commitment to the region will last. At the same time, the Washington summit represents an opening and a positive momentum for further development of not only the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace process, but larger connectivity in South-Caucasus, and several capitals will have been watching the proceedings keenly. This paper first briefly discusses the agreements reached and some of the remaining questions surrounding them, and then analyses the attitudes and/or reactions of the US, Russia, Iran, Türkiye and the EU, which in some cases, will be crucial to the success or failure of the initiative.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, Peace, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Eurasia, Caucasus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and United States of America

300. The Biden Administration’s New Industrial Policy: Domestic and International Implications

Author:
Barbara Regulska-Ingielewicz
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:
Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:
The article aims to analyze new industrial policy based on the example of actions taken by the Joe Biden administration. Their essence is transforming the economy in line with climate goals while stimulating development. The paper will present the main assumptions of the United States’ green industrial policy, its goals, and international implications, which indicate that it is characterized by economic nationalism. The article attempts to answer three main research questions: What is the essence of the new industrial policy? What are the goals of the new industrial policy initiated by the Joe Biden administration? What are the expected international implications of this policy? Answers to the above questions will enable verification of the hypothesis, which states that the Joe Biden administration has initiated a new industrial policy in the spirit of state interventionism based on new environmental protection assumptions. Its goal is to give the U.S. economy new pro-development impulses and increase its competitiveness. The first part of the paper will present assumptions of the new industrial policy, then the goals and measures of the new United States industrial policy, and the third part will show the international implications of the above policy.
Topic:
Climate Change, Industrial Policy, Economic Growth, Joe Biden, Green Transition, Green Economy, and Economic Nationalism
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America