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11. Irán entre protestas y geopolítica

Author:
Xavier Villar
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Fundación Alternativas
Abstract:
Análisis de las protestas en Irán surgidas en un contexto de fuerte inflación y depreciación del rial —que perdió cerca de la mitad de su valor frente al dólar en 2025— y que, tras iniciarse como una movilización de carácter económico encabezada por comerciantes y pequeños empresarios, derivaron rápidamente en expresiones de descontento político más amplio. Aunque las manifestaciones se han extendido a numerosas ciudades y han adquirido una notable visibilidad social, su escala y composición difieren de ciclos previos, como los de 2009 o 2019, y hasta ahora no se han producido deserciones significativas en las fuerzas de seguridad que permitan hablar de un cambio de régimen inminente. El artículo subraya además las dificultades para verificar cifras de víctimas debido al bloqueo informativo, matiza la idea de un rechazo político unánime al régimen y sitúa las protestas en un marco político-estratégico más amplio, marcado por la posición geográfica de Irán, sus recursos energéticos y la competencia internacional entre Estados Unidos y China.
Topic:
Regime Change, Sanctions, Economy, Protests, Inflation, Transatlantic Relations, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

12. Political Violence in America: Public Perceptions, Polarization, and Accountability

Author:
PRRI Staff
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
PRRI: Public Religion Research Institute
Abstract:
Two-thirds of Americans (67%) believe political leaders’ failure to condemn violent rhetoric contributes a lot to violent actions in society. Majorities of Americans also believe that false or misleading information generated by AI (64%) and public displays of hate symbols (61%) contribute a lot to violent actions in society, while smaller majorities believe easy access to guns and harsh and violent political language are also drivers (both 53%). While 51% of Republicans believe public displays of hate symbols contribute a lot to violence, 76% of Democrats do. Fewer than half of Republicans (46%) believe that harsh and violent political language contributes a lot to violence in society; white evangelical Protestants are the only group of religious Americans in which a minority (45%) share that view. Very few Americans support hostile and violent actions by their political allies to advance important political goals. Very few Americans justify imprisoning a political opponent without a trial if that person poses a clear danger to the country (12%); damaging or destroying property as a form of protest (7%); pushing, shoving, or punching a political opponent (6%); posting the home address or private phone number of a political opponent online so their family will be harassed (5%); or killing a political opponent if that person poses a clear danger to the country (5%). While very strong majorities of Americans over the age of 50 completely disagree that violent and harsh actions may justify political outcomes, such sentiments are less widely shared among younger Americans, especially those who are under 30. More than three in four Americans disagree that violence may be needed to save the country; views are similar across partisan groups, though they have shifted some throughout the year. Most Americans (77%) disagree that “because things have gotten so far off track, true American patriots may have to resort to violence in order to save our country,” compared with 20% of those who agree. Agreement about the potential need for political violence has decreased significantly among Republicans since President Donald Trump’s reelection in November 2024; agreement among Democrats has remained low over time but increased slightly in the past year. Since early 2021, support for political violence has varied across religious groups. Support among white Christians has declined since the 2024 election, though white evangelical Protestants continue to show higher support than white Christians overall. Support for political violence remains highest among Christian nationalism Adherents and lowest among Rejecters. Americans’ views on who is most responsible for political violence are deeply polarized, split largely along partisan and religious lines. Democrats overwhelmingly attribute most responsibility for political violence to right-wing groups (73%), while Republicans attribute most responsibility to left-wing groups (72%). While more Christians of color and non-Christians attribute most responsibility to right-wing groups for most political violence today, white Christian groups attribute most responsibility to left-wing groups. Most Christian nationalism Adherents (73%) and Sympathizers (64%) attribute responsibility to left-wing groups, while most Rejecters (72%) attribute responsibility to right-wing groups. Christian nationalism Skeptics are divided. Americans’ views are strongly divided by party and religion on whether National Guard deployments in American cities cause more violence than they prevent. A slim majority of Americans (52%) agree that deploying the National Guard to patrol American cities may cause more violence than it prevents. Democrats (80%) and independents (60%) are far more likely than Republicans (23%) to agree. Most Christians of color and non-Christians agree that these deployments cause more violence, while white Christian groups are far less likely to do so. Agreement is particularly lower among white evangelical Protestants (29%). Christian nationalism Rejecters (80%) are the most likely to agree, followed by Skeptics (54%), Sympathizers (37%), and Adherents (26%). Opposition to Trump’s Jan. 6 pardons is widespread, with notable exceptions among Republicans, white Christian groups, and Christian nationalism Adherents and Sympathizers. Most Americans (68%) oppose “President Trump’s pardoning of over 1,500 people convicted for their role in the attacks on the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021,” compared with 29% who favor it. Republicans (63%) are far more likely to favor these pardons than independents (22%) and Democrats (4%). White Christian groups, particularly white evangelical Protestants (58%), are more likely than non-Christians (24%), Christians of color (19%), and unaffiliated Americans (18%) to favor Trump’s Jan. 6 pardons, as are Christian nationalism Adherents (61%) and Sympathizers (49%), compared with Skeptics (25%) and Rejecters (8%). Opposition to stripping citizenship and deporting U.S. citizens deemed a threat is widespread, with notable exceptions among Republicans, white evangelical Protestants, and Christian nationalism Adherents and Sympathizers. Four in ten Americans (41%) favor “stripping U.S. citizens of their citizenship and deporting them if they are determined to be a threat to the country.” Republicans (60%) are roughly twice as likely as independents (38%) and Democrats (27%) to agree. White evangelical Protestants (56%) are the only religious group with majority support for stripping U.S. citizens of their citizenship and deporting them, compared with fewer Hispanic Protestants (49%), white Catholics (48%), and white mainline Protestants (46%). Support among other religious groups is notably lower. Christian nationalism Adherents (67%) and Sympathizers (57%) are notably more likely than Skeptics (40%) and Rejecters (23%) to favor stripping U.S. citizens of their citizenship.
Topic:
Political Violence, Accountability, Misinformation, and Polarization
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

13. Mapping Christian Nationalism Across the 50 States: Insights from PRRI’s 2025 American Values Atlas

Author:
PRRI Staff
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
PRRI: Public Religion Research Institute
Abstract:
Around three in ten Americans qualify as Christian nationalism Adherents or Sympathizers. One-third of Americans qualify as Christian nationalism Adherents (11%) or Sympathizers (21%), compared with two-thirds who qualify as Skeptics (37%) or Rejecters (27%). These percentages have remained stable since PRRI first asked these questions in late 2022, with a slight decline among Americans who qualify as Christian nationalism Rejecters, who peaked at 32% in June 2023 and declined to 26% by the end of 2025. White evangelical Protestants and Hispanic Protestants are most likely to hold Christian nationalist beliefs; Americans who frequently attend religious services, especially those who are white, are more likely to be Christian nationalists. White Christians (46%) are more likely than Christians of color (39%), non-Christians (13%), and religiously unaffiliated Americans (10%) to qualify as Christian nationalism Adherents and Sympathizers. White evangelical Protestants (67%) and Hispanic Protestants (54%) are the only major religious groups among whom a majority hold Christian nationalist beliefs. The majority of those who attend religious services weekly or more qualify as Christian nationalism Adherents or Sympathizers (54%), compared with 39% of those who attend at least a few times a year and 20% of those who seldom or never attend services. This correlation holds among those who pray outside of religious services and those who read religious texts. White Americans who attend religious services, pray, or read the Bible or other religious texts frequently are more likely than their Black and Hispanic counterparts to qualify as Christian nationalism Adherents and Sympathizers. Christian nationalism support is also strongly linked to party, media habits, age, education, and race. A majority of Republicans qualify as either Christian nationalism Adherents (21%) or Sympathizers (35%), compared with one-quarter of independents (7% Adherents and 18% Sympathizers) and less than one in five Democrats (5% Adherents and 12% Sympathizers). Two-thirds of Americans who most trust far-right news sources qualify as Christian nationalism Adherents (34%) or Sympathizers (31%), as do a majority of those who most trust Fox News (18% Adherents and 37% Sympathizers). Support for Christian nationalism is positively associated with lower education levels and older age; AAPI Americans are far less likely to be Christian nationalists than other Americans. Christian nationalist views predominate in the South and Midwest; support for Christian nationalism is strongly correlated in all 50 states with favorable views of President Donald Trump and the proportion of Republican representation in state legislatures. The states with the highest levels of support for Christian nationalism — which includes about half of their residents — are Arkansas (54%), Mississippi (52%), West Virginia (51%), Oklahoma (49%), and Wyoming (46%). Three states emerge with more than half of their white, non-Hispanic residents supporting Christian nationalism: Arkansas (59%), Mississippi (54%), and West Virginia (53%). The higher state residents scored on the Christian nationalism scale, the more likely they are to hold favorable views of Trump and the larger the proportion of Republican elected officials in their state legislatures. Christian nationalists are more likely than other Americans to support political violence and score high on PRRI’s Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale. Three in ten Christian nationalism Adherents (30%) and one-quarter of Sympathizers (23%) agree that “because things have gotten so far off track, true American patriots may have to resort to violence to save the country,” compared with only 14% of Skeptics and 11% of Rejecters. Support for political violence among Christian nationalism Adherents was higher under President Joe Biden and declined after Trump’s reelection. Christian nationalism Adherents and Sympathizers score high on PRRI’s Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale; scores for Skeptics are mixed, while Rejecters score low. Christian nationalism Adherents and Sympathizers overwhelmingly view Trump as a strong leader, while Skeptics and Rejecters overwhelmingly view him as a dangerous dictator. Christian nationalists also hold more extreme views about immigrants and are more likely to say mandatory vaccines for children should be illegal. Majorities of Christian nationalism Adherents (67%) and Sympathizers (53%) believe that “immigrants are invading our country and replacing our cultural and ethnic background.” Majorities of Christian nationalism Adherents (61%) and Sympathizers (54%) agree with “the U.S. government deporting undocumented immigrants to foreign prisons without due process.” While at least half of Christian nationalism Adherents and Sympathizers support birthright citizenship, majorities agree with “stripping U.S. citizens of their citizenship and deporting them if they are determined to be a threat to the country” (66% and 56%). Over four in ten Christian nationalism Adherents (44%) and one-third of Sympathizers (34%) say that mandatory vaccines for children should be illegal in all or most cases, compared with one-quarter of Skeptics and one in ten Rejecters.
Topic:
Politics, Religion, Ideology, and Christian Nationalism
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

14. Mapping Support for LGBTQ Rights Across the 50 States: Insights from PRRI’s 2025 American Values Atlas

Author:
PRRI Staff
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
PRRI: Public Religion Research Institute
Abstract:
LGBTQ Americans trend younger, Democratic, liberal, and more religiously unaffiliated than other Americans. One in ten Americans identify as LGBTQ. Two in ten Americans ages 18-29 (20%) identify as LGBTQ, compared with smaller shares among those ages 30-49 (11%), ages 50-64 (5%), and ages 65 and older (4%). LGBTQ Americans are more likely to identify as Democrats (40%), compared with 28% of all Americans, and are nearly twice as likely to identify as politically liberal (51% vs. 26%, respectively). The majority of LGBTQ Americans identify as religiously unaffiliated (51%), compared with 27% of all Americans. Views on LGBTQ rights differ strongly by state. Massachusetts (85%), Maryland (82%), and Alaska (81%), along with the District of Columbia (82%), hold the highest support for nondiscrimination protections for gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender people, while Mississippi (60%), Wyoming (57%), and Arkansas (53%) show the lowest support. Massachusetts (72%), Hawaii (71%), Vermont (71%), and Connecticut (70%), along with the District of Columbia (70%), show the strongest opposition to religiously based service refusals, while West Virginia (44%) shows the lowest opposition. The only states without majority support for same-sex marriage are Mississippi (47%) and Arkansas (50%). Massachusetts (85%), Rhode Island (85%), and Vermont (81%) show the highest support. Except for Christian nationalism Adherents, strong majorities of Americans — including most people of faith — support nondiscrimination protections for LGBTQ individuals. Most Americans support nondiscrimination protections for LGBTQ people (72%), with Democrats (90%) being the most supportive, followed by independents (76%) and Republicans (56%). Majorities of most major religious groups support non-discrimination protections, though support is highest among non-Christians and the religiously unaffiliated. Christian nationalism Rejecters (91%) are the most likely to support nondiscrimination protections, followed by 77% of Skeptics, 61% of Sympathizers, and 42% of Adherents. Over the past decade, Americans ages 18-29 have shown a gradual decrease in support for LGBTQ nondiscrimination laws, from 80% in 2015 to 70% in 2025, largely driven by young Republicans, while seniors 65 and over have increased their support from 61% to 74% over the same period. Except for Republicans, Christian nationalism Adherents, and Sympathizers, most Americans continue to oppose religiously based service refusals for LGBTQ people. Most Americans oppose allowing small businesses to refuse service to LGBTQ people on religious grounds (59%), with Democrats (82%) more likely to oppose, compared with independents (60%) and Republicans (35%). Opposition among white Christians grew from 49% in 2015 to 55% in 2020, but has declined since to 46%. Opposition among Christians of color, non-Christians, and religiously unaffiliated Americans remains high. Christian nationalism Rejecters (83%) are the most likely to oppose religiously based refusals for LGBTQ people, followed by 62% of Skeptics, 44% of Sympathizers, and 32% of Adherents. Support for same-sex marriage remains high for most Americans, but partisanship, religious affiliation, and Christian nationalist views are linked to differing opinions. Support for same-sex marriage remains higher today (65%) than in 2015 (53%). Today, Republicans (49%) are notably less likely than Democrats (83%) and independents (69%) to support same-sex marriage. Majorities of most religious groups support same-sex marriage, except for Latter-day Saints (47%), Hispanic Protestants (45%), white evangelical Protestants (37%), Muslims (37%), and Jehovah’s Witnesses (19%). Nearly all Christian nationalism Rejecters (93%) and three-fourths of Skeptics (73%) support same-sex marriage, compared with 46% of Sympathizers and 22% of Adherents. Except for young Americans under 30, support for same-sex marriage has steadily grown across older age groups, gender, race, and education levels. While most Americans agree that transgender people deserve the same rights and protections as other Americans, just 40% oppose laws that require transgender people to use bathroom of their sex assigned at birth. Seven in ten Americans (71%) agree that “transgender people deserve the same rights and protections as other Americans,” including most Democrats (88%), independents (77%), and Republicans (57%). Except for Christian nationalism Adherents (40%), solid majorities across all religious groups, Christian nationalism groups, age, gender, race, and education levels agree that transgender people deserve the same rights as other Americans. The majority of Americans (56%) favor laws that require transgender individuals to use bathrooms that correspond to their sex at birth, with most Republicans (81%) in favor, compared with 55% of independents and 32% of Democrats. Americans who agree transgender people deserve the same rights and protections as other Americans are less likely to favor laws that require transgender individuals to use bathrooms that correspond to their sex assigned at birth than those who disagree that transgender people deserve the same rights (49% vs. 77%).
Topic:
Human Rights, Religion, Discrimination, LGBT+, Transgender, and Christian Nationalism
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

15. Netanyahu’s Long Game to Reorder the Middle East

Author:
Akram Zaoui
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
As the inspirator of the ongoing war in the Middle East, Netanyahu’s actions must be read through decades of political action. US participation in the war marks the apex of years of manoeuvring in Washington to reshape the region. Goals sought include obliteration of regional strategic threats and normalisation with Arab countries from a position of undisputable strength.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Normalization, Benjamin Netanyahu, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and United States of America

16. Letter from Joseon to Korea: International Politics of the Korean Peninsula

Author:
Muhammad Eren Yıldırım
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:
International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:
South Korea has indispensable military relations with the United States (US), especially in the context of its hostile relations with North Korea. In addition, China’s giant economic power makes South Korea reluctant to abandon its relations with China. Yet another significant factor complicating the regional dynamics for South Korea is the unresolved historical issues inherited from the imperial exploitation by the Japanese Empire on the Korean peninsula. This book aims to replace the narrative of South Korea’s as an “agent” in the global arena, considering its historical values and above-mentioned transforming conditions, with a multifaceted approach called “strategic pragmatism.” The author asks the following questions: what resources does South Korea have in its foreign policy-making processes?, what is its strategy based on these resources?, and what are the sources of the fundamental beliefs that construct the policymakers’ perception of South Korea’s foreign policy strategy?
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Book Review, Regional Politics, and Strategic Pragmatism
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

17. Deepening Strategic Alignment: Priorities for the U.S.-Japan Alliance

Author:
Kristi Govella and Nicholas Szechenyi
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
With new leadership in both countries, Japan and the United States are facing an increasingly uncertain global environment. As Japan prepares to revise its core national strategy documents, it is a particularly important time for Tokyo and Washington to deepen their strategic alignment. Although bilateral cooperation continues to proceed relatively smoothly at the operational level, there is a pressing need to articulate a strategic vision to guide alliance priorities and facilitate effective implementation of common objectives.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

18. Managing the Transatlantic Relationship in the Absence of US Leadership: Understanding the Trump Administration’s National Security Strategy

Author:
Paul Fritch
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)
Abstract:
The Trump administration’s December 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) represents a radical shift in US foreign policy, involving a move from global leadership of a rules-based international order to unabashed nationalism and regional hegemony. The new strategy no longer views the country’s sprawling network of alliances and partnerships and its ability to attract and integrate high-level talent from around the world as unique strengths, but rather as vulnerabilities to be mitigated. However, as jarring as these substantive changes are, the document’s structural changes and the irregular process that produced it may prove more significant in demonstrating just how sharply Washington is turning away from 80 years of bipartisan foreign policy consensus. The change is evident not just in the Trump administration’s policies, but – crucially – in the decision-making process that produces them. The new NSS is best understood as the formalisation of the administration’s abandonment of traditional policy coordination and strategic planning itself, an effort that has included the removal of senior career diplomats, military commanders, and intelligence officers; the systematic dismissal of senior judge advocates general and inspectors general; and the firing of many National Security Council (NSC) staff. The collective result of these steps, which find their natural culmination in the NSS and the National Defense Strategy (NDS) that followed in January 2026, is a policymaking process that is less informed by objective intelligence and analysis, less constrained by legal and policy advice or alliance consultation, and thus more subject to impulsiveness and ideological influence. Both of these developments – a new “America First” nationalism that eschews multilateral constraints and an erratic decision-making process that produces unpredictable and often impracticable outcomes – require a fundamental assessment by the country’s partners of their approach to the United States, both bilaterally and within established multilateral frameworks. This Policy Brief examines the practical implications of the 2025 NSS and the dramatically changed decision-making process it represents. For transatlantic allies and other middle powers, the central question is no longer whether US strategy has changed, but how to operate effectively in an environment of reduced predictability and diminished US strategic anchoring.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Transatlantic Relations, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

19. Representatives in Robes? How California Respondents think of Judicial Representation

Author:
Nancy Bays Arrington and Matthew Moore
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
California Journal of Politics and Policy
Institution:
Institute of Governmental Studies, UC Berkeley
Abstract:
Many have identified the tension between conceptualizing judges as legal versus political actors. One dimension of this tension is the extent to which we should or do think of judges as political representatives, both broadly and in ways that are either similar to or distinct from elected political representatives. In this project, we address the role of judges as representatives and then assess whether and to what extent California residents think of judges as representatives. Using public opinion data of California residents from the CalSpeaks survey fielded in the spring of 2021, we find that about a third of respondents do consider judges representatives in some way. While we find no gender differences in perceptions of judicial representation and very limited racial differences, there are strong age differences: younger respondents were significantly more likely to indicate that judges are representatives in some way compared to older respondents. This project informs how Californians understand the role of the courts, which might have consequences for judicial legitimacy and effectiveness.
Topic:
Politics, Public Opinion, Representation, Legitimacy, and Judiciary
Political Geography:
California, North America, and United States of America

20. COVID-19 Relief Measures had Few Durable Post-Pandemic Effects on Renters

Author:
Benjamin Mark Reicher and Michael Kuehlwein
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
California Journal of Politics and Policy
Institution:
Berkeley APEC Study Center
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic was responsible for an unprecedented crisis in the rental housing market, as families faced eviction as a consequence of pandemic lockdowns and resulting economic recession. In response, for the first time ever in US history, eviction moratoria were introduced to protect renters from being evicted for nonpayment; these were accompanied by several stimulus measures to support renters and the overall economy. This study asks whether these pandemic-era policies had any lingering effects after they had ceased to be implemented, by examining whether renters’ housing vulnerability at the state level saw any improvement in the post-pandemic years of 2022-23. For comparison, the study also evaluates the effects of variables reflecting economic fundamentals and renters’ housing burden. The findings suggest that the included policies had little effect on renters’ post-pandemic housing precarity.
Topic:
Economics, Public Policy, Eviction, COVID-19, Housing, Rent, and Housing Market
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America