Political Geography: Europe - CIAO Search Results

1. Monitoring Report | Public consultation in Albania: The illusion of inclusion

Author:: Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM)
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM)
Abstract:: The Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM) has released a new report: Public Consultation in Albania: The Illusion of Inclusion. This report presents the results of an in-depth monitoring of 50 laws, public policies, and strategic documents consulted by the central government during the years 2022-2023. The assessment covers 10 key government institutions, evaluating their public consultation processes in terms of: Transparency and accessibility of consultation documents; Effectiveness of the public consultation process; Public accountability during this process; Citizen participation in consultations; Ensuring inclusivity and non-discrimination. In addition to the qualitative analysis of public consultation previously conducted by IDM, this assessment for the first time provides statistical data related to this important governance process. The evaluation system applied in this report provides the opportunity to compare institutions’ performance in the consultation of different acts, in relation to the aforementioned principles. Ultimately, the findings highlight a ‘’long distance’’ between transparency and participation in government consultations. The goal of this study is to contribute to evidence-based advocacy for legal reforms and the improvement of institutional practices, so that public consultations fulfill their core function – citizens’ participation and impact in decision-making.
Topic:: Transparency, Inclusion, Monitoring, and Civic Space
Political Geography:: Europe, Balkans, and Albania

2. Untangling the Transatlantic Knot: Germany, France, and the United States

Author:: Gesine Weber and Jacob Ross
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: France’s and Germany’s reactions to Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine reveal their significantly different relationships with the United States. Their interpretations regarding the European security architecture are almost diametrically opposed. While Berlin concluded that European security must be constructed transatlantically, Paris saw confirmation of its interpretation that Europeans must be able to address security challenges independently of Washington. Donald Trump’s reelection constitutes a challenge for the two countries because both need to fundamentally rethink their respective relationships with the United States and Europe-US relations more generally. The scope of the US withdrawal from European security remains to be seen, but it will be similarly challenging for Paris and Berlin.
Topic:: NATO, Geopolitics, Transatlantic Relations, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:: Europe, France, Germany, North America, and United States of America

3. China: From Systemic Rival to Systemic Threat

Author:: Andrew Small and Bonnie S. Glaser
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: For the United States and Europe, dealing with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is now a challenge of such wide-ranging nature that it will cut across almost the entire transatlantic agenda of the incoming Trump administration. From addressing Beijing’s role as the “decisive enabler” for Russia’s war of aggression to rethinking the way that US-EU trade and technology ties need to be organized, China policy no longer occupies a separate silo but conditions every element of the security and economic landscape. Under the Biden administration, Europe and the United States undertook an unprecedented effort not only to coordinate their approaches to the PRC itself, but also to advance on other fronts where the China challenge was the main motivating factor, such as EU-US efforts to negotiate agreements on steel, aluminum, and critical minerals. The two sides’ analysis has grown much closer, and in some areas, this translated into tangible results—whether conveying common red lines to Beijing on the delivery of lethal aid to Moscow and the use of force against Taiwan or tightening controls on advanced semiconductor equipment exports. Overall, however, progress still fell short of the high stakes. Some EU member states treated the Biden administration’s partner-friendly approach as a holiday from difficult strategic choices on China rather than an optimal window in which to make them. EU-level efforts to build more effective approaches on economic security, trade defense, and cyber security were often slow-rolled or undercut by major capitals. There were also areas in which the Biden administration allowed domestic political considerations to undermine efforts to build a common strategic economic approach among US partners—particularly the use of national security tools against US allies, whether the blocking of Nippon’s takeover of US Steel or the initial retention (and suspension rather than lifting) of Section 232 tariffs against the EU. While the two sides are certainly more closely aligned and better coordinated, moving in the right direction is no longer enough. If Europe and the United States are unable to achieve results in several critical areas in the next few years, it will come at a growing cost to their security and economic interests, as well as to the broader transatlantic relationship. Success, on the other hand, would put a new set of foundations under it. Three issues are likely to loom over the agenda for the incoming Trump administration: the threat of the “Second China Shock” to US and European industry; Beijing’s deepening coordination with Russia and other authoritarian states; and intensifying PRC pressure on Taiwan.
Topic:: European Union, Geopolitics, Trade, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

4. New Information on Shenyang Machine Tool Company’s Illicit Sales to North Korea and Russia

Author:: David Albright and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:: Several years ago, the Institute reported about the relatively large, multinational Chinese company Shenyang Machine Tools Company supplying sophisticated computer numerically controlled (CNC) machine tools, equipped with Western controlled software, to North Korea in violation of UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions and a supplier country’s trade control laws that banned re-export of this software. New information details the disingenuous way in which the Chinese government investigated this case, indicating nonetheless inadvertently that North Korea received these machine tools, while also demonstrating China’s utter disregard for enforcing UNSC sanctions or its own or others’ export control laws. This case serves as another of the many cases highlighting China as a long-time irresponsible trading partner that responsible companies should avoid when sensitive dual-use goods are involved, lest they be complicit in outfitting North Korea’s, Iran’s, or Russia’s military programs. Today, responsible suppliers are inadvertently facilitating Russia’s prosecution of an illegal war against Ukraine. Given Shenyang Machine Tools Company’s recent exports of goods to Russia with Harmonized Shipments (HS) codes found on the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Common High Priority List (CHPL), this company should be considered for sanctions.
Topic:: Sanctions, Trade, Illegal Trade, and Shenyang Machine Tool Company
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and North Korea

5. Ukraine and Beyond: Shaping Europe’s Security Future

Author:: International Crisis Group
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Crisis Group
Abstract:: What happens with the war in Ukraine matters beyond its borders, as events there will shape the larger standoff between Russia and the West. The U.S. and European powers can manage the risks of a changing security order with a mix of diplomacy and deterrence.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

6. Factsheet: Alice Weidel

Author:: Bridge Initiative Team
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Bridge Initiative, Georgetown University
Abstract:: Alice Weidel is the co-chairwoman of the Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD), a far-right political party in Germany and the first far-right nationalist party to enter the German parliament since World War II. Under the leadership of Weidel, the party has become the second strongest force following the national elections in February 2025. Weidel has a long history of anti-Muslim statements and support for discriminatory policies targeting Muslims. She argues that Islam is incompatible with the German constitution and European values, and is also connected to several anti-Muslim actors.
Topic:: Islamophobia, Far Right, Alternative for Germany (AfD), and Alice Weidel
Political Geography:: Europe and Germany

7. Factsheet: Tomio Okamura

Author:: Bridge Initiative Team
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Bridge Initiative, Georgetown University
Abstract:: Tomio Okamura is a far-right Czech politician who founded the anti-elitist and anti-Muslim party, Freedom and Direct Democracy (Svoboda a přímá demokracie, SPD). He has made comments that promote anti-Muslim tropes and demonize Muslims and actively advocates for the Czech Republic to exit from the European Union. Following the 2024 European Parliament elections, Okamura joined the right-wing group, Europe of Sovereign Nations, which includes several political parties that support discriminatory policies targeting Muslims.
Topic:: Discrimination, Islamophobia, Far Right, Political Parties, and Tomio Okamura
Political Geography:: Europe and Czech Republic

8. Factsheet: Jordan Bardella

Author:: Bridge Initiative Team
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Bridge Initiative, Georgetown University
Abstract:: Jordan Bardella is the party chairman of the French far-right National Rally (Rassemblement National) and also the leader of Patriots for Europe (PfE) for the legislative period of 2024 – 2029. In 2024, he ran for the office of the French Prime Minister. Bardella wants to “curb immigration” and warns “against Islamization.”
Topic:: Immigration, Islamophobia, Political Parties, National Rally (Rassemblement National), and Jordan Bardella
Political Geography:: Europe and France

9. Factsheet: Mario Kunasek

Author:: Bridge Initiative Team
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Bridge Initiative, Georgetown University
Abstract:: IMPACT: Mario Kunasek is a member of the far-right Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) and is the current Governor of Styria. From December 2017 to May 2019, he was the Austrian Defense Minister under a coalition government of the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) and his own FPÖ. Kunasek has a long history of tying Muslims to terrorism, fearmongering about “radical Islam” and “Islamism,” and supporting anti-Muslim policies.
Topic:: Domestic Politics, Islamophobia, Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), and Mario Kunasek
Political Geography:: Europe and Austria

10. The European Screening Mechanism and Its Implications for Chinese FDI

Author:: Emanuele Ballestracci
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: The European Commission has recently proposed a revision of the EU foreign direct investment (FDI) screening mechanism, originally established in 2020. The aim is to further strengthen the EU’s economic security within the framework of its “de-risking” policy, which aims to manage risks coming from the economic and technological engagement with China.[1] The new proposal aims to address major shortcomings in the current screening mechanism, expanding its scope to greenfield investments and European outward FDI. However, this could conflict with the EU’s goal of encouraging Chinese greenfield investment and joint ventures, particularly in the electric vehicle (EV) sector.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Foreign Direct Investment, European Union, and Economic Security
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

11. Italy’s Foreign Policy in the ‘Super-election Year’ 2024

Author:: Leo Goretti and Filippo Simonelli
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: This document provides an English summary of the 2024 edition of IAI’s annual report on Italian foreign policy titled: “L’Italia nell’anno delle grandi elezioni”, developed with the support of the Fondazione Compagnia di San Paolo. The 2024 edition of the report, edited by Ferdinando Nelli Feroci and Leo Goretti, features the contributions of a group of IAI researchers coordinated by the Institute’s Italian Foreign Policy programme. The report covers all the core areas of Italian foreign policy, beginning with the relations with the European Union and European allies and those with the US at the dawn of Donald Trump’s second term. Specific attention is paid to the two major crises in the closest neighbourhood of the country, analysing Italy’s commitment to supporting Ukraine and its position vis-à-vis the Israel-Gaza conflict. An in-depth focus is devoted to the government’s pivot to Africa under the umbrella of the so-called “Mattei Plan”, as well as the relations with the People’s Republic of China and the Indo-Pacific region at large. Structural policies are then addressed, from the defence and aerospace policy to the government’s approach to the energy and climate crises to migration policy. Finally, some considerations are made on the 2024 Italian G7 Presidency and the overall Italian involvement in multilateral fora.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Elections, European Union, Donald Trump, and Mattei Plan
Political Geography:: Europe and Italy

12. Trump’s Call with Putin Raises Great Concerns, Few Hopes

Author:: Riccardo Alcaro
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: US President Donald Trump’s phone call with Russia’s leader Vladimir Putin, especially when read in combination with Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth’s re-definition of US Europe policy, casts a long shadow. There are good reasons to be more concerned than hopeful about the peace deal that seems to be taking shape in the minds of the US Administration. At the same time, there are elements suggesting a less pessimistic assessment of the looming negotiations. Trump’s call with Putin has made a big splash but has not yet pierced Ukraine’s armour.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, European Union, Donald Trump, and Vladimir Putin
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

13. Another Transatlanticism Is Possible: Europe’s Moment in Latin America amid Trump’s Return

Author:: Raffaele Piras
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Donald Trump’s return to the White House has reignited his hallmark “America First” agenda, with significant consequences for Latin America. During his inaugural address, Trump emphasised the need to regain US control of the Panama Canal, framing it as a cornerstone of national security amidst heightened competition with China.[1] This rhetoric marks the continuation of a policy approach that relies on coercion and transactional diplomacy to achieve US objectives. While Trump’s focus on Latin America will undoubtedly reshape the region’s geopolitical dynamics, it also presents a strategic opportunity for the European Union to strengthen its role as a stabilising force and reliable partner.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Politics, European Union, Institutions, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:: Europe, Latin America, North America, and United States of America

14. The G7 and Sustainable Agri-Food Systems’ Transformation: Lessons Learned from the Italian Presidency

Author:: Daniele Fattibene
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Italy put a strong emphasis on food and nutrition security during its 2024 G7 Presidency, designing or scaling up plans to transform global food systems. Although the Italian presidency was able to gather consensus on key dimensions such as the food and climate nexus or development finance, structural weaknesses remain. Among them, the limited representation of Global South interests, the lack of space for civil society and farmers’ organisations in the decision-making process and the institutional rivalry between the Finance and the Development Tracks. While the G7 can more easily mobilise consensus and financial solutions to tackle global hunger, it has gradually lost ground to settings such as the G20 or the UN climate conference generally known as COP. The G7 must align its food-security solutions with those designed by other global partners (the G20 Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty, or the EU’s Global Gateway) that can more effectively address food insecurity, while tackling all the barriers that make it too risky for local actors and the private sector to invest in sustainable agri-food systems transformation.
Topic:: Agriculture, Climate Change, Food Security, and G7
Political Geography:: Europe and Italy

15. A Three-year War and Four Lessons for Europe

Author:: Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: The tragic third anniversary of the Russian invasion of Ukraine that began on 24 February 2022 witnesses the start of diplomatic talks between Russia and the United States on the possible end of the conflict. Three years of large-scale, high-intensity war of attrition in Europe, with over a million dead or injured soldiers, offers at least four politico-military lessons for European countries, the EU and NATO. Lessons to bear in mind through this negotiation for the future not only of Ukraine but of the security of the whole continent.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Transatlantic Relations, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe and Ukraine

16. Giorgia Meloni’s Italy between Trump and Europe: Fateful Choices Ahead

Author:: Maria Luisa Fantappiè, Leo Goretti, and Filippo Simonelli
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: The priority should be “preventing divisions within the West and the transatlantic alliance”, while “rooting for” this or that side would not be helpful: it is thus that Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni commented on the spat in the Oval Office between President Volodymyr Zelensky and Donald Trump,[1] and by extension, between Washington and Europe. In the aftermath of the clash, while most European leaders openly supported Zelensky, Meloni’s reticence was notable. The choice was tough. Siding with Zelensky would jeopardise Meloni’s aspiration to become the go-to EU leader for Washington. And yet, siding with Trump would lay bare a lack of commitment to Europe and especially the defence of Ukraine, for which Meloni had previously shown constant support. At the ensuing London Summit on Ukraine, Meloni couldn’t hide her discomfort.[2] The resolve of European leaders – spearheaded by the French president Emmanuel Macron and the UK’s Prime Minister Keir Starmer – in advocating for a strategic Europe seemed to shelve Meloni’s carefully crafted plan to leverage her bilateral ties with the Trump administration to bolster her role in Europe – even at the cost of fragmenting its unity. Meanwhile, at home, her junior coalition partner Matteo Salvini openly sided with Trump, in an attempt to present himself as an alternative to Meloni and to win consensus among that sizable chunk of the Italian public opinion who wants to see an end to the war in Ukraine.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Transatlantic Relations, Donald Trump, Russia-Ukraine War, and Giorgia Meloni
Political Geography:: Europe, Italy, and United States of America

17. Trump’s Exit from the Paris Agreement: An Opportunity for the EU to Back South Africa’s Climate Leadership

Author:: Bongiwe Ngcobo-Mphahlele and Darlington Tshuma
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: In his address to the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting in Davos in January 2025,[1] South Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa – who currently chairs the G20, the first African leader to do so – outlined a bold and assertive agenda centred on global cooperation, inclusive growth and sustainable development. His address included a renewed call for transparency in the allocation of climate resources and the reform of the global financial architecture that has long been criticised as too rigid to support long-term sustainable development in the Global South.[2]
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Climate Change, Economics, and Sustainable Development
Political Geography:: Europe, South Africa, North America, and United States of America

18. Can France Provide European Allies with Nuclear Deterrence?

Author:: Roberto Zadra
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: In his speech to fellow citizens on 5 March, French President Emmanuel Macron announced the opening of a “strategic debate on the protection of our allies on the European continent by our (nuclear) deterrent”.[1] It is not the first time: already in the 1990s then-president François Mitterrand alluded to a vocation européenne of French nuclear deterrence.[2] Macron himself proposed, already in February 2020, the opening of a dialogue on the matter.[3] The initiative was not very successful at the time, essentially because European allies considered the security guarantees provided by the United States to Europe through NATO sufficient, together with the repeated reassurances of NATO communiqués that the British and French nuclear forces “have a deterrent role of their own and contribute significantly to the overall security of the Alliance”.[4] This time, however, the reactions by many European allied countries to the French initiative will probably be different. For a simple reason: excluding the deployment of its own forces to Ukraine in the event of a ceasefire and denying security guarantees to Kyiv, the Trump administration fuels the fears of European allies that Washington’s commitment to collective defence is less solid than in the past. Indeed, the Ukraine crisis has shown the limitations of the traditional NATO distinction between Article 5 and non-Article 5 – that is, between those who are members of NATO and therefore protected by collective defence, and those who are not because collective defence is not valid for NATO partners – as it has laid bare how crisis management and cooperative security are having a direct impact on (the perceived lack of US commitment to) collective defence in Europe.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:: Europe and France

19. The New Partnership among Italy, Japan and the UK on the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP)

Author:: Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: The Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) launched by Italy, Japan and the UK in 2022 represents a novel partnership among the three countries for the development and production of a next-generation crewed fighter aircraft. A partnership based on equality of rights for and investments by the founding partners, as well as on the principles of Freedom of Action and Freedom of Modification at national level – that means full operational and technological sovereignty on the core platform, differently from the F-35 experience. As such, GCAP presents new challenges and opportunities in political, military and industrial terms, in addition to the programme’s tight schedule and high level of technological ambitions. The cooperation accelerated in 2024 with the establishment of a dedicated international governmental organisation to manage the programme, and the agreement on a joint venture among the three major companies involved on equal foot from the respective countries. This study provides an in-depth and comprehensive analysis of the specific British, Italian and Japanese ways to GCAP, of the programme’s politico-institutional governance and industrial architecture, as well as of training issue and the cross-sectorial implications for Italy. Moreover, a dedicated chapter focuses on the Franco-German-Spanish Future Combat Air System (FCAS) and the US Next-Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) programmes in a comparative perspective. The conclusions outline 15 policy recommendations for Italy concerning GCAP.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Defense Industry, and F-35
Political Geography:: Japan, United Kingdom, Europe, and Italy

20. NATO-Europe-US Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific: Challenging Times Ahead

Author:: Gabriele Abbondanza
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: As the Indo-Pacific gradually becomes the world’s geopolitical and geoeconomic epicentre, states and regional organisations are progressively pivoting to it. Due to a combination of drivers – chiefly US pressure, economic opportunities, strategic interests and politico-normative priorities – European and Indo-Pacific actors have increased cooperation with Washington and NATO in the region. However, the second Trump administration looks considerably less aligned with the conventional pillars of US foreign policy. In light of the unfolding fracture between the US and its European allies over Ukraine, what lies ahead for NATO-Europe-US cooperation in the Indo-Pacific?
Topic:: NATO, International Cooperation, Geopolitics, Transatlantic Relations, and Military
Political Geography:: Europe, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

21. Exploring options for advancing Kosovo-NATO relations

Author:: Ramadan Iazi and Jeta Loshaj
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:: NATO’s role in Kosovo has been vital since the 1999 intervention and KFOR remains integral for guaranteeing security and stability not only in Republic of Kosovo but also the wider Western Balkans. Public sentiment for full NATO membership is extremely high in Kosovo—over 90% support—reflecting Kosovars’ enduring trust in the NATP alliance. However this overwhelming public support can be affected if Kosovo’s aspirations for closer ties with NATO are not addressed. While, Kosovo’s formal progress toward full membership is politically constrained by the fact that four NATO member states have yet to recognize its independence, there are other options that NATO can pursue to advance relations with Kosovo. In this context, this paper explores options how can Kosovo and NATO advance relations and cooperation. The 1995 study provides core principles for options that are examined in this paper. These principles remain highly relevant for Kosovo. While formal membership is stalled by non-recognizing NATO member states, the paper argues that an inclusive, step-by-step approach can be adapted for a flexible, deeper engagement with Kosovo. A central recommendation is the creation of a “Kosovo Enhanced Cooperation Initiative,” a tailored version of NATO’s partnership mechanisms (e.g., Partnership for Peace, Planning and Review Process, and the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre). KECI would aim to strengthen Kosovo’s defense institutions, enhance interoperability, support civil emergency preparedness, and develop broader crisis-management capabilities. Crucially, it would not force any change in the political stance on recognition among NATO member states. The EU-facilitated normalization dialogue between Republic of Kosovo and Serbia is one of the essential elements especially for Kosovo to build the confidence of both skeptical NATO member states and international partners when it comes to Euro-Atlantic integration process of the country. Regular coordination with NATO and the EU, particularly concerning sensitive actions in the north, would affirm that Kosovo’s leaders prioritize strategic partnerships and diplomacy over moves that risks and undermine support for Kosovo. Nevertheless, without any concrete carrots such as anything close to a guarantee that Kosovo gains an open perspective for NATO’s PfP, it is rather difficult for Kosovo to be encouraged to deliver on either an agreement with Serbia or any other agreement.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Partnerships, Normalization, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Europe, Kosovo, and Serbia

22. How Does Disinformation Target and Affect Interethnic Relations in Kosovo?

Author:: Ramadan Ilazi, Jeta Loshaj, Tamara Pavlović, and Agnesa Bytyçi
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:: Disinformation and misinformation are pervasive issues in Kosovo, where they exploit existing societal divisions and low trust in institutional narratives. Participants in focus groups and interviews largely defined misinformation as unintentional inaccuracies or partial truths spread due to misunderstanding or lack of verification, while disinformation was seen as deliberately misleading information designed to create division. Though malinformation was not discussed, the distinction between misinformation and disinformation highlights the deliberate nature of the latter in destabilizing interethnic relations. According to a recent NDI Kosovo survey 67% of Kosovo Serbs believe things are moving in the wrong direction, while 41% of Kosovo Albanians believe the opposite. Kosovo Serbs prioritize unemployment (66%) and interethnic tensions (49%) as their primary issues, while Albanians focus more on unemployment (77%) and corruption (56%). There is a significant disparity in perceptions of interethnic relations, while 65% of Kosovo Serbs expect relations to worsen, 53% of Kosovo Albanians are optimistic about improvement. Media consumption is heavily segmented by ethnicity with 79% of the Kosovo Serbs relying on Serbian TV stations daily, with 66% expressing trust in these outlets. Kosovo Albanian respondents primarily use Kosovo TV stations (86%) and social media (50%) as information sources. Trust in information sources remains low across ethnic groups, with reliance on personal networks (friends and family) common for fact-checking.2 Kosovo Serbian community widely believe in disinformation narratives, such as claims of ethnic cleansing plans and mistreatment by Kosovo Police during incidents like the Banjska terrorist attack. Among Kosovo Albanians, skepticism about these narratives is higher, reflecting ethnic polarization. A significant factor enabling both misinformation and disinformation is the skepticism toward institutional narratives—whether from the government, international organizations, or national media. These institutions are widely viewed as biased or agenda-driven, misaligned with the priorities of local communities. Conversely, reliance on familiar sources, such as ethnically divided local news outlets and word-of-mouth communication, exacerbates separation and distrust. These sources, while perceived as relatable and acting in the community’s best interest, are often biased, incomplete, or inaccurate, further reinforcing community echo chambers. Relations between Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs are frequently manipulated through disinformation to fuel distrust. Actions by the Kosovo Government impacting the Serbian community—such as institutional closures—are framed in Serbian media as ethnic discrimination or even “ethnic cleansing.” Similarly, uncontextualized or sensationalized reports about past events, like the fabricated claim of Albanian children being drowned by Serbs, continue to inflame ethnic hostility. These narratives exploit the unresolved history, reinforcing grievances that hinder reconciliation efforts. Socio-economic hardships, such as high poverty rates and employment gaps, increase susceptibility to disinformation. According to the 2024 Democracy Plus Vulnerability Index, which saw Kosovo’s vulnerability score rise from 41 to 57, economic instability makes individuals more receptive to emotionally charged misinformation.3 Limited access to quality education weakens critical thinking and media literacy, leaving many unable to identify biased information. The National Democratic Institute in their report on Information Integrity in Kosovo Assessment of the Political Economy of Disinformation (July 2022) found that the education system insufficiently prepares citizens for assessing online disinformation, further enhancing vulnerability. The issue of disinformation is not merely a challenge of modern information ecosystems; it is a deliberate strategy employed by internal and external actors to destabilize communities and undermine democratic governance. As digital platforms expand access to information, they also facilitate the rapid spread of false narratives, making it increasingly difficult for communities to discern fact from fiction. This report addresses these challenges with a focus on their implications for interethnic relations between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs. This report is grounded in qualitative research, incorporating insights from two primary sources: Two focus group discussions were conducted with a total of fifteen participants, comprising a mix of Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs. These discussions provided a grassroots perspective on how disinformation affects interethnic dynamics, exploring lived experiences, perceptions, and community-level challenges. Additionally, nine in-depth interviews were conducted with a diverse range of stakeholders, including local and international experts, representatives from civil society, and government officials. These interviews offered expert insights into the structural, cultural, and political dimensions of disinformation in Kosovo. The combination of these approaches ensures a nuanced understanding of the issue, capturing both macro-level trends and micro-level experiences. The findings are contextualized within existing literature and complemented by statistical data from surveys and prior studies. The report is structured as follows: A detailed analysis of the main themes and insights that emerged from the focus groups and interviews, highlighting the impact of disinformation on interethnic relations, institutional trust, and reconciliation efforts. The next section explores the structural, cultural, and political factors that make Kosovo particularly susceptible to disinformation. A breakdown of the primary methods and stories used in disinformation campaigns, including the roles of media, political actors, and diaspora communities, is also included. An assessment of how disinformation influences community dynamics, perpetuates stereotypes, and undermines peacebuilding initiatives. Kosovo’s ongoing efforts at normalization of relations with Serbia make the issue of disinformation particularly salient. Disinformation not only perpetuates division but also undermines trust in institutions and mediation efforts to normalize relations between Kosovo and Serbia. By addressing the mechanisms and impacts of disinformation, this report seeks to contribute to a deeper understanding of how to better counter disinformation targeting interethnic relations, in order to foster a cohesive and democratic society. The findings and recommendations presented here are intended to serve as a resource for policymakers, civil society organizations, media practitioners, and international actors working to promote peace and reconciliation in Kosovo. At its core, this report emphasizes the importance of fostering resilience against disinformation where interethnic relations are characterized by trust, cooperation, and mutual respect. The research paper “Understanding How Disinformation Targets and Affects Interethnic Relations in Kosovo” is implemented with the support of the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and United States Agency for International Development (USAID), in Kosovo. The content of this research paper belongs to the Kosovar Center for Security Studies and does not necessarily reflect the position and stances of NDI and USAID.
Topic:: Ethnicity, Institutions, Disinformation, Misinformation, Trust, and Civil Peace
Political Geography:: Europe and Kosovo

23. From Partners to Rivals: Normative Power Europe Meets Normative Power China?

Author:: Gözde Yilmaz
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: The European Union (EU) has been promoting its norms, values, and rules for decades. However, in the current international environment, the EU’s normative power is not being received well outside the EU, particularly in reference to the growing power of illiberal states. Within that context, this study explores EU-China relations across time and unpacks the position of normative power Europe towards China and the Chinese response. The study foregrounds the fruitless attempts of the EU to project its transformative power onto China and the growing resistance by China against this, which it expresses by presenting itself to the West as an alternative power with an alternative understanding of international politics.
Topic:: International Relations, European Union, Rivalry, Strategic Partnerships, and Normative Power
Political Geography:: China and Europe

24. Schengen Visa Deadlock: The Unresolved Case of Turkish Citizens

Author:: Burak Erdenir
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: The visa policy of the European Union (EU) member states against Turkish citizens has been a controversial topic for decades. Millions of Turkish citizens suffer from serious restrictions before their travel to the Schengen area for the purpose of their non-gainful activities. In time, two main options appeared before the visa-free travel of Turkish citizens, namely the opportunity brought by the interpretations of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) based on the “stand-still clause” and secondly the Visa Liberalisation Dialogue. The objective of the article is to discuss whether the visa regime against Turkish citizens is justified or politically motivated. It connects the technical/legal analysis to a political analysis through the securitization theory. Security framing practices of the European actors at various policy levels are analyzed to explain the continuation of the restrictive visa regime against Turkish citizens despite two strong options that could have ensured visa-free travel. This article concludes that as a result of developments following the failed coup attempt in 2016, visa-free travel of Turkish citizens which was framed through the perceived threat of Turkish migration has transformed into a real threat.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, European Union, Visa, Securitization, and Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU)
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, and Middle East

25. Ukraine and Russia: From Civilized Divorce to Uncivilized War

Author:: Hüsna Taş Yetim
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: Russia’s ongoing military intervention in Ukraine since February 24, 2022, has attracted considerable attention from International Relations specialists, analysts, intellectuals, and academics. Russia's decision to go to war has been interpreted in a variety of ways. Some scholars have linked it to the country's imperial and Soviet history (Mankoff 2022; Rojeck 2022; Trenin 2022; Timothy 2022; Van Harpen et al. 2023), while others have seen it as a deliberate distraction from internal problems (Torbakov 2022). Paul D’Anieri’s second edition of “Ukraine and Russia: From Civilized Divorce to Uncivilized War”, which consists of ten chapters, challenges prevailing views by providing a comprehensive analysis of the historical context of the conflict. D’Anieri contends that the origins of the Ukrainian war of 2022 go beyond the immediate crises of late 2021 or the events of 2014. Instead, he identifies three post-Cold War dynamics - the security dilemma, democratization, and domestic politics - as the primary drivers of the war. According to D’Anieri, these factors strained ties between Russia, Ukraine, and the West, leading to the conflict (pp. 2-3). Chapters three, four, and five meticulously dissect each dynamic, offering a detailed analysis of the intricate relationships between the United States (US), Russia, Ukraine, and Europe from 1989 to the present conflict.
Topic:: International Relations, History, Book Review, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

26. KGB Operations against the USA and Canada in Soviet Ukraine, 1953-1991

Author:: Nebahat Akkoç
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: Professor Zhuk’s “KGB Operations against the USA and Canada in Soviet Ukraine, 1953- 1991” focuses on the post-Stalin Cold War period, when Soviet Ukraine was gradually opened to American and Canadian visitors and combines counter-intelligence documents in the 1st (and 16th) fund of Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) archive with the Committee for State Security’s (KGB) official correspondence and reports to the political leadership of Soviet Ukraine.
Topic:: Cold War, History, Book Review, and KGB
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

27. Russia’s Shadow War Against the West

Author:: Seth G. Jones
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:: Russia is conducting an escalating and violent campaign of sabotage and subversion against European and U.S. targets in Europe led by Russian military intelligence (the GRU), according to a new CSIS database of Russian activity. The number of Russian attacks nearly tripled between 2023 and 2024. Russia’s primary targets have included transportation, government, critical infrastructure, and industry, and its main weapons and tactics have included explosives, blunt or edged instruments (such as anchors), and electronic attack. Despite the increase in Russian attacks, Western countries have not developed an effective strategy to counter these attacks.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Intelligence, Geopolitics, Russia-Ukraine War, and Transnational Threats
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and United States of America

28. Political and Legal Foundations of Russia’s Strategic Planning in the Field of Nuclear Weapons

Author:: Tatyana Kashirina
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:: East View Information Services
Abstract:: RUSSIA’S official position on nuclear deterrence is outlined in several strategic planning documents concerning national security and defense. The deterioration of the international situation, worsening Russian- American and Russian-European relations, and the escalation of the Russia-Ukraine crisis in 2013-2014 prompted Moscow to revise its Military Doctrine in 2014. This document places significant emphasis on the increased activity of military forces unfriendly to Russia and foreign nations operating in territories adjacent to the Russian Federation and its allies. Among the key external military dangers are threats to global stability (which is primarily based on the possession of nuclear weapons) and regional stability through the development and deployment of strategic missile defense systems that disrupt the established balance of power in the nuclear missile domain. Other threats include the implementation of the “global strike” concept, intentions to deploy weapons in space, the proliferation of high-precision nonnuclear strategic systems, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction, missiles, and missile technologies.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, International Security, Deterrence, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

29. Hermeneutics and Psychology of Russia’s Nuclear Deterrence

Author:: Vasily Belozyorov
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:: East View Information Services
Abstract:: RECENT developments surrounding Russia’s nuclear deterrence policy have sparked widespread reactions in Russia and abroad, ranging from belligerent and aggressive to eschatological and apocalyptic. On November 19, 2024, official guidelines were unveiled in the updated document titled Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence1 (hereinafter referred to as the Fundamentals). Several factors compelled Russia to revise its approaches to nuclear deterrence policy: the erosion of strategic stability, provocations and nuclear blackmail by Ukraine, and Western encouragement of the latter’s irresponsible and reckless leadership. The increasingly adversarial nature of global relations has brought the international system to the brink of large-scale war. The release of this new doctrinal policy provides a critical opportunity to analyze various aspects of Russia’s nuclear deterrence strategy.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Communications, Deterrence, Hermeneutics, Russia-Ukraine War, Perception, and Intimidation
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

30. Baltic and Nordic States Assess the Russian Military Threat

Author:: Marcin Andrzej Piotrowski
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The newest intelligence reports by the Baltic and Nordic states jointly warn about the aggressive intentions and reconstitution of Russia’s armed forces. All of the documents assume the successful implementation of plans for larger Russian land and airborne forces till the end of 2026. However, these reports differ in the estimates of when the political moment and Russia’s conventional capabilities may permit it to initiate open conflict with NATO. Despite their informational and analytical contents, these reports may affect the Baltic region states’ capabilities development plans and their decisions about whether to increase defence spending.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Nordic Nations, and Baltic States

31. Carbon leakage through supply chain adjustments

Author:: Hanyi Wang
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:: This paper examines carbon leakage through supply chain recalibration in response to European carbon policies. Using input-output data and a high-frequency identification approach for carbon policy shocks, this paper investigates whether stringent carbon regulations in Europe affect the imports of carbon-intensive inputs from major emerging economies lacking similar policies. The findings reveal a temporary increase in the rate of change of imports from emerging countries relative to all inputs in the carbon-intensive sectors following carbon policy shocks, with effects peaking after two years before dissipating. While not directly quantifying emissions transfer, this study suggests some evidence of short-term input substitution patterns consistent with carbon leakage through international supply chains.
Topic:: Carbon Emissions, Imports, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:: Europe

32. Local feminist perspectives as transformation levers for sustainable development in Ukraine in the context of ongoing defence

Author:: Olena Strelnyk, Liudmyla Yuzva, and Tamara Zlobina
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:: The research in this discussion paper explores the significant role of feminist perspectives and actions in fostering sustainable gender-transformative changes within Ukraine, particularly during the ongoing defence against Russian aggression. It highlights the ability of feminist movements to catalyse long-term shifts towards gender equality and social inclusion, with a focus on women’s and LGBT+ rights. Despite the challenges of war, feminist activists continue to push for transformative policies that not only address immediate wartime needs, but also lay the foundation for gender-responsive defence, inclusive recovery and post-war reconstruction. This study examines the impact of feminist actions and perspectives on various sectors of Ukrainian society, the barriers they face and the opportunities that remain for strengthening feminist policies during and after the war. The research timeline spans 2014-2024, corresponding to the duration of Russia’s war against Ukraine, with a particular emphasis on the period of the full-scale invasion from 2022 to 2024.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Feminism, LGBT+, Russia-Ukraine War, Sustainable Development, and Gender Equality
Political Geography:: Europe and Ukraine

33. Hybrid threats: the new horizons for a "Europe of internal security"?

Author:: Jean Mafart
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: Even today, most of our fellow citizens are unaware that the European Union is actively involved in the fight against terrorism, money laundering and drug trafficking, in border protection and in the harmonisation of criminal legislation[1]. This is why a European internal security strategy, ProtectEU published by the Commission on April 1st is important : it defines the European Union's work programme for the coming years, within the framework of the guidelines laid down by the European Council. The assessment of the previous internal security strategy (for the period 2020-2025) shows that this kind of programme has real scope: the Commission announced numerous initiatives that were actually completed, even if, as time goes by, the action inevitably deviates from the initial intentions in response to circumstances. Since the successive strategies are work programmes for a given period, none of them really resembles the previous one. On the other hand, the major underlying themes vary relatively little: terrorism, organised crime and external border control were, as it is the case today, key concerns of the ‘founding fathers’ of the ‘area of freedom, security and justice’ (AFSJ). The doubling of the staff of Europol, the agency responsible which supports Member States in the fight against crime, and the tripling of the staff of the European Border Guard, which are part of the Frontex agency, are also the most spectacular proposals of the new strategy, even if they had already been voiced by the President of the Commission at the beginning of her second term. The arrival of a new theme is therefore bound to attract attention: in this case, it is striking to see the space given over to hybrid threats (a whole chapter, eight pages out of the thirty in the document published on 1 April). A sad sign of the times: it is no longer conceivable to develop an internal security policy without addressing, alongside the more ‘traditional’ themes, the growing threat of destabilisation operations of all kinds coming from Russia or elsewhere. The link between the internal and external dimensions of security is obviously nothing new: in France, the White Paper on defence and national security published in 2008 already considered that ‘the distinction between internal and external security is no longer relevant’. Current geopolitical tensions and the development of hybrid threats are blatantly reinforcing this. How can the ‘internal security of Europe’, initially conceived to respond to internal issues - compensating for the effects of free movement between Member States - adapt to take better account of threats from the outside?
Topic:: Security, European Union, and Hybrid Threats
Political Geography:: Europe

34. The end of the energy price crisis must not mean the end of the energy transition

Author:: Valérie Plagnol
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: In many respects, Europe has recently experienced a rude awakening, albeit a salutary one. Barely recovered from the Covid pandemic, it has had to contend with the most serious energy supply crisis since the oil shocks of the 1970s, due to Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent disruption of Russian gas supplies, particularly via the Nord Stream pipelines. After electricity prices rose to extreme levels, their recent decline in Europe is particularly welcome. But this respite is far from enough. On the one hand, electricity prices are still higher than before the crisis and, on the other hand, they remain almost twice as high as those of our main trading partners, weighing on household purchasing power and business competitiveness. Such constraints, combined with rising geostrategic and trade tensions and the need to strengthen our common defence, have led some segments of European public opinion, including some economic actors, to question the efforts undertaken in the energy and climate transition. However, there can be no question of abandoning the path of energy transition, as the current tensions confirm the necessity and legitimacy of this approach. - This is, of course, about our climate future: numerous and consistent studies show that doing nothing rather than taking action will cost our economies and ourselves much more. - Geopolitical and economic tensions are accentuating the convergence between these imperatives and the need to strengthen our sovereignty, through diversification of supply sources and greater control of production cycles on our own soil. - The growing electrification of uses is generating a new industrial revolution – particularly in the mobility and artificial intelligence sectors – creating an economic and ecological dynamic that Europe is in a position to capture. Combining these imperatives therefore means accelerating the transition to energy and decarbonising our consumption. The current crisis has shown us that massive reliance on natural gas cannot be as stable a transition solution as we had hoped. Rising electricity prices have led to an acceleration of renewable energy projects and installations. More Member States support the development of nuclear power, better integrated into the overall mix and included in the European taxonomy. France, which is committed to renewing its facilities, is at the forefront of these efforts. Finally, strengthening and reorganising our electricity networks, including the development of interconnections, is already at the heart of our industrial strategies.
Topic:: Electricity, COVID-19, Energy Crisis, Russia-Ukraine War, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:: Europe

35. Slovakia: civil society opposes its leaders

Author:: Radovan Gura and Gilles Rouet
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: For some years now, Slovakia has been going through a period of profound political change. Marked by a complex history influenced by the Pan-Slavic movement and the legacy of the communist period, the Slovak political scene is characterised by growing instability, a division of society and a rise in populist discourse. Successive events have fuelled discontent and protests, which are now directed at the Prime Minister Robert Fico.
Topic:: Civil Society, Elections, Populism, Domestic Politics, and Post-Communism
Political Geography:: Europe and Slovakia

36. When sleepwalkers awake: German plea for a new European security architecture - a German point of view

Author:: Stéphane Beemelmans
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: For three years, a war has been raging on Europe's borders between two geographically connected states – a conflict that originated in Russia's occupation of Crimea and Donbass almost 11 years ago. Since then, every political and military decision-maker in our part of Europe should have realized that there is a (great) power on our continent that is ready at any time to put ‘war as a continuation of politics by other means’ (Clausewitz) into practice. The deterrent mechanism between the former blocs, which had been effective for almost 50 years and thus prevented war, has evidently given way to a ‘laissez-faire’ on the part of the European states, which has allowed Russia to attack and partially occupy Ukraine with complete impunity, using a crude mix of historical and political justifications that violate international law. What should not have happened could not be seen and therefore could not be addressed appropriately. Our and NATO's ‘laissez-faire’ was based on the for malistic argument that no NATO member country had been attacked and on the lack of strategic foresight disguised as ‘hope’, the expression of which under international law was the ‘Minsk Peace Agreement’ of 2015. The hope, namely, that this attack could be localized and thus geographically restricted or ‘frozen’.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe and Germany

37. European support to the defence industry - Mid-term review of the European Defence Fund

Author:: Nicolas-Jean Brehon
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: Poland has made security one of its top priorities during its Presidency of the Council (January-June 2025). Almost a year ago, the Commission presented a European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) aimed at strengthening European industrial capabilities. If implemented, this programme will bolster the European Defence Fund (EDF), launched in 2021 and which has already financed one hundred and sixty-two armaments industry programmes. Cooperation projects are numerous and extensive. The programmes selected by the Commission bring together an average of seventeen entities, and it takes care to appoint coordinating leaders in almost all the Member States. Questions are now beginning to emerge. After three years, it is useful to draw up a mid-term review to inform future choices.
Topic:: Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:: Europe

38. Polish Presidency of the Council - A paradigm shift in Poland's European policy

Author:: Piotr Buras and Michał Matlak
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: Poland is holding the Presidency of the Council of the European Union in the first half of 2025. After a controversial Hungarian presidency and political turbulence in France and Germany, European public opinion is looking to Poland, where an openly Eurosceptic government was ousted in the 2023 elections. This change has come at a time when the European Union is facing major existential challenges, in particular with the war in Ukraine, which are especially resonant in Poland. The hopes pinned on Poland are as much a reflection of the impression of a leadership vacuum in Europe that Warsaw - who else at the moment? - could fill, as well as the country's growing economic and geopolitical position after two decades of EU membership.
Topic:: Public Opinion, European Union, Geopolitics, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Europe and Poland

39. EU’s Strategic Net-zero Technology Promotion Policies and Global Supply Chains

Author:: Youngook Jang
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: This brief examines recent trends in the EU's industrial and trade policies related to net-zero strategic technologies and their supply chains. It then analyzes the impact of these policies on global supply chain reshaping. As a major player in global supply chains and an active participant in the transition to a net-zero economy, the EU has recently been promoting industrial competitiveness through various industrial and trade policies. Quantitative analyses imply that these policies will likely increase intra-EU trade and reduce extra-EU trade. Korea should respond and adapt to changes in the global trade environment by drawing up Korean industrial policies using EU examples as a reference.
Topic:: Science and Technology, European Union, Trade Policy, Supply Chains, and Net Zero
Political Geography:: Europe and South Korea

40. No One-Size-Fits-All: Outreach and Counselling for Irregular Migrants

Author:: María Belén Zanzuchi
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Migration Policy Institute (MPI)
Abstract:: Tackling irregular migration to Europe has long been high on the EU agenda. The strategies proposed and adopted for addressing this issue have evolved over time, resulting in an increasingly diverse set of tools. These include strengthened border controls, voluntary and forced return efforts, new legal pathways to offer alternatives to irregular movement, and regularization. In recent years, European countries have also added to the toolkit to address irregular migration by conducting outreach and counselling for specific groups of irregular migrants. The reasons include informing them about available return and reintegration support, raising the visibility of pathways out of irregularity (such as regularization options, where they exist), and ensuring all members of a society have access to certain essential services. As interest and investments in this area grow, this MPI Europe issue brief explores the diversity of initiatives, actors, and practices in this field. It draws, among other sources, on interviews with government and nongovernmental stakeholders in eight European countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) and on roundtable discussions among public officials, local administrations, civil-society actors, and representatives of nongovernmental organizations.
Topic:: Civil Society, European Union, Investment, Irregular Migration, and Regularization
Political Geography:: Europe

41. Connecting Opportunities: Greece’s Strategic Role in the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC)

Author:: Dimitris Gavalas and George Dikaios
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: This policy brief discusses the role of Greece in the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), focusing mainly on those aspects related to infrastructure and ports and the global supply chain. It suggests a series of different actions and highlights different angles that Greece should take into account if it wants to be a major player in the establishment of the Corridor and its gateway to Europe/European Union. – IMEC will be a game changer in international trade relationships, regional tensions, and political challenges. – The main obstacles to IMEC’s establishment are the conflicts in the Middle East and other major national interests of key actors (such as the Chinese monopoly in the region). – Focus is given to port infrastructure, as ports are pivotal to the global supply chain. India pays significant attention to its ports, while the Port of Piraeus is the largest port in Eastern Europe. – The critical role and position of Greece are highlighted, underlying its role as a hub that connects India and the Middle East to Europe. – Greece needs to invest in infrastructure development, build a skilled workforce, and attract foreign investments. – Suggestions for establishing a successful commercial corridor between India and Greece are given, focusing on mutual interests and growth opportunities.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Trade, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:: Europe, Middle East, India, and Greece

42. Long-term Effects of the Refugee Crisis on Greek Public Opinion Regarding Immigration

Author:: Nicholas Sambanis and Carlos di Bonifacio
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: Analyzing data from the European Social Survey (ESS), we explore macro-level effects of the 2015 refugee crisis on public attitudes toward immigration in Greece. Contrary to the belief that the crisis hardened Greeks’ attitudes toward immigration, we find no evidence of a significant negative effect that persists over time. Indeed, we observe a slight improvement in immigration attitudes since a low point that occurred during Greece’s foreign debt crisis. More broadly, the commonly held belief that European publics are becoming more hostile toward immigrants over time is a misperception of reality. We instead observe a slight improvement in attitudes since the refugee crisis of 2015.
Topic:: Migration, Immigration, Public Opinion, Refugee Crisis, and Debt Crisis
Political Geography:: Europe and Greece

43. The New Political Groups in the European Parliament: Ideological Identity and Cohesion

Author:: Antonis Papakostas and Spyros Blavoukos
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: This paper provides an in-depth analysis of the outcome of the June 2024 European Parliament elections, focusing on the characteristics of national political formations that are represented in Strasbourg and the identity of the political groups in the European Parliament. This analysis is based on two axes of ideological and political nature: (1) the political spectrum (Left to Right), and (2) the disposition of the parties toward European integration. The paper makes use of data from the European Election Study 2024 (EES) exploring EP political groups’ (lack of) homogeneity and the varying degree of their internal cohesion.
Topic:: Ideology, European Parliament, Identity, Regional Politics, and Cohesion
Political Geography:: Europe

44. Reducing the Motherhood Penalty in Greece: Lessons from Norway

Author:: Manos Matsaganis, Tone Fløtten, Chrysa Papalexatou, Daphne Nicolitsas, and Bjorn Dapi
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: This Working paper draws on the emerging literature that has established that the employment rates and the earnings of men and women start to diverge once they have children, with women’s labour market performance deteriorating, while that of men’s left unaffected or even improving. This phenomenon has been dubbed the motherhood penalty (or the child penalty). The size of the penalty is affected by the choices parents make as regards employment and childcare, which in turn are affected by gender norms, instilled in women and men early in life, but also by public policies aiming to establish a better work-life balance and help working mothers and fathers combine bringing up a child with pursuing a career. The paper reviews cultural norms and institutional arrangements as potential determinants of mothers’ employment in two polar cases: Greece (where female employment is low, and child penalties large) compared to Norway (where female employment is high, and child penalties are virtually non-existent). The paper concludes with a list of policy recommendations, inspired by our understanding of the gradual emergence of family-friendly work-life policies in Norway, and informed by our awareness of constraints facing policy makers in Greece.
Topic:: Employment, Economy, Public Policy, Parenting, and Motherhood
Political Geography:: Europe and Greece

45. European Democracy Support Annual Review 2024

Author:: Richard Youngs, Kinga Brudzinska, Zselyke Csaky, Ricardo Farinha, and Ken Godfrey
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: In 2024, a series of elections reinforced EU concerns about the fragility of European democracies. This, coupled with intensifying conflict dynamics and authoritarian trends worldwide, led the EU to focus on protecting democracy at home at the expense of supporting it globally.
Topic:: Civil Society, Authoritarianism, Reform, European Union, Democracy, and Democratic Backsliding
Political Geography:: Europe

46. Regional deprivation, individual prospects, and political resentment

Author:: Giovanni Facchini, Anja Neundorf, Sergi Pardos-Prado, and Cecilia Testa
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Nottingham Interdisciplinary Centre for Economic and Political Research (NICEP)
Abstract:: Regional economic conditions affect livelihoods and the geography of political resentment. Yet, individuals do not equally partake in their region’s economic fortunes, and their perceptions of relative deprivation need not be the same. Grievances are likely to be shaped not only by income disparities but also by how personal prospects are tied to regional conditions. We argue that the interaction between subjective individual and regional relative deprivation crucially affects perceptions of shared experience and systemic unfairness. Through a large-scale survey experiment in Britain, we provide causal evidence that poor individuals in poor regions express more political resentment due to diminished personal financial prospects and social status. In contrast, political attitudes among poor and wealthy individuals are indistinguishable in affluent regions. Our findings reveal how reference groups affect subjective perceptions of relative deprivation and highlight the importance of egocentric mechanisms, whereby the local economy shapes expectations of individual prospects.
Topic:: Economic Inequality, Regional Economy, Social Status, and Political Resentment
Political Geography:: Britain and Europe

47. Europe’s next watershed – how liberal Europe should react to Trump 2.0

Author:: Fabian Zuleeg
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: The return of Donald Trump to the White House and his “America first” doctrine inevitably poses a fundamental challenge for the EU. Trump’s second presidency represents a new watershed moment: the policies of the next US administration are not just likely to put Europe at a global disadvantage, they will threaten its core objectives of prosperity, sustainability, security, and democracy. This is why European countries will have to act decisively to safeguard the bloc’s unity and strengthen its autonomy in a changed world. Assuming that a second Trump administration will resemble the first would be a serious error. Trump has become more extreme in his policy positions, while facing fewer constraints and operating in a more favourable international environment. As a result, preparing for a worst-case scenario may be a wise approach. Trump’s adversarial, zero-sum approach to international trade is likely to undermine the structures and processes of multilateral economic governance. Measures such as tariffs also threaten the EU’s growth and competitiveness and risk deepening divisions within the bloc. Global progress towards greater sustainability is certain to suffer. A disengagement on behalf of the US from its leadership role in environmental and climate governance will be a significant setback in these efforts. Should the US turn away from its climate goals, this would send a strong signal to other countries that these objectives are no longer a priority. On security, any potential benefit that a Trump presidency might produce in terms of strengthening EU unity is strongly undermined by his stance on Ukraine, which is set to increase the threat facing Europe from Russia. A US-imposed ceasefire would be no guarantee of lasting peace or security for Ukraine or for Europe. In response, the EU and its members will have to take a much bolder and more proactive role, sharply increasing Europe’s own military capabilities and spending. Policies that signal a tolerance for the use of open and covert force, in violation of international law, will also have profound consequences for global security. Far-right and anti-democratic forces within Europe are likely to be emboldened by an incoming Trump government. His actions to exploit Europe’s political divides are set to put significant pressure on European integration – a project Trump will have no qualms in undermining. The entrenchment and normalisation of Trump’s style of populistic, divisive politics and ‘us against them’ rhetoric risks eroding democratic debate more broadly. His amplification of falsehoods and disinformation will undermine public trust in the US and beyond, and could also boost political figures adopting similar strategies in Europe. There is strong potential for Trump’s anti-establishment narrative to gain further ground in Europe, and Europe’s illiberal, regressive and new-nativist forces will no doubt seek to harness this to increase their power. Should they be successful, there is a very real risk of the EU becoming hollowed-out and ineffectual. In this context, achieving consensus and acting with unity will be a greater challenge than ever for the EU27. Those within the EU who are prepared to take the necessary steps to rise to the challenge posed by Trump may have to explore unconventional forms of cooperation to act effectively. Moving forward in this way poses its own legal and political risks. But with European democracy at stake, it may be the only path to achieving the necessary level of ambition and unity to mount a strong response to Trump 2.0.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, Donald Trump, Sustainability, and Democratic Backsliding
Political Geography:: Europe

48. Building Economic Security into Europe’s Clean Energy Agenda: Eight Recommendations for Europe’s Net-Zero Course Correction

Author:: Pawel Swieboda, Georg Riekeles, and Simon Dekeyrel
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: A European consensus may still exist on the end goal of climate neutrality, yet there is no such consensus on the political, economic and social choices required to reach it. Each possible pathway carries a distinct set of costs and trade-offs across the energy trilemma of sustainability, affordability and security. An excessively benign reading of the international environment, political and economic negligence and a lack of sufficient action on key parameters of the trilemma have put Europe on a decarbonisation trajectory of high prices and low security. This has become increasingly untenable. The long-term reliance on Russian natural gas was a fateful symptom of this predicament but is not a stand-alone example. Europe’s situation is currently aggravated by a series of equations that do not compute, with targets being set not matched by the required efforts and investments across core areas of Europe’s ambitions, such as wind, hydrogen, nuclear, net-zero manufacturing and energy efficiency. Europe is, consequently, on paths towards endpoints that are inconsistent with the EU’s Fit for 55 and 2040 climate scenarios. All too often, the EU’s energy choices have been an outcome of inner-EU compromises, rather than a reflection of the long-term strategic approach. All this is happening in a stormy international environment, with President Trump abandoning international cooperation and climate ambitions while China’s overcapacities are taking global economic relations to the brink. Consequences are bound to be dire. Unless yearly energy system investments can be significantly ramped up, suggestions that Europe can no longer pursue its 2050 net-zero objective at the expense of cost competitiveness and economic security will only get stronger. Europe should not abandon its net-zero ambitions, but a significant course correction is required. Building on the former European Central Bank President Mario Draghi’s call for a joint approach to decarbonisation and competitiveness and adding an economic security perspective, this paper proposes eight recommendations for Europe’s net-zero course correction. We argue that the best course of action for Europe is to gain ‘escape velocity’ on the green transition: prioritising cost-effective investments in clean industry and energy infrastructure, which are essential to enable a transition to clean energy. While the competitiveness debate tends to focus on the more immediate ways of activating growth, economic security encompasses a broader, forward looking framework that emphasises resilience. This includes managing risks, reducing dependencies, and preparing for potential disruptions. Staying on track toward achieving net-zero emissions by 2050 must remain Europe’s overarching objective, coupled with a parallel goal of optimising economic value-creation and reducing the cost, uncertainty and risks of the energy transition. EIGHT RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EUROPE’S NET-ZERO COURSE CORRECTION Prioritise and coordinate large-scale investments to achieve ‘escape velocity’ in the energy transition. Set realistic targets and priorities using foresight and analysis recognising the interdependencies between policy levers at EU and national levels. Double down on electrification through proactive technology-neutral supply policies, grid investment, strategic industrial policy and enabling frameworks. Elaborate and implement a dedicated ‘masterplan for energy system flexibility, grid investment and energy storage’. Anchor the Clean Industrial Deal on an ‘economic security yardstick’ involving strategic funding for European ecosystems, enabling infrastructure and necessary shielding. Factor in nuclear power investments as an essential component in Europe’s net-zero scenario. Strengthen single market coordination, price differentiation and investment incentives while expanding long-term contractual solutions. Develop a comprehensive energy system risk management approach.
Topic:: Renewable Energy, Carbon Emissions, Economic Security, and Net Zero
Political Geography:: Europe

49. How to Spend It: European defence for the age of mass precision

Author:: Chris Kremidas-Courtney
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: Europe urgently needs to redefine its defence strategy in response to the United States’ growing disengagement from its transatlantic allies. The suspension of US military assistance to Ukraine and calls for increased European self-reliance have forced policymakers to rapidly reassess how to sustain collective security. The European Union’s ReArm EU plan seeks to mobilise €800 billion in national defence spending to meet these challenges, but investments must be made wisely to prepare for future warfare. Modern warfare has entered into an era of mass precision, where forces can achieve the effects of massed firepower through distributed, AI-enabled, and highly accurate weapons systems. Ukraine’s innovative use of drone swarms and precision strikes against Russian forces has demonstrated this shift. China and the US are also leveraging mass precision to reshape the battlefield, making traditional mass-based warfare increasingly obsolete. However, while armoured vehicles, fighter jets, and ships require new protections, they remain essential when integrated into networked, distributed operations. To prepare for this new strategic reality, Europe must: Invest in mass precision and distributed operations – Prioritise drone warfare, deep-strike capabilities, and networked operations. Accelerate investment in the European Long-Range Strike Approach (ELSA) programme to develop long-range cruise missiles. Build a European command-and-control (C2) system – Reduce reliance on NATO’s US-centric C2 infrastructure. Strengthen Europe’s intelligence capabilities and decision support – Expand European satellite and cyber capabilities and expand analytical capacities. Strengthen air and missile defence – Accelerate the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) and deploy cost effective countermeasures such as more cost effective laser-based systems. Build a European military logistics system – Ensure the ability to sustain forces and ensure rapid troop and equipment mobility within Europe. Train and exercise European forces at scale – Conduct large-scale joint exercises to build readiness. Buy Ukrainian – Integrate Ukrainian defence firms into EU supply chains. Buy European – Reduce dependence on US arms while leveraging UK, Norwegian, Canadian and Turkish defence industries. Build a European nuclear umbrella – France and the UK should explore extended deterrence options to protect all European allies in case of further US withdrawal. Build a European blue-water navy – Strengthen and expand European naval capabilities to protect vital sea lanes in addition to supporting territorial defence. Winning the next war, not the last one Europe can no longer afford slow, bureaucratic and fragmented defence spending—it must accelerate, integrate and innovate in order to defend itself in the event that the United States is unable or unwilling to do so. We don’t just need bigger budgets—we need a better strategy. The future of warfare is mass precision and distributed operations, enabled by AI, and supported by capabilities that enable decision, cyber and information dominance. If Europe invests wisely, it can be a technologically advanced, resilient and autonomous military power while remaining a robust pillar of NATO’s collective security. The hour of Europe is now.
Topic:: Defense Policy, European Union, Weapons, Disengagement, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:: Europe and United States of America

50. The e-commerce challenge: Is importing low-value consignments going to become more cumbersome in the EU and the US?

Author:: Anna Jerzewska
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: In the last few months, terms such as e-commerce and de minimis (threshold below which imported goods are not subject to tariffs) have made headlines both in the EU and in the US. The rapid growth of e-commerce exacerbated problems with this exemption both in the US and in the EU. The first problem is lack of control. Only a percentage of commercial goods are subject to physical border checks, and for e-commerce goods this number is even smaller. Then there is the issue of endangering the level-playing field. De minimis benefits consumers and businesses that rely on it, but harms domestic manufacturers and retail outlets that import in bulk (and thus are subject to full customs and product standards and safety requirements). But can the challenges around the rapid growth of e-commerce be solved by the removal of de minimis? And what would be the consequences of removing the exemption? The paper summarises recent attempts and proposals of removing de minimis in the EU and the US and the challenges faced by both administrations. In both cases, e-commerce is still under discussion and it’s not clear what the final solution will look like. However, there are already noticeable differences in approach.
Topic:: European Union, Trade, Imports, and E-Commerce
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

51. What’s next for Ukraine and Europe? A conversation with Dmytro Kuleba

Author:: Dmytro Kuleba, Carol Saivetz, and Elizabeth Wood
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:: What’s next for Ukraine and Europe? A conversation with Dmytro Kuleba, former foreign minister of Ukraine: Tuesday, April 8th, 2025. Speaker: Dmytro Kuleba is a senior fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and served as the foreign minister of Ukraine from March 2020-September 2024. Prior to that, he was deputy prime minister on matters of European relations from August 2019 to March 2020. He is internationally recognized as one of the most influential diplomats of his generation and a global champion for democracy, freedom, and resilience. Discussants: Carol Saivetz is a senior advisor in the MIT Security Studies Program at the Center for International Studies (CIS). She is the author and contributing co-editor of books and articles on Soviet and now Russian foreign policy issues. Elizabeth Wood is Ford International Professor of History at MIT. She is the author most recently of Roots of Russia’s War in Ukraine as well as articles on Vladimir Putin, the political cult of WWII, right-wing populism in Russia and Turkey, and US-Russian Partnerships in Science. She is director of the MIT-Ukraine Program at CIS.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Armed Conflict, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

52. Vulnerabilities and Resilience of Electrical Grids in Wartime: Lessons from Ukraine

Author:: Volodymyr Kudrytskyi and Mariana Budjeryn
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:: Vulnerabilities and Resilience of Electrical Grids in Wartime: Lessons from Ukraine: Tuesday, March 11, 2025. The Russian assault on Ukraine’s electrical generating capacity and transmission grid as part of its full-scale war against Ukraine, is unprecedented in the history of warfare. Volodymyr Kudrytskyi, the former CEO of Ukraine’s electric grid operator Ukrenergo, discussed the challenges of securing Ukraine’s energy system throughout the war, lessons for mitigating grid vulnerabilities, and prospects for rebuilding a more resilient energy system in Ukraine and Europe. Speaker: Volodymyr Kudrytskyi served as the CEO and Chairman of the Management Board of the Ukrainian Transmission System Operator Ukrenergo from February 2020 until September 2024. Under his leadership, Ukraine’s electrical grid has undergone preparations for synchronization with the power system of Continental Europe ENTSO-E and emergency synchronization with ENTSO-E in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. From February 24, 2022, Mr. Kudrytskyi and his team at Ukrenergo managed the Ukrainian power grid through unprecedented Russian attacks against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure. Previously, Mr. Kudrytskyi held leadership roles in key Ukrainian energy sector companies, including Naftogaz and Ukrtransnafta. Mr. Kudrytskyi holds a degree in international finance from Kyiv National Economic University. Moderator: Mariana Budjeryn is the author of Inheriting the Bomb: The Collapse of the USSR and the Nuclear Disarmament of Ukraine (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2023) and a winner of the 2024 William E. Colby Military Writers’ Award, the first female in the award’s 25-year history. Dr. Budjeryn is a member of the Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the National Academies of Sciences and a senior nonresident fellow at the Brookings Institution.
Topic:: Electricity, Resilience, Vulnerability, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

53. Analysis of the Organizational Performance of a Strategic Defense Company in Brazil: Conceptions from the Perspective of Defense Studies in Europe

Author:: Marcus Vinicius Goncalves da Silva
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
Institution:: Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
Abstract:: This study proposes, based on scientific production carried out in Europe, the adaptation of the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) method by Kaplan and Norton, for the analysis of the performance of Brazilian Strategic Defense Companies (SDC). The investigation is carried out in a comparative way, in two stages. In the first one, a bibliometric research was carried out to identify the characteristics of the European Defense Industrial Base. In the second stage of the research, the BSC-Defense indicators, developed based on the literature found, were empirically analyzed in a Strategic Defense Company in Brazil. The results indicate that the BSC-Defense instrument can serve as a guiding element for Strategic Defense Companies, as it includes an integrated and dynamic set of capabilities, processes and activities related to the strategic performance of the organization.
Topic:: Defense Industry, Performance Evaluation, and Strategic Defense Companies (SDC)
Political Geography:: Europe, Brazil, and South America

54. Lessons for the European Central Bank from the 2021–23 Inflationary Episode

Author:: Pablo Hernández de Cos
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:: Since mid-2021, the euro area economy has gone through several shocks, leading to the highest inflation since the creation of the European Monetary Union. A forceful and persistent response from the European Central Bank, grounded in the monetary policy framework it agreed in 2021 ahead of the inflationary episode, has succeeded in bringing inflation down and delivering on the central bank’s price stability mandate. The framework will be reviewed in 2025, and it might conclude that there is no need for a drastic change. Nevertheless, this assessment should be compatible with identifying some areas for improvement. In particular, the 2021 review was primarily focused on the effective lower bound. The recent inflationary episode, together with high ongoing uncertainty, indicate that the articulation of monetary policy strategy frameworks should be robust to very different scenarios. Likely persistence of high levels of uncertainty over the next few years will also require an emphasis on flexibility to adapt to the magnitude, origin, and persistence of shocks. Unconditional forward guidance should be avoided. In addition, there might be a need to more clearly distinguish in the future, when possible, between quantitative easing for market functioning versus monetary stimulus, which could incentivize a careful assessment of the amount, duration, and structure of any asset purchase program. Communication also needs to be improved in relation to the level of uncertainty and its consequences for monetary policymaking with, for instance, greater use of scenarios and sensitivity analyses as appropriate. Improving forecasting/modeling tools, in particular when dealing with large supply shocks, and understanding the roles of different measures of inflation expectations should also be priorities.
Topic:: Monetary Policy, Inflation, and European Central Bank
Political Geography:: Europe

55. Destined for Division? US and EU Responses to the Challenge of Chinese Overcapacity

Author:: Salih Bora, Mary Lovely, and Luis Simón
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:: Heightened concerns about China’s exports have intensified competitive pressures on producers and compelled American and European policymakers, government officials, and political leaders to try to counteract those concerns. President Donald Trump’s decision to raise tariffs on China by 145 percent is the most recent—and arguably most dramatic—example of broader concerns about Chinese overcapacity. The clash with China is particularly evident in sectors that US and European leaders have deemed essential for growth and security, charging that Chinese industrial subsidies, rather than comparative advantage, are the basis for the country’s export success. However, the European Union and the United States have taken different approaches to resolve tensions with China. The European Union seeks, at least for now, to preserve and adhere to global trading rules. By contrast, the United States has acted unilaterally (even before the second Trump administration) to defend its domestic production by engaging in a trade confrontation with China that, together with China’s retaliation, has rattled global financial markets. This Policy Brief explores these EU-US divisions, their reflection on trade and industrial policy, and prospects for coordinated action against Chinese overcapacity. The authors argue that the European Union can take the lead toward a resolution within the rules-based system while maintaining an open door to future US participation.
Topic:: European Union, Tariffs, Exports, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: China, Europe, North America, and United States of America

56. The European Union Growth Plan for the Western Balkans: A reality test for EU enlargement

Author:: Valbona Zeneli, Richard Grieveson, Isabelle Ioannides, and Dimitar Bechev
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The European Union (EU) Growth Plan for the Western Balkans aims to integrate the region into the EU single market, enhance regional cooperation, implement significant governance and rule of law reforms, and boost EU financial support. In doing so, the EU seeks to foster economic development, political stability, and security in the region amid rising geopolitical tensions, while accelerating the Western Balkans’ EU accession process. The Growth Plan holds substantial potential to reinvigorate the enlargement process and counter the stagnation felt by both the EU and the region. Strong points include: Tangible benefits before full accession: Providing stronger incentives for reform. Active involvement of regional governments: Increasing buy-in from local leaders, who must submit their own reform agendas. Enhanced economic integration, greater access to the EU market, increased EU funding, and reforms to governance and the rule of law: Stimulating investment, promoting economic growth, and raising living standards. These improvements would bring the Western Balkans closer to the economic success seen in the Central and Eastern European countries in the EU over the past two decades. Moreover, fostering deeper regional cooperation will not only deliver an economic boost but also contribute to political normalization. If successful, the plan will bolster the EU’s political influence in the region, countering the impact of external actors and encouraging much-needed nearshoring investment from EU firms. However, the plan faces several challenges: Enforceability: Although conditionality is rigorous, with disbursement of funds tied to strict conditions to prevent misuse, there are concerns regarding its enforceability. The European Court of Auditors has already raised reservations. Quantity: Additionally, the financial support offered is significantly lower than what EU member states in Southeast Europe receive. The reforms required for fund access and single market integration are substantial and will demand significant political will and institutional capacity—both of which have been lacking in the region at times over the past two decades. The success of the growth plan will largely depend on its implementation. The EU must ensure rigorous enforcement of conditionality, reward positive reform steps, and increase funding for countries making progress. Civil society in the Western Balkans should be engaged as much as possible to foster broader support and transparency. The EU should also leverage the plan to align with its broader geopolitical and geoeconomic interests, particularly in strengthening its strategic autonomy. Additionally, the Growth Plan should be fully integrated with the EU’s competitiveness, green, and digital transition agendas. For their part, Western Balkans leaders should seize the increased agency provided by the plan. They must take ownership of the reforms they propose, participate actively in EU meetings, and design their reform agendas to deliver better living standards and deeper EU integration for their populations.
Topic:: Markets, Reform, European Union, and Enlargement
Political Geography:: Europe and Western Balkans

57. The imperative of augmenting US theater nuclear forces

Author:: Greg Weaver
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The United States and its allies and partners face an impending change in the threats posed by nuclear-armed adversaries: a strategic environment marked by two nuclear peer major powers. Russia, long a nuclear peer of the United States, will likely emerge from the war in Ukraine—regardless of how it ends—even more reliant on its nuclear forces, which are already the largest in the world. Meanwhile, China is undertaking the largest nuclear force buildup since the Cold War. That buildup will increase the size of Beijing’s nuclear forces by roughly seven and a half times since 2018, positioning China as a nuclear peer of the United States by 2035.1 Meanwhile, North Korea continues to expand and diversify its nuclear arsenal. Although the North Korean threat has been somewhat constrained by the quality of its ballistic missile systems—particularly its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)—technical assistance from Russia, in exchange for Kim Jong Un’s material support for the war in Ukraine, could rapidly enhance North Korean capabilities. Finally, the ongoing conflict in the Middle East could prompt Iran to choose to acquire its own nuclear arsenal, presenting a wholly new challenge. A pair of recent analyses of the strategic impact of this two-nuclear-peer environment have sounded an alarm, making clear that this environment poses a qualitatively and quantitatively new threat of adversary aggression and the potential for nuclear war.2 Conducted by bipartisan teams of former senior US officials and other nuclear experts, both analyses concluded—in the words of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (hereafter referred to as the Strategic Posture Commission)—that the planned US nuclear force “is absolutely essential, although not sufficient [emphasis added] to meet the new threats posed by Russia and China.”3 Both reports emphasized the urgent need to enhance US theater nuclear forces to address the most likely path to large-scale nuclear war: the failure to deter or counter limited adversary nuclear use in an ongoing conventional conflict. Finally, both reports laid out a set of attributes that US theater nuclear force enhancements must possess to effectively address the threat of limited nuclear escalation. However, these reports did not examine in depth the deterrence and warfighting implications of alternative new US theater nuclear systems. This paper examines why the two-nuclear-peer threat makes the enhancement of US theater nuclear forces an urgent imperative. It explains why the planned US strategic and theater nuclear forces are insufficient to address this threat. The paper then presents a more detailed set of political-military and operational attributes that enhanced US theater nuclear forces must possess to effectively counter the threat. Using these attributes, it evaluates the relative deterrence and warfighting value of various potential alternative theater-range nuclear weapon systems. The paper concludes with a recommended future US theater nuclear force structure and posture, specifically, that the United States should field a theater nuclear force that combines an effectively dispersible dual-capable fighter aircraft (DCA) force in Europe with nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-Ns) deployed day-to-day on attack submarines (SSNs) in Europe and Asia and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM-Ns) and/or ground-launched ballistic missiles (GLBM-Ns) continuously deployed in Europe and/or Asia.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

58. Issue brief: A NATO strategy for countering Russia

Author:: Ian Brzezinski
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Russia is the most direct and significant threat to the security of NATO member states—and since Moscow’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 this threat continues to grow. It now encompasses the war in Ukraine, the militarization of the Arctic, hybrid warfare, and violations of arms control treaties. While NATO holds a significant advantage over Russia in military and economic power, an effective and unified strategy is needed to counter Russia’s aggression and fully harness the Alliance’s collective capabilities. To effectively counter Russia, NATO must defeat Russia in Ukraine, deter Russian aggression against NATO allies and partners, contain Russian influence beyond its borders, and degrade Russia’s ability and will to accomplish its revisionist agenda. That will require, among other actions, a significant increase of support and commitment to Ukraine’s defense against Russia, and a more robust Alliance force posture including the modernization of its nuclear deterrent, the permanent stationing of brigade elements along NATO’s eastern frontier and increased defense industrial capacities.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Intelligence, International Organization, National Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Deterrence, Resilience, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

59. The Future of European Digital Competitiveness

Author:: Oscar Guinea and Vanika Sharma
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: Former Italian prime minister Mario Draghi’s recent report on Europe’s competitiveness lays bare the negative effects of overregulation in the EU economy and the underperformance of its digital sector. However, Draghi failed to draw connections between these two phenomena. The future of Europe’s competitiveness is inextricably linked to the future of its digital economy. Unfortunately, the economic contribution of Europe’s Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector remains significantly smaller than that of the US ICT sector to the US economy. There are well-known reasons behind this divergence. Chief among them is the lack of sufficient investment in Europe’s intangible and tangible assets. Regulation, particularly those regulations governing the digital economy, has emerged as a key factor that restricts Europe’s usage of digital technologies and hinders subsequent productivity growth. The EU now has nearly 100 tech-focused laws, comprising thousands of pages, provisions, and restrictions. This must change. The EU should develop a joint plan for digitalisation and competitiveness. This plan should build upon Europe’s comparative advantages: openness, strong institutions, the rule of law, robust intellectual property protections, and high levels of human capital. Above all, the EU must recognise that, while protecting consumer rights, EU policies and regulations must also prioritise the competitiveness of Europe’s ICT sector and promote the widespread adoption of digital technologies across the entire EU economy.
Topic:: Markets, European Union, Digital Economy, and Economic Competition
Political Geography:: Europe

60. Quantum Technology: A Policy Primer for EU Policymakers

Author:: Oscar Guinea, Dyuti Pandya, Oscar du Roy, and Andrea Dugo
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: Quantum technology is rapidly emerging as a transformative force with the potential to reshape industries ranging from finance and pharmaceuticals to automotive and aerospace. In 2024 alone, investments in quantum technology reached over USD 56 billion. Its development, however, presents unique geopolitical challenges, stemming from its applications in defence and encryption, as well as its power to unsettle established comparative advantages and market specialisations across countries. Against this backdrop, an open and collaborative approach to quantum innovation is critical for maximising the benefits of this technology. Countries perform more effectively in quantum technology when they support cross-border collaborations and market specialisation. Firms producing quantum hardware or software solutions can sell to a range of industrial users who, in turn, integrate these cutting-edge systems into goods and services. Such synergy reduces the overall risks and costs of R&D, as different partners share both the financial burden and any uncertainties related to the commercial viability of quantum applications. Moreover, collaboration fosters a wider diffusion of quantum technologies. As firms specialising in quantum computing, communication, or sensing deepen their expertise, their insights permeate adjacent sectors through the shared knowledge enabled by joint collaborations. Conversely, restrictive policies that limit interaction between domestic and foreign firms risk stifling innovation. Self-reliance strategies reduce opportunities for knowledge-sharing, limit the pool of potential partners, and ultimately slow the pace of quantum breakthroughs. This operating framework supports the current EU approach to quantum technology, which emphasises openness and encourages a higher number of collaborations between EU and non-EU companies. This approach is grounded in economic realities: the EU ranks second only to the US in terms of the number of companies and collaborations between firms and it thrives on partnering with non-EU countries as the number of collaborations with companies outside the EU far exceeds the number of collaborations within the EU.
Topic:: European Union, Digital Economy, Digital Policy, and Quantum Computing
Political Geography:: Europe

61. Cybersecurity at Risk: How the EU’s Digital Markets Act Could Undermine Security across Mobile Operating Systems

Author:: Matthias Bauer and Dyuti Pandya
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: The EU’s fight against cybersecurity threats risks being undermined by the over-enforcement of the Digital Markets Act (DMA). Article 5(4) could force mobile operating system providers to allow unregulated external links, bypassing critical security controls and exposing millions of smartphone users to cyber threats. The DMA focuses on market structure, overlooking how differences in operating system design affect security vulnerabilities. A one-size-fits-all approach ignores platform-specific security needs, leaving European users exposed to cyber threats. This risks undermining the EU’s economic security agenda, including initiatives like the Cybersecurity Strategy, Cyber Resilience Act, and NIS2 Directive, which aim to strengthen digital defences. The unintended consequences of this regulatory approach are already evident in Apple’s recent decisions to withhold certain features – such as advanced AI functionalities and enhanced app security tools – from the EU market due to DMA-related concerns. As a result, EU consumers face reduced access to innovative technologies, diminished user experiences, and weaker security protections compared to users in other regions. Now, Android, a widely used open-source system, may also be compromised by DMA enforcement, potentially limiting its flexibility, security, and the broader ecosystem of app developers and device manufacturers that rely on its open architecture.
Topic:: European Union, Cybersecurity, Digital Economy, and Digital Markets Act (DMA)
Political Geography:: Europe

62. The Participation of Foreign Bidders in EU Public Procurement: Too Much or Too Little?

Author:: Lucian Cernat
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: This policy brief examines EU public procurement data from the Tenders Electronic Daily (TED) to evaluate foreign bidders’ participation and success in winning EU public contracts. Despite data coverage limitations, the available information shows an increase in foreign participation in both full and partial contracts, with most activity concentrated in a few countries. Countries like the United States, Japan, and Canada focus on securing full contracts, while nations such as Norway and Turkey often engage through partial contracts. Notably, since Brexit, UK bidders have faced a significant decline in market share, benefiting other countries. The main conclusion is that foreign participation via cross-border procurement (Mode 1) – the only one available in the TED database – is not very high. Although it increased over time, it remains relatively modest, mainly due to low participation rates, rather than discriminatory practices. Between 2016 and 2019, only about 7 percent of EU procurement authorities received foreign bids. This fact alone largely explains the low level of cross-border procurement taking place via Mode 1: put simply, there is no winning without trying. Another important conclusion is that a comprehensive assessment of the participation of foreign bidders in EU procurement would require two new key metrics in the TED data collection process to capture the more important yet missing modes of international procurement. Having reliable and comprehensive data is not just an academic pursuit but a necessity for shaping effective EU policy in the face of rising global protectionism in public procurement.
Topic:: European Union, Contracts, and Public Procurement
Political Geography:: Europe

63. Competitive Harmonisation: A Collaborative Framework for Intra-EU Reform and Competitiveness

Author:: Matthias Bauer
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: Persistent legal fragmentation, compounded by the EU’s 24 official languages, increases costs and legal uncertainty, deterring meaningful investments in innovation and preventing businesses from scaling across borders. Without bold, comprehensive legal reforms, Europe will fall further behind in global competition and major global technological developments. The EU’s incremental reform approach has failed to address the deep-rooted legal and institutional challenges threatening Europe’s economic future. Competitive Harmonisation offers a pragmatic yet visionary concept to overcome legal fragmentation, tackle the business scale gap, and unlock Europe’s vast economic potential. By embracing “collaborative governance” through coalitions of willing Member States, aligning with global standards, and prioritising innovation and technology diffusion, European governments can enhance the Single Market and restore Europe’s leadership in lawmaking and industrial competitiveness. Amid growing political risks, such as the threat of tariffs, the responsibility to act decisively rests squarely with Europe. By taking bold, pragmatic steps now, Europeans can not only resolve immediate challenges but also lay the groundwork for sustainable, long-term economic development.
Topic:: Markets, Reform, European Union, Regional Economy, and Economic Competition
Political Geography:: Europe

64. The 8 Percent Approach: A Big Bang in Resources and Capacity for Europe’s Economy and Defence

Author:: Andrea Dugo, Fredrik Erixon, and Ismail Abdi
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: Europe has become a region of feeble economic performance and military frailty. Its share of the world economy is rapidly shrinking, and the region is struggling to keep up with economies at the modern technological frontier. Countries in the European Union have for decades talked about the importance of raising Research and Development (R&D) expenditure and allow greater space for an entrepreneurial business sector that is prospering on the back of innovation. However, the results are poor. R&D expenditures as a share of GDP have largely been stagnant, business investment and inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) have tanked. Rates of new business formation and growth are paltry, partly as a result of gross overregulation. Productivity growth has continued its decades-long path of deceleration, and the EU is increasingly behind international leaders. Fortunately, Europe is beginning to wake up from its strategic slumber. Defence expenditures are now growing faster than in previous decades – and some countries, like Poland, are becoming serious powers. Yet, the region’s own military capacity remains poor. Europe must rebuild core conventional capacities at a time when defence modernisation requires substantial resources and focus. Russia may be bogged down by its war against Ukraine, but it is rebuilding its capacities fast and is increasingly aided by partnerships with other countries that want to break down what remains of a liberal world order. Many European NATO-members are now hitting the 2-percent spending target but must spend vastly more to acquire sufficient capacities to defend themselves and their interests.
Topic:: Defense Policy, European Union, Regional Economy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

65. The Impact of Increased Mass Litigation in Europe

Author:: Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, Dyuti Pandya, Vanika Sharma, Elena Sisto, Oscar du Roy, Renata Zilli, and Philipp Lamprecht
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: The purpose of this study is to better understand the growth of mass litigation in the European Union (EU) and its economic consequences. European authorities have long encouraged consumers to seek redress through private litigation in European competition law and, more recently, they have shifted their focus towards collective actions in a broad range of areas, including data privacy and product liability. Facilitating access to justice through collective actions is not a cost-free option. Unfortunately, there is a lack of economic analysis on the consequences of an increase in collective action cases in the EU. It is crucial to understand the economic consequences of a “mixed regime” – that is, a regime based on both ex-ante public enforcement through regulation and ex-post enforcement through private litigation. The combination of these two enforcement models raises questions about how the system is intended to work together and what the consequences might be for the economy. This study examines the economic implications of these developments in the EU.
Topic:: Law, European Union, Regulation, Regional Economy, and Litigation
Political Geography:: Europe

66. Boosting Efficiency and Quality in EU Public Services: The Need for a European Multi-Cloud-First Strategy

Author:: Matthias Bauer, Andrea Dugo, Dyuti Pandya, Vanika Sharma, and Elena Sito
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: EU governments have an unprecedented opportunity to unlock up to EUR 450 billion in annual fiscal savings by modernising public services through advanced multi-cloud solutions, cloud-based AI, and other deep tech innovations. As estimated in this study, this figure highlights the transformative impact of digitised government services – not only in improving service quality and operational efficiency but also in generating substantial fiscal gains that would enhance Europe’s economic competitiveness. Multi-cloud adoption is not merely an infrastructure choice but a strategic enabler of modern, agile, and citizen-focused public services. To fully capitalise on cloud adoption, EU governments should embrace a multi-cloud strategy that integrates different public cloud providers and, where necessary, also incorporates sovereign or private cloud environments. Cloud services come in many forms, including Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS), Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS), and Software-as-a-Service (SaaS). Each model offers unique value propositions such as ease of use, rapid security updates, scalability, and the capacity to integrate novel technological features, such as AI applications, seamlessly.
Topic:: European Union, Digital Economy, and Cloud Computing
Political Geography:: Europe

67. EU Export of Regulatory Overreach: The Case of the Digital Markets Act (DMA)

Author:: Matthias Bauer, Dyuti Pandya, and Vanika Sharma
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: The EU’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) exemplifies the “Brussels Effect,” extending the EU’s regulatory influence beyond its borders and shaping global digital competition policies. While intended to curb the market power of large technology platforms and promote fair competition, its broad, rigid, and pre-emptive approach risks stifling technological development, deterring investment, and creating legal uncertainty, particularly in emerging markets still building digital infrastructure and seeking to attract foreign investment. Large technology firms play a pivotal role in global economic development, driving innovation, infrastructure upgrading, and consumer welfare. However, increasing regulatory scrutiny, particularly under DMA-like frameworks, could inadvertently harm the very markets they help grow by imposing compliance burdens that hinder business expansion and technology diffusion. Countries with weaker institutions and regulatory capacity – such as India, Brazil, South Africa, and other emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) like Indonesia – could face greater risks of regulatory capture, corruption, and enforcement challenges if they replicate the EU’s approach without adapting it to their economic realities (Section 2). A key concern with the DMA is the departure from traditional case-by-case enforcement in competition policy, instead relying on broad, pre-emptive obligations based on ambiguous concepts such as fairness and contestability. This shift reduces legal certainty, increases the risk of inconsistent enforcement, and may inhibit dynamic competition, which is essential for innovation-driven sectors like fintech, e-commerce, ICT, and edtech. By prioritising static over dynamic competition, the DMA could impede technological progress, limiting consumer choice and long-term economic benefits (Section 3). The global adoption of DMA-like regulations risks further regulatory fragmentation and may create unintended consequences, particularly in emerging economies where regulatory frameworks, institutional quality, and market structures differ significantly from the EU. Broad prohibitions on business practices, such as self-preferencing and data-sharing, could limit opportunities for local firms to scale internationally, weaken cybersecurity protections, and reduce incentives for large technology firms to invest in these regions (Section 4). To ensure proportionate and effective competition enforcement, governments outside the EU should prioritise regulatory flexibility and case-by-case assessments over broad, static restrictions. OECD best practices on competition policy emphasise clear objectives, legal certainty, and regulatory proportionality, ensuring that competition enforcement supports, rather than stifles, innovation and investment (Section 5). Moreover, the risks of corruption and regulatory overreach in developing countries make broad ex-ante regulations especially problematic. Excessive discretionary power granted to local authorities could increase the risk of politically motivated enforcement, deter foreign investment, and undermine long-term economic growth. A more effective approach would be to strengthen institutional frameworks, enhance transparency, and adopt supply-side policies that support technology neutrality, free trade, and economic freedom.
Topic:: Science and Technology, European Union, Regulation, Digital Markets Act (DMA), and Economic Competition
Political Geography:: Europe

68. Trade in the Great Sea: The Future of EU-Southern Neighbourhood Trade Relations

Author:: Jan A. Micallef
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: This policy brief looks into the future of EU-Southern Mediterranean trade relations. It evaluates the current trade and contractual instruments governing these relations and asks if they are sufficient or if more is needed to exploit trade opportunities and manage trade challenges in the region. The policy brief shows why and how the current trade instruments are no longer sufficient. There are two main reasons for this: first, they do not really tackle areas such as services, investment and non-tariff measures (NTMs), all of which are important to unlock economic value for both sides in today’s economy; and second, new economic and political developments reinforce the need for better agreements. As trade becomes more political and intertwined with other issues such as energy, critical minerals, the environment and industrial policy, it is necessary to improve the agreements and instruments that govern trade. The policy brief lists some of the upgrades in EU-Southern Mediterranean trade agreements that are necessary. However, it also analyses what challenges there are to pursue these upgrades and what can be done to overcome the problems. The policy brief concludes that working towards these aims will be challenging but not impossible if there is the necessary political will on both sides. Both sides should realise that the price of not doing anything might be higher than the effort that is required to bring their trade instruments up to the standards needed.
Topic:: International Relations, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, and Trade
Political Geography:: Africa and Europe

69. Navigating Geopolitical Realities: The EU’s Strategic Positioning in the South Caucasus and Central Asia

Author:: Tengiz Pkhaladze
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: This policy brief examines the strategic importance of the South Caucasus and its pivotal role in the European Union’s evolving engagement with Central Asia. The regional landscape, however, remains highly volatile. Russia’s aggression in Ukraine has had direct and indirect repercussions for the South Caucasus. Against the backdrop of the war, Moscow continues its efforts to maintain the region within its sphere of influence – through military presence, disinformation, economic leverage, and political interference. Twenty percent of Georgia’s territory remains illegally occupied by Russian forces, while the fragile post-conflict environment following the Second Karabakh War continues to shape relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. While missions such as EUMM in Georgia and EUMA in Armenia reflect the EU’s growing political engagement, they remain limited in scope and capacity, constraining the Union’s ability to address the region’s evolving risks. The EU’s partnerships with South Caucasus countries are characterized by both strategic opportunity and persistent friction. Azerbaijan has become an important energy supplier to the EU, particularly via the Southern Gas Corridor, and is also involved in early-stage renewable initiatives such as the Black Sea Submarine Cable Project. However, the relationship remains complicated by enduring concerns related to governance, human rights, and democratic norms. Georgia, despite receiving EU candidate status in 2023, has prompted growing concern among EU institutions and member states over perceived democratic backsliding and increasing political polarization. The country remains a vital transit hub for the Middle Corridor and a central partner in EU connectivity efforts, but its internal developments have raised questions in Brussels about the sustainability of its European path. At the same time, Georgia continues to be a major target of Russia’s hybrid influence operations, which exploit internal divisions and erode trust in Euro-Atlantic institutions. Armenia, disillusioned with Russia’s security guarantees, is cautiously deepening its engagement with the West. However, the extent of this shift remains contingent on developments in Georgia – given Armenia’s geographic dependence – and on the prospects for a durable peace agreement with Azerbaijan. This policy brief assesses how the EU is managing the tensions between its strategic objectives and its normative commitments in a region increasingly shaped by Great Power rivalry. It concludes with policy recommendations aimed at strengthening the EU’s credibility and effectiveness in both the South Caucasus and Central Asia – advocating for a more coherent, proactive, and principled approach that aligns short-term geopolitical interests with long-term goals for regional stability and integration.
Topic:: European Union, Geopolitics, Strategic Interests, Regional Economy, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Central Asia, and South Caucasus

70. Collective Action in the Netherlands: Why It Matters for the Transposition of the Product Liability Directive

Author:: Oscar Guinea, Dyuti Pandya, and Vanika Sharma
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: This policy brief explores the implications of the Netherlands’ transposition of the new EU Product Liability Directive (PLD), focusing on its interaction with the Dutch collective action system. As one of the first EU countries to implement PLD and a key hub for mass litigation, the Netherlands offers a compelling case study. Features such as low claim thresholds, opt-out mechanisms, flexible settlements, limited cost-shifting, and the ease of creating litigation-backed entities make the Netherlands particularly attractive for mass claims, reinforcing its reputation as a “litigation magnet.” The new PLD simplifies liability claims, broadens the definition of “product” to include software, digital files, and related services, lowers evidentiary thresholds, extends liability to third-party actions such as cyberattacks, and includes post-market defects. These provisions, combined with the Netherlands’ collective redress regime, are expected to drive a rise in mass litigation. This rise poses particular economic risks for the Netherlands, one of the EU’s most digitised economies. Ranked sixth in digital adoption by Eurostat’s Digital Intensity Index, Dutch firms – especially in finance, insurance, ICT, and manufacturing – may also face growing exposure to collective actions under the PLD, which extends liability across the entire value chain. These sectors account for 27 percent of the value added in the Dutch market economy and are widely recognised as key drivers of economic growth. Increased legal uncertainty may also reduce the Netherlands’ attractiveness to multinational corporations, threatening levels of foreign direct investment and employment, both essential pillars of the Dutch economy. Growing mass litigation may also hinder innovation by redirecting R&D resources toward legal risk management. This is particularly concerning for the Netherlands, one of the EU’s top R&D investors. Drawing on US evidence, large-scale litigation can significantly erode market capitalisation, and based on our estimates, the cumulative loss in value for 31 Dutch companies featured in the EU R&D Scoreboard could reach €5.5 billion under the high-growth scenario. Such declines could impact household wealth, as Dutch households save approximately 14.6 percent of their gross disposable income, of which 20 percent is invested in equity. Pension funds, which also play a central role in Dutch long-term savings, can also hold significant stakes in publicly traded Dutch companies. As a result, the effects of collective actions on the market value of Dutch companies extend beyond corporate balance sheets, posing potential negative consequences for Dutch savers, as well as current and future pensioners. This report was commissioned by the European Justice Forum, a coalition of businesses, individuals and organisations that are working to build fair, balanced, transparent and efficient civil justice laws and systems for both consumers and businesses in Europe.
Topic:: European Union, Economy, Litigation, and Liability
Political Geography:: Europe and Netherlands

71. The Impact of Increased Mass Litigation in the UK

Author:: Oscar Guinea, Dyuti Pandya, Vanika Sharma, and Renata Zilli
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: Over the past decade, the United Kingdom has seen a marked rise in collective litigation, transforming what was once a niche legal, rarely employed, tool into a fast-growing business model with wide-ranging economic implications. At a time when the country seeks to boost investment, support innovation and attract global business, the proliferation of mass litigation risks undermining these ambitions. This study takes a closer look at how mass litigation is reshaping the UK’s legal, business and regulatory landscape – and asks whether the balance between justice and economic efficiency is tipping too far. The UK stands out among European countries for the ease with which mass claims can be launched. It has long provided a favourable environment for consumer representation and dispute resolution, with a strong culture of accountability. But recent years have seen the emergence of a new ecosystem: law firms specialising in group actions; litigation funders offering upfront capital in exchange for a share of awards; and Claims Management Companies (CMCs) that recruit claimants en masse and process high volumes of cases. The business model has proved highly successful, making group litigation an asset class in its own right and pushing collective actions far beyond traditional sectors such as banking and pharmaceuticals. Today, a growing portion of the UK economy is in the firing line – with potentially damaging consequences. This shift has been rapid and striking. From fewer than 10 mass litigation cases in the late 2010s, the UK saw 47 such actions in 2024 alone, more than any other European country. On a per capita basis, the UK ranks as one of the most litigious jurisdictions in Europe, well ahead of comparable economies such as France or Germany. The implications for the UK economy are far-reaching: many of the companies targeted by these actions operate in sectors that were included in the UK Government’s latest industrial strategy as critical to the country’s future economic growth. Whereas previously limited to financial and professional services, mass litigation cases are now rising in UK companies working in life sciences, advanced manufacturing and digital services. These are industries where risk-taking, long product development cycles and data-driven innovation are the norm. The threat of mass litigation introduces uncertainty and cost at exactly the moment when these businesses need regulatory clarity and investment stability. Moreover, claims against public sector entities involve a direct transfer of capital from the tax payer to hedge fund litigation funders. The financial burden is also considerable. Legal fees and returns to funders often consume a large share of total settlements, reducing the compensation that actually reaches affected individuals. In the Post Office Horizon scandal, for example, £46 million in legal fees and funders payments were deducted from a £57 million settlement, leaving a paltry sum of just over £20,000 per claimant. In the recent judgment of Merricks v. Mastercard, £100 million have been allocated to compensate consumers. Affected individuals could receive up to £70 each if only 5 percent claim, but as little as £2.5 if the full class of 44 million comes forward. These figures raise questions about who really benefits from mass litigation. The limited benefits for individual consumers stand in stark contrast to the substantial costs that mass litigation imposes on the UK economy as a whole. Our scenario modelling shows that, under a scenario where the costs of mass litigation are just 30 percent of the current costs in the US, litigation costs in the UK could reach more than half of the claim value; the cost of mass litigation for the UK economy could reach close to £18 billion, and the market capitalisation of the UK’s most innovative companies could fall by £11.2 billion, more than half the announced public investment into R&D in the 2025 Autumn Budget. These financial pressures affect the whole country. While many large companies are headquartered in Greater London, their operations, and the jobs they support, are often spread across the wider regions. This means that the impact of a legal challenge is not just a concern for a corporate boardroom in London, but it impacts local economies and communities across the UK. As the Civil Justice Council reviews the framework for litigation funding, this study provides evidence to inform the debate. It does not argue against collective actions per se but urges a careful weighing of their benefits against broader economic costs. If the UK wants to remain an attractive destination for business, investment, and innovation, it must ensure that its legal infrastructure supports rather than stifles those ambitions.
Topic:: Economics, European Union, Finance, and Litigation
Political Geography:: United Kingdom and Europe

72. Strengthening the Supply-Side Innovation in EU Telecommunications

Author:: Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, and Dyuti Pandya
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: The telecommunications sector is central to the EU’s competitiveness, not only providing the infrastructure that underpins digital connectivity but also serving as a key driver of innovation. Recent EU reports already highlight the persistent structural challenges faced by the EU telecommunication sector: market fragmentation, low investment levels, divergent spectrum policies, and an urgent need to bolster digital sovereignty. However, a critical dimension in this discussion often receives far less attention: the supply of the underlying technologies that power telecommunications infrastructure. In this domain, EU companies remain competitive. In 2023, 27 EU-headquartered firms were among the world’s top 2,000 R&D spenders in telecommunications, accounting for 16 percent of global sectoral investment. These figures underscore that, while Europe may lag in investment and infrastructure, it still holds strategic leadership in telecom innovation and technology development. Central to Europe’s success are standard development organisations (SDOs), technical standards, and Standard Essential Patents (SEPs). SDOs provide collaborative forums where companies jointly develop technical standards that ensure interoperability, reduce fragmentation and foster innovation. Complementing this, SEPs protect the innovations embedded within these standards, granting European companies vital licensing revenues that sustain their research efforts. This system is particularly important for EU firms, which tend to be smaller than their global competitors; it enables them to specialise in cutting-edge technology development and commercialise their innovations globally without needing to dominate manufacturing or end-user markets. As competitiveness in telecommunications increasingly depends on the pace and adoption of innovation, the EU faces both a challenge and an opportunity. European firms have the potential not only to supply critical technologies but to drive breakthroughs in connectivity which are linked to the development of other technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) or quantum technologies. However, to stay competitive, the EU must reinforce its position on the supply side, where its companies still operate at the technological frontier.
Topic:: Economics, European Union, Digital Economy, Innovation, and Supply and Demand
Political Geography:: Europe

73. CTC Sentinel: January 2025 Issue

Author:: Paul Cruickshank, Julika Enslin, Nicolas Stockhammer, and Colin Clarke
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: CTC Sentinel
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: France24’s Wassim Nasr is the only international journalist to spend time with Syria’s de facto leader Ahmed al-Sharaa both before and after the fall of Assad. In the spring of 2023, Nasr traveled to Idlib where he met with al-Sharaa (who at the time was widely known by his jihadi kunya Abu Muhammad al-Julani). Nasr’s insights detailed in “Journey to Idlib” in the May 2023 issue of CTC Sentinel on al-Sharaa’s ideological journey away from the Islamic State and al-Qa`ida toward what might be termed pragmatic Islamism were invaluable to international security analysts. Late last year, shortly after the fall of the Assad regime, Nasr traveled back to Syria where he met with al-Sharaa for a second time and interviewed him. Speaking to CTC Sentinel about the trip in his follow-up feature interview “Journey to Damascus,” Nasr says: “Comparing the man I saw in 2023 with the man I saw in late 2024, he was the same. He spoke very slowly, very quietly. It was the same impression I had a year and a half ago, which was very surprising to many people. I was very cautious a year and a half ago, asking myself, ‘Okay, should I take what he is saying for granted?’ But I was reassured. Because I saw that when they took Aleppo, [when] they took Damascus, actually he applied what he said to me a year and a half ago. It can’t be dismissed as just talk.” In the feature article, Nicolas Stockhammer and Colin Clarke examine the Islamic State-inspired plot to attack a Taylor Swift concert in Vienna that was thwarted in August 2024. They write that the plot “underlined that Islamic State Khorasan (ISK), which appears to have inspired the lead plotter, remains an enduring threat, evolving its tactics and strategy while focusing on radicalizing followers and supporters through relentless online propaganda. The suspects in the Vienna plot epitomized the interplay of online and offline radicalization, with extremist content on social media platforms like TikTok playing a pivotal role.” In the second interview, Wassim Nasr provides insights from his interview last fall with Mohamed (Amadou) Koufa, the number two in JNIM, al-Qa`ida’s affiliate in the Sahel. For Nasr, the questions Koufa chose not to answer were even more significant than his answers. “In my assessment, Koufa’s refusal to speak about al-Qa`ida was significant. I think it’s very possible that JNIM is at least seriously discussing and maybe preparing to break from al-Qa`ida. Since the last third of December, JNIM has stopped referring to AQIM and stopped directing followers to the AQIM media outlet Al-Izza. … It looks like they might be preparing the landscape for a split with al-Qa`ida in the same way that Jabhat al-Nusra—the predecessor group of Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS), the group now in power in Syria—split with al-Qa`ida.” Nasr says that it is possible that having seen HTS come to power in Syria after it split with al-Qa`ida and having seen al-Sharaa in recent weeks win broad international acceptance, JNIM may be preparing to start on a similar path away from the global jihadi group.
Topic:: Al Qaeda, Islamic State, Syrian War, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Bashar al-Assad, and Ahmad al-Sharaa
Political Geography:: Europe, Middle East, Syria, and Austria

74. CTC Sentinel: March 2025 Issue

Author:: Don Rassler, Yannick Veilleux-Lepage, Julika Enslin, Aaron Y. Zelin, and Jake Dulligan
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: CTC Sentinel
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: The March issue focuses in particular on the drone threat. In the feature article, Don Rassler and Yannick Veilleux-Lepage examine the evolution of terrorist drone usage and forecast its future trajectory in light of the tactical and technological innovations emerging from the Russo-Ukrainian War. They write that “the conflict has become a critical ‘innovation hub’ for drone warfare, accelerating advancements in the scale, speed, and range of drone operations. These developments are not only transforming the modern battlefield but also creating new opportunities for violent extremist organizations (VEOs) to enhance their operational capabilities.” They assess that “in particular, the war has normalized large-scale drone deployment, demonstrating the feasibility of launching coordinated drone swarms and phased attacks capable of overwhelming existing defenses” and note that the potential future pairing of high-speed First-Person View (FPV) drones with emerging technologies such as AI-assisted targeting “could significantly increase the precision and impact of future attacks.” In a similar vein, Jake Dulligan, Laura Freeman, Austin Phoenix, and Bradley Davis, in assessing the threat posed by commercial drones, write that the biggest concern “is that drone swarms could dramatically increase the impact of bad actor drone operations, be it kinetic strikes, ISR, or psychological warfare.” This month’s interview is with Dr. Christian Klos, the Director General of Public Security at Germany’s Federal Ministry of Interior and Community. He says that “when it comes to the external threat, I would agree with the assessment that ISIS-K is in Germany as well. What we observe from the intelligence side is that there are clear indications that the group intends to conduct attacks in Europe, and this can also include Germany and therefore we are very much aware of this threat, and we have seen also travel activities. So, it’s not just some minor indications.” Aaron Zelin assesses the new Syrian government’s efforts to counter the Islamic State, Hezbollah, and the captagon trade. He writes: “Unlike the Assad regime—which did little to fight the Islamic State, was closely aligned with Hezbollah, and produced captagon on an industrial scale—HTS in its guise as the new government of Syria is taking on these challenges assertively, and has a significant track record in doing so previously. Not only are these efforts a benefit to Syrian society and the security and stability of the country, but they also align with the interests of the United States and U.S. regional allies.” Alexandre Rodde and Justin Olmstead examine the evolution of vehicular ramming attacks and prevention efforts. They write that “when it comes to indicators and warnings of future attacks, the demonstration effect created by high-casualty vehicle-ramming attacks has in the past seemingly produced a surge in copycat attacks, which means the security agencies should be particularly vigilant given the recent uptick in high-profile attacks, including the New Orleans attack.”
Topic:: Intelligence, Terrorism, Violent Extremism, Weapons, Drones, Islamic State, Syrian War, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Public Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

75. NATO’s future: a history

Author:: Bruno Tertrais
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: Past pessimism about the solidity and survivability of the Alliance turned out to be misplaced, but assumptions about some of its fundamental tenets were not always correct. Doomsayers have been proven wrong. Internal tensions and external challenges have never brought the Alliance to a breaking point. After 75 years of existence, NATO appears to be a historical anomaly. A few lessons to ensure its longevity stem from this retrospective. NATO would be wise to stick with its core mission: deterrence and defense against an armed attack. Attempts to alter the rules and procedures of the Alliance risk endangering its foundations.
Topic:: NATO, History, Alliance, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Europe and North America

76. Fast, Fair, Funded and Feminist: A pathway to a just and transformative climate transition within and beyond the UK

Author:: Natalie Shortall, Chiara Ligouri, and Ruth Mayne
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:: The world is in the grip of a climate emergency. Urgent and equitable action is essential to prevent yet further escalating climate impacts that are devastating communities worldwide and to safeguard a liveable planet for future generations. For governments everywhere, including the UK Government, this is a defining test of leadership. But it is also a moment of opportunity—an opportunity to build economies and societies that are not only decarbonised and climate resilient, but that actively reduce inequalities, are more inclusive, and prioritise the wellbeing of people and the planet over short-term profit. In this report, we outline key steps the UK Government can take to lead the way toward a just and transformative transition—one that not only stabilises the climate but also delivers fairness and justice for all.
Topic:: Climate Change, Government, Transition, Climate Justice, and Net Zero
Political Geography:: United Kingdom and Europe

77. Raising the Bar: Supermarkets must urgently address structural exploitation of cocoa farmers

Author:: Jesse Arnon and Anouk Franck
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:: Most cocoa farmers in main cocoa producing countries Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana are poor, even though they are at the heart of the supply chain for a luxury good: chocolate. For decades they have been receiving low farm gate prices, which don’t allow them to earn a living income for their families. At the same time, companies in the cocoa and chocolate supply chains have been making huge profits. Supermarkets in the Netherlands and Germany have taken first steps by making long-term commitments to ensuring cocoa farmers are paid a living income reference price, but the share of honest chocolate they have on offer only reaches 5%. It’s time that they radically change the way they do business, by committing to long-term fair prices for farmers, sharing the risk with cocoa farmers and being accountable for all the chocolate products they sell. This paper focuses on supermarkets, which are powerful actors in the cocoa and chocolate supply chain. As primary retailers, supermarkets have a direct link with consumers and have power across the supply chain so they can drive real change. Dutch and German supermarkets have made living income commitments, and they have started implementing them.
Topic:: Human Rights, Business, Cocoa, Farming, Living Income, and Supermarkets
Political Geography:: Europe, Germany, Netherlands, and Global Focus

78. No Women, No Peace – A Snapshot of Oxfam’s Engagement with the Women, Peace and Security Agenda: Lessons and Opportunities

Author:: Marie Sophie Petersson, Lydia Ayikoru, Souhadou Diasso, Fatma Jaffer, and Moath Jamal
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:: This briefing paper summarizes the important lessons learned since 2018 by Oxfam Denmark and the wider Oxfam confederation while promoting the women, peace and security (WPS) agenda and supporting WPS programming in Burkina Faso, Colombia, Ghana, Kenya, Lebanon, Mali, Niger, the Occupied Palestinian Territory, South Sudan, Syria, Uganda, Ukraine and Yemen, including under the Danish International Development Agency (Danida) strategic partnerships. It contains practical and policy-level recommendations for international actors working on the WPS agenda in various crisis and conflict contexts globally. The briefing paper shows that supporting and amplifying locally led feminist action by diverse women-led, women’s and LGBTQIA+ rights organizations, networks and groups is a central foundation for peace and justice.
Topic:: Leadership, Crisis Management, Gender, Protection, Localization, Women, Peace, and and Security (WPS)
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, Middle East, and Global Focus

79. Progress in Ending Statelessness in Europe

Author:: Sam Mosallai
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: Europe is home to almost 500,000 stateless people or people with undetermined nationality, mainly due to the dissolution of the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia over three decades ago. Other causes of statelessness in Europe include the lack of safeguards to prevent children from being born stateless, gaps in universal birth registration, and, to a lesser extent, the deprivation of nationality as a counterterrorism measure. Many Roma, particularly those residing in Southeastern Europe, are stateless or at risk of statelessness due to persistent discrimination against them. Additionally, due to the lack of dedicated statelessness determination procedures found in many countries in Europe, many stateless migrants cannot enjoy the rights to which they are entitled under international law.
Topic:: Discrimination, Nationality, and Statelessness
Political Geography:: Europe

80. Sharks in the Muddy Waters: Terrorism and Mounting Global Disorder

Author:: Jahangir E. Arasli
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: The international system is in increasing disarray, thanks partly to systemic and structural factors. The strategic competition between major powers and groups of states is growing sharply. One particular consequence of this process is an escalation in scale and scope of shooting wars and armed conflicts (e.g., in Europe and the Middle East) and other antagonisms on the edge of war (e.g., Taiwan, the South China Sea, and South Asia). Moreover, the existing geopolitical alignments are shifting oddly. Neo‑revisionism, expansionist foreign policies, and advanced territorial claims militarize international relations. With a reoccurrence of “utility of force,” the standing norms of international law are frying, and WMD proliferation regimes and arms control treaties are crumbling. Trade wars and deteriorating growth prospects are increasing strains and risks to the global economy and individual states. Political and ideological polarization in societies, institutional decay, inefficiency of elites, and the rise of populism affect states’ stability. The challenges of climate change and emerging technologies remain unanswered and unsettled.
Topic:: Terrorism, Geopolitics, Armed Conflict, and International System
Political Geography:: Europe and Middle East

81. Achieving Minimum Viable Cyber Resilience: A Leadership Top Ten “To-Do” List

Author:: Steve Hill
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: I t is a reflection of the growing maturity of the cybersecurity industry that when the UK’s Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Pat McFadden, a senior cabinet minister responsible for national security, claimed in a speech to the November 2024 NATO Cyber Defence Conference that Russia “can turn the lights off for millions,” he was roundly criticized for hyperbole. Pragmatism has replaced alarmism as the driver for persuading the state and the C-suite to invest in cybersecurity. The world has neither ever been more complex nor more fast-moving. But that is not the same as saying that the world is more dangerous. The same inter-connectedness that creates supply-chain fragility also acts as a disincentive for governments whose priorities are primarily inward-looking (domestic stability and growth) to escalate conflicts to outright regional or global warfare that will likely undermine that domestic agenda. We see therefore brinkmanship and “grey conflict” taking place throughout the world. This includes targeted assassinations, arson attacks, disruption of underseas cables, drone activity, social media election influence campaigns, and all kinds of cyber-attacks.
Topic:: NATO, Cybersecurity, Gray Zone, Resilience, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and North America

82. The New Geopolitical Scramble for Corridors

Author:: Velina Tchakarova
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: The geopolitical landscape in winter 2024- 2025 is marked by significant transformation, uncertainty, and fierce competition for influence. The geopolitical hotspots of this new contest are most visible in the regions that bridge Europe and Asia—what the editors of Baku Dialogues call the “Silk Road region.” Central to this dynamic is the growing intersection of interests between major regional players against the backdrop of a Cold War 2.0, putting the West against what I was the first to call the “DragonBear” alliance of China and Russia. These corridors are not just infrastructural undertakings; they are the arteries of global power, trade, and connectivity, reflecting deeper geopolitical ambitions and contestations. This extensive analysis elaborates on today’s most significant connectivity projects, exploring their strategic implications and the new power dynamics they are fostering. In the traditional sense, empires have always relied on transport and trade corridors to project power and expand influence. From the ancient Silk Roads to the West’s colonial sea routes, the ability to control the flow of goods and resources has often equated to geopolitical dominance. Today, this principle remains unchanged, though the scale and stakes have reached unprecedented levels.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Trade, and International Competition
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Central Asia, and Asia

83. Lonely in the Crowd: Plugged or Remote?

Author:: Tobia Zevi
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:: The Covid-19 pandemic forced cities to shut down and citizens to stay home, disrupting economic activity and social life. The crisis pushed companies to adopt remote work, transforming it from a niche practice to a widespread norm, altering the balance between work and personal life. This shift created inequalities across sectors and influenced the ability of "global cities" to attract talent in a globalized labor market. Now, as the pandemic has receded, many companies are reversing course. This Report explores how remote work has impacted cities and citizens, from mobility to urban planning. How can remote work reshape global cities? What strategies are available to local authorities? Is remote work still the future?
Topic:: Cities, COVID-19, Labor Market, Digitalization, and Remote Work
Political Geography:: Europe and Global Focus

84. Are bad governments a threat to sovereign defaults? The effects of political risk on debt sustainability

Author:: Samantha Ajovalasit, Andrea Consiglio, Giovanni Pagliardi, and Stavros Zenios
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Political risk is a significant determinant of bond yields and economic growth in both developed and emerging markets and we develop a debt sustainability analysis model with both channels using a country ratings proxy of political risk. Political risk also affects a sovereign’s willingness to pay and it can render debt unsustainable, triggered by changes in the rating level, volatility or both. Conversely, sustainability can be restored through reforms that can be as effective as large-scale quantitative easing programmes. The political effects on debt are especially large for high-debt countries during periods of high interest rates, and have an impact on debt management through the choice of optimal financing maturities.
Topic:: Governance, European Union, Macroeconomics, Sustainability, Public Debt, and Sovereign Debt
Political Geography:: Europe

85. Dilemmas for the EU in deficit-financing of defence expenditure and maintenance of fiscal discipline

Author:: Lucio Pench
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: The European Union is grappling with the challenge of increasing defence expenditure while maintaining fiscal discipline under the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The European Commission has proposed activating the national escape clause available under the SGP to accommodate defence spending without triggering the excessive deficit procedure (EDP). However, the scope and enforcement of this measure remain uncertain. A proposed 1.5 percent of GDP cap on extra fiscal flexibility is legally questionable and unlikely to be enforced. While low-debt countries do not require the clause due to existing flexibility, highly indebted nations may find it insufficient in the face of rising debt costs. The escape clause may also serve as a backdoor for European Central Bank interventions under the Transmission Protection Instrument, which requires compliance with EU fiscal rules. The Commission has also proposed the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) funding mechanism, a €150 billion loan programme to finance national defence investments. SAFE relies on national borrowing and follows the model of the SURE (Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency) facility, put in place during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, SAFE’s limited scale and dependence on national fiscal capacities mean it falls short of the collective security funding approach advocated by economists. Meanwhile, Germany’s decision to reform its constitutional debt brake marks a major departure from its traditional fiscal policies. The reform establishes a permanent ‘defence golden rule’, exempting military spending from borrowing limits, alongside a €10 trillion infrastructure fund. Although this move does not endanger Germany’s fiscal sustainability, it undermines EU-wide fiscal coordination and conflicts with the SGP. This could weaken the European Central Bank’s position in future market interventions. Given these challenges, discussions on a new EU fiscal framework are necessary to ensure fiscal flexibility while maintaining debt sustainability.
Topic:: Security, Budget, European Union, Fiscal Policy, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:: Europe

86. The quickly fading memory of why and when bank capital is important

Author:: Jesper Berg, Nicolas Boivin, and Hans Geeroms
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Less than fifteen years after the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, banks and policymakers are calling for deregulation and lower capital requirements in the financial sector. They dispute that the Basel framework, the global standards for regulating large international banks, should be implemented fully in the European Union. One concern is that stricter capital regulation will affect the competitiveness of European banks compared to those in the United States and will restrict loan provision in the EU, despite Europe’s significant investment gap. However, deregulation should not be confused with reducing capital requirements for banks. On balance, there is only limited empirical evidence that respecting the capital requirements necessary to support financial stability hampers credit to the economy, investment or economic growth in the long term. Only well-capitalised banks can continue financing the economy during economic setbacks, and weakening the implementation of the Basel standards increases the risks of a new financial crisis. Bank lending and access to financing surveys also show there is no credit crunch in the euro area at present and that capital requirements are not the primary constraint on credit provision. A detailed look at current banking regulation does not support the conclusion that European banks are more strictly regulated overall than US banks. A direct comparison suggests rather the opposite. However, the compliance cost incurred by EU banks from current banking regulation can be reduced by simplifying EU rules.
Topic:: Markets, Financial Crisis, European Union, Regulation, Capital, and Banking
Political Geography:: Europe

87. Lessons for the European Central Bank from the 2021-2023 inflationary episode

Author:: Pablo Hernández de Cos
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Since mid-2021, the euro-area economy has gone through several shocks, leading to the highest inflation since the creation of the European Monetary Union. A forceful and persistent response from the European Central Bank, grounded in the monetary policy framework it agreed in 2021 ahead of the inflationary episode, has succeeded in bringing inflation down and delivering on the central bank’s price-stability mandate. The framework will be reviewed in 2025 and it might conclude that there is no need for a drastic change. Nevertheless, this assessment should be compatible with identifying some areas for improvement. In particular, the 2021 review was primarily focused on the effective lower bound. The recent inflationary episode, together with high ongoing uncertainty, indicate that the articulation of monetary policy strategy frameworks should be robust to very different scenarios. Likely persistence of high levels of uncertainty over the next few years will also require an emphasis on flexibility to adapt to the magnitude, origin and persistence of shocks. Unconditional forward guidance should be avoided. In addition, there might be a need to more clearly distinguish in the future, when possible, between quantitative easing for market functioning versus monetary stimulus, which could incentivise a careful assessment of the amount, duration and structure of any asset purchase programme. Communication also needs to be improved in relation to the level of uncertainty and its consequences for monetary policy making with, for instance, greater use of scenarios and sensitivity analyses as appropriate. Improving forecasting/modelling tools, in particular when dealing with large supply shocks, and understanding the roles of different measures of inflation expectations should also be priorities.
Topic:: Monetary Policy, Governance, European Union, Central Bank, and Macroeconomics
Political Geography:: Europe

88. Which companies are ahead in frontier innovation on critical technologies? Comparing China, the European Union and the United States

Author:: Alicia Garcia-Herrero, Michal Krystyanczuk, and Robin Schindowski
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Competition in critical technologies is attracting increasing attention not only because of the foundational nature of these technologies for other types of innovation, but also because of their role in the United States national security strategy. In this paper, we look into which entities in China, the European Union and the US innovate at the technology frontier in the three most important critical technologies – artificial intelligence, quantum computing and semiconductors – based on identification of the most radical novel patents in these technologies and their subsectors. Working with these pathbreaking patents, we look into the origin of the companies that file the largest numbers of them. US innovators dominate the innovation frontier for quantum computing and, to a lesser extent, AI, with Chinese innovators doing better in semiconductors. European innovators lag in all, but perform relatively better in quantum computing, in which they rank similarly to Chinese innovators. Furthermore, the innovation ecosystem is quite different across geographies. In the US, tech companies top the rankings of critical novelties and are highly concentrated: as many as three companies are in the top rankings of all of the three critical technologies. Frontier innovators in the field in which the EU competes most equally – quantum – are mostly research centres and not companies. China lies somewhat in between in all three domains.
Topic:: Science and Technology, European Union, Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, Semiconductors, and Quantum Computing
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

89. Intra-Western Balkans dynamics: stocktaking and ways ahead

Author:: Armin Steinbach, Nina Vujanović, and Anna Fiore
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: In the context of the push by the European Union for regional integration in the Western Balkans, this paper explores the barriers to, and prospects for, deeper intra-Western Balkan economic relationships. First, it addresses the pronounced bilateral economic relationships between Western Balkan countries associated with historical path-dependencies. Second, by comparing the Central European Free Trade Agreement with Stabilisation and Association Agreements that the EU has with Western Balkan countries, it identifies areas of less economic integration under the former. Third, it focuses on intra-Western Balkan trade barriers and how the associated costs influence regional integration. Finally, the paper describes the structures of Western Balkan economies and how much they contribute to regional exports through domestic value added. The paper emphasises the importance of regulatory alignment for reducing trade barriers and the role of funds under the EU Growth Plan for the Western Balkans for investment in transport infrastructure within the region. It finds that the Central European Free Trade Agreement and Common Regional Market should focus on untapped potential, especially in the liberalisation of capital, services and movement for employment. Infrastructure issues, trade logistics and the tackling of technical barriers to trade should feature prominently on the policy agenda.
Topic:: Governance, Macroeconomics, Trade, and Trade Policy
Political Geography:: Europe and Western Balkans

90. Implementing the EU Nature Restoration Law: exploring pathways for member states

Author:: Heather Grabbe, Bas Heerma van Voss, Camille Mehlbaum, and Sjoerd van der Zwaag
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: The European Union Nature Restoration Law (NRL) entered into force in 2024. The NRL sets quantitative restoration targets aimed at improving natural habitats that are currently in poor condition, with substantial leeway for countries to choose implementation pathways that fit their priorities. This Working Paper examines three pathways: (1) evenly spreading restoration efforts across all ecosystems; (2) prioritising cost-efficiency; and (3) maximising carbon sequestration. Each approach yields vastly different outcomes. This paper provides insights into the trade-offs. For countries seeking to minimise costs in the short run, an 81 percent reduction in costs over the period 2025-2030 is possible compared to a baseline scenario of an even restoration of all ecosystems. Countries that aim to maximise carbon sequestration benefits can achieve a 54 percent increase in climate impact over the same period. However, the different pathways converge after 2040. Prioritising cost minimisation in the early years could lead to higher costs later if delays in investment in the more costly restoration projects allow habitats to continue to degrade. Maximising cost-efficient carbon sequestration is possible, allowing relatively low investment costs and high sequestration. Countries should adopt a holistic approach to pathway selection, considering the full spectrum of ecological and societal gains alongside climate mitigation. Land ownership is an important factor that shapes feasible and effective pathways. In countries such as Spain and Germany, where private entities own substantial shares of agricultural and forest lands, policies should incentivise private investment, including through norms, subsidies or pricing mechanisms. Countries with substantial public landholdings, such as the Netherlands, may find it easier to implement direct restoration projects. These structural differences will influence the cost and pace of restoration and also the design of policies and governance mechanisms to ensure compliance with NRL targets.
Topic:: Climate Change, European Union, Decarbonization, Green Deal, Energy, and Carbon Sequestration
Political Geography:: Europe

91. European export finance needs a reboot

Author:: Conor McCaffrey and Niclas Poitiers
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Export credit agencies (ECAs) play an important role in international trade by providing derisking instruments that function as public assistance to companies engaging in international commerce. As the geopolitical environment has become more fraught, this support has become ever more important. In recent years, the role of ECAs has evolved from a purely commercial one to include the pursuit of strategic goals, such as fighting climate change, shaping trade relations with key partners and securing access to critical raw materials. However, the system of European export credit agencies is not well equipped to deal with these challenges. ECAs are national with a variety of models and not all European Union countries have one. There is little transparency on their operations, very limited steering at the EU level and, beyond a small pilot project in Ukraine, no EU-level funding for European public goods. Non-EU ECAs have increasingly used funding instruments not available to EU ones, partly because of competition from countries not subject to the OECD Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits and state aid constraints. This makes the lack of coordination not only a strategic oversight but a potential competitive disadvantage. For these reasons, we argue that reform of the European ECA sector is necessary. We advocate for improved transparency and EU-level steering to ensure European strategic objectives are met. More complex is the question of how European public goods could be adequately supported by ECAs. Several models are possible, with the most promising option being EU level funding for projects implemented by national ECAs coupled with some form of EU level oversight.
Topic:: Governance, Regulation, Exports, Macroeconomics, and Financial Literacy
Political Geography:: Europe

92. How can Europe’s nuclear deterrence trilemma be resolved?

Author:: Andrea Gilli and Francesco Nicoli
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: The United States under President Donald Trump has adopted an ambiguous position on European security. Although no immediate risk of abandonment is apparent, European countries are rethinking their defence strategies in case the US declines to support them, or provides only partial support, in a crisis. This discussion is particularly sensitive in relation to nuclear weapons, the ultimate deterrent, for which European countries depend extensively on the United States. We argue that a possible future US withdrawal from European nuclear security will force European countries to face a policy trilemma. If they stick to the existing policy framework of no proliferation and no joint deterrence, they expose themselves to nuclear blackmail, should the US withdraw its external guarantee. If they want to protect themselves from nuclear blackmail, they must choose how to provide nuclear security: either collective nuclear security, which would compromise some national sovereignty, or independent provision by individual countries, leading to nuclear proliferation in Europe. Having established that uncontrolled proliferation is an inferior outcome to some form of joint deterrence, we identify four main alternatives: an extension of the Franco-British nuclear deterrent; an extension complemented by a jointly financed expansion of existing deterrence; the absorption of the French (and perhaps British) nuclear arsenals into a European arsenal; and the construction of a separate European submarine deterrent (with Europe using French or British technology or developing new technology). We also discuss briefly forms of non-nuclear deterrence, which however would likely be a complementary rather than a substitute for a nuclear deterrent. We compare these options using a set of parameters: strategic autonomy and credibility, changes to treaties (including non-proliferation), costs, capabilities and readiness. Our analysis shows that all options have advantages and disadvantages, but some are politically, financially and militarily more feasible.
Topic:: Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Industrial Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, Macroeconomics, Deterrence, Transatlantic Relations, and Vulnerability
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

93. Using data as a production factor: policy ideas for a new EU data strategy

Author:: Bertin Martins
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: A major task for the 2024-2029 European Commission will be to reconcile and simplify the European Union’s range of data-market laws into a more coherent framework. At the heart of the approach should be the non-rival nature of data, meaning it can be used by many parties for many purposes at the same time. That creates the potential for economic efficiency gains from the re-use and aggregation of data. Exclusive private data control rights and high transaction costs may stand in the way of realising these gains. We define economic criteria against which existing data market regulations can be evaluated. These criteria lead to the following recommendations to improve existing EU data regulations: The EU general data protection regulation facilitates re-use of personal data. Machine-readable consent notices and real-time data transfers could reduce high transaction costs that prevent meaningful exercise of informed consent. The European Health Data Space contains an almost-ideal governance regime for health-data re-use and pooling that maximises incentives for data-driven innovation. This regime should be applied to other industrial data-space initiatives. The Data Act facilitates access and re-use of product data but exclusive licensing rights for data holders, monopolistic pricing of third-party data transfers and other anti-competitive measures reduce its impact. Widening its application to services data would make it a truly horizontal data-market regulation. The Digital Markets Act contains several obligations for platforms to grant users access to their own data. Widening access to networked data would facilitate competition between platforms and their users. Mutual instead of unilateral sharing of search-engine data would avoid fragmentation of the search-data pool. The Artificial Intelligence Act imposes unwarranted and costly restrictions on the re-use of copyright-related content data for AI model training data, reducing the innovative impact of AI. The text and data mining exception in the EU Copyright Directive could be broadened to address these new AI technology challenges. EU data market regulations exhibit a tension between exclusive private rights and the realisation of the wider societal value of data. Finding an acceptable balance may involve some redistribution of the efficiency gains between data users and the original data collectors.
Topic:: Markets, European Union, Digital Economy, Microeconomics, Data, and Digital Markets Act (DMA)
Political Geography:: Europe

94. Prepare now: Europe must get ready for the coming long-term care surge

Author:: Svend E. Hougaard Jensen, David Pinkus, and Nina Ruer
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Demographic change and ageing populations in European Union countries will impact many aspects of the economy and have a direct effect on long-term care (LTC) systems. Demand for LTC already exceeds supply in many EU countries, leading to the ‘care gap’. This gap is expected to widen, threatening quality of life for the elderly, exacerbating gender disparities and imposing significant economic costs. The root causes of the gap include demographic shifts, inadequate public investment, workforce shortages and a heavy reliance on informal caregiving. Women stand to lose the most if no steps are taken to prepare LTC systems for the coming surge in demand because care, both formal and informal, is predominantly provided by women. The care gap can be reduced by either increasing the supply of care or by reducing the demand for care. We assess LTC reforms in five EU countries and explain how these can affect the care gap by influencing demand and supply. Governments should: Recognise LTC as a priority. Governments should increase public spending on LTC and make LTC a central policy priority linked to broader goals, including gender equality and economic growth. Expand funding mechanisms. Governments can introduce new means of financing, such as mandatory LTC insurance and pre-funding mechanisms. Most importantly, benefits should target those with the greatest needs, to promote equity and adequacy. Support the workforce more. The LTC sector should be made more attractive by raising wages, improving working conditions and expanding training programmes to attract and retain workers. Develop prevention strategies. EU funds could be directed to research into treatments targeting age-related diseases such as dementia. National governments could invest in public health campaigns and preventive care to reduce future demand. Use the newest technologies. EU countries should invest in robotics and assistive technologies to improve productivity and to reduce physical strain on caregivers.
Topic:: Economics, Health, Governance, European Union, and Macroeconomics
Political Geography:: Europe

95. Not yet Trump-proof: an evaluation of the European Commission’s emerging policy platform

Author:: Heather Grabbe and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: The economic strategy being defined by the 2024-2029 European Commission seems to follow the prescriptions on innovation and single market reform, and the expansive approach to industrial policy, set out by Mario Draghi in his September 2024 report on European Union competitiveness, with two important differences. First, the Commission stops short of calling for World Trade Organisation-prohibited subsidies – this is welcome. Second, the Commission proposes a new state aid framework for national industrial policy rather than expansion of EU-level public investment funding. This runs the risk of weakening the single market and harming competition, with the unintended consequence of protecting incumbents and inhibiting structural change. In terms of specific policies, on defence, the Commission is right to face up to the challenge of defining an EU procurement mechanism that offers sufficient speed and cost advantages to justify large-scale funding. On economic security and international partnerships, the Commission is right to take a broader approach than a foreign economic policy focused only on supply chains. What is lacking is a much greater commitment to providing support for climate mitigation in developing countries. The second Trump presidency creates risks for the Commission strategy. President Trump has gone further than expected in threatening territorial expansion and with the speed, aggression and disregard for the rule of law with which he has started to implement his policies. These factors will complicate the EU-United States relationship. The best defence against both Trump and the competitive and security threats posed by China is to accelerate policies that address the EU’s structural weaknesses: raising productivity growth, defence capacity and economic security. Economic security, in turn, requires more resilient trade relationships, less financial dependence on the US and an improved standing with emerging market and developing economies. The EU should also seize the opportunity offered by the shift in US policy from subsidies to deregulation. While the EU should not race Trump to the bottom on environmental or financial deregulation, it should rapidly improve its own regulatory framework while building on its core strengths: human capital and the rule of law. Unlike tariff wars or discriminatory subsidies, a competition to provide a good business environment is not a zero-sum game.
Topic:: Security, Economics, Industrial Policy, Budget, European Union, Digital Economy, Trade Policy, Donald Trump, Sustainability, European Commission, and Energy
Political Geography:: Europe and United States of America

96. Upgrading Europe's electricity grid is about more than just money

Author:: Conall Heussaff and Georg Zachmann
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Electricity network investment is essential for the energy transition, with annual investments of tens of billions of euros required across Europe. Network companies are already investing such amounts and delivering efficient grid investments requires more than additional money. Assessing infrastructure needs is the first step in grid investment. At local, national and European Union levels, network development planning is determined by policy choices and can greatly affect the efficiency of investments. Coordinated grid planning is crucial to set the right incentives for the efficient development of the European electricity system. An EU independent system operator could assume responsibility for network planning by providing regular, independent assessment of efficient network investment needs from a holistic European perspective. Although significant capital expenditure is undoubtedly necessary, network regulation should encourage network companies to invest in the most-efficient solutions. Current regulatory approaches may favour traditional capital expenditure, leading to system inefficiencies and higher-than-necessary consumer costs. Cross-border electricity transmission infrastructure is critical to integrate renewables into the electricity system at scale and reduce costs for European consumers. But such projects are often not built or are delayed because those that decide on and pay for the infrastructure are not necessarily those that benefit from it. A European fund could smooth negotiations between parties and accelerate the physical interconnection of the European electricity system. Fairly recovering the costs of grid investments from consumers is vital to maintain public support for the energy transition. National funds could smooth out cost impacts over time, keeping electricity affordable throughout the energy transition.
Topic:: Climate Change, Electricity, Decarbonization, and Energy Security
Political Geography:: Europe

97. How to improve the European Union’s sustainable finance framework

Author:: Silvia Merler
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: The European Union has sought to steer corporate behaviour to support its climate goals by adopting a large body of rules on sustainable investment, sustainability disclosures and sustainability labelling of financial products, underpinned by a taxonomy of activities considered sustainable. It is unclear, however, if this effort has had significant results. Examination of financial market data and metrics of investment flows towards green and sustainable investment shows up several weaknesses – both contingent and structural – in the EU sustainable finance framework, which could limit its effectiveness in aligning capital flows with climate objectives. The Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (SFDR) is aimed at making the sustainability content of financial products more transparent but rests on a concept of ‘sustainable investment’ that is too broad and loosely defined. Meanwhile, the EU Taxonomy Regulation has not yet become established as the reference framework for corporate bond issuance or sustainable investing. The EU also lacks a coherent framework for transition finance – or investment that is not yet classified as sustainable but that represents progress to greater sustainability – despite this being the market segment to which the largest volumes of investment will need to flow in the short to medium run. Five adjustments would make the EU sustainable finance framework more effective at delivering the desired alignment of incentives. First, the taxonomy framework should be completed and clarified. Second, the SFDR definition of sustainable investment should be toughened. Third, the neutrality of the framework across capital market instruments, in particular debt versus equity, should be ensured. Fourth, a dedicated framework for transition finance should be developed. Finally, formal sustainable and transition labels for financial products should be introduced. This approach would make the sustainable finance framework more easily applicable to all kind of companies and all types of capital market instruments, regardless of whether they limit the use of proceeds, and it would be naturally extendable into a framework for transition finance and into a transparent sustainability labelling regime for financial products.
Topic:: Climate Change, European Union, Regulation, Finance, Macroeconomics, and Sustainability
Political Geography:: Europe

98. The European Union’s new fiscal framework: a good start, but challenges loom

Author:: Nicolas Boivin and Zsolt Darvas
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: The European Union’s fiscal framework, updated in April 2024, aims to strengthen fiscal sustainability and foster public investment. It requires countries to maintain or gradually reduce their public debts to no more than 60 percent of GDP, and ensures compliance with a 3 percent of GDP deficit limit and some safeguards. EU countries must submit Medium-Term Fiscal Structural Plans (MTFSPs) showing how they intend to comply. MTFSPs for most EU countries have now been approved by the European Commission, on the basis that the fiscal paths in the plans are credible and increased public investment is foreseen even amid fiscal consolidation. However, macroeconomic assumptions in MTFSPs frequently deviate from the Commission’s guidance, often reflecting optimistic growth projections. Overly optimistic assumptions risk deviations from approved fiscal paths, while disagreements about macro projections, which are central to debt sustainability analysis, could undermine the framework’s credibility and hinder implementation at a later stage. Several MTFSPs assume higher stock-flow adjustments (SFAs) than included in the Commission’s prior guidance, indicating that these countries must implement somewhat larger fiscal adjustments. Historical data shows large positive SFAs for many countries, suggesting that multi-year-ahead SFA projections should be extended to all countries, based on a transparent methodology. The plans indicate that greater planned fiscal adjustments tend to be associated with deeper cuts to public investment. The overall increase in public investment ratios remains below 0.2 percent of GDP according to the plans and Commission and OECD forecasts. While the EU’s major investment gaps should primarily be addressed through private investment, public investment must also play a role. Innovative approaches, such as a new EU fund financed by common borrowing, are essential to boost investment in the EU. The updated fiscal framework’s long-term success depends on achieving consensus on macroeconomic assumptions, including the standardisation of methods to assess the growth impacts of reforms, while refining SFA methodologies and finding new ways to foster investment. Strengthening these elements will make the framework more credible and effective, enabling it to better guide fiscal policy and support sustainable growth.
Topic:: Governance, European Union, Macroeconomics, and Fiscal Policy
Political Geography:: Europe

99. Europe’s energy information problem

Author:: Ben McWilliams, Simone Tagliapietra, and Georg Zachmann
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Comprehensive information on energy-related topics, such as take-up of heat pumps, industrial natural gas consumption and prices, and battery connections to the electricity grid, is either not available in Europe in a timely manner, or not available at the level of granularity, reliability and consistency needed for informed decision-making. Certain information is simply not collected, while other information is collected but is not comparable or consistent across Europe, or is hard to access. European policy targets, such as greenhouse-gas emission reduction pathways, are evaluated using models for which input assumptions and parameters are not public knowledge. It should be a European Union priority to improve this situation. Doing so will enable better decision-making by policymakers and companies. This is especially relevant when Europe faces the triple challenge of decarbonisation, ensuring security of energy supply and growing its internationally competitive energy-consuming industries. The EU status quo is that good energy information is provided by a mix of institutions, agencies, national bodies, industrial associations and non-governmental organisations, but with substantial room for improvement. Lessons can be learned from the United States Energy Information Administration and the European Environment Agency, which was established to better coordinate climate data. Improving energy information will involve difficult political decisions. A process should be started to evaluate the options and to measure the continued cost of inaction.
Topic:: Climate Change, European Union, Institutions, Green Deal, and Energy
Political Geography:: Europe

100. Europeans still want climate action, but don't trust governments to deliver

Author:: Jan Eichhorn and Heather Grabbe
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: The vast majority of Europeans continues to support action to combat climate change, but many are losing faith in governments to deliver a transition that is effective and fair. Based on a large-scale questionnaire answered by nearly 8000 people in five EU countries in 2024, with a comparison to responses from 2020, we find that Europeans continue to worry about climate change and want effective action to combat it, even though the pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine significantly increased their concerns about economic and physical insecurity. Scepticism about the causes of climate change has risen a bit, and concern about adapting to its impact has grown. People across all income groups, particularly in France, Germany, Italy and Sweden, feel negative about the outlook for their economic future and their governments’ ability to improve it. People who feel politically disaffected think that decisionmakers are not taking their views and interests into account when making economic and climate policies. Some people are now shifting their attention away from action against the climate crisis towards adaptation, but this does not mean they are less concerned about climate change. Instead, for some people, it is an expression of their disillusionment with state institutions – and this feeling is present among supporters of parties across the political spectrum. Worry about climate change is equally spread across all socio-economic groups. Closer examination of attitudes in Germany, using evidence from focus groups, which we also discuss in this Policy Brief, reinforces the finding of increasing scepticism about the German government’s ability to manage the climate crisis. If political leaders want the public to continue to support climate policies, they must engage proactively now to avoid even greater loss of confidence in government. If governments go soft on efforts to combat the climate crisis now or delay action, they will not meet voters’ demand for an effective and just transition. Moreover, hesitation and delay would boost populist and far-right actors’ efforts to sow doubt about the causes of climate change and whether policies will be effective.
Topic:: Climate Change, Elections, Populism, and Energy
Political Geography:: Europe

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS