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1. The World After Taiwan’s Fall

Author:
David Santoro, Ralph Cossa, Ian Easton, Malcolm Davis, and Matake Kamiya
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Let us start with our bottom line: a failure of the United States to come to Taiwan’s aid—politically, economically, and militarily—would devastate the Unites States’ credibility and defense commitments to its allies and partners, not just in Asia, but globally. If the United States tries but fails to prevent a Chinese takeover of Taiwan, the impact could be equally devastating unless there is a concentrated, coordinated U.S. attempt with likeminded allies and partners to halt further Chinese aggression and eventually roll back Beijing’s ill-gotten gains. This is not a hypothetical assessment. Taiwan has been increasingly under the threat of a military takeover by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and, even today, is under attack politically, economically, psychologically, and through so-called “gray zone” military actions short of actual combat. The U.S. government, U.S. allies, and others have begun to pay attention to this problem, yet to this day, they have not sufficiently appreciated the strategic implications that such a takeover would generate. To address this problem, the Pacific Forum has conducted a multi-authored study to raise awareness in Washington, key allied capitals, and beyond about the consequences of a Chinese victory in a war over Taiwan and, more importantly, to drive them to take appropriate action to prevent it. The study, which provides six national perspectives on this question (a U.S., Australian, Japanese, Korean, Indian, and European perspective) and fed its findings and recommendations into the second round of the DTRA SI-STT-sponsored (and Pacific Forum-run) Track 2 “U.S.-Taiwan Deterrence and Defense Dialogue,”[1] outlines these strategic implications in two alternative scenarios. In the first scenario, China attacks Taiwan and it falls with no outside assistance from the United States or others. In the other scenario, Taiwan falls to China despite outside assistance (i.e., “a too little, too late” scenario).
Topic:
Security, Conflict, Crisis Management, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Europe, India, Taiwan, Asia, Korea, and United States of America

2. Cautious Pragmatism: What is thе potential outcome of Washington's approach to thе Nigеr crisis?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
On August 8, 2023, US Sеcrеtary of Statе Antony Blinkеn announcеd that diplomacy is thе prеfеrrеd way of rеsolving thе crisis causеd by thе coup in Nigеr. Following thе coup on July 26, US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan strongly condemned any effort to detain or subvert thе functioning of Nigеr's dеmocratically еlеctеd govеrnmеnt, led by President Mohamеd Bazoum. Thеsе statements reflect thе ambiguity of Washington's stance regarding thе crisis in Nigеr.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Counter-terrorism, Crisis Management, Coup, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Africa, Niger, and United States of America

3. War and Energy Security: Lessons for The Future

Author:
Tomas Jermalavicius, Veli-Pekka Tynkkynen, Andrian Prokip, Christian Egenhofer, and Edoardo Righetti
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Russia’s war against Ukraine has produced multiple shifts in the geopolitical landscape of Europe. Various EU member states and EU institutions broke through entire decades of dogmatic principles and established practices in security and defence policies to respond to Russia’s aggression and protect the continent. The energy domain is at the forefront of this confrontation, as Russia used its dominant market position in European energy supply in the run-up to – as well as during – the war to weaken Europe’s responses, divide the EU, and deter it from increasing its support to Ukraine. The multifaceted and far-reaching impact of the war offers an opportunity for a deeper reflection on the lessons learned for energy security at the national, regional, and EU levels. It allows for an assessment of the prospects in the geopolitical landscape where Russia is comprehensively isolated; new energy and technology players grow in importance; a new global energy order emerges; and the effects of the climate crisis become more severe and evident. It is also a rare opportunity to assess how complex energy systems retain their resilience or degrade under the conditions of a high-intensity conventional war, which has collective defence implications to the ability of the frontline states, such as Estonia, to fulfil NATO’s baseline requirements for national resilience and thus Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The report seeks to provide analysis concerning these aspects of the war’s short-, medium-, and long-term impact on energy security in Europe, the Baltic region, and Estonia. Conclusions of the report stress the importance of regulatory, policy, and technological flexibility, as well as innovation, in responding to various forms of strategic coercion through the energy sector – especially when such coercion is applied against targets under the duress of a major war, in which economic disruption, market uncertainty, geopolitical turmoil, and societal anxieties are abundant. The conclusions caution though that the appetite for resilience-enhancing investments and transformative solutions might diminish in the cost-conscious economic environment of the future or that the EU and US will start a vicious cycle of protectionist measures in green energy development, which will undercut transatlantic cooperation in energy security.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Infrastructure, European Union, Gas, Crisis Management, Renewable Energy, Hybrid Threats, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Finland, Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Sweden, and United States of America

4. Enabling NATO’s Collective Defense: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resiliency (NATO COE-DAT Handbook 1)

Author:
Carl V. Evans, Chris Anderson, Malcom Baker, Ronald Bearse, and Salih Biçakci
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
In 2014 NATO’s Centre of Excellence-Defence Against Terrorism (COE-DAT) launched the inaugural course on “Critical Infrastructure Protection Against Terrorist Attacks.” As this course garnered increased attendance and interest, the core lecturer team felt the need to update the course in critical infrastructure (CI) taking into account the shift from an emphasis on “protection” of CI assets to “security and resiliency.” What was lacking in the fields of academe, emergency management, and the industry practitioner community was a handbook that leveraged the collective subject matter expertise of the core lecturer team, a handbook that could serve to educate government leaders, state and private-sector owners and operators of critical infrastructure, academicians, and policymakers in NATO and partner countries. Enabling NATO’s Collective Defense: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resiliency is the culmination of such an effort, the first major collaborative research project under a Memorandum of Understanding between the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), and NATO COE-DAT. The research project began in October 2020 with a series of four workshops hosted by SSI. The draft chapters for the book were completed in late January 2022. Little did the research team envision the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February this year. The Russian occupation of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant, successive missile attacks against Ukraine’s electric generation and distribution facilities, rail transport, and cyberattacks against almost every sector of the country’s critical infrastructure have been on world display. Russian use of its gas supplies as a means of economic warfare against Europe—designed to undermine NATO unity and support for Ukraine—is another timely example of why adversaries, nation-states, and terrorists alike target critical infrastructure. Hence, the need for public-private sector partnerships to secure that infrastructure and build the resiliency to sustain it when attacked. Ukraine also highlights the need for NATO allies to understand where vulnerabilities exist in host nation infrastructure that will undermine collective defense and give more urgency to redressing and mitigating those fissures.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, Alliance, Crisis Management, and Risk Assessment
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

5. Raising the Minimum: Explaining China’s Nuclear Buildup

Author:
Lyle J. Goldstein
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
China’s nuclear buildup, consisting of new ICBMs, submarine-launched weapons, a new generation of strategic bombers, and advances in hypersonic weapons, implies a significant recalibration of Beijing’s traditional “minimum deterrence” strategy. Beijing deliberated for decades about whether to increase its nuclear arsenal, and it finally seems to be doing so, at least partially in response to the precipitous decline in U.S.-China relations, U.S. initiatives to develop ballistic missile defense, and U.S. nuclear doctrine. China is not bidding for numerical nuclear superiority against the United States with its buildup. Rather, China is likely looking to secure its “second strike” deterrence forces and negate any perception of U.S. nuclear predominance to avoid being coerced by the United States, especially with respect to Taiwan. China’s buildup reflects a strengthening of its deterrent and thus does not contradict China’s long-time policy of no first use (NFU). Beijing wants decision-makers in Washington to recognize its credible deterrent. The United States should both preserve strong nuclear deterrent forces and avoid an overreaction to China’s buildup. U.S. nuclear modernization should focus on survivability and be accompanied by attempts at dialogue, arms control, and the development of crisis management mechanisms.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Crisis Management, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

6. US Needs to Play Larger Role as Swing Producer of Oil and Gas in the Current Crisis

Author:
Thomas J. Duesterberg
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
In response to Russian aggression in Ukraine, European nations have drastically reduced imports of crude oil, refined petroleum products, and natural gas from Russia. The 2021 levels of these energy imports were around 2.2 million barrels per day (mbd) of crude oil, 1.2 mbd of refined products, and 155 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas on an annual basis.In addition to extreme difficulties in obtaining new sources of natural gas and to a lesser extent oil, the price increases throughout Europe since the onset of the war have been of historic proportions. In the days following the invasion, natural gas prices shot up by 62 percent, and UK energy prices were up by 150 percent. The full impact of the war, along with the related need to rein in the highest inflation numbers in over 40 years, has pushed Europe into a recession that threatens households and small businesses as well as European manufacturers’ ability to remain competitive. As a result, if the region cannot quickly assemble alternative supplies, the European commitment to assist in containing Russian aggression may weaken.
Topic:
Economics, Oil, Gas, Crisis Management, Supply Chains, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

7. The Ukraine Crisis: There Is Still Room for Diplomacy

Author:
George Tzogopoulos
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
Confronting each other over the future of Ukraine, NATO and Russia are engaged in complicated diplomatic bargaining over security, power and the limits of the transatlantic alliance in Europe. Diplomacy can work toward a peaceful resolution of the Ukraine crisis, in spite of the heated public rhetoric. The US and the EU share a common objective in preventing a war in the short term and reaching an understanding with Russia in the longer term. The EU may not be at the negotiating table, but it is still actively involved in the diplomatic discussions. It plays an important role via deterrence and diplomacy in several fora, while France is steadily upgrading its geopolitical standing and pursuing a modus vivendi with Russia. Greece is closely monitoring the Ukrainian crisis and supports all de-escalation efforts. The presence of Greek diaspora communities in Ukraine is an important factor. So are Turkey’s efforts to assume a mediating role between Ukraine and Russia with a view to upgrading its own NATO standing.
Topic:
NATO, Diplomacy, European Union, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and United States of America

8. Toward a New Transatlantic Approach to Russia Sanctions

Author:
Edward Fishman, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, and Angela Stent
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
This policy brief is a product of the Center for a New American Security Transatlantic Forum on Russia, an initiative designed to spur coordination between the United States and Europe on Russia-related policy across multiple issue areas. The policy briefs are informed by a series of dialogues with leading experts from both sides of the Atlantic. The analysis and recommendations in the memo reflect areas of agreement between U.S. and European experts. Where there are notable differences in perspective, we highlight those to better enable policymakers to navigate fissures that can hinder coordination. We thank all the experts who contributed to such fruitful dialogue, especially Nigel Gould-Davies, Brian O’Toole, and Maria Shagina. Introduction As Russia continues to build its forces on Ukraine’s border, the United States and its allies have laid out the economic costs that Russian President Vladimir Putin would face for any further aggression against Ukraine. The Biden administration has stated it is willing to pursue “economic measures that we've refrained from using in the past.”1 In addition, the United States has indicated it is prepared to use export controls on U.S.-origin technologies that are key to Russia’s industrial sectors and potentially enact a Russia-focused Foreign Direct Product Rule—a tool that, to date, has only been used against Huawei. It is unclear if such a package is enough to deter Putin, especially if he is intent on pursuing his maximalist objectives—autonomy for parts of eastern Ukraine that would give Russia a veto over Ukrainian foreign policy and closing NATO’s door to Ukraine. Nonetheless, implementing such sanctions if Putin further escalates in Ukraine is critical for raising the costs to Putin and for restricting Russia’s ability to sustain its aggressive foreign policy over the long term. Regardless of what happens in Ukraine, however, U.S.-Russia relations are on a new course. The era of working toward a stable and predictable relationship with Russia is over for now. The United States will need a new, more proactive approach—one in which sanctions will be a tool (among many) that Washington should use to deter future Russian attacks on liberal democracies and disrupt Russia’s destabilizing actions, especially the corrupt networks that Moscow uses to spread its influence and sustain its hold on power. This policy brief outlines the current state of play of U.S. and European sanctions policies on Russia and how the United States and Europe can update its sanctions approach in this new era of relations with Russia.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Crisis Management, Deterrence, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and United States of America

9. Risky Competition: Strengthening U.S.-China Crisis Management

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
As their strategic rivalry grows, China and the U.S. are increasingly operating in close proximity in the Asia Pacific. An accident or misinterpreted signal could set off a wider confrontation. The danger level is low, but dialogue is needed to dial it down further.
Topic:
Conflict, Crisis Management, Rivalry, and Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

10. COVID-19 vaccine supply chains and the Defense Production Act

Author:
Chad P. Bown
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the US government used novel policies to accelerate research, development, and production of a diversified portfolio of new vaccines. This paper begins by describing the Defense Production Act (DPA) of 1950 and the initial “priority-rated” contracts agreed to under Operation Warp Speed in 2020 to expedite manufacturing and achieve scale, which succeeded in producing hundreds of millions of doses of COVID-19 vaccines by early 2021. However, a puzzle soon emerged, as the scale of US vaccine production was shortly thereafter overtaken by plants in the European Union and India. The paper investigates the tradeoffs US policymakers faced in early 2021 once much of the initial uncertainty about the safety and effectiveness of many COVID-19 vaccines had been resolved—about whether to recalibrate contracts to expand production capacity to help meet global, instead of US, vaccine demand. It also examines the emergence of input shortages and assesses whether both the price constraints implicit in the 2020 DPA contracts and business decisions made to quicken the process of bringing new vaccine plants online globally inadvertently exacerbated them. It also explores the potential need for complementary, input capacity enhancing policies in the face of highly fragmented, cross-border COVID-19 vaccine supply chains.
Topic:
Crisis Management, Vaccine, COVID-19, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

11. What do we know about cyber operations during militarized crises?

Author:
Michael Fischerkeller
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The Department of Defense (DoD) will soon kick off the drafting of its cyber strategy and cyber posture review to align US cyber capabilities and operating concepts with the foreign policy objectives of the Joseph Biden-Kamala Harris administration. Given that the administration describes China as the “pacing threat,” debates over the best use of cyber operations and campaigns will likely be framed by US-China interaction in day-to-day competition, and by a potential militarized crisis and war over the status of Taiwan. This essay focuses on how cyber operations employed during militarized crises are likely to impact escalation management. Policymakers may be attracted to the idea that cyber operations could serve as de-escalatory offramps in a crisis. Such expectations should be tempered, if not completely set aside, for two reasons. First, there is no experience with cyber operations employed during a militarized crisis between two nuclear-armed peers. Absent direct experience, all one can rely on is academic research. Yet, secondly, deductive and empirical academic research provides no basis for confidence that cyber operations are either de-escalatory or non-escalatory in the context of militarized crises.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Cybersecurity, Crisis Management, and Militarization
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

12. The Necessary U.S. Role in Fixing the Baghdad-Kurdistan Energy Dispute

Author:
Michael Knights
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
A targeted intervention could aid American interests and the global effort to find a substitute for Russian and Iranian oil and gas. On February 15, 2022, Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court ruled that the 2007 oil and gas law for the Kurdistan Region was unconstitutional, requiring a review of numerous production sharing contracts and oil sales agreements. If the case prevents oil exports via Iraqi Kurdistan, then the world market will almost immediately lose 500,000 barrels per day, triggering higher oil prices, expanded windfalls for Russia and Iran, the collapse of Iraqi Kurdistan’s economy, and a dangerous turn in Baghdad’s ties with Erbil and with Ankara. In this timely Policy Note, Iraq expert Michael Knights calls for the United States to act with other concerned states to resolve the Baghdad-Erbil energy crisis. In doing so, he categorizes the sub-issues of FSC implementation on a spectrum from higher to lower consensus, and explains both sides’ views in an unvarnished, direct manner. A targeted intervention by the United States and its partners, the author argues, could guide the dispute toward a long-overdue resolution that greatly aids U.S. interests and the global effort to find a substitute for Russian and Iranian oil and gas.
Topic:
Oil, Gas, Crisis Management, Disputes, and Energy
Political Geography:
Iraq, North America, United States of America, and Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)

13. The Role of America in Crises Management: A Study of India- Pakistan Crises (2001-2019)

Author:
Salma Naz
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Political Studies
Institution:
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:
The enduring antagonism between Pakistan and India enlarged by thoughts of threat perception has spawned recurring crises. Because of the presence of misperceptions as well as miscalculations the possibility of an accidental clash between both nuclear powers was high. So, through the crisis management technique possible armed collision is controlled. The primary purpose of the study is to analyze the American mediation in the India-Pakistan crises. The nature of the study is qualitative because qualitative research supports explaining comprehensively and helps interpretive objectives to understand the role of America in the India-Pakistan crises. The case study method is applied for the present study and the selected era is from 2001 to 2019. Being a review study descriptive, exploratory and historical approaches are applied to discover the answers of the research questions. This research would offer a guiding structure for studying third-party mediation in the management of the crisis. Consequently, an analysis of this research will support to discover several potential finding of the American involvement in crisis management to keep strategic stability and peace in the South Asian region. But, there is no assurance that the findings and conclusions of this crisis management case study are applied to other contexts or crises.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Crisis Management, Mediation, and Perception
Political Geography:
Pakistan, South Asia, India, and United States of America

14. State Building in Crisis Governance: Donald Trump and COVID-19

Author:
Nicholas F. Jacobs, Desmond King, and Sidney M. Milkis
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Political Science Quarterly
Institution:
Academy of Political Science
Abstract:
Nicholas F. Jacobs, Desmond King, and Sidney M. Milkis look at the final year of the Donald Trump presidency, and the administration’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. They argue that Trump’s actions fit a rationale, partisan strategy endemic to executive-centered partisanship. Consequently, Trump and the Republican Party failed to suffer the repudiation that punished previous presidents when adjudged failed crisis leaders.
Topic:
Governance, Political Science, Crisis Management, Donald Trump, COVID-19, Health Crisis, and Republican Party
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

15. Operation Warp Speed and the Countermeasures Acceleration Group—A Twenty-first Century Manhattan Project

Author:
John E. Hall and Nathan Packard
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
On 15 May 2020, Operation Warp Speed, later renamed the HHS-DOD COVID-19 Countermeasures Acceleration Group (CAG), was a collaboration between the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Defense (DOD), and the private sector to accelerate development, production, and distribution of effective vaccines and therapeutics to counter COVID-19 for the American people. The CAG was the nucleus of the “whole-of-America” effort to defeat COVID-19, and DOD’s contribution was essential to the success of the CAG. This article highlights the contributions made by DOD, with a focus on innovative solutions and best practices that might apply to other DOD activities.
Topic:
Crisis Management, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Health Crisis
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

16. Why Haiti Advocacy Needs New Strategies

Author:
Mark Schuller
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA)
Abstract:
As the Biden administration continues to ignore Haitian civil society proposals for a pathway out of crisis, confronting white supremacy across borders is essential.
Topic:
Civil Society, Borders, Crisis Management, and White Supremacy
Political Geography:
Caribbean, Haiti, and United States of America

17. Contested Deployment

Author:
Bert B. Tussing, John Eric Powell, and Benjamin C. Leitzel
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
As indicated in the 2018 National Defense Strategy and evolving Multi-Domain Operations doctrine, the assumption the homeland will provide a secure space for mobilization and deployment is no longer valid. This integrated research project goes beyond affirming this assumption and contributes to efforts to mitigate the concerns a contested deployment entails. Following the introductory chapter, Chapter 2, “Army Deployments in a Contested Homeland: A Framework for Protection,” explores how current coordination and cooperation mechanisms between the DoD and state and local government may need realignment, with civil authorities preparing themselves to support military mobilization. Chapter 3, “Strategic Seaports and National Defense in a Contested Environment,” examines the 22 strategic seaports across the United States, identifying issues with throughput, structural integrity, security, readiness, funding, and authorities. Chapter 4, “Single Point of Failure,” identifies how strict adherence to a business efficiency model for munition production and distribution may jeopardize the successful employment of military forces. Chapter 5, “The Interstate Highway System: Reinvestment Needed before a Contested Deployment,” provides the status of the deteriorating road network and explains how associated vulnerabilities could be exploited by an adversary. The two appendices provide points for consideration on cyberattacks and defense and the impacts a full mobilization of reserve forces would have on the homeland.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Military Affairs, Crisis Management, Public Policy, Army, and Troop Deployment
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

18. Ending the Destructive Sino-U.S. Interaction Over Taiwan: A Call for Mutual Reassurance

Author:
Michael D. Swaine
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
Recent years have witnessed steadily rising hostility and suspicion between the United States and China over each other’s approach vis-à-vis Taiwan. The unprecedentedly aggressive Chinese military exercises in response to U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s trip to Taipei this year indicated that the continued downward spiral in Sino-American relations over Taiwan would increasingly expose Washington and Beijing to risks of repeated crises with a potential of a dangerous armed conflict. This brief lays out the policy steps necessary to reverse this spiral of escalation.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Crisis Management, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

19. The Worsening Taiwan Imbroglio: An Urgent Need for Effective Crisis Management

Author:
Michael D. Swaine
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
A severe diplomatic or military crisis over Taiwan is the issue that poses the greatest risk of war between the United States and China. Worryingly, the risk has increased in recent years with the deepening Sino-American rivalry amid intensifying conflicts of interest vis–à–vis Taiwan. Washington and Beijing must recognize the cycle of confrontational deterrence that drives it and take urgent measures to stop it. If the United States and China fail to take measures of mutual reassurance, the two countries will continue on the path to confrontation over Taiwan. This is particularly likely if their overall bilateral relationship continues to deteriorate. While acknowledging the likelihood of such a dangerous scenario, this brief affirms the need to improve crisis management on the Taiwan issue, outlines the major problems and limits of existing crisis management efforts, and offers concrete recommendations for improving the ability of both Washington and Beijing to more effectively manage future crises over Taiwan, as well as Sino-American crises in general.1
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

20. Fragile States Index 2021 – Annual Report

Author:
Natalie Fiertz, Nate Haken, Patricia Taft, Emily Sample, and Wendy Wilson
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Fund for Peace
Abstract:
The Fragile States Index, produced by The Fund for Peace, is a critical tool in highlighting not only the normal pressures that all states experience, but also in identifying when those pressures are pushing a state towards the brink of failure. By highlighting pertinent issues in weak and failing states, The Fragile States Index—and the social science framework and software application upon which it is built—makes political risk assessment and early warning of conflict accessible to policy-makers and the public at large.
Topic:
Climate Change, Authoritarianism, Employment, Fragile States, Economy, Political stability, Conflict, Crisis Management, Peace, Resilience, COVID-19, Health Crisis, Early Warning, and Risk Assessment
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, Middle East, Tajikistan, Germany, Armenia, Central America, Spain, Lebanon, Timor-Leste, North America, Ethiopia, Southeast Asia, El Salvador, Global Focus, and United States of America