5901. The Case Against a Dollar Policy
- Author:
- Samuel Brittan
- Publication Date:
- 07-2006
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- The Cato Journal
- Institution:
- The Cato Institute
- Abstract:
- Milton Friedman’s classic “The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates” was published in 1953, but its inception dates back to 1950 when the author was a consultant to the U.S. Economic Cooperation Administration that was responsible for implementing the Marshall Plan. At that time, it was taken for granted that the Western nations were committed to a system of fixed exchange rates, except for periodic adjustments to new parities. Little did he know that in 1952 the British Treasury had proposed—in a very pessimistic vein and as a result of gloomy and wrongheaded forebodings—that sterling should move to a floating rate. The plan, known as “Robot,” was defeated in the British Cabinet. The country had to wait until 1972 to move to floating and another 20 years—after it was forced out of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism—to learn how to operate economic policy under such a system. Internationally the big shift to floating dates to the early 1970s, between President Nixon’s suspension of gold convertibility in 1971 and the collapse of the Smithsonian attempt to rebuild a fixed exchange rate system in 1973. The fixed rate system broke down because of the inherent tensions between the goals of free multilateral trade, national freedom to determine monetary policy, and fixed exchange rates. It is fortunate that a fixed exchange rate regime was the element that gave way in the end. The main force for change was as usual the pressure of events. Insofar as there was an intellectual influence it was the coming together of a coalition of “sound money” economists who wanted to be free to run stable domestic policies and “expansionists” who wanted to experiment with a more rapid increase in domestic nominal demand.
- Topic:
- Economics, Exchange Rate Policy, Currency, and Exchange Rates
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus