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451. Measuring Results and Monitoring Progress of Transitional Justice Processes

Author:
Mateo Porciuncula
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)
Abstract:
Transitional justice processes are complex, politically contested, and not necessarily linear. Because of this, they present unique theoretical and practical challenges for measuring results, which include challenges for gathering data, registering unintended outcomes, reporting progress, providing feedback to interventions, and extracting useful information to establish impact or counterfactuals. Based on a desk research and a series of discussions with practitioners, policymakers, and academics, this report considers the following: The different roles monitoring and evaluation systems can play and the questions they can answer at different stages of a transitional justice process. This report recommends conducting assessments early on to inform design and to build feedback loops into ongoing processes. Key features of transitional justice processes, including their complexity, their political nature, and the difficult contexts where they are usually implemented. Combining qualitative and quantitative methods and designing monitoring and evaluation approaches that allow for capturing rich contextual data and unexpected results. Power dynamics, exclusion, and language, particularly in fragile contexts and when dealing with vulnerable populations. Monitoring and evaluation approaches that are conflict sensitive, victim centered, and participatory. The Sustainable Development Agenda as a framework for measuring results of transitional justice. While a politically legitimate and useful conceptual framework, there is room for improvement as current indicators are not best suited to contexts where a large proportion of the population has experienced human right abuses. Overall, stakeholders in transitional justice should take a “user-centered” approach to measuring progress and results, one that puts the people that a process is meant to serve at the center. In doing so, they can focus on collecting what matters, establishing feedback loops, and learning from and continually improving their interventions.
Topic:
Reform, Transitional Justice, Youth, Criminal Justice, Memory, Institutions, Gender, and Truth and Reconciliation
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, Middle East, Asia, South America, and North America

452. Transitional Justice and Prevention: Summary Findings from Five Country Case Studies

Author:
Roger Duthie
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)
Abstract:
This report summarizes the findings of an ICTJ research project exploring the role that transitional justice can play in preventing both massive and serious violations of human rights as well as violence and violent conflict more broadly. Its conclusions are drawn from case studies of five countries—Colombia, Morocco, Peru, the Philippines, and Sierra Leone—representing a range of complex contexts in which societies are grappling with violent conflicts, repressive governments, or acute inequality. It argues that transitional justice should be an integral element of conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and sustainable development. The report contends that transitional justice can contribute to prevention by: (1) addressing the exclusion and other harms that victims experience due to human rights violations they suffered; (2) addressing the exclusion and related injustices that communities and social groups face as a result of targeted violations and structural marginalization; (3) strengthening the rule of law and making it more inclusive; and (4) catalyzing the reform of institutions and laws that have perpetuated violence and discrimination as a means to exclude marginalized groups. The report also identifies a number of limitations to the preventive impact of transitional justice, including: (1) tensions that can exist between justice and prevention initiatives, especially in the short term; (2) justice processes that may be seen to be insufficiently participatory or even exclusionary themselves; (3) a lack of implementation of measures and reforms that are designed or recommended; and (4) contextual factors such political dynamics, security concerns, and the absence of broader structural change. The report concludes that applying a prevention lens to transitional justice does not fundamentally change how the field is understood, but it does have broad policy implications. First, fostering inclusion should be a primary objective of both the outcomes and the design of transitional justice mechanisms. Second, assessing the preventive role of transitional justice requires a long-term approach to inclusion and reform as these involve changes to social relationships, institutions, and structures. Third, prevention requires a society to confront both the root causes and consequences of injustice, and transitional justice processes can contribute greatly in this regard. However, they alone are not enough.
Topic:
Reform, Transitional Justice, Criminal Justice, Memory, Institutions, Reparations, and Truth and Reconciliation
Political Geography:
Africa, Middle East, Asia, South America, North Africa, North America, Sierra Leone, Morocco, Peru, and Oceania

453. Setting an Agenda for Sustainable Peace: Transitional Justice and Prevention in Colombia

Author:
María Cielo Linares
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)
Abstract:
This study examines the preventive impact of transitional justice mechanisms created in Colombia before the 2016 peace agreement, namely the 2005 Peace and Justice Law and the 2011 Victims and Land Restitution Law. It finds that transitional justice has contributed to prevention in a number of ways, including by: (1) improving institutional responses for victims of human rights violations and creating spaces for participation; (2) adding issues to the public agenda, such as those related to economic and political networks supporting armed groups and the need to address the plundering of land; (3) developing a culture of awareness and respect for human rights; and (4) strengthening leadership within victims’ communities and facilitating the reintegration of victims into public life. The report also concludes, however, that these transitional justice processes have not done all that they could to promote the structural social changes necessary to resolve the underlying violent dynamics, especially in matters of inequity and discrimination, leaving the door open for future violence. Little progress has been made in addressing economic, social, cultural, and environmental rights violations, and insufficient attention has been paid to gender and ethnic discrimination. Where progress has been made in areas such as land restitution and participation, it has been limited by a lack of coordination between the national and local levels, a dearth of political will, and an ensuing failure of implementation. The study demonstrates that pursuing transitional justice in contexts of ongoing violence requires coordination between the justice and security sectors that depends on a holistic view of security and sustainable development. Additionally, it suggests that transitional justice processes have to work in tandem with the institutions set up to more directly address the structural problems of inequity and inequality. Finally, it contends that promoting the rights to truth, justice, reparation, and nonrecurrence requires a strategy to comprehensively address the associated demands and expectations.
Topic:
Reform, Criminal Justice, Memory, Institutions, Peace, Reparations, Gender, Atrocity Prevention, and Truth and Reconciliation
Political Geography:
Colombia and South America

454. A Fight by Other Means: Keeping the Peace with Colombia’s FARC

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Colombia’s 2016 peace deal was a landmark achievement, convincing the FARC guerrillas to disarm and enter civilian life. Yet much remains to be done to show insurgents that they can redress their grievances through ordinary politics. The country’s leaders should recommit to finishing the job.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Colombia and South America

455. A Broken Canopy: Deforestation and Conflict in Colombia

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Colombia’s vast forest is fast receding, partly because guerrillas and criminals are clearing land for farming, ranching and other pursuits. These unregulated activities are causing both dire environmental harm and deadly conflict. Bogotá should take urgent steps to halt the damage.
Topic:
Environment, Regulation, Farming, Ranching, and Deforestation
Political Geography:
Colombia and South America

456. The Pandemic Strikes: Responding to Colombia’s Mass Protests

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
In Colombia’s history of protest, the 2021 mobilisations against inequality and police brutality stand out for their breadth and intensity. Unrest has quieted for now but could soon return. The government should urgently reform the security sector while working to narrow the country’s socio-economic chasms.
Topic:
Inequality, State Violence, Protests, and Police Brutality
Political Geography:
Colombia and South America

457. What Railway Deals Taught Chinese and Brazilians in the Amazon

Author:
Adriana Erthal Abdenur, Maiara Folly, and Maurício Santoro
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Over the past decade, Chinese investments in Brazil have expanded and diversified considerably, especially ones involving infrastructure. Chinese investors have also diversified geographically. Increasingly, major Brazilian infrastructure projects are being planned or implemented with Chinese backing in environmentally sensitive regions such as the Amazon rain forest and the Cerrado, a large savanna region in Central-West Brazil. Chinese actors have become directly involved in such projects against a backdrop of sharpening debates about sustainability and other consequences of large-scale infrastructure projects. This is especially true in protected areas such as land populated by Indigenous groups and conservation units. A notable example is the Ferrogrão project, a major railway line designed to cross sections of the Amazon and Cerrado to deliver goods to Brazilian ports. This paper examines the diverse ways that Brazilian and Chinese actors have learned from each other as they negotiate the terms of these deals. It also explores how these learning processes have been conditioned by intense domestic political debates over these projects in Brazil. Official documents and secondary sources reveal that, rather than a set Chinese way of doing business or a stock Brazilian response, such projects entail dynamic institutional learning. Such learning is shaped not only by the particulars of the Ferrogrão project but also by Chinese actors’ broader engagement with Brazilian infrastructure projects over the past ten years.
Topic:
Environment, Infrastructure, Investment, and Sustainability
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Brazil, South America, and Amazon Basin

458. Chinese Mining and Indigenous Resistance in Ecuador

Author:
Cintia Quiliconi and Pablo Rodriguez Vasco
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Chinese mining companies were drawn to Ecuador by a strong interest in diversifying their sources of copper in Latin America. But Chinese mining operations in Ecuador, which could have contributed to Ecuadorian development, soon gained a negative reputation after these activities prompted a great deal of local pushback, especially from affected Indigenous communities. As a result, the major Chinese mining consortium that now controls Ecuador’s two main copper mines has taken adaptive steps to stabilize its mining investment and increase the security of its supply networks, steps that often have not produced the intended results. Working through two subsidiaries, the Chinese mining consortium has responded to this localized criticism with a blend of tactics that includes co-opting select local figures, colluding with national officials to sidestep environmental and sociocultural safeguards, and coercing inhabitants into relocating under the threat of force from accommodating Ecuadorian authorities. By turning Ecuadorian national elites against locals and using divide-and-conquer tactics among Indigenous communities, the Chinese-led mining projects have entrenched existing political cleavages, have undermined community cohesion, and ultimately have harmed Ecuador’s democratic fabric, especially the standing of civil society and Indigenous rights organizations. While Ecuador has welcomed Chinese capital and other sources of international investment, this infusion of financing has increased the risk of political abuses at the national and local levels. This paper explains the adaptive strategies employed by the Chinese consortium and its subsidiaries in charge of the Mirador and San Carlos Panantza mining sites, contrasting the differing results these tactics have produced in each case. Both projects are located in Ecuador’s so-called Copper Belt provinces of Morona Santiago and Zamora Chinchipe, which are part of a mountain range known as the Cordillera del Cóndor. They are embedded in an ecologically and culturally sensitive zone that includes territory of the Indigenous Shuar community in the Ecuadorian Amazon. In the case of Mirador, the Chinese mining consortium’s adaptive response helped its subsidiary overcome local resistance but only by crushing it. In the case of San Carlos Panantza, local resistance so far has not been overcome, so the Chinese consortium has remained unable to proceed with its project. Neither case, even the Mirador site where mining has moved forward, is a sign of success for future relationships between Chinese mining conglomerates and Ecuadorian communities. To understand why the Chinese consortium’s adaptive tactics were somewhat more successful in Mirador, it is important to focus on the differing composition of the inhabitants of the land where the two mines are located. Mirador sits on territory shared by Shuar and non-Shuar settler communities who have different bonds with the land. The non-Shuar settlers emphasize the productive and commercial value of the land over the spiritual and symbolic value that is key for many in the Shuar community. The Canadian-held and later Chinese-controlled companies active in Ecuador’s mining industry understood this difference between Mirador’s inhabitants and adapted accordingly: they managed to displace resistant residents despite widespread opposition through questionable and sometimes arguably illegal purchases of land. In San Carlos Panantza, a second subsidiary of the Chinese consortium chose to respond to local criticism with the same alleged practices of violence, occupation, and displacement used in Mirador. However, although the two projects are geographically near each other, the situation played out differently at the second would-be mine: ongoing opposition has prevented mining operations from beginning at all yet. Again, paying attention to the inhabitants of the land is instructive. San Carlos Panantza is in the heart of Shuar territory in Arutam, a region with few non-Indigenous settlers. The mining incursion by the Chinese-run subsidiary and the Ecuadorian security forces tasked with supporting it were seen as a threat to the area’s Shuar people, who have been strongly protesting and opposing the mining venture since late 2016. This state of affairs is likely to have far-reaching effects for Ecuador too. The apparent collusion between Ecuador’s national government and the Chinese consortium (and its subsidiaries) has crushed those who oppose mining, has upended the country’s policies on resource extraction, and has yielded documented violations of local communities’ human rights. These events have transpired because both the Chinese firms and the Ecuadorian state have tended to see local communities as an obstacle to the development of the country’s extractive industries. As a result, local social and environmental safeguards have been weakened, tenuous consultation processes have eroded, environmental licenses have been granted under dubious circumstances, and local communities have been forcibly displaced. This paper explores the implications of the adaptive tactics chosen by the Chinese mining subsidiaries that run the Mirador and San Carlos Panantza mines. It also addresses how Chinese companies have, in some cases, negotiated with local communities to begin mining exploitation, while also analyzing the ways the Chinese mining consortium has interacted with the Ecuadorian government and other players, such as the Canadian mining company it acquired and other peer companies that set up successful coalitions for mining development in Ecuador. Finally, the paper explores the effects the agreements between the Ecuadorian government and the Chinese consortium have had on local actors.
Topic:
Development, Government, Mining, Indigenous, and Resistance
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South America, and Ecuador

459. How Argentina Pushed Chinese Investors to Help Revitalize Its Energy Grid

Author:
Juliana González Jáuregui
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
China’s modernization strategy integrates both domestic and foreign policy, especially through two complementary prongs—the so-called Going Global strategy and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This push to internationalize China’s development strategy has ushered in a new era in Beijing’s relationships with countries and regions around the world. In Latin America, these policies have triggered a dynamic pattern of interactions between China and the region’s political economy. Being rich in fuels, energy, foodstuffs, and basic products, countries in Latin America have emerged as significant suppliers for China, but they also have become important destinations for Chinese-made industrial products, and, subsequently, Chinese investment and lending. For Latin American countries, China’s rise as an influential investor, lender, trader, and builder has created an array of new challenges and opportunities. While Beijing has harnessed its engagement in Latin America to support its own development, countries in the region have sought to direct some of China’s economic and financial resources to promote their own strategic sectors. Argentina illustrates this dynamic well, particularly in the energy sector. Argentinian government officials and business leaders have attracted Chinese investment and finance into renewables and other types of energy to promote Buenos Aires’s goals of taking a hybrid path to an energy transition. For its part, China has seized this opportunity to advance its own development goals and to participate in Argentina’s energy transition strategy. Though Argentina has not yet formally joined the BRI, Argentinian officials have reported publicly that Buenos Aires has already decided to endorse the initiative and is waiting for the right moment to do so.1 Argentina has been weighing the pros and cons of signing on to the BRI. On the one hand, signing on could enhance the presence of Chinese actors in the Argentinian renewables sector, as China seeks to intertwine its engagement in Latin America with the deployment of the Green BRI, the dimensions of the initiative that are framed in terms of environmental sustainability. More broadly, joining the BRI could attract new Chinese investment and finance in alternative energy and electricity transmission infrastructure, further contributing to Argentina’s goals for an energy transition. On the other hand, Argentina faces the challenge of designing and implementing a long-term national energy plan that complements its role in the BRI. This means devising an energy plan that, among broader objectives, seeks to help Argentina harness Chinese know-how on renewables and develop innovation and technological capacities of its own. In the meantime, Argentina’s lack of committed engagement with the BRI to date has not impeded the expansion of Chinese overseas investment and financing for renewables and other types of energy projects in the country. In a clear sign of political agency, the diplomatic outreach of key Argentinian national and provincial government officials, as well as corporate players’ push for local associations, has been central in the quest to increase Chinese engagement in Argentina’s solar and wind power sectors and in other alternative energy projects. These interactions have allowed Argentinian policymakers to help shape an adaptive partnership to strengthen the alignment between Chinese investments and Argentinian development objectives. Admittedly, this engagement has at times encountered resistance due to environmental and social risks in certain localities. Even so, these concerns are part of the learning process and set a tone for future cooperation on energy projects. Renewables and alternative energy will continue to be a magnet for global investment as countries around the world strive to address climate change. Thus, local tensions are pushing both Argentinian and Chinese actors to learn from the problematic impacts of some projects and do more to address local communities’ concerns jointly. Successful responses to such concerns would further enhance the basis of Argentina and China’s energy-focused adaptative partnership.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Economy, Business, Investment, and Energy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Argentina, and South America

460. Non-Consensual Intimate Image Distribution: The Legal Landscape in Kenya, Chile and South Africa

Author:
Michelle Bordachar, Nonhlanhla Chanza, Kailee Hilt, Carlos Lara, Emma Monteiro, and Grace Mutung'u
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:
The non-consensual distribution of intimate images, colloquially referred to as “revenge pornography” or “image-based sexual abuse,” is an unforgiving reality that continues to plague the lives of many within the current digital landscape. It alludes to the non-consensual distribution of photos or videos depicting nudity, partial nudity or sexually explicit acts. This paper provides an overview of the state of the law, both existing and proposed, in three countries in the Global South — Kenya, Chile and South Africa — as it relates to the non-consensual distribution of intimate images. It was prepared under the overall coordination of CIGI’s Kailee Hilt and Emma Monteiro, who also wrote the introduction and conclusion. The three case studies were written by leading experts from Kenya, Chile and South Africa. The authors discuss current and proposed legislation in response to non-consensual intimate image distribution, while also sharing recommendations for further action to address this growing form of gender-based violence within the digital sphere. On June 24, 2021, CIGI held a panel discussion on this topic moderated by Ruhiya Seward, senior program officer at the International Development Research Centre. Grace Mutung’u, Michelle Bordachar and Nonhlanhla Chanza, experts who contributed the case studies in the paper, spoke about this issue as it pertains to Kenya, Chile and South Africa, respectively, and offered recommendations and road maps for further action within the existing landscape.
Topic:
Rule of Law, Sexual Violence, Judiciary, Digital Culture, and Digitization
Political Geography:
Kenya, Africa, South Africa, South America, and Chile