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61. The European Union Growth Plan for the Western Balkans: A reality test for EU enlargement

Author:
Valbona Zeneli, Richard Grieveson, Isabelle Ioannides, and Dimitar Bechev
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The European Union (EU) Growth Plan for the Western Balkans aims to integrate the region into the EU single market, enhance regional cooperation, implement significant governance and rule of law reforms, and boost EU financial support. In doing so, the EU seeks to foster economic development, political stability, and security in the region amid rising geopolitical tensions, while accelerating the Western Balkans’ EU accession process. The Growth Plan holds substantial potential to reinvigorate the enlargement process and counter the stagnation felt by both the EU and the region. Strong points include: Tangible benefits before full accession: Providing stronger incentives for reform. Active involvement of regional governments: Increasing buy-in from local leaders, who must submit their own reform agendas. Enhanced economic integration, greater access to the EU market, increased EU funding, and reforms to governance and the rule of law: Stimulating investment, promoting economic growth, and raising living standards. These improvements would bring the Western Balkans closer to the economic success seen in the Central and Eastern European countries in the EU over the past two decades. Moreover, fostering deeper regional cooperation will not only deliver an economic boost but also contribute to political normalization. If successful, the plan will bolster the EU’s political influence in the region, countering the impact of external actors and encouraging much-needed nearshoring investment from EU firms. However, the plan faces several challenges: Enforceability: Although conditionality is rigorous, with disbursement of funds tied to strict conditions to prevent misuse, there are concerns regarding its enforceability. The European Court of Auditors has already raised reservations. Quantity: Additionally, the financial support offered is significantly lower than what EU member states in Southeast Europe receive. The reforms required for fund access and single market integration are substantial and will demand significant political will and institutional capacity—both of which have been lacking in the region at times over the past two decades. The success of the growth plan will largely depend on its implementation. The EU must ensure rigorous enforcement of conditionality, reward positive reform steps, and increase funding for countries making progress. Civil society in the Western Balkans should be engaged as much as possible to foster broader support and transparency. The EU should also leverage the plan to align with its broader geopolitical and geoeconomic interests, particularly in strengthening its strategic autonomy. Additionally, the Growth Plan should be fully integrated with the EU’s competitiveness, green, and digital transition agendas. For their part, Western Balkans leaders should seize the increased agency provided by the plan. They must take ownership of the reforms they propose, participate actively in EU meetings, and design their reform agendas to deliver better living standards and deeper EU integration for their populations.
Topic:
Markets, Reform, European Union, and Enlargement
Political Geography:
Europe and Western Balkans

62. The imperative of augmenting US theater nuclear forces

Author:
Greg Weaver
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The United States and its allies and partners face an impending change in the threats posed by nuclear-armed adversaries: a strategic environment marked by two nuclear peer major powers. Russia, long a nuclear peer of the United States, will likely emerge from the war in Ukraine—regardless of how it ends—even more reliant on its nuclear forces, which are already the largest in the world. Meanwhile, China is undertaking the largest nuclear force buildup since the Cold War. That buildup will increase the size of Beijing’s nuclear forces by roughly seven and a half times since 2018, positioning China as a nuclear peer of the United States by 2035.1 Meanwhile, North Korea continues to expand and diversify its nuclear arsenal. Although the North Korean threat has been somewhat constrained by the quality of its ballistic missile systems—particularly its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)—technical assistance from Russia, in exchange for Kim Jong Un’s material support for the war in Ukraine, could rapidly enhance North Korean capabilities. Finally, the ongoing conflict in the Middle East could prompt Iran to choose to acquire its own nuclear arsenal, presenting a wholly new challenge. A pair of recent analyses of the strategic impact of this two-nuclear-peer environment have sounded an alarm, making clear that this environment poses a qualitatively and quantitatively new threat of adversary aggression and the potential for nuclear war.2 Conducted by bipartisan teams of former senior US officials and other nuclear experts, both analyses concluded—in the words of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (hereafter referred to as the Strategic Posture Commission)—that the planned US nuclear force “is absolutely essential, although not sufficient [emphasis added] to meet the new threats posed by Russia and China.”3 Both reports emphasized the urgent need to enhance US theater nuclear forces to address the most likely path to large-scale nuclear war: the failure to deter or counter limited adversary nuclear use in an ongoing conventional conflict. Finally, both reports laid out a set of attributes that US theater nuclear force enhancements must possess to effectively address the threat of limited nuclear escalation. However, these reports did not examine in depth the deterrence and warfighting implications of alternative new US theater nuclear systems. This paper examines why the two-nuclear-peer threat makes the enhancement of US theater nuclear forces an urgent imperative. It explains why the planned US strategic and theater nuclear forces are insufficient to address this threat. The paper then presents a more detailed set of political-military and operational attributes that enhanced US theater nuclear forces must possess to effectively counter the threat. Using these attributes, it evaluates the relative deterrence and warfighting value of various potential alternative theater-range nuclear weapon systems. The paper concludes with a recommended future US theater nuclear force structure and posture, specifically, that the United States should field a theater nuclear force that combines an effectively dispersible dual-capable fighter aircraft (DCA) force in Europe with nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-Ns) deployed day-to-day on attack submarines (SSNs) in Europe and Asia and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM-Ns) and/or ground-launched ballistic missiles (GLBM-Ns) continuously deployed in Europe and/or Asia.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

63. Issue brief: A NATO strategy for countering Russia

Author:
Ian Brzezinski
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Russia is the most direct and significant threat to the security of NATO member states—and since Moscow’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 this threat continues to grow. It now encompasses the war in Ukraine, the militarization of the Arctic, hybrid warfare, and violations of arms control treaties. While NATO holds a significant advantage over Russia in military and economic power, an effective and unified strategy is needed to counter Russia’s aggression and fully harness the Alliance’s collective capabilities. To effectively counter Russia, NATO must defeat Russia in Ukraine, deter Russian aggression against NATO allies and partners, contain Russian influence beyond its borders, and degrade Russia’s ability and will to accomplish its revisionist agenda. That will require, among other actions, a significant increase of support and commitment to Ukraine’s defense against Russia, and a more robust Alliance force posture including the modernization of its nuclear deterrent, the permanent stationing of brigade elements along NATO’s eastern frontier and increased defense industrial capacities.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Intelligence, International Organization, National Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Deterrence, Resilience, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

64. The Future of European Digital Competitiveness

Author:
Oscar Guinea and Vanika Sharma
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Former Italian prime minister Mario Draghi’s recent report on Europe’s competitiveness lays bare the negative effects of overregulation in the EU economy and the underperformance of its digital sector. However, Draghi failed to draw connections between these two phenomena. The future of Europe’s competitiveness is inextricably linked to the future of its digital economy. Unfortunately, the economic contribution of Europe’s Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector remains significantly smaller than that of the US ICT sector to the US economy. There are well-known reasons behind this divergence. Chief among them is the lack of sufficient investment in Europe’s intangible and tangible assets. Regulation, particularly those regulations governing the digital economy, has emerged as a key factor that restricts Europe’s usage of digital technologies and hinders subsequent productivity growth. The EU now has nearly 100 tech-focused laws, comprising thousands of pages, provisions, and restrictions. This must change. The EU should develop a joint plan for digitalisation and competitiveness. This plan should build upon Europe’s comparative advantages: openness, strong institutions, the rule of law, robust intellectual property protections, and high levels of human capital. Above all, the EU must recognise that, while protecting consumer rights, EU policies and regulations must also prioritise the competitiveness of Europe’s ICT sector and promote the widespread adoption of digital technologies across the entire EU economy.
Topic:
Markets, European Union, Digital Economy, and Economic Competition
Political Geography:
Europe

65. Quantum Technology: A Policy Primer for EU Policymakers

Author:
Oscar Guinea, Dyuti Pandya, Oscar du Roy, and Andrea Dugo
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Quantum technology is rapidly emerging as a transformative force with the potential to reshape industries ranging from finance and pharmaceuticals to automotive and aerospace. In 2024 alone, investments in quantum technology reached over USD 56 billion. Its development, however, presents unique geopolitical challenges, stemming from its applications in defence and encryption, as well as its power to unsettle established comparative advantages and market specialisations across countries. Against this backdrop, an open and collaborative approach to quantum innovation is critical for maximising the benefits of this technology. Countries perform more effectively in quantum technology when they support cross-border collaborations and market specialisation. Firms producing quantum hardware or software solutions can sell to a range of industrial users who, in turn, integrate these cutting-edge systems into goods and services. Such synergy reduces the overall risks and costs of R&D, as different partners share both the financial burden and any uncertainties related to the commercial viability of quantum applications. Moreover, collaboration fosters a wider diffusion of quantum technologies. As firms specialising in quantum computing, communication, or sensing deepen their expertise, their insights permeate adjacent sectors through the shared knowledge enabled by joint collaborations. Conversely, restrictive policies that limit interaction between domestic and foreign firms risk stifling innovation. Self-reliance strategies reduce opportunities for knowledge-sharing, limit the pool of potential partners, and ultimately slow the pace of quantum breakthroughs. This operating framework supports the current EU approach to quantum technology, which emphasises openness and encourages a higher number of collaborations between EU and non-EU companies. This approach is grounded in economic realities: the EU ranks second only to the US in terms of the number of companies and collaborations between firms and it thrives on partnering with non-EU countries as the number of collaborations with companies outside the EU far exceeds the number of collaborations within the EU.
Topic:
European Union, Digital Economy, Digital Policy, and Quantum Computing
Political Geography:
Europe

66. Cybersecurity at Risk: How the EU’s Digital Markets Act Could Undermine Security across Mobile Operating Systems

Author:
Matthias Bauer and Dyuti Pandya
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The EU’s fight against cybersecurity threats risks being undermined by the over-enforcement of the Digital Markets Act (DMA). Article 5(4) could force mobile operating system providers to allow unregulated external links, bypassing critical security controls and exposing millions of smartphone users to cyber threats. The DMA focuses on market structure, overlooking how differences in operating system design affect security vulnerabilities. A one-size-fits-all approach ignores platform-specific security needs, leaving European users exposed to cyber threats. This risks undermining the EU’s economic security agenda, including initiatives like the Cybersecurity Strategy, Cyber Resilience Act, and NIS2 Directive, which aim to strengthen digital defences. The unintended consequences of this regulatory approach are already evident in Apple’s recent decisions to withhold certain features – such as advanced AI functionalities and enhanced app security tools – from the EU market due to DMA-related concerns. As a result, EU consumers face reduced access to innovative technologies, diminished user experiences, and weaker security protections compared to users in other regions. Now, Android, a widely used open-source system, may also be compromised by DMA enforcement, potentially limiting its flexibility, security, and the broader ecosystem of app developers and device manufacturers that rely on its open architecture.
Topic:
European Union, Cybersecurity, Digital Economy, and Digital Markets Act (DMA)
Political Geography:
Europe

67. The Participation of Foreign Bidders in EU Public Procurement: Too Much or Too Little?

Author:
Lucian Cernat
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
This policy brief examines EU public procurement data from the Tenders Electronic Daily (TED) to evaluate foreign bidders’ participation and success in winning EU public contracts. Despite data coverage limitations, the available information shows an increase in foreign participation in both full and partial contracts, with most activity concentrated in a few countries. Countries like the United States, Japan, and Canada focus on securing full contracts, while nations such as Norway and Turkey often engage through partial contracts. Notably, since Brexit, UK bidders have faced a significant decline in market share, benefiting other countries. The main conclusion is that foreign participation via cross-border procurement (Mode 1) – the only one available in the TED database – is not very high. Although it increased over time, it remains relatively modest, mainly due to low participation rates, rather than discriminatory practices. Between 2016 and 2019, only about 7 percent of EU procurement authorities received foreign bids. This fact alone largely explains the low level of cross-border procurement taking place via Mode 1: put simply, there is no winning without trying. Another important conclusion is that a comprehensive assessment of the participation of foreign bidders in EU procurement would require two new key metrics in the TED data collection process to capture the more important yet missing modes of international procurement. Having reliable and comprehensive data is not just an academic pursuit but a necessity for shaping effective EU policy in the face of rising global protectionism in public procurement.
Topic:
European Union, Contracts, and Public Procurement
Political Geography:
Europe

68. Competitive Harmonisation: A Collaborative Framework for Intra-EU Reform and Competitiveness

Author:
Matthias Bauer
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Persistent legal fragmentation, compounded by the EU’s 24 official languages, increases costs and legal uncertainty, deterring meaningful investments in innovation and preventing businesses from scaling across borders. Without bold, comprehensive legal reforms, Europe will fall further behind in global competition and major global technological developments. The EU’s incremental reform approach has failed to address the deep-rooted legal and institutional challenges threatening Europe’s economic future. Competitive Harmonisation offers a pragmatic yet visionary concept to overcome legal fragmentation, tackle the business scale gap, and unlock Europe’s vast economic potential. By embracing “collaborative governance” through coalitions of willing Member States, aligning with global standards, and prioritising innovation and technology diffusion, European governments can enhance the Single Market and restore Europe’s leadership in lawmaking and industrial competitiveness. Amid growing political risks, such as the threat of tariffs, the responsibility to act decisively rests squarely with Europe. By taking bold, pragmatic steps now, Europeans can not only resolve immediate challenges but also lay the groundwork for sustainable, long-term economic development.
Topic:
Markets, Reform, European Union, Regional Economy, and Economic Competition
Political Geography:
Europe

69. The 8 Percent Approach: A Big Bang in Resources and Capacity for Europe’s Economy and Defence

Author:
Andrea Dugo, Fredrik Erixon, and Ismail Abdi
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Europe has become a region of feeble economic performance and military frailty. Its share of the world economy is rapidly shrinking, and the region is struggling to keep up with economies at the modern technological frontier. Countries in the European Union have for decades talked about the importance of raising Research and Development (R&D) expenditure and allow greater space for an entrepreneurial business sector that is prospering on the back of innovation. However, the results are poor. R&D expenditures as a share of GDP have largely been stagnant, business investment and inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) have tanked. Rates of new business formation and growth are paltry, partly as a result of gross overregulation. Productivity growth has continued its decades-long path of deceleration, and the EU is increasingly behind international leaders. Fortunately, Europe is beginning to wake up from its strategic slumber. Defence expenditures are now growing faster than in previous decades – and some countries, like Poland, are becoming serious powers. Yet, the region’s own military capacity remains poor. Europe must rebuild core conventional capacities at a time when defence modernisation requires substantial resources and focus. Russia may be bogged down by its war against Ukraine, but it is rebuilding its capacities fast and is increasingly aided by partnerships with other countries that want to break down what remains of a liberal world order. Many European NATO-members are now hitting the 2-percent spending target but must spend vastly more to acquire sufficient capacities to defend themselves and their interests.
Topic:
Defense Policy, European Union, Regional Economy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

70. The Impact of Increased Mass Litigation in Europe

Author:
Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, Dyuti Pandya, Vanika Sharma, Elena Sisto, Oscar du Roy, Renata Zilli, and Philipp Lamprecht
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The purpose of this study is to better understand the growth of mass litigation in the European Union (EU) and its economic consequences. European authorities have long encouraged consumers to seek redress through private litigation in European competition law and, more recently, they have shifted their focus towards collective actions in a broad range of areas, including data privacy and product liability. Facilitating access to justice through collective actions is not a cost-free option. Unfortunately, there is a lack of economic analysis on the consequences of an increase in collective action cases in the EU. It is crucial to understand the economic consequences of a “mixed regime” – that is, a regime based on both ex-ante public enforcement through regulation and ex-post enforcement through private litigation. The combination of these two enforcement models raises questions about how the system is intended to work together and what the consequences might be for the economy. This study examines the economic implications of these developments in the EU.
Topic:
Law, European Union, Regulation, Regional Economy, and Litigation
Political Geography:
Europe

71. Boosting Efficiency and Quality in EU Public Services: The Need for a European Multi-Cloud-First Strategy

Author:
Matthias Bauer, Andrea Dugo, Dyuti Pandya, Vanika Sharma, and Elena Sito
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
EU governments have an unprecedented opportunity to unlock up to EUR 450 billion in annual fiscal savings by modernising public services through advanced multi-cloud solutions, cloud-based AI, and other deep tech innovations. As estimated in this study, this figure highlights the transformative impact of digitised government services – not only in improving service quality and operational efficiency but also in generating substantial fiscal gains that would enhance Europe’s economic competitiveness. Multi-cloud adoption is not merely an infrastructure choice but a strategic enabler of modern, agile, and citizen-focused public services. To fully capitalise on cloud adoption, EU governments should embrace a multi-cloud strategy that integrates different public cloud providers and, where necessary, also incorporates sovereign or private cloud environments. Cloud services come in many forms, including Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS), Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS), and Software-as-a-Service (SaaS). Each model offers unique value propositions such as ease of use, rapid security updates, scalability, and the capacity to integrate novel technological features, such as AI applications, seamlessly.
Topic:
European Union, Digital Economy, and Cloud Computing
Political Geography:
Europe

72. EU Export of Regulatory Overreach: The Case of the Digital Markets Act (DMA)

Author:
Matthias Bauer, Dyuti Pandya, and Vanika Sharma
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The EU’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) exemplifies the “Brussels Effect,” extending the EU’s regulatory influence beyond its borders and shaping global digital competition policies. While intended to curb the market power of large technology platforms and promote fair competition, its broad, rigid, and pre-emptive approach risks stifling technological development, deterring investment, and creating legal uncertainty, particularly in emerging markets still building digital infrastructure and seeking to attract foreign investment. Large technology firms play a pivotal role in global economic development, driving innovation, infrastructure upgrading, and consumer welfare. However, increasing regulatory scrutiny, particularly under DMA-like frameworks, could inadvertently harm the very markets they help grow by imposing compliance burdens that hinder business expansion and technology diffusion. Countries with weaker institutions and regulatory capacity – such as India, Brazil, South Africa, and other emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) like Indonesia – could face greater risks of regulatory capture, corruption, and enforcement challenges if they replicate the EU’s approach without adapting it to their economic realities (Section 2). A key concern with the DMA is the departure from traditional case-by-case enforcement in competition policy, instead relying on broad, pre-emptive obligations based on ambiguous concepts such as fairness and contestability. This shift reduces legal certainty, increases the risk of inconsistent enforcement, and may inhibit dynamic competition, which is essential for innovation-driven sectors like fintech, e-commerce, ICT, and edtech. By prioritising static over dynamic competition, the DMA could impede technological progress, limiting consumer choice and long-term economic benefits (Section 3). The global adoption of DMA-like regulations risks further regulatory fragmentation and may create unintended consequences, particularly in emerging economies where regulatory frameworks, institutional quality, and market structures differ significantly from the EU. Broad prohibitions on business practices, such as self-preferencing and data-sharing, could limit opportunities for local firms to scale internationally, weaken cybersecurity protections, and reduce incentives for large technology firms to invest in these regions (Section 4). To ensure proportionate and effective competition enforcement, governments outside the EU should prioritise regulatory flexibility and case-by-case assessments over broad, static restrictions. OECD best practices on competition policy emphasise clear objectives, legal certainty, and regulatory proportionality, ensuring that competition enforcement supports, rather than stifles, innovation and investment (Section 5). Moreover, the risks of corruption and regulatory overreach in developing countries make broad ex-ante regulations especially problematic. Excessive discretionary power granted to local authorities could increase the risk of politically motivated enforcement, deter foreign investment, and undermine long-term economic growth. A more effective approach would be to strengthen institutional frameworks, enhance transparency, and adopt supply-side policies that support technology neutrality, free trade, and economic freedom.
Topic:
Science and Technology, European Union, Regulation, Digital Markets Act (DMA), and Economic Competition
Political Geography:
Europe

73. Trade in the Great Sea: The Future of EU-Southern Neighbourhood Trade Relations

Author:
Jan A. Micallef
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
This policy brief looks into the future of EU-Southern Mediterranean trade relations. It evaluates the current trade and contractual instruments governing these relations and asks if they are sufficient or if more is needed to exploit trade opportunities and manage trade challenges in the region. The policy brief shows why and how the current trade instruments are no longer sufficient. There are two main reasons for this: first, they do not really tackle areas such as services, investment and non-tariff measures (NTMs), all of which are important to unlock economic value for both sides in today’s economy; and second, new economic and political developments reinforce the need for better agreements. As trade becomes more political and intertwined with other issues such as energy, critical minerals, the environment and industrial policy, it is necessary to improve the agreements and instruments that govern trade. The policy brief lists some of the upgrades in EU-Southern Mediterranean trade agreements that are necessary. However, it also analyses what challenges there are to pursue these upgrades and what can be done to overcome the problems. The policy brief concludes that working towards these aims will be challenging but not impossible if there is the necessary political will on both sides. Both sides should realise that the price of not doing anything might be higher than the effort that is required to bring their trade instruments up to the standards needed.
Topic:
International Relations, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, and Trade
Political Geography:
Africa and Europe

74. Navigating Geopolitical Realities: The EU’s Strategic Positioning in the South Caucasus and Central Asia

Author:
Tengiz Pkhaladze
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
This policy brief examines the strategic importance of the South Caucasus and its pivotal role in the European Union’s evolving engagement with Central Asia. The regional landscape, however, remains highly volatile. Russia’s aggression in Ukraine has had direct and indirect repercussions for the South Caucasus. Against the backdrop of the war, Moscow continues its efforts to maintain the region within its sphere of influence – through military presence, disinformation, economic leverage, and political interference. Twenty percent of Georgia’s territory remains illegally occupied by Russian forces, while the fragile post-conflict environment following the Second Karabakh War continues to shape relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. While missions such as EUMM in Georgia and EUMA in Armenia reflect the EU’s growing political engagement, they remain limited in scope and capacity, constraining the Union’s ability to address the region’s evolving risks. The EU’s partnerships with South Caucasus countries are characterized by both strategic opportunity and persistent friction. Azerbaijan has become an important energy supplier to the EU, particularly via the Southern Gas Corridor, and is also involved in early-stage renewable initiatives such as the Black Sea Submarine Cable Project. However, the relationship remains complicated by enduring concerns related to governance, human rights, and democratic norms. Georgia, despite receiving EU candidate status in 2023, has prompted growing concern among EU institutions and member states over perceived democratic backsliding and increasing political polarization. The country remains a vital transit hub for the Middle Corridor and a central partner in EU connectivity efforts, but its internal developments have raised questions in Brussels about the sustainability of its European path. At the same time, Georgia continues to be a major target of Russia’s hybrid influence operations, which exploit internal divisions and erode trust in Euro-Atlantic institutions. Armenia, disillusioned with Russia’s security guarantees, is cautiously deepening its engagement with the West. However, the extent of this shift remains contingent on developments in Georgia – given Armenia’s geographic dependence – and on the prospects for a durable peace agreement with Azerbaijan. This policy brief assesses how the EU is managing the tensions between its strategic objectives and its normative commitments in a region increasingly shaped by Great Power rivalry. It concludes with policy recommendations aimed at strengthening the EU’s credibility and effectiveness in both the South Caucasus and Central Asia – advocating for a more coherent, proactive, and principled approach that aligns short-term geopolitical interests with long-term goals for regional stability and integration.
Topic:
European Union, Geopolitics, Strategic Interests, Regional Economy, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Central Asia, and South Caucasus

75. Collective Action in the Netherlands: Why It Matters for the Transposition of the Product Liability Directive

Author:
Oscar Guinea, Dyuti Pandya, and Vanika Sharma
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
This policy brief explores the implications of the Netherlands’ transposition of the new EU Product Liability Directive (PLD), focusing on its interaction with the Dutch collective action system. As one of the first EU countries to implement PLD and a key hub for mass litigation, the Netherlands offers a compelling case study. Features such as low claim thresholds, opt-out mechanisms, flexible settlements, limited cost-shifting, and the ease of creating litigation-backed entities make the Netherlands particularly attractive for mass claims, reinforcing its reputation as a “litigation magnet.” The new PLD simplifies liability claims, broadens the definition of “product” to include software, digital files, and related services, lowers evidentiary thresholds, extends liability to third-party actions such as cyberattacks, and includes post-market defects. These provisions, combined with the Netherlands’ collective redress regime, are expected to drive a rise in mass litigation. This rise poses particular economic risks for the Netherlands, one of the EU’s most digitised economies. Ranked sixth in digital adoption by Eurostat’s Digital Intensity Index, Dutch firms – especially in finance, insurance, ICT, and manufacturing – may also face growing exposure to collective actions under the PLD, which extends liability across the entire value chain. These sectors account for 27 percent of the value added in the Dutch market economy and are widely recognised as key drivers of economic growth. Increased legal uncertainty may also reduce the Netherlands’ attractiveness to multinational corporations, threatening levels of foreign direct investment and employment, both essential pillars of the Dutch economy. Growing mass litigation may also hinder innovation by redirecting R&D resources toward legal risk management. This is particularly concerning for the Netherlands, one of the EU’s top R&D investors. Drawing on US evidence, large-scale litigation can significantly erode market capitalisation, and based on our estimates, the cumulative loss in value for 31 Dutch companies featured in the EU R&D Scoreboard could reach €5.5 billion under the high-growth scenario. Such declines could impact household wealth, as Dutch households save approximately 14.6 percent of their gross disposable income, of which 20 percent is invested in equity. Pension funds, which also play a central role in Dutch long-term savings, can also hold significant stakes in publicly traded Dutch companies. As a result, the effects of collective actions on the market value of Dutch companies extend beyond corporate balance sheets, posing potential negative consequences for Dutch savers, as well as current and future pensioners. This report was commissioned by the European Justice Forum, a coalition of businesses, individuals and organisations that are working to build fair, balanced, transparent and efficient civil justice laws and systems for both consumers and businesses in Europe.
Topic:
European Union, Economy, Litigation, and Liability
Political Geography:
Europe and Netherlands

76. The Impact of Increased Mass Litigation in the UK

Author:
Oscar Guinea, Dyuti Pandya, Vanika Sharma, and Renata Zilli
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Over the past decade, the United Kingdom has seen a marked rise in collective litigation, transforming what was once a niche legal, rarely employed, tool into a fast-growing business model with wide-ranging economic implications. At a time when the country seeks to boost investment, support innovation and attract global business, the proliferation of mass litigation risks undermining these ambitions. This study takes a closer look at how mass litigation is reshaping the UK’s legal, business and regulatory landscape – and asks whether the balance between justice and economic efficiency is tipping too far. The UK stands out among European countries for the ease with which mass claims can be launched. It has long provided a favourable environment for consumer representation and dispute resolution, with a strong culture of accountability. But recent years have seen the emergence of a new ecosystem: law firms specialising in group actions; litigation funders offering upfront capital in exchange for a share of awards; and Claims Management Companies (CMCs) that recruit claimants en masse and process high volumes of cases. The business model has proved highly successful, making group litigation an asset class in its own right and pushing collective actions far beyond traditional sectors such as banking and pharmaceuticals. Today, a growing portion of the UK economy is in the firing line – with potentially damaging consequences. This shift has been rapid and striking. From fewer than 10 mass litigation cases in the late 2010s, the UK saw 47 such actions in 2024 alone, more than any other European country. On a per capita basis, the UK ranks as one of the most litigious jurisdictions in Europe, well ahead of comparable economies such as France or Germany. The implications for the UK economy are far-reaching: many of the companies targeted by these actions operate in sectors that were included in the UK Government’s latest industrial strategy as critical to the country’s future economic growth. Whereas previously limited to financial and professional services, mass litigation cases are now rising in UK companies working in life sciences, advanced manufacturing and digital services. These are industries where risk-taking, long product development cycles and data-driven innovation are the norm. The threat of mass litigation introduces uncertainty and cost at exactly the moment when these businesses need regulatory clarity and investment stability. Moreover, claims against public sector entities involve a direct transfer of capital from the tax payer to hedge fund litigation funders. The financial burden is also considerable. Legal fees and returns to funders often consume a large share of total settlements, reducing the compensation that actually reaches affected individuals. In the Post Office Horizon scandal, for example, £46 million in legal fees and funders payments were deducted from a £57 million settlement, leaving a paltry sum of just over £20,000 per claimant. In the recent judgment of Merricks v. Mastercard, £100 million have been allocated to compensate consumers. Affected individuals could receive up to £70 each if only 5 percent claim, but as little as £2.5 if the full class of 44 million comes forward. These figures raise questions about who really benefits from mass litigation. The limited benefits for individual consumers stand in stark contrast to the substantial costs that mass litigation imposes on the UK economy as a whole. Our scenario modelling shows that, under a scenario where the costs of mass litigation are just 30 percent of the current costs in the US, litigation costs in the UK could reach more than half of the claim value; the cost of mass litigation for the UK economy could reach close to £18 billion, and the market capitalisation of the UK’s most innovative companies could fall by £11.2 billion, more than half the announced public investment into R&D in the 2025 Autumn Budget. These financial pressures affect the whole country. While many large companies are headquartered in Greater London, their operations, and the jobs they support, are often spread across the wider regions. This means that the impact of a legal challenge is not just a concern for a corporate boardroom in London, but it impacts local economies and communities across the UK. As the Civil Justice Council reviews the framework for litigation funding, this study provides evidence to inform the debate. It does not argue against collective actions per se but urges a careful weighing of their benefits against broader economic costs. If the UK wants to remain an attractive destination for business, investment, and innovation, it must ensure that its legal infrastructure supports rather than stifles those ambitions.
Topic:
Economics, European Union, Finance, and Litigation
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

77. Strengthening the Supply-Side Innovation in EU Telecommunications

Author:
Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, and Dyuti Pandya
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The telecommunications sector is central to the EU’s competitiveness, not only providing the infrastructure that underpins digital connectivity but also serving as a key driver of innovation. Recent EU reports already highlight the persistent structural challenges faced by the EU telecommunication sector: market fragmentation, low investment levels, divergent spectrum policies, and an urgent need to bolster digital sovereignty. However, a critical dimension in this discussion often receives far less attention: the supply of the underlying technologies that power telecommunications infrastructure. In this domain, EU companies remain competitive. In 2023, 27 EU-headquartered firms were among the world’s top 2,000 R&D spenders in telecommunications, accounting for 16 percent of global sectoral investment. These figures underscore that, while Europe may lag in investment and infrastructure, it still holds strategic leadership in telecom innovation and technology development. Central to Europe’s success are standard development organisations (SDOs), technical standards, and Standard Essential Patents (SEPs). SDOs provide collaborative forums where companies jointly develop technical standards that ensure interoperability, reduce fragmentation and foster innovation. Complementing this, SEPs protect the innovations embedded within these standards, granting European companies vital licensing revenues that sustain their research efforts. This system is particularly important for EU firms, which tend to be smaller than their global competitors; it enables them to specialise in cutting-edge technology development and commercialise their innovations globally without needing to dominate manufacturing or end-user markets. As competitiveness in telecommunications increasingly depends on the pace and adoption of innovation, the EU faces both a challenge and an opportunity. European firms have the potential not only to supply critical technologies but to drive breakthroughs in connectivity which are linked to the development of other technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) or quantum technologies. However, to stay competitive, the EU must reinforce its position on the supply side, where its companies still operate at the technological frontier.
Topic:
Economics, European Union, Digital Economy, Innovation, and Supply and Demand
Political Geography:
Europe

78. CTC Sentinel: January 2025 Issue

Author:
Paul Cruickshank, Julika Enslin, Nicolas Stockhammer, and Colin Clarke
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
France24’s Wassim Nasr is the only international journalist to spend time with Syria’s de facto leader Ahmed al-Sharaa both before and after the fall of Assad. In the spring of 2023, Nasr traveled to Idlib where he met with al-Sharaa (who at the time was widely known by his jihadi kunya Abu Muhammad al-Julani). Nasr’s insights detailed in “Journey to Idlib” in the May 2023 issue of CTC Sentinel on al-Sharaa’s ideological journey away from the Islamic State and al-Qa`ida toward what might be termed pragmatic Islamism were invaluable to international security analysts. Late last year, shortly after the fall of the Assad regime, Nasr traveled back to Syria where he met with al-Sharaa for a second time and interviewed him. Speaking to CTC Sentinel about the trip in his follow-up feature interview “Journey to Damascus,” Nasr says: “Comparing the man I saw in 2023 with the man I saw in late 2024, he was the same. He spoke very slowly, very quietly. It was the same impression I had a year and a half ago, which was very surprising to many people. I was very cautious a year and a half ago, asking myself, ‘Okay, should I take what he is saying for granted?’ But I was reassured. Because I saw that when they took Aleppo, [when] they took Damascus, actually he applied what he said to me a year and a half ago. It can’t be dismissed as just talk.” In the feature article, Nicolas Stockhammer and Colin Clarke examine the Islamic State-inspired plot to attack a Taylor Swift concert in Vienna that was thwarted in August 2024. They write that the plot “underlined that Islamic State Khorasan (ISK), which appears to have inspired the lead plotter, remains an enduring threat, evolving its tactics and strategy while focusing on radicalizing followers and supporters through relentless online propaganda. The suspects in the Vienna plot epitomized the interplay of online and offline radicalization, with extremist content on social media platforms like TikTok playing a pivotal role.” In the second interview, Wassim Nasr provides insights from his interview last fall with Mohamed (Amadou) Koufa, the number two in JNIM, al-Qa`ida’s affiliate in the Sahel. For Nasr, the questions Koufa chose not to answer were even more significant than his answers. “In my assessment, Koufa’s refusal to speak about al-Qa`ida was significant. I think it’s very possible that JNIM is at least seriously discussing and maybe preparing to break from al-Qa`ida. Since the last third of December, JNIM has stopped referring to AQIM and stopped directing followers to the AQIM media outlet Al-Izza. … It looks like they might be preparing the landscape for a split with al-Qa`ida in the same way that Jabhat al-Nusra—the predecessor group of Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS), the group now in power in Syria—split with al-Qa`ida.” Nasr says that it is possible that having seen HTS come to power in Syria after it split with al-Qa`ida and having seen al-Sharaa in recent weeks win broad international acceptance, JNIM may be preparing to start on a similar path away from the global jihadi group.
Topic:
Al Qaeda, Islamic State, Syrian War, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Bashar al-Assad, and Ahmad al-Sharaa
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, Syria, and Austria

79. CTC Sentinel: March 2025 Issue

Author:
Don Rassler, Yannick Veilleux-Lepage, Julika Enslin, Aaron Y. Zelin, and Jake Dulligan
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
The March issue focuses in particular on the drone threat. In the feature article, Don Rassler and Yannick Veilleux-Lepage examine the evolution of terrorist drone usage and forecast its future trajectory in light of the tactical and technological innovations emerging from the Russo-Ukrainian War. They write that “the conflict has become a critical ‘innovation hub’ for drone warfare, accelerating advancements in the scale, speed, and range of drone operations. These developments are not only transforming the modern battlefield but also creating new opportunities for violent extremist organizations (VEOs) to enhance their operational capabilities.” They assess that “in particular, the war has normalized large-scale drone deployment, demonstrating the feasibility of launching coordinated drone swarms and phased attacks capable of overwhelming existing defenses” and note that the potential future pairing of high-speed First-Person View (FPV) drones with emerging technologies such as AI-assisted targeting “could significantly increase the precision and impact of future attacks.” In a similar vein, Jake Dulligan, Laura Freeman, Austin Phoenix, and Bradley Davis, in assessing the threat posed by commercial drones, write that the biggest concern “is that drone swarms could dramatically increase the impact of bad actor drone operations, be it kinetic strikes, ISR, or psychological warfare.” This month’s interview is with Dr. Christian Klos, the Director General of Public Security at Germany’s Federal Ministry of Interior and Community. He says that “when it comes to the external threat, I would agree with the assessment that ISIS-K is in Germany as well. What we observe from the intelligence side is that there are clear indications that the group intends to conduct attacks in Europe, and this can also include Germany and therefore we are very much aware of this threat, and we have seen also travel activities. So, it’s not just some minor indications.” Aaron Zelin assesses the new Syrian government’s efforts to counter the Islamic State, Hezbollah, and the captagon trade. He writes: “Unlike the Assad regime—which did little to fight the Islamic State, was closely aligned with Hezbollah, and produced captagon on an industrial scale—HTS in its guise as the new government of Syria is taking on these challenges assertively, and has a significant track record in doing so previously. Not only are these efforts a benefit to Syrian society and the security and stability of the country, but they also align with the interests of the United States and U.S. regional allies.” Alexandre Rodde and Justin Olmstead examine the evolution of vehicular ramming attacks and prevention efforts. They write that “when it comes to indicators and warnings of future attacks, the demonstration effect created by high-casualty vehicle-ramming attacks has in the past seemingly produced a surge in copycat attacks, which means the security agencies should be particularly vigilant given the recent uptick in high-profile attacks, including the New Orleans attack.”
Topic:
Intelligence, Terrorism, Violent Extremism, Weapons, Drones, Islamic State, Syrian War, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Public Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

80. NATO’s future: a history

Author:
Bruno Tertrais
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Past pessimism about the solidity and survivability of the Alliance turned out to be misplaced, but assumptions about some of its fundamental tenets were not always correct. Doomsayers have been proven wrong. Internal tensions and external challenges have never brought the Alliance to a breaking point. After 75 years of existence, NATO appears to be a historical anomaly. A few lessons to ensure its longevity stem from this retrospective. NATO would be wise to stick with its core mission: deterrence and defense against an armed attack. Attempts to alter the rules and procedures of the Alliance risk endangering its foundations.
Topic:
NATO, History, Alliance, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe and North America