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451. Four scenarios for the future of transatlantic relations: European autonomy and the American challenge

Author:
Ville Sinkkonen and Garret Martin
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
While concerns about the long-term durability of the US commitment to European security are not new, the unpredictable Trump administration stands out as a serious threat to the foundations of the transatlantic partnership. By analysing the US approach to Europe through the lens of two key variables – investment (whether the US prioritizes Europe) and control (whether the US seeks to dictate Europe’s policy choices) – the Briefing Paper maps out four scenarios for the transatlantic alliance over the next five to ten years. The four scenarios – neglect, partner, vassal, and bloc logic – each present specific challenges and trade-offs for Europe. However, the first two models, neglect and partner, are less thorny on paper because they would preserve European strategic autonomy. Vassal and bloc logic, by contrast, would likely present Europe with far more challenging dilemmas. American pressure to toe the line would compel Europe to choose between unpalatable options, such as surrender or resistance, while testing its ability to preserve autonomy.
Topic:
Power Politics, Governance, Democracy, Transatlantic Relations, and Strategic Autonomy
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

452. Brazil’s split worlds: Navigating between the Global South and the United States

Author:
Lauri Tahtinen
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Brazilian foreign policy, traditionally nonpartisan, is increasingly shaped by domestic political divides, complicating alignment with global powers. This also fuels unpredictability, especially in relation to the United States. Brazil’s political right is looking to align with Washington in a bipolar world order, while its political left still seeks multipolarity through the Global South and with the help of the Global East. If, contrary to many expectations and current Brazilian policy, the world becomes bipolar, Brazil may be forced to pick sides, challenging its tradition of balanced diplomacy. If the world appears to be heading towards multipolarity, this would fulfil a long-held Brazilian foreign policy objective. However, Brazil faces regional dynamics that, perhaps paradoxically, resemble bipolarity, as South America remains only a secondary, or even tertiary, zone for great power competition. Hosting major forums like the G20, BRICS, and COP30 puts pressure on Brazil to deliver more consistent global messaging, limiting its room for strategic flexibility.
Topic:
Global South, Multipolarity, Strategic Autonomy, Great Powers, and Middle Powers
Political Geography:
Brazil, South America, Latin America, North America, and United States of America

453. Geostrategic thinking and quantum technology: How promises of quantum technology breakthroughs shape Sino-US rivalry

Author:
Markus Holmgren
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Disruptive technologies have emerged as key arenas of strategic competition between the United States and China, and, alongside artificial intelligence, quantum technologies are key among them. By influencing current strategies and policies, their implications begin even before innovations materialize. Uncertainty about the future and the promised benefits of these technologies have implications for both nations’ build-up efforts, resilience strategies, and potential for pre-emptive actions. China has made rapid technological advancements in many fields, narrowing the gap with the United States. Examples include the release of an AI application by the Chinese company DeepSeek and China’s lead in quantum communication technologies. Beyond civilian applications, quantum technology promises significant breakthroughs in military applications, such as codebreaking, signal-free submarine navigation, and intrusion-proof communications.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, Strategic Competition, Geoeconomics, and Quantum Computing
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

454. Four lenses for observing the second Trump administration: Reflecting uncertainty

Author:
Charly Salonius-Pasternak and Ville Sinkkonen
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
The global security landscape has evolved in the four years since President Donald Trump’s first term. The new administration aims to usher in a “Golden Age of America”, with impacts on domestic politics and society, as well as foreign policy. Unlike in 2017, the incoming administration appears better prepared, with outlined plans and key appointments. However, chaotic decision-making processes and an emphasis on loyalty to Trump are likely to introduce unpredictability into governance and policymaking. The administration’s unified domestic and foreign policy strategy can be viewed through four lenses: national sovereignty, economic nationalism, devolution, and the unmooring of power. The Trump administration is likely to embrace disruption and chaos to achieve revolutionary rather than evolutionary change. This thinking draws on tech-inspired startup culture and generational-revolutionary philosophies, which perceive the US as being in a moment of crisis that will usher in a new historical epoch. Key uncertainties remain regarding the administration’s long-term effects on democracy, alliances, and great power competition, particularly concerning trade-security linkages and alliance relations with Europe and Asia.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Elections, Democracy, Donald Trump, and Great Powers
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

455. The boom and crash of cooperative security in Europe: Four scenarios for the future

Author:
Sinikukka Saari and Tyyne Karjalainen
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
The post-Cold War European cooperative security order, based on shared liberal norms and institutions, has been challenged by Russia’s revisionism and aggression – and more recently by the alienation and even hostility of the United States. Cooperative security has shrunk in scope to an internal European order, shaped around relations among like-minded European states. To maintain this order, Europe will need to actively defend it, not only in words but also in deeds, and even militarily as a last resort. There is a crucial link between the fate of Ukraine and wider European security: the outcome of the war will effectively either validate or reject spheres of influence in Europe and, by extension, the basic principles on which the future of Europe is being built. Europe’s emerging military posture should be grounded in the key norms of European cooperative security: multilateral cooperation, democratic values and international law. Europe can leverage these strengths to navigate the global context of shifting power dynamics.
Topic:
Defense Policy, War, European Union, Regional Security, and Great Powers
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and United States of America

456. Turkey and Israel – Cooperation through Gritted Teeth

Author:
Joseph Epstein
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
In the shadow of Israel's Operation "Rising Lion" against Iran, the latest edition of Turkeyscope features Joseph Epstein's analysis of recent developments in Israeli-Turkish relations. Azerbaijan's mediation, pragmatic signals from Syria's new leadership, and strong U.S. encouragement are helping both nations identify mutual interests.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Syrian War, and Mediation
Political Geography:
Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Syria, and United States of America

457. Critical Minerals, Rare Earth Elements, and the Challenges Ahead for the United States

Author:
Karl Friedhoff
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs (CCGA)
Abstract:
The race to secure critical minerals (CM) and rare earth elements (REE) has become an area of increasing geopolitical competition, with China and the United States the two key players. The United States is currently behind in that competition. It is being out-invested, out-innovated, and out-educated. Not only is Washington losing, but it is falling further behind by undermining the alliances and cooperative networks that should play a crucial role in overcoming the existing structural deficit. At the same time, current US policy is weakening the domestic green energy market that relies on CMREE inputs and drives technological innovation and investment as much of the world pushes ahead with the energy transition. Solely market-driven solutions are unlikely to materialize to address this challenge in the United States. After all, it was this approach over at least the last two decades that helped to create the current imbalance. The central challenge for the United States, then, is how to build a foundation from which market forces can once again play a leading role in driving financing, research, and labor in the sector. The interlocking web of policies to build this foundation is complex. To be done right, each policy requires others surrounding for support. Completing the puzzle will require broad-spectrum cooperation between government and business. This will include a renewed focus on industrial policy and require setting explicit goals for the United States and its partners to create secure supply chains. This process is not without challenges and will inevitably produce local, and potentially national, opposition. The refineries required to diversify where CMREE are processed will create environmental hazards as well as stress local water resources, among other vulnerabilities. This set of policies will also demand heavy investment in material sciences to develop new technologies that can reduce and replace CMREE inputs where possible. Pursuing these policies will necessitate much deeper investment in education and training to create a workforce capable of meeting the demands in the CMREE mining, processing, and materials science sector. Even with extensive government support, there is no guarantee that private investment will materialize to sustain the industry. China’s virtual cornering of a vast swath of the market means much of the sector does not operate along traditional axes of supply and demand, discouraging private investment in the process. This makes it more likely that long-term government support in the form of subsidies, tax incentives, and price controls will be required. That puts such funding and support at the mercy of shifting political winds. Under previous US administrations, a wide-ranging challenge like CMREE would produce the requisite policy papers calling for deeper coordination, cooperation, and integration between the United States and a consortium of like-minded countries. Some of that cooperation may yet be possible, but with a US administration that views the world through a zero-sum lens, it becomes less likely each day. Rather than coordination, it will be absolute dollar amounts that drive cooperation. That approach may be successful in the short term in establishing the building blocks of a secure CMREE supply chain. But its longer-term prospects are uncertain. This report and its policy recommendations are based on discussions from two seminars and multiple conversations across several countries and continents with policy analysts, industry professionals, and government officials. The first seminar was conducted in cooperation with the Perth USAsia Centre in Perth, Western Australia. This seminar brought together participants from around the Indo-Pacific to share their views on how allies and partners could coordinate their efforts. The second seminar was held in Chicago at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs with industry professionals, minerals practitioners, and academic experts from across the United States. A full list of participants can be found in the appendix.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Rare earth elements (REEs), Critical Minerals, and Global Economy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

458. NATO: The Damage Is Done – So Think Big

Author:
Sven Biscop
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
For seventy-six years, NATO tried to prove Lord Palmerston wrong. Now it turns out that he was right after all: “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow”. The second Trump Administration behaves as Europe’s rival, not as its ally. It is too late for mere damage control. Placating Trump will not work either: unrestrained, he will just go further and further. Europeans must present the US with a clear idea of which NATO they want, and what they will invest to get it. That is the way to salvage the Alliance at the NATO Summit in The Hague in June. The damage is done. Because even if the US were to radically alter course and recommit fully to NATO as we knew it, everyone now knows that a next President may change it back again. The US cannot treat NATO the way it treats the agreements on climate change: it joins, it leaves, it rejoins, and leaves again. Deterrence demands constancy, or there is no deterrence. Unless it is actually tested in war, Article 5 will now never be as credible as before. This has already affected the global balance of power: adversaries who perceive that the US may not stand by Europe may be emboldened and become more aggressive. Against Europe, but also against the US, whose erratic economic and foreign policies Europe will not follow.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

459. The AI Bubble and the U.S. Economy: How Long Do ‘Hallucinations’ Last?

Author:
Servaas Storm
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
The U.S. is undergoing an extraordinary, AI-fueled economic boom: The stock market is soaring thanks to exceptionally high valuations of AI-related tech firms, which are fueling economic growth by the hundreds of billions of U.S. dollars they are spending on data centers and other AI infrastructure. The AI investment boom is based on the belief that AI will make workers and firms significantly more productive, which will in turn boost corporate profits to unprecedented levels. But evidence is piling up that generative AI (GenAI) is failing to deliver. This paper argues that (i) we have reached “peak GenAI” in terms of current Large Language Models (LLMs); scaling (building more data centers and using more chips) will not take us further to the goal of “Artificial General Intelligence” (AGI); returns are diminishing rapidly; (ii) the AI-LLM industry and the larger U.S. economy are experiencing a speculative bubble, which is about to burst (because of the first point); and (iii) the U.S. bet the farm on a future dominated by U.S.-owned AGI, because, for geopolitical reasons, it could not afford to risk to lose the AI-race with China; this geopolitical bet on AGI is now going bad.
Topic:
Water, Geopolitics, Economy, Profit, Artificial Intelligence, Productivity, Energy, Large Language Models (LLMs), ChatGPT, and Speculative Bubbles
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

460. Is Fedwire Still a Subsidy That Fully Recovers Its Cost?

Author:
William Bergman
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
This paper examines the Federal Reserve’s current financial losses—unprecedented in scale—and the questionable accounting practices it uses to downplay their impact. It argues that the Fed’s selfdefined accounting standards, particularly the creation of a “deferred asset” to mask negative equity, obscure the fiscal consequences for the U.S. government and taxpayers. The analysis connects today’s losses to longstanding institutional practices, notably the Fed’s flawed costrecovery accounting for its Fedwire payment system. These issues first emerged in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when the author, then a Fed staffer, challenged the internal logic used to claim that Fedwire guaranteed payments and still avoided subsidies. The paper includes as an appendix the original 2002 draft, “Fedwire: A Subsidy That Fully Recovers Its Cost?”, which helped reveal the moral hazard and accounting inconsistencies that contributed to the 2008 crisis and continue to shape central bank risk and governance today
Topic:
Monetary Policy, Financial Crisis, Federal Reserve, Regulation, Central Bank, and Payment Systems
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

461. Historical American Political Finance Data at the National Archives: A Preface to the INET Edition

Author:
Thomas Ferguson
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
Narratives in American history, politics, and economics — even those by the most accomplished researchers — often resemble donuts: at their core lies a hole that no amount of sweet speculation can truly fill. They say almost nothing about the financing behind even the most pivotal American political campaigns and elections. Both history and the social sciences suffer greatly when facts are missing and wild guesses take their place. INET’s new data archive of historical political finance records at the National Archives marks a major step toward filling this factual void. It assembles all campaign finance reports filed by political parties and presidential candidates up to 1974, the year before the Federal Election Commission was established. A few additional files, including one from the FEC for 1976, are also included, as detailed below. This INET Working Paper outlines what users need to know to navigate the archive effectively and locate the data they require.
Topic:
History, Elections, Regulation, and Political Finance
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

462. Aligning global military posture with U.S. interests

Author:
Jennifer Kavanagh and Dan Caldwell
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The Pentagon should revise the U.S. global military posture to be consistent with protecting vital national interests based on a grand strategy of realism and restraint. This will mean reducing the size of the military footprint in certain regions and changing the mix and location of military forces in others. A review of the U.S. global military posture should focus on four priorities: defending the homeland, preventing the rise of a rival regional hegemon in key areas, burden shifting to allies and partners, and protecting U.S. economic security. The current military posture in Europe is too large, encouraging free-riding by European allies and preventing them from taking more responsibility for their own security. U.S. troop levels should be reduced to approximately where they were before Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine. This will involve the withdrawal of some ground combat units, multiple fighter squadrons, and several destroyers. Likewise, the military posture in the Middle East is too large given limited U.S. interests and the region’s lack of an existential military threat to the U.S. homeland. Air and naval assets deployed after the 2023 attacks on Israel should be removed, post-9/11 legacy deployments in Iraq and Syria should be ended, and troops in Kuwait and Qatar should be fully withdrawn. The U.S. military posture in East Asia should be realigned to focus on balancing Chinese power and protecting U.S. interests. Recommended changes include removing most ground forces and two fighter squadrons from South Korea, moving U.S. forces away from the Chinese coast, and shifting more frontline defense responsibilities to allies like Japan and the Philippines.
Topic:
Grand Strategy, Strategic Interests, Military, and Pentagon
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

463. Will the U.S. go to war over Taiwan?

Author:
Jennifer Kavanagh
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The small island of Taiwan is often at the center of U.S. foreign policy discourse. This is thanks to the threat of a Chinese invasion and fears over a resulting loss of U.S. military and economic power in the region. A recent survey by Defense Priorities shows there is substantial disagreement among experts as to how the United States should and would respond to a Taiwan conflict. This suggests the U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity toward Taiwan is working. The experts surveyed largely agreed that China is unlikely to invade Taiwan, a departure from political and military leaders who have inflated the possibility. They also tended to agree that China is unlikely to strike U.S. military bases in East Asia ahead of a Taiwan invasion, which would grant U.S. leaders flexibility in how they respond to this scenario. These experts are divided, however, on what that response should look like. Some say the United States should use direct military force in Taiwan while others argue it should only send military aid. Very few think the U.S. should stay out completely. Even as they acknowledge that a successful seizure of Taiwan would not offer China significant military or economic benefits and recognize the enormous risks and costs to the United States of entering a Taiwan conflict, some experts continue to support a U.S. intervention. This tension is perhaps best explained by a lingering attachment to the pursuit of U.S. hegemony.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Strategic Ambiguity
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

464. Target Taiwan: Challenges for a U.S. intervention

Author:
Lyle Goldstein
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
China could attack Taiwan, attempting a fait accompli before the United States could mobilize sufficient forces in theater to defend it. Chinese advantages of proximity and will suggest that the U.S. would pay a heavy price in this scenario. U.S. ground forces would struggle to enter the combat theater in the relevant time because of uncertainties related to the air and sea campaigns. Attempts to insert U.S. ground forces in peacetime could ignite the very conflict they would intend to deter. Chinese missile, air, and drone assaults could damage U.S. airfields in the region and slow U.S. air support, acutely degrading U.S. maritime operations and Taiwan’s ground defenses. Because U.S. Navy surface forces, including aircraft carrier battle groups, are vulnerable to China’s A2/AD systems, combat in a Taiwan scenario would likely be disproportionately borne by the U.S. Navy submarine force. While these submarines could do damage to the Chinese Navy, they probably lack sufficient firepower to affect the overall outcome of a war. Surging forward U.S. air and naval power in a Taiwan scenario would entail incredible risks, including nuclear escalation. Any war or even intensive militarized rivalry between the U.S. and China would entail enormous risks in exchange for little gain.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Armed Forces, Military Intervention, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

465. Target Taiwan: Prospects for a Chinese invasion

Author:
Lyle Goldstein
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
In a scenario where China attempts an amphibious invasion of Taiwan and the United States does not fight, the invasion will likely succeed assuming Beijing is willing to bear heavy casualties. Taiwan’s vulnerability to China is due to its proximity, since it is located well within range of Chinese missiles, airpower, rocket artillery, helicopters, and paratroopers. All this will reduce Taiwan’s ability to prevent an amphibious landing. Due to its air superiority and the geography of Taiwan, which is mostly urban and mountainous, China can plan for an infantry fight, at least initially, not one dominated by heavy armor. Hence, civilian vessels, including small craft of all types, can help ferry most troops ashore. While an operation to seize Taiwan would be a highly risky endeavor that could result in heavy Chinese losses, Beijing would likely be motivated to bear such costs, since it views national unification as a core interest. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan thus cannot be discounted and Taiwan should prepare by boosting its defense spending, emphasizing its own self-reliance, and engaging in diplomacy.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Armed Conflict, Vulnerability, and Invasion
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

466. China can’t dominate the Middle East

Author:
Rosemary Kelanic
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
A common argument for the United States to remain in the Middle East is that it needs to counter Chinese expansionism. The U.S. is embroiled in a new cold war, this line of thinking goes, and if it withdraws from the Middle East, Beijing will fill the power vacuum and expand its influence. This fundamentally misreads China’s modest aims in the region, which have more to do with hedging against U.S. threats to Chinese oil access. Unlike the Soviet Union, which was proximate to the Middle East, China lacks the military wherewithal to threaten the region. And whereas it was very plausible that the Soviet Union could have captured and weaponized Middle Eastern oil production, China almost certainly could not capture the oil, and even if it did, couldn’t withhold it from the global market. In the Middle East, the United States faces less of a military and economic threat from China than it did from the Soviet Union. It should respond by finally withdrawing from the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Oil, Strategic Competition, and Expansionism
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Asia, and United States of America

467. Japan Looks Ahead to Trump 2.0

Author:
Bart Gaens
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Today, on the eve of the presidential inauguration in the US, Japan’s current Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba faces a new Trump administration, and, in a more volatile regional and global environment, also more challenges in terms of foreign and security policy.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and United States of America

468. Why the ‘Reverse Nixon’ Strategy Will Fail: The Illusion of Decoupling

Author:
Sanshiro Hosaka
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The second Trump administration has undertaken a peace deal with Russia. This policy may not simply reflect Donald Trump’s personal affinity for Moscow and deal-making style but is also likely informed by a certain strategic perception of the US-China-Russia triangle.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Donald Trump, Strategic Interests, and Decoupling
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

469. EU Defence Series: Military Mobility A Critical Enabler

Author:
Mihai Sebastian Chihaia
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The first months of 2025 witnessed monumental changes for European security. Donald Trump’s return to the White House has created a huge degree of uncertainty, and it is increasingly likely that Europe will need to prepare for much less American commitment to its security and defence. There are serious questions about how large the impact on the EU and NATO will be, the future of NATO’s Article 5, and what the US reaction will be if a NATO Ally is attacked. In any scenario, one of the most important enablers of Europe’s defence is the ability to move troops and equipment swiftly across the continent and ensure that reinforcements can arrive quickly in case of conflict. This brief maps developments at the EU level to enhance military mobility and highlights what is still needed to overcome challenges and bottlenecks.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Military Affairs, European Union, and Mobility
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

470. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Ukraine’s Strategy And Western Military Assistance

Author:
Hennadiy Maksak
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
International partners have provided significant military assistance to Ukraine since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022. The temporary suspension of critical US military assistance in early 2025 raised concerns about Ukraine’s strategy to fend off Russia. While it is difficult to predict how the battlefield will unfold in 2025, strong ties with Western partners will be crucial to continue a war of attrition against an overwhelming enemy.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Armed Conflict, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

471. Obscurity By Design: Competing Priorities for America’s China Policy

Author:
Tanner Greer
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Few notes of concord survive contact with Donald Trump. Trump’s election in 2016 upended settled assumptions; one by one he knocked down the pillars of consensus and convention that held up decades of American diplomacy. The strongest and most consequential of these pillars concerned China. For more than forty years, American diplomats and statesmen worked to integrate China into an American-led economic order. By doing so, they hoped to align Beijing’s behavior (and, if lucky, the entire Chinese political regime) with liberal norms. Their hopes proved in vain. China did not moderate or liberalize. The new president, rejecting both the means and ends of engagement, pushed for a less cataleptic strategy. That was five years ago. Those who see Trump as a champion of the new hawkish “bipartisan consensus on China” have been nonplussed by the first moves of his second administration. Trump invited Xi Jinping—but no other foreign leader—to attend his swearing-in. One of his first acts as president was an executive stay of the TikTok ban. Trump publicly browbeat a dozen countries with threats and blandishments in the week that followed—but not the People’s Republic of China. Contrary to expectation, Trump’s inaugural address barely glanced at China. It does not outline, or even hint at, what Trump’s approach to America’s greatest challenger might be. This obscurity is by design. Trump sees no advantage in giving advance notice. Quite the opposite: he clearly believes that the more inscrutable and erratic he seems, the better off the United States will be. This attitude was expressed neatly when the editorial board of the Wall Street Journal asked Trump about the approach he would take toward Taiwan if elected president. Trump replied that the Chinese would not dare attack Taiwan under his watch. After all, “[Xi Jinping] knows that I am f—ing crazy.” Like Richard Nixon before him, Trump is ready to play the lunatic.[1] If this is one reason Trump’s campaign never published or endorsed any detailed policy proposals regarding China, there are others. As one member of Trump’s transition team puts it, “Trump is a pragmatist, not an ideologue. He does not like tying his hands. He prefers to have strong personalities underneath him with conflicting views. He wants them to fight it out. He wants to pick the winner of each battle.” If this risks strategic incoherence, then so be it: “If you want to see what an ideologically unified administration looks like, look back at Bush and Cheney. That is the sort of disaster we want to avoid.”[2] This leadership style should be considered by any analyst who forecasts the new administration’s future. Trump positions himself as the kingmaker among competing centers of power. He encourages a certain level of disagreement in the ranks. This report provides a framework for thinking about these disagreements—especially in regard to the United States’ relationship with China.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

472. The People Are the Key: Irregular Warfare Success Story in the Philippines

Author:
Steve Lewis
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
After decades of conflict and instability, the US government helped the government of the Republic of the Philippines defeat the Abu Sayyaf Group. This was accomplished through a combination of military and development assistance focused on building local legitimacy and protecting the population. The Abu Sayyaf Group was a terrorist and insurgency group active in Southeast Asia. They were aligned with al Qaeda and sought to create a sharia state in the southern Philippines. The challenge of separating the Abu Sayyaf Group from the populations is a hallmark of irregular warfare. In irregular warfare, the human terrain is the key terrain for success. In this conflict, providing legitimate governance and protecting the population was a far more successful strategy than hunting down individual terrorists. This article describes how this was done in the Philippines and provides specific lessons learned from that operation.
Topic:
Development, Governance, Military Aid, Protection, Irregular Warfare, Human Terrain, and Abu Sayyaf Group
Political Geography:
United States of America and West Philippines

473. Assessing Trump’s Trade and Tariff Policies: The Basics

Author:
John Lee
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
In an April 2025 interview with the New York Times, former United States Secretary to the Treasury Larry Summers argued that Donald Trump’s trade policies are “the most radical trade policies and probably the most radical, rapid change in economic policies that the United States has announced since the Second World War.” Several leaders and commentators argue that, by leveling tariffs against virtually every American trading partner, Trump is relinquishing American global economic leadership, undermining free trade, winding back globalization, and transforming the US from being an outward-looking superpower into an inward-looking and selfish nation. Now that the Court of International Trade has ruled Trump exceeded his powers under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977, the appeals process will address the legality of many of his tariffs. The decision relates specifically to the so-called Liberation Day reciprocal tariffs announced on April 2, tariffs on Canada, Mexico, and China related to fentanyl, and the 10 percent baseline tariffs on many other countries. The ruling does not affect other tariffs on steel, aluminum, and automobiles. Regardless of how the legal appeals process unfolds, one should still consider the logic behind general tariffs and how such measures ought to be assessed as an instrument of policy. In many cases, assessments of Trump’s trade policies reflect analysts’ enduring critical or supportive views of Trump’s broader policies, character, and leadership style. The emotive response to tariffs is also unusual in that a tariff is simply another form of a tax applied to goods entering the US market. True, unlike many other taxes, tariffs target foreign-made rather than domestic goods and tend to trigger more serious diplomatic reactions than a domestic tax would. Even so, many countries levy tariffs and use other restrictions against imports into their economies. One might debate the methodology behind the calculation of so-called reciprocal tariffs against many US trading partners, but virtually all US trading partners are undeniably imposing protectionist measures against American goods. Such measures protect local firms and industries and should not be understood as a diplomatic slight or attack against the US. In this sense, some visceral reactions to Trump’s tariffs seem disproportionate and even hypocritical. Indeed, the European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) will, beginning in 2026, impose a carbon levy on imported emissions-intensive goods based on their quarterly carbon content. The CBAM is designed to incentivize non-EU firms to reduce their carbon emissions if they seek to export their goods into the EU. One purpose of the CBAM is to offer advantages to European firms that have reduced their carbon emissions over firms that have not. Putting aside whether one agrees with the decarbonization project, both the CBAM and Trump’s tariffs change the incentives for firms moving goods into the European and American markets, respectively. As with all other protectionist measures, Trump’s tariffs manipulate the cost-benefit calculations for firms. If a business assesses that the tariff burden is too onerous, it will presumably make a commercially rational decision to either add more US-produced content into the product or abandon the American market. The point is that the imposition of a tariff or any other tax requires a policy debate rather than a moral one. Instinctive outrage that Trump’s trade policies are undermining globalization and free trade, or are an insult to allies and partners, presupposes that globalization is an uncontested virtue, free trade (defined as the absence of tariffs) exists, and a tax on imported goods from a friendly country is an inherently hostile act—all contestable presuppositions. Instead, analysts should assess Trump’s tariffs based on whether they advance the policy objectives the administration is pursuing: reindustrializing America, raising revenue, increasing wages and productivity, and accelerating American leadership and innovation in strategic sectors such as artificial intelligence (AI). Furthermore, the tariffs against China have an explicit geopolitical element, and US tariffs against allied or friendly economies have possible geopolitical ramifications. Therefore, a dispassionate assessment of Trump’s trade policy also requires analysis as to whether the trade policies enhance or weaken America’s geopolitical leverage and standing vis-à-vis China. This policy memo looks at the structural drivers of the changes in US trade policy and why the current administration’s actions should not be dismissed or ridiculed as Trumpian irrationality, vandalism, or malice. Upcoming Hudson Institute briefs will assess whether Trump’s trade policies are achieving the intended policy objectives and outcomes, and whether they are advancing (or hindering) the geopolitical goals of the administration.
Topic:
Sanctions, Economy, Tariffs, Trade Policy, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

474. Embodied AI: How the US Can Beat China to the Next Tech Frontier

Author:
Michael Sobolik
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
In 2025, violent incidents involving robotic systems caught the public eye. In June, pre-positioned Israeli drones attacked Iranian air defenses and missile launchers as part of Operation Rising Lion.1 Ukraine ran a similar operation in May. In Operation Spiderweb, Ukrainian intelligence agents targeted Russia’s strategic bombers with cheap drones that they had smuggled deep into Russia in commercial trucks.2 In other notable cases, humans attacked robots. In June, demonstrators in Los Angeles used the Waymo app to draw self-driving vehicles to their location, then set the cars on fire.3 Other cases were peaceful and even amusing. In April, a pack of humanoid robots ran a half-marathon in Beijing. Unlike their human competitors, the robots required multiple battery changes throughout the race. Less than 30 percent of the robots completed the race, and several required human assistance to finish.4 Despite their obvious differences, these instances jointly underscore the ubiquity of embodied artificial intelligence (AI). Humans have used robots in everyday life for decades, from ovens and microwaves to cars and planes. But AI has introduced the possibility of autonomous robots—machines that can perform tasks with minimal to no human involvement. Though current attack drones depend mainly on human guidance, both the United States and China are training drones to strike autonomously.5 Self-driving cars operate at a higher degree of autonomy, and their goal is to replace a human being with AI as the decision-maker inside the vehicle. Humanoid robots, meanwhile, present an even bolder proposition: replacing human workers with robots that approximate human features but exceed humans in strength and intelligence. Robots today are a far cry from the Skynet of the Terminator franchise or Hal from 2001: A Space Odyssey.They are not self-aware, nor are they capable of functioning like humans in human environments. Some believe dystopian science fiction could become reality. In a conversation with Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) in March, Elon Musk made several startling predictions: “I think in 10 years, based on the current rate of improvement, AI will be smarter than the smartest human.” Musk went on, “There will be ultimately billions of humanoid robots. All cars will be self-driving. . . . In 10 years, probably 90 percent of miles driven will be autonomous. . . . In five years, probably 50 percent of all miles driven will be autonomous.” Most concerningly, when Cruz asked about the likelihood of a doomsday AI scenario where robots unite to annihilate humanity, Musk responded dryly, “20 percent likely, maybe 10 percent . . . [within] five to 10 years.”6 Amid AI competition with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), US policymakers should soberly weigh these risks. The likelihood of robots gaining consciousness and destroying humanity is small.7 But there is a far more likely scenario: an adversarial regime will exploit its AI advantage to steal proprietary technology from US companies, sabotage critical infrastructure, and spy on or attack Americans. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is currently waging multi-domain political warfare against the United States. It is encouraging the flow of fentanyl into the US to kill Americans,8 and it shapes America’s social media ecosystem by spreading disinformation and divisive narratives through TikTok and other apps.9 Furthermore, CCP agents within the United States have targeted America’s food supply with agroterrorism.10 With Beijing threatening US interests across domains, America cannot afford to also allow China to achieve dominance in AI and the global robotics supply chain—both because of the CCP’s malign intent and because of the transformative nature of these technologies.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, Robotics, and Information Technology
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

475. AI, National Security, and the Global Technology Race: How US Export Controls Define the Future of Innovation

Author:
Nury Turkel
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
President Donald Trump has called China’s DeepSeek artificial intelligence (AI) system a “wake-up call” for the American technology sector and emphasized the need for the United States to remain “laser-focused” on winning the AI race. His warning reflects growing concerns that China’s rapid advancements in AI—enabled by loopholes in US export control laws—pose a direct threat to national security and economic dominance. Without decisive action, the United States risks losing its competitive edge in one of the most consequential technology races of the twenty-first century. The launch of DeepSeek has heightened security concerns in the United States, leading to calls for stricter export controls to curb China’s access to advanced AI technologies. In response, the state of New York banned DeepSeek from government devices, citing serious national security risks, including data privacy vulnerabilities and state-sponsored censorship. The Pentagon and Capitol Hill also banned the use of the chatbot. Meanwhile, Beijing continues to advocate for open-source AI, arguing that broader accessibility fosters global technological advancement. However, critics warn that unrestricted openness could enable adversarial nations to exploit cutting-edge AI research for mass surveillance, cyber warfare, and disinformation campaigns. While open-source AI has fueled rapid innovation and democratized access to AI tools, its potential misuse—particularly by authoritarian regimes—raises concerns about national security and economic competition. DeepSeek represents a fundamentally different model of AI—one that enforces ideological censorship and suppresses politically sensitive topics. Unlike American AI models, which prioritize free expression and open knowledge, China’s AI platforms are deeply integrated into its system of authoritarian control. The United States should not only maintain its technological edge but also actively promote American AI as the superior alternative—one that is free from state-imposed censorship and aligned with democratic values. AI is increasingly redefining global power, with nations competing for technological supremacy. As AI reshapes industries, economies, and national security, the United States faces a critical challenge in maintaining its leadership. A comprehensive strategy should (1) strategically develop effective regulations; (2) build practicable enforcement; (3) increase investment in research and development (R&D); (4) foster domestic innovation; (5) enhance international collaboration; and (6) implement a responsible export regime that balances security with appropriate trade and economic ties.
Topic:
National Security, Science and Technology, Exports, Innovation, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

476. How Russian Coercion Diminished Deterrence and Shifted the Nuclear Balance

Author:
WIlliam Schneider
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
For a recent example of the rapidity of change in the international security environment, one should look to the United States’ most recent Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Though it was released in 2022, nearly all its policy aims and expectations are already out of date. With Joint Chiefs of Staff Chair General Dan Caine warning last week that he does not believe Russia will stop at Ukraine, and with Russian President Vladimir Putin boasting that his country is the “highest of all nuclear powers,” Washington needs to update its understanding of the new nuclear balance. In its NPR, the Biden administration sought to place “renewed emphasis on arms control [and] nuclear non-proliferation.” Doing so, it believed, would enable the president to “pursue opportunities to reduce the role of nuclear weapons globally, enhance strategic stability with the [People’s Republic of China] and Russia, and reduce the risks of war or escalation during war.” But nuclear weapons are now central to the diplomatic aspirations of four nuclear-armed (or near-nuclear-armed) US adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. These increasingly aligned states have signed a series of diplomatic, intelligence, defense-industrial, logistics, and military agreements. Additionally, arms control and nuclear nonproliferation frameworks constructed during the Cold War have ceased to meaningfully constrain Russian nuclear weapons programs. Russia has withdrawn from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which suggests that it will resume nuclear testing and will not extend New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty). Moreover, emerging doubts about the US commitment to global nuclear deterrence are emboldening Moscow’s nuclear weapons development and deployment aspirations. And Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine signaled a definitive end to the accords concerning Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity: the 1994 Budapest Memorandum and the 2014 and 2015 Minsk agreements. Most fundamentally, US policy choices since Russia’s invasion have given US allies and adversaries alike reason to believe that nuclear threats are an effective means of deterring the US. The widespread recognition that the US could be deterred from taking actions otherwise in its interest set in motion a sequence of Russian initiatives that have adversely affected the credibility of US nuclear deterrence and nuclear nonproliferation aims more broadly.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Missile Defense, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and United States of America

477. Japan-US Trade Talks: Start by Expanding Beyond Trade

Author:
Mark Siegel
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Japan is facing a world suddenly beset by enormous uncertainties. Tokyo didn’t ask for this moment, but it should take the embedded opportunity seriously. This is not a time to patiently wait for a return to the old normal. The ancien régime is gone. Instead, Tokyo should put forward ideas that transcend previous institutional arrangements. While the coming period will be challenging, Japan may never have a better opportunity to press for systemic change. By most accounts, negotiations between Japan and the United States have started well. The US seems open to novel and tradition-breaking approaches, and wants to develop a framework agreement quickly. There is clearly goodwill between the two countries, and President Donald Trump’s participation in the opening dialogue was more than just symbolic. He appreciates the extraordinary importance of the bilateral relationship to both countries, and while the president takes issue with the merchandise trade imbalance, he and his team see value in creating win-win outcomes across a spectrum of subjects.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economics, Bilateral Relations, and Trade
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

478. Five Ways to Bolster the US Semiconductor Ecosystem Under the Trump Administration

Author:
Jason Hsu
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
As the United States seeks to strengthen its semiconductor industry—a national security imperative amid rising competition with China—the next four years will be crucial. Policymakers and industry professionals need a comprehensive strategy to build on the Trump administration’s efforts to reshore this critical supply chain. This policy memo examines Washington’s past and present approaches to semiconductor policy and provides recommendations for the United States to secure a sustainable and successful ecosystem at a time of intensifying US-China technology competition.
Topic:
National Security, Science and Technology, Donald Trump, Strategic Competition, Supply Chains, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
China, North America, and United States of America

479. The Yemen Review Quarterly: January-March 2025

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
On March 15, the US launched Operation Rough Rider, a massive expansion of its aerial campaign against the Houthi group (Ansar Allah). The strikes followed a Houthi threat to resume targeting Israeli ships due to the blockade of aid into Gaza on March 2. Strikes have been taking place continuously as of the time of writing. The Houthi-affiliated Health Ministry has reported that as of April 14, at least 123 civilians have been killed and another 247 wounded, though the real numbers are probably higher. The airstrikes are fundamentally different than those undertaken during the Biden administration, both in intensity and scope, targeting not just missile installations and weapons depots, but also communications infrastructure and the group’s leadership. International scrutiny of the airstrikes briefly increased when the White House mistakenly leaked operational plans to a journalist.
Topic:
Politics, Houthis, Humanitarian Crisis, Shipping, and Airstrikes
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and United States of America

480. Law of duty: The case for a US-inspired EU Preparedness Act

Author:
Tiago Antunes
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Europe faces an era of geopolitical uncertainty, demanding a stronger response to security threats. Increased defence spending is essential but not enough. To be truly prepared, the EU needs a whole-of-society approach. An EU Preparedness Act, partly inspired by the US Defense Production Act (DPA), would empower the EU to mobilise industrial capacity, protect critical infrastructure, safeguard supply chains and ensure access to raw materials during crises. Current EU emergency tools fall far short of the scope of the DPA because they lack the command-and-control authority needed to address systemic disruptions. While the DPA cannot be replicated wholesale, some of its provisions could be adapted to the EU legal context. The adoption of an EU Preparedness Act finds legal basis in existing treaty provisions and adheres to the principles of conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality.
Topic:
Defense Policy, European Union, Supply Chains, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

481. Law of duty: The case for a US-inspired EU Preparedness Act

Author:
Tiago Antunes
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Europe faces an era of geopolitical uncertainty, demanding a stronger response to security threats. Increased defence spending is essential but not enough. To be truly prepared, the EU needs a whole-of-society approach. An EU Preparedness Act, partly inspired by the US Defense Production Act (DPA), would empower the EU to mobilise industrial capacity, protect critical infrastructure, safeguard supply chains and ensure access to raw materials during crises. Current EU emergency tools fall far short of the scope of the DPA because they lack the command-and-control authority needed to address systemic disruptions. While the DPA cannot be replicated wholesale, some of its provisions could be adapted to the EU legal context. The adoption of an EU Preparedness Act finds legal basis in existing treaty provisions and adheres to the principles of conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Geopolitics, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

482. Analysing the spread of gendered disinformation in the run-up to the 2024 French and US elections

Author:
Center for Feminist Foreign Policy (CFFP)
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy
Abstract:
Based on targeted case studies developed in collaboration with the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), this policy brief analyses the spread of gendered disinformation and online misogyny in the run-up to the 2024 French and US elections. It offers compelling empirical evidence that demonstrates how online anti-feminist mobilisations weaponise gendered disinformation to shape public discourse, undermine feminist and democratic imperatives, and influence electoral outcomes.
Topic:
Elections, Women, LGBT+, Disinformation, and Gender
Political Geography:
Europe, France, and United States of America

483. Between Trade and Trust: Rethinking Indonesia–US Cross-Border Personal Data Transfer

Author:
Fikri Adib Rianto
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
Indonesia’s recent decision to recognise the United States as an adequate jurisdiction for personal data protection – made under a new bilateral trade deal – permits the transfer of Indonesian personal data to US private entities without additional safeguards. This move, taken before Indonesia’s Personal Data Protection Authority (PDPA) is established and before adequacy criteria are formally defined, raises concerns over legal legitimacy and data governance. Given persistent systemic risks in the US – ranging from corporate misuse and cybersecurity vulnerabilities to expansive surveillance powers and fragmented privacy laws – the decision appears premature. To safeguard privacy while supporting trade interests, Indonesia should complete its domestic data protection framework, clarify adequacy criteria, and temporarily recalibrate its adequacy determination until more robust bilateral governance mechanisms are in place.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Bilateral Relations, Governance, Regulation, Trade, and Data
Political Geography:
Indonesia, North America, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

484. Tough Times, Tough Choices: Charting PEPFAR’s Next Chapter While Safeguarding Its Legacy

Author:
Rachel Bonnifield and Janeen Madan Keller
Publication Date:
11-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Global Development (CGD)
Abstract:
The Trump administration and key congressional lawmakers are shaping a new US government approach to the future of PEPFAR, alongside other global health programs like malaria and tuberculosis. The emerging vision emphasizes country ownership and greater government-to-government support via bilateral Global Health Compacts, paired with a financial drawdown of US assistance. The government’s proposed approach offers a broadly reasonable blueprint for PEPFAR’s evolution. Yet, the pace and scale of proposed changes are unprecedented in global health history, posing significant risks to hard-won PEPFAR results. Thoughtful and calibrated risk mitigation measures are needed to prevent financing gaps, service disruptions, and accountability breakdowns. We propose a differentiated three-track framework to operationalize a responsible PEPFAR transition while meeting the administration’s key strategic goals: Track 1 – Graduation: For wealthier and stable partner countries able to feasibly absorb PEPFAR funding on a relatively rapid timeline, following a phased shift of service delivery to government systems Track 2 – Toward self-reliance: For poorer, higher-burden countries, allowing extended timelines to gradually increase domestic financing while sustaining PEPFAR funding for key treatment and prevention outcomes Track 3 – Compassionate: For the poorest and most fragile countries where sustained PEPFAR investment is required, with potential scope for partial service delivery via national systems in some settings. This analysis and proposed timeline only apply to PEPFAR, and should not be extended to other global health programmatic areas and investments. We urge the administration and congressional leaders to pair adequate financial, technical, and human resources with a prudent operational approach to implement this next chapter of PEPFAR—protecting public health outcomes and preserving PEPFAR’s extraordinary legacy.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, HIV/AIDS, Development, Global Health, and US President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief(PEPFAR)
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

485. Riding Unruly Waves: The Philippines’ Military Modernisation Effort

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
What’s new? Under President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., the Philippines is modernising its military capabilities and accelerating efforts to shift focus from internal to external threats. Manila is increasing its defence acquisitions, augmenting its military partnerships and deepening its alliance with Washington – including by expanding U.S. troops’ access to Philippine bases. Why does it matter? Manila’s military modernisation effort is unfolding amid growing tensions with Beijing in the South China Sea; worries about a confrontation between the U.S. and China over Taiwan; shifting geopolitics; and uncertainty surrounding the second Trump administration’s policies. Increasingly dangerous confrontations at sea risk more strategic distrust and even armed conflict. What should be done? In balancing deterrence with diplomacy, Manila should continue military modernisation; work to enhance its alliance with the U.S.; and cultivate other defence partners. As friction with China threatens to increase, Manila should bolster crisis management channels and avoid acts that might be perceived as provocative.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Territorial Disputes, Partnerships, Deterrence, Military, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Philippines, United States of America, and South China Sea

486. Asia in Flux: The U.S., China and the Search for a New Equilibrium

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
What’s new? The intensifying U.S.-China military competition is shaping threat perceptions in Asian capitals, leading many countries to revisit their defence postures and doctrines. Asia experienced its largest-ever military spending increase in the last decade, fuelling regional “militarisation”. The U.S. trade war is impeding diplomacy that might manage these dynamics. Why does it matter? Continued militarisation aggravates threat perceptions among regional powers and creates conflict risks. Concretely, it raises the probability of unintended collisions and accidents in the air and at sea that involve either the U.S. or one of its allies and partners, on one side, and China on the other. What should be done? The U.S. and China should expand defence discussions and bolster channels for communicating intentions and red lines. For deterrence purposes, President Donald Trump should underscore his support for U.S. officials who are working to strengthen regional alliances. The two countries should also continue efforts to end the U.S.-launched trade war.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Strategic Competition, Militarization, Military, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

487. Calming the Red Sea’s Turbulent Waters

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
What’s new? Renewed violence between the U.S. and the Houthis in Yemen has brought a sudden end to the short-lived calm in the Red Sea during the Gaza ceasefire. The end of the truce threatens a dangerous escalation, not just in these waters but in the region writ large. Why does it matter? From late 2023 to early 2025, a Houthi offensive hit over a hundred vessels allegedly connected to Israel, the U.S. or the UK, raising shipping costs and triggering an international military response. With navies from over fifteen nations operating in the Rea Sea, the risk of wider hostilities is high. What should be done? A permanent end to the Gaza war and Yemen’s internal conflict, alongside a reduction in U.S. tensions with Iran, could quell Red Sea turmoil. For now, and over the longer term, Red Sea coastal states and outside powers should work harder to curb the military build-up and foster collective security.
Topic:
Houthis, Shipping, Armed Conflict, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Yemen, United States of America, and Red Sea

488. Transición Geopolítica Global: Conectividad, Competición y Fragmentación. Introducción

Author:
Soledad Segoviano and Antonio Marquina
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
Este número especial de la Revista UNISCI se centra en una de las cuestiones relvantes de la trasnformación que está aconteciendo en el sistema internacional, la transformación geopolítica y la rivalidad creciente entre Estados. Se puede decir que el orden internacional creado tras la segunda guerra mundial y reforzado tras el fin de la guerra fría se está disipando en medio de una profunda división y fragmentación geopolítica.
Topic:
Climate Change, European Union, Geopolitics, Maritime, Space, Strategic Competition, BRICS, Connectivity, International Order, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:
China, Europe, United States of America, and Global South

489. US-China Rivalry: Constructing Virtual Borders in Cyberspace Through War of Narratives

Author:
Dibakar De, NagaLaxmi M Raman, and Sitakanta Mishra
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
Cyberspace has redefined national borders, prompting a rethink of traditional concepts of territoriality. In this digital realm, nations can leverage technological advancements to expand their influence beyond physical borders. This article begins by discussing the rapid emergence of narratives in cyberspace, before exploring the concept of territoriality in a virtual landscape and the roles played by both state and non-state actors. The rest of the article explores a range of aspects, including covert operations, fintech policies, divisions in emerging technologies such as AI, tech diplomacy, export control, and space-based digital infrastructure, to establish the notion of ideological and political fragmentation within cyberspace. Finally, it discusses the various strategies employed by the US, China and other actors to exploit the fragmentation of cyberspace for their own national benefit.
Topic:
Borders, Digital Revolution, Rivalry, Cyberspace, Public Diplomacy, and Great Powers
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

490. Facing off Trump’s coercive bargaining: Preparing Europe’s response and retaliation to ‘Liberation Day’

Author:
Ian Hernandez, Varg Folkman, and Georg Riekeles
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
President Trump’s ‘Liberation Day’ tariff announcements must be understood not simply as a trade war but as an attempt to reshape the global economic system and to coerce partners through a logic of coercive bargaining. On par with all other countries, Europe is a target and a prey to the US. In this paper, we suggest that there are two fundamental aims the EU must pursue: taking leadership in salvaging the open economic order and increase its capacity to withstand coercive bargaining in defence of own interests. We also consider what the US negotiation strategy entails. While Trump struck a considered ‘madman’ pose to frighten trade partners into making unfavourable deals, he also postponed the tariffs in response to the spectre of a market crash and credit crunch. In the face of fundamental uncertainty, the EU’s tightrope act consists of preparing to negotiate through the threat of retaliation but also preparing for negotiations to fail. We argue for holding off and buying time, letting the Americans reap what they sow, while preparing a vigorous “one date, one strike”- retaliation together with a term sheet for a reciprocal economic deal, making clear European red lines in any rapprochement. We map out various tools and instruments the EU can avail of to push back against US trade aggression. The Union is not without means to fight back against Trump’s coercive approach. The bloc’s Trade Enforcement Regulation allows for a wide set of responses to the trade measures we are seeing from the US. Even more far reaching is the Anti-Coercion Instrument. Additionally, the EU can strike US services trade by tightening digital rules and addressing intellectual property and tax shifting. While increasing trade barriers with partners is a sticking point, the EU must also consider safeguard measures to protect European domestic industries from Chinese overcapacities and trade diversion. Although unlikely at the moment, we also suggest further opportunities, such as pursuing economic security deals with the US. Along with like-minded partners, the EU could also take action to counter Trump, including reinvigorating ideas around a ‘WTO 2.0’. The gravity of the moment should not be lost on us. Europe faces the prospect of a fundamental shift in global economic flows and systems, along with the risk of an international economic crisis. Facing this onslaught will take effort, unity and collective action.
Topic:
European Union, Tariffs, Trade, Transatlantic Relations, Donald Trump, and Coercion
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

491. Accept, prepare, leverage: How Europeans can manage a changing transatlantic security partnership in the Trump era

Author:
Iana Maisuradze
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
The transatlantic security partnership is entering a new phase. Europeans must assume greater responsibility for their own defence as the United States under President Donald Trump no longer prioritises Europe. Trump’s approach to trying to end the war in Ukraine, including attempts at direct negotiation with Russian President Vladimir Putin and ambiguous security guarantees for Kyiv, pose significant challenges that risk undermining the transatlantic security relationship. For the foreseeable future, however, European security will continue to depend on the United States. To manage that reality, European governments face three main tasks: first, to understand and accept Trump’s political calculations and interests; second, to prepare NATO’s European members and the EU to take the lead on their continent’s security; and third, to ensure that guarantees for Ukraine are credible enough to deter renewed or enhanced Russian aggression.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

492. Cyber Crossroads in the Indo-Pacific: Navigating Digital Potential and Cyber Peril

Author:
Vivek Chilukuri, Lisa Curtis, Janet Egan, Morgan Peirce, Elizabeth Whatcott, and Nathaniel Schochet
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The Indo-Pacific faces a cyber crossroads. Down one path lies deeper military, intelligence, and economic ties between Washington and its key allies and partners in this strategically vital region. Down another, rising cyber threats from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), North Korea, Russia, and a growing shadow industry of cybercriminals and hacktivists derail these ambitions by compromising critical infrastructure, weakening data security, and undermining democratic institutions. The outcome will depend on the choices Washington and its Indo-Pacific partners make—or fail to make—in the coming years. The U.S.-China rivalry has long extended to the cyber domain, but in recent years, Beijing has increasingly exploited the gray zone of cyberspace to test, probe, and push other nations as part of a broader campaign to gain influence and shape regional norms and power structures.1 In recent years, the PRC has sharply escalated its cyber aggression in a dangerous new game that combines traditional operations focused on espionage, intellectual property theft, and data exfiltration with newly assertive disinformation, influence operations, and pre-positioning in critical infrastructure. Adding to the uncertainty, rapid advances in artificial intelligence (AI) could further tilt the balance toward offense in cyberspace in unpredictable and potentially dangerous ways. Against this backdrop, Indo-Pacific governments have taken historic steps to strengthen their resilience in a cyber landscape that has grown more varied, volatile, and dangerous than ever. To assess how Washington and its Indo-Pacific partners are navigating this cyber crossroads, the Center for a New American Security’s Technology and National Security Program and Indo-Pacific Security Program led a year-long research project that combined extensive desk research with in-person field research and expert workshops in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. This report draws on this research to offer in-depth assessments of the cyber landscapes in all four countries to identify key trends, challenges, and opportunities to strengthen cybersecurity and resilience in partnership with the United States. The findings offer cause for both optimism and concern. On the one hand, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines have all undergone notable shifts in elevating cybersecurity as foundational to national security. Japan’s 2022 National Security Strategy made cybersecurity a pillar for the first time, and the government has passed reforms to facilitate information sharing with the United States and shift toward active cyber defense.2 South Korea updated its National Cybersecurity Strategy to adopt a Defend Forward cyber posture, mirroring the U.S. shift in 2018.3 Taiwan established a National Institute of Cybersecurity within its Ministry of Digital Affairs, and the Executive Yuan approved a four-year plan to boost digital resilience.4 The Philippines finalized a five-year National Cybersecurity Plan.5 For its part, the United States has elevated cybersecurity in its foreign policy with expanded information sharing, capacity building, and diplomacy anchored in a new Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy within the U.S. Department of State. Recent years have seen Washington both strengthen its proactive cyber capacities and embrace a “name and shame” approach to call out malign cyber operations from foreign adversaries like Russia and the PRC. Still, these laudable efforts to bolster cyber policies, personnel, and partnerships have failed to keep pace with rising threats. Washington’s finger-wagging statements and targeted sanctions in the wake of cyber incidents have failed to stem rising threats. To confront growing cyber dangers across the Indo-Pacific, the United States and its partners need a more assertive and coordinated approach that intensifies efforts on two fronts: (1) building capacity within each country to strengthen cybersecurity and resilience, and (2) strengthening cooperation to enable more integrated, proactive cyber defense, collective signaling, and cost inflicting on malign cyber actors. To that end, this report offers recommendations to government leaders in the United States, along with both country-specific and cross-cutting recommendations for government leaders in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. Although many of the recommendations directed toward the four countries could fairly apply to the United States, strengthening domestic cybersecurity and resilience is beyond the scope of this report. Summary of Recommendations
Topic:
Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Artificial Intelligence, Strategic Competition, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

493. Global Compute and National Security: Strengthening American AI Leadership Through Proactive Partnerships

Author:
Janet Egan
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The current pathway to breakthrough artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities relies on amassing and leveraging vast “compute”—specialized chips housed within massive data centers that generate the computational power to train, enhance, and deploy advanced models. If current AI development trends continue, securing and extending U.S. access to a robust compute ecosystem will play a decisive role in whether the United States leads the world in AI or cedes its leadership to competitors. The nation that leads in deploying compute worldwide will wield critical leverage over the rules and norms governing its use. Most importantly, U.S. leadership can crowd out China’s expanding sphere of technology influence and ensure the AI transition is underpinned by trusted democratic technologies. This goal necessitates a strategy with two key components: maintaining U.S. control of the most capable compute infrastructure in the world to ensure leadership at the AI frontier, while simultaneously providing subfrontier levels of compute to partners around the world. Recent advances in AI efficiency, as demonstrated by Chinese AI models like DeepSeek-R1, have not negated the fundamental importance of compute for AI leadership.1 The nation with the most robust compute ecosystem will retain key advantages: the ability to train the most advanced systems, enhance and deploy those systems at scale, and run the experiments necessary to drive new breakthroughs in model efficiency and training.2 These advantages are likely to generate a self-reinforcing cycle of AI development, making it increasingly difficult for other nations to close the gap. If current technical trends hold, and as chip export controls increasingly hinder China’s capabilities, the AI capability gap between the United States and China should widen. However, the United States cannot afford to be complacent. Washington’s efforts to protect America’s AI leadership have relied heavily on controlling the export of advanced AI chips. Controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment going to China were imposed as early as 2019, followed by AI chip export controls targeting U.S. adversaries in 2022, which were strengthened in 2023, 2024, and 2025.3 In January 2025, the Biden administration’s Framework for Artificial Intelligence Diffusion went a step further, placing caps on compute exports to most countries in the world.4 While now rescinded, this unprecedented action sent a clear signal to other nations that the United States is willing and able to control AI compute access. However, a heavily protectionist approach faces challenges. Abroad, chip smuggling has provided China with illegal access to advanced chips, eroding the U.S. lead.5 At home, permitting and regulatory constraints threaten to limit America’s ability to meet the energy demand for large-scale AI data centers and chip fabrication. Nondemocratic countries that possess the regulatory flexibility, capital, and readily available energy now seek to rapidly build frontier-scale AI data centers, with the potential to surpass the United States’ own compute ecosystem, absent adequate safeguards. Meanwhile, China’s ongoing investments in its compute capacity could eventually create a viable alternative supply chain beyond U.S. control, while growing concerns over reliance on U.S. technology among traditional partners may fuel demand for non-U.S. compute offerings.
Topic:
Partnerships, Leadership, Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, North America, and United States of America

494. Countering AI Chip Smuggling Has Become a National Security Priority: An Updated Playbook for Preventing AI Chip Smuggling to the PRC

Author:
Erich Grunewald and Tim Fist
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
BBased on the available evidence, artificial intelligence (AI) chip smuggling has likely been occurring at a scale that significantly undermines U.S. attempts to restrict the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) access to advanced AI. This is indicated by four lines of argument: Smuggling should be expected based on historical precedent. The PRC has a long history of smuggling U.S. technology despite export restrictions, which has rarely resulted in criminal or civil penalties.1 Smuggling of U.S. AI chips is highly incentivized by their superior performance, higher supply, and more mature software ecosystem relative to chips legally available to Chinese AI labs.2 Based on publicly available data, of the 22 notable models that had been developed exclusively in the PRC by 2025, only two were trained with Chinese chips.3 Six news outlets have independently reported evidence of large-scale AI chip smuggling, totaling tens to hundreds of thousands of chips smuggled in 2024. One smuggler reportedly handled an order of for servers containing 2,400 NVIDIA H100s—worth $120 million—to a customer in the PRC.4 Another facilitated an order worth $103 million.5 Singapore authorities arrested three individuals suspected of diverting AI servers worth $390 million.6 Within this reporting, multiple chip resellers and start-ups in the PRC have claimed that gaining access to export-controlled AI chips is straightforward, with one Chinese start-up founder estimating in 2024 that there were more than 100,000 NVIDIA H100s in the PRC.7 Most of the Chinese chip sellers interviewed in these reports confirm that they work with multiple distributors, use shell companies based overseas, and employ simple tactics to avoid detection, such as relabeling shipments as tea or toys.8 There are many online listings for export-controlled AI chips available for purchase in the PRC. The authors conducted a non-exhaustive search of three Chinese online marketplaces and found 132 domestic listings for export-controlled chips, along with many photos of supposedly smuggled goods.9 Where sellers provided information on stock, the average quantity of export-controlled graphics processing units (GPUs) per listing was around 1,200 for GPU server listings and 400 for GPU card listings. Though this data is patchy and likely unreliable, the total stock implied is around 100,000 H100 GPUs, as of December 2024.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Intellectual Property/Copyright, Artificial Intelligence, Smuggling, and National Security
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

495. Global Swing States and the New Great Power Competition

Author:
Richard Fontaine and Gibbs McKinley
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
International politics is undergoing a period of rapid, significant change. China and Russia are working together more closely and alongside Iran and North Korea in opposition to what they view as a U.S.-dominated international order.1 The current U.S. administration has in its early days pursued a form of upheaval, altering key policies, relationships, and arrangements. Policymakers in Washington represent a mix: Some see the rules-based international order as key to U.S. security, prosperity, and liberty, while others argue that any such order exists only to enrich other countries at America’s expense. In contrast to broad, vague notions of what constitutes international order, five concrete pillars have benefited the United States over recent decades. The territorial order aims to protect national sovereignty and discourage wars of conquest; the global trade order aims to regularize an open international trading system in which prosperity can increase; the financial order aims to facilitate international trade and investment, promote monetary stability, and avoid crises; the nonproliferation order attempts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons; and the human rights order seeks to preserve the basic rights and liberties of individuals everywhere. Despite the many doubts about them, these core pillars of the international order enhance the security, prosperity, and freedom of Americans. As a result, the overarching goal of U.S. policy should be to preserve them, even as specific rules and institutions change and adapt. Policymakers should work with allies and against adversaries in this attempt, focusing on six “global swing states”—Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Türkiye—that together will exert disproportionate influence over the future of international order. Each of these countries is multi-aligned and determined to maintain ties with the United States, Russia, and China. They all seek to reform existing rules and institutions. Together, they possess the geopolitical weight to sway the future of global order. This report offers a multifaceted path for engaging with global swing states, aiming U.S. policy at a vision of world order favorable to American interests and values. Informed by more than a year of research and consultations, it offers a set of cross-cutting and country-specific policy recommendations.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, International Order, and Great Powers
Political Geography:
China, Iran, North Korea, and United States of America

496. Quad: The Next Phase

Author:
Lisa Curtis, Kareen Hart, Ryan Claffey, Keerthi Martyn, and Thomas Corel
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
T The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) among the United States, Australia, India, and Japan is becoming the focal point for economic and technological cooperation in the Indo-Pacific as the competition between the United States and China intensifies and regional power dynamics continue to evolve. The Quad nations share democratic values and seek to advance an affirmative vision for the region that promotes an inclusive regional architecture and offers options for regional partners, which are charting their economic and security futures in the face of growing great power competition. The second Trump administration is signaling its commitment to deepening Quad cooperation to counter China’s efforts to dominate the region and to ensure other countries in the region remain prosperous, peaceful, and free from coercion. However, the administration also has indicated that it wants to streamline the work of the Quad and whittle down its dozens of different working groups to focus on a handful of priorities. With the need to deliver tangible results, the administration is interested in maintaining fewer—yet more active—working groups that produce substantial outputs.1 While the Quad has made notable progress since it was revived nearly eight years ago, there is opportunity to expand and deepen its work to fulfill its promise of promoting a free, open, peaceful, and prosperous Indo-Pacific. To
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Economy, Strategic Competition, and Quad Alliance
Political Geography:
Japan, China, India, Australia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

497. Game Over? How the United States Could Have Won the Trade Wars

Author:
Emily Kilcrease and Geoffrey Gertz
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The Center for a New American Security's Energy, Economics, and Security (EES) Program designed and conducted an economic wargame to explore possible pathways to resolve the trade wars sparked by historic levels of U.S. tariff escalation. This trade wargame was designed to examine foreign government responses to U.S. tariffs, including whether they would retaliate, negotiate, and/or make concessions. After being punished by U.S. tariffs, would foreign governments have the appetite to engage in dealmaking with the United States and, if so, under what conditions? The trade wargame was conducted on March 17, 2025, two weeks before President Donald Trump made his real-world announcement of shockingly high tariff rates on a day he deemed “Liberation Day.”
Topic:
Economics, Tariffs, Trade Wars, and Trade
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

498. Ten Years Later: The Legacy of the Paris Attacks on Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks in the West

Author:
Alexandre Rodde
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
A decade ago, the terrorist attacks in Paris illustrated the risks and challenges posed by complex coordinated terrorist attacks (CCTA) in a Western capital. These marauding attacks, striking multiple scenes in quick succession, were different from the bombing of public transport in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005. This article explains the evolution of the Western law enforcement response while facing such attacks, and how the 2008 Mumbai attacks and the 2015 Paris attacks led to operational and tactical evolutions in France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The 2024 Crocus City Hall attack in Moscow demonstrates the continuing threat posed by CCTA outside of the West. The constantly evolving modus operandi used by terrorists requires a strong anticipation effort by law enforcement agencies in order to prepare for a potential return of CCTA in the West.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Law Enforcement, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:
Europe, France, North America, and United States of America

499. A View from the CT Foxhole: Admiral Frank Bradley, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command

Author:
Don Rassler
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
Admiral Frank M. Bradley has been the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) since October 2025. Originally from Eldorado, Texas, ADM Bradley is a 1991 graduate of the United States Naval Academy. He has commanded at all levels of special operations, including Joint Special Operations Command, Special Operations Command Central, and Naval Special Warfare Development Group. He has multiple tours in command of joint task forces and was among the first to deploy into Afghanistan following the attacks of September 11, 2001.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Interview
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

500. Dealing with Third-Country Involvement in Sanctions Evasion

Author:
Floor Stoelinga, Kaspar Pucek, and Rem Korteweg
Publication Date:
11-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
A key challenge to the effectiveness of sanctions lies in the role of third countries that are neither subject to sanctions nor obliged to enforce them. In today’s highly interconnected global economy, trade and financial flows can be redirected through these jurisdictions, enabling the circumvention of restrictive measures. Following the imposition of far-reaching sanctions against Russia in 2022, the EU, U.S., and UK have intensified efforts to counter such sanctions evasion and avoidance (SEA). As a result, the European sanctions framework has acquired an increasingly ‘extraterritorial’ dimension, affecting sectors and operators beyond the EU’s borders. While this approach can strengthen control over evasion, the use of extraterritorial sanctions also raises legal, geopolitical, and economic trade-offs. This paper explores these challenges and outlines eight recommendations for improving the effectiveness of the EU’s counter-SEA framework along a spectrum of extraterritoriality: prioritising high-risk goods, ensuring policy consistency, assessing economic impacts, reviewing institutional arrangements, strengthening international partnerships, employing positive inducements, and leveraging market-based instruments.
Topic:
Sanctions, European Union, Economy, Trade, and Sanctions Evasion
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, North America, and United States of America