Political Geography: United States of America

201. Trump’s Return: What It Could Mean for Palestine and the Region

Author:: Ramzy Baroud
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:: School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:: Donald Trump’s return to the White House in the context of the Gaza war and other regional conflicts raises questions regarding his approach to the Israel-Palestine conflict
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Donald Trump, Armed Conflict, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and United States of America

202. Trump 2.0: Where Rhetoric Meets Reality

Author:: Diana Bartelli Carlin
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:: School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:: The new president has made big promises, but can he keep them?
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, Donald Trump, and Rhetoric
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

203. Round Two: Trump’s Foreign Policy Takes on New Challenges

Author:: William B. Quandt
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:: School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:: Trump will have to manage the continuing conflict in the Middle East, the war in Ukraine, and the rising power of China as he navigates the beginning of his second term
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: China, Ukraine, Middle East, and United States of America

204. American Netizens Worry For the Future of TikTok

Author:: Sydney Wise
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:: School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:: The temporary banning of TikTok in the United States in January prompted concern over the politicization of tech platforms. The two likeliest paths forward for TikTok represent alternate visions of the relationship between Big Tech and government
Topic:: Science and Technology, Social Media, TikTok, and Politicization
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

205. Longer Sticks and Shorter Carrots: How the U.S. is Changing its Engagement in MENA

Author:: Amr Adly
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:: School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:: The United States’ approach to achieving international hegemony is shifting away from trade and investments back toward bombs and missiles
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Hegemony, Investment, Trade, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:: Middle East, North Africa, and United States of America

206. The View from Africa Before and After the U.S. Elections—Q&A with Mark Deets

Author:: Omar Auf and Mark Deets
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:: School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:: Trump’s re-election brought massive changes to many aspects of the United States and the world. What led to Trump regaining the presidency? What will the reverberations look like in West Africa? Omar Auf sat with historian Mark Deets to find out
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Elections, Interview, Donald Trump, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Africa, West Africa, and United States of America

207. The Effects of US-China Cooperation on Fentanyl Markets and Overdose Deaths

Author:: Marcus Noland, Julieta Contreras, and Lucas Rengifo-Keller
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:: Drug overdose is the leading cause of death among Americans aged 15–44, exceeding heart disease, cancer, suicide, vehicular accidents, and COVID-19 in 2023. Most drug deaths are associated with fentanyl. This paper uses data on illicit drug prices to estimate reduced-form price equations of fentanyl, oxycodone, and alprazolam based on supply and demand, including hedonic characteristics. The results are used to estimate the relationship between fentanyl prices and overdoses. They suggest that the Chinese embargo on fentanyl shipments to the United States beginning in May 2019 raised street prices for a limited period, reducing fentanyl overdose deaths in the United States by roughly one-quarter over a three- to five-month period after the announcement.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Drugs, Opioid Crisis, Cooperation, and Fentanyl
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

208. Eight Principles for the 2025 Tax Policy Debate (that Republicans and Democrats Should Be Able to Agree On)

Author:: Kimberly A. Clausing
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:: The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, which Congress passed in 2017, came with a built-in policy time bomb—several of the more popular provisions are set to expire on the last day of 2025. These tax cut expirations limited the cost of the law to meet the requirements of the budget reconciliation process and thereby avoid being blocked by a Senate filibuster. The bill's architects deliberately made the less popular provisions (corporate tax cuts) permanent, but they wagered that the more popular individual tax cuts could be extended when the time came. That time has arrived. Yet Congress faces daunting challenges in extending the expiring tax cuts this year, including their high costs, competing fiscal priorities, a fractious Republican caucus with narrow House and Senate majorities, and President Trump's mercurial demands. As the 2025 tax policy debate moves forward, Clausing offers eight principles that both parties should be able to agree on. Of course, actual agreement on these principles is far from likely in today's political environment. Still, she suggests "middle of the road" positions for those who would resuscitate bipartisan tax policy cooperation.
Topic:: Budget, Domestic Politics, Tax Systems, and Fiscal Policy
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

209. Destined for Division? US and EU Responses to the Challenge of Chinese Overcapacity

Author:: Salih Bora, Mary Lovely, and Luis Simón
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:: Heightened concerns about China’s exports have intensified competitive pressures on producers and compelled American and European policymakers, government officials, and political leaders to try to counteract those concerns. President Donald Trump’s decision to raise tariffs on China by 145 percent is the most recent—and arguably most dramatic—example of broader concerns about Chinese overcapacity. The clash with China is particularly evident in sectors that US and European leaders have deemed essential for growth and security, charging that Chinese industrial subsidies, rather than comparative advantage, are the basis for the country’s export success. However, the European Union and the United States have taken different approaches to resolve tensions with China. The European Union seeks, at least for now, to preserve and adhere to global trading rules. By contrast, the United States has acted unilaterally (even before the second Trump administration) to defend its domestic production by engaging in a trade confrontation with China that, together with China’s retaliation, has rattled global financial markets. This Policy Brief explores these EU-US divisions, their reflection on trade and industrial policy, and prospects for coordinated action against Chinese overcapacity. The authors argue that the European Union can take the lead toward a resolution within the rules-based system while maintaining an open door to future US participation.
Topic:: European Union, Tariffs, Exports, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: China, Europe, North America, and United States of America

210. Alignment or Misalignment? US and EU High-Tech Trade and Sanctions Policies toward China

Author:: Antonio Calcara and Jeffrey J. Schott
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:: This Policy Brief focuses on the alignment or misalignment of the European Union and the United States on high-technology trade and sanctions vis-à-vis China. The Trump administration is likely to continue the aggressive US stance toward China in the technological realm, putting increasing pressure on its European allies to align with US policy. The Europeans, for their part, are in a difficult position: On the one hand, they are under pressure from the US government; on the other hand, the more Washington restricts Chinese trade, the more Chinese exporters will look to the European market to sell their manufactured goods. Increased competition from Chinese imports in Europe, especially in the automotive sector, could in turn trigger a political backlash that weakens support for transatlantic coordination on China.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Sanctions, European Union, Trade Policy, and Imports
Political Geography:: China, Asia, United States of America, and European Union

211. Siloed No More: The U.S.-ROK Alliance and a Taiwan Conflict

Author:: Clint Work
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: This project was motivated by and builds upon earlier research tracing the evolution and apparent alignment of U.S. and South Korean signaling on Taiwan, wherein the South Korean government adopted a more outspoken position regarding “the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait” and framed it in increasingly expansive terms—as a regional and global issue yet also directly linked to the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula. The previous research indicated the U.S.-ROK alliance faced a gap between its topline diplomatic rhetoric on Taiwan and its preparedness to navigate an actual conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan and the attendant risk of a simultaneous conflict on the Korean Peninsula. This project aimed to go beyond diplomatic rhetoric. Forty-two interviews were conducted from June 2024 to February 2025 in both Washington and Seoul. Most were in-person interviews with some conducted virtually or by written response via email. Through these interviews with U.S. and ROK current and former government officials, think tank experts, and academics—as well as open-source research—this project offers insight on the evolution and state of U.S.-ROK alliance discussions on a Taiwan conflict, key challenges obstructing such discussions, and critical variables or dynamics the alliance would have to navigate in the event of a conflict.
Topic:: Security, Alliance, Conflict, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Taiwan, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

212. Untethered Sentiments: How Politics, Visibility, Perception, and Demographic Differences Shape American Views on Foreign Investment and Trade

Author:: Je Heon (James) Kim and Nils Wollesen Osterberg
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: The key takeaways from this study are as follows: 1. Impact of Perception on Foreign Investment Attitudes: The study finds that individual perceptions of FDI at the state level play a crucial role in shaping attitudes toward investment. Individuals who perceive high Korean FDI or states where Korean FDI has more visibility tend to have more favorable views toward foreign investment compared to those in states with low FDI or visibility of such investments. This finding highlights the importance of strategic communication and visibility in shaping public perceptions of foreign investment. Simply increasing investment is not enough; companies and governments must actively promote their contributions to local economic growth and job creation to gain broader public support. 2. Variation in Support Based on Country of Origin: While most Americans view foreign investments as beneficial, attitudes differ based on the investing country’s origin. Investments from South Korea, Japan, and Germany, for instance, are viewed more favorably than investments from China and Russia. 3. Political and Ideological Divides in Trade and Tariff Attitudes: The data reveals partisan differences regarding trade and tariffs. According to our data, a substantial majority of Republicans—at the time of this survey—favor tariffs, mirroring their party leader’s policies. Meanwhile, a minority of Democrats expressed similar support for the use of tariffs. 4. Dissonance on Trade and Tariffs: Despite broad support for U.S. participation in international trade, a significant portion of respondents also favor maintaining or increasing tariffs, suggesting support for the theoretical benefits of trade and protectionism. Evidence suggests that partisan or ideological drivers may be at work. 5. Demographic Influences on Trade and Investment Opinions: Factors such as gender, age, income, and education significantly impact trade attitudes. Younger individuals, higher-income earners, and those with higher education levels are more supportive of open trade, while lower-income and older individuals are more skeptical. 6. Reciprocity as a Key Factor in Investment Policy Preferences: Many Americans favor restrictions on inbound foreign investment unless similar restrictions are removed for U.S. investments abroad, highlighting the importance of the reciprocal approach to trade and investment policies. 7. Limited Influence of Job Creation on Investment Preferences: While respondents recognize that foreign investments create jobs, this factor alone does not significantly sway opinions on investment restrictions, as other economic and political considerations often take precedence. 8. Defense Industrial Cooperation and Export Control Concerns: A majority of respondents support maintaining or increasing restrictions on defense-related industrial cooperation, emphasizing national security concerns over economic benefits from defense-related investments and trade.
Topic:: Politics, Science and Technology, Foreign Direct Investment, Trade, and Economic Security
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

213. US interests can benefit from stronger congressional ties with the Caribbean

Author:: Wazim Mowla and Maite Gonzalez Latorre
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The Caribbean’s geographic proximity to the United States—as well as its use as a transit point for US citizens, goods, and financial services—makes it a crucial hub for US national interests. However, the relationship has suffered from inconsistent and infrequent assistance. Changes in US policy priorities bring ever-changing adjustments to US engagement, leaving the Caribbean, its leadership, and its institutions with insufficient time to benefit from US policy action. For Caribbean countries, policy continuity is critical for implementation and to see tangible and meaningful development. The region’s small populations and markets, vulnerability to natural disasters and changing global commodity prices, and limited institutional capacity slow the pace of receiving and utilizing development assistance and support. Underpinning US-Caribbean ties with stronger US congressional engagement can provide needed longevity to the relationship. Congressional actions—like newly appropriated resources and committee hearings—can bring tangible benefits to US-Caribbean relations.
Topic:: Security, Environment, Politics, and Economy
Political Geography:: Caribbean, North America, and United States of America

214. The imperative of augmenting US theater nuclear forces

Author:: Greg Weaver
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The United States and its allies and partners face an impending change in the threats posed by nuclear-armed adversaries: a strategic environment marked by two nuclear peer major powers. Russia, long a nuclear peer of the United States, will likely emerge from the war in Ukraine—regardless of how it ends—even more reliant on its nuclear forces, which are already the largest in the world. Meanwhile, China is undertaking the largest nuclear force buildup since the Cold War. That buildup will increase the size of Beijing’s nuclear forces by roughly seven and a half times since 2018, positioning China as a nuclear peer of the United States by 2035.1 Meanwhile, North Korea continues to expand and diversify its nuclear arsenal. Although the North Korean threat has been somewhat constrained by the quality of its ballistic missile systems—particularly its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)—technical assistance from Russia, in exchange for Kim Jong Un’s material support for the war in Ukraine, could rapidly enhance North Korean capabilities. Finally, the ongoing conflict in the Middle East could prompt Iran to choose to acquire its own nuclear arsenal, presenting a wholly new challenge. A pair of recent analyses of the strategic impact of this two-nuclear-peer environment have sounded an alarm, making clear that this environment poses a qualitatively and quantitatively new threat of adversary aggression and the potential for nuclear war.2 Conducted by bipartisan teams of former senior US officials and other nuclear experts, both analyses concluded—in the words of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (hereafter referred to as the Strategic Posture Commission)—that the planned US nuclear force “is absolutely essential, although not sufficient [emphasis added] to meet the new threats posed by Russia and China.”3 Both reports emphasized the urgent need to enhance US theater nuclear forces to address the most likely path to large-scale nuclear war: the failure to deter or counter limited adversary nuclear use in an ongoing conventional conflict. Finally, both reports laid out a set of attributes that US theater nuclear force enhancements must possess to effectively address the threat of limited nuclear escalation. However, these reports did not examine in depth the deterrence and warfighting implications of alternative new US theater nuclear systems. This paper examines why the two-nuclear-peer threat makes the enhancement of US theater nuclear forces an urgent imperative. It explains why the planned US strategic and theater nuclear forces are insufficient to address this threat. The paper then presents a more detailed set of political-military and operational attributes that enhanced US theater nuclear forces must possess to effectively counter the threat. Using these attributes, it evaluates the relative deterrence and warfighting value of various potential alternative theater-range nuclear weapon systems. The paper concludes with a recommended future US theater nuclear force structure and posture, specifically, that the United States should field a theater nuclear force that combines an effectively dispersible dual-capable fighter aircraft (DCA) force in Europe with nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-Ns) deployed day-to-day on attack submarines (SSNs) in Europe and Asia and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM-Ns) and/or ground-launched ballistic missiles (GLBM-Ns) continuously deployed in Europe and/or Asia.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

215. The next decade of strategic competition: How the Pentagon can use special operations forces to better compete

Author:: Clementine G. Starling-Daniels and Theresa Luetkefend
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Strategic competition is likely to intensify over the next decade, increasing the demands on the United States to deter and defend against wide-ranging and simultaneous security challenges across multiple domains and regions worldwide. In that time frame, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Joint Force should more effectively leverage the competencies of US Special Operations Forces (USSOF) to compete with US strategic adversaries. Three realities facing the DOD over the next decade lend themselves toward leveraging USSOF more in strategic competition. First, the growing need to counter globally active and increasingly cooperative aggressors, while the broader Joint Force remains focused on the Indo-Pacific and Europe, underscores the value of leveraging USSOF to manage competition in other regions. Second, the desire to avoid war and manage competition below the threshold of conflict aligns with USSOF’s expertise in the irregular aspects of competition. Third, unless defense spending and recruitment dramatically increase over the next decade, the Joint Force will likely have to manage more security challenges without a commensurate increase in force size and capabilities, which underscores the need for the DOD to maximize every tool at its disposal, including the use of USSOF to help manage strategic competition. The US government must harness all instruments of national power, alongside its network of allies and partners, to uphold international security, deter attacks, and counter efforts to undermine US security interests. Achieving this requires effectively integrating and leveraging the distinct roles of the DOD, interagency partners, the intelligence community (IC), and the Joint Force, including components like USSOF that have not been traditionally prioritized in strategic competition. For the past two decades, USSOF achieved critical operational successes during the Global War on Terror, primarily through counterterrorism and direct-action missions. However, peer and near-peer competition now demands a broader application of USSOF’s twelve core activities, with emphasis on seven: special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, security force assistance, civil affairs operations, military information support operations, unconventional warfare, and direct action. Over the next decade, the DOD should emphasize USSOF’s return to its roots—the core competencies USSOF conducted and refined during the Cold War. USSOF’s unconventional warfare support of resistance groups in Europe; its support of covert intelligence operations in Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America; its evacuation missions of civilians in Africa; and its guerrilla and counterguerrilla operations helped combat Soviet influence operations worldwide. During that era, special operations became one of the US military’s key enablers to counter coercion below the threshold of armed conflict, and that is how USSOF should be applied in the next decade to help manage strategic competition. This report outlines five ways the Department of Defense should use Special Operations Forces over the next decade to support US efforts in strategic competition. USSOF should be leveraged to: Enhance the US government’s situational awareness of strategic competition dynamics globally. Entangle adversaries in competition to prevent escalation. Strengthen allied and partner resilience to support the US strategy of deterrence by denial. Support integration across domains for greater effect at the tactical edge Contribute to US information and decision advantage by leveraging USSOF’s role as a technological pathfinder. This report seeks to clarify USSOF’s role in strategic competition over the next decade, address gaps in understanding within the DOD and the broader national security community about USSOF’s competencies, and guide future resource and force development decisions. By prioritizing the above five functions, USSOF can bolster the US competitive edge and support the DOD’s management of challenges across diverse theaters and domains.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, National Security, Terrorism, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Africa, China, Middle East, Latin America, and United States of America

216. Trade with Colombia is big business for US exporters—amid growing Chinese influence in Latin America

Author:: Geoff Ramsey and Enrique Millán-Mejía
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Colombia and the United States have achieved a close, mutually beneficial partnership over several decades on migration, security, counternarcotics, and commerce—with the US trade surplus with Colombia totaling $1.3 billion in 2024. The Colombian market is particularly important for US agricultural producers. Thanks to the US-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (TPA), Colombia is the top destination for US agricultural exports in South America and the third main destination in the Western Hemisphere. The United States is still Colombia’s largest trading partner in South America—with $36.7 billion in two-way trade in 2024—but January data showed Chinese products leading over US imports for the month. The TPA promotes both reciprocal trade and US influence; interpretative improvements to previously agreed-upon matters are possible,
Topic:: Economy, Business, Tariffs, Exports, Trade, and International Markets
Political Geography:: China, Colombia, South America, Latin America, and United States of America

217. CTC Sentinel: March 2025 Issue

Author:: Don Rassler, Yannick Veilleux-Lepage, Julika Enslin, Aaron Y. Zelin, and Jake Dulligan
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: CTC Sentinel
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: The March issue focuses in particular on the drone threat. In the feature article, Don Rassler and Yannick Veilleux-Lepage examine the evolution of terrorist drone usage and forecast its future trajectory in light of the tactical and technological innovations emerging from the Russo-Ukrainian War. They write that “the conflict has become a critical ‘innovation hub’ for drone warfare, accelerating advancements in the scale, speed, and range of drone operations. These developments are not only transforming the modern battlefield but also creating new opportunities for violent extremist organizations (VEOs) to enhance their operational capabilities.” They assess that “in particular, the war has normalized large-scale drone deployment, demonstrating the feasibility of launching coordinated drone swarms and phased attacks capable of overwhelming existing defenses” and note that the potential future pairing of high-speed First-Person View (FPV) drones with emerging technologies such as AI-assisted targeting “could significantly increase the precision and impact of future attacks.” In a similar vein, Jake Dulligan, Laura Freeman, Austin Phoenix, and Bradley Davis, in assessing the threat posed by commercial drones, write that the biggest concern “is that drone swarms could dramatically increase the impact of bad actor drone operations, be it kinetic strikes, ISR, or psychological warfare.” This month’s interview is with Dr. Christian Klos, the Director General of Public Security at Germany’s Federal Ministry of Interior and Community. He says that “when it comes to the external threat, I would agree with the assessment that ISIS-K is in Germany as well. What we observe from the intelligence side is that there are clear indications that the group intends to conduct attacks in Europe, and this can also include Germany and therefore we are very much aware of this threat, and we have seen also travel activities. So, it’s not just some minor indications.” Aaron Zelin assesses the new Syrian government’s efforts to counter the Islamic State, Hezbollah, and the captagon trade. He writes: “Unlike the Assad regime—which did little to fight the Islamic State, was closely aligned with Hezbollah, and produced captagon on an industrial scale—HTS in its guise as the new government of Syria is taking on these challenges assertively, and has a significant track record in doing so previously. Not only are these efforts a benefit to Syrian society and the security and stability of the country, but they also align with the interests of the United States and U.S. regional allies.” Alexandre Rodde and Justin Olmstead examine the evolution of vehicular ramming attacks and prevention efforts. They write that “when it comes to indicators and warnings of future attacks, the demonstration effect created by high-casualty vehicle-ramming attacks has in the past seemingly produced a surge in copycat attacks, which means the security agencies should be particularly vigilant given the recent uptick in high-profile attacks, including the New Orleans attack.”
Topic:: Intelligence, Terrorism, Violent Extremism, Weapons, Drones, Islamic State, Syrian War, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Public Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

218. CTC Sentinel: May 2025 Issue

Author:: Daisy Muibu, Yayedior Mbengue, Sean Morrow, Don Rassler, and Briar Bundy
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: CTC Sentinel
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: In the May 2025 feature article, Daisy Muibu and Yayedior Mbengue examine the evolving counterterrorism challenge in Somalia. They write that “nearly three years after the Somali government launched its offensive against al-Shabaab, the security landscape remains precarious. Al-Shabaab has resurged, coordination between federal and Puntland forces is limited despite Islamic State-Somalia’s growing global remit, and the future of the African Union mission is uncertain. These trends are driven by political discord, a fragmented national landscape, donor fatigue, operational challenges, and al-Shabaab’s resilience.” Our interview is with Christine Abizaid, the former director of the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center. She emphasizes that: “The CT business is still a needles-in-the-haystack business; it’s still one piece of information that can open up a whole new threat network. You have to be digging into and accessing multiple sources of information, collaborating with multiple partners who see things in different ways.” Aymenn Al-Tamimi charts the rise, fall, and dissolution of al-Qa`ida’s loyalist group in Syria Hurras al-Din. He writes that: “The primary ongoing concern from a counterterrorism perspective is that regardless of Hurras al-Din’s own weakness, individuals who were members of the group, particularly leading figures, may try to coordinate with other members of al-Qa`ida or other jihadis outside Syria for the purpose of organizing terrorist attacks abroad.” Saif Tahir and Amira Jadoon examine the geographical origins, mobility patterns, and demographic characteristics of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants through an analysis of 615 profiles from the organization’s own martyrdom commemorative publications spanning 2006-2025. Julika Enslin outlines the evolution of the Islamist terror threat landscape in Germany since 2020 by taking an in-depth look at all nine executed Islamist terrorist attacks and the 20 publicly reported thwarted attack plots during that time. A personal note: Over the last 10 years, it has been the privilege of a lifetime to serve as the Editor-in-Chief of CTC Sentinel to showcase the best and brightest scholars and practitioners in our field. It’s time for me to pass the baton. The publication will be in great hands with my brilliant colleagues Kristina Hummel and Don Rassler. I look forward to continuing my close association with the Combating Terrorism Center and CTC Sentinel. The faculty and staff at the center, past and present, are the very best of America. I greatly appreciate the trust that directors Colonel Sean Morrow, Brian Dodwell, and Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Bryan Price placed in me. Above all, I would like to express my thanks to our extraordinary contributors. They have greatly helped the counterterrorism enterprise. Who thinks wins.
Topic:: Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Al Qaeda, Al-Shabaab, African Union, Salafi-Jihadism, and Hurras al-Din
Political Geography:: Africa, Middle East, Syria, North America, Somalia, and United States of America

219. Strategies for States to Weather DisasterRelated Income Tax Extensions

Author:: Nancy Y. Augustine, Miles Murphy, Kate Kellen, and Coleman Stallworth
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA)
Abstract:: The Academy will conduct comprehensive research and analysis to examine how disaster declarations affect tax extension periods in states and the IRS decision-making process in determining the extension duration. The objective of this engagement is to improve state and IRS coordination, communication, and decision making.
Topic:: Budget, Financial Management, Intergovernmental Models, and Government Operations
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

220. Washington’s Opportunity in Central Asia (and the South Caucasus)

Author:: Stephen Blank
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: As the Trump Administration conducts a global survey of strategic opportunities for the United States, it would be well advised to view Central Asia and the South Caucasus (the core subregions of what this journal’s Editorial Statement calls the “Silk Road region” and what is commonly still called “Eurasia” in some circles) as areas where a creative, new approach would yield lasting strategic gains—both for America and those states themselves. To be sure, this region is not and will not become a major priority or a vital interest for the United States—nor is that necessary. But its importance in world politics as an area of strategic competition among many rival states, including Russia and China and several aspirant and rising middle powers, is increasing. Therefore, it should be understood to be beneficial for all the states in Central Asia and the South Caucasus that Washington both enhance and sustain at a higher level its comprehensive, multi-dimensional engagement with them because only America can provide or convene many of the public goods they need.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Donald Trump, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: Central Asia, South Caucasus, and United States of America

221. Friends and Foes in the Indo-Pacific: Multilateralism Out, Minilateralism In?

Author:: Axel Berkofsky and Guido Alberto Casanova
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:: Minilateralism is already among us, and it is here to stay. The well-known shortcomings of the multilateral system of governance are pushing individual states in the Indo-Pacific to come up with new and different solutions to deal with the security and prosperity issues that current institutions are unable to tackle. Amid growing geopolitical rivalries and the uncertainty provoked by the re-election of Donald Trump, this report aims to shed some clarity on an emerging trend that is already affecting the foreign policy of great powers in a region that is central to global affairs.
Topic:: Security, Alliance, Multilateralism, Institutions, and Cooperation
Political Geography:: Russia, Japan, India, Asia, North Korea, Philippines, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

222. Radical novelties in critical technologies and spillovers: how do China, the US and the EU fare?

Author:: Alicia Garcia-Herrero, Michal Krystyanczuk, and Robin Schindowski
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Critical technologies including artificial intelligence, semiconductors and quantum computing are attracting attention because of their indispensable nature and their role in national security strategies. We compare China, the United States and the European Union in these technologies and their subfields. We use large language models (LLMs) to identify which patents in these technologies can be considered most groundbreaking (not patented before) and worth replicating. These are ‘radical novelties.’ We find that the US clearly dominates quantum. Chinese and EU progress is similar. The US does slightly better than China in AI with clear dominance in generative AI, but China stands out in some important subfields, such as aerial vehicle technology. China dominates in a larger number of semiconductor fields but not in the highest value added, which is related to design. In a second step we assess how quickly radical novelties in these three technologies are transferred from one economic area to another and within each economic area. We find that the fastest transmission overall is for AI. The EU is by far the slowest in replicating radical novelties from the US and China, while the US and China tend to replicate European novel patents relatively quickly. Radical novelties are also replicated quickly between China and the US which is surprising given US controls on exports of critical technologies to China. Our findings are concerning for Europe because it does not produce enough critical patents in these technologies and because it is slower in replicating patents from the US and China.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Economy, Trade, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

223. Which companies are ahead in frontier innovation on critical technologies? Comparing China, the European Union and the United States

Author:: Alicia Garcia-Herrero, Michal Krystyanczuk, and Robin Schindowski
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Competition in critical technologies is attracting increasing attention not only because of the foundational nature of these technologies for other types of innovation, but also because of their role in the United States national security strategy. In this paper, we look into which entities in China, the European Union and the US innovate at the technology frontier in the three most important critical technologies – artificial intelligence, quantum computing and semiconductors – based on identification of the most radical novel patents in these technologies and their subsectors. Working with these pathbreaking patents, we look into the origin of the companies that file the largest numbers of them. US innovators dominate the innovation frontier for quantum computing and, to a lesser extent, AI, with Chinese innovators doing better in semiconductors. European innovators lag in all, but perform relatively better in quantum computing, in which they rank similarly to Chinese innovators. Furthermore, the innovation ecosystem is quite different across geographies. In the US, tech companies top the rankings of critical novelties and are highly concentrated: as many as three companies are in the top rankings of all of the three critical technologies. Frontier innovators in the field in which the EU competes most equally – quantum – are mostly research centres and not companies. China lies somewhat in between in all three domains.
Topic:: Science and Technology, European Union, Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, Semiconductors, and Quantum Computing
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

224. How can Europe’s nuclear deterrence trilemma be resolved?

Author:: Andrea Gilli and Francesco Nicoli
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: The United States under President Donald Trump has adopted an ambiguous position on European security. Although no immediate risk of abandonment is apparent, European countries are rethinking their defence strategies in case the US declines to support them, or provides only partial support, in a crisis. This discussion is particularly sensitive in relation to nuclear weapons, the ultimate deterrent, for which European countries depend extensively on the United States. We argue that a possible future US withdrawal from European nuclear security will force European countries to face a policy trilemma. If they stick to the existing policy framework of no proliferation and no joint deterrence, they expose themselves to nuclear blackmail, should the US withdraw its external guarantee. If they want to protect themselves from nuclear blackmail, they must choose how to provide nuclear security: either collective nuclear security, which would compromise some national sovereignty, or independent provision by individual countries, leading to nuclear proliferation in Europe. Having established that uncontrolled proliferation is an inferior outcome to some form of joint deterrence, we identify four main alternatives: an extension of the Franco-British nuclear deterrent; an extension complemented by a jointly financed expansion of existing deterrence; the absorption of the French (and perhaps British) nuclear arsenals into a European arsenal; and the construction of a separate European submarine deterrent (with Europe using French or British technology or developing new technology). We also discuss briefly forms of non-nuclear deterrence, which however would likely be a complementary rather than a substitute for a nuclear deterrent. We compare these options using a set of parameters: strategic autonomy and credibility, changes to treaties (including non-proliferation), costs, capabilities and readiness. Our analysis shows that all options have advantages and disadvantages, but some are politically, financially and militarily more feasible.
Topic:: Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Industrial Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, Macroeconomics, Deterrence, Transatlantic Relations, and Vulnerability
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

225. Not yet Trump-proof: an evaluation of the European Commission’s emerging policy platform

Author:: Heather Grabbe and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: The economic strategy being defined by the 2024-2029 European Commission seems to follow the prescriptions on innovation and single market reform, and the expansive approach to industrial policy, set out by Mario Draghi in his September 2024 report on European Union competitiveness, with two important differences. First, the Commission stops short of calling for World Trade Organisation-prohibited subsidies – this is welcome. Second, the Commission proposes a new state aid framework for national industrial policy rather than expansion of EU-level public investment funding. This runs the risk of weakening the single market and harming competition, with the unintended consequence of protecting incumbents and inhibiting structural change. In terms of specific policies, on defence, the Commission is right to face up to the challenge of defining an EU procurement mechanism that offers sufficient speed and cost advantages to justify large-scale funding. On economic security and international partnerships, the Commission is right to take a broader approach than a foreign economic policy focused only on supply chains. What is lacking is a much greater commitment to providing support for climate mitigation in developing countries. The second Trump presidency creates risks for the Commission strategy. President Trump has gone further than expected in threatening territorial expansion and with the speed, aggression and disregard for the rule of law with which he has started to implement his policies. These factors will complicate the EU-United States relationship. The best defence against both Trump and the competitive and security threats posed by China is to accelerate policies that address the EU’s structural weaknesses: raising productivity growth, defence capacity and economic security. Economic security, in turn, requires more resilient trade relationships, less financial dependence on the US and an improved standing with emerging market and developing economies. The EU should also seize the opportunity offered by the shift in US policy from subsidies to deregulation. While the EU should not race Trump to the bottom on environmental or financial deregulation, it should rapidly improve its own regulatory framework while building on its core strengths: human capital and the rule of law. Unlike tariff wars or discriminatory subsidies, a competition to provide a good business environment is not a zero-sum game.
Topic:: Security, Economics, Industrial Policy, Budget, European Union, Digital Economy, Trade Policy, Donald Trump, Sustainability, European Commission, and Energy
Political Geography:: Europe and United States of America

226. The governance and funding of European rearmament

Author:: Guntram B. Wolff, Armin Steinbach, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Europe faces a grave security threat. Gaps in European military equipment are substantial compared to Russia’s military build-up. The European defence market is fragmented and weakened by home bias in procurement, low order numbers and technological gaps. These problems reflect the combination of past reliance on the United States and Europe’s nationally-based defence governance. With the US now retreating from its role of European guardian, greater cooperation is essential to close technological gaps and reduce rearmament costs. Unless procurement is pooled and fragmentation reduced, additional demand for defence goods will mainly drive up prices. Better-integrated defence markets would both increase competition and facilitate entry of new defence technology firms. The combination of integrated markets and scaled-up procurement could lead to a halving of unit costs. European Union measures including the European Defence Fund, the Act in Support of Ammunition Production, the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act and ReArm Europe represent progress towards strengthening the supply of military goods but the incentives offered are too small to address the home bias in procurement or to coordinate the provision of ‘strategic enablers’ such as military satellites. To go further, the EU and its European allies have two options. First, the role of the European Defence Agency could be broadened, possibly in combination with a new lending instrument similar to the EU’s 2020-22 SURE programme. Second, a European Defence Mechanism (EDM) could be created: an institution similar to the European Stability Mechanism, based on an intergovernmental treaty. The EDM would undertake joint procurement and plan for the provision of strategic enablers in specified areas, with a capacity to fund these roles. It could own strategic enablers and charge usage fees to EDM members, reducing the budgetary impact of rearmament. EDM membership would entail prohibition of both state aid and procurement preferences that benefit national defence contractors at the expense of contractors from other EDM members. Of the two options, the second is preferable, as it would (1) create a defence industry single market among EDM members, (2) create a financing vehicle that might make large-scale projects fiscally feasible, and (3) include non-EU democracies such as the United Kingdom on an equal footing, while also giving an opt-out to EU countries that lack the political appetite for more defence integration, or that have national constitutional constraints.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Governance, Geopolitics, Weapons, Macroeconomics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and United States of America

227. Evolving Partnerships: U.S. Alliances and the Pacific Islands

Author:: Grace Price
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:: Pacific Island countries (PICs) have long attracted development and security assistance from the region’s traditional partner states—the United States, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. However, the Pacific has received renewed attention from them as China actively vies for influence. Despite increased engagement, the PICs are still turning to China in pursuit of their development and security needs. This report will map out efforts the United States, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand are taking to increase influence, obstacles that are hindering effective cooperation in the Pacific, and recommendations for improving their collective engagement with the PICs.
Topic:: Security, Development, Partnerships, and Alliance
Political Geography:: North America, United States of America, and Pacific Islands

228. Charting a Path in the Uncharted Domain

Author:: Jennifer Hong Whetsell
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:: The Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) is rising as a prominent player in the space domain. The size of its space program makes its current position as an emerging space power even more impressive and promising. The United States, one of South Korea's closest political and defense allies, and South Korea share a considerable history in space cooperation since the late 1980s. Despite the long history of collaboration between the United States and South Korea, fundamental differences have slowed their progress toward a deeper and more meaningful cooperation in this domain. As space becomes an integral aspect of national security and a coveted frontier for scientific endeavor and exploration, the two capitals have much to gain through enhanced cooperation. “Charting a Path in the Uncharted Domain” examines the landscape of South Korea’s space ecosystem and provides a broad overview of its accomplishments and challenges in the space domain. It then highlights significant milestones of space cooperation between Washington and Seoul and analyzes the cooperative landscape, noting areas of differences and opportunities for enhanced cooperation. The paper then presents recommendations for U.S. and ROK policymakers to help overcome those barriers and strengthen their cooperation in the space domain.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Space
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

229. Terrorism and Immigration: 50 Years of Foreign-Born Terrorism on US Soil, 1975–2024

Author:: Alex Nowrasteh
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: Terrorism is a hazard to human life and material prosperity that should be addressed in a sensible manner whereby the benefits of government actions taken to contain it outweigh the costs. Whether policies are sensible depends on the risks that terrorism poses, the harms that terrorism inflicts, and the costs of anti-terrorism policies. This risk analysis of foreign-born terrorism is a crucial step in evaluating anti-terrorism policies related to immigration.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, and Immigration
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

230. Aimless Rivalry: The Futility of US–China Competition in the Middle East

Author:: Jon Hoffman
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: Fear in Washington over China’s expanding regional presence is quickly becoming a new rationale for an expansive US foreign policy in the Middle East. But China remains an opportunistic actor in the Middle East, driven by practical needs, not by aspirations to dominate the region. Beijing lacks the ability and desire to assume a dominant position in the Middle East, and its ability to jeopardize US regional interests is limited.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Strategic Competition, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

231. Sanctuaries, Islands, and Deserts: A Typology of Regionalized Abortion Policy

Author:: Payton Gannon and Danielle Pullan
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:: This paper elaborates a typology of regionalized abortion policy based on a comparative case study of Italy and the United States. Italy originally legalized abortion in 1978 and has seen little effort to modify the law since. Contrastingly, the United States’ abortion landscape has been in near constant flux since 1974, when, in Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right to abortion. This became even more unstable in 2022 when the Supreme Court overruled Roe in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health and held there is no constitutional right to abortion. Despite their differences in national abortion policy, both Italy and the US have regionalized the implementation of their abortion policies. Italy’s law is national, but implementation is interpreted differently at the regional level. Since Dobbs, US states have proposed and passed many laws about abortion, creating even greater regional variation than before. We propose a typology of regionalized abortion access: “Sanctuaries” where abortion is most protected and available; “Islands” with liberal policies that are surrounded by more restrictive territories; and “Deserts” with minimal abortion access. Through qualitative analysis of policies, political activities, and firsthand accounts by abortion providers and advocates working in places of each type, we then highlight the long-term implications of each of these components of the typology, analyzing the ways that they impact abortion providers and patients.
Topic:: Human Rights, Health Care Policy, Abortion, and Regionalization
Political Geography:: Europe, Italy, North America, and United States of America

232. The Future of the 'Special Relationship'

Author:: Kim Darroch and Evie Aspinall
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Mile End Institute, Queen Mary University of London
Abstract:: Since Winston Churchill first coined the term in 1946, successive American Presidents and Prime Ministers have hailed the ‘Special Relationship’ between the United Kingdom and the United States. For over 80 years, the exceptionally close political, diplomatic, economic, military and intelligence relationship between the two countries has endured changes of government, the end of the Cold War, the ‘War on Terror’, and globalisation. In the week that Donald Trump returned to the White House, the former British Ambassador to the United States, Kim Darroch, the Director of the British Foreign Policy Group, Evie Aspinall, and Dr James Ellison explored the future of Anglo-American relations. With tariffs looming and Elon Musk waging war on the Starmer government, they asked how should Britain handle this relationship - and explored the challenges it will face over the coming years.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Politics, Bilateral Relations, Tariffs, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:: United Kingdom, Europe, North America, and United States of America

233. EU-Taiwan Relations: Navigating PRC Pressure, U.S.-China Competition, and Trump’s Foreign Policy

Author:: Simona Grano
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: This paper first explores the growing relationship between the European Union and Taiwan by focusing on recent interactions. It then discusses the broader geopolitical implications of Trump’s “America First” policy and how the U.S.-China competition impacts the EU’s ability to strategically balance the China-Taiwan dynamic. The paper demonstrates how a number of variables, including Europe’s strategic interests in the region, the U.S. position on China, and the U.S.-EU relationship under the second Trump administration, will influence ties between the EU and Taiwan. The shift in EU-Taiwan ties has gone largely unnoticed. The EU has started paying more attention to Taiwan’s security, shifting away from its former focus on China for its importance in trade and investment. This shift is partly due to supply chain and security concerns and partly due to growing political apprehension about China’s long-term goals. In the coming years, Europe will be influenced by the Trump administration when deciding how to handle Taiwan. The EU will have to find a balance between the need for steady access to vital technology and U.S.-EU relations. At the same time, the EU and the United States seem to have entered a critical phase in their bilateral relationship, especially concerning the war in Ukraine and Washington’s warming relationship with Moscow. This indeterminate situation may also impact the EU’s relationship with both Taiwan and China, the consequences of which will take several months to fully gauge.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, European Union, Geopolitics, Donald Trump, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

234. China’s Views on Escalation and Crisis Management and Implications for the United States

Author:: Lyle Morris
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: China lacks experience dealing with military crises and has attempted to compensate by investing considerable intellectual capital to develop theories and strategies for managing escalation with potential adversaries. China’s military strategists believe that if a crisis breaks out, it can be “controlled,” and escalation can be “managed” by applying scientific principles and advanced military technology. People’s Liberation Army strategists have developed a conceptual framework for managing crises called “effective control” (youxiao kongzhi) — a flexible, graduated tool designed to guide political and military action during times of tension. Due to an overreliance on theoretical underpinnings, China believes it can control all facets of military escalation. This could make China’s leaders overconfident in their ability to prevail in a conflict and increase the risk of escalation in a military confrontation between China and the United States. The writings of Chinese military strategists omit how China’s behavior may be perceived — or misperceived — by an adversary. Absent is an acknowledgment that China’s actions, such as in space or cyberspace, may be viewed as provocative and grounds for the tit-for-tat escalation that Beijing seeks to avoid. Further research is necessary to explore the actions that China’s military may employ to manage escalation and how adversaries may interpret them.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Crisis Management, Escalation, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

235. Agenda for change 2025: Preparedness and resilience in an uncertain world

Author:: Raelene Lockhorst, Charles Lewis Taylor, Justin Bassi, Danielle Cave, and Marc Ablong
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: For more than a decade, which has included the 2013, 2016, 2019 and 2022 federal elections, ASPI has helped to generate ideas and foster debate about Australian strategic policymaking through Agenda for change, a wide-ranging collection of analyses and recommendations to assist the next Australian Government in its deliberations and planning. Agenda for change 2025: Preparedness and resilience in an uncertain world continues in its tradition by providing focused and anticipatory policy advice for the 48th Parliament of Australia. The agenda strives to highlight, and present solutions to, the most pressing questions that our next government must consider in order to advance and protect Australia’s national interests in a more disordered and challenging world. This edition reflects five interrelated aspects of Australia’s position in 2025, focused on the need to: defend Australia navigate our place in a new world (dis)order reform our security architecture and policies secure our critical infrastructure protect and use our natural resources. In 2025, that means equipping the next government for the reality of the contest in which our country is engaged. Since the previous edition of Agenda for change in 2022 we’ve seen: Russia’s ongoing war on Ukraine and public confirmation of the China–Russia ‘no limits’ partnership change in Australia’s policy towards China, with a focus on ‘stabilisation’, accompanied by reduced economic coercion against Australia but a ratcheting up of military intimidation, including an unprecedented PLA Navy circumnavigation of Australia heightened aggression by China against the Philippines in the South China Sea and against Taiwan a lowering of the national terrorism threat level to ‘possible’ in 2022, before it was raised back to ‘probable’ not quite two years later the 7 October 2023 Hamas terrorist attacks on Israel, the resulting war in Gaza and an increase in politically motivated violence in Australia the rise of artificial intelligence, including the landmark release of ChatGPT in late 2022 and then DeepSeek in 2025 the return of Donald Trump to the White House, bringing tension among allies and question marks over the future of the US-led international order. Each chapter in Agenda for change includes a limited number of prioritised policy recommendations, which are intended to be discrete, do-able and impactful. Although, when dealing with some of the more existential challenges facing Australia, the recommendations are necessarily and similarly expansive. In addressing that extraordinary range of developments, ASPI has drawn on a wide range of expertise for the 2025 edition of Agenda for change. The views expressed are the personal views of the authors and don’t represent a formal position of ASPI on any issue, other than a shared focus on Australia’s national interests.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Climate Change, National Security, United Nations, European Union, Counter-terrorism, Defense Industry, and Defense Economics
Political Geography:: Australia, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

236. British public opinion on foreign policy: President Trump, Ukraine, China, Defence spending and AUKUS

Author:: Sophia Gaston
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: Results snapshot President Trump Britons support an open and engaged foreign policy role for the United Kingdom. In light of the re-election of President Donald Trump, 40% believe Britain should continue to maintain its current active level of engagement in world affairs, and 23% believe it should play a larger role. Just 16% of Britons support a less active United Kingdom on the world stage. When asked what Britain’s response should be if the United States withdraws its financial and military support from Ukraine, 57% of Britons would endorse the UK either maintaining (35%) or increasing (22%) its contributions to Ukraine. One-fifth would prefer that the UK reduces its contributions to Ukraine. UK–China relations Just a quarter (26%) of Britons support the UK Government’s efforts to increase engagement with China in the pursuit of economic growth and stabilised diplomatic relations. In comparison, 45% of Britons would either prefer to return to the more restricted level of engagement under the previous government (25%) or for the government to reduce its relations with Beijing even further (20%). A large majority of Britons (69%) are concerned about the increasing degree of cooperation between Russia and China. Conservative and Labour voters share similarly high levels of concern, and Britons over 50 years of age are especially troubled about the trend of adversary alignment. Defence and security When asked whether the UK will need to spend more on defence to keep up with current and future global security challenges, a clear two-thirds (64%) of the British people agree. Twenty-nine per cent of Britons strongly agree that defence spending should increase. Just 12% disagree that the UK will need to spend more. The majority of Britons believe that collaboration with allies on defence and security projects like AUKUS will help to make the UK safer (55%) and that partnerships like AUKUS focusing on developing cutting-edge technologies with Britain’s allies will help to make the UK more competitive towards countries like China (59%). Britons are somewhat less persuaded that AUKUS will succeed as a deterrent against Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific, although the largest group of respondents (44%) agree that it will.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Bilateral Relations, Public Opinion, Alliance, AUKUS, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: China, United Kingdom, Ukraine, Australia, and United States of America

237. The future of US Indo-Pacific policy

Author:: Greg Brown, Nerida King, and Eric Lies
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: How might US policy in the Indo-Pacific change over the next four years? In anticipation of a new US administration and Congress in 2025, ASPI USA held an “alternative futures analysis” exercise in mid-October 2024 to explore the drivers of US policy and how they might evolve through to November 2028. The workshop involved seven Indo-Pacific experts, who discussed a range of factors that could determine US policy and assessed how key factors could drive different outcomes. The participants determined that the two key drivers affecting the US role in the Indo-Pacific over the next four years that are simultaneously most uncertain and most determinative for US policy are: Washington’s perception of China’s strength in the Indo-Pacific the level of US attention to the region. The former is a key determinant of Washington’s threat perception, and the latter is a key determinant of Washington’s capacity to sustainably engage in the region. The nexus of those drivers produced a skeleton of four potential scenarios: Failing to walk and chew gum: Perceived high China power and a low level of US attention. In this scenario, Beijing continues to advance its interests across the region while Washington fails to prioritise imperatives in the Indo-Pacific amid ongoing conflicts in Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere. Follow US: Perceived high China power and a high level of US attention. In this scenario, the possibility of Chinese regional hegemony is growing, but the US adopts a focused, harder-edged security strategy and leads like-minded states to confront the challenge. The Peaceful Pivot: Perceived low China power and a high level of US attention. In this “stars align” scenario, the perception of diminishing competition and conflict with China couples with the US implementing the decade-old promise of a pivot to Asia. Leading from behind: Perceived low China power and a low level of US attention. China’s capacity to project power falters in this scenario, but the US—pulled into global events elsewhere and distracted by its own domestic politics—does not provide forceful leadership in the region and leans on allies and partners to carry the load.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, and Threat Perception
Political Geography:: North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

238. The Pacific cocaine corridor: A Brazilian cartel’s pipeline to Australia

Author:: Rodrigo Duton
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: Australia faces an emerging national security threat from Brazilian transnational crime groups. Once a domestic concern, Brazilian organised crime has evolved into a powerful narco-insurgency with transnational reach, making Brazil the world’s second-largest player in the cocaine trade after Colombia. While Brazilian organised crime previously posed little threat to Australia, this report, The Pacific cocaine corridor: A Brazilian cartel’s pipeline to Australia, examines how Brazil’s expanding role in global cocaine supply, rising criminal network sophistication, and growing demand in Australia’s lucrative cocaine market are increasing the presence of Brazilian organised crime on Australian shores. The report highlights how Brazil’s Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) has become a major transnational criminal threat, exploiting weaknesses in political, legal, and economic systems. It explores Brazil’s geography and criminal networks with South American cocaine producers and examines the PCC’s global distribution networks, with a focus on how the Pacific is increasingly used to transport drugs destined for Australia. A recent case study demonstrates the prioritisation of the Australian market in these operations. The report concludes with recommendations for strengthening police cooperation, enhancing financial surveillance, and proactively detecting and disrupting PCC activities. By addressing key enablers of the PCC’s resilience and closing gaps in international information exchange, a coordinated approach will not only mitigate the immediate threat but also bolster Australia’s long-term defences against transnational organised crime.
Topic:: National Security, United Nations, Armed Forces, European Union, Police, and Organized Crime
Political Geography:: Asia-Pacific and United States of America

239. NATO is safe, but for how long? What needs to be taken from the Hague Summit

Author:: Sophie Draeger and Loïc Simonet
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: The Hague NATO Summit was a success – on the paper. Mark Rutte’s first test as Secretary-General may have avoided the chaos of Trump’s first term, but the outcome reveals deep contradictions in the Alliance. The agreed 5% defence spending target is historic and the final communiqué strikingly short, yet these moves mask rather than resolve NATO’s structural vulnerability. Trump’s transactional view of Article 5 remains the Alliance’s Damocles sword, as America’s long-term commitment to Europe remains in question. The EU, meanwhile, is facing a strategic and identity crossroads. While Trump’s pressure spurs long-overdue momentum toward a stronger European defence posture, it also risks accelerating Europe’s militarization at the expense of its founding peace project. The 'phoney transatlantic bargain' – Europe promises to spend, Trump promises to stay – may hold for now, but cannot guarantee NATO’s credibility in the long run. Amid economic risks and political fragmentation, the EU must act fast to assert its own roadmap, including tying EU funds to defence efforts and planning for U.S. retrenchment. Without this, Europe may find itself simultaneously more militarized and more vulnerable.
Topic:: NATO, European Union, Alliance, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:: Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

240. The ‘geopolitical’ European Union and the new Transatlantic relation 100 days after Donald Trump’s inauguration: How to navigate the storm?

Author:: Loïc Simonet
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: Donald Trump’s second administration is a test for the “geopolitical” EU. It comes at a time of morosity and decline in Europe, both in terms of hard and soft power, and reveals EU’s major structural deficiencies and dependencies. In Ukraine, “Europe’s era is over”, former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev cynically assessed. At the same time, Donald Trump’s contemptuous foreign policy plays an accelerating role for the EU’s long-awaited strategic autonomy. The narrative is rapidly changing and the Commission’s first initiatives are promising, but the EU needs not only competitiveness but also political ambition. New ‘coalitions of the willing’ are emerging in Europe across old borders such as Brexit-related divisions or rivalries between the EU and NATO, reviving the concept of ‘concentric circles’. They might provide Europe with much needed impulse, but also enhance divisions and internal quarrels, which is in Trump’s strategy. Trump.2 also accelerates the ‘de-Westernisation’ of the world and leaves Europe alone versus ‘the Rest’. With EU’s more assertive stance and strategic quantum leap, it might also question and jeopardize Europe’s original peace project.
Topic:: European Union, Geopolitics, Transatlantic Relations, Donald Trump, and Inauguration
Political Geography:: Europe and United States of America

241. Brave New World – The Future of China-US relations

Author:: Thomas Eder
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: The US’s diminished leverage and Beijing’s reticence to engage an erratic US president mean that a new trade deal will likely take longer than in Donald Trump’s first administration, if it materializes at all. Prolonged trade tensions are unlikely to spiral into a security crisis in the Pacific. Both sides have economic priorities, US allies and partners lose trust in Washington, and Beijing will be loath to upset a trend towards a more accommodating region. The US-China trade and technology war will challenge the EU and its member states more than before but also provide Europe with leverage as the US and China gradually lose their economic partnership.
Topic:: Economics, Treaties and Agreements, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

242. Bro-Politics in Action: Trump and the “Personalization” of Foreign Policy

Author:: Ádám Csobánci
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: Congratulations poured in from European heads of state and government as soon as it became clear that Donald Trump was turning U.S. battleground states red and winning the presidential election last November. Many presidents and prime ministers posted selfies and pictures with Trump, emphasizing their strong personal relationship and shared history. While congratulations to the new President might seem like standard diplomatic courtesy, the enthusiasm for the upcoming Trump 2.0 administration from Paris, Berlin, and Brussels appears less than sincere, given their rather complicated relationships with the first Trump administration. In contrast, leaders like Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who described Trump’s victory as "the biggest comeback in Western political history" and forecasted a golden era in US-Hungarian relations, expressed a strong eagerness to collaborate on shared goals. Similarly, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni praised the "unshakable alliance" between Italy and the U.S., demonstrating clear support for Trump’s win. Recognizing the heightened importance of personal relationships in dealing with Trump and his administration, European leaders are hoping to establish strong personal ties with the President. This trend report predicts how in 2025 further “personalization” of foreign policy is to be expected from the next U.S. administration. I present, through the examples of Orbán and Meloni, that European leaders already possessing close ties with the next U.S. president or his inner circle might have a significant head start to influence Trump’s Europe policy, with far-reaching consequences. Europeans who were not in power during Trump’s first term are pressed for time because the start of his new presidency is expected to bring rapid and aggressive policy changes. With the Republican Party controlling all branches of government, Trump’s administration will likely prioritize advancing its agenda swiftly, particularly before the midterm elections in 2026, when Congressional support could wane. For European leaders who are new to office or lacked strong ties with Trump previously, this creates urgency. They have strong incentives to build closer relations with his administration, whether due to shared ideologies or fears of trade tariffs; however, they face a glaring challenge. They will have to compete for Trump’s very limited time, attention and interest, as European affairs are unlikely to be a top priority for the new administration.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Elections, Domestic Politics, Donald Trump, and Personalization
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

243. France – U.S. Relationship under Trump 2.0: No Big Drama or Turbo-Charged Confrontation?

Author:: Loïc Simonet
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: In 2018, to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the end of the first World War, Emmanuel Macron, the French President, gifted Donald Trump with a young oak tree from Belleau Wood, where 1,800 American soldiers lost their lives during the first World War. The tree soon died. Macron insisted that no analogies to the Franco-American relationship should be drawn, stating, “It’s no big drama, the symbol was to plant it together.” (RFI, 2019). From Lafayette to Tocqueville, from General de Gaulle to Dominique de Villepin, France and the United States are linked by a long history that goes to the heart of their universalist values. But the relationship has not always been simple; rather “a rich drama with many chapters” (Lightfoot & Bel, 2020, 4). France’s dilemma in 2017 was: “Is Trump a revolutionary actor or a noisy status quo president?” (Lightfoot, 2018, 7). Seven years later, the answer remains uncertain. Unlike many EU members and NATO allies, France views Trump’s foreign policy with a certain détachement and regards it as ‘business as usual’—just as it already felt relatively comfortable with Trump’s America in 2017 (Zajac, 2018), On the morning of 6 November 2024, French President Emmanuel Macron was one of the first world leaders to congratulate the president-elect. The Washington Post’s columnist David Ignatius says he found a “surprising mood of acceptance” in Paris. Joe Biden’s presidency has certainly not been the ‘oasis’ of transatlantic harmony that many naively predicted, between the abrupt and uncoordinated U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, the AUKUS humiliation and the Inflation Reduction Act. This might also explain why Benjamin Haddad, France’s Deputy Minister for European Affairs, pragmatically assessed: “We worked with the first Trump administration, and we will work with the second. (…) You have to be emotionally neutral about what’s out of your control” (quoted by Ignatius, 2024). To paraphrase a recent Policy Paper of the Notre Europe Foundation, for France, it is not about the Good (Democrats) or the Bad (Republicans), but just the Ugly (Bertolini & Fabry, 2024). Having said that, Trump’s foreign policy views could hardly be more at odds with France’s current 'global agenda', which emphasizes accelerated green transition, environmental protection initiatives, global finance regulation, and multilateral governance revitalization (Tenenbaum, 2024, 13). Most of these divergences are likely to be turbo-charged during Trump’s second mandate. An opinion poll on 7 November 2024 on “The French and the election of Donald Trump” showed that 62% of French people are worried, with only 12% satisfied. 8 out of 10 French people have a poor image of Donald Trump, including the voters of the far-right Rassemblement National (56%). In both domestic and foreign policy, 85% of French people expect Donald Trump to lead a policy of rupture. 48% of French people think that with the election of Donald Trump, relations between the United States and France will deteriorate, and 44% that they will not change. Only 7% expect relations between the two countries to improve (ELABE, 2024). France, which might well be considered the least ‘Atlanticist’ country in the transatlantic community, with its NATO-skeptic past and its aspiration to European strategic autonomy, has a vested interest in an understanding with Washington. What will it make out of Trump’s victory? A lot will depend on the relationship forged between the two presidents during Trump’s first mandate, since French and American leaders have a long history of using personal diplomacy to reach agreement on divisive issues.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: Europe, France, North America, and United States of America

244. The Rise of Agentic AI: Infrastructure, Autonomy, and America's Cyber Future

Author:: Yam Atir
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: The rise of agentic artificial intelligence marks a critical inflection point in the digital landscape. Unlike generative AI models that passively produce content, agentic AI systems are autonomous, goal-driven entities capable of initiating actions, using external tools, collaborating with other agents, and completing complex, real-world tasks with minimal human oversight. These systems are no longer experimental. Platforms like OpenAI’s Operator, Microsoft’s Copilot Studio, and Google’s A2A protocol are already transforming enterprise workflows and are on the cusp of integration into healthcare, infrastructure, and defense. While agentic AI promises immense productivity gains, it introduces a dramatically expanded cybersecurity threat surface. These agents can execute transactions, access sensitive APIs, retain memory across sessions, and operate continuously in high-stakes environments. If compromised, they pose risks, not just to data, but also to physical infrastructure, public systems, and democratic oversight. Moreover, today’s agentic systems are being built atop proprietary architectures governed by a handful of private firms, with little public transparency or accountability. This policy brief argues that the United States must act urgently to shape the foundational rules, standards, and infrastructure of agentic AI. It recommends a strategic policy roadmap, anchored in cybersecurity, to ensure that these systems are safe, resilient, and aligned with democratic values. The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), working with CISA, NIST, and other agencies, has a narrow window of opportunity to establish governance over this emerging layer of digital infrastructure before default norms are set by private actors or adversarial states. The White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) is uniquely positioned to lead the national response to agentic AI. As the primary body coordinating science and technology policy across federal agencies, OSTP holds the convening authority to align disparate stakeholders, ranging from NIST and CISA to DARPA, NSF, and federal procurement bodies. Its mandate includes setting cross-agency priorities, shaping national R&D strategy, and advising the President on emerging technologies. Given the systemic implications of agentic AI for cybersecurity, public infrastructure, and democratic oversight, OSTP is the only entity with both the strategic purview and policy leverage to orchestrate a whole-of-government approach before de facto standards are cemented by the private sector. Its leadership is ess
Topic:: Defense Policy, Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, Artificial Intelligence, Autonomy, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

245. Stimulating Clean Hydrogen Demand: The Current Landscape

Author:: Rachel Mural, Matt Floyd, Sebastian Berns, and Ai Takahashi
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Hydrogen is expected to play an important role in the global energy transition as a chemical feedstock and fuel; when produced with renewable energy, hydrogen offers a means of decarbonizing hard-to-abate industrial processes and the heavy transportation sector.1 To support market growth, current hydrogen programs aim to expand clean2 (also called “green”) hydrogen production by providing substantial subsidies in the form of supply-side funding and tax incentives. In 2023, global public investments in clean hydrogen reached $308 billion, with the vast bulk of funding allocated to production-side support.3 While worldwide clean hydrogen production targets4 reached 27-35 megatons (Mt) in 2023, demand targets have stalled at just 14 Mt.5 This trend reflects regional asymmetries in production and demand uptake. Under current projections, demand for renewable hydrogen in Europe is expected to hit 8.5 Mt by 2030, far behind the region’s planned 20 Mt of supply.6 Similarly, although the passage of the United States’ (U.S.) Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) in 2022 spurred an explosion of announced clean hydrogen projects, project offtake has lagged behind policy ambition. Supply-side incentives alone are insufficient to build robust markets for clean hydrogen; therefore, stakeholders must investigate additional demand-side innovation policies to facilitate market growth and development. In the remainder of this brief, we summarize the hydrogen policy landscape in the United States and European Union (EU), concluding with an examination of the causes of demand-side stagnation in the clean hydrogen market.
Topic:: Environment, Science and Technology, Natural Resources, Regulation, Public Policy, and Hydrogen
Political Geography:: Global Focus, United States of America, and European Union

246. Trump and the future of transatlantic relations

Author:: Mikkel Runge Olesen and Jakob Linnet Schmidt
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: A widespread view in Europe is that the US is becoming more a necessary partner than an ally or a friend. Lack of confidence that the US will defend Europe is as powerful a driver for increased European defence spending as pressure from the US. Due to the breach of trust, transatlantic relations are unlikely to be normalised after Trump.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Transatlantic Relations, Donald Trump, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

247. Tariff Tensions: Redefining Washington-New Delhi Relations

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: The strategic partnership between the United States and India faces a critical juncture as recent developments strain their ties. On August 15, 2025, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi called for national self-reliance in trade and foreign exchange, a response to high tariffs imposed by US President Donald Trump's administration on Indian imports.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Tariffs, Trade, Donald Trump, Imports, and Narendra Modi
Political Geography:: South Asia, India, North America, and United States of America

248. Geography and Energy: The US-Central Asia Partnership in Critical Minerals

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: The U.S. administration has issued an executive order aimed at boosting domestic production of critical minerals, reflecting President Donald Trump's recognition of the national security risks posed by China's dominance over global supply chains in this sector. Following the approach of previous administrations, the current leadership has sought partnerships with multiple suppliers to diversify American access to these vital resources. The focus has now turned to the five Central Asian republics—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—a region rich in minerals essential for energy and defense technologies. Through two primary frameworks, the U.S. has begun exploring Central Asia's untapped critical mineral wealth: the C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue and the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), alongside a series of bilateral memorandums of understanding signed with the region. However, political ambition does not necessarily align with the logistical challenges of emerging supply chains in Central Asia. In response to these complexities, analysts Haley Nelson and Natalia Stroz published a report with the Atlantic Council titled "Central Asia's geography inhibits a US critical minerals partnership."
Topic:: Partnerships, Energy, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:: Central Asia, North America, and United States of America

249. Spring 2025 Snapshot on International Educational Exchange

Author:: Julie Baer and Nora Nemeth
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute of International Education (IIE)
Abstract:: The Spring 2025 Snapshot on International Educational Exchange continues the commitment of the Institute of International Education (IIE) to map the current state of international educational exchange to and from the United States. The report presents data from 559 U.S. higher education institutions in two sections: (1) current trends and recruitment patterns with respect to international students for 2025/26 and (2) trends related to U.S. study abroad in 2024/25, as well as an outlook for 2025/26.
Topic:: Education, Students, Study Abroad, and International Exchange
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

250. Outlook 2030 Brief: Expanding International Study to the U.S.

Author:: Mirka Martel and Jonah Kokodyniak
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute of International Education (IIE)
Abstract:: In 2024, over 1.1 million international students pursued their higher education in the United States. By 2030, increasing our efforts will ensure support for U.S. higher education, industries, and innovation. This is the second edition of IIE’s annual Outlook 2030 brief. The data-driven report focuses on key trends in academic mobility to the United States, comparing global findings and looking ahead at the next five years. The United States is the single largest host of international students in the world, attracting top talent from around the globe. International students pursue academic degrees in the U.S. due to the excellence of its higher education system, particularly in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM). U.S. colleges and universities, in turn, benefit from the innovation and global perspectives that students and scholars bring to their institutions. Attracting global talent is crucial for driving the U.S. economy’s growth and maintaining the country’s leadership in research and development. The U.S. will continue to drive the development of new industries, and building a domestic and global pipeline of talent will advance this pivotal role.
Topic:: Education, Innovation, Higher Education, Industry, Study Abroad, and International Exchange
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS