5501. Nation-Building: The Dangers of Weak, Failing, and Failed States
- Author:
- Richard S. Williamson
- Publication Date:
- 01-2007
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
- Institution:
- School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
- Abstract:
- Iraq continues to be in the throes of violent turmoil. The cost in treasury and blood is higher than anyone anticipated. Despite numerous “turning points,” milestones, and benchmarks, there is no neat solution in sight. The American people are thus understandably disheartened, discouraged and dismayed. After over a decade as the world’s sole superpower, the brief and circumscribed US military actions in the first Persian Gulf War, Bosnia and Kosovo, and the quick defeat of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the American people were ill-prepared for a lengthened, bloody post-conflict engagement in Iraq. “Black Hawk Down” in Somalia was the rare exception, not the rule.1 America’s high-tech military power was capable of vanquishing foes quickly and at acceptable cost. It was also thought that once Saddam Hussein and his brutal regime were brought down, Americans would be hailed as liberators and, like Eastern Europe after the fall of Communism, Iraqi democracy would emerge like a phoenix from the ashes. However, it is clear that the history of the 1990s and the history being written in blood in Sadre City, Baghdad, and elsewhere in Iraq, are tragically different. A democratic broader Middle East would be a safer and more stable region. People desire the dignity, human rights, and opportunity granted them by their creator and promised by a freedom agenda. It also is undeniable that Saddam Hussein was a vicious dictator who victimized his own people, sought weapons of mass destruction, and threatened his neighbors. Testament to this indictment is found in Saddam’s mass graves and torture chambers, in his nuclear program in the 80s and early 90s and use of chemical weapons against Iran and Iraqi Kurds, in the long, bloody war initiated against neighboring Iran, the blitzing invasion and occupation of Kuwait, and his on-going military spectacles and bellicose rhetoric.2 The world is better off without Saddam Hussein in power. Even given all of that, should Iraq have been invaded? That matter is for the historians to debate. My purpose is not to relitigate that issue, but to recognize that any discussion of nationbuilding going forward must be informed by the chaos and conflict in post-Saddam Iraq. It is abundantly clear that we were not adequately prepared to deal with the challenges of Iraq after the fall of Saddam. We have memoirs from some of the principles that, sometimes unwittingly, describe an overly optimistic view of Iraq after Saddam, based upon meager planning and unrealistic resource allocation.3 We have a growing library of books and other reports by journalists that seem to reinforce that conclusion.4 Moreover, our most powerful indication comes from the events on the ground. These events have brought into question the wisdom of nation-building. Is it ever possible? If so, is the right sort of societal history, habits, and harmony a prerequisite for success? Is it worth the cost? If so, when and why?
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Fragile/Failed State, Iraq War, and Nation-building
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and United States of America