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21. Lilliputians at the Gate: Small Individual Campaign Donations and Political Polarization in Western State Legislatures

Author:
Todd Lochner, Ellen Seljan, Madeleine MacWilliamson, and Valerie Naborska
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
California Journal of Politics and Policy
Institution:
Institute of Governmental Studies, UC Berkeley
Abstract:
Scholars seek to understand campaign donor behavior and its effects on candidates. Researchers generally agree that individual donors are more ideologically extreme than most organizational donors but disagree as to whether small individual donors (those giving less than $200 per cycle) are especially correlated to extremist candidates. We study the relationship between small individual donors and legislators’ NPAT and CFscores for the California, Washington, and Oregon legislatures between 2016 and 2022. We find both that individual donors correlate to more partisan legislators in general and that the correlation between donors and politically polarized legislators is even greater for small individual donors than for large individual donors in most cases.
Topic:
Politics, Campaign Finance, Campaign Donations, and State Legislature
Political Geography:
Washington, California, North America, United States of America, and Oregon

22. The 2026 oil crisis: an opportunity for Europe's energy transition

Author:
Valérie Plagnol
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
Seven weeks after the launch of the joint US-Israeli attacks against Iran on 28 February, the damage to regional production facilities and the virtual halt to maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz have triggered a rise in crude oil prices of nearly 60% for the WTI index and over 70% for Brent. Despite the two-week truce declared on 7 April, these increases have already had a painful impact on our economies. The duration of the tensions will, of course, determine the severity of the crisis, but the damage has already been done.
Topic:
Oil, Armed Conflict, Energy Crisis, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:
Europe, Iran, Israel, United States of America, and Strait of Hormuz

23. Law and Politics of Israel and the United States’ Attacks on Iran with Maryam Jamshidi (Episode 54)

Author:
Sahar Aziz and Maryam Jamshidi
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Security, Race and Rights (CSRR), Rutgers University School of Law
Abstract:
Join host Professor Sahar Aziz (https://www.law.rutgers.edu/bio/sa1356) in her conversation with Professor Maryam Jamshidi (https://www.colorado.edu/law/node/125...) about the political and legal implications of Israel and the United States' unprovoked military attacks against Iran on February 28, 2026. As Israeli Benjamin Netanyahu publicly admitted, the Israeli government has been preparing for a war to topple the Iranian regime for over 30 years. (https://www.lemonde.fr/en/internation...) Knowing they do not possess sufficient military capacity to do it alone, Israel unsuccessfully attempted to persuade the United States to start a war of aggression against Iran under the Bush, Obama and Biden administrations. The reasons for restraint by past US administration were often the same. Iran posed no direct threat or conducted an imminent attack toward the US that legally justified an offensive war of aggression. The risk of a global economic downfall and the exorbitant price tag of a major war far outweighed the benefits of removing a hostile government. And perhaps most importantly from a military perspective, the United States had no exit strategy. Indeed, these were the same reasons that led to the Democratic Party winning the White House in 2008 after expensive and endless wars in Iraq and Afghanistan after 2001. Republican politicians campaigned on an America First platform in the 2021 elections by explicitly rejecting wars of choice in the Middle East that cost American lives and treasure. And yet, Republican President Donald Trump violated that promise to his constituents and granted Israel its 30-year dream to start an offensive war on Iran despite no credible evidence of an imminent threat by Iran. The result has been predictably catastrophic for the Middle East and the global economy. The war has engulfed the Gulf states, the Strait of Hormuz is closed to the 20% of global supply of oil and natural gas, energy prices are skyrocketing across the world, Tehran is being bombarded daily by Israel, over 1300 Iranians have been killed thus far, and the war is costing American taxpayers $1 billion per day.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Armed Conflict, Aggression, and Global Economy
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, North America, and United States of America

24. Critical Perspectives on Relations Between Iran, Israel and the United States (3/17/26)

Author:
Juan Cole and Mojtada Mahdavi
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Center for Security, Race and Rights (CSRR), Rutgers University School of Law
Abstract:
Critical Perspectives on Relations Between Iran, Israel and the United States with Dr. Juan Cole, University of Michigan & Dr. Mojtada Mahdavi, University of Alberta (3/17/26) Israel and the United States' military attacks on Iran have prompted heated debates on the legality, political motives, and global economic impact of this latest war in the Middle East. Join the Rutgers Law Center for Security, Race and Rights for a critical analysis of the history, politics, and international relations between Israel, the United States and Iran by experts on Iran and the broader Middle East.
Topic:
International Relations, International Law, Armed Conflict, and Global Economy
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, North America, and United States of America

25. Hindutva in America: A Threat to Equality & Religious Pluralism (11/12/2025)

Author:
Safa Ahmed
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Center for Security, Race and Rights (CSRR), Rutgers University School of Law
Abstract:
Hosted by the Rutgers Law chapter of the American Constitution Society (ACS) and the Center for Security, Race, and Rights (CSRR). Join us for an engaging discussion on the rise of Hindutva—a Hindu nationalist ideology—and its influence in the United States. This conversation will explore how religious nationalism manifests within diaspora communities, its impact on civil rights and pluralism, and the role of law and policy in addressing related challenges.
Topic:
Nationalism, Diaspora, Ideology, Civil Rights, Pluralism, and Hindutva
Political Geography:
India, North America, and United States of America

26. E-Waste as a U.S. Social Policy Challenge: Addressing Inequity, Governance Gaps, and Consumer Rights Through a Repair-Reuse-Regulate Framework

Author:
Cynthia Norgbey
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Public and International Affairs (JPIA)
Institution:
School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA), Princeton University
Abstract:
Electronic waste (e-waste) is one of the most rapidly growing waste streams in the United States, creating pressing environmental, economic, and social challenges. The United States generates over seven million tons of e-waste each year, and has a largely unregulated system, with significant amounts of e-waste burned, landfilled, or exported to countries with weaker environmental protections. The current system is fragmented and inequitable, producing pollution, depleting resources, and perpetuating environmental injustice for both domestic and overseas communities. Without a unified federal policy, structural gaps harm consumers, communities, and the environment. The United States lacks enforceable right-to-repair laws, manufacturers face inconsistent accountability for recycling and reuse, and export loopholes allow toxic e-waste to be shipped overseas with minimal transparency. In contrast, countries in the European Union are modernizing their electronics economy through comprehensive laws that establish minimum standards for repair rights, data transparency, and producer responsibility. This paper proposes a Three-Pillar Strategy for creating an equitable and circular e-waste management system in the United States.: Repair: Enhance consumer rights and equity through national right-to-repair legislation, including requirements for parts availability, diagnostic tools, and restrictions on anti-repair practices. State-level laws in Minnesota and New York provide models. Reuse: Incentivize reuse and refurbishment at the federal level by formally recognizing it as a distinct category in the waste hierarchy, building infrastructure in schools and community institutions, and collecting consistent data on secondary markets. Regulate: Enact a national Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) framework with clear standards on takeback, design-for-recycling, and export transparency. This includes updating federal regulations and aligning U.S. law with the Basel Convention. The three-pillar approach addresses socially equitable sustainability at upstream, midstream, and downstream intervention points. Using qualitative content analysis of 23 policy documents, this paper analyzes how repair, reuse, and producer responsibility instruments are distributed across U.S. federal and state governance levels, identifying structural gaps from fragmentation and contributing to scholarship on environmental governance and extended producer responsibility. Building on these findings, the paper advances a three-pillar framework: Repair, Reuse, and Regulate, that calls for a federally coordinated approach integrating national right-to-repair legislation, reuse and refurbishment infrastructure development, and a comprehensive producer responsibility system to address these governance gaps.
Topic:
Governance, Regulation, Social Policy, Waste, Electronic Waste (E-Waste), and Consumer Rights
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

27. Beyond the Hype: Assessing Hyperscaler Nuclear Commitments Against U.S. Energy Realities

Author:
John Pendleton and Mackenzie Schuessler
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Electricity demand is rising rapidly, along with growing enthusiasm for nuclear power. In addition to climate concerns and the desire for secure energy, these needs are driven in large part by the planned expansion of data centers for artificial intelligence and cloud computing. The United States is home to the world’s largest data center market and the leading global cloud service providers, including Alphabet (Google), Amazon, Meta (Facebook), and Microsoft. These firms—or “hyperscalers”—design, build, and operate massive data center facilities that support skyrocketing AI demands, but require large amounts of firm, scalable, and always-available power. This puts new pressure on electricity grids already facing capacity, reliability, and affordability challenges. As technology companies pursue aggressive AI buildouts, they are seeking innovative ways to meet their energy demands. Nuclear power has thus entered the conversation as one of the few energy sources capable of delivering the kind of firm, high-density electricity that data centers need while simultaneously allowing companies to maintain public climate commitments.1 The entry of hyperscalers into a rapidly evolving nuclear energy market introduces new dynamics to what has been a highly regulated and slow-moving industry. Since 2024, a series of high-profile agreements have been announced between hyperscalers and nuclear utilities, vendors, and reactor designers. These deals signal enthusiasm for the sector, but it is still unclear whether big tech is willing to make big bets on nuclear power. This paper explores how large U.S. technology companies are approaching nuclear power in the context of their energy strategies to meet the escalating demands from AI. The first section describes the approaches hyperscalers are using to secure nuclear energy. To date, their efforts reflect their preference to be energy offtakers (customers) over direct nuclear ownership or project development. The second section then assesses why these approaches have remained cautious, considering factors such as priorities, timing, and costs. Additionally, it considers key entanglement risks that big tech will need to confront including potential reputational exposure, nonproliferation concerns, and management of long-term nuclear waste.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Nuclear Energy, and Energy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

28. Implementing the Biden Administration’s China Strategy

Author:
Christopher S. Chivvis and Senkai Hsia
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
When Joe Biden’s administration took office in January 2021, U.S.-China relations were in free fall. The era of presumed convergence had ended, mutual trust had collapsed, and the risk of escalation was real. The COVID-19 pandemic was raging. The central question was whether the relationship would harden into open and dangerous hostility or settle into a more durable form of rivalry. Biden officials viewed the inheritance of the first Trump administration to be a sharpened awareness of the China challenge but an underdeveloped national strategy and limited institutional capacity for that challenge. They set out to impose greater coherence, discipline, and durability on the U.S. approach to this crucial problem of American statecraft. At the heart of Biden’s approach was the consolidation of a framework for strategic competition with an eye toward coexistence. These officials accepted that China and the Chinese Communist Party are permanent features of the geopolitical landscape and that neither America nor China could meaningfully defeat the other without catastrophic cost. Their objective was therefore not dominance, but competitive coexistence—preserving U.S. advantages while avoiding war. That framing now shapes Washington’s statecraft and has endured even in the second Trump administration, albeit with some adjustments. The Biden team looked to technology as the center of gravity of their strategy. Building on but systematizing earlier efforts, they deployed export controls, industrial policy, and alliance coordination to protect U.S. leadership in semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and advanced manufacturing. For the first time in decades, technological advantage was treated as the decisive arena of great-power rivalry. This shift represents one of their most consequential legacies. The Biden administration also paired competition with sustained diplomacy—especially in the second half of its term. Rather than treating dialogue as a concession, the White House aimed to use it to reduce misperception and manage risk. Strategic communications channels were restored and military-to-military contacts resumed. This produced tangible gains, including improved crisis management and renewed Chinese cooperation on fentanyl enforcement. Biden’s diplomats did not aim to eliminate rivalry, only to stabilize it by convincing Beijing that strategic competition was the appropriate framing for the U.S.-China relationship. Without this diplomatic track, the competitive strategy would have been more dangerous. The administration also emphasized U.S. alliances, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. Security ties with Japan, Australia, India, and the Philippines deepened, and the administration worked to improve military coordination. At the same time, the administration was cautious about market opening, judging the domestic costs to outweigh the alliance building benefits. The alliance network thus grew stronger on defense but less integrated economically than long-term competition may require. On military strategy, the administration took a maximalist approach that bolstered deterrence, but they did so without fully resolving a fundamental question: how much is enough? Investments in regional posture and advanced capabilities were substantial, yet the strategy leaned toward maximizing capability rather than defining sufficiency from a strategic perspective. A competition framework does not require primacy at all costs. Future administrations will need to determine how to balance deterrence with flexibility, fiscal sustainability, and escalation risk—especially as the depth of U.S. support for conflict with China can be questioned. Biden’s China policy was calibrated realism—neither naive nor warlike. It recognized that long-term competition will be decided more by American domestic vitality than by military deployments. The strategy’s enduring insight is that diplomacy is an important complement to sustaining technological leadership, economic resilience, political stability, and capable alliances. These ultimately matter more than rhetorical confrontation and maximizing military advantage. The U.S.-China relationship remains fraught and unsettled, but Biden established a structured rivalry that avoided collapse and created a baseline from which future leaders—of either party—can operate.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Strategic Competition, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

29. Ecological Statecraft in the Midst of War: Water, Regeneration, and the Future of Gulf Security

Author:
Olivia Lazard and Ali Bin Shahid
Publication Date:
05-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The 2026 U.S.-Iran war is radiating through the Gulf’s energy systems, maritime routes, supply chains, food corridors, financial flows, and regional diplomacy—and its effects will be long-lasting. In energy markets, the war is accelerating demand toward more autonomous sources like renewables. On food, the world is bracing for a compound crisis: a convergence of disrupted fertilizer supply chains, inflationary pressures, and El Niño–induced crop failures. These are cascading trends that will demand sustained attention for years to come. But one long-tail effect has already slipped out of view. The war has crossed a dangerous threshold: Infrastructure essential to civilian survival, including desalination facilities, has been directly targeted. Water infrastructure is emerging as a strategic target in kinetic warfare against a background of structural scarcity. This marks a qualitative shift in the Gulf’s security landscape. In a region defined by extreme aridity, collapsing groundwater reserves, and deep structural dependence on manufactured water, desalination infrastructure is not merely a technical utility; it is part of the region’s survival architecture. Millions depend on a relatively concentrated set of energy-intensive coastal plants for drinking water, industry, and urban continuity. The exposure of this infrastructure reveals that ecological fragility and military escalation are no longer parallel crises: They are becoming fused within a single battle space.
Topic:
Security, Infrastructure, Ecology, Statecraft, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

30. An Unbowed Petro Successfully Plays the Diplomat

Author:
Juan Antonio Martínez-Sánchez
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA)
Abstract:
Colombian President Gustavo Petro’s positive meeting with Trump stands to benefit not only his coalition, but also the region writ large.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Donald Trump, Regional Politics, and Gustavo Petro
Political Geography:
Colombia, South America, North America, and United States of America