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1. How Sweden Can Use its EU Presidency to Build the Civilian Security Dimension of the Eastern Partnership

Author:
Michal Baranowski, Mikołaj Bronert, Maximilian Kaminski, and Elene Kintsurashvili
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) lacks a security dimension and this is an urgent reform need. In particular, the EU should become the leading provider of civilian security support in the EaP countries, particularly Ukraine. But significant weaknesses in this policy field inhibit its capability to do so. Sweden’s long-term focus on the EaP, its experience in augmenting domestic cyber and hybrid resilience as well as in placing the civilian aspect at the heart of its national security, and it its leading contribution to the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) missions put it in a unique position to be a champion of the security dimension of the EaP during its presidency of the Council of the EU. Sweden can do so by pushing for: a EU-NATO memorandum of understanding on the EaP; the provision of a rapid financing mechanism to assist EaP countries in nonmilitary defense; a more coordinated training, planning, and implementing process for CSDP missions between EU actors and the EaP countries; a more targeted approach towards EaP countries; and prioritization of deepening of cooperation with EaP countries in the domain of hybrid threats.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, and Partnerships
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, Sweden, and Central Europe

2. Economic Priorities in Post-war Ukraine

Author:
Dmytro Boyarchuk
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Social and Economic Research - CASE
Abstract:
Ukraine has been a stellar example of a little reform going a long way. First invaded by Russia in 2014, the Ukraine of 2022 was a different country, with more resilience, more ability, and more depth. As it pushes to repel the Russian aggressor, it is never too early to think about how Ukraine can continue its reform process and become a state that is free of Russia, economically strong, and a model for policy reform. The ways in which Ukraine can attain this goal are contained in the economic roadmap, “Economic Priorities in Post-war Ukraine,” produced by Ukrainian experts and world-class policy advisors under CASE-Center for Social Research and CASE Ukraine and funded by agencies from around Europe and the United States. This report focuses on the essential reforms that will help Ukraine with the post-war reconstruction, as well as enable progress in its efforts on the way to EU membership. Over 30 years of independence, Ukraine has launched almost all of the necessary reforms to build and develop a market economy. In 2014, Ukraine signed the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, and substantial progress has been demonstrated since then. However, the country fought against a legacy of start-stop reforms and inattention to major objectives such as building the rule of law and encouraging private sector competition. Before the full-scale Russian invasion, it had been making progress in institutional reforms but still had far to go. This report addresses many of the complex tasks that Ukraine needs to complete, with the main challenge being the rule of law, a problem lasting for three decades. Our team of experts propose specific mechanisms to make the transition to a country which respects the rule of law, including ways to improve the judiciary, respect property rights, and encourage private sector competition. The report also examines the question on how the Ukrainian government can attract funding and rebuild the country after the war is over, discussing ways in which the EU and the donor community can be involved. The eventual end of the war also provides Ukraine with a unique opportunity to leap ahead in the European integration process and to finish its institutional reforms. With Ukraine now a candidate for EU membership, the prospects of the integration process, the unprecedented support for integration with the EU in Ukrainian society and the continued support of the West, present Ukraine with a way forward and overcoming the obstacles that have delayed, stalled, or even caused the abandonment of reforms in the past.
Topic:
Development, Reform, Economy, Institutions, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

3. Lessons Learned from the Development of Turkish IR: A View from Greece

Author:
Kyriakos Mikelis
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:
Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:
The essay addresses an outsider's perception of the characteristics and dynamics of the IR field/discipline in Turkey. How may this country serve as a role model or, at the very least, as a source of inspiration, reflection, or evaluation of the field's development in other local/national settings? In this respect, Greece is chosen as a case study. Βy addressing and assessing Turkish self-reflection and the search for disciplinary identity within Turkish IR scholarship, what can be learned, on behalf of Greek IR scholarship, regarding both Greece's and Turkey's social scientific development regarding foreign affairs/policy? A major theme discovered is the acknowledgement of the limitations of the dependency/vulnerability-centered explanations for the development of IR.
Topic:
International Relations, Development, Academia, and Social Science
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Greece

4. The Russian-Ukrainian War: An Opportunity to Strengthen the AfCFTA

Author:
Steve Tametong and Venessa Aboudi
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
The world had hardly covered from the horrors of the COVID-19 pandemic when it was once again tested on February 24, 2022, by the outbreak of war between Russia and Ukraine. The consequences of this war are quite significant for humanity. On the economic level, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict has highlighted the disadvantages of globalization, understood as a process marked by the interconnection and interdependence of world economies. The inflationary shock and the food crisis resulting from the inoperative nature of import channels for certain basic necessities from Russia and Ukraine have demonstrated the fragility of the economies. With regard to African countries, in particular, the prices of several basic food products (wheat, flour, rice, maize, bread, vegetable oil, etc.) have risen sharply. Indeed, most African countries are almost dependent on the import of agricultural products and seeds from the two belligerent countries. These imports correspond to 35 billion US dollars of imports each year (1). This appears to be an incongruity given the extent of arable land on the African continent. The low production and especially processing capacity increases the dependence of African economies on the import of these basic products. The outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict makes it possible to question the economic resilience of African States, that is to say, their “capacity [ to] keep output close to [their] potential despite a shock ” (2). Above all, it offers the opportunity to analyze the economic and commercial potential of the AfCFTA in the process of building the resilience of African economies to external shocks. Indeed, the AfCFTA was officially launched in January 2021 with the main objective of “creating a single market for goods and services facilitated by the movement of people in order to deepen the economic integration of the African continent…” (3). This policy note is structured around the idea that the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, in view of its socio-economic consequences on the African continent, offers an opportunity for African countries to work toward the strengthening of the AfCFTA. So that it appears as a real pole of competitiveness and inter-African trade likely to counter the shocks and uncertainties of the dynamics of world trade. Before analyzing the AfCFTA as a pole of production and export of African products (II), it is necessary to take stock of the socio-economic consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian war on African economies (I).
Topic:
Security, International Trade and Finance, Military Strategy, Free Trade, Peace, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

5. EU Energy Security & the Maghreb

Author:
Intissar Fakir and Alberto Rizzi
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
North Africa and the Sahel Program Director Intissar Fakir speaks to Alberto Rizzi - pan-European fellow at the Rome Office of the European Council on Foreign Relations - about existing and future energy partnerships between the European Union and the Maghreb. In the wake of energy market disruption caused by the conflict in Ukraine, what alternative fuel sources are the EU looking towards - and how does this align with current production capacities in Maghreb countries?
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, North Africa, and Morocco

6. Reasons for the West’s Hatred of Russia

Author:
Yury Sayamov
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
East View Information Services
Abstract:
Russia as a state and civilization and Russian statehood as an institution have acted for centuries as system-forming factors of the world order. They have, at various times, exerted influence of varying intensity and significance on the shape, character, and content of international relations, while also being influenced by them. The West’s hostility toward Russia arose, took shape, and began to actively manifest itself as one of the constants of this influence, occasionally reaching the level of outright hatred and spiraling into attacks against Russian statehood, which invariably mobilized the country’s peoples to rebuff the aggressors.
Topic:
History, Statehood, Information Warfare, Crusades, and Russophobia
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

7. Russia’s Aggression Against Ukraine: Concept, Ideology, Objectives, Means, Consequences

Author:
Plamen Pantev
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
The study tries to outline interim conclusions about the concept, the ideology, the objectives and the tools used by the Russian federation in this barbaric war of attrition against Ukraine – a war of a nuclear superpower against a smaller neighbouring country. The study does not aim to analyse the strange way the war is developing – Russians carry on military attacks in both a regular and terrorist manner 7 on the whole territory of Ukraine, while the Ukrainians are deterred to counter-attack the aggressor on the latter’s own territory and to fight with longer-range arms even on their own land. The author understands how many issues from the theoretic fields of international relations, foreign, security and defense studies need to be considered to understand in a holistic way the final result of the interaction of domestic Russian, international, political, economic, governance, psychological and other problems that led to launching an aggressive and devastating war in the European continent by Moscow. The purpose of the study is not to outline the avalanche of mistakes in the policy of the collective West towards a showing for decades signs of revenge imperialist Russia. Neither it aims to point to the multitude of military mistakes by the aggressor in the last year. The aim of the study is to outline and discuss the concept, the ideology, the objectives and the means of the Russian aggression. Revealing the Nazi-like behaviour of the Russian leadership and its armed forces could serve to construct the broader picture of the developing conflict and learn how to prevent a similar invasion by Moscow. The study aims to prove that the legal and moral consequences of the war will be the conviction of the aggressor for the genocide and the war crimes. This would be the only possibility for normalising the life of the Ukrainians and the Russians as well as of the broader international relations system.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, NATO, Imperialism, Sovereignty, European Union, Conflict, Ideology, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

8. European Security and Defence: Don’t Get Your Hopes Up Just Yet

Author:
Adaja Stoetman
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
“2022 will be the year of European defence”.[1] These were the words of European Council President Charles Michel in October 2021. When he gave his speech at the Charlemagne Prize Award Ceremony in Aachen, no one expected that his statement would materialise in the way it did. Yes, headway was to be expected with the adoption of the Strategic Compass and European countries demonstrating commitment to investing more in defence cooperation. Although there is still a world of difference between ambitions and reality, the degree of progress accomplished in the past twelve months was not foreseen.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Politics, European Union, and Institutions
Political Geography:
Europe

9. The War against Ukraine and Russia’s Position in Europe’s Security Order

Author:
Stephen Blank
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Russia’s aggressions against its neighbours since 2008 – first Georgia, then Ukraine twice – impel the urgent reconstruction of European security. While articulating a post-war European security order and Russia’s place there is easy, implementing it is extremely difficult. Nevertheless, in Ukraine, Russia has unilaterally, and unprovokedly, violated or broken at least eight major international treaties and accords, ranging from the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, according to which Moscow had pledged to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity, to the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty, which prohibits nuclear threats against non-nuclear states.[1] It has also broken NATO’s (and especially Washington’s) conventional deterrence.[2]
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

10. Turkey vis-à-vis Russia’s War against Ukraine

Author:
Özgür Ünlühisarcıklı
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Characterising Turkey’s policy towards Russia’s war on Ukraine is not an easy task. Elements of both support for Ukraine and neutrality have emerged in the past year. An analysis of the fundamentals of Turkey–US relations and Russia–Turkey relations is thus helpful.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, and United States of America

11. Diplomacy and the War against Ukraine

Author:
Ferdinando Nelli Feroci
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Normally, diplomacy is meant as the set of rules and processes that preside over international relations to prevent or resolve disputes and conflicts, or even as a special skill in dealing with complex issues and finding compromises. If this is the case, one may be tempted to conclude that diplomacy has so far failed with respect to the year-long conflict in Ukraine. But perhaps it is worth analysing the issue more closely.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Diplomacy, Crisis Management, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

12. The War against Ukraine and Its Lessons for NATO Militaries: Food for Thought

Author:
Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
One year of full-fledged conventional war fought on the European continent between two large countries, including a nuclear power, is obviously a historical watershed for NATO and the whole Euro-Atlantic area, whose strategic implications are yet to be fully assessed. The conflict has already destroyed a number of expectations widely shared in Western Europe, including the ideas that Putin would not have invaded the whole of Ukraine, that Western sanctions would have paralysed his ability to wage a prolonged military campaign, or that Europeans would have diminished their military support to Ukraine over the first wartime winter. Given the ongoing “fog of war” and uncertainty about future scenarios, it is perhaps too early to identify lessons for allies and their militaries. Still, the following elements may be considered food for thought for the Western defence policy communities, cum grano salis.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Military Affairs, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

13. The Existential Value of Ukraine’s Freedom

Author:
Nathalie Tocci
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has turned the international spotlight back onto the value of democracy and the contrast between liberal democracies and authoritarian systems. However, it has done so by adding nuance and emotional power to what was previously a rather sterile debate. When Joe Biden was elected President of the United States, putting an end – at least for the time being – to the traumatic years for US democracy epitomised by Donald Trump’s presidency, international politics reacquired a distinctively normative, if not ideological, taste. Powers like Russia and China should be opposed, not “only” because of their aggressive or unfair behaviour – be it in the South China Sea, Taiwan, Ukraine, cyber, energy, technology or trade – but because that malign behaviour, so the argument went, is intrinsically linked to the nature of their political systems: it’s democracy versus autocracy, stupid.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Democracy, Freedom, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

14. Italy’s Response to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Nona Mikhelidze
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
In line with the EU’s policy, former Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi and current Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni have taken a strong stance in response to the Russian aggression against Ukraine by firmly condemning the invasion and offering their full support for Kyiv’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Italy

15. Reach for the Stars: Bridging Italy’s Potential in Space with Its Foreign and Security Policy

Author:
Karolina Muti
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Italian capabilities, expertise and potential in the space sector are not widely known. Among state actors, Rome has actually been a pioneer in the field, boasting a long tradition that started in 1964 when Italy became the third country, after the Soviet Union and the United States, to send a nationally manufactured satellite into orbit.[1] From an industrial standpoint, Italy is among the few countries whose companies cover the whole space value chain.[2] In Europe, Rome is ranked second for total number of assets in orbit and is currently the third contributor to the European Space Agency (ESA).[3] An Italian astronaut, Samantha Cristoforetti, has recently become the first European woman to take command of the International Space Station (ISS).[4]
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Military Strategy, European Union, and Space
Political Geography:
Europe and Italy

16. Small-scale LNG in the Euro-Mediterranean: A Contribution to the Decarbonisation of the Maritime Sector

Author:
Pier Paolo Raimondi
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
While governments have reaffirmed their commitment towards energy transition in light of the current energy crisis, the urgency to act implies to use all possible solutions to reduce CO2 emissions during the transitional period. Natural gas can play a role in the decarbonisation of certain sectors, such as the transport sector. In this sense, the small-scale LNG industry could contribute to the decarbonisation of the Mediterranean region. Regulatory and political incentives as well as socioeconomic and environmental benefits could represent critical drivers for the growing role of the small-scale liquefied natural gas (SSLNG), while it will need to overcome several challenges (e.g. political pressure, economic and infrastructure constraints).
Topic:
Climate Change, Natural Resources, European Union, Gas, Decarbonization, and Energy
Political Geography:
Europe and Mediterranean

17. Citizens’ Perceptions on Public Safety and Threats to National Security in Kosovo

Author:
Dea Fetiu and Dorjeta Rukiqi
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
The following Western Balkans Security Barometer (WBSB) report provides a thorough analysis of respondents’ perception of potential threats to their public safety and national security in Kosovo in 2022. Respondents feel generally safe in their close communities. Nevertheless, the sense of safety gradually decreases as the communities grow larger. Around 77 percent of the respondents declared that they feel safe in their houses, while they feel the least safe in their country (around 33 percent). Respondents’ perceptions between 2021 and 2022 indicate a slow decrease in their feeling of public safety; whereby in the previous 2021 WBSB, 79 percent and 40 percent of respondents stated that they feel safe in their homes and in their country, respectively. On the other hand, almost half of the respondents feel safe on the cyberspace. Brain drain is ranked as the highest threat to public safety, with 83 percent of the respondents viewing it as a threat or high threat to their respective communities. Stray animals and drug abuse are also perceived as highly threatening phenomena. Moreover, respondents are generally concerned about shortages of necessities, however, they express the biggest concerns about the shortages of electricity. On the national level, respondents see the increased prices of goods as the highest threat towards Kosovo’s national security, followed closely by the energy crisis. Pollution and climate change, violent extremism, and COVID-19 are seen as the lowest threats to national security. When asked if COVID-19 continues to endanger public health, almost half of the respondents answered negatively. Further, COVID-19 was ranked as the lowest threat to Kosovo’s national security. Opinions are somewhat divided when it comes to the efficiency of the COVID-19 vaccine on hindering the pandemic; yet 45 percent of respondents believe that the vaccine contributed to curb the pandemic. According to the survey data, the main causes of domestic violence in Kosovo are poor economic conditions and low levels of education. Respondents believe that raising the quality of education, and organizing more raising awareness campaigns are some of the measures that need to be taken by institutions to prevent and fight domestic violence.
Topic:
National Security, Public Opinion, and Public Safety
Political Geography:
Europe, Kosovo, and Balkans

18. Fossil Fuel Industry Phase-Out and Just Transition: Designing Policies to Protect Workers’ Living Standards

Author:
Robert Pollin
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:
This paper focuses on just transition policies targeted at supporting workers now employed in the fossil fuel industries and ancillary sectors within high-income economies. As a general normative principle, I argue that the overarching aim of such policies should be to protect workers against major losses in their living standards resulting through the fossil fuel industry phase-out. The impacted workers should be provided with three critical guarantees to accomplish this, in the area of jobs, compensation and pensions. Just transition policies should also support workers in the areas of job search, retraining and relocation, but these forms of support should be understood as supplementary. Within the framework of these broad principles, the paper first reviews experiences with transitional policies in Germany, the UK, the EU and, more briefly, Japan and Canada. A critical point that emerges is that these just transition policies do not provide the needed guarantees for assuring workers that they will not experience major living standard declines. The paper then describe an illustrative just transition program for workers that includes reemployment, income and pension guarantees, focusing on a case study for the U.S. state of West Virginia. The results show that the costs of the just transition program for West Virginia’s fossil fuel industry dependent workers will amount to an annual average of about $42,000 per worker, equal to about 0.2 percent of West Virginia’s GDP. I briefly summarize results from the seven other studies of U.S. states and for the overall U.S. economy. For the U.S. economy overall, the just transition program’s costs would total to about 0.015 percent of GDP. These findings demonstrate that providing a generous just transition program does not entail unaffordable levels of public spending. Robust just transition policies should therefore be understood as an entirely realistic prospect for all high-income economies.
Topic:
Political Economy, Labor Issues, European Union, GDP, Economy, and Fossil Fuels
Political Geography:
Japan, United Kingdom, Europe, Canada, and Germany

19. The Political Economy of the Cost of Living Crisis in the UK: What Is to Be Done?

Author:
Ozlem Onaran
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:
This paper analyzes the political economy of the cost of living crisis in the context of the United Kingdom. The paper presents the long-term trends in the wage share, wealth inequality, labour’s bargaining power, and real wages in the UK. The first and second waves of inflation in 2021-22 are discussed presenting the trends in the profit margins. The policy responses by the conservative governments and the Bank of England are analyzed, and their limitations are assessed. The paper concludes with short-run and medium-run policy alternatives to the cost of living crisis
Topic:
Political Economy, Labor Issues, Inequality, Inflation, and Cost of Living
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

20. Environmental Inequality in Industrial Brownfields: Evidence from French Municipalities

Author:
Charlotte Bez, Michael Ash, and James K. Boyce
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:
Recent research on environmental inequality has extended its focus from ongoing pollution to legacy pollution by examining the geography of industrial brownfields, defined as nonproductive, contaminated land. This article is the first extensive brownfield analysis for a European country from an environmental inequality perspective, exploiting the political momentum in France where brownfield restoration has become a national priority. In doing so, we combine data on over 7,200 industrial brownfields from the 2022 geodatabase ‘Cartofriches’ with socio-economic variables at the municipality level. We demonstrate communities with higher percentages of foreign-born and unemployed persons are disproportionately more likely to be located near brownfields. The social gradient increases significantly in communities that host many brownfields, the so-called hotspots. There is an inverted U-shaped relationship with income, with a positive correlation until the 75th percentile (C23,700 annually). These findings are robust to different controls, including across urban and rural areas, though with regional differences. Further, we also account for the location of noxious industrial facilities sourced from the E-PRTR database to show the existence of cumulative impacts of environmental risks. Our analysis provides crucial entry points for restorative environmental justice considerations and has important implications for Europe’s just transition and cohesion policies.
Topic:
Environment, Inequality, Pollution, Industry, and Municipalities
Political Geography:
Europe and France

21. Toward Inclusive Recovery in Ukraine: Engaging Women and Civil Society in Ukraine’s Relief, Recovery, and Reconstruction

Author:
Jess Keller
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security (GIWPS)
Abstract:
Women’s participation in the design and implementation of Ukraine’s recovery programs is critical to maximize the effectiveness of the reconstruction process, take into account differentiated needs, and bolster post-conflict development. Key recommendations: Promote women’s participation, leadership, and decision-making in Ukraine’s planning frameworks and recovery process. Ensure new funding enables women’s active participation in Ukraine’s recovery and advances gender equality. Establish a gender-sensitive monitoring mechanism for the Ukrainian government to report on recovery progress and collect and analyze sex-disaggregated data. Prioritize the re-establishment of critical social infrastructure and services. Integrate gender equality in Ukraine’s EU accession commitments.
Topic:
Civil Society, Reconstruction, Women, Recovery, Participation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

22. Can Israel mediate an end to the Ukraine war?

Author:
Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Israel is well positioned to again become a go-between between Russia and Ukraine, an effort that could further elevate its international status
Topic:
Diplomacy, Conflict, Peace, and Mediation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Israel

23. Turkey’s Rift with Sweden and Finland

Author:
Hay Ertan Cohen Yanarocak
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Turkey’s relations with Sweden and Finland are at a crossroads, and it behooves all three countries to proceed with sensitivity to protect their national interests
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Finland, and Sweden

24. The Future of EU Blended Finance and Guarantees: An Assessment of Cooperation Strategies with Least Developed Countries in Africa

Author:
Erik Lundsgaarde
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
The European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+) is a core element of EU development cooperation and reflects the EU’s strong commitment to deploying blended finance and guarantees as development financing tools. This discussion paper examines the EU’s intentions concerning how the EFSD+ will be integrated into geographic programmes, focussing on the least developed countries (LDCs) in Africa. Based on a review of the Multiannual Indicative Programmes (MIPs) for 30 African LDCs as well as the regional MIP for Sub-Saharan Africa covering the period 2021-2027, the paper provides an overview of funding reserved for EFSD+ implementation in geographic programmes, identifies the expected EFSD+ sectoral priorities and summarises references to development finance institutions (DFIs) as EFSD+ implementation partners. This descriptive review highlights issues for the future monitoring and assessment of the EFSD+. The paper points to uncertainty about the magnitude of the management challenge that EU institutions face in EFSD+ implementation given the difficulties of predicting the scale of guarantee-backed operations in individual countries, the lack of information on the expected volume of blended finance operations, and the limited analysis of how EFSD+ tools relate to other EU funding approaches. The paper also notes that EU institutions should be more explicit about the criteria shaping EFSD+ resource commitments to clarify relevant prerequisites for the effective deployment of EFSD+ tools. Finally, the broad thematic scope for EFSD+ use implies that knowledge about how blended finance and guarantees function and how the financing approaches interact with other interventions needs to increase throughout the EU system.
Topic:
Development, European Union, Finance, Sustainability, and Cooperation
Political Geography:
Africa and Europe

25. Towards a Seat at the Table: How an Initiative of Cities Got Their Voices Heard during Germany’s 2022 G7 Presidency

Author:
Maria Elisabeth Gronen and Yannick Sudermann
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
In the past, both researchers and policymakers have often underlined the important role cities have to play in reaching the objectives of the Paris Agreement and the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Meanwhile, city networks have become increasingly active in approaching international institutions and getting their voices heard. Among them are the Urban7 Group – a recently founded group of city associations from G7 countries advocating for a stronger involvement of cities in G7 policymaking. The discussion about who has a voice in the G7 and what role cities can potentially play in it is significant. The G7, despite being somewhat contentious, remains a highly relevant forum both in terms of the negative contribution of its members to global sustainability crises (such as climate change) and their collective economic capability to address the crises. In the past, references to the role of cities were largely absent from G7 official documents; this changed during Germany’s G7 presidency in 2022. Based on a document analysis and semi-structured interviews with ministry officials and city network representatives, this paper investigates how, in 2022, the Urban7 Group was involved in the G7 process, and which actors and contextual factors had an impact on the width and depth of this involvement. While the German presidency opted not to directly involve the Urban7 Group as an official G7 engagement group, the group nevertheless gained access to ministerial negotiations, in particular those of the new G7 track on urban development. The paper finds that this engagement was facilitated by pre-existing contacts with ministerial officials as well as changes in the delineation of ministries following the German federal election in late 2021 that led to changes in political leadership and the formation of a new ministry to take responsibility for urban development. The paper closes with critical reflections on the 2022 process, recommendations and potential avenues for future research.
Topic:
Sustainable Development Goals, Institutions, Cities, and G7
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

26. Beyond European extraterritoriality, for legal intelligence and compliance in the service of sovereignty: A response to the extraterritoriality of foreign laws to safeguard fundamental European values

Author:
Amélie Giuliani
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
In this period of change, companies must anticipate their local legal environment, regional and international regulations and foreign laws with extraterritorial scope on a daily basis.
Topic:
International Relations, Sovereignty, Law, European Union, and Compliance
Political Geography:
Europe

27. European energy solidarity: strengthening the EU’s crisibility

Author:
Aline Bartenstein
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
By default, when the EU is hit by a crisis, member states tend to have a national sovereignty reflex. When Italy was hit hard by the Covid-19 pandemic, the first reaction was to close its borders and restrict the export of urgently needed medical equipment. National interest superseded the call for European solidarity. Although member states have repeatedly managed to unite and – in the face of the polycrisis – developed a certain crisibility, no one would have been surprised if member states had preferred to seek their own advantage when Russia started the war in Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Nearly one year later, member states are (still) united – some declaring this as never before – and a gas or electricity crisis has so far been averted. This unity, which certainly threatened to crumble in the face of Hungarian opposition, German hesitancy, and the different approaches to dealing with the war, leads us to the question of what is different this time? Certainly, the EU's identity has been profoundly challenged by the war since its peacekeeping credentials – the EU is even a recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize – were perceived to be at risk. Was is this identity-threatening experience that united the member states? Or was it the recognition of Russia as a common foe that strengthened the bond between them?
Topic:
Sovereignty, European Union, Solidarity, Energy, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Italy

28. Can the EU still wrest the Balkans from their blighted history?

Author:
Jean Bizet and Fabrice Hugot
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
It is perhaps necessary, first of all, to recall why the name "Western Balkans" is still used to describe this peninsula in south-eastern Europe, why this imprecise geographical concept is preferred to any other name. To answer this question is to recognise from the outset the difficult fate suffered by this part of Europe: if we prefer to speak of the Balkans, it is quite simply because only geography is stable in this region.
Topic:
European Union, History, Geography, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Balkans

29. Geopolitical and Technocratic: EU International Actorness and Anne PINTSCH Russia’s War Against Ukraine

Author:
Anne Pintsch and Maryna Rabinovych
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 marked the start of the largest and most brutal war at the heart of the European continent since World War II. It inevitably came as a “cold shower” for the EU and Member States’ politicians, demonstrating with absolute certainty the fragility of the international and European security order. The EU responded to the invasion with unprecedented sanctions against Russia and Belarus and multifaceted resolute support to Ukraine. The latter included the breaking of many previously existing taboos, such as the first ever use of the European Peace Facility to procure weapons for a third country at war or offering collective protection to about 8 million Ukrainian citizens and residents, fleeing the war
Topic:
European Union, Geopolitics, Resilience, Technocracy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

30. Europe as a power: now or never

Author:
Jean-Paul Palomeros
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
One year already, one year of misfortune for the Ukrainian people, one year of blind violence, of sirens’ blasts, of terror, of exile for some, even of deportation, of grief for many families. One year of systematic destruction of Ukraine's industry, its infrastructure, its energy production centres, part of its agricultural resources, of its economy. One year of oppression in the occupied territories, torture, war crimes, indoctrination, Russification. However, this appraisal is not exhaustive, it cannot take into account the destructuring of Ukrainian society, the reality and the extent of the sacrifices of a young generation of Ukrainians who are paying with their lives for their visceral attachment to their country and its values. But it must be stressed and repeated, for the Ukrainian people and their army it has been a year of struggle, of fierce, often heroic resistance, of resilience, of will to defend a free, democratic Ukraine and to restore its sovereignty.
Topic:
Crisis Management, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe

31. Gender equality in Europe: a still imperfect model in the world

Author:
Stefanie Buzmaniuk
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
In a world where women's rights are once again being challenged from all quarters, Europe remains the place where women live best. Within the Union, however, there have been some setbacks, difficulties persist, and progress is still required in the political, economic and social fields to achieve true gender equality.
Topic:
Human Rights, European Union, Women, Inequality, and Gender
Political Geography:
Europe

32. Rule of law: the uncertain gamble on conditionality

Author:
Eric Maurice
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
Will 2023 be the year when Hungary and Poland join the ranks of Member States that respect the values of the European Union? Nothing is less certain because, in Budapest as in Warsaw, the reforms demanded by the Union have not yet been implemented. In early February Polish president Andrzej Duda, referred a law which was supposed to bring an end to disciplinary abuses against judges to the Constitutional Court. The Hungarian government has still not completed reforms to make public procurement more transparent and to strengthen the fight against corruption. The fact that these measures are being discussed indicates however that the balance of power has changed. 2022 was a pivotal year in the European Union's efforts to combat breaches of the rule of law in its Member States. For the first time, a range of new and old tools, specific or not, structural or conjunctural, were used to try to reverse the trend that has been developing for several years, mainly in Hungary and Poland, of undermining the independence of the judiciary, systems of checks and balances, and certain rights that are considered fundamental.
Topic:
European Union, Rule of Law, Judiciary, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Europe, Poland, Romania, and Hungary

33. A return to grace for nuclear power in European public opinion? Some elements of a rapid paradigm shift

Author:
Mathieu Brugidou and Jérémy Bouillet
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
The health crisis triggered by the Covid-19 pandemic, and perhaps above all the war in Ukraine, together with increasingly outspoken Chinese and/or American interventionism, have largely contributed to "breaking European energy taboos"[1] towards more collective and coordinated approaches. This is undeniable in the field of energy: if certain mechanisms such as the general cap on gas prices have not been adopted, some measures, which were hard to imagine at European level until recently, have now been ratified, such as joint gas purchases, shared objectives for reducing energy demand, the obligation to store energy, etc.
Topic:
Public Opinion, Nuclear Power, COVID-19, Health Crisis, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe

34. Judging Putin

Author:
Arnaud De Nanteuil
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
The publication of an international arrest warrant against Vladimir Putin on 17 March 2023 by the Second Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has caused a stir. Although the institution is far from immune from criticism (it has long been accused of being "strong with the weak and weak with the strong"), this is a major change in the Court's policy as it is the first warrant ever issued against the sitting leader of a permanent member of the UN Security Council; a member who, moreover, in a chilling irony of history, played a key role in the Nuremberg Trial. In some respects, this is a gamble, given the many obstacles that stand between this historic event and a possible conviction of Vladimir Putin. But this arrest warrant is also a way to put the ICC back in the centre of the game, even though until now it seems to have been largely denied the possibility of judging the main perpetrator of the war of aggression against Ukraine and its disastrous humanitarian consequences.
Topic:
International Law, War Crimes, International Criminal Court (ICC), Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

35. The European Union and the war in Ukraine: the liberal power and its limits

Author:
Maxime Lefebvre
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
The European Union has been deeply affected by the war in Ukraine. There was talk of a "paradigm shift" in France, of a "Zeitenwende" ("change of era") in Germany, of an "end to naivety". Across Europe, a surge of sympathy and solidarity for Ukraine and its suffering has gripped public opinion, right down to the blue and yellow colours of the EU and Ukrainian flags being ostensibly displayed by Ursula von der Leyen. The European Union has given massive economic aid to Ukraine (€20 billion already paid out, €20 billion planned for 2023) and has taken in 4 million Ukrainian refugees. At the June European Council, it accepted Ukraine's membership application, as well as that of Moldova, and a prospect of accession for Georgia. By adopting sanctions against Russia that were unprecedented since those taken against Serbia at the beginning of the wars in the former Yugoslavia, it has also demonstrated its capacity for "hard power". In the wake of its common defence policy, it delivered arms to Ukraine for the first time through its €3 billion "peace facility". By almost completely depriving itself of Russian fossil fuels, it is accelerating its energy transition. This shows the enormous change that the war in Ukraine represents for the European project, which is undergoing a new existential crisis after the repeated shocks of the last few years (eurozone crisis, migration crisis, Brexit, Covid-19 pandemic), which again seems to confirm Jean Monnet's prophecy that Europe would be built through crises and would be the sum of the solutions brought to these challenges. By defending its values against Russia, the European Union is asserting itself as a "liberal power". But it remains no less fragile beyond its response.
Topic:
European Union, Geopolitics, Liberalism, Strategic Autonomy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

36. Digital Sovereignty: For a Schuman Data Plan

Author:
Arno Pons
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
On 9 January, the European Commission launched the first cooperation and monitoring cycle for the achievement of the European Union’s digital decade by 2030. If, in the digital field, Europe faces issues of sovereignty, it is because it has left the sector open for over twenty years to the American Tech giants, who have imposed a game whose rules that have never been understood here. Either because these rules were inaccessible to the European Union (Moore and Metcalfe laws), or because we accepted that there were no rules of the game (code is law).
Topic:
Markets, Science and Technology, Infrastructure, Law, European Union, Data, European Commission, and Digital Sovereignty
Political Geography:
Europe

37. The Élysée Treaty, FrancoGerman reconciliation and European integration: myth and reality

Author:
Hartmut Marhold
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
“During General de Gaulle's visit last week, I thought often of you, the man who, with his proposal to create the European Coal and Steel Community, laid the foundations of the friendship which would henceforth bind our two countries so closely together. I always think of our cooperation with great appreciation. I feel the need, especially in the present circumstances, to express this gratitude to you[1],” wrote the German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, on 10 September 1962 to former French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman. Konrad Adenauer was anxious to set things straight and avoid the creation of a myth. For him, Franco-German reconciliation, at the service of European integration, began on 9 May 1950 with the “Schuman Declaration”. It was not going to start with the Treaty in progress, the future Elysée Treaty. Robert Schuman, in his "Testimony on Adenauer", confirms this: "When in May 1950, the French government offered to the European nations to sit down, without discrimination between victorious and defeated countries, with equal rights and obligations, for a work of joint cooperation guaranteed by mutual control, this truly political revolution required Franco-German reconciliation. Even before consulting our friends and allies, we asked Chancellor Adenauer. If he had said no, Europe and European integration could not have existed. Our expectations were not disappointed[2].” Three years earlier, at a solemn ceremony, Konrad Adenauer had already had the opportunity to address Robert Schuman in front of a Franco-German audience, emphasising that it was he, Schuman, who had "definitively put an end to the Franco-German history full of atrocities thereby creating a lasting friendship between the two peoples". He said: "You, Mr Schuman, took the initiative for this great work and began to build it. That is why we are deeply grateful to you.” The Chancellor concluded by insisting that "it was Monsieur Schuman who laid the foundations for a good and lasting understanding between France and Germany and for a European future, that Europe owed its survival to his action[3].”
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, History, and Regional Integration
Political Geography:
Europe, France, and Germany

38. WHY DEMOCRACIES AREN’T MORE RELIABLE ALLIANCE PARTNERS

Author:
Mark Nieman and Doug Gibler
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
ussia’s invasion of Ukraine set off a security spiral in Europe. Despite US President Biden’s pledge to “defend every inch of NATO territory,” Poland increased its military budget by a whopping 60 percent and asked to have US nuclear weapons based on its territory. Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia also announced sizable defense increases, with Latvia re-instating compulsory military training. Why didn’t Biden’s pledge reassure these NATO members? Is the alliance’s famed Article 5 promise—that an attack on one member is an attack on all—a less than ironclad guarantee?
Topic:
NATO, Democracy, Alliance, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

39. Russia’s Ukraine Revanchism: Dugin, Neo-Eurasianism, and the Emerging World Order

Author:
Mohammad Ali Zafar
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:
Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:
The Ukrainian conflict has paved the way to re-examine the geopolitical implications of Russian Neo-Eurasianism, which has challenged the Liberal International Order. The implications of such a development will have global implications for Russia. Indications of Putin's renewed mission, infused by restrategising the Russian position in Eurasia coupled with cultural exceptionalism based on messianic identity, are observable in recognition of Donbas and Luhansk as separate territories and the invasion of Ukraine. The conflict has allowed the US to lead as an Atlanticist player and regain its slipping position in the international system. Therefore, following exploratory research methodology, the paper examines Dugin’s geopolitical model based on neo-Eurasianism. The paper concludes that the model will observe major setbacks in the post-Ukrainian conflict order as the proposed alliances by Dugin’s model with Moscow, Tokyo, and Tehran face several challenges. Consequently, the invasion has pushed Atlanticist pre-eminence back on track across Eurasia.
Topic:
Conflict, Regionalism, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

40. The Strategic Repositioning of LNG: Implications for Key Trade Routes and Choke Points

Author:
Leslie Palti-Guzman and Marc-Antoine Eyl-Mazzega
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
2022 saw the climax so far of the weaponization of energy. Following its geopolitical demise, Russia has undertaken its own gas amputation, moving from a super energy power status to a diminished role with uncertain prospects and only hard options left. Russia has cut off almost entirely pipeline gas supplies to the European Union (EU), first inflicting huge financial pain and collecting record high revenues, but then simply losing out its largest and best market with no realistic alternative, and no prospect of any significant return. However, the Kremlin could still further reduce some of the remaining pipeline gas or liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies and thus cause some tensions in the markets. Russia also retains leverage on oil markets, where the Kremlin managed to cope with the embargo as well as the price cap and maintain the relationship with Saudi Arabia which drives OPEC+ decisions. Meanwhile, in 2022, the European energy system has managed to surprisingly adapt on the supply and demand side to the three shocks: the decoupling from Russian energy supplies, the hydropower generation crisis, and the French nuclear electricity crisis. Liquefied natural gas has made a comeback in Europe and has been a savior of industries, governments, and populations. The LNG corridor between the EU and the United States (U.S.) has become the most dominant LNG trade route in 2022. This came at a huge cost though – EU’s gas import bill soared ten times from 2020 and three times from 2021 levels. For 2023, the European gas balance is much more fragile, as the demand reduction potential has reached its limits, same for the ability to attract additional non-Russian exports to Europe, at a time when missing Russian volumes will probably reach 120 billion cubic meters (bcm), instead of about 77 bcm in 2022. More moderate price levels since November 2022 have clearly overshadowed this fundamental mismatch, especially as the weather has been mild and China was still struggling with the pandemic. With an additional 30-40 bcm of missing Russian gas to offset in 2023 compared to 2022, Europeans can be expected to benefit from an extra gas of around 20-25 bcm left in storages thanks to mild weather and available LNG. They have no choice but to continue saving energy in a hurry, that is both on gas and electricity. Gas demand in power generation had increased in the first nine months of 2022 before falling in Q4 2022, and well over 15 bcm can be saved here in 2023 as more nuclear is available altogether, alongside more renewables, and some coal. It will be critical to reduce peak loads though. The key improvement is in terms of logistics, with the massive new LNG import capacity deployed across Europe. Overall, EU’s import situation will be very tensed and fragile for the next winter. The key challenge is that EU’s gas supply security ultimately depends on the weather in Europe, China’s and Japan’s LNG demand, and weather or technical outages in the Gulf of Mexico or in other producers. Any slight disruptions in supplies can have major impacts. As a last resort, bringing back some Groningen supplies, no matter how politically sensitive this would be, must be considered and prepared. Large financial compensations and effective governmental action would notably be required to offset the hardships.
Topic:
European Union, Gas, Exports, Trade, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Europe

41. China/United States: Europe off Balance

Author:
Thomas Gomart and Marc Hecker
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
As French President Emmanuel Macron (accompanied by Ursula von der Leyen) is on a state visit to China, some twenty Ifri researchers decipher the stakes of the U.S./China/Europe strategic triangle. This 16-text study follows Olaf Scholz’s visit to Beijing (November 2022) and precedes that of Emmanuel Macron (April 2023). It comes especially one year after the beginning of a geopolitical and geoeconomic shock of a rare magnitude: the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. The War in Ukraine or the Return of Bloc Geopolitics? The war in Ukraine has broken ties between the European Union (EU) and Russia for the foreseeable future, particularly in the field of energy, though not without consequences in the Middle East, Africa, and the Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, this war has become the main show of active indirect confrontation between the United States—which has provided military support to Ukrainians, with help from its European allies—and China, which has supported Russia politically and economically. In February 2022, Moscow and Beijing declared their “no limits friendship”; in March 2023, Xi Jinping offered his personal support to Vladimir Putin after the International Criminal Court issued a warrant for his arrest. In its position on the political settlement of the Ukraine crisis, presented in February 2023, China stated: “All parties should oppose the pursuit of one’s own security at the cost of others’ security, prevent bloc confrontation, and work together for peace and stability on the Eurasian Continent”. China is no more of a mediator than the United States: it would be unrealistic to believe so. We appear to be witnessing a return of bloc geopolitics, albeit in a starkly different context than that of the Cold War (1947-1991). Globalization has produced strong economic and technological interdependencies that make any prospect of decoupling very costly, if not impossible. Economic partners are no longer necessarily military allies, and vice versa. In other words, a gap is opening up between geopolitical perceptions and geoeconomic realities. The term “decoupling” is popular in the United States, though much less so elsewhere. The rejection of bloc geopolitics is particularly acute outside of the West, where a “pragmatic” approach to foreign policy is often promoted. The Saudi foreign minister summed this up during the World Policy Conference in December 2022: “Polarization is the last thing we need right now. […] We need to build bridges, strengthen connections, and find areas of cooperation”. A few months later, China pulled off an extraordinary diplomatic coup by brokering a deal to restore relations between Riyadh and Tehran. For the EU, the situation is particularly delicate: Europe is in the Western camp, but a severing of ties with Beijing would cause a crushing economic blow. In 2022, China accounted for more than 20% of the EU’s imports, while the United States accounted for around 12%. By 2030, the EU’s GDP is expected to rise to $20.5 trillion, compared to $30.5 trillion for the United States and $33.7 trillion for China. In January 2023, the President of the European Commission declared at Davos: “We still need to work and trade with China, especially when it comes to this transition. So, we need to refocus our approach on de-risking, rather than decoupling”. For its part, Beijing has encouraged European aspirations of “strategic autonomy”, understood in China as a form of detachment from the United States. At the same time, the EU is constantly strengthening its military, technological, financial and energy ties with the U.S. This collective study notes a hypothetical search for balance on the part of the Europeans, faced with a war on their territory (the Western peninsula of the heartland), who cannot escape Sino-American mechanisms, and who do not form a monolithic whole. It also analyzes the strategy of several important actors outside our continent, and shows that, from Ukraine to Taiwan, via Africa and the Middle East, Europeans have little room for maneuver. This is why the study proposes recommendations to try, at a crucial moment, to reinforce their positioning.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Climate Change, International Trade and Finance, Science and Technology, European Union, and Industry
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

42. Higher Renewable Energy Targets in Germany: How Will the Industry Benefit?

Author:
Gilles Lepesant
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
“Deutschland – Einstieg in die Deindustrialisierung?” – “Germany, the beginning of deindustrialisation?” asked the German economic newspaper Handelsblatt in the context of the spike in energy prices that has put at risk thousands of companies across Germany in 2022. Whereas some sectors such as steel, glass and chemicals have been seriously hit, the manufacturing industries operating in the areas linked to the energy transition (such as renewable energies and hydrogen production) should benefit from decisions taken to reach climate neutrality. Will the German industry benefit from the ambitious commitments agreed by the new coalition? The boom and bust of the solar sector in 2011 are a reminder that a strong internal demand does not necessarily translate into strong and resilient supply chains on the national territory. In the context of generous support schemes, several companies emerged in the 2000s benefiting from the strong demand for solar panels before being overwhelmed by Asian competitors. Nowadays, more than 90% of solar panels are imported from China. The level of ambition of the Federal government for the Energiewende has dramatically increased with the new coalition elected in 2021, the share of renewables to be reached in the power mix by 2030 being set at 80% (against 47% in 2022). The German wind industry has however been affected by a slowdown of the expansion of capacities, several rounds of onshore wind and solar auctions being in 2022 undersubscribed. The added value of the Energiewende in terms of job creation has been ambivalent so far. The country’s current industrial geography might be partly reshaped with the efforts made by northern and eastern States to deploy renewables and green hydrogen at large scale. Stakes are high for southern Germany since new spatial patterns are emerging in the automotive sector too. While Chinese competition in the solar and wind manufacturing sectors is tough, the Inflation Reduction Act has reinvigorated discussions around a stronger industrial policy.
Topic:
European Union, Electricity, Renewable Energy, Wind Power, Hydrogen, and Energy
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

43. Rebooting the Entente: An Agenda for Renewed UK-France Defense Cooperation

Author:
Alice Billon-Galland and Élie Tenenbaum
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The Franco-British Summit on March 10th, 2023, will mark a much-needed reset in bilateral cooperation, following years of strained relations. With a recently re-elected French president and a new British Prime minister, both sides are committed to making this summit a success and re-launching a positive agenda for bilateral cooperation. The summit, the first since Sandhurst in 2018, will focus on three key topics: migration, energy, and foreign policy. Defense cooperation will also be addressed, as it remains the cornerstone of the bilateral relationship, though it may take a less prominent part than on previous occasions. Rebooting the Entente: An Agenda for Renewed UK-France Defense Cooperation Download 1.38 Mo Several concrete topics for joint work should therefore be discussed and agreed, from strategic discussions on European security frameworks to joint operational deployments and capability projects. It is crucial to ensure that the symbolic reset of the bilateral relationship at the summit leads to a realistic yet ambitious defense roadmap, with concrete commitments and deliverables. As the Franco-British Summit approaches, defense cooperation remains the cornerstone of the bilateral relationship. As the war in Ukraine continues, it increases the rationale for resuming closer UK-France defense cooperation. Lessons needs to be drawn from the Lancaster House Treaties : overly ambitious and structuring plans are less likely to succeed than pragmatic, budget-conscious and ready-to-use projects. The need to prepare for high-intensity warfare opens new perspectives for capability development in all domains and for operational cooperation across the globe. This Briefing is part of a joint Chatham House-IFRI research project, the "Cross-Channel Strategic Dialogue", investigating prospects for UK-France defence and security cooperation.
Topic:
Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and High Intensity Warfare
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, Ukraine, and France

44. Food Systems in the Pacific: Addressing Challenges in Cooperation with Europe

Author:
Celine Pajon
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
More frequent climate disasters, rising sea levels, the economic fallout of Covid-19 lockdowns, border closures, supply chain constraints, and the global impact of the war in Ukraine have aggravated the challenge of maintaining sustainable and resilient food systems for Pacific Island Countries (PICs). Food systems in PICs are of great importance due to their impact on the health and well-being of Pacific peoples, local livelihoods, and national economies. Between 50 and 70% of Pacific people depend on agriculture and fishing activities for their livelihoods. The Pacific is home to extensive crop biodiversity, and Pacific countries are developing unique value chains for markets and international supply. However, they also face unique challenges in realizing equitable benefits in the global food system. Additionally, the Pacific needs to tackle issues like malnutrition and non-communicable diseases. Urgent global and local action is needed to manage climate change and other risks and ensure resilient food systems. Europeans are also confronted with the global food crisis and are actively working with their Pacific partners to find and fund solutions to address current and future risks by investing in local sustainable food systems. This Briefing explains the complex issues at stake regarding food systems in PICs and explores ways to address these challenges, both at the local level and in cooperation with Europeans. This Briefing is based on discussions that took place during the webinar "Food Security in Times of Crisis: Connecting the Pacific and Europe," organized by the French Institute for International Relations (Ifri)'s Pacific Islands Program in partnership with the Pacific Community (SPC) on December 8, 2022. Contributions from panelists will, therefore, be highlighted.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Food, and Industry
Political Geography:
Europe, European Union, Oceania, and Pacific Islands

45. Imagining Beyond the Imaginary. The Use of Red Teaming and Serious Games in Anticipation and Foresight

Author:
Héloïse Fayet and Amélie Ferey
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The Red Team Defence demonstrates the Ministry of the Armed Forces' desire to appropriate new foresight tools. Thus, brain games or serious games aim to bypass the weight of the military hierarchy, the standardisation of thoughts and cognitive biases in order to avoid strategic unthinking. In September 2022, The New York Times revealed that the successful Ukrainian offensive on Kharkiv had been prepared in a series of wargames conducted that summer. Given this success, further wargames have been undertaken with a view to a possible Ukrainian counter-offensive in the spring. This rise in the popularity of wargames, which come in various forms, is due to their ability to immerse participants in a situation, helping them to become aware of their strategic and tactical blind spots and to identify their own vulnerabilities by putting themselves in the enemy’s position. The ability to anticipate crises and foresee conflicts is essential in order to maintain the initiative and ultimately win out. Thus, the aim of defense foresight is to understand the different forms future wars might take (asymmetric, hybrid, high intensity), the weapons systems that may be employed (drones, high-velocity missiles), and the factors that could trigger them. The use of wargames or scenario analyses to facilitate anticipation and foresight goes hand in hand with changes in the relationship between military and political leaders and civilians, who no longer hesitate to hold the former to account when they have failed to foresee a crisis. The German sociologist Ulrich Beck thus refers to the paradox of a society that is keen to predict the future because of its aversion to risk and the fact that it is now much more difficult to foresee what might happen in the short term due to very rapid technological developments. The modern world generates both risks and progress, and the inability to foresee strategic ruptures carries significant political costs, which explains why politicians set so much store in anticipation and foresight. The initiatives launched by Florence Parly after being appointed French minister of the armed forces in 2017 included promoting experimentation in new cognitive tools. Beyond the issue of technology, the aim was to rethink information management within the ministry in order to make it more agile and cross-cutting. In addition to a significant budget allocated to innovation in the 2019–2025 Military Programming Law, the Ministry of the Armed Forces has drawn inspiration from methods often originating in other organizational cultures, such as start-ups and the private sector, in order to improve its creativity and accelerate its adoption of digital technology.
Topic:
War Games, Military, and Anticipation
Political Geography:
Europe, France, North America, and United States of America

46. Digital Sovereignty: European Policies, American Dilemmas

Author:
Mathilde Velliet
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
European digital sovereignty has been made a priority by Ursula von der Leyen’s European Commission. Due to the privileged position of American companies in the European market, Brussels’ efforts towards digital sovereignty (on privacy, antitrust, data sovereignty, etc.) are closely scrutinized by American policymakers. They often view European initiatives as “protectionist” and unfairly targeting U.S. companies. However, the American vision of European digital sovereignty has evolved in recent years under the influence of two main factors. On the one hand, awareness of the problematic effects and practices of platforms has led to a consensus on the need for reform in the digital sector. On the other hand, technological competition with China has been elevated to a priority. This vision remains fraught with contradictions, along inter-party, intra-party, inter-agency, state-federal, and issue-based fault lines. Washington’s position on anti-monopolistic practices is an illuminating example, characterized by a double discourse between a desire to reform the U.S. digital sector domestically and active diplomacy to dilute these efforts at the European level. Nonetheless, several American actors – particularly in the legislative branch – are seeking to learn from the successes and flaws of European regulations for American reform projects, such as on platform regulation or privacy. The China factor reinforces the ambiguity of the U.S.’ position. It creates new opportunities for cooperation in the face of perceived common vulnerabilities (infrastructure security, inbound investments, etc.) and autocratic definitions of digital sovereignty. However, it also raises tension and misunderstanding on the American side towards European reforms that often target American companies more than Chinese ones. Lastly, while American and European companies have adapted to the need for digital sovereignty through a range of technical and commercial solutions, the temptation of a maximalist definition of European sovereignty continues to create major stumbling blocks, particularly on the cloud.
Topic:
European Union, Regulation, Cloud Computing, Digital Sovereignty, and Data Governance
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

47. How the War in Ukraine is Changing the Space Game

Author:
Guilhem Penent and Guillaume Schlumberger
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The war in Ukraine has become a showcase for the new commercial paradigm emerging in the space sector (New Space). As such, it seems to confirm the relevance of adaptation efforts led by the United States – more specifically the Pentagon – since the mid-2010s. Thus, it highlights ongoing transformations and announces potential disruptions in the exploitation of orbits, particularly in the fields of satellite connectivity and remote sensing. It also shapes future tensions, while the structuring of international relations around the two poles constituted by the United States and China raises questions about the consequences on the safe, sustainable, secure, and stable use of space. With these developments, Europe is faced with the challenge of remaining relevant.
Topic:
International Relations, European Union, Space, Satellite, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

48. The Europeanisation of the Energy Transition in Central and Eastern EU Countries: An Uphill Battle that Can Be Won

Author:
Diana-Paula Gherasim
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Russia’s war in Ukraine, and the brutal decoupling from Russian fossil fuels, is a game changer for the Central and Eastern Europe region which was still heavily dependent on Russia for its energy supply. There are still a few oil, gas, and nuclear fuel supplies, but the sharp decline, and search for alternatives, lead to a shift in paradigm: deploying low-carbon technologies and energy efficiency is now a matter of national security and economic security. Hence, following the 2022 energy crisis, the understanding that the European Union’s (EU) energy security of supply means an acceleration in phasing out fossil fuels and deploying clean energies has become the newest European acquis in energy policy, increasing the importance of the Green Deal at EU, national and local levels. The risk that a carbon wall would be erected within Europe between the West and the Central and Eastern European Member States (CEECs) is no more valid. The concept of Europeanization is at the core of the analysis of the energy transition in the CEECs. The progress on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction observed in these Member States (MS) can be considered as a success of the Europeanization process in this region, as its timing coincides with the implementation of the 2020 agenda for climate and energy, to the establishment of which these countries were part of. Moreover, the Clean Energy Package and the Green Deal seem to have been successful in putting in place a mechanism of cognitive framing pertaining to the Europeanization toolbox, by setting a framework for all Europeans to move in the same direction, of a cleaner and healthier way of living, independently of their starting point. Given the status quo in the ten CEECs, the new ambitious objectives regarding transport decarbonization will translate into important transformation costs for the region, which in turn could increase the risk of renegotiation attempts, as the circular Europeanization theory predicts. The acknowledgment at the EU level that the transition must be just to succeed is one instance of bottom-up Europeanization, where the challenges brought forward by specific Member States shaped the European energy transition agenda and discourse. Large financial support for this end was a first condition for CEECs to support the climate neutrality agenda. The second condition is that CEECs plan to replace their coal fleet at least partially with nuclear power, be they reactor capacity expansions, lifetime extensions, large new reactors, or small modular reactors (SMRs). The third condition has been securing a role for the use of natural gas for the transition, which in 2022 turned out to be a costly choice. With the crisis, CEECs have all taken on board the necessity to boost renewables as a tool to rapidly decrease dependence on imported fossil fuels, to meet the 2030 targets, prepare for the progressive phase-out of free emission allowances while awaiting the new nuclear generation capacities due from 2035 onwards. This strategy is also supported by public opinion, while it remains to be seen how public acceptance of SMRs will be. This gives the CEE region a strong joint interest to push for the inclusion of nuclear energy in EU legislations, alongside France. On gas, countries have switched to liquefied natural gas (LNG) and diversified their pipeline supplies, and where possible, try to boost the domestic supply of natural gas and soon, biomethane. Although being relatively far from alternative gas entry points means that for some CEECs Russia remains, to a certain extent, a necessity, this cannot be used as an excuse for undermining EU unity and should push towards harder EU-level reflections on energy solidarity on which some progress was done during the 2022 energy crisis. It remains to be seen if a new line of fragmentation will not appear between Germany and Austria on the one hand and the CEEs on the other: following the Nord Stream betrayal and denial by Germany of Polish energy security concerns for example, CEECs are concerned about the extraterritorial outreach of Germany’s nuclear phase-out policies, and of Austria’s continued systemic opposition to nuclear. This plays in the hand of the United States, which is the ultimate gatekeeper to pressure Germany and secure the energy technology choices of CEECs through the export of US technologies. Of note is also the shared concern now over the dependence on Russian nuclear fuels and equipment, and efforts to reduce this. A last source of possible tensions comes from some new gas infrastructure investments which can strengthen resilience but risk locking in gas much longer than the EU trajectory allows for. Beyond nuclear energy, however, the interest in accelerating the deployment of renewables, and the concern over a just transition, the note shows that there is little in common between the CEECs which have all their specificities. Last but not least, this note argues that a new risk of fragmentation may emerge, related to the localization of innovation and the volume of state aids and subsidies to industries. While some CEECs appear to be a frontrunner in the deployment of battery cell gigafactories, their financial and budgetary capacities are much more limited compared to Western MSs, and their ability to develop comprehensive, coherent climate plans, and to mobilize EU tools and funding, is also limited. Without an EU Sovereignty Fund, the region will find it hard to keep pace with EU’s objectives in the Net-Zero Industry Act and the Critical Raw Materials Act due to limited fiscal space to be leveraged for state aid purposes, despite more favorable conditions.
Topic:
European Union, Renewable Energy, Fossil Fuels, Transition, and Energy
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, and Central Europe

49. European Democracy Support Annual Review 2022

Author:
Richard Youngs, Elena Ventura, Ken Godfrey, Erin Jones, and Zselyke Csaky
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The need to defend democratic values from violent attack was the dominant theme of 2022. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February made democracy’s defense a priority of the highest geopolitical as well as normative order. It propelled commitments to protect democracy to the top of the agenda for Europe, internally as well as in foreign and security policy. European powers responded and a common line gained currency that the war had pulled them through a watershed conversion in their strategic outlook. However, in a year dominated by the imperative of defending democracy, European policies specifically aimed at supporting democracy evolved in only understated fashion. While these policies were adjusted in important ways to the new context, Europe shifted gear much less in this area than in others. In 2021, the European Democracy Hub published the first annual review of European democracy support.1 This second review aims to provide an empirical overview of European democracy support policies in 2022. The review covers policies, strategies, and initiatives at the level of the European Union (EU) as well as those of its member states and of non-EU European countries active in democracy support (Norway, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom). It presents information on European efforts to defend and strengthen democracy around the world while highlighting their shortcomings. The aim is to inform debates about policies geared toward upholding democracy internationally. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine dominated European policy debates in 2022 in many ways. This review examines the democracy-related consequences of the invasion and of the geopolitical changes it unleashed. Western leaders framed the invasion as a threat not only to Ukraine but also to democratic norms and the rules-based order more widely, and as such it galvanized EU institutions and European governments into new commitments to defend democracy. However, these commitments were far from being the main policy responses; for all the rhetoric about a new struggle to defend democratic values, many elements of European democracy policy were second-order priorities. And, in some ways, the security aspects of the strategic landscape diluted European democracy commitments. The invasion did not alter all aspects of European democracy policy, which in many countries was shaped by domestic political developments. In a year of notable protests and other forms of civic activism around the world, the EU and some member states improved the ways in which they engage with local actors in support of political reform. The EU began to roll out many new programs in its democracy toolbox. Though low-profile, this began to add more tactical sophistication to EU policies. Yet the degree of European support for democratic openings remained modest and, in some places, negligible. And, while much attention was on the global consequences of the war in Ukraine, the EU’s democracy activities moved up a gear to a greater extent internally than externally. This review offers a summary of the main changes to the context conditioning European democracy policies before outlining their evolution at the EU and national levels during the year. It then looks at the war in Ukraine and the democracy-related aspects of the European response to it. The review then delves into more specific aspects of democracy support that were pursued, such as democracy funding, the use of sanctions and conditionality, and democracy considerations in conflict interventions. In line with the previous review, we frame democracy support in a broad sense. The concept lacks a firm definition and this review reflects an elastic understanding of it. Broadly, the analysis considers quantitative and qualitative aspects of European strategies relevant to strengthening democratic practices, norms, and institutions. Democracy support in this sense includes the use of funding for democracy projects, decisions over sanctions, the use of political conditionality, and the incorporation of democracy factors into conflict-related policies. The review looks not only at examples of such democracy support but also instances where democratic considerations were absent from EU policy. Democracy support is understood here as including EU and European action around the world, including within Europe, but not the actions of governments in their country’s domestic affairs.
Topic:
European Union, Democracy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe

50. Leveraging Lives: Serbia and Illegal Tunisian Migration to Europe

Author:
Hamza Meddeb
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
In 2020–2022, Tunisian illegal migrants traveled through Serbia to reach Western Europe, as an alternative to the hazardous, more monitored Mediterranean route. This was driven by push factors in Tunisia, including deteriorating economic conditions and government acquiescence, and pull factors in Europe, namely smuggling networks and Serbian authorities looking the other way. While the route was sealed for Tunisians in November 2022, as long as transit states can use illegal migration to secure geopolitical leverage, such actions will continue.
Topic:
Migration, European Union, Economy, and Smuggling
Political Geography:
Europe, Serbia, North Africa, and Tunisia