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41. The third EU-NATO joint declaration (10 January 2023): Was it worth the delay?

Author:
Loïc Simonet
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
Triggered by the war in Ukraine, the long-awaited third joint EU-NATO declaration was signed on 10 January 2023, after months of postponement. Neither a joint strategic concept nor a plan of actions, the document primarily sends a strong political message of transatlantic unity with regards to the gravest threat to Euro-Atlantic security in decades. Although it recognises the value of a stronger and more capable European defence, it marks the primacy of NATO as European security provider, therefore being seen as a defeat for EU’s strategic autonomy. China’s first ever mention in a joint EU-NATO declaration sparked a nervous reaction in Beijing.
Topic:
Security, NATO, European Union, Strategic Autonomy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and Ukraine

42. The Impacts of the Russo-Ukranian War on Latin America in the Age of Strategic Competition

Author:
Guido Torres
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
As we enter the second year of the Russo-Ukranian war, it is prudent that the foreign policy community examine the impacts of the conflict on other regions, including Latin America. Despite the distance between Latin America and Ukraine, the conflict has disrupted the region and exacerbated the negative impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. COVID-19 disproportionately affected Latin America’s fragile socioeconomic, fiscal, and political situation. For example, Brazil, a major regional economic powerhouse, was one of the worst-struck countries in the region, and the pandemic significantly impacted its economy. The country’s GDP contracted by 4.1% in 2020, and unemployment reached a record high of 14.1% in the first quarter of 2021. The pandemic also impacted Brazil’s fiscal situation, with the country’s debt reaching 90% of GDP. Brazil’s downturn is not an isolated incident, albeit a microcosm of the region. In addition, the instability allowed authoritarian regimes to further consolidate control in places like Nicaragua, Venezuela, and El Salvador. For instance, leaders like El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele capitalized on the chaos of the pandemic and a desperate citizenry to strengthen his power. Furthering the impacts on domestic politics, the confluence of the pandemic and war in Ukraine disrupted global supply chains, agriculture production, and energy resources. Moreover, as tensions between the West and nations such as Russia and China continue to grow, globalization is becoming increasingly divided. This will likely lead to further political turmoil and socioeconomic disparity in Latin America, which has already been compounded by the war and the lackluster COVID-19 recovery efforts. With these repercussions still lingering, a lack of economic and trade development, an intensifying energy crisis, and rampant inflation prevailing in 2023, the region’s outlook remains bleak.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Conflict, Strategic Competition, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Latin America

43. EIU Global Outlook—a summary of our latest global views

Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Country Data and Maps
Institution:
Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:
No abstract is available.
Topic:
Economy, 5-year summary, and Forecast
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, and Americas

44. The promises and perils of law-making as the way to strengthen societal resilience

Author:
Amelie Theussen
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Societal resilience is seen as a key answer to the deteriorating security situation, especially in the Baltic Sea region. States often employ new laws in an attempt to strengthen resilience, but is legislation the best way to build stronger societies? There is an underlying mismatch between the dynamism of resilience and the static nature of laws. Resilience entails the capacity to bounce back flexibly from crises. Laws should be formulated so as to nurture such flexibility. Democratic accountability might be at risk when laws are used in the quest for strengthened resilience.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Resilience, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Baltic States

45. Free Association and the United Nations

Author:
Rachael Johnstone
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Since 1945, most States, on achieving independence, seek admission to the United Nations. This is a shortcut to international recognition on the world stage and secures their statehood against future challenge. Although in theory States do not require formal recognition from other States to come into existence, it is desirable. Rather than seeking recognition and/or expensive diplomatic relations with dozens of other States, admission to the UN puts to bed any doubts about the nation’s existence as a State once and for all. Membership is available to States in Free Association (FA States). UN Members each hold a seat on the General Assembly with an equal vote (irrespective of population or economy). The General Assembly controls the UN budget and elects Member States to other major UN bodies (e.g., ECOSOC, Human Rights Council and Security Council). Membership of these bodies allows States to influence UN focus and policy. A small, new Member State may not desire or have the capacity to seek a seat on these bodies directly, but it can engage in “vote-trading” to promote its interests within the broader system. The General Assembly is also a crucial diplomatic forum in which Member States build trust and alliances with one another.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Organization, United Nations, History, and Free Association
Political Geography:
Europe and Denmark

46. Climate resilience and Cook Islands' relationship of Free Association with Aotearoa / New Zealand

Author:
David J. Kilcullen
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
On 1 January 2020, the Cook Islands was removed from the OECD Development Assistance Committee’s List of Official Development Assistance (ODA) Recipients. Having been assessed as a “high-income status country”, this re-classification rendered the Cook Islands ineligible for OECD development assistance. It was unfortunate timing. The Covid-19 pandemic hit a few months later and caused a significant contraction in the tourism sector on which the Cook Islands is economically dependent. The result was, by the government’s own description, a “severe recession” with a total contraction of -21.6% of GDP in 2020/ 2021. Thus, only months after being recognized as having a sufficiently high income as to no longer warrant OECD development-assistance, the Cook Islands lost nearly a quarter of its GDP. This was especially significant for a country that is particularly susceptible to climate change and weather-related hazards. The Cook Islands is made up of 15 coral atolls and volcanic islands. Over 90% of the residents of the 12 inhabited islands live within one kilometer of a coastline. In addition, its already modest population of just under 15,000 people is rapidly decreasing (down from approximately 17,500 in 2016), undermining social and economic resilience to shocks. Despite notable economic growth in the years preceding Covid-19, greater infrastructure and other investment remains essential to brace the country for future climate-related changes. A question thus arises as to the benefits of Free Association in circumstances where the former colony faces crises.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Climate Change, History, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Europe, Denmark, New Zealand, and Cook Islands

47. The European Political Community: Putting politics first?

Author:
Fabrizio Tassinari
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The European Political Community (EPC) was launched in Prague on October 6th of 2022 in the presence of 44 European heads of state and government, including all 27 Member States of the EU, as well as governments of neighbouring European countries, most notably the United Kingdom, Ukraine and Turkey. The initiative came in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its stated aims was to address the shortcomings of the European institutional architecture. While the project is a direct emanation of the French government, its objectives, perspectives and potential as an intergovernmental forum for political and strategic discussions about the future of Europe remain unexplored. The gathering has already planned three future summits (in Chișinău, Moldova; Granada, Spain and the United Kingdom) but it is as yet unclear if and how the new format can contribute to the wider European security architecture in light of the war, ongoing NATO enlargement to Finland and Sweden and the EU’s opt-out referendum in Denmark. This brief aims to spell out three questions surrounding the evolution of the EPC across three key dimensions that concerns its possible institutional, policy and power-related contribution to the wider European constellation.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Organization, Politics, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe and Denmark

48. Toward a Unified NATO Response to the People’s Republic of China

Author:
Rob York, David Camroux, Kelly Grieco, and Bradley Jensen Murg
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Following the Cold War’s end there were those who questioned NATO’s continued relevance. Such views may have found little currency among scholars of foreign policy and security, but among the general public it was not unheard of to wonder why, with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 its rival organization did not also become defunct, especially given the Russian Federation’s friendlier tilt in the decade that followed. On the part of the United States, by the 2010’s a fatigue had settled in among much of the populace over US foreign commitments, especially regarding partner countries not perceived as pulling their own weight. By the middle of that decade, that fatigue had begun to manifest itself in US election results. Vladimir Putin’s Russia, and its brazen invasion of Ukraine last year may not have succeeded in bringing Ukraine to heel or establishing Moscow as a great military power again, but it did accomplish two other things. For one, it demonstrated for the world what the countries separated by the Atlantic could achieve—even indirectly—by helping partners (even non-NATO members) acquire the means to defend themselves. For another, and for all Putin’s claims to the contrary, it showed that nations near Russia’s western border have a very good reason for wanting NATO membership. Putin, more so than any mainstream American or continental European security scholar, has demonstrated the alliance’s continued relevance in providing for the security of countries that desire self-determination and alignment with the liberal, rules-based international order. As it approaches its one-year anniversary the outcome of the Ukraine war is still far from clear, as is precisely how the alliance will respond to the challenge that looms beyond it: the People’s Republic of China, with its growing military might, and its economic influence. And there is broad agreement on the appropriateness of the term “challenge”—the US Department of Defense, which calls Russia an “acute threat,” uses the noun “pacing challenge” to describe Beijing. Meanwhile NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept used the verb form, declaring the PRC’s “stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values.” The forcefulness of these words should not have come as a surprise: US partners in the European Union have been every bit as outspoken about human rights in China as Washington has, as well as against its “malicious cyber activities.” Differences in priority remain, informed by economics, history, and geography (especially considering how much more imminent a threat Russia represents to Europe than the United States), but opinions on both sides of the Atlantic have shifted regarding the PRC, and for many of the same reasons. That shift, and what policies should follow, is the subject of Pacific Forum’s edited volume “Toward a Unified NATO Response to the People’s Republic of China” and its accompanying webinar. With a grant from the NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Pacific Forum brought together three distinguished scholars—one to discuss the evolution of views toward the PRC in the United States over the past decade, one to chart the same change in Europe, and a third to discuss how the two sides should best work together in meeting this shared challenge. Describing the US position, Bradley Jensen Murg argues that increasing American skepticism of Beijing’s intentions is not, as is frequently argued, a unipolar action driven by the insecurity of one great power being replaced by another. Instead, he argues that it is a multifaceted evolution driven by generational change, increased awareness of the PRC’s human rights record, and the failure of international institutions (such as the World Trade Organization) to contribute to PRC liberalization. He further notes that the United States’ views on Beijing are no international outlier but are broadly shared, especially in Europe. Regarding the European perspective, David Camroux notes that the thinking shifted in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-09. Once a destination for European investment the PRC, thanks to its rapid recovery from the crisis and growing domestic capacity, increased its own financial presence on the European continent, arousing increasing concerns. Subsequent revelations about Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang and the suppression of Hong Kong’s protest movement further alienated Europe. He stresses, though, that Europe’s views will likely remain distinct from Washington’s to an extent—Europe does not consider Beijing a “hard security challenge” nor does it possess the hard security capabilities to meet them. Instead, it will continue minilateral engagement with regional powers such as Tokyo, Seoul, Delhi, and Canberra, to reduce dependency on the PRC in a non-confrontational way and avoid direct alignment with Washington in the emerging Great Power Competition. Concluding the edited volume, Kelly Grieco notes the increasing comity in US and EU positions regarding the PRC, but states that, as the “North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” NATO faces practical limitations in terms of projecting power in the Indo-Pacific. Rather than working to confront Beijing militarily, European countries’ most beneficial contribution to NATO would be to increase their security commitments in Europe—thus reducing the burden faced by the United States there—and to use their “diplomatic clout and economic, financial, and technological resources to form an effective coalition to balance against [PRC] power and influence.” Pacific Forum hopes that these scholarly insights will find a wide audience in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere, and that NATO will remain an effective partnership—not to defend Euro-American hegemony and primacy, but the values that underpin the rules-based order and its promise of a fairer, more prosperous global community. Pacific Forum also hopes that, amid their shared defense of rules and values, NATO and its partners will find avenues for some cooperation with China—at the governmental and people-to-people level—and that people from China continue to feel welcome to work, study, and live in the United States and Europe. No one—American, European, Asian, or otherwise—should mistake our disputes with specific PRC policies and actions for antipathy toward the people of China.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Transatlantic Relations, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and North America

49. The World After Taiwan’s Fall

Author:
David Santoro, Ralph Cossa, Ian Easton, Malcolm Davis, and Matake Kamiya
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Let us start with our bottom line: a failure of the United States to come to Taiwan’s aid—politically, economically, and militarily—would devastate the Unites States’ credibility and defense commitments to its allies and partners, not just in Asia, but globally. If the United States tries but fails to prevent a Chinese takeover of Taiwan, the impact could be equally devastating unless there is a concentrated, coordinated U.S. attempt with likeminded allies and partners to halt further Chinese aggression and eventually roll back Beijing’s ill-gotten gains. This is not a hypothetical assessment. Taiwan has been increasingly under the threat of a military takeover by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and, even today, is under attack politically, economically, psychologically, and through so-called “gray zone” military actions short of actual combat. The U.S. government, U.S. allies, and others have begun to pay attention to this problem, yet to this day, they have not sufficiently appreciated the strategic implications that such a takeover would generate. To address this problem, the Pacific Forum has conducted a multi-authored study to raise awareness in Washington, key allied capitals, and beyond about the consequences of a Chinese victory in a war over Taiwan and, more importantly, to drive them to take appropriate action to prevent it. The study, which provides six national perspectives on this question (a U.S., Australian, Japanese, Korean, Indian, and European perspective) and fed its findings and recommendations into the second round of the DTRA SI-STT-sponsored (and Pacific Forum-run) Track 2 “U.S.-Taiwan Deterrence and Defense Dialogue,”[1] outlines these strategic implications in two alternative scenarios. In the first scenario, China attacks Taiwan and it falls with no outside assistance from the United States or others. In the other scenario, Taiwan falls to China despite outside assistance (i.e., “a too little, too late” scenario).
Topic:
Security, Conflict, Crisis Management, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Europe, India, Taiwan, Asia, Korea, and United States of America

50. Rhodes Must Fall: The Legacy of Cecil Rhodes in the University of Oxford

Author:
Emma Day
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Case Study
Institution:
Oxford Centre for Global History
Abstract:
On 9 June 2020, more than a thousand people gathered in central Oxford demanding that Oriel College remove the statue of imperialist and mining magnate, Cecil Rhodes. Congregating in defiance of the Covid-19 pandemic, protesters drew renewed attention to the long-standing struggle to decolonise education and tackle institutional racism at British and South African universities. They also knelt with fists raised for over nine minutes in tribute to George Floyd, a man whose recent murder at the hands of Minneapolis police marked only the latest atrocity in a long history of racialised violence in the United States. Amid the local and global reckonings over race and racism taking place in the wake of Covid-19 and Floyd’s murder, the 2020 Rhodes Must Fall protest marked the latest iteration in a fight to remove Rhodes from campuses that began over five years earlier.1 In 2014, after completing his master’s degree at the University of Cape Town (UCT) in South Africa, Ntokozo Qwabe won a Rhodes scholarship to study a Bachelor of Civil Law (BCL) degree at Keble College, University of Oxford. Qwabe arrived in Oxford amid growing calls for the removal of the statue of Rhodes back home. UCT students argued that Rhodes’s monument embodied the pervasive white privilege at the university, and that tackling those problems required removing his oppressive figure from campus. On 9 March 2015, students accelerated their demands for change. Political science student Chumani Maxwele hurled excrement at Rhodes’s statue. Others occupied UCT offices and posted the hashtag #RhodesMustFall to publicise their campaign on Twitter. One month later, UCT removed Rhodes’s statue from campus, inaugurating the Rhodes Must Fall movement. Although Rhodes fell in Cape Town, he remained standing at the University of Oxford. The abundance of tributes to Rhodes at the university may have surprised South African students arriving in Oxford, left wondering why Cecil Rhodes still enjoyed such an outsized public representation at one of the world’s oldest and most prestigious universities. Moreover, with Oxford’s own issues of institutional racism rooted in colonialism and slavery, South African students questioned why the many monuments to Rhodes did not provoke anger among Oxford’s staff and student body. After demanding that Rhodes fall in Cape Town, and asking, why not in Oxford, Qwabe brought the anti-colonialist movement to his new university.
Topic:
Imperialism, Capitalism, History, and Cecil Rhodes
Political Geography:
Europe and England

51. Robert Maxwell’s Expectations Gap: Regulation and Reputation in the British Communications Industry, 1981-91

Author:
Charlie Harris
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Case Study
Institution:
Oxford Centre for Global History
Abstract:
During Robert Maxwell’s turbulent lifetime, the world knew him as one of the most successful businessmen in Britain, presiding over a publishing and media empire in direct competition with that of Rupert Murdoch. In 1991, Robert Maxwell died – at which point the world discovered that he was, in fact, far beyond bankrupt. As banks called in their huge loans, accountants found that his empire boasted £2 billion in debt. When he drowned, various auditors and authorities were close to catching him in an enormous fraud. Maxwell had stolen around £460 million from his employees’ pension funds and committed extensive stock fraud in order to manipulate the share prices of his empire. Accusations of fraud and mismanagement dogged Maxwell’s career, but to little effect. Beginning with a single publishing house, he built a media empire. His rivalry with Rupert Murdoch – and perhaps his emotional state, which was notoriously volatile and competitive – drove him to expand at an unsustainable pace, which he supported with confidence trickery and enormous loans. His debts quickly outstripped his assets. Desperately scrambling to repay the loans, he turned to stock fraud and his employees’ pension funds. Still desperate for capital six months before his death, Maxwell floated his largest-ever venture – Mirror Group Newspapers – which successfully attracted £250 million in investment, despite the destitution of its parent company. Public autopsies concluded that the blame lay not just with Maxwell, but with advisers, regulators, and complicit financial institutions. Maxwell killed himself (though some still speculate he was murdered) shortly before a scheduled meeting that would have uncovered his fraud. Maxwell did not leave his family destitute, but they no longer had immediate access to the lifestyle to which they had become accustomed. His sons continued working in the City of London. His daughter, Ghislaine Maxwell, continued to circulate in high society. Her crimes are now better known than her father’s; she is famous for her work as Jeffrey Epstein’s right-hand woman, procuring victims (often under-age) for Epstein’s “prostitution ring” (something of a misnomer, as the term implies consent). Both scandals implicated some of the most powerful figures of their day, and in both cases, th
Topic:
Communications, History, Capitalism, Industry, and Robert Maxwell
Political Geography:
Britain and Europe

52. Diplomacy of Neglect: Assessing the European Union’s engagement in the Sudanese Crisis

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
The European Union aims to strengthen its involvement in the Sudanese crisis. This was recently evident when Brussels welcomed a delegation of Sudanese political leaders on July 27, 2023. This effort aims to establish an active European role in the endeavors to settle the Sudanese crisis.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Sanctions, European Union, Conflict, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, and Sudan

53. Cluster Bombs: What is the potential impact of American weapons on Ukraine’s counteroffensive?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
The US Department of Defense officially announced on July 7, 2023, that the US would provide cluster bombs to Ukraine as part of a new military assistance package to support Kyiv in its counteroffensive against Russia. Cluster munitions are weapons that consist of a container that opens in mid-air to scatter up to 600 explosive submunitions or bomblets over a wide area. Most of these weapons are known for their lack of precision guidance, meaning they are not individually directed toward specific targets. Estimates suggest that these weapons' failure rate (dud rate) during conflicts ranges from 10% to 40%, posing a significant risk to civilians, especially because they can explode later upon contact or movement.
Topic:
Weapons, Military Aid, Russia-Ukraine War, and Cluster Bombs
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

54. Restraining Moscow: What are the repercussions of Wagner's rebellion for the Russo-Ukrainian war?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Yevgeny Prigozhin, the chief of the Russian private military contractor group Wagner, announced that his forces had crossed the Ukrainian border into the city of Rostov-on-Don in southern Russia, threatening to destroy anyone who would obstruct their path, including Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu if necessary. In an official speech delivered on the morning of June 24, 2023, Russian President Putin confirmed that what had happened was a stab in the back, instructing the security and military forces to neutralize the "traitors," referring to Prigozhin himself. He called on Russian security to arrest Prigozhin on charges of inciting a civil war. Wagner issued a statement in response to Putin's speech, affirming that Putin had chosen the wrong path and that Russia would soon have a new leader. In an official speech delivered on the morning of June 24, 2023, Russian President Vladimir Putin confirmed that what had happened was a stab in the back, and instructed the security and military forces to neutralize the "traitors," referring to Prigozhin himself. He called on Russian security to arrest Prigozhin on charges of inciting a civil war. In response to Putin's speech, Wagner issued a statement affirming that Putin had chosen the wrong path and that Russia would soon have a new leader. The defection of Wagner and the involvement of its forces in the conflict have significant implications for the Russo-Ukrainian war. The actions of Wagner and the response from the Russian government signal internal divisions and potential shifts in power dynamics within Russia. The situation remains highly volatile, and the repercussions of these events on the ongoing war are yet to unfold fully.
Topic:
Wagner Group, Military, Russia-Ukraine War, and Yevgeny Prigozhin
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

55. A Long Shot: Chances of reviving the JCPOA following FM’s Moscow visit

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Iranian foreign minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian, on March 29, 2023 led ministry officials and a member of the parliament on a visit to Moscow where he met with Russian counterpart Sergie Lavrov to discuss ways of reinforcing bilateral relations and matters of common concern.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, JCPOA, and Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, and Middle East

56. Gas for Survival: Tackling reasons behind the Italian PM's efforts to promote relations with Libya

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Italian PM Giorgia Meloni visited Libya on January 28, where she met with Abdul Hamid al-Dbeibeh, PM of the outgoing government of national unity. The two leaders signed a new gas deal which has proved controversial.
Topic:
Migration, Gas, Energy, and Government of National Unity (GNU)
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, Libya, and Italy

57. Russia’s 2023 foreign policy concept: war against Ukraine, confrontation with the west, and continuation of the tradition of imperialism

Author:
Medea Ivaniadze
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
On March 31, 2023, the sixth Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation was published (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2023). The document was updated for the first time in six years, the main reason for which is the deteriorating international situation for Moscow amid the Russo-Ukrainian war. The text of the concept is highlighted by harsh and revanchist calls against the West and especially the USA. The document almost entirely refers to the Russo-Ukrainian war, at the same time, the concept shows that the current war is only one part of Russia’s confrontation with the Western world. The concept contains a number of statements inconsistent with the real policy of Russia and even lies, but despite the absurd, propagandistic content of the new document, it is important to find out how the new concept differs from its predecessor, and also what factors Russia relies on in the current difficult international situation? Based on the 2023 Concept of the Foreign Policy of Russia the impact of Russia’s imperialist worldview on its foreign policy in the light of full-scale military intervention in Ukraine, the changed attitude towards the West, the prospects of Russia-West relations, Russia’s attempt to strengthen ties with non-Western countries, and finally, threats from Russia to Georgia are discussed in this publication.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Politics, Russia-Ukraine War, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Georgia, and United States of America

58. The Zeitenwende in German Foreign Policy And The Eastern Partnership

Author:
Mariam Macharashvili
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
This paper aims to analyze Germany’s approach to the Eastern Partnership against the backdrop of the “turning point” (Zeitwende) in German foreign policy announced by Olaf Scholz in February 2022. The deviation from the previous policy came as a result of Russia’s war against Ukraine, which disrupted the European collective security system and called into question the main characteristics of German foreign policy. The outbreak of the war on the territory of Europe showed the German leadership that the use of non-military means in the foreign policy, as well as their policy of openness and normalization towards the East (Ostpolitik), which largely implies Russia, turned out to be wrong. Russia’s war in Ukraine also became the basis for the rethinking of yet another political concept - change through trade (Wandel durch Handel), according to which trade and economic interdependence with Russia will facilitate its integration into Europe and push it towards peaceful mutual cooperation. Germany’s dependence on Russian natural resources on the one hand gave Russia a lever of political influence, and on the other made the German economy vulnerable.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, Partnerships, Regional Integration, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Germany

59. The war in Ukraine: Adapting the EU’s security and defence policy

Author:
Dick Zandee and Adaja Stoetman
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Russia’s war in Ukraine is violating the rules-based international order and poses a significant threat to European security. The EU and NATO have responded by taking coordinated action. The measures taken have varied from unprecedented sanctions on Russia to assisting Ukraine with the delivery of arms and ammunition. The war in Ukraine has led to an even stronger focus on collective defence, which was already put in motion after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Furthermore, the European security architecture has witnessed a significant change with Finland (and later this year Sweden) joining the North Atlantic Alliance. At the Vilnius Summit (11-12 July 2023), NATO has taken new decisions to strengthen its deterrence and defence posture
Topic:
NATO, European Union, International Order, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

60. Countering hybrid threats: The role of the Joint Expeditionary Force

Author:
Adaja Stoetman and Dick Zandee
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Russia’s war in Ukraine has fundamentally changed the international order that is based on norms and values of state sovereignty and international law. While the Balkan wars in the nineties were the result of internal turmoil leading to the collapse of Yugoslavia, the Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict marks the return of large-scale interstate warfare in Europe for the first time since the end of the Second World War. A year after the Russian invasion was launched on 24 February 2022, valuable lessons can already be drawn for the characteristics of modern warfare. The conflict has shown – both in the run-up to the invasion as well as after the start of the war – that non-military aspects are part of Russia’s strategy. Well-known examples are the abuse of the European ‘oil and gas dependency’ on Russia, the spread of disinformation, cyberattacks and the channelling of refugees and migration flows. What these means have in common is that they are aimed at undermining the unity of the West and destabilising their societies and democracies. This very complex set of hybrid threats raises new questions on how to respond to them, as the hybrid domain requires the involvement of many different actors at the national and international level: from various ministries and even private companies (such as the energy sector) to the EU and NATO. As hybrid challenges have become an integral part of modern conflict, the question has arisen what kind of role should be laid down for the armed forces. Hybrid challenges are very often of a transboundary and non-military nature. Therefore, they have to be addressed primarily by civil actors. But in addition, the military can also play a role in countering hybrid threats, and this raises the question of the role of multinational (military) formats such as the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF). The JEF is a multinational military formation of northern European countries with the United Kingdom as the lead nation. Since 2019, the JEF has increasingly focused its activities on the hybrid domain. The war in Ukraine has been a catalyst for increased cooperation in the JEF context at the political, policy and military operational levels. The Russian threat, both physically (conventional forces) and virtually/digitally, has become the main focus of attention. It is in the latter category of threats that the JEF Nations are struggling with the question of what its role should be. This report explores the possible role of the JEF in hybrid conflicts and how cooperation in the JEF can be attained. The first chapter addresses the role of military forces in responding to hybrid threats and what the JEF has realised in this context so far. Particular attention will be given to the challenges of but also the opportunities for connecting military activities with those of non-military actors. The second chapter focusses on the roles of NATO and the EU in the hybrid domain and how the JEF could relate to the efforts of these international organisations. The potential impact of the future NATO membership of Finland and Sweden – both JEF Participating Nations – is also addressed. The third chapter zooms in on the potential of the JEF’s role and functions in the hybrid domain and how this should be implemented. The growing political character of the JEF cooperation is also addressed. The report ends with a list of conclusions and recommendations for the Netherlands. The methodology used for this report consists of a mix of literature research and a series of interviews with government representatives and members of think tanks in a selection of JEF Nations as well as with staff officers at the JEF Headquarters, at the NATO Headquarters and at EU institutions. These interviews were held under the application of the Chatham House rule. The authors are grateful to all interviewees for their valuable contributions.
Topic:
Conflict, Hybrid Threats, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe