Political Geography: United States of America

501. Azerbaijan-Armenia Agreement: US Entry Upsets Balance of Power in the South Caucuses

Author:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:: The US administration succeeded in sponsoring a peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia, under which the two countries agreed to US management of the Zangezur Corridor, which various regional and international powers are keen to control to tip the balance in their strategic competition.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Treaties and Agreements, Bilateral Relations, Strategic Competition, and Peace Process
Political Geography:: Caucasus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and United States of America

502. Trump’s Plan: The Promises and Pitfalls of Peace in Gaza

Author:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:: Trump’s peace initiative has received approval from the two main parties in the Gaza war—Hamas and Israel—along with broad Arab, Islamic and international support that strengthens its chances of success. However, a number of pitfalls contained within it could reignite the war in the Strip.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Hamas, Mediation, Armed Conflict, 2023 Gaza War, and Peacemaking
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and United States of America

503. Elusive Peace: Russian and Western Manoeuvres to End the War in Ukraine

Author:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:: The Trump-Putin summit failed to advance peace in Ukraine, despite Trump’s push to fulfill his campaign promise. The deep divide between Russian and Ukrainian demands, and mutual ability to block each other’s goals, suggests the war may head toward sporadic truces or a prolonged stalemate.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

504. The First 90 Days of Trump 2.0

Author:: Rachel Tausenfreund, Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff, Claudia Schmucker, Aylin Matlé, and Stefan Meister
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: This report examines the first 90 days of the Trump 2.0 administration and offers strategic recommendations for the new German government and its partners in Europe and beyond. DGAP experts analyze the administration’s priorities and methods across key policy areas and explore how best to respond. The opening chapter outlines the ideological foundations of Trump’s new coalition and their foreign policy implications, concluding with key insights and policy takeaways.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, Climate Change, Migration, Science and Technology, Trade, Donald Trump, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, Germany, and United States of America

505. Media and Democracy in Crisis. A Comparative Analysis of Images of the Riots in the USA in the Public Media of Germany, Poland, and Russia

Author:: Dagmara Głuszek-Szafraniec and Patrycja Szostok-Nowacka
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:: Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:: This article presents a diverse European perspective on democracy and freedom of expression. The research was conducted on 73 public television materials after the storming of the Capitol in Germany, Poland, and Russia. The content analysis employed 75 categories in the categorization key. The German perspective focused on stabilizing the democratic system after Biden’s win and on respect for democratic values in the USA. The narrative style is centered around change, a natural process in a democracy. Polish public television dominated an atmosphere of anxiety, but the criticism of the democratic opposition in Poland found an analogy between the actions of media corporations and opposition politicians. The materials in the Russian service were biased and directed against American democracy in general. Criticism was levelled at the hypocrisy of the authorities, the inefficiency of democratic procedures, and the lack of respect for political traditions. The portrayal of crisis events in the USA depended on the level of democracy in the country and, to varying degrees, also served as a pretext for criticizing democracy in general and referencing events in the country being analyzed.
Topic:: Democracy, Media, Narrative, January 6, and Public Media
Political Geography:: Russia, Poland, Germany, and United States of America

506. Transatlantic Relations under the Biden Administration: Balancing between Liberal Internationalism and Pragmatic Realism

Author:: Aleksandra Jarczewska
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:: Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:: The article examines transatlantic relations under the Biden administration, focusing on the tension between liberal internationalist ideals and the imperatives of pragmatic realism. In its early stage, the Biden presidency signalled a renewed commitment to multilateralism, democratic values, and revitalised alliances. However, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine underscored the limits of the idealist framework, compelling a recalibration toward interest-driven, security-oriented policies. The study explores whether this represents a genuine revival of liberal internationalism or a strategic hybridisation of liberal norms and realist instruments of statecraft. Moreover, it identifies elements of continuity from the first Trump administration to Biden’s pragmatic adjustments beneath the liberal rhetoric. The article contributes to the scholarly debate by reassessing certain conceptual frameworks in international relations, offering a nuanced understanding of how liberal internationalism is being reconfigured in response to shifting geopolitical realities. The findings highlight the evolving nature of US-EU cooperation and the challenges facing the international liberal order.
Topic:: European Union, Transatlantic Relations, Joe Biden, Internationalism, and Pragmatic Realism
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

507. Towards a Trade War in 2025: Real Threats for the World Economy, False Promises for the US

Author:: Antoine Bouët, Leysa Maty Sall, and Yu Zheng
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:: Using the MIRAGE-Power model, we simulate a trade war initiated in 2025 by the new US administration. The central scenario consists in a 60 percentage point tariff increase on all US imports from China, a 10 percentage point tariff increase on all products from other partners, except Canada and Mexico, and reciprocal tariff retaliation. World GDP and world trade decrease respectively by 0.5% and 3.4% in volume, with significant losses for the US and China, and gains for Canada and Mexico. A substantial reallocation of bilateral goods trade flows is taking place at global level. Additional scenarios show that: details of the tariff reform matter; the discriminatory tariff treatment of China benefits other trading partners; trade retaliation increases US economic losses; if Non-Tariff Measures are included in this trade war, the consequences are worse; if Canada and Mexico are included in the trade war, both experience significant losses in terms of GDP and trade. Last, we show that the US will not be able to replace the federal income tax with tariff revenues, even with a revenue-maximizing tariff.
Topic:: GDP, Economy, Tariffs, Trade Wars, Trade, and Retaliation
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

508. Dünyada ve Türkiye'de Zaman Kapsülleri'nin Gelişimi

Author:: Mutlu Erbay
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AURUM Journal of Social Sciences
Institution:: Altinbas University
Abstract:: Bu çalışma, zaman kapsülleri konusunu gündeme getirerek bu konuya dikkat çekmeyi hedeflemektedir. Makalede, zaman kapsüllerinin Amerikalılar ve Türkler için sosyo-kültürel açıdan önemi vurgulanmakta ve önemli örnekler ele alınmaktadır. Zaman kapsülleri, Amerikan kültüründe hatırlama, hatırlatma ve anma yöntemi olarak kullanılmaktadır. Hatıraların anılması, düşünülmesine ve bu yolla anlamlandırılmasına sebep olur. Kültürler, kendi öz hedeflerine yönelik hatırlatma ve hatırlamalar yapabilmektedir. Bu hatırlamalar, geçmişi gelecek kuşaklara tanıtır ve aktarmada önemli bir rol oynar. Zaman kapsülleri, geleceğe gönderilen mektuplar aracılığıyla gelecek temennilerini yansıtmakta; kişilerin ve kurumların geleceği öngörme ve şekillendirme çabalarını simgelemektedir. Yeni açılan bir fabrika, yeni üretilen bir ürün, borsa için yazılan mektuplar, yeni hammadde üretimleri veya uzaya gönderilen yeni araçlar gibi çeşitli sebeplerle zaman kapsülleri hazırlanabilmektedir. Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nde devlet kurumları, yüksek enstitüler ve fabrikalar tarafından zaman kapsülleri oluşturulmakta, kayda geçirilmekte ve belirlenen tarihte açılması planlanmaktadır. Zaman kapsülleri, Amerikan tarihinin önemli kültürel davranışlarından biri olarak kabul edilmektedir. Aşağıdaki makalede, önemli zaman kapsülleri ele alınarak incelenmiştir. Gelecekte açılmak üzere hazırlanan bu kapsüller, geleceğe bir not düşmekte ve bu yönüyle geleceği planlama ve öngörme amacı taşımaktadır. Türkiye’de de hazırlanmış zaman kapsülleri mevcuttur. Çalışma, bu örneklere de kısaca değinerek zaman kapsüllerinin Türk kültüründeki yeri ve önemini ortaya koymaktadır.
Topic:: Culture, Memory, Tradition, and Time Capsules
Political Geography:: Turkey, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

509. How To Help Armenia Navigate Its Democracy-Security Nexus

Author:: Narek Sukiasyan
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: The 2018 Velvet Revolution was a breakthrough for Armenia’s democracy, but progress has since stalled. The June 2026 parliamentary elections will be a decisive test in a polarized environment dominated by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party and an opposition tied to former presidents Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan. This dominant dichotomy, fueled by both sides, frustrates the attempts of alternative forces to come to the fore. Support for Civil Contract is stable, but the majority of voters are undecided, disengaged, or disillusioned by the trauma of the 2020 war in Nagorno-Karabakh and the 2023 ethnic cleansing there as well as by the lack of credible political alternatives. Civil Contract’s political dominance over the last seven years has led to unilateral lawmaking and some controversial actions against opposition figures, media, civil society, and the judiciary. However, recent municipal elections saw the party fail to secure majorities in major cities. While the diplomatic breakthrough in the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, marked by the White House deal in August, sets a path for stability in the near term, it is crucial to follow up and to push for a final agreement. Azerbaijan’s continued demands and rhetoric cast doubt as to the extent of its commitment to the process. Similarly, Türkiye still does not meet its commitment to end its blockade of Armenia. Meanwhile, Armenia’s drift away from Russia and pivot to the West has been characterized by its increased ambition to join the EU. It also seeks to diversify its security with the help of its Western partners, advancing with reforms and political alignment with Euro-Atlantic priorities. Until the next elections, Armenia is likely to continue deepening its ties with the West while maintaining cautious cooperation with Russia, while peace talks with Azerbaijan drag on, and relations with Türkiye remain complex. It is likely that Civil Contract will campaign on defending Armenia’s sovereignty and on Western alignment while the fragmented opposition struggles to broaden its support. The most probable scenario is another Civil Contract government with a reduced majority, which will continue efforts toward peace with Azerbaijan and balancing engagement with the West and Russia. Two other scenarios (in descending order of likelihood) are a government coalition of Civil Contract and smaller pro-West parties, which will push a more confrontational stance toward Russia, or an opposition-led government realigning the country with Moscow and further undermining democratization. The EU, its member states, and the United States should support Armenia by helping it strengthen its democratic institutions and its security in order to preserve the public’s confidence in democracy. The country needs a combination of financial, technical, and political assistance to facilitate democratization, to resist external pressures, and to maintain its sovereignty. This includes backing the consolidation of democratic institutions, promoting electoral integrity, encouraging a diversity of democratic actors, and empowering civil society, all against the background of addressing the country’s security challenges. By providing Armenia with the tools to defend its territorial integrity and to pursue democratic reforms, the West can help revive the optimism sparked by the Velvet Revolution and overturn a public disillusionment that could weaken Armenia’s democracy and its ties with Europe.
Topic:: European Union, Democracy, Geopolitics, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:: Caucasus, Eastern Europe, Armenia, and United States of America

510. Not Your Average Visitor: Senator Edward “Ted” Kennedy in London and Bucharest

Author:: Jonathan Rickert
Publication Date:: 11-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: Visits by CODELs, or Congressional delegations, long have been an inescapable fact of life for US missions overseas. And serving as “control officer” for legislative visitors is a rite of passage for many Foreign Service officers stationed abroad. There are two main categories of CODEL. First are the boondoggles, during which the Congresspeople visit only developed countries and spend more time on tourism and shopping than anything else. We had more than our fair share of those in London. Then there are what I would call “substantive” CODELs, which visit countries that often are not garden spots and look into issues that are of serious concern to the US, such as human rights abuses and drug trafficking. These are rarer but can be helpful to the posts visited in promoting our foreign policy objectives. A very few CODELs have a third purpose, providing an opportunity for a senator or representative seeking higher office to raise his or her profile, at home and abroad. Among several experiences that I had over the years as a CODEL control officer, two stand out. Both involved Senator Edward “Ted” Kennedy; one had all the earmarks of a boondoggle, while the other seemed to have a profile-raising objective.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Memoir
Political Geography:: United Kingdom, Romania, and United States of America

511. Shifting Sands for Public Diplomacy in the USSR and Russia

Author:: Michael Hurley
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: Public diplomacy (PD) work in the Soviet Union and Russia from the Cold War to the current time has presented some unique and variable challenges. As an example, during the pre-1985 Cold War years, interaction with in-country media was most often possible only by attending Foreign Ministry press briefings. In the Gorbachev era, 1985-91, this began to change. In the Yeltsin years, 1991-99, the Russian media became much more open to questioning Russia’s own past, and it was also much easier for western journalists to get appointments in the ministries. In the Putin years, 2000 to the present time, independent Russian media have disappeared from Russia and report in Russian to home and abroad readers from exile. PD practitioners have had to adjust across the full range of public diplomacy activities, including dealing with the media. In this article I will draw on my personal and professional experiences from the 1970s to the 2020s to look briefly at some of the challenges of conducting public diplomacy over the years in this closed society and recount how I and my colleagues achieved some successes in our work. I’ll conclude by looking at some of the current challenges public diplomacy faces.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Cold War, Diplomacy, Soviet Union, and Public Diplomacy
Political Geography:: Russia, North America, and United States of America

512. Differences with Hanoi About “Peace Talks”

Author:: Thomas E. McNamara
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: On my first diplomatic assignment in the embassy in Paris, I spent most of my time on Vietnam War issues, in which the French were heavily involved. Shortly after President Johnson’s March 1968 address to the nation, the US and North Vietnamese negotiations opened in Paris. In the first private meetings and press conferences after the talks opened, Le Duc Tho, head of the North Vietnamese delegation, asserted that they came to Paris to talk about “the timing and the manner of the US withdrawal of its forces from Vietnam.” The US delegation heads, Averell Harriman and Cyrus Vance, said they came “to negotiate peace, an end to the war.” After a few weeks of inconclusive talks, Le Duc Tho gave a press conference directly accusing the US of reneging on the agreement to meet in Paris. My boss, Ambassador Sargent Shriver, recently arrived in Paris, called me in, and said: “Find out about this.” Shriver was briefed on the talks. But he paid little attention to Vietnam and was focused on his new job, ambassador to France. I suspect this issue came up in his introductory calls on ministers and parliamentary leaders, who were interested in the negotiations. He needed a response.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Negotiation, Memoir, and Vietnam War
Political Geography:: Vietnam, North America, and United States of America

513. Reducing Inequity Globally Will Make America Safer, Stronger, and More Prosperous

Author:: Marianne Scott
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: The views of the Biden and Trump administrations on diversity, equity, inclusion and accessibility (DEIA) could not be in greater contrast. President Biden issued three Executive Orders (EOs) on the subject, mandating that the federal government support and extend equity to a broad variety of individuals and communities facing poverty and discrimination. His secretary of state, Anthony Blinken, directed the State Department to engage with foreign governments and foreign peoples on equity and justice, calling the EOs “based on hard-nosed self-interest.” On his first day in office, President Trump revoked President Biden’s EOs on equity. His secretary of state, Marco Rubio, introduced three criteria for the State Department: If it doesn’t make America safer, stronger, and more prosperous, don’t do it. Although the current administration is scrubbing all talk of equity, I think using Secretary Rubio’s yardstick to measure whether addressing equity globally will make America safer, stronger, and more prosperous shows that equity considerations do belong in our nation’s foreign policy. Here’s how I came to that conclusion.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Inequality, Equity, State Department, Diversity, Equity, and and Inclusion (DEI)
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

514. The Destruction of USAID

Author:: W. Robert Pearson
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: The final destruction of USAID by President Trump in early July 2025 is the greatest strategic surrender of global American influence in the 80 years since the end of WWII.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Soft Power, Donald Trump, and USAID
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

515. Aftershocks from Gaza: From Local to Global Consequences (Part 1)

Author:: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy Working Group
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
Abstract:: The grotesque attacks by Hamas on October 7, 2023, and Israel’s subsequent military campaign in Gaza have upended long-standing assumptions about regional order. The Middle East’s previous reliance on a US-led security framework has given way to a fragmented, multi-aligned landscape in which middle powers pursue their interests, while the Palestinian issue—long marginalized—has returned to the center of regional and global diplomacy. Israel has secured tactical military gains but at the cost of increasing diplomatic isolation, while conditions in Gaza have fueled global demands for a sustainable political solution. Iran, Hezbollah, and Syria face profound setbacks, while Turkey and the Arab Gulf states seek to expand influence without the means to dominate. China and Russia remain cautious players, unwilling or unable to shape the conflict’s outcome. For the United States, the Gaza war poses a strategic dilemma. Despite efforts to broker ceasefires and secure hostages, Washington has been unable—or unwilling—to exert decisive leverage on Israel. The Biden and Trump administrations alike have struggled to articulate a coherent, sustainable strategy that balances US interests in security, energy, stability, and credibility. The ISD Gaza Report is organized in two parts: Part I: A ground assessment of the regional shifts since October 7, with particular focus on Israel, Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as the reemergence of Palestine as the central unresolved question in Middle East politics, and the role of regional states. Part II: A deeper analysis of Iran’s position and prospects, scenarios for regional order, and US policy options, culminating in concrete recommendations for advancing stability while protecting US strategic interests. Participants underscored that any durable path forward begins and ends with Palestine and the Palestinians. US policymakers must adapt to a regional order defined not by hegemonic control but by contested pluralism and assertive middle powers. Strategic clarity, consistent diplomacy, and credible leverage are essential if Washington hopes to pursue its interests amid the aftershocks from Gaza—and not merely react to them.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Hezbollah, Strategic Interests, Palestinians, Regional Politics, 2023 Gaza War, and Regional Stability
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and United States of America

516. Case Study on Conspiracy to Smuggle U.S.-Origin Military Equipment and Dual-Use Technology to North Korea

Author:: Jessica Kim and Sarah Burkhard
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Case Study
Institution:: Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:: A Chinese national, Shenghua Wen, pleaded guilty in 2024 to conspiring with North Korea to export restricted items without a license, violating the U.S. International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), the North Korea Sanctions Regulations, and Executive Orders. At the direction of the North Korean government, Wen acted from his private residence in the United States, buying military goods domestically and providing false shipping information to send the items to Hong Kong, and then to North Korea. The case demonstrates that though North Korea can achieve limited success through such schemes, its agents face a high risk of exposure, detainment, and prosecution. Beyond firearms, ammunition, and other military equipment, North Korea sought civilian aircraft engine blueprints to manufacture engines for its drone program. At present, Wen’s scheme does not appear to indicate the presence of a more sophisticated smuggling network. Thus far, Wen’s partners/co-conspirators, the unnamed Hong Kong-based “broker,” and front company mentioned in the criminal complaint have not faced any punitive action from the U.S. government.
Topic:: Security, Sanctions, Smuggling, and Dual Use Items
Political Geography:: Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

517. Canadian-Based Company Fined by U.S. Commerce Department for Hiding U.S. Exports to Iran

Author:: Aline Spyrka
Publication Date:: 11-2025
Content Type:: Case Study
Institution:: Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:: Canada-based biotechnology company Luminultra illegally exported from its Maryland-based production facility three Photonmaster luminometers and 25 aqueous test kits valuing $33,438 USD to Iran on October 21, 2022. Under instructions from the Iranian buyer, and hopes of future sales to the Iranian market, Luminultra agreed to falsify export declarations and ship the items from the United States via the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to Iran. Under further instructions from the Iranian buyer, Luminultra received payment at a Canadian bank in Canadian dollars specifically to avoid payment for the shipment in USD and through a US bank. The case shows a lack of awareness of the risks and penalties associated with willful violation of export controls and sanctions and indicates that Canada needs to improve its outreach to the industry, especially now that a wide range of UN sanctions on Iran are re-instated. It also shows the importance of UN sanctions to prevent banks in third countries from processing illicit payments from Iran. Luminultra signed a settlement agreement in September 2025 and agreed to pay the $685,051 fine. They also agreed to establish an export compliance system and complete export compliance audits over a three-year probationary period.[1]
Topic:: Sanctions, Exports, Compliance, and Luminulta
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Canada, North America, and United States of America

518. U.S. and Chinese Dual Citizen Engineer Pleads Guilty to Stealing Missile Launch and Detection Technology

Author:: Jessica Kim and Sarah Burkhard
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Case Study
Institution:: Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:: During and shortly after his employment at a large U.S. defense contractor, a Chinese-US dual citizen downloaded thousands of export-controlled and proprietary files from the company’s secure server onto multiple hard drives, some of which remain at large. The files included manufacturing specifications and test results for two sophisticated types of sensors used for space-based detection and tracking of threats, suitable for tracking ballistic and hypersonic missiles. The files included assembly designs and engineering specifications for a specialized vacuum-sealed, cooling enclosure to further protect the radiation-hardened sensors in space. While it is not explicitly stated that he acted at the direction of the Chinese government, it appears likely that Gong intended to utilize the information he stole to benefit the Chinese military.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Intellectual Property/Copyright, Missile Defense, Exports, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:: China, North America, and United States of America

519. Balancing National Security and Economic Priorities in the U.S.-Jordan Relationship

Author:: Saud Al-Sharafat
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: As the U.S. administration shifts towards an economics-first approach to foreign policy, Jordan will need to find ways to emphasize the benefits of the two countries' decades-long broader strategic relationship in public messaging—both for its own national security interests and as a way to assuage public concerns. Recent developments in U.S.-Jordanian relations, from the announcement of President Trump’s “Middle East riviera” plan for Gaza to tariff announcements—have prompted the question of how Jordan will deal with the current regional challenges it faces as the United States reorients to an economy-focused approach. For a country like Jordan, which has relied on a combination of military support and diplomatic engagement with the United States and Israel for more than seven decades, its primary challenge now lies in integrating these new market-based visions with the realities of the entrenched political conflicts that surround and impact its domestic national security. Jordan will have a dual challenge: managing domestic attitudes towards this U.S. reprioritization and, on an external level, articulating a dynamic and forward-thinking strategy to emphasize its continued importance to U.S. policymakers. On the one hand, Jordan's options in response to a more distant United States are few and far from ideal; yet Jordan has its own strong incentives to promote stability in the region, as well as concrete examples it can point to regarding how the value of its relationship with the United States extends beyond the economic when it comes to the impact of its stability and security in broader regional dynamics. Perhaps most importantly, Jordan has been and can continue to be a regional first line of defense against all types of extremism, whether leftist, nationalist, or religious. Ensuring that this message reaches those in power in the United States may require more extensive and creative avenues than in the past, but will be vital in emphasizing the ongoing value of the relationship.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, National Security, Bilateral Relations, and Economy
Political Geography:: Middle East, North America, Jordan, and United States of America

520. Setting Up the Next Phase of U.S.-UAE Nuclear Cooperation

Author:: Noam Raydan
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: With the U.S. point man on energy development touring the Gulf and Chinese and Russian nuclear initiatives on the rise, the Trump administration should consider how best to replicate the responsible Emirati model elsewhere in the region. To kick off his first official tour of the Middle East, U.S. energy secretary Chris Wright arrived in the United Arab Emirates this week, where he has been meeting with key stakeholders and is expected to make a timely visit to the Barakah civil nuclear power plant in al-Dhafra. The plant visit comes amid growing global enthusiasm about nuclear energy, both to meet decarbonization targets and to address tech company plans for more data centers and artificial intelligence initiatives that require substantial amounts of nonstop power. Yet Wright also has an opportunity to underscore the importance of solid nuclear policy in a region where such technology is usually associated with proliferation risks.
Topic:: Development, International Cooperation, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Middle East, United Arab Emirates, and United States of America

521. China Flexes Its Soft Power in the KRI

Author:: Winthrop Rodgers and Sardar Aziz
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: In the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, signs of Chinese soft power are increasingly visible to residents of an area with longstanding ties to the United States. As the world’s largest nation without a state of their own, Kurdish politicians in Iraq have long prioritized robust and visible relationships with foreign powers as a means to ensure the leaders and interests of Iraq’s Kurdistan Region (KRI) remain relevant amid changing geopolitical tides. For foreign governments, this welcoming atmosphere provides an opportunity to nurture the green shoots of soft power, often in the most ordinary ways. Given the longstanding role of U.S. foreign aid in the KRI, Chinese soft power efforts and the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG)’s response may provide a bell weather for how other longstanding U.S. allies respond to the shift in American attitudes towards aid and its attendant soft power.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Geopolitics, and Soft Power
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, United States of America, and Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)

522. How Washington’s Drone Policy Is Catching Up to Reality

Author:: Elizabeth Dent and Grant Rumley
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: To balance competition and global responsibility, the Trump administration should combine its welcome reinterpretation of the MTCR with updated nonproliferation standards and robust safeguards.
Topic:: Weapons, Drones, Nonproliferation, and Competition
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

523. Addressing Maritime Security in Smaller South Asian States: Opportunities for US, Indian, and International Partnerships

Author:: Frank O'Donnell
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: Under the dominant US paradigm of great-power competition, the maritime domain as a concept can often be viewed as shorthand for maintaining open access to sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and assuring sufficient deterrence against Chinese and Russian maritime coercion. The December 2020 joint US Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard Maritime Strategy emphasized these points. While these issues are important, this framing downplays two key US and global security factors. These firstly include the broader, multidimensional, and often interactive set of maritime security challenges – such as illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, piracy, smuggling, disastrous climatic changes, and insufficient maritime law enforcement capacities – experienced by most world states, as opposed to a reductive, classical focus on the comparative naval and maritime force balances among the few international and regional powers. The second is the rising populations and economic influence of these smaller states, meaning their risk exposure to these maritime security threats poses deeper consequences beyond their borders and regions. It also means that, in an increasingly multipolar world, these states will have growing agency to select key relationships to nurture, and to decline or distance themselves from others. For great-power competition strategists, partnering with these states on their maritime security priorities as they define them will be critical to improving their own resilience and their ability to secure the global commons. Moreover, it will help nurture the durable relationships, based on mutual understanding, that each of the expert authors in this Occasional Paper special series argue their focal states are seeking. Such efforts should not be viewed as mutually exclusive with a preferred focus on high-end naval and maritime competition with rival powers, but a fundamental element of a successful grand strategy.
Topic:: Security, Partnerships, Geopolitics, Maritime, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: South Asia, India, and United States of America

524. Navigating Global Value Chains and Economics in 2025: US–Vietnam Relations in a Changing IndoPacific

Author:: Thanh Nha Nguyen
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: Vietnam has emerged as an indispensable link in Indo-Pacific manufacturing networks. The country’s strategic advantage lies in its ability to adapt to shifting policies while mitigating risks from trade frictions. To sustain these gains, Vietnam must invest strategically in long-term competitiveness by upgrading workforce skills, improving infrastructure, and climbing the value chain through enhanced design and innovation capabilities. Vietnam’s adaptability has made it a prime beneficiary of the ongoing realignment in global supply chains driven by US trade policy changes. Tariffs on Chinese goods and broader efforts to "de-risk" supply lines have prompted many manufacturers to expand operations in Vietnam, sharply boosting exports and investment. By 2023, Vietnam had vaulted from the 12th- to 7th-largest exporter to the United States, as US imports from Vietnam rose by nearly 35 percent year-on-year. High-profile firms, including Samsung, Apple contractors, and major textile producers, have accelerated investments in Vietnam, solidifying its role as a preferred “China+1” manufacturing base.
Topic:: Economics, Manufacturing, and Global Value Chains
Political Geography:: Vietnam, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

525. Assessing Access to Legal Representation for Unaccompanied Migrant Children: National, State, and County-Level Analysis of Free- and Low-Cost Attorney Prevalence in Relation to Children’s Locations

Author:: Jill M. Williams
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal on Migration and Human Security
Institution:: Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:: This study presents the first effort to assess unaccompanied migrant children’s access to free and low-cost attorneys in the United States at the national, state, and county levels. Since 2021, over 544,000 unaccompanied children have entered the United States and been apprehended along the southwest border. The vast majority of these children are transferred to the Office of Refugee Resettlement and released to sponsors across the country while their immigration cases are processed. While unaccompanied children are not guaranteed the right to government appointed counsel, a broad body of research indicates that having legal representation greatly increases the likelihood that a child will identify a form of legal relief and will have a legal outcome that allows them to remain in the country. Access to legal representation additionally connects children with trusted adults and increases opportunities to identify and address instances where children are being abused or exploited. However, a large percentage of unaccompanied children still lack legal representation. To date, little research has explored the factors that support or inhibit unaccompanied children’s access to representation. This study draws on research that shows that geographic proximity to attorneys is one key factor affecting the likelihood that immigrants will obtain counsel and research that demonstrates dramatic unevenness in legal counsel nationally to assess the prevalence of free and low-cost immigration attorneys in relation to where unaccompanied children are released to sponsors. Our findings demonstrate an overall lack of free and low-cost immigration attorneys in relation to the number of unaccompanied children in need of legal representation, with only one attorney for every 137 children nationally. Moreover, in assessing attorney to child ratios at the state-scale, we demonstrate that in 43 states (86 percent of the states in the country) the number of children to attorneys exceeds reasonable caseloads. Importantly, these estimates do not account for the fact that not all free and low-cost immigration attorneys take on children’s cases nor for the overall demand for immigration legal services among the more than three million individuals facing deportation in the United States. In turn, while sobering, our estimates likely significantly over-estimate children’s actual access to representation across the United States. Based on these findings, we offer the following policy recommendations: • Federal, state, local, and philanthropic organizations should strategically invest in workforce development to grow the number of free and low-cost immigration attorneys in general and specifically in areas where the lack is particularly high. • Workforce development programs should both engage new law school graduates and individuals working in private practice who may be looking to enter the public interest sector. • Policy makers, funders, and organizational leaders should invest in and support holistic representation models in order to reduce the burdens experienced by attorneys and foster retention in the field. • Governmental and philanthropic organizations should invest in additional research and program evaluation in order to more fully understand the need for representation among unaccompanied children and barriers to and facilitators of accessing representation. These efforts should go hand-in-hand with improvements in data quality and sharing among governmental and non-governmental stakeholders. • The federal government should immediately reinstate all contracts and programs related to providing legal orientation and representation to unaccompanied migrant children in line with Congressionally appropriated funds allocated for these purposes to both ensure children’s rights under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) are realized and that the existing (already insufficient) workforce of trained and experienced attorneys equipped to represent unaccompanied children is not eroded.
Topic:: Migration, Children, Migrants, Lawyers, and Unaccompanied Children
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

526. The United States, Europe, and the Global Compacts: Honoring the Right to Remain and the Right to Migrate

Author:: J. Kevin Appleby
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal on Migration and Human Security
Institution:: Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:: The adoption of the Global Compacts on Migration and Refugees in 2019 by the UN General Assembly marked a significant achievement, providing two essential frameworks from which UN Member States could fashion their future immigration and refugee policies. Since their adoption, however, the number of forcibly displaced in the world has increased significantly, prompting receiving nations, such as the United States and the European countries, to rely more on deterrence-based enforcement initiatives to reduce the number of migrants arriving at their borders. At the same time, the number of migrant deaths, both on sea and land, have increased, as desperate migrants, asylum-seekers, and refugees have attempted to find new homes in industrialized nations. This paper analyzes the migration policies adopted by the United States and Europe in the nearly six years since the Global Compacts were adopted and provides an assessment about how these receiving nations have adapted to the rising number of forcibly displaced in the world, and whether, in doing so, their policies have been consistent with the provision of both Compacts. The paper finds that: • Both the US and Europe have instituted enforcement policies that violate the spirit, if not the intent, of the two Compacts, and, in some cases, undermine international human rights standards; • Both the US and Europe have attempted to balance their enforcement-related approaches with the creation of legal avenues and immigrant integration policies, consistent with the two Compacts, but their efforts, to date, have been insufficient to the need; • The US has made significant strides in introducing policies to protect refugee-like populations, but has failed to protect asylum-seekers in need of protection who arrive at the US-Mexico border; • Europe has relied on bilateral agreements and restrictive laws to deter migrants from reaching European shores, while at the same time supported sending and transit countries with development assistance; • Both the US and Europe have a mixed record with regard to preserving the principles of the right to remain and the right to migrate, a record which must be improved in the years ahead.
Topic:: Migration, United Nations, Refugees, Freedom of Movement, Rights, and Right to Stay
Political Geography:: Europe and United States of America

527. More Than Miscommunication: Rethinking Interpretation at the Asylum Office

Author:: Hillary Mellinger
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal on Migration and Human Security
Institution:: Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:: The United States requires asylum applicants to provide their own interpreters for their interviews at the Asylum Office, barring exceptional circumstances. Applicants can face significant hurdles in finding suitable interpreters, who play a critical role in giving them a voice in the asylum process. Inaccurate interpretation can have serious ramifications such as denial of an applicant’s asylum claim. Despite the critical need for meaningful language access in the asylum process, interpretation at the Asylum Office remains understudied. This article represents a first attempt at bringing the scholarly and practitioner communities together to rethink interpretation at the Asylum Office, with the goal of identifying feasible steps that the Asylum Office can take to enhance language access. This article proposes the below five holistic policy recommendations to improve interpretation at the Asylum Office, based on data from 28 interviews with attorneys who practiced before either the Arlington or Houston Asylum Offices, as well as the authors’ own prior professional experiences advocating on behalf of asylum seekers. 1. Government provision of telephonic interpreters. 2. Advance notice when a bilingual asylum officer can conduct an asylum interview in a language other than English. 3. Additional institutional support for asylum officers including lunch breaks. 4. Improved data collection regarding interpretation. 5. Additional research including analysis of how the COVID-19 pandemic affected interpretation at the Asylum Office. These recommendations are a starting point to improving language access at the Asylum Office. With this article, the authors hope to spark future research and conversations to ensure that individuals with limited English proficiency have meaningful access to asylum interviews.
Topic:: Immigration, Asylum, Interpretation, Lawyers, and Language Access
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

528. The Undocumented Population in the United States Increased to 12.2 Million in 2023

Author:: Robert Warren
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal on Migration and Human Security
Institution:: Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:: In 2023, the US undocumented population reached 12.2 million, exceeding the previous high of 12.0 million in 2008. This report provides estimates of the undocumented population in 2023 based on data collected in the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (ACS). The report focuses on trends in annual population growth from 2013 to 2023 for the total population and for 17 countries or areas of origin. It also describes trends in the undocumented population in the six states with the largest undocumented population in 2023. The CMS estimates of undocumented residents include immigrants in the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and Temporary Protected Status (TPS) programs, and the estimates include most of the people that have entered asylum backlogs or received humanitarian parole status since 2021. The estimates were derived using previous CMS estimation procedures except that higher undercount rates were used to estimate the number of undocumented residents that arrived after 2020. Adjustment for undercount was increased for post-2020 arrivals to account for the unusually large flow across the US/Mexico border in recent years and because relatively more migrants resided in group quarters1 where enumeration can be difficult. The CMS methodology is summarized after the following section, and information about undercount rates for recent arrivals is shown in the Appendix.
Topic:: Demographics, Migration, Immigration, and Undocumented Population
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

529. Fear as a Group Emotion in Mixed-Status Immigrant Ecuadorian Community in Queens, New York

Author:: Halyna Lemekh
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal on Migration and Human Security
Institution:: Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:: This study foregrounds fear as a group emotion shared by members of the Ecuadorian immigrant community in Queens, New York. The study is based on 30 in-depth interviews collected through ethnographic fieldwork in an Ecuadorian enclave in 2022–2023. It illuminates how fear, as a group emotion, instilled by “illegality,” is experienced by first-generation, 1.5-generation, and second-generation immigrants. Group fear experienced by members of the mixed-status immigrant community stems from collective and cumulative fear. This study defines collective fear as an emotion prevailing in mixed-status immigrant communities because of vulnerability from their undocumented status and marginalization passed on to members through socialization. Collective fear affects group dynamics and intergroup interactions, with debilitating effects on its members; however, it has positive functions, cementing social bonds between immigrants and solidifying the community. Another aspect of group fear is cumulative fear, defined in this study as the totality of fears experienced by first-generation, 1.5-generation, and second-generation Ecuadorian immigrants. First-generation immigrants express fear of border crossing, fear of detention and deportation, and fear of uncertainty during the legalization process. Meanwhile, 1.5-generation immigrants convey retrospective fear of crossing the border, fear of detention and deportation, fear of uncertainty during the legalization process, fear of liminal status restrictions, and fear of termination of the temporary protective status granted to Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals recipients. Second-generation immigrants, as jus-soli citizens of the United States, report fear of family separation and sympathy toward undocumented community members. Collective fear disseminated through numerous in-group (among community members) and inter-group interactions (community members and interior immigration enforcement) and learned through socialization provides empirical evidence of the “top–down” influence of group members’ experiences on emotions. Conversely, cumulative fear is based on individuals’ immigrant experiences cohering through the “bottom–up” influence of shared emotion on group formation. The only way to eradicate this group fear is to adjust one’s undocumented status, leading former undocumented immigrants to feel guilty about their acquired freedom, as their family members may still live in the shadow of “illegality.” This study demonstrates that U.S. President Joe Biden’s executive order aimed at keeping American families together cannot eliminate the overall paralyzing fear in immigrant communities. Given that the policy will affect an insignificant number of people, drastic measures are needed. The following policy recommendations are offered: • Allow non-citizen spouses and children to adjust their unresolved immigrant status unconditionally (removing the requirement of residence in the U.S. for 10 years or more). • Grant all recipients of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program legal permanent resident status as a pathway to U.S. citizenship. • Allow all liminally legal 1.5-generation immigrants to pursue education and careers through legalization. • Forbid deportation of U.S. citizens’ parents, forgive most undocumented immigrants’ unauthorized entry into the country, and allow them to adjust their status.
Topic:: Immigrants, Fear, Undocumented Population, Amnesty, and Group Emotion
Political Geography:: New York, North America, Ecuador, United States of America, and Queens

530. Virtuality for Real Children: Unaccompanied Minors and US Immigration Custody

Author:: Kif Augustine-Adams, Hayley Pierce, Melissa Alcaraz, and Jhandra Melissa Díaz López
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal on Migration and Human Security
Institution:: Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:: In the United States, federal law charges the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) with responsibility for the custody and care of unaccompanied migrant children. Since April 2021, more than 1,250 child migrants have experienced what ORR terms a “Virtual” program placement while in its custody. ORR has not: explained what its use of virtuality means for the children in its care, defined Virtual as a program placement type, set forth parameters for its use, or published the criteria by which it selects children for virtual rather than physical placement. Using administrative data, an online video meeting with ORR personnel, and ORR manuals and documents, this article conceptualizes ORR’s use of virtuality as a bifurcation of a child’s custody: ORR takes technical legal custody but not physical custody of the child. The article recognizes risks this bifurcation poses to the physical well-being of unaccompanied children and how bifurcation complicates ORR’s compliance with minimum legal standards set by federal law. The article likewise identifies benefits some children have received from virtual placement: quick release from ORR custody; the opportunity to remain with accompanying non-parental adults, such as siblings and grandparents, rather than enduring separation from them, as is standard practice in US immigration detention; and privileged entry into the US independent of standard legal authorization procedures. The article urges ORR and other US government entities to account for the risks and benefits virtuality poses to the well-being of unaccompanied migrant children.
Topic:: Migrants, Unaccompanied Children, Immigration Detention, and Virtual
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

531. What does Trump's new National Security Strategy mean for the Middle East?

Author:: David Hale and Alistair Taylor
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:: In this episode, MEI Distinguished Diplomatic Fellow Ambassador David Hale joins host Alistair Taylor to unpack the Trump administration’s new National Security Strategy (NSS). Released on December 4, the document outlines the administration’s foreign policy vision, priorities, and approach to global challenges. Ambassador Hale analyzes the new NSS and how it compares to previous US strategy documents. The conversation focuses on what the NSS means for the future of US policy in the Middle East, and how it is likely to be received by regional actors. Recorded on December 9, 2025.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, National Security, Donald Trump, and Strategy
Political Geography:: Middle East and United States of America

532. Reauthorizing the Defense Production Act in the Era of Defense Mobilization and Supply-side Industrial Policy

Author:: Michael Hikari Cecire
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: The 1950 Defense Production Act (DPA) is one of the most significant tools the U.S. government uses to mobilize the civilian economy for national defense. As the United States approaches the DPA’s statutory termination and likely reauthorization in 2025, this article surveys its recent employment during the COVID-19 pandemic and potential for policy iteration, assessing its evolution from postwar and early Cold War origins to a broader industrial policy tool. By analyzing DPA usage, legislative actions, and public interest trends, this study aims to extract key lessons from its recent implementation. The article argues that while the DPA has become increasingly central to the government’s industrial policy initiatives, its application has been broadly inconsistent, unevenly coordinated, and insufficiently integrated into broader strategic frameworks. Reauthorization of the DPA could include creating a more permanent and coordinated executive branch infrastructure, clarifying its use as an emergency versus routine policy tool, and identifying gaps in future deployment.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Industrial Policy, COVID-19, Defense Production Act (DPA), and Reauthorization
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

533. The Winds of Change: How China's Focus on Rare Earth Minerals Reshapes the World

Author:: Ian Murphy and Kevin Johnston
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: This article examines how rare earth minerals and the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) strategic dominance in the global economy affect U.S. national security. The PRC’s near monopoly on rare earth processing and its use of export controls as leverage pose significant risks to global supply chains and U.S. national security interests. This analysis explores contemporary PRC strategies in the rare earth sector and their implications for U.S. national security by explaining how the PRC’s view of international cooperation differs from the United States’ view. In essence, the PRC is using the transition to renewable energy to pursue its broader security goals and enhance its position in the global power hierarchy. Furthermore, the article offers policy recommendations aimed at mitigating vulnerabilities and ensuring the secure and sustainable supply of resources critical to U.S. interests.
Topic:: Climate Change, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Strategic Competition, Rare earth elements (REEs), Critical Minerals, and Great Powers
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

534. Recent U.S. Government Policy Literature on Critical and Strategic Minerals

Author:: Bert Chapman
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: Critical and strategic minerals have become increasingly important in U.S. government civilian and military policymaking in recent years. This is demonstrated by the heavy use of such minerals in many critical civilian and military infrastructures. This work will discuss how this subject has been addressed in laws, presidential documents, and works by government agencies along with congressional oversight committees and support agencies. It will stress how the United States is heavily dependent on strategic minerals from adversarial foreign countries such as China and will examine U.S. efforts to increase its ability to produce such materials in the United States by reforming permitting processes. It will conclude with recommendations for the United States to enhance its ability to produce these materials domestically and acquire them from reliable foreign sources. The conclusion will also suggest ways that the president and federal agency stakeholders can enhance public awareness of this problem and their efforts to rectify it.
Topic:: National Security, Science and Technology, Supply Chains, Information, Critical Minerals, and Permitting
Political Geography:: China, North America, and United States of America

535. NATO's Long Cold Front: Why NATO Must Reorganize Its Approach to Defending the European High North

Author:: Ryan R. Duffy, Jahara Matisek, Jeremy M. McKenzie, and Chad M. Pillai
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) faces strategic vulnerabilities in the European high north due to growing Russian and Chinese collaboration. Leveraging scenario planning and enhanced integration of Nordic capabilities into Joint Force Command Norfolk is recommended to bolster Arctic deterrence. Clarified command structures, specialized polar-warfare units, targeted infrastructure investments, and expanded Joint exercises are essential. This would strengthen NATO’s Arctic posture, ensuring regional stability and enabling the U.S. strategic pivot toward countering China’s growing global influence in the Indo-Pacific.
Topic:: NATO, Armed Forces, Deterrence, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, Arctic, and United States of America

536. The Role of Artificial Intelligence in the U.S. Military Strategy in Proxy Wars, 2020–2024

Author:: Ehsan Ejazi and Mahsa Ahmadyan
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: Proxy war has been a dynamic U.S. military strategy since the Cold War. In recent decades, however, artificial intelligence (AI) as a new manifestation of technology has played a significant role in these wars. The United States has been a pioneer in this field, making substantial investments, annually allocates multibillion-dollar budgets to advance robotic and automated weapons to win future wars. Artificial intelligence proxy wars can manage the competition between international actors as a mediating factor without wasting human resources. The main question of this article is as follows: What is the role of artificial intelligence in U.S. military strategy, and how much can this new technology help win proxy wars? The findings indicate that the United States, by applying artificial intelligence technology to its military equipment with remote control capabilities, robots, and automated guided weapons, has reduced human and financial costs while increasing the probability of triumph on the battlefield. However, the obtained data, according to moral and humanitarian criteria, suggest a high rate of civilian casualties in such military conflicts.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Drones, Artificial Intelligence, and Proxy War
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

537. Synthesizing Strategic Frameworks for Great Power Competition

Author:: Gavin Holtz
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: This article examines the theoretical foundations necessary for conceptualizing and operationalizing modern great power competition through the innovative synthesis of three influential military frameworks: Colonel John R. Boyd’s observe, orient, decide, act (OODA) loop, Colonel John A. Warden’s systems analysis, and Chinese colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui’s unrestricted warfare theory. The research demonstrates how complementary frameworks provide strategic practitioners with comprehensive capabilities for identifying systemic vulnerabilities, orchestrating cross-domain effects, and maintaining decisive advantage through superior decision-making processes. The analysis reveals how modern competition transcends traditional military boundaries, necessitating organizational architectures capable of implementing synchronized operations across multiple competitive domains. This theoretical synthesis supports the proposal for an Interagency Action Committee on China (IAC-C) and identifies the foundational principles of a cross-domain organizational framework.
Topic:: Gray Zone, Strategic Competition, Warfare, Great Powers, and Systems Analysis
Political Geography:: China, Global Focus, and United States of America

538. Strategic Implications of Emerging Weapon Technologies: Kinetic Bombardment, Antimatter, and Antigravity Technology for U.S. National Security

Author:: Ahsan Uddin
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: This article explores the strategic implications of emerging weapon technologies on U.S. national security, focusing specifically on antimatter, kinetic bombardment systems, and antigravity technology. As global military dynamics evolve, it is imperative for the United States to assess and perhaps integrate these emerging technologies to maintain its military superiority. This article examines the accuracy and destructive capability of kinetic bombardment, the immense energy potential of antimatter, and the groundbreaking applications of antigravity propulsion in aerial operations. The findings underscore the critical role that these technologies may play in improving U.S. national security and provide a foundation for additional research on their national security applications and implications.
Topic:: Defense Policy, National Security, Science and Technology, Weapons, Research and Development, and Military
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

539. The Arctic as a Periphery in U.S.-China Competition

Author:: Charlotte Hulme
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: While China’s Arctic inroads have attracted growing attention from the United States, this article views Arctic competition as a periphery of global great power competition, or as a sideshow to the main theater of U.S.-China competition—the Indo-Pacific. Examining China’s Arctic activity from a peripheral perspective, it ultimately argues that the United States should sustain its current posture of not letting a nonpriority theater become a main event in its competition with China.
Topic:: Strategic Competition, Periphery, and Great Powers
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Arctic, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

540. The Hegemonic Transition in Latin America: To What Extent is China Challenging US’s Hegemony?

Author:: Andoni Maiza-Larrarte and Ricardo Bustillo-Mesanza
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:: Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:: In this paper, we examine the geopolitical consequences of China’s enhanced engagement in Latin America. China is increasing its economic weight among Latin American countries, reinforcing its external image to counter the perception that the US is a unique relevant ally. In previous research, some authors have supported the idea that China could become a sort of neocolonial power in Latin America, substituting the hegemony of the United States. In this article, we carry out an in-depth review of Western literature and a comprehensive analysis of the bilateral relationship to discuss China’s role in the region. We apply the principles of the hegemonic stability and the power transition theories, and we also include an assessment of “soft power” components. We conclude that China is eroding US power in Latin America but is still far from becoming the new regional hegemon.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Hegemony, Transition, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Latin America, and United States of America

541. Defending Without Provoking: The United States and the Philippines in the South China Sea

Author:: Sarang Shidore
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: The South China Sea has long been the subject of territorial and maritime disputes between Beijing, Manila, and other claimants. Since late 2022, escalating confrontations between Philippine and Chinese forces over tiny maritime features such as Second Thomas Shoal have posed a serious and growing risk of a military confrontation, which could in turn entangle the United States. Washington can avoid this worst-case scenario by charting a pragmatic approach and upholding its alliance commitment to the Philippines while avoiding military actions that would needlessly provoke China. The data in this brief show a dramatic increase of maritime incidents starting in the third quarter of 2023. China and the Philippines are disputing control over, among other things, what are little more than specks in the ocean, most located a hundred miles or more from the mainland of either country. However, maritime rights and jurisdiction are significant issues, and there is no question that Beijing’s behavior in the South China Sea has been provocative and coercive. Moreover, an international tribunal has ruled overwhelmingly in favor of the Philippines in the dispute, decisively rejecting China’s “historic” claims around the “nine/ten dash line.” The U.S. relationship with the Philippines represents one of the United States’ oldest treaty alliances in the Global South and is important to America’s Pacific strategy. But the South China Sea conflict does not represent a threat of conquest of the Philippine mainland. Washington should recognize that defending maritime rights and tiny land features in waters half a world away is not a vital U.S. national interest and could become a serious liability should it open the door to a high-intensity conflict with China. An honest assessment of U.S. interests dictates a strategy of restraint in the South China Sea. While recognizing Manila’s agency and continuing to strengthen Philippine capacities, Washington should also encourage Manila to engage constructively with Beijing to prevent escalation. Crucially, U.S. policymakers must also avoid raising the risk of conflict by drawing the Philippines into taking a more aggressive stance on Taiwan. Washington can help preserve and uphold international law in the South China Sea while reducing the risk of war between the United States and China by taking the following steps: Do not pull the U.S.–Philippines alliance into the Taiwan theater. Washington should not add to its nine existing military sites in the Philippines and, ideally, should disband one or more of the new sites located in northern Luzon (closer to Taiwan) in exchange for Chinese concessions. Do not give the U.S. Navy or Coast Guard a frontal role in countering Chinese intrusions in the South China Sea; enable Manila to take the lead instead. Do not seek to draw the military of U.S. allies (particularly extra-regional ones) into South China Sea disputes, in order to avoid needlessly heightening Chinese perceptions of bloc-formation and armed encirclement. Enhance diplomatic support to Manila for its legitimate claims under international law. Provide aid, capabilities, and intelligence for modernizing the Philippine Coast Guard and Navy and enhancing maritime domain awareness. Build on the early success of the July 2024 Philippines–China understanding on Second Thomas Shoal by emphasizing preventive diplomacy and crisis management to stabilize the maritime dispute and reduce the chances of a conflict spiral.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Territorial Disputes, Armed Forces, Maritime, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:: Asia, Philippines, North America, United States of America, and South China Sea

542. Big Ideas and Big Money: Think Tank Funding in America

Author:: Ben Freeman and Nick Cleveland-Stout
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: This brief provides a detailed analysis of a first-of-its-kind, publicly available repository of U.S. think tank funding — www.thinktankfundingtracker.org. The repository tracks funding from foreign governments, the U.S. government, and Pentagon contractors to the top 50 think tanks in the United States over the past five years. It serves as a vital research guide for anyone wishing to learn more about the funding sources of prominent U.S. think tanks. The repository gives a five-point transparency score to each of the top 50 think tanks in the U.S., a scale created by the authors based on five binary questions. Based on this criteria, nine of the top 50 think tanks (18 percent) are fully transparent, while 23 think tanks (46 percent) are partially transparent. Most concerning, the remaining 18 think tanks (36 percent) are “dark money” think tanks, entirely opaque in their funding without revealing donors. In the past five years, foreign governments and foreign government-owned entities donated more than $110 million to the top 50 think tanks in the United States. The most generous donor countries were the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and Qatar, which contributed $16.7 million, $15.5 million, and $9.1 million to U.S. think tanks, respectively. The Atlantic Council, Brookings Institution, and German Marshall Fund received the most money from foreign governments since 2019: $20.8 million, $17.1 million, and $16.1 million, respectively. In that same period, the top 100 defense companies have contributed more than $34.7 million to the top 50 think tanks. The top donors include Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin, and Mitsubishi, which provided $5.6 million, $2.6 million, and $2.1 million, respectively, to the tracked think tanks between 2019 and 2023. The Atlantic Council, Center for a New American Security, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies were the top recipients of Pentagon contractor money: $10.2 million, $6.6 million, and $4.1 million, respectively. The U.S. government has directly given at least $1.49 billion to American think tanks since 2019. However, the vast majority of this funding — $1.4 billion — goes to the Rand Corporation, which works directly for the U.S. government. While think tanks exist to produce independent analysis, the prevalence of special interest funding raises questions of intellectual freedom, self-censorship, and perspective filtering. This is compounded by instances in which individual researchers simultaneously hold positions at a think tank and a given foreign government or corporation, a clear potential conflict of interest. Moving forward, this brief contains a set of recommendations for various actors: For media: Adopt a professional standard to report any conflicts of interest with sources discussing U.S. foreign policy. For Congress: Pass legislation requiring all nonprofit organizations that seek to influence public policy to publicly disclose all of their corporate, U.S. government, and foreign government donors above $10,000, and improve the conflict of interest disclosure requirements for congressional witnesses. For the Department of Justice: Provide clearer guidelines surrounding what think tanks not registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act can do on behalf of their foreign donors. For think tanks: End pay-to-play research and proactively move toward identifying conflicts of interest.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, Think Tanks, Donors, Funding, and Foreign Influence
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

543. European Hedging as a Diplomatic Opportunity for the United States

Author:: Naman Karl-Thomas Habtom
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: With the onset of multipolarity in the world and growing disagreement between the U.S. and Europe, the U.S. should expect a declining foreign policy alignment with Europe. Rather than bemoan this development, the U.S. should recognize it as a strategic opportunity. Selective hedging by European countries — reducing their dependency on the United States and cultivating stronger relations with other major powers — would facilitate a diplomacy-led, restraint-based U.S. foreign policy and help the U.S. navigate a multipolar world order. For years, Europe has stood as a de facto vassal of the United States, a continent dependent on American military might and comprising countries largely lacking foreign policy independence. Such self-subordination has had negative consequences for Europe and the United States alike. It has weakened Europe’s overall global standing, which in turn means that the U.S. has been able to draw less advantage from its European alliance. This has unintentionally reduced U.S. diplomatic heft in engaging with adversaries. But a considerable U.S.–European schism has recently emerged. The Trump administration’s decided break from the transatlantic status quo has engendered strong disagreements over Ukraine, European security policy more broadly, and international trade. With the combined weakening of political, military, and economic links across the Atlantic, Europe is more likely to hedge moving forward. Strategic hedging — a posture already adopted by many countries in the Global South — would allow European countries to pursue an independent foreign policy, bolstering their international relevance. This reorientation would be diplomatically advantageous to the United States, as hedgers in Europe could serve as friendly interlocutors for American engagement with rival nations. European hedging could provide a conduit for constructive U.S. diplomacy, while discouraging zero-sum thinking and the disintegration of the global order into hostile blocs. The U.S. must recognize that a vassalized European continent is both unsustainable and antithetical to a restrained foreign policy vision. While retaining friendly ties with European countries, the United States should now actively promote selective hedging, paving the way for long-term European independence and peaceful multipolarity.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Donald Trump, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

544. Under Primacy, Weapons Sales Will Always Supersede Human Rights

Author:: Annelle Sheline
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: The U.S. government’s expressed commitment to human rights is routinely undermined by its actual commitment to maintaining America’s global military primacy. Since the 1970s, Washington has cast itself as a defender of global human rights, when Congress passed laws to bar the U.S. from providing security assistance to human rights violators. Yet America’s interest in human rights has long been sublimated to the logic of hegemony, from Cold War containment to the Global War on Terror and beyond. Congress has still never successfully voted to block a weapons sale. Today, the myth that American power upholds human rights lies buried beneath the rubble of Gaza. This research brief traces the emergence of human rights within U.S. foreign policymaking in the waning decades of the Cold War — alongside Washington’s rise to the top of the global arms trade — and surveys the various U.S. government efforts to codify human rights considerations in the practice of U.S. foreign policy, particularly arms sales, through the Biden administration. This history reveals how American leaders, regardless of political party, have consistently instrumentalized human rights concerns to target perceived adversaries, while tossing aside such concerns when they apply to U.S. partners. After Israel invaded Gaza following the Hamas attacks on October 7, 2023, the Biden administration failed to place any meaningful conditions on weapons sales to Israel, despite Israel’s conduct showing clear violations of international and U.S. law. The Trump administration has since expanded America’s unconditional support for Israel. Even as the world becomes increasingly multipolar, the defense establishment remains intent on maintaining U.S. military primacy. In clinging to this pursuit, human rights will remain an afterthought, selectively invoked by U.S. leaders when they do not threaten the military-industrial complex and arms sales. Only a sober recalibration of America’s approach to our new geopolitical reality — including a foreign policy of military restraint — can bring about a deeper commitment to human rights in Washington.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Military Affairs, Arms Trade, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

545. Peace Through Strength in Ukraine: Sources of U.S. Leverage in Negotiations

Author:: George Beebe, Mark Episkopos, and Anatol Lieven
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: The key to American success in ending the war in Ukraine is to broaden, rather than narrow, the issues under negotiation. If American negotiators treat the war as a bilateral dispute between Russia and Ukraine and press both sides to agree to an immediate ceasefire, they are likely to fail. In a narrow negotiation, Russia has significant advantages because it has turned the conflict into a war of attrition in which its much greater population and much larger military industry are overwhelming Ukraine’s defenses. The United States and Europe lack the capacity to match Russia’s arms production or bridge the Russia–Ukraine manpower gap without direct conflict with Russia. By contrast, if Washington recognizes that Moscow’s security concerns extend beyond Ukraine to the broader military threat posed by U.S. and NATO forces in Europe — a threat Russia cannot blunt by conquering Ukraine — the U.S. can employ leverage that Kyiv lacks in direct bargaining with Moscow.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Negotiation, Leverage, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

546. U.S.–Cuban Relations: A Realist Case for Pragmatic Engagement

Author:: William M. LeoGrande and Geoff Thale
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: This report, sponsored by the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, is the product of a set of consultations among a group of scholars, opinion leaders, and foreign policy specialists that took place over the last nine months to develop a proposal for a new way forward in U.S. relations with Cuba. The project was coordinated by William M. LeoGrande, professor of government at American University, and Geoff Thale, former president of the Washington Office on Latin America and now an independent analyst. In a series of individual discussions, written exchanges, and small group meetings, participants shared views on U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba, including the state of U.S.–Cuban relations, the impact of U.S.–Cuba policy on broader U.S. national interests, and the impact of U.S. sanctions on the Cuban people. Participants also discussed the situation in Cuba itself, including the state of the economy, migration, political rights, and civil rights. The group sought additional input from policymakers, former executive branch officials, and congressional staff. The group’s broad consensus is that the national interest of the United States would be better served by resetting U.S. policy toward Cuba, embarking on a path of engagement aimed at eventually normalizing relations. We recognize that this was not the policy that President Trump pursued in his first term, nor was it a policy supported by key members of the president’s current foreign policy team. As of this writing, the new administration has taken several steps toward tightening the embargo but has yet to announce a full-fledged Cuba policy. Sometimes advancing U.S. interests requires setting aside old animosities and engaging with former adversaries, as President Trump has done by opening negotiations with Syria, as well as continuing talks with Russia, China, and others. The president defines his “America First” foreign policy as one that champions “core American interests” and “puts America and its interests first.” 1 U.S. policy toward Cuba in recent years has failed that test. This document lays out the rationale for a new policy that advances U.S. national interests and also takes into account the interests of the Cuban people. It recommends a series of specific policy steps that would address priority issues like mass migration, narcotics trafficking, and the rising influence of U.S. global rivals, both in Cuba and in Latin America, as well as U.S. economic and cultural interests. This report benefited enormously from the thoughtful comments and suggestions of a great many people with deep experience and insight into U.S.–Cuban relations who graciously shared their expertise and advice with us in the course of this project. They include current and former U.S. government officials — from both the executive and legislative branches — as well as civil society leaders who have been engaged with this issue for many years. We offer special thanks to Ambassador (retired) Jeffrey DeLaurentis, who served as chargé d’affaires in the U.S. Embassy in Havana; Angela Mariana Freyre, former special advisor on Cuba at the National Security Council; Victor Johnson, former staff director for the House Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs; and Cindy Buhl, former legislative director and foreign policy aide to Congressman Jim McGovern. They read several drafts of this report, and their suggestions improved it considerably. Their participation does not mean that they endorse every argument or recommendation; that responsibly rests with us alone. We are also grateful to the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft for sponsoring this project and especially to Sarang Shidore, director of the Quincy Institute’s Global South program, and Marcus Stanley, director of the Quincy Institute’s Studies department, for their support and advice.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Engagement, Strategic Interests, and Pragmatism
Political Geography:: Cuba and United States of America

547. Investing in the National Interest: The DFC and American Statecraft

Author:: Karthik Sankaran and Dan M. Ford
Publication Date:: 11-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, or DFC, supports private-sector investment across the Global South, particularly in low- and middle-income countries. Congress is currently reviewing legislation to reauthorize the DFC. The DFC is likely to see significant changes in the coming years, including a large expansion of its financial resources and a liberalization of its permissible investments. The likely expansion of the DFC would serve U.S. interests as an instrument of positive influence in the Global South. However, it is also possible that changes made during the reauthorization process may amplify a major concern with the DFC’s focus and strategic approach: an excessive emphasis on national security goals and on exclusionary conflict with U.S. adversaries, particularly China. Such an approach can damage the potential for the U.S. to grow its competitive commercial presence in the Global South and reduce the DFC’s effectiveness as a pro-development instrument that enhances U.S. influence in the Global South. Proposed changes to the DFC’s strategic goals and an outright ban on engagement with Chinese–funded projects may drive the DFC further down an exclusionary, zero-sum path. The DFC should also not be used to invest in high-income countries, which would detract from one of its core missions. This brief outlines a more expansive vision for the DFC, which would help the United States expand its economic footprint in the Global South without the pitfalls of an excessively securitized view of international development. A higher-impact DFC could improve the global influence of the United States, deepen economic partnerships and drive healthy, vigorous competition with China while avoiding coercive and almost certainly ineffective efforts to force countries to completely decouple from Beijing. Critical minerals, energy, and strategic infrastructure should be major focuses of an enlarged DFC. Such projects diversify U.S. supply chains and offer holistic investment opportunities. At the same time, the DFC should pursue an approach that emphasizes broad-based commercial development, to include engagement with small- and medium-sized enterprises. An approach that views target countries as commercial partners rather than pawns for hard security competition best positions the United States to enhance its reputation in the Global South. Expanding the DFC’s range of available financial tools to include, for example, subordinated loans and more mechanisms to manage political and currency risk, could also improve its flexibility as a commercial partner. A clear candidate for a future DFC initiative along those lines is the Lobito Corridor. This project would create a massive transit hub for mineral transportation across sub-Saharan Africa and subsequent incorporation into the global market, bolstering local infrastructure, expanding the supply of critical minerals, and providing ample downstream U.S. investment opportunities. Another possible candidate is the brownfield expansion and modernization of the Puerto Bolivar container port in Ecuador’s El Oro province.
Topic:: Global South, Investment, Private Sector, Supply Chains, Strategic Interests, Statecraft, and US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC)
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

548. Beyond Strategic Ambiguity: Supporting Taiwan Without a Commitment to War

Author:: Michael D. Swaine
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: The first brief in this series made the case that Taiwan is not a vital interest justifying a war between the United States and China. This second brief outlines how Washington can transition from strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity in a manner that continues to deter Beijing from coercing Taipei while ruling out direct American military intervention in defense of the island. This brief recommends that, in the short to medium term, the United States should maintain its standing policy of strategic ambiguity toward Taiwan while also carrying out necessary preparations for a noninterventionist policy shift. These preparations include: A clear statement from Washington that it opposes any unilateral move by Taipei to achieve formal independence. A revitalization of the eroding One China Policy. A reaffirmation of U.S. security commitments to Japan and South Korea. A bolstering of the self-defense capabilities of Taiwan and nearby treaty allies. Encouragement and support for those in Japan who seek to ease tensions with China and wish to cultivate cooperative Sino–Japanese and Sino–American relationships. The initiation of a results-oriented strategic dialogue with China. The expansion of mutually beneficial trade, investment, and technology exchanges with Taiwanese companies and the offshoring of Taiwanese high-tech capabilities. Once these necessary, gradual preparations have been made, the U.S. president should explicitly state that America will not go to war with China to defend Taiwan but that the United States will support Taiwan — and the development of an improved cross-strait environment — in every other way possible. This policy shift is necessary because ongoing military and political trends are eroding the ability of the United States to deter and reassure China, increasing the likelihood of conflict. The One China Policy is deteriorating, the Taiwanese public increasingly rejects any political association with China, and China is expanding its reliance on military displays, which undermines the credibility of the Chinese commitment to a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. More generally, U.S.–China relations continue to worsen. This trajectory renders the standing U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity, which accepts the possibility of a direct U.S. war with China, dangerous and misaligned with U.S. interests. The above preparatory changes will require considerable diplomatic finesse and sustained attention over a considerable period of time. Given the weakened National Security Council and the virtual collapse of the past interagency coordinating process for policy development under President Trump, these required qualities might be in short supply at present. Hopefully, the Trump administration will be able to correct these deficiencies. It is unlikely China would respond to the strategy outlined here by attempting to reunify with Taiwan by force. This is because of the still high — and, in some areas, increased — risks confronting any Chinese use of force and because of the fact that this policy shift would likely increase Beijing’s confidence in eventually reaching a peaceful resolution of the issue.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, National Security, Bilateral Relations, Deterrence, and Strategic Ambiguity
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

549. The Fading of Old Irritants: U.S.–Türkiye Relations in a Post–Assad Landscape

Author:: Adam Weinstein and Steven Simon
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: The U.S.–Türkiye relationship today is a fraught partnership marked by discord and strategic misalignment — particularly within the context of the Syrian Civil War but long before it as well. With the fading of old irritants in a post–Assad Syrian political landscape, a more stable and cooperative U.S.–Türkiye relationship is possible — an opportunity the Trump administration should seize. The United States and Türkiye, though NATO allies, have historically lacked the shared values that make the transactionalism inherent in alliance frameworks easier to manage. As such, tensions have arisen when the strategic interests of each country or domestic politics have diverged. The Syrian Civil War, particularly since the emergence of the ISIS caliphate in 2014, illustrated this division starkly. While initially supportive of the mission to defeat ISIS in Syria, Türkiye became disillusioned with the military campaign once the United States partnered with the Kurdish–led People’s Protection Units, or YPG. To Türkiye, the YPG is an extension of the Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK, a militant Kurdish group that the country has fought since the early 1980s and views as an existential challenge. This misalignment of primary objectives in Syria created a fraught dynamic between the U.S. and Türkiye. In December 2024, Bashar al–Assad’s regime fell following a successful military campaign by Hay`at Tahrir al–Sham, or HTS, a Sunni Islamist group with close ties to Türkiye. While HTS’s rule moving forward is precarious, the United States and Türkiye share a common interest in preventing renewed civil strife in Syria. A resumed war could create another wave of asylum migration to Türkiye and beyond, stimulate deeper Israeli involvement, renew Iranian attempts to influence developments, and run counter to a broadly shared international interest in a unitary Syrian state. President Trump has expressed a desire to withdraw American troops from Syria and a willingness to permit greater Turkish influence in northern Syria. To advance a more cooperative U.S.–Türkiye relationship, this brief recommends the following: The Trump administration should establish a formal working group with Türkiye on Syria, bringing together intelligence, military, diplomatic, and economic channels. Türkiye and Kurdish groups should engage in backchannel diplomacy to promote Kurdish integration into a functioning Syrian state and protect the Kurds against human rights abuses. The United States and Türkiye should rebuild strategic trust through targeted defense cooperation, resuming U.S. arms sales to Türkiye contingent on its cooperation in Syria and Iraq, and expanding U.S.–Türkiye joint training and NATO exercises. Türkiye and Israel should engage in stabilization dialogue to mitigate tensions over their respective zones of influence in Syria and to coordinate on eastern Mediterranean energy development.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Islamic State, Syrian War, Kurds, and Political Transition
Political Geography:: Turkey, Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America

550. Soft Power, Hard Influence: How Qatar Became a Giant in Washington

Author:: Ben Freeman and Nick Cleveland-Stout
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: This brief explores Qatar’s evolution into one of the more influential foreign lobbies in the United States. Qatar’s story demonstrates how money begets influence in the United States. Since Donald Trump was first elected president in 2016, Qatar has spent nearly $250 million on 88 FARA–registered lobbying and public relations firms. From January 2021 to June 2025, Qatar’s agents reported 627 in-person meetings with political contacts in the United States — more FARA–registered meetings than any other country in the world. The current Trump administration has deep ties to Qatar. Three cabinet-level members in the administration — Attorney General Pam Bondi, FBI Director Kash Patel, and EPA Administrator Lee Zeldin — have all previously held consultancy or lobbying positions on Qatar’s behalf. Qatar substantially increased its political influence efforts beginning in 2017, when it was blockaded and reportedly threatened with invasion by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. In response, Qatar began vigorous efforts to counteract anti–Qatar lobbying in the U.S. conducted by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and pro–Israel groups. More recently, Qatar has used its lobbying influence to bolster its legitimacy and reputation as a global conflict mediator and reassert its importance to U.S. strategic interests and its defense posture in the Middle East. In the aftermath of the Hamas attack against Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, Qatar worked to combat claims of terrorist sympathies by successfully positioning itself as a mediator for ceasefire and hostage exchange negotiations between Israel and Hamas. The Qatar lobby has also helped to preserve the country’s standing as a critical U.S. ally in the Middle East, heading off a congressional push to move Al Udeid Air Base out of Qatar, preserving Qatar’s designation as a major non–NATO ally, and strengthening defensive ties via lucrative arms sales. Beyond the defense realm, Qatar is heavily invested in the U.S. In the past five years, Qatar has given upward of $9.1 million to think tanks. Since 2001, it has provided $6.25 billion to American colleges and universities. However, contrary to insinuations from some, its university-related funding and influence have primarily focused on educational efforts within Qatar, where the majority of students enrolled are Qatari. Qatar has also invested more broadly in the U.S. economy. This past May, Qatar pledged to invest $500 billion in the U.S. economy over the next decade, demonstrating its intention to retain its U.S. economic influence for the foreseeable future.
Topic:: Soft Power, Investment, Donald Trump, Lobbying, and Foreign Influence
Political Geography:: Middle East, North America, Qatar, and United States of America

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS