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Begin New Search Topic Foreign Direct Investment Political Geography United States

1. Implications of Foreign Direct Investment, Capital Formation and its Structure for Global Value Chains

Author:
Amat Adarov and Robert Stehrer
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:
In the age of globalisation, international trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) have become integral elements of cross-country production sharing. In this paper we empirically assess the impact of FDI, as well as capital dynamics and structure, on the formation of global value chains (GVC) and trade in value added at country and sectoral levels based on a database constructed for a sample of European countries over the period 2000-2014. The analysis reveals that inward FDI is especially conducive to the formation of backward linkages while outward FDI facilitates forward GVC participation, especially in high-tech manufacturing sectors. A particularly robust influence of FDI and capital accumulation on GVC integration is identified in the textile and clothing industry. While capital accumulation in general intensifies GVC linkages for most sectors, ICT capital appears to be especially instrumental for backward integration of electrical and transportation equipment sectors.
Topic:
Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Foreign Direct Investment, Trade, and Global Value Chains
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, and Europe

2. Russia’s National Oil Champion Goes Global

Author:
Edward C. Chow and Andrew J. Stanley
Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
After the Soviet Union collapsed and Russia was roiled by political and economic chaos, many state-owned assets were privatized based on political connections and corrupt practices. The oil sector was a particularly attractive, but by no means the only, target for these privatizations. By the end of the 1990s, almost all of Russia’s oil production was privately owned. In spite of continued nontransparency, the oil sector began to resemble a competitive market with private investors introducing Western technology, financial accounting, and operating and management practices. It also started to attract major foreign investments. The remaining state oil assets were managed by a sleepy state enterprise named Rosneft that, in spite of its name (Russian Oil), produced less than 5 percent of Russia’s oil. Today, majority state-owned Rosneft produces almost half of Russia’s oil. Its daily oil production of 4.6 million barrels, according to its last reported quarterly results, is double that of the world’s largest oil company by market capitalization, ExxonMobil, which last reported daily liquids production of 2.3 million barrels. Rosneft’s rapid rise coincided with the rule of Vladimir Putin, who first became president of Russia in 2000. Its production increases were built largely on the backs of controversial acquisitions of assets previously held by private companies such as Yukos, TNK-BP, and Bashneft. Rosneft’s acquisition spree accelerated after Putin’s close associate and Russia’s then-deputy prime minister Igor Sechin became chairman of its board of directors in 2004. Sechin left government in 2012 to take over as Rosneft’s chief executive officer. Rosneft’s board of directors is now chaired by former German chancellor Gerhard Schroeder. Rosneft’s transformation as Russia’s national oil champion is consistent with Putin’s policy of regaining state control over the commanding heights of the Russian economy, which is more reliant on oil income today than the Soviet Union ever was. Rosneft is Russia’s largest taxpayer and contributed a quarter of government revenue in 2014. Until recently, Rosneft concentrated mainly on consolidating its dominance over the domestic oil patch. It is also Russia’s leading refiner and is increasing natural gas production for direct sales to domestic gas users, producing 67 billion cubic meters in 2016. In 2014, Russia was hit by the twin shocks of a global oil price collapse and Western economic sanctions enacted after its aggression against Ukraine in the Donbas region and annexation of Crimea. These developments affected Rosneft severely since it involved the value of the commodity it produces and sells and restricted Rosneft’s access to international financing when it was heavily indebted from the aforementioned acquisitions. A normal company might hunker down, repair its balance sheet, and wait for external conditions to improve. Instead Rosneft has done the exact opposite and expanded its international business aggressively. As part of the 2014 U.S.-led sanction efforts, Igor Sechin, as the leading figure of Russia’s largest petroleum company and his having “shown utter loyalty to Vladimir Putin,” was directly sanctioned. Further Russian sanctions enacted by Congress in 2017 called on the U.S. Department of the Treasury to submit a detailed report on senior political figures, oligarchs, and parastatal entities as determined by their “closeness to the Russian regime and their net worth.” While the unclassified version of the report released to Congress on January 29 included Igor Sechin, the report was poorly received and largely regarded as nothing more than a “rich list” by Russian experts. However, the report also contains classified annexes, including a list of parastatal entities and supporting analysis, which by definition would have included Rosneft. Although Rosneft’s rapid international expansion is too recent to assess definitely, this paper describes some of Rosneft’s overseas ventures and explores possible motivations, economic and political, behind them.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Oil, Foreign Direct Investment, Sanctions, Gas, Transparency, and Private Sector
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Eastern Europe

3. Chinese Investment in Critical U.S. Technology: Risks to U.S. Security Interests

Author:
Council on Foreign Relations
Publication Date:
10-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
Chinese firms, both private and state-owned, have in recent years invested billions of dollars in the U.S. technology industry, raising concerns that a powerful rival has gained or could soon gain access to sensitive and, in some cases, critical technologies that underpin American military superiority and economic might. At the workshop entitled “Chinese Investment in Critical U.S. Technology: Risks to U.S. Security Interests,” held in San Francisco, on July 18, 2017, CFR convened nearly thirty current and former government officials, academics, bankers, investors, and corporate executives to explore whether the large and growing early-stage Chinese investment in critical U.S. technology poses a threat to U.S. national security, and, if so, to outline policies that mitigate the risks of unbridled Chinese investment and to bolster U.S. competitiveness.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Foreign Direct Investment, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
United States, China, Asia, and North America

4. Writing New Rules for the U.S.-China Investment Relationship

Author:
Jennifer M. Harris
Publication Date:
12-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
Chinese outbound investment is on the rise, and much of it is finding its way into the United States. Be- tween 2010 and 2015, China’s foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to the United States grew by an average of 32 percent annually.1 Within the past two years alone, Chinese foreign investment inflows to the United States increased four-fold, and available data suggests 2017 will see the second highest annual investment on record, after 2016.2 This is not a two-way street: the United States and other foreign investors do not enjoy similar open market access in China. China maintains a dizzying assortment of formal and informal barriers to for- eign investment—from outright restrictions and quotas to mandatory joint ventures, forced localization measures, and domestic licensing regimes. Despite years of negotiations, these barriers are, if anything, growing more cumbersome in many sectors. U.S. firms paint a darkening picture of the business climate they face in China. U.S. FDI in China has slowed considerably in recent years: after growing roughly 180 percent from 2002 to 2007 (albeit from a low baseline), U.S. FDI flows into China have declined since 2012.3 The one-way surge of Chinese investment into the United States comes against a backdrop of strategic mistrust between Washington and Beijing. Ongoing accusations of state-sponsored cyber predation of U.S. firms, Beijing’s increasing aggressiveness over territorial disputes, its systematic efforts to under- mine the U.S. alliance system in Asia, and mounting tensions over North Korea all contribute to a dark- ening mood in the U.S.-China relationship. And, like so much involving China, this investment is simply different. Rarely, if ever, has the United States seen an increase in investment of this magnitude—espe- cially from a non-ally and especially from one where the lines between state ownership and private own- ership are so inherently blurred. For all the concern surrounding Japanese investment in the United States in the 1980s—coming as it did amid fierce economic competition—those debates ultimately re- mained under the umbrella of the U.S.-Japan military alliance. All of this raises questions about whether the United States needs to tighten its stance on Chinese in- bound investment; proposals to that effect have bipartisan support in the Congress. The Donald J. Trump administration has signaled its desire for a tougher approach in its economic dealings with China, which U.S. businesses seem to welcome. One foundation for such an approach is the principle of reciprocity. Roughly two dozen sectors in China—construction, mining, banking, insurance, and so on—remain effectively off-limits to American investment, because the Chinese government protects its domestic companies through regulations and financial subsidies. Even in sectors that technically allow foreign investment, discriminatory industrial policies tilt the playing field in favor of Chinese firms. Until this changes, Washington would be justi- fied—even obligated—to limit Chinese investment in the U.S. market. However, U.S. policymakers do not have a consensus on what a policy of reciprocity would entail, and different policy interpretations could spell quite different economic and foreign policy consequences for the United States. The United States should aim for a version of reciprocity that allows it the flexibility to maximize pressure on the broad range of Chinese industrial policy concerns while leaving a clear route to negotiations. The United States should also encourage European and other Western countries, many of which are seeing similar increases in Chinese investment, to adopt this new approach.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, and Foreign Direct Investment
Political Geography:
United States, China, Asia, and North America

5. Investor-State Arbitration Between Developed Democratic Countries

Author:
Armand de Mestral
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:
Investor-state arbitration (ISA), also known as Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), by which a foreign investor is entitled to sue a state for damages resulting from the alleged violation of an applicable bilateral investment treaty or an investment chapter in a regional trade agreement, has come under scrutiny in many parts of the world. But in no countries has it been subject to greater scrutiny and challenge than in developed democracies. First in Canada and the United States as a result of the adoption of NAFTA Chapter 11, subsequently in the European Union as a result of the adoption of the International Energy Charter, and latterly in other countries such as Australia, critics have alleged that ISA grants an undue privilege to foreign investors whose complaints should be heard by domestic courts instead of panels of international arbitrators. Availability of ISA is in fact worldwide, due to a network of more than 3,200 investment treaties; criticisms have been voiced in different parts of the world and various proposals for change have been made. The criticisms in developed democracies have become sufficiently strong for it to be necessary to raise the question of whether recourse to ISA is appropriate in any form in developed democracies. Armand de Mestral’s paper is the first in the Investor-State Arbitration project. The series of papers will be prepared by leading experts from a number of developed democracies. Each will review the experience of ISA within specific jurisdictions, with a view to understanding the debates that have occurred in each one. The focus of the debate is on developed democracies, but the implications for the whole international community are very much in mind.
Topic:
Development, Energy Policy, Treaties and Agreements, Bilateral Relations, Foreign Direct Investment, and Democracy
Political Geography:
United States and Canada

6. Chinese Investment and CFIUS: Time for an Updated (and Revised) Perspective

Author:
Theodore Moran
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
For more than a decade, China has complained about what it maintains has been a pattern of erratic and politicized treatment of Chinese investors when they attempt to acquire US companies. The Chinese want the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to be more open and transparent in its rulings and to not discriminate against Chinese firms. The United States is not likely to accede to these demands in any formal or legal manner. Moran proposes practical steps to address the concerns of Chinese investors without diluting CFIUS procedures. He provides a national security threat assessment filter, which allows Chinese investors—like investors of all nationalities—to determine when their proposed acquisitions might pose a genuine threat and when any such threat is simply not plausible. He also suggests that first-time Chinese investors seek expert counsel to overcome the secrecy surrounding CFIUS objections to figure out how to proceed with problematic acquisitions.
Topic:
Economics, Markets, and Foreign Direct Investment
Political Geography:
United States

7. The Wisdom of Crowd-Funders: What Motivates Cross-Border Private Development Aid?

Author:
Homi Kharas and Raj M. Desai
Publication Date:
01-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Brookings Institution
Abstract:
The rapid growth in crowd-funded private development aid allows an examination of the preferences of philanthropic individuals with respect to international causes. Using survival analysis, we analyze the rate at which loan requests are funded through an internet-based nonprofit organization that bundles contributions from individuals and transfers them as loans to borrowers in developing countries. We find little evidence for the view that crowd-funders behave as either official aid donors or as selfish aid-givers. Rather, our results show that private aid contributions are motivated by associational communities that link citizens in donor countries to those in recipient countries - in particular, through migrant and diaspora networks - and that, as a result, their giving may be considered a complement to official aid.
Topic:
Development, Non-Governmental Organization, Foreign Aid, and Foreign Direct Investment
Political Geography:
United States

8. The China-United States BIT negotiations: A Chinese perspective

Author:
Sheng Zhang
Publication Date:
01-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Abstract:
The China-US bilateral investment treaty (BIT) negotiations have attracted attention due to the relative size and weight of both economies. Despite broad consensus about the importance of such a treaty, there is considerable debate about its shape and content. The debate is reflected in two recent Columbia FDI Perspectives. Donnelly argued that a China-US BIT should be modeled on the US Model BIT without "splitting the difference between Chinese and US positions", and that the possibility of meaningful BIT negotiations are "really up to China at this point".
Topic:
Economics, Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Bilateral Relations, Foreign Direct Investment, and Governance
Political Geography:
United States, China, Europe, and Colombia

9. Launching a New Chapter in U.S.-Africa Relations

Author:
Richard Downie and Jennifer G. Cooke
Publication Date:
02-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Africa's changing economic landscape is prompting a shift in how U.S. policymakers view the continent. High growth rates, new technologies, and a rapidly expanding consumer class are driving greater global competition for investment and access to potential export markets, and the United States is recognizing that it will need to step up its game to remain relevant and influential in an increasingly crowded and competitive environment. This will mean placing a stronger emphasis on strengthening trade and investment ties and encouraging U.S. companies to take fuller advantage of expanding opportunities. Playing up these opportunities will not only serve long-term U.S. commercial interests in Africa but will serve U.S. development and diplomatic objectives as well. U.S. investments, done right, can have long-term development impacts in Africa, through technology and knowledge transfer, training, systems development, and partnerships. And a new, more optimistic engagement with Africa's citizens and entrepreneurs will have strong resonance with the continent's up-and-coming generation, creating links based on enduring mutual interest.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economics, International Trade and Finance, Markets, and Foreign Direct Investment
Political Geography:
Africa and United States

10. A New Development Agenda

Author:
Daniel F. Runde and Scott Miller
Publication Date:
02-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The link between economic development and state security has been well established but is still too often overlooked. Former secretary of defense Robert Gates argued in support of development efforts as a form of “preventative diplomacy,” preventing the conditions where violent crises occur that may require more aggressive intervention. For example, rising food prices in Egypt have been cited as a major instigator for the protests that overthrew Hosni Mubarak. That does not mean that Mubarak could have stayed in power if only food were more affordable, but higher levels of economic development and the concurrent factors that encourage it could have made the transition more stable and less violent.
Topic:
Development, Economics, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Markets, and Foreign Direct Investment
Political Geography:
United States