Political Geography: Europe - CIAO Search Results

201. Artificial Intelligence and Politics: Legal Dilemmas and Risks to Democracy

Author:: Daniele Battista and Gabriele Uva
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: The rapid progress of AI has raised questions about its political, ethical, and legal impact, particularly regarding institutional transparency and citizens’ privacy. This study examined the implications of AI in European politics, evaluating whether it enhances democracy or fosters algorithmic manipulations that contravene ethical and legal norms. Adopting a deductive approach, it examined narratives, scenarios, and expectations regarding the use of AI in decision-making and governance mechanisms. The aim was to offer a critical perspective on the dynamics at play, highlighting the risks, opportunities, and legal protections available. The study contributed to the academic debate on the ethical and regulatory implications of AI in governance, providing insights for future regulation and public policy.
Topic:: Politics, European Union, Democracy, Ethics, Privacy, Artificial Intelligence, Data, and Decision-Making
Political Geography:: Europe

202. Constitutionalizing the Environment in 21st Century Europe: Innovations for Greener Constitutions

Author:: Goce Kocevski
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: This paper analyzes and systematizes innovations in the constitutional entrenchment of environmental protection provisions, moving beyond the mere recognition of the right to a healthy environment or the affirmation of general policy declarations. Using the comparative constitutional method, it examines relevant provisions in the constitutions of France, Montenegro, Hungary, Austria, and Slovenia. The findings reveal significant diversity in the scope and manner of environmental constitutionalization, contrasting with the similarities observed among constitutions adopted in the 1990s. Identified approaches include the integration of environmental law principles, the constitutional recognition of procedural environmental rights, and the establishment of institutions dedicated to environmental protection. These constitutional innovations demonstrate significant potential for broader adoption, thereby strengthening frameworks for environmental protection and enhancing the safeguarding of human rights and liberties.
Topic:: Environment, Human Rights, Constitution, Innovation, and Amendment
Political Geography:: Europe

203. Libertarian Perspectives on Social Change: The Overton Window and the Role of the State in Macedonian Society

Author:: Nikola Lj. Ilievski
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: This paper analyzes public opinion on the state’s role in Macedonian society. The Ideological Carreau and the Overton Window of Political Possibilities frameworks visually represent the findings. The primary objective was to develop a reliable tool for measuring public attitudes and monitoring potential shifts in political culture. To gather the necessary data, an online political quiz was created. The responses were analyzed using arithmetic means to determine public opinion’s central tendencies and position them within the Ideological Carreau. The analysis revealed that public attitudes toward the state’s role predominantly align with the conceptual model of the liberal democratic state and the ideological orientation of modern liberalism.
Topic:: Public Opinion, Ideology, State, Liberalism, Libertarianism, Social Change, and Overton Window
Political Geography:: Europe and North Macedonia

204. Criminal Dimensions of Forced Sterilization of Romani Women: A Focus on Gender-Based Violence and Deprivation of Liberty

Author:: Olga Koshevaliska and Roze Surlovska Ristevska
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: This paper examines the forced sterilization of Romani women as a serious violation of human rights and a fundamental denial of personal liberty. Drawing on legal, sociological, and feminist frameworks, the analysis demonstrates how this practice reflects intersecting forms of racial and gender-based discrimination within healthcare systems and state institutions. Romani women in vulnerable socio-economic circumstances have been systematically denied autonomy over their reproductive choices, highlighting broader patterns of structural exclusion. The findings emphasize the need to address forced sterilization not only as a criminal offense but also as a form of institutionalized violence that requires urgent legal, policy, and institutional reforms to protect personal liberty and advance reproductive justice.
Topic:: Women, Gender Based Violence, Roma, Discrimination, Systemic Racism, Liberty, Antigypsyism, and Forced Sterilization
Political Geography:: Europe

205. The Portrayal of Religious Freedom in Media Discourse: Evidence from Kosovo

Author:: Ilmije Kuqi and Lulzim Esati
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: This study examines how religious freedom is portrayed in Kosovo’s media and how citizens perceive related tolerance and hate speech. A quantitative survey (N = 150) was conducted from March to April 2025 across six regions using simple random sampling. While 90% of respondents affirmed that religious freedom exists in Kosovo, only 35% rated media coverage as very good or excellent. Sixty percent believed Muslims receive the most media attention, and half noted that ethical standards in religious reporting are only partially upheld. The findings reveal a gap between the legal guarantee of religious freedom and its representation in the media, with negative narratives and online hate speech undermining democratic values and social cohesion in post-conflict Kosovo.
Topic:: Public Opinion, Media, Hate Speech, Social Cohesion, Society, Freedom of Religion, and Post-Conflict
Political Geography:: Europe, Kosovo, and Balkans

206. LNG Projects Are a Bad Deal for Germans and Americans

Author:: Milena Pressentin, Josefin Schmidt, and Julian Schwartzkopff
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:: Subsidizing fossil gas, especially long-term contracts for liquefied natural gas (LNG), undermines Germany’s energy independence, national security, public health, and climate goals, while also raising energy prices and pollution for Americans. On the other hand, accelerating the deployment of affordable and cleaner technologies across sectors could lower costs and pollution.
Topic:: Climate Change, Diplomacy, Environment, Trade, Donald Trump, and Energy
Political Geography:: Europe, Germany, North America, and United States of America

207. Bitter Pill for Brussels? Trump’s Fight with Irish Pharma

Author:: Oskar Fairbairn, Lena Fiedler, and Aoife Hanley
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: Around 60% of Irish net exports to US are pharma products. Charging a 200% US tariff would devastate all EU exports, not just Ireland’s. Still, business leaders in Ireland are confident that pharma’s competitiveness will help it survive.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Multinational Corporations, Exports, Trade, and Pharmaceuticals
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, Ireland, and United States of America

208. Rethinking Aid in a Contested World

Author:: Stefan Dercon
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: Development aid faces a crisis of budgets, legitimacy, and political alignment. Framed in recent decades as technocratic and benevolent, aid has always been political, shaped by donor and recipient incentives. Its post–Cold War expansion reflected a permissive era of unipolarity and globalization, when Western foreign policy, business, and security establishments provided broad support. That equilibrium has now collapsed. Multipolar rivalry, protectionism, and fragmented domestic coalitions have left aid vulnerable, shallowly supported, and increasingly driven by narrow donor interests. The paper calls for recognition of the need for a globalization 2.0 that enables poorer countries to grow, warning that without such a framework, remaining aid will become more fragmented and ineffective. It also cautions against a euphemistic reliance on “mutual interest,” as evidence of genuine donor–recipient benefits is limited; trade facilitation and post-conflict stabilization are rare exceptions. Finally, the paper advances four propositions: aid must be selective, avoid entrenching dependency, balance short-term results with long-term system building, and support reformers willing to challenge the status quo. Only by acknowledging its political nature and aligning incentives within a reconfigured global order can aid remain relevant to development.
Topic:: Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Markets, Political Economy, Foreign Aid, and Sustainable Development
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, Asia, South America, and North America

209. How to scale up effective international climate finance by the EU? Tax coalitions and jurisdictional reward funds for the case of fossil fuel

Author:: Ottmar Edenhofer, Matthias Kalkuhl, and Lennart Stern
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: This paper examines how donor countries can be motivated by self-interest to fund emission reductions in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). While not solving the broader climate cooperation problem, we propose pragmatic measures that do not require global consensus on future climate risks or binding commitments. We quantify the unilateral benefits for donors—reduced climate damages and improved terms-of-trade from lower fossil fuel prices—resulting from financing fossil fuel demand reductions. To address project-level finance inefficiencies, we introduce jurisdictional reward funds targeting governments, which also generate implicit wealth transfers to LMICs. A self-enforcing coalition of fossil fuel importers, such as the European Union and China, could mobilize USD 66 billion annually for mitigation in LMICs, cutting emissions by 1060 Mt CO₂ per year and transferring USD 33 billion per year. LMICs additionally benefit from USD 78 billion in reduced climate damages and USD 19 billion from lower fuel prices. We explore coalition stability, geopolitical considerations, and how broader tax and reward mechanisms could further improve global climate, forest, and health outcomes.
Topic:: Climate Change, European Union, Tax Systems, Trade, Fossil Fuels, and Public Goods
Political Geography:: Europe

210. Transatlantic Ties beyond Goods Trade: Significance and Policy Implications of EU-U.S. Services Trade

Author:: Frank Bickenbach, Holger Görg, and Wan-Hsin Liu
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: Trade in services is an important component of international trade and is becoming increasingly more important with growth rates exceeding the rates with which goods trade increases. This is also true in the bilateral U.S. – EU relationship: Trade in services, and especially trade in digitally deliverable services, is a highly important element of the economic relations between the U.S. and the EU. And it is growing much faster than goods trade between the two economies. Despite its importance, trade in services has received much less attention in political and public discussions on the transatlantic trade relationship – even beyond the current narrow focus on the U.S. goods trade deficit. Against this background this policy brief attempts to explore major developing trends over time in EU-U.S. services trade in general and EU-U.S. trade in digitally deliverable services in particular. In addition to services trade, we analyze the development of services supplied by affiliates of U.S. multinationals in the EU and of those supplied by EU affiliates in the U.S. We provide policy suggestions based on data-driven insights derived from the analysis.
Topic:: Globalization, European Union, Services, Trade, Digitalization, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:: Europe and United States of America

211. Hard to Learn for the Future? Field Evidence from a Digital– Green Classroom Pilot Shows No Gains and Lower Enjoyment

Author:: Leonie Dworsky, David Pipke, and Juliet Tschank
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: We evaluate Raise-Up, a pilot in two Turin-area vocational schools that integrated project-based learning on digitization and the green transition into the regular curriculum. Using a difference-indifferences design on three survey waves, we find no positive effects on any pre-registered outcomes, including aspirations, motivation, competencies, preferences, and socio-emotional engagement. The only significant effect is negative: treated students report lower school enjoyment (−0.39σ), plausibly from higher workload. Impacts are more adverse for females, reducing self-confidence and perceived job knowledge, with no socio-economic differences. Post-program feedback aligns with these results, suggesting limited benefits and potential unintended costs.
Topic:: Education, Digital Economy, Labor Market, Skills, Green Economy, and Behavioral Economics
Political Geography:: Europe and Italy

212. Who Pays for Higher Energy Costs? Distributional Effects in the Housing Market

Author:: Francisco Amaral and Steffen Zetzmann
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: We examine how rising energy costs affect rental housing markets and inequality. Using listing data for the 30 largest German cities from 2015–2024, we find that higher energy prices are passed through to net rents in high-rent segments, where inefficient properties see significant rent reductions, but not in lower-priced segments. This asymmetry reflects tighter markets and lower demand elasticity in the affordable segment. Consequently, low-income households face much larger increases in total housing costs. Our results show how segmented housing markets can amplify inequality when energy prices rise, highlighting important distributional implications for climate policy.
Topic:: Climate Change, Real Estate, Energy, Housing Market, and Inequality
Political Geography:: Europe and Germany

213. The Geopolitical Externality of Climate Policy

Author:: Timothé Beaufíls, Killian Conyngham, Maríene de Vries, Michael Jakob, and Matthias Kalkuhl
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: This paper formalizes the geopolitical externality of climate policy and estimates its plausible magnitudes. Specifically, domestic reductions in fossil fuel demand depress global prices, thereby lowering export revenues for resource-rich autocracies – many of which allocate substantial resources to military spending. As a result, climate policy reduces geopolitical and security burdens on Western democracies, offering a potential “peace dividend” as a cobenefit. Exploiting the link between the European Union’s oil consumption and the EU’s costs of the Russian war in Ukraine as a case study, we highlight the relevance of this externality. We estimate that each euro spent on oil in the EU generates geopolitical costs of 0.37 [0.01 - 4.7] euros related to Russia’s war on Ukraine. Based on our central estimate, a carbon price of 62 euros per ton of CO2 would be required to internalize these costs. Even under conservative assumptions, our analysis highlights that the geopolitical externality offers a compelling argument for strong unilateral efforts to reduce fossil fuel demand in the EU.
Topic:: Climate Change, War, European Union, Geopolitics, Geoeconomics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

214. Shocking a CEO: Economic disintegration and executive compensation in manufacturing and services firms

Author:: Merchan Federico and Holger Görg
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: This paper uses the Brexit referendum in 2016 as a quasi-natural experiment to estimate the effect of an exogenous negative shock to globalization on executive compensation for German companies listed in the DAX and MDAX stock indices. We show that it matters whether they work for firms exporting goods or services. The main results indicate that executive compensation in firms operating in sectors that export services was negatively affected, in particular through lower variable compensation. On the contrary, executives of firms that operate in sectors exporting goods were not negatively affected overall, though they experienced a compositional change (from bonuses to equity payments). Sectoral regressions suggest that manufacturing firms redirected successfully exports from the UK to other relevant trade partners, while this was not the case in the service sector.
Topic:: Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Brexit, and Services
Political Geography:: United Kingdom, Europe, and Germany

215. The Security Dividend of Climate Policy

Author:: Timothé Beaufíls, Michael Jakob, and Matthias Kalkuhl
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: By reducing reliance on fossil fuels, EU climate policy substantially lowers Russia’s financial strength, thereby limiting its military capabilities to sustain its aggression on Ukraine and beyond. We provide estimates for the security dividend of EU climate policy. A one-euro reduction in oil consumption in the EU results in a security dividend of 37 cents (central estimate). Based on the security dividend alone, a significant carbon price (central estimate of 60 euros per ton of CO2) on oil consumption is justified – in addition to its climate, terms-of-trade, and local health benefits. Ambitious EU climate policy that reduces demand for oil and natural gas should be seen as an important pillar of the European security architecture, complementing military spending, diplomatic efforts, and continued support to Ukraine.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Climate Change, European Union, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

216. Spatial distribution of housing liquidity

Author:: Francisco Amaral, Mark Toth, and Jonas Zdrzalek
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: This paper examines the relationship between location, liquidity, and prices in housing markets. We construct spatial datasets for German and U.S. cities and show that liquidity and prices decline with distance to the city center. To rationalize these results, we build a structural model with spatial search frictions. We argue that location preferences concentrate buyers in central areas, making markets tighter, more liquid, and driving up prices. Counterfactuals show that suppressing search frictions raises welfare and prices, especially in peripheral areas. Our findings highlight the importance of demand-side preferences and search frictions for understanding liquidity and asset prices.
Topic:: Economics, Financial Markets, Cities, Housing, Real Estate, Liquidity, and Assets
Political Geography:: Europe, Germany, North America, and United States of America

217. The consequences of the Trump trade war for Europe

Author:: Julian Hinz, Isabelle Mejean, and Moritz Schularick
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: • Using the KITE model suite, we study the economic costs of the Trump tariff policy for Europe, and analyze the potential for trade diversion from China. • If the current tariff regime stays in place, trade between the U.S. and China would fall dramatically, hurting mainly the U.S. and the Chinese economies. The direct economic impact for Europe appears limited. • The expected rerouting of Chinese and U.S. exports to third countries is likely to intensify competition between European and Chinese producers in key markets. European consumersstand to benefit from lower prices.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, Tariffs, Trade Wars, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: China, Europe, North America, and United States of America

218. Ukraine Aid: How Europe Can Replace US Support

Author:: Giuseppe Irto, Ivan Kharitonov, Taro Nishikawa, and Christoph Trebesch
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: We study how Europe could replace US support for Ukraine both (i) financially, in terms of the fiscal effort required, and (ii) militarily, in terms of weapon production. Financial effort: The financial challenge of replacing US aid is limited. Currently, European governments are spending just 0.1% of their annual GDP on bilateral aid for Ukraine - a minor effort. To replace US aid flows and keep total support at the same level: Europe needs to double its yearly support to an average level of 0.21% of GDP. This is less than half of what Denmark and the Baltics are already doing and on a level of what Poland and the Netherlands do. In short: Europe as a whole would need to follow Scandinavia’s or Poland’s example. In absolute terms (billions of Euro), the biggest European countries and the EU Institutions will be decisive. To replace US aid and get to 0.21% of GDP, Europe as a whole needs to increase its yearly aid flow from currently €44 bn per year to €82 bn per year. The biggest donors for that effort will be the EU institutions (Commission and EIB), who will need to increase their annual support from currently €16 bn to €36 bn per year. Next comes Germany (from currently €6 billion to at least €9 billion per year), then Great Britain (from €5 to €6.5 bn per year), then France (from currently just €1.5 bn to €6 bn per year), Italy (from currently just €0.8 bn to €4.5 bn) and Spain (from just €0.5 bn to €3 bn per year). All remaining European donors would need to move from €14 bn to €16.5 bn per year. To avoid freeriding, we recommend offering financial incentives to those countries giving aid to Ukraine. Big Ukrainian donors (in % of GDP) could get priority access to any new EU-level defense financing scheme. Large Ukraine aid could also be exempt from EU fiscal rules, or deducted from each nation’s contributions to the EU budget. Military effort: On military aid, replacing the US will be more challenging, but is possible in many domains. We show weapon-by-weapon that Europe’s industry has viable alternatives for almost all of the main US heavy weapon systems donated to Ukraine. Europe also accelerated ammunition production and this effort would now need to be intensified at greater speed and scale, especially for howitzer ammunition. Our data show that the biggest dependency from US-produced weapons is in (i) rocket artillery such as HIMARS (86% of weapons for Ukraine are US-produced systems), (ii) Howitzer ammunition (82% US produced), (iii) long-range anti-aircraft systems such as Patriots (70% US produced). In other domains, European weapons play a more important role, in particular regarding Howitzers and battle tanks. Among the heavy weapons, US HIMARS and Patriots are hardest to replace, as is the supply of ammunition for these systems. Also, US intelligence sharing and satellite imagery are decisive. To respond to these challenges: Europe needs to ramp up the production of essential weapons and artillery ammunition quickly and broadly. It is advantageous that European donors already transited away from donating from stocks to procuring new weapons for Ukraine from industry. These procurement efforts would need to be extended considerably by making firm medium- and long-term commitments to weapon-producing firms. For US weapons that are hard to replace, Europe could place orders in the US and beyond. Viable alternatives to HIMARS include the South Korean K239 Chunmoo and Israel’s PULS. In addition, Europe could heavily invest in the development and production of alternative systems such as SAMP/T. European countries could also increase drone production considerably, both by European producers, and, more importantly, by directly investing in the highly successful weapons industry of Ukraine. Finally, Europe would need to move fast to build alternative digital, satellite, and intelligence systems, including accelerated and expanded initiatives such as the satellite internet constellation IRIS2.
Topic:: Foreign Aid, Arms Trade, Fiscal Policy, Military Aid, Geoeconomics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

219. Capabilitarian Social Justice in EU: Care, Dependency, and the Conception of the Person

Author:: Elisabeth Schöyen
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Goettingen Journal of International Law (GoJIL)
Institution:: The Goettingen Journal of International Law (GoJIL)
Abstract:: While the European Union (EU) is nominally committed to the promotion of social justice by virtue of Article 3 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU), the substantive meaning of this objective remains an open question. By first presenting an ideal of social justice for the EU, and then comparing it to the acquis, this paper hopes to make a small contribution to a (necessarily larger) debate about the substantive content of the social justice objective and about the place of political philosophy within legal scholarship more broadly. To do so, Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach (CA) is used as a starting point. Nussbaum proposes a list of ten central human capabilities, all of which must be ensured (at least) at a threshold level in order for a given polity to be considered minimally just. Rather than considering the individual capabilities, the analysis focuses on the conception of the person underlying Nussbaum’s CA, contrasting it with the conception which emerges from the analysis of the legal subject in EU law. It argues that the latter is not only unrealistic but unjust. Focusing on the construction of the disabled legal subject, as well as its intersections with the statuses of ‘worker’ and ‘migrant’, the paper contrasts EU law and policy with Nussbaum’s normative ideal. It finds that the conception of the person underlying the construction of the EU legal subject is insufficiently receptive to care and vulnerability as constitutively human traits, and moreover struggles to conceive of personhood outside of a productivity framework.
Topic:: Migration, European Union, Social Justice, Disability, and Person
Political Geography:: Europe

220. How to Finance Europe’s Military Buildup? Lessons from History

Author:: Johannes Marzian and Christoph Trebesch
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: Europe must rapidly increase its military spending, but how? We collect 150 years of data to study what governments in similar situations have done. How were past military buildups financed? What was the relative importance of debt financing, budget cuts, and taxes? Our main finding is that budget cuts, e.g. on social or foreign affairs, were rarely used to finance military buildups. Instead, governments typically relied on a mix of deficit financing and higher tax revenues. The larger the buildup, the more dominant debt financing has been. In line with history and theory, Germany and Europe should again rely on debt financing to quickly increase its defense spending and military capabilities. To deal with the added debt burden in the medium run, governments could increase taxes, reduce subsidies and tax avoidance, and freeze the growth of social spending. Fiscal rules must not stand in the way of the defence of Europe. A warning example is the case of the UK in the 1930s, which refrained from significantly ramping up military expenditure and instead pursued a policy of balanced budgets and appeasement. Consequently, the UK was ill-prepared when Nazi Germany launched its attack. Germany should not repeat the errors made by Britain in the 1930s and should invest heavily in defense so as to deter Russia. To achieve this, defense spending should be excluded from fiscal rules both in Germany and Europe. A less clear-cut alternative would be the creation of new debt funds, such as a European financing mechanism or another "Sondervermögen" in Germany.
Topic:: Economic Growth, Military Spending, Innovation, Geoeconomics, Fiscal Multipliers, Rearmament, and History
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Germany, and United States of America

221. How to Finance Europe’s Military Buildup? Lessons from History

Author:: Johannes Marzian and Christoph Trebesch
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: Europe must rapidly increase its military spending, but how? We collect 150 years of data to study what governments in similar situations have done. How were past military buildups financed? What was the relative importance of debt financing, budget cuts, and taxes? Our main finding is that budget cuts, e.g. on social or foreign affairs, were rarely used to finance military buildups. Instead, governments typically relied on a mix of deficit financing and higher tax revenues. The larger the buildup, the more dominant debt financing has been. In line with history and theory, Germany and Europe should again rely on debt financing to quickly increase its defense spending and military capabilities. To deal with the added debt burden in the medium run, governments could increase taxes, reduce subsidies and tax avoidance, and freeze the growth of social spending. Fiscal rules must not stand in the way of the defence of Europe. A warning example is the case of the UK in the 1930s, which refrained from significantly ramping up military expenditure and instead pursued a policy of balanced budgets and appeasement. Consequently, the UK was ill-prepared when Nazi Germany launched its attack. Germany should not repeat the errors made by Britain in the 1930s and should invest heavily in defense so as to deter Russia. To achieve this, defense spending should be excluded from fiscal rules both in Germany and Europe. A less clear-cut alternative would be the creation of new debt funds, such as a European financing mechanism or another "Sondervermögen" in Germany.
Topic:: Military Spending
Political Geography:: Europe

222. In Merz We Truss: Financial Market Reaction to Germany’s Fiscal Package

Author:: Filippos Petroulakis and Farzad Saidi
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: • This study analyzes capital market reactions to Germany’s recent announcement of loosening fiscal restrictions for defense and state-level spending, while establishing a €500 billion infrastructure investment fund. In particular, we examine whether surging Bund yields reflect growth expectations or fiscal risk concerns. • Clear evidence of growth expectations: The steepening German yield curve, rising stock prices, euro appreciation, and stable credit default swap prices collectively indicate that markets interpret Germany’s fiscal expansion as growth-enhancing rather than a reckless fiscal bet. • The contrast with the UK’s Truss-Kwarteng episode is stark: Unlike the 2022 UK “mini budget” aftermath, which triggered a selloff across all UK asset classes, Germany’s announcement has seen positive market reception across different asset classes, suggesting confidence in Germany’s fiscal credibility. • While the policy shift introduces some uncertainty, evidenced by modest increases in the European VSTOXX volatility index, this reaction appears calibrated and partially attributable to concurrent global market events, reinforcing the interpretation that markets view Germany’s fiscal expansion as responsible.
Topic:: Economics, Markets, Budget, Fiscal Policy, Sovereign Debt, Yield Curve, and Debt Brake
Political Geography:: Europe and Germany

223. Veterans of Russia’s war of aggression: Failed reintegration as a threat to the post-Putin era

Author:: Jussi Lassila
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the eventual demobilization of troops is set to pose the greatest veteran reintegration challenge in Russian society since World War II. Problems that have already emerged, such as crimes committed by veterans, will almost certainly increase. Russian society is unlikely to be welcoming towards veterans, either now or in the future, due to emerging inequalities. These inequalities stem from the high rewards paid for military service and the many other privileges granted to veterans and their relatives. Besides offering various benefits, the Kremlin has sought to prepare for this situation by appointing veterans to positions in regional administrations. However, efforts to maintain their respected status will fall short amid the unprecedented number of veterans. Moreover, those promoted to high-profile bureaucratic roles do not actually represent the broader veteran population. The simmering discontent among veterans is unlikely to pose a critical threat to Putin’s rule because the conditions for any kind of oppositional political organization are non-existent under the current regime. Instead, the veteran problem, the scale of which remains unclear, could become a significant factor in deepening the political crisis in post-Putin Russia.
Topic:: Armed Forces, Veterans, Armed Conflict, Demobilization, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

224. NATO and the Middle East: Turkey’s threat conceptions and attempts at stability in post-Assad Syria

Author:: Olli Ruohomäki, Toni Alaranta, and Iro Särkkä
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: With the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, and potential growing instability in Syria, NATO has struggled to formulate a coherent position on the Middle East and to build a cohesive network of partners in the region. As the stakes rise and Europe becomes more invested, both economically and militarily, in Euro-Atlantic defence, the Alliance should not neglect the chance to further develop its cooperative security agenda in the Middle East. In this context, Turkey – NATO’s only member state in the region – can act as a link between the Alliance and the Middle East. Turkey and other NATO members have long held different threat conceptions, resulting in differing priorities in counterterrorism. However, ongoing negotiations between Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), aimed at ending their long-standing conflict, could ease this divergence. While deeper cooperation between Turkey and European countries in the new European security arrangements depends on Turkey’s willingness to choose a side in the Europe-Russia confrontation, European NATO allies could still work with Turkey in areas where there is clear common ground with other Middle Eastern states, such as safeguarding an orderly political transition in Syria.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Terrorism, Governance, European Union, and Security Cooperation
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

225. The EU in an age of empires: A liberal geopolitical force in the making?

Author:: Niklas Helwig, Juha Jokela, Harald Müller, Sanna Salo, and Saila Heinikoski
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: With the US under President Trump challenging the core principles of the rules-based international order, the EU finds itself in an age of empires. The rise of imperialist politics is forcing the EU to defend liberal democracy and economic stability, and to rely increasingly on likeminded partners in the absence of the US. Rising far-right populism, democratic backsliding, and institutional gridlock are weakening the EU. To maintain internal cohesion and external influence, the EU must reform its decision-making, strengthen democratic legitimacy, and accelerate enlargement through differentiated integration. The EU must redefine its relationships, particularly with the Global South. By stepping up as a development partner and demonstrating responsiveness and consistency rather than relying on purely transactional diplomacy, the EU can solidify its added value on the global stage. Facing economic rivalry with the US, the EU must enhance its competitiveness, deepen the single market, and strengthen the euro. Joint borrowing and fiscal integration could bolster the EU’s resilience and economic statecraft, ensuring that it can “stand up for itself”.
Topic:: Governance, European Union, Democracy, Geopolitics, and Strategic Autonomy
Political Geography:: Europe

226. Reforming EU return policy: Proposed tools appear counterproductive for the Union’s external relations

Author:: Saila Heinikoski
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: Return policy has been at the forefront of the EU’s recent migration policy, with significantly stricter rhetoric during the current legislative term. On 11 March 2025, the EU Commission proposed a new regulation on returns. It included conditions for the establishment of return hubs outside the Union, a measure that 15 member states had already advocated in a public letter sent to the previous Commission in May 2024. A comparable return centre has already been established in Europe: in April 2025, Italy started transferring returnees from Italy to a centre it operates in Albania. Initially, the centre was intended for the transfer of asylum seekers rescued from the Mediterranean Sea by the Italian authorities. The Commission’s proposal and the EU’s external return policy seem to have abandoned even the few previous cooperation incentives, focusing instead on conditionality and deterrence, which appear counterproductive in promoting readmission and cooperation with key countries of origin and transit. The proposal contributes to legitimising ‘innovative’ migration solutions by member states, to be followed by the forthcoming revision of the safe country concepts, which would need to be amended for the much-discussed transfer of asylum seekers to third countries with which they have no connection.
Topic:: Migration, European Union, Refugees, and Return
Political Geography:: Europe

227. Four scenarios for the future of transatlantic relations: European autonomy and the American challenge

Author:: Ville Sinkkonen and Garret Martin
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: While concerns about the long-term durability of the US commitment to European security are not new, the unpredictable Trump administration stands out as a serious threat to the foundations of the transatlantic partnership. By analysing the US approach to Europe through the lens of two key variables – investment (whether the US prioritizes Europe) and control (whether the US seeks to dictate Europe’s policy choices) – the Briefing Paper maps out four scenarios for the transatlantic alliance over the next five to ten years. The four scenarios – neglect, partner, vassal, and bloc logic – each present specific challenges and trade-offs for Europe. However, the first two models, neglect and partner, are less thorny on paper because they would preserve European strategic autonomy. Vassal and bloc logic, by contrast, would likely present Europe with far more challenging dilemmas. American pressure to toe the line would compel Europe to choose between unpalatable options, such as surrender or resistance, while testing its ability to preserve autonomy.
Topic:: Power Politics, Governance, Democracy, Transatlantic Relations, and Strategic Autonomy
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

228. Can France lead? European security in times of transatlantic crisis

Author:: Barbara Kunz
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: France has long been a driving force in the European security debate, yet it has often failed to gain traction for its ideas. This is particularly true of President Emmanuel Macron’s push for European Strategic Autonomy and his warnings of US disengagement from Europe. European fears that the Trump II administration will drastically reduce US engagement in European security affairs could now lead more European governments to see France as a more attractive partner. Since 2022, French perceptions of the threat posed by Russia have been converging with the views of most of its eastern and Nordic NATO allies. This development also translates into greater French military engagement on NATO’s eastern flank. Macron’s offer to engage in dialogue on the role of nuclear deterrence in European security could play a prominent role if transatlantic security relations continue to deteriorate. Yet France’s potential role in European security is limited by military and budgetary constraints. In addition, uncertainties pertaining to the country’s political future raise further questions.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, Transatlantic Relations, Strategic Autonomy, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Europe and France

229. The boom and crash of cooperative security in Europe: Four scenarios for the future

Author:: Sinikukka Saari and Tyyne Karjalainen
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: The post-Cold War European cooperative security order, based on shared liberal norms and institutions, has been challenged by Russia’s revisionism and aggression – and more recently by the alienation and even hostility of the United States. Cooperative security has shrunk in scope to an internal European order, shaped around relations among like-minded European states. To maintain this order, Europe will need to actively defend it, not only in words but also in deeds, and even militarily as a last resort. There is a crucial link between the fate of Ukraine and wider European security: the outcome of the war will effectively either validate or reject spheres of influence in Europe and, by extension, the basic principles on which the future of Europe is being built. Europe’s emerging military posture should be grounded in the key norms of European cooperative security: multilateral cooperation, democratic values and international law. Europe can leverage these strengths to navigate the global context of shifting power dynamics.
Topic:: Defense Policy, War, European Union, Regional Security, and Great Powers
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and United States of America

230. Germany’s ‘perfect storm’: A structural crisis for the EU’s engine?

Author:: Marco Siddi, Tuomas Iso-Markku, Harald Müller, and Niklas Helwig
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: Germany is facing significant challenges in its foreign and economic policies, most notably the loss of Russian energy supplies, managing the economic partnership with China amid growing geopolitical tensions and, more recently, the prospect of an unfriendly US administration under Donald Trump. Domestically, Berlin is grappling with the consequences of long-term underinvestment in public infrastructure, limited innovation capacity, and sluggish productivity growth. Anti-establishment parties, particularly the far right, have gained popularity, limiting options for coalition governments after the February 2025 election. At the EU level, Germany’s leadership and its partnership with France have suffered setbacks. At the same time, no credible alternatives have emerged that could potentially replace the leading role of the Franco-German tandem. The next German government will have to contend with a deteriorating economic situation, as well as the long-term foreign policy challenges faced by the outgoing government.
Topic:: Elections, European Union, Democracy, and Economy
Political Geography:: Europe and Germany

231. Russia’s war dilemma: Can the Kremlin seek peace without losing face?

Author:: Margarita Zavadskaya
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: The Kremlin appears to be cautiously testing public sentiment on potential peace negotiations, using state-controlled media and elite statements to gauge reactions. Support for peace talks is growing, particularly among regime supporters, reflecting increasing war fatigue. This shift is largely shaped by Putin’s narrative that the war is nearing its objectives, reinforcing the perception of a strategic victory. Most Russians remain insulated from the direct consequences of the war, but exposure is gradually increasing through family connections. As a result, concerns about the country’s stability and the long-term costs of the war are rising. Even if peace negotiations take place, Vladimir Putin – not the military – will claim the political benefits by framing the outcome as a victory. Despite the war, Russia’s military elite has not significantly increased its political influence, and public trust in the armed forces has declined.
Topic:: War, Authoritarianism, Negotiation, Peace, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

232. Addressing environment-related risks in the EU’s crisis management: From greening to foresight and preparedness

Author:: Emma Hakala
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:: The EU and its crisis management efforts are increasingly challenged by environment-related risks, such as extreme weather events and their implications for stability, migration and food security. Greater recognition of environmental risks could bolster resilience and preparedness not only within specific crisis management missions, but also across the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy. The integration of environmental issues into crisis management has been hindered by unclear mandates, lack of knowledge and expertise, and a failure to recognize the potential benefits for preparedness. For better mainstreaming, the environment needs to be seen as a key part of comprehensive preparedness, for example by producing foresight data, identifying linkages between the environment and security, and contributing to early-warning systems.
Topic:: Security, Climate Change, Environment, European Union, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:: Europe

233. Ceuta y Melilla: ¿casus belli España-Marruecos?

Author:: Daniel Sansó-Rubert Pascual
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:: International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:: Spanish-Moroccan relations have traditionally been characterized by a complex relationship from a political, geographical, economic, social, and strategic perspective. This relationship is often misunderstood and not always peaceful, especially in relation to sovereignty and territory, generating crises and tensions. Specifically, Morocco, practically since its establishment in 1956, has maintained a demanding and unilateral position toward Spain regarding Ceuta and Melilla, as well as the other Spanish territories located on the North African coast. To the question of whether a military confrontation between Spain and Morocco over these territories is feasible, the answer must be that, although highly unlikely, it is by no means an impossible scenario. Therefore, in the face of an act of Moroccan aggression, the legal response is unquestionable: the legitimate defense of the territory under international law would allow Spain to repel an illegitimate armed attack, using force and invoking the solidarity clauses that protect it as a member of the European Union and NATO.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Defense Policy, Lawfare, Hybrid Warfare, Armed Conflict, and NATO
Political Geography:: Europe, Spain, North Africa, and Morocco

234. Ceuta: dos escenarios bélicos que desafían la política militar y de defensa española

Author:: Juan Carlos Fernández-Rodríguez
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:: International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:: The threat to Spanish sovereignty over its African territory is a reality connected to regional security challenges and the military issue. Therefore, in this document, we will explore the various military scenarios we consider most relevant to highlight its nature.
Topic:: Sovereignty, Islamic State, War, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Spain, Morocco, North Africa, and Europe

235. Come and (Re)discover China: Staunchly Patriotic, Sincerely Religious, and Eager to Further Engage with the World

Author:: Bart Dessein
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: While elderly women and men are happily singing and dancing on the shores of Hangzhou’s famous West Lake, grandparents are taking their grandchildren out for a stroll and a boat trip on the lake. Buddhist monasteries in the vicinity of Ningbo, a coastal city south of Shanghai that has recently been elevated to a ‘new first-tier city,’ are teeming with monks who have retreated from every-day life and devote themselves to the word of the Buddha. On a daily basis, tens of thousands of ordinary citizens visit Putuoshan, an insular sanctuary just off the coast of Ningbo, devoted to Avalokitesvara, the Buddhist god(ess) of compassion. In a small place in the neighborhood of Ningbo, the local monastery has newly built the ‘Avalokitesvara’s Dharma-world,’ a temple complex in full marble, ornamented with precious stones and gold leaf, venerating the same Buddhist god(ess). Also in early morning Beijing, hundreds of people are queuing up, waiting for the gates of the Lama temple to open, so that they can enter to pay their respect to the Buddhist deities. Meanwhile, the number of European tourists – despite the extended visa free travel possibilities of up to one month for many European citizens – can be counted on the fingers of one hand. Even in cities such as Shanghai where, judging from the attendance in the breakfast room of an international hotel, the foreign guests are of Indian or Near-Eastern descent, and where shops that have closed down business and commercial spaces for rent in newly built high-rise buildings catch the eye. Also in Hangzhou (equally a new first-tier city), top-end restaurants and small street stalls alike are waiting for customers. This picture is repeated in Anyang, a provincial town in Henan Province, where waitresses and waiters brave the freezing cold to lure customers into their restaurants.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Nationalism, Religion, and Tourism
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia-Pacific

236. NATO: The Damage Is Done – So Think Big

Author:: Sven Biscop
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: For seventy-six years, NATO tried to prove Lord Palmerston wrong. Now it turns out that he was right after all: “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow”. The second Trump Administration behaves as Europe’s rival, not as its ally. It is too late for mere damage control. Placating Trump will not work either: unrestrained, he will just go further and further. Europeans must present the US with a clear idea of which NATO they want, and what they will invest to get it. That is the way to salvage the Alliance at the NATO Summit in The Hague in June. The damage is done. Because even if the US were to radically alter course and recommit fully to NATO as we knew it, everyone now knows that a next President may change it back again. The US cannot treat NATO the way it treats the agreements on climate change: it joins, it leaves, it rejoins, and leaves again. Deterrence demands constancy, or there is no deterrence. Unless it is actually tested in war, Article 5 will now never be as credible as before. This has already affected the global balance of power: adversaries who perceive that the US may not stand by Europe may be emboldened and become more aggressive. Against Europe, but also against the US, whose erratic economic and foreign policies Europe will not follow.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

237. Summits and Sanctions, War and Peace: Is the EU Still in the Game?

Author:: Sven Biscop
Publication Date:: 08-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: As I set out for Beijing in early July, to teach my annual summer course on grand strategy and great powers, I knew in advance what all my Chinese interlocutors would make fun of: Mark Rutte’s and Donald Trump’s embarrassing “Daddy moment” at the NATO Summit in The Hague, epitomising European subservience to the United States. While I was still in Beijing, the EU-China Summit produced the expected non-result. That didn’t seem to bother my Chinese contacts, or so they pretended. And shortly after returning to Brussels, Ursula von der Leyen and Trump announced the EU-US trade deal – a bad deal whose main merit is that it avoided an even worse one. Even the EU’s claim to be a strong and unified economic player, as opposed to its often divided diplomatic and military posture, begins to sound hollow. One has to wonder: is the EU still in the game of great power politics?
Topic:: Sanctions, European Union, Grand Strategy, Trade, and Great Powers
Political Geography:: China and Europe

238. Fit for the Future? A Review of the Belgian Defence’s 2025 Strategic Vision

Author:: Wannes Verstraete
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: The new Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), Alexus G. Grynkewic, said in July 2025 that NATO should prepare for the threat of two simultaneous wars in Europe and the Pacific within two years (2027), instigated and potentially coordinated by Russia and the People’s Republic of China. This devastating and near-future scenario should drive Allied Defence policymaking with a single goal in mind, namely deterring such an outcome, and if deterrence fails, defending Allied interests. General Grynkewic also mentioned during his confirmation hearing at the United States Senate Armed Services Committee that he will “conduct a 90-day assessment to evaluate” the priorities for the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM). This ongoing assessment will be a key element to determine the evolution of the USEUCOM force posture in the European theatre during the coming years.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:: Europe and Belgium

239. Semiconductors and Statecraft: Belgium’s Role in Europe’s Technological Sovereignty

Author:: Victor De Decker and Marcus Loiseau
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: Belgium’s global role in semiconductors hinges not on scale but on control of a strategic chokepoint: upstream innovation. With imec at its centre, Belgium functions as Europe’s semiconductor R&D engine – but this asymmetric position leaves the country structurally exposed. Without manufacturing capacity, talent diversification, or broader ecosystem scaling, Belgium risks becoming a high-value subcontractor in a geopolitical and financial game it does not fully control. To remain indispensable – and not merely useful – Belgium must convert R&D dominance into strategic leverage, push for Chips Act reforms that close the EU’s coordination gaps, build scaling innovation ecosystems, and expand its influence within a fragmented European industrial policy landscape.
Topic:: Economics, Science and Technology, Sovereignty, European Union, Innovation, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:: Europe

240. From Syria to the Black Sea: Containing Russia, Partnering with Turkey?

Author:: Bernard Siman
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: The outcome of the Russo-Turkish power competition in Syria will impact the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea. This, in turn, will impact the outcome of any peace negotiations with Ukraine and its relative position in the Black Sea. The future of Syria very much matters for the EU, therefore. Because blunting Russia’s attempts at achieving dominance over the Black Sea will play an important role in Europe’s security. And because the Syrian coast is only 300KM from Cyprus, the EU’s southeastern most border. Syria is the EU’s neighbour for all intents and purposes. In Syria, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Black Sea, Turkey and the EU finally have a key strategic objective in common.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Strategic Competition, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Turkey, Syria, and Black Sea

241. The Fog: The Opacity That Warns

Author:: Joris Van Bladel
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: Now in its fourth year, Russia’s war on Ukraine has become more than a battlefield confrontation. It is fire, ice, and fog at once: the hot war in Ukraine fought with mass, drones, and attrition; the cold confrontation with NATO, centred on escalation management; and the fog of Russia’s internal struggle, marked by fatigue, militarisation, repression, and a growing social isolation, as much of the population seeks to distance itself from the war both mentally and in daily life. Considered alone, each dimension distorts the picture. Taken together, they reveal a Russia both fragile and resilient, archaic and adaptive. This is Part III: The Fog, examining Russia’s internal front—the least legible dimension of the conflict. The system performs strength while pressure accumulates beneath the surface: raison d’état coexists with societal passivity, producing fragility that yields lurches rather than orderly decline. This Policy Brief maps that opacity through an economy of exhaustion, the “veteran variable” as battlefield costs migrate home, a society that holds still under pressure, elite cohesion sustained by fear and performance, and the indicators that often precede sudden shifts. The policy lesson is simple: do not mistake opacity for stability—prepare for discontinuity, monitor the silent front, and prioritise endurance over spectacle.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, Political stability, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

242. The Ice: The Confrontation That Cannot Thaw

Author:: Joris Van Bladel
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: Europe’s debate over Russia is sharply divided along ideological, epistemological, and geographical lines, crystallised by Fiona Hill’s June 2025 warning that “Russia is at war with Britain.” While sceptics downplay the threat and frame Western policy as the driver of Russian behaviour, others emphasise Russia’s capabilities and ambitions yet struggle to reconcile its simultaneous weakness and aggression. Van Bladel resolves this through the fragile-state paradigm, where capacity limits foster risk-taking coercion rather than restraint. This brief (Part II in a three-part series) systematically assesses Russia’s layered challenge: battle-hardened forces, grey-zone campaigns, conventional build-up in key regions, nuclear signalling, and adaptive but inconsistent execution. Democracies must prepare for rare but catastrophic “fat-tail” risks, emphasising endurance over spectacle—munitions stockpiles over prestige platforms, redundancy over efficiency, rehearsed decision-making over rhetorical unity—ensuring a measured response compatible with liberal deomcracy.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Fragile States, Gray Zone, Coercion, and Aggression
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

243. The Fire: The Offensive Meant to Decide the War

Author:: Joris Van Bladel
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: Now in its fourth year, Russia’s war on Ukraine has become more than a battlefield confrontation. It is fire, ice, and fog at once: the hot war in Ukraine fought with mass, drones, and attrition; the cold confrontation with NATO, centered on escalation management; and the fog of Russia’s internal struggle, marked by fatigue, militarization, repression, and a growing social isolation, as much of the population seeks to distance itself from the war both mentally and in daily life. Considered alone, each dimension distorts the picture. Taken together, they reveal a Russia both fragile and resilient, archaic and adaptive. This is Part I: The Fire, focusing on Russia’s war against Ukraine. Two further Policy Briefs will follow, each covering the other fronts of Russia’s struggle.
Topic:: NATO, European Union, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

244. The EU-India Strategic Relationship in Times of Geopolitical Turmoil

Author:: Jan Luykx
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: After an eventful geopolitical summer, the India-EU relationship has been pushed completely to the political background. The waves created by President Trump have unbalanced both India and the EU. While this seems to have pushed the EU-India relationship into the background, it has the potential of opening up opportunities for working together more closely in several significant areas. It is up to the EU and India to take up this challenge and to carry forward their stated intention of strengthening their strategic relationship. While developing this strategic relationship, New Delhi and Brussels will both be forced to consider the reality of their respective relationships with Washington, Beijing and Moscow, in a context of shifting geopolitical dynamics.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Europe and India

245. Keep NATO focused on Europe, not China

Author:: Thomas P. Cavanna
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: During the Trump I and Biden presidencies, the United States applied growing pressure on NATO to turn against China. Although focused on protecting Europe, these efforts also attempted to expand the alliance’s prerogatives into the Indo-Pacific. Should this expansion continue, it could distract NATO from Russia, the only real threat that Europe faces. It could also delay the emergence of a more autonomous Europe able to defend itself, thereby perpetuating current U.S. overstretch and reducing Washington’s ability to concentrate on the China challenge in Asia. NATO’s turn against China might generate undue tensions with the PRC, deepen Sino-Russian cooperation, and cause controversy in the Global South, all of which would work against U.S. interests. Instead of trying to fold Europe and Asia together to counter the Sino-Russian axis along the Eurasian rimland, the U.S. should keep NATO focused on Russia and encourage European strategic autonomy. It should refocus its own efforts on the Indo-Pacific and reduce the risk of escalation with Beijing.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, and Expansionism
Political Geography:: Russia, United States, China, Europe, and Asia

246. DONG to Ørsted: Seven Insights to Transform National Oil Companies

Author:: Giovanni Tagliani, Andrea Furnaro, David Manley, and Camilo Romero
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI)
Abstract:: The experience of Denmark’s national oil company (NOC) DONG transforming into Ørsted, the world’s leading offshore wind developer, is a case worth exploring. While aspects of Denmark’s story are unique and not easily replicated, many of the underlying lessons can apply elsewhere. Governments in oil- and gas-exporting countries have long worried about two things: the eventual depletion of reserves and the volatility of global oil and gas prices. In response, many have acknowledged the need to diversify their economies beyond fossil fuels—to create new industries, generate jobs, stabilize government revenues and earn foreign exchange. Yet, despite decades of ambition, few have managed to succeed. And now, the urgency is growing in light of the global energy transition, threatening long-term demand for oil and gas. This shift has not only pushed governments to rethink their economic strategies but also forced national oil companies (NOCs)—along with their private-sector counterparts—to outline their own diversification plans. While these corporate efforts may not be sufficient on their own to shield a country from the impact of declining demand, they matter. Understanding how NOCs attempt to diversify can help governments determine whether these strategies support or undermine broader economic goals. There are reasons to be cautious. Diversification by NOCs could end up wasting public resources if, for example, NOCs invest in poorly planned ventures, politically motivated projects or sectors where the company lacks expertise. Worse, if such efforts are not carefully aligned with national development and decarbonization goals, they can divert capital and attention away from other priority areas.
Topic:: Exports, State-Owned Enterprises, Energy Transition, National Oil Companies, and Natural Resources
Political Geography:: Europe, Denmark, and Global Focus

247. EU-North Africa Energy Partnerships: Is a Win-Win Formula Possible?

Author:: Laury Haytayan
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI)
Abstract:: The European Union and North Africa have complementary strengths in the energy transition, with the former harnessing technology and the latter, an abundance of resources. Partnerships between the two regions must prioritize local development, job creation and infrastructure in North Africa. It is essential that the European Union moves beyond the extractivist model for equitable energy partnerships. European Union investments should align with North Africa’s priorities, to ensure sustainable progress. Interconnected grids and renewable energy projects can enhance mutual energy security.
Topic:: Development, European Union, Partnerships, Investment, Energy, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:: Europe and North Africa

248. A Mountain to Climb: Russia’s Influence in the South Caucasus and EU Policy Options

Author:: Sanshiro Hosaka
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Azerbaijan’s recapture of Nagorno-Karabakh have triggered significant geopolitical shifts and resulted in varied manifestations of Russian influence across the South Caucasus, a region that Moscow has traditionally regarded as its “sphere of influence.” This report examines the implications of these events for Russia’s geopolitical position in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. It analyses Russia’s opportunities and constraints across military, political, economic, cultural, and other domains. Russia’s influence is interpreted broadly, encompassing: Bogus Mediation and Military Deployment: Moscow exploits regional conflicts—such as Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia disputes—to position itself as an indispensable mediator while consolidating its military and political foothold. Non-Military Coercive Levers: Russia leverages asymmetrical trade dependencies, energy resources, media influence, cultural ties, diasporas (both Russian and target nations’), and intelligence connections to coerce target governments. Authoritarian Illiberal Alignment: Moscow supports regional autocrats in resisting democratisation (what they refer to as “colour revolutions”), enacting restrictive legislation modelled after that of Russia, such as foreign agent laws, and promoting “traditional values.” In Georgia, Russia’s indirect influence through authoritarian illiberal alignment has intensified under Ivanishvili’s regime. Armenia has begun to tacitly reduce Russia’s influence in sensitive areas such as intelligence, whereas systemic military and economic dependence persists. Azerbaijan has aligned more closely with Moscow in political-military spheres, although this does not necessarily translate into greater Russian leverage over Baku. The continuation of these trends, particularly for the landlocked and resource-poor Armenia, hinges on the outcomes of Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine and the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace negotiations. This report recommends a multifaceted approach to strengthening resilience against Russia’s malicious influence while promoting democratic development in the region: Block Russia’s “Bogus Mediation”: Prevent Russia from exploiting regional conflicts to entrench its geopolitical influence under the guise of mediation and peacekeeping. The deployment of the EU Monitoring Mission in Armenia is a timely and significant step. Counter “Traditional Values” Narratives: Challenge Russia’s promotion of anti-western “traditional values” narratives by showcasing the compatibility of the EU integration with preserving local traditions and cultures. Diversify Regional Trade Routes: Support initiatives such as Armenia’s “Crossroads of Peace” to revive traditional trade routes and reduce dependence on Russia. Provide Shelter and Support for Civil Society: Offer robust backing for civil society activities that build resilience against Russian influence and promote trust-building in the region.
Topic:: Intelligence, Diaspora, European Union, Geopolitics, Annexation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, South Caucasus, and Nagorno-Karabakh

249. Ukrainian War Refugees in Estonia: Sociodemographic Portrait and Support Policies

Author:: Mykola Nazarov
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Demographics will be one of the most difficult challenges for post-war Ukraine. Depopulation, combined with emigration, poses significant risks to the country’s socio-economic recovery.[1] In July 2025, Ukraine’s government adopted a decision to merge the Ministry of National Unity with the Ministry of Social Policy.[2] The Ministry will now be responsible for the respective state policies, as well as the protection of the rights of Ukrainians abroad. Estonia has a significant proportion of Ukrainian citizens relative to its population. Understanding the sociodemographic profile of Ukrainian refugees and the level of support from the host country can be useful for adjusting the strategy for their return from abroad.
Topic:: Refugees, Displacement, Russia-Ukraine War, and Temporary Protection Status (TPS)
Political Geography:: Europe and Ukraine

250. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Drone-Centric Warfare

Author:: Mykhailo Samus
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: In December 2024, Major Robert ‘Madyar’ Brovdi, a key figure in Ukraine’s drone warfare development, announced that his strike drone regiment would become a separate uncrewed systems brigade within the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). Since 2022, Ukraine’s drone capabilities have expanded rapidly. Over a million drones have now been deployed. But this is not simply a question of numbers—the AFU has embraced a fully drone-centric military strategy.
Topic:: Weapons, Drones, Armed Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, and Warfare
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

251. Russia’s War in Ukraine: The Resonance of Ukraine’s Resistance

Author:: Ben Heap
Publication Date:: 10-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Ukraine’s messaging resonates because it reflects the audience’s values, beliefs, and historical experiences. Its power lies not only in President Zelenskyy’s skilled communication, social media savvy, and emotional appeals, but in the deeper principles it expresses—justice, sovereignty, and the rule of law. These liberal democratic values define what we are willing to defend.
Topic:: Democracy, Resistance, Narrative, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

252. A New but Ambiguous Momentum in EU Enlargement

Author:: Steven Blockmans
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: EU enlargement usually happens in fits and starts. Currently, there is an important new dynamic in the EU’s enlargement policy. Driven by geopolitical forces, the risk is that it will soon come to a stop.
Topic:: European Union, Geopolitics, Regional Politics, and Enlargement
Political Geography:: Europe

253. Estonia’s Role in the Changing Architecture of Development Cooperation

Author:: Merili Arjakas, Hille Hanso, Ivan Ulises Klyszcz, Kai Kaarelson, and Solveig Niitra
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Development cooperation is a tool of soft power for states that enables them to promote their values, build relationships with partner states, and reduce global poverty. Since development cooperation is impacted by changes in the norms and power dynamics of international politics, it is essential to analyse Estonia’s use of development cooperation up to now and the directions it may take in the future. Firstly, bilateral development cooperation is becoming more interest- and business-based, with development cooperation by western countries also being increasingly shaped by the goal of promoting their own goods and services. For example, Sweden – one of the European Union’s key donor countries – is increasingly focusing on its exports. At the same time, it is hoped that economic growth in the global south will offer solutions to the global north’s security and welfare challenges, including migration. Another significant trend in the area is the growing influence of non-democratic donor countries that use development cooperation not to empower local populations but to consolidate or expand their spheres of influence. This shift is exacerbated by substantial cuts in development aid budgets in several western countries, including the United States – the largest contributor to aid – which leaves more room for China and other states offering an alternative to western governance models. Estonia has primarily focused its development cooperation on sharing its transition experience with countries such as Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, who have shown interest in the lessons Estonia’s example can offer and whose development directly affects Estonia’s security. These reform efforts include the promotion of democracy, the rule of law, and a favourable business environment, along with a strong emphasis on education-related development cooperation. More recently, Estonia has expanded its efforts to share its expertise in digital governance and digital education, particularly with African countries. A new area of focus is the export of Estonia’s education model, which might help address the high global demand for quality education, though there is still no national consensus on what the priorities in this sector should be and who the suitable actors are. The overarching aim of Estonian development cooperation has been to support target countries and their populations. At the same time, it has also served as a means to advance Estonia’s own security, reputation, and economic interests. Compared to larger donor countries, Estonian development cooperation resources are very limited, yet it has distinct strengths that should be better recognised internally and more widely promoted internationally. Estonia conducts strong bilateral development cooperation with relatively little fragmentation, in which it takes advantage of its strengths: digitalisation, flexibility, personal engagement, low coordination costs, and reform expertise. Thus far, Estonian development cooperation has focused on so-called smart cooperation (reforms, IT, and education) and supporting human development in middle-income countries. This approach should continue, rather than shifting towards infrastructure development in the world’s poorest nations. The reconstruction of Ukraine is an exception, where Estonia is both taking a leading role that sets an example for others and supporting a key security partner.
Topic:: Development, International Cooperation, Poverty, and Soft Power
Political Geography:: Europe and Estonia

254. Kenya’s Foreign Policy Towards Europe and Estonia

Author:: Stephen Kimoita
Publication Date:: 07-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Kenya’s foreign policy towards Europe is largely motivated by the need to promote its national interests through trade and investment, as reflected in its 2014 Foreign Policy document (revised 2024). This paper explores Kenya’s relations with Europe and Estonia in areas of security, multilateralism, education, culture, and the diaspora. Despite having already achieved a close partnership, there is room for growth in Europe-Kenya relations. To maximise foreign policy gains, Kenya should fully leverage existing bilateral and multilateral frameworks for cooperation. Meanwhile, Europe needs to customise its exports to Kenya’s needs and pursue well-targeted trade and investment opportunities in areas like manufacturing.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Multilateralism, Investment, Manufacturing, and Trade
Political Geography:: Kenya, Africa, Europe, and Estonia

255. EU Defence Series: Strengthening the Industry

Author:: Marianne Paire
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: With the March 2022 Strategic Compass, the EU “set out a common strategic vision and concrete objectives for strengthening the EU's security and defence policy by 2030.” [1] The Compass noted the deterioration in the strategic environment as a result of the return of war to Europe, increased competition between powers, the complexity of threats to the continent's security, and the undermining of the principles of the international order. In defence, the member states (MS) recognised the need to invest “more and better in innovative capabilities and technologies, fill strategic gaps, and reduce technological and industrial dependencies.” [2] This brief considers the EU’s progress in the defence industrial domain.
Topic:: Defense Policy, European Union, Defense Industry, and International Order
Political Geography:: Europe

256. The EU’s Dilemmas in the Black Sea Region: Security and Enlargement

Author:: Koen Claessen
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The Black Sea region has gained renewed strategic importance for the European Union following Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. As an area of considerable economic and geopolitical significance, as well as a focal point for potential future EU enlargement, its stability is now an urgent concern for European policymakers. Russia’s sustained efforts to undermine security in the Black Sea necessitate a coherent EU vision, moving beyond the fragmented scope of earlier initiatives such as the Black Sea Synergy and aspects of the Eastern Partnership.
Topic:: Security, European Union, Geopolitics, Russia-Ukraine War, and Enlargement
Political Geography:: Europe and Black Sea

257. Why the ‘Reverse Nixon’ Strategy Will Fail: The Illusion of Decoupling

Author:: Sanshiro Hosaka
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The second Trump administration has undertaken a peace deal with Russia. This policy may not simply reflect Donald Trump’s personal affinity for Moscow and deal-making style but is also likely informed by a certain strategic perception of the US-China-Russia triangle.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Donald Trump, Strategic Interests, and Decoupling
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

258. EU Defence Series: PESCO Must Step Up

Author:: Maxime Cordet
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), established by the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007, was intended to create a framework for the most willing and able Member States (MS) to cooperate on defence within the EU. It was activated by 23 of them in 2017. Today, all MS except Malta participate. This brief examines PESCO’s contribution to the EU’s growing defence ambitions and sets out the challenges ahead.
Topic:: Defense Policy, European Union, and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)
Political Geography:: Europe

259. The Staying Power of Ukrainian Lights. Lessons of Wartime Resilience of the Electricity Sector

Author:: Tomas Jermalavicius, Henry Rõigas, Oleksandr Sukhodolia, and Dmitri Teperik
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Ukraine continues its struggle to maintain the supply of electricity across the country, as Russia ramps up its aerial campaign, shifting the focus towards the destruction of power generation facilities. Ukraine’s remarkable energy sector resilience is attributed to multiple factors: redundancies in and adaptiveness of the power system, pre-invasion preparedness measures, and the capacity to restore damaged or destroyed facilities. This report identifies and analyses some key lessons in physical protection, energy policy, cybersecurity, and strategic communication domains when ensuring the functioning of the power generation, transmission, and distribution system in wartime. It examines how Ukraine responded to the kinetic attacks against its power system. The report also outlines the protection and recovery policies and the practical measures implemented by its government, local authorities, and power companies. It then analyses the nature of cyber threats and how Ukraine has countered them during two distinct periods — in 2014-22 and 2022-24. It also shows how Ukraine mounted effective crisis and strategic communication efforts and dealt with the attempts by Russia and its proxies to use disinformation to undermine public self-confidence, trust, and cooperation — all while managing the consequences of the attacks against the power system. The report argues that wartime resilience of power system requires active and sustained contribution from a broad range of stakeholders — domestic and foreign, civil and military, as well as governmental, corporate, and societal — and provides another convincing case of how valuable and important the whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches are under such severe conditions, including in cyber and cognitive warfare domains. It outlines a set of recommendations for defence planners, energy policymakers, electricity producers, transmission and distribution system operators, cybersecurity managers, and strategic communicators that could be applied to enhancing the war preparedness of the power systems of NATO Allies.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, Cybersecurity, Critical Infrastructure, Energy Security, Strategic Communication, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

260. Independent report on the Future of the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS)

Author:: Toomas Hendrik Ilves and Gabrielius Landsbergis
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Under the auspices of the Estonian presidency of the Council of Baltic Sea States, Toomas Hendrik Ilves and Gabrielius Landsbergis were appointed as the independent Wise Persons to produce a report on the future of the CBSS to look into the need to reform and restructure the Council and better respond to the current challenges of the region. The decision to commission a report was born at the CBSS Porvoo ministerial meeting in June 2024, where the foreign ministers enjoyed an open, like-minded discussion on the hybrid threats in the region. The organisation has been dealing with the issues of democracy building, as well as economic and social challenges, since 1992. Over the last 33 years, however, times have changed significantly, and an urgent need for a different platform has arisen. The Wise Persons, accompanied by the ICDS research fellow, Kai Kaarelson as the penholder, visited all 10 capitals of the CBSS, as well as Brussels, and reported back about their vision. What they discovered was a common plea for a Council that would address the hybrid security threats of the Baltic Sea States on a regular basis. If the Wise Persons’ recommendations are implemented, a new permanent strategic discussion forum on hybrid threats will be established. As an avant-garde in the EU and NATO, and advancing the unity in both organisations, it will enhance the security architecture of the region. This work could be further supported by a strong civil protection pillar. Should the security situation in the world continue to deteriorate, a regional organisation with a stronger military dimension could be considered. The regional cooperation on other issues could proceed under a different framework.
Topic:: NATO, European Union, Hybrid Warfare, Hybrid Threats, Civil Protection, and Critical Infrastructure
Political Geography:: Europe and Baltic Sea

261. Returning Ukrainians Home: Mission Possible?

Author:: Mykola Nazarov
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: In 2025, about 6.9 million Ukrainians remain abroad due to the war, while migration dynamics in Ukraine in the fourth year of the war are still negative. Returning people from abroad is a challenging task for the authorities and a crucial issue for society. To motivate people to repatriate, it is necessary to create both effective institutional mechanisms and a favourable psychological atmosphere. Post-war Ukraine will be confronted with all the negative consequences of depopulation, such as shortages in the labour market and an increasing tax burden on businesses. Regardless of how Ukrainian citizens come back, the state will need to attract significant numbers of labour migrants, which will, in turn, pose new integration challenges. The government’s policy framework to encourage the return of Ukrainians home is a work in progress, with only several strategic documents already developed. A ministry of national unity has been tasked with coordinating the efforts of other government agencies and designing a unified approach to repatriation policy. It is likely that the end of the hot phase of the war will become a trigger for the start of intensive reconstruction in Ukraine and the implementation of the strategy to bring Ukrainians home.
Topic:: Civil Society, Migration, Refugees, Resilience, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe and Ukraine

262. EU Defence Series: Military Mobility A Critical Enabler

Author:: Mihai Sebastian Chihaia
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The first months of 2025 witnessed monumental changes for European security. Donald Trump’s return to the White House has created a huge degree of uncertainty, and it is increasingly likely that Europe will need to prepare for much less American commitment to its security and defence. There are serious questions about how large the impact on the EU and NATO will be, the future of NATO’s Article 5, and what the US reaction will be if a NATO Ally is attacked. In any scenario, one of the most important enablers of Europe’s defence is the ability to move troops and equipment swiftly across the continent and ensure that reinforcements can arrive quickly in case of conflict. This brief maps developments at the EU level to enhance military mobility and highlights what is still needed to overcome challenges and bottlenecks.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Military Affairs, European Union, and Mobility
Political Geography:: Europe and United States of America

263. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Prospects for an American Peace

Author:: Laurynas Jonavičius
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: As Russia’s war in Ukraine grinds on, international attention has turned toward the prospect of a negotiated settlement, with a US-backed framework among the most prominent initiatives. Reports suggest this might include a ceasefire, security guarantees for Ukraine, tacit recognition of Russia’s existing territorial control, and a long-term halt to Ukraine’s NATO aspirations. On the surface, these terms may appear pragmatic, offering a potential off-ramp from a costly and protracted conflict. However, below this is a complex dilemma, shaped by structural asymmetry, political mistrust, and fundamentally divergent national priorities.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, NATO, Armed Conflict, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

264. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Ukraine’s Strategy And Western Military Assistance

Author:: Hennadiy Maksak
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: International partners have provided significant military assistance to Ukraine since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022. The temporary suspension of critical US military assistance in early 2025 raised concerns about Ukraine’s strategy to fend off Russia. While it is difficult to predict how the battlefield will unfold in 2025, strong ties with Western partners will be crucial to continue a war of attrition against an overwhelming enemy.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Armed Conflict, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

265. EU Defence Series: The White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030

Author:: Marianne Paire
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The Commission presented its White Paper on defence on 19 March at a press conference with the Commissioner for Defence and Space, Andrius Kubilius, and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas. [1] This document is part of a dynamic that has been at work since the outburst of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, namely the greater priority given to defence within the EU.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, European Union, and Readiness
Political Geography:: Europe

266. More Than a Systemic Rival: China as a Security Challenge for the EU

Author:: Tauno Tõhk
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The EU's ties with China rank just behind its transatlantic ones in significance. With China being a major trading partner, the focus has long been on economic opportunities. In recent years, there has been a shift in how the EU frames its relationship with China. Yet, despite increasing emphasis on systemic rivalry and economic security, security risks remain underrepresented in EU China policy.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

267. Prometheism: A Polish Covert Action Program

Author:: Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: Between World War I and II, Poland conducted a covert action program known as Prometheism to undermine the Soviet Union by supporting the national independence movements of non-Russian peoples within its borders.[1] Poland hoped this program could blunt Russian imperialism, then with a Communist veneer, by redirecting Moscow’s attention internally toward irredentism within its own borders. Prometheism had four dimensions: political, military, intelligence, and cultural/ educational. It supported governments in exile and émigré groups from states that had temporarily gained independence during the Russian Civil War only to lose it once the Bolsheviks reconquered much of the former Russian empire. The program created two secret armies of Ukrainians and Georgians in case the Soviet Union imploded or another world war broke out. To penetrate the veil of secrecy regarding the domestic situation in the Soviet Union, Poland used Promethean contacts to conduct intelligence operations, and the Soviets conducted their own intelligence activities to penetrate the program and assassinate key leaders. Prometheism included a massive covert influence campaign supported by journals, clubs, news outlets, and publishing houses to spread Promethean messages inside the Soviet Union and around the world. Prometheism failed to achieve Poland’s national security objectives, partly due to the massive Soviet police state apparatus and use of terror during Joseph Stalin’s era. However, its activities did help preserve the languages, literatures, and cultures of non-Russian nationalities during this period. When the Kremlin’s willingness to use repression and terror dissipated in the 1980s, what followed vindicated the Promethean vision as the Soviet empire broke apart into its basic ethno-national constituent parts and Poland and other satellites on its periphery regained their sovereignty.
Topic:: Intelligence, National Security, Sovereignty, History, and Soviet Union
Political Geography:: Europe and Poland

268. UK-EU Relations Tracker Q3

Author:: Cleo Davies and Jannike Wachowiak
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
Abstract:: Released quarterly, the UK in a Changing Europe UK-EU Relations Tracker assesses relations between the UK and EU as well as relationships between the UK and EU member states. This edition of the tracker covers developments from July to September 2023. On 1 October, the UK government introduced the green-lane/red-lane system to ease the flow of goods between Great Britain and Northern Ireland as part of the Windsor Framework. In the context of thawing relations post Windsor Framework, the UK and EU have reiterated their commitment to making the most of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA). The political agreement on the UK’s association to the Horizon and Copernicus programmes was an important milestone. In other areas, the tracker notes that discussions are ongoing. On the future of the relationship, the tracker highlights a growing mismatch between debates on the two sides. Within the UK, the Labour Party have set out plans for building on the TCA in pursuit of a closer trading relationship. The EU, on the other hand, shows little appetite for revisiting the terms of UK-EU trade. Bilaterally, the UK has now signed general statements or declarations with most EU member states. The focus is therefore shifting from formalising relations to maintaining and implementing them. This requires continued engagement, which the tracker indicates can be difficult to sustain at the highest political level.
Topic:: International Relations, International Cooperation, European Union, and Trade
Political Geography:: United Kingdom and Europe

269. NATO's New Ambitions for Space

Author:: Béatrice Hainaut
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: Ahead of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, a devastating cyber attack targets Ukrainian army communications, exposing Western dependence and vulnerability to space technologies, and calling NATO's defensive posture into question. The longevity of the organization, which celebrates its 75th anniversary in 2024, is partly due to its ability to adapt to the international context. The war in Ukraine has undoubtedly strengthened its legitimacy and attractiveness. The massive use of space applications in Ukraine raises the question of the role of the Atlantic Alliance in providing space data and services to its member states: it does not have its own space capabilities, but its deterrence posture includes space. By equipping itself with a solid documentary corpus, space-focused centers, and access to national capabilities, the Alliance seeks to implement its vision of space as a theater of operations. This theater of operations aims at the integration and interoperability of the space assets of the various member states. For now, these are primarily American capabilities. NATO's space ambition then poses to the states the question of mobilizing financial and human resources. Moreover, deeper cooperation between NATO and the EU could presumably allow for the pooling of efforts.
Topic:: NATO, Science and Technology, European Union, Cybersecurity, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, North America, and Space

270. European Solar PV Manufacturing: Terminal Decline or Hope for a Rebirth?

Author:: Thibaud Voïta
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: While solar photovoltaic (PV) installations are booming in Europe (and in other parts of the world), the local industry is closing down. Over the past two years, the European installed solar PV capacity has been multiplied by two. On the other hand, the remaining European manufacturers of solar PV panels are dying. Installed solar PV capacities are experiencing an unprecedented increase in Europe: in two years, they have been multiplied by two with 60 gigawatts (GW) added in 2023. However, local solar PV manufacturers are not benefiting from it as the Chinese competition is knocking them down. Structurally much more competitive, prices of Chinese solar panels have further decreased by 42% in 2023 – making it difficult even for some Chinese companies to survive and forcing many of the remaining European manufacturers out of the market. This situation fragilizes Europe’s strategic autonomy and decarbonization. Covid-19-like disruption or an aggression against Taiwan would leave the continent without any supply. American manufacturers are also flexing their muscles with the aggressive Inflation Reduction Act. Europe’s answer, the Net Zero Industry Act (NZIA), a tougher approach to China’s imports and national support measures, could create a new generation of solar PV manufacturers in Europe.
Topic:: Manufacturing, Renewable Energy, Solar Power, Decarbonization, Strategic Autonomy, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:: Europe

271. German Ports and China: How to Reconcile Openness, Resilience and Security?

Author:: Marie Krpata
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Case Study
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: Germany is dependent on its ports for the smooth running of its open economic model and has benefited from globalization in recent decades when the internationalization of its value chains strengthened its competitiveness. Yet, with today’s hardening geopolitics, the vulnerabilities of Europe’s leading economic power are becoming apparent. Germany’s ports are an indispensable interface between its production base and its export markets, as well as for its sources of supply. Crucial to its competitiveness, Germany’s ports are becoming increasingly indispensable for energy supplies given the country’s decoupling from Russian hydrocarbons, and they are essential for the deployment of military equipment to Europe’s eastern flank. This is why particular vigilance is required in ports such as Hamburg, where the Chinese shipping company COSCO has acquired a stake in the company operating the Tollerort terminal. This transaction would scarcely have worried anyone in the past. But now it is the subject of bitter discussions, with the Zeitenwende (“change of era”) announced by Olaf Scholz in reaction to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Increased caution seemed to gain a foothold in order not to repeat past mistakes –until the German Chancellor decided in favor of the acquisition. Given closer ties between China and Russia, China’s assertive stance on the international stage, and increased pressure on Germany from its American ally to clarify its position with regard to its main trading partner, Germany is seeing its room for maneuver shrink. Today, we need a more European approach that goes beyond short-term, profit-driven concerns. But to achieve this, we need to put in place a range of resources to be deployed in a resolutely cooperative approach.
Topic:: Security, International Trade and Finance, Sports, Trade, Industry, and Resilience
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and Germany

272. Xi Jinping’s Visit to France: Stumbling Blocks Pile Up on the Path of Bilateral Cooperation

Author:: Marc Julienne
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: On May 6 and 7, Chinese President Xi Jinping will pay a state visit to France, his first to Europe since 2019 and the Covid-19 pandemic. Emmanuel Macron and Xi Jinping will celebrate Franco-Chinese friendship and the sixtieth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between their two countries. It comes at a time when the bilateral relationship is officially perceived as positive on both sides, especially after the French President’s visit to China in April 2023. However, beneath the diplomatic varnish, obstacles are piling up, and the space for cooperation between the two countries is receding. Of the four major areas of cooperation on the visit’s agenda – Ukraine, economic relations, human and cultural exchanges, and global challenges – the first three are already facing significant limitations. Beyond the strictly bilateral relationship, the two heads of state have radically different visions of and for Europe. Finally, there is a number of issues that remain absent from the discussions, which are not likely to ease tensions: the Taiwan Strait, nuclear arms control and Chinese interference in Europe. They will need to be addressed sooner or later.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Emmanuel Macron, and Xi Jinping
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and France

273. South Korea’s Emergence as a Defense Industrial Powerhouse

Author:: Wooyeal Paik
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: In recent years, South Korea’s ascent in the global arms market has been remarkable. This surge, particularly amid a shifting geopolitical landscape and the ongoing Ukraine-Russia War, has captured the attention of security watchers worldwide. This paper delves into the intricacies of the South Korean defense industry’s rapid emergence, wherein arms sales skyrocketed to 17.3 billion USD in 2022, and provides an in-depth analysis of its portfolio, capacity, and the rationales guiding its development over the last five decades. It explores how South Korea has capitalized on critical opportunities, including overcoming steep barriers to entry to major contracts with Central and Eastern European countries, especially Poland. It sheds light on South Korea’s competitive technologies, mass production capacity, and cost-effectiveness, and addresses the crucial role played by the government’s diplomatic support and coordination with key allies and partners. Against that backdrop, it concludes with some implications for the global defense industry and security architecture.
Topic:: Security, Defense Industry, Armament, and Arms Sales
Political Geography:: Europe, Asia, South Korea, and Poland

274. Germany’s Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy: Balancing Sustainable Development and Energy Security

Author:: Jeanette Süß
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Case Study
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: With the war in Ukraine, Germany’s “traffic light” coalition government has had to adapt its climate policy to the upheavals caused by this war, which has turned its economic, energy, and military model upside down. Against a backdrop of high energy costs and increasing calls for reshoring in Europe, German industry is looking at how to maintain its competitiveness while decarbonizing its industry. To combat climate change and find new forms of energy cooperation that are more sustainable for the planet, the federal government has set up a Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy bringing together its collaborative actions with partner countries. Climate, energy, and development partnerships play a vital role in this context, and emerging countries are key partners for climate initiatives. They have a high demand for energy and exploit resources, though without always respecting environmental, social, and governance standards. Their renewable energy (RE) production potential is significant, and there are major opportunities for CO2 reduction thanks to modernization technologies that Germany is seeking to transfer to its partners. To this end, Germany is using a multitude of diplomatic tools and is leveraging a unique network of international agencies, chambers of commerce and climate finance players.
Topic:: Climate Change, European Union, Sustainable Development Goals, Renewable Energy, and Energy
Political Geography:: Europe and Germany

275. Russia’s Ideological Construction in the Context of the War in Ukraine

Author:: Marlène Laruelle
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the Russian government has been proactive in the ideological realm to ensure the sustainability of the war for Russian society. Counter to the claims of many Western observers, this paper argues that the Russian regime does have an ideology, which translates into a relatively coherent political project for Russia and a desire to build a new world order. This ideology is based on a set of beliefs that has evolved over the years while remaining true to its core principles. However, it draws on an eclectic doctrinal stock and multiple (sometimes contradictory) repertoires and sees content as situational and therefore malleable. With the war, proponents of the officialization of a state ideology—all from the hawkish part of the establishment—have been gaining weight: the Presidential Administration now mainly reproduces language and tropes that have long been present in the security and military realm and have become the official doxa. Yet while new indoctrination methods and textbooks are introduced to the school system, the Kremlin has not so far recreated a Soviet-style ideological monolith: even in the context of war, it appears hesitant to engage in excessive “true teaching”, preferring a functional, technocratic understanding of ideology. After briefly defining what ideology means for the Putin regime, this paper explores how the main set of beliefs, strategic narratives, and doctrines have stabilized and gained increased internal coherence, as well as how new textbooks and military-patriotic indoctrination mechanisms are developed, before delving into the social reception of this official ideology.
Topic:: Ideology, Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

276. When Life Gives You Lemons: How EU Citrus Standards Can Limit Trade

Author:: Trinity Johnson
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Public and International Affairs (JPIA)
Institution:: School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA), Princeton University
Abstract:: In the early 2000s, the European Union (EU) created multiple standards on agricultural imports. This paper focuses on the effect of stricter maximum residue limits (MRLs) for pesticides on citrus fruit exports to the EU after the limits went into effect in 2005. Using a regression model on overall citrus fruit exports and an interaction term for country-level income, the data shows that the EU’s stricter MRLs hurt exports from high-income, lower-middle-income, and low-income countries. Exports from low-income countries declined the most after 2005, while only upper-middle-income countries saw an increase in exports. For product-specific models, low-income countries saw a reduction in exports to the EU for all citrus fruits, while results varied by fruit for other income classifications. The results of these models demonstrate that the EU’s tightened pesticide regulation hurt low-income countries the most. While the regulation is meant to maintain a standard of food quality in the EU, its impact on low-income countries raises important questions about the unintended effects of import regulations. The EU could maintain its quality of food while alleviating the burden on low-income countries by relaxing its MRL standards or by providing more assistance to developing nations to meet its standards.
Topic:: Agriculture, European Union, Regulation, and Imports
Political Geography:: Europe

277. Migrant Death and Disappearability at Sea: Mediterranean Necropolitics as a European Strategy of Migration Deterrence

Author:: Bertille Motte
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Public and International Affairs (JPIA)
Institution:: School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA), Princeton University
Abstract:: The Mediterranean Sea has become the deadliest passage in the world over the past decade, as thousands of migrants lose their lives at sea each year. It has become a key actant of European border violence perpetrated against migrants, as European national and supranational migration institutions instrumentalize the Mediterranean’s natural properties through necropolitical strategies of deterrence. The sea must be understood as a wet ontology and a fluid hybrid border. It is shaped by dynamic and complex interactions between human actors and more-than-human elements through which European violence is passed onto non-European migrants’ bodies. It conceals migrants’ deaths and disappearances, as they become ‘inevitable accidents’ caused by natural and untamable elements. The Mediterranean Sea therefore invisibilizes European structural violence occurring at the border zone and acts as an archive and witness to this violence.
Topic:: Migration, Border Control, Refugees, Violence, Deterrence, Asylum, Necropolitics, and Refugee Policy
Political Geography:: Europe and Mediterranean

278. Understanding the Energy Drivers of Turkey’s Foreign Policy

Author:: Francesco Siccardi
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Turkey has an energy dependence problem. For the past two decades, Ankara’s energy needs have been on the rise, and they are projected to continue on an upward trajectory until at least 2035. Yet, the country is not endowed with the proven natural resources to support its energy needs, and so it imports almost all of the energy it consumes. This reliance on energy imports creates economic and security constraints for Ankara. On the economic front, strategic decisions to diversify Turkey’s energy market impact the direction and pace of the country’s economic development. On the security front, dependence on foreign energy exposes Turkey to external shocks and creates vulnerabilities that affect the country’s international posture. To Turkish policymakers, this is hardly breaking news. For many decades, successive governments have been considering ways to diversify the country’s energy portfolio with the objective of ensuring access to affordable, reliable energy supplies. Domestically, this goal has translated into continued investments in locally produced power, such as the development of natural gas fields under the Black Sea and the opening of nuclear and coal-fired power plants across the country. Externally, the aim of diversification has led Ankara to forge a wide range of international partnerships and preserve relations with both Western purchasers of Turkish exports and key energy providers, including Russia and countries in Turkey’s immediate neighborhood. What is more, Ankara pursues its energy diplomacy against the backdrop of a broader geopolitical strategy of bolstering Turkey’s status as a regional power based on its geographic position and connections. At the heart of this strategy is a grand plan to establish Turkey as a major natural gas hub that will put the country at the center of regional energy trade. This policy has ramifications for Ankara’s relations with its close and more distant neighbors. Turkey is surrounded by energy-rich countries, and one of its primary objectives when reaching out to them is to secure the conditions for a steady inflow of energy resources—typically, natural gas and oil. This objective can lead to the development of durable economic partnerships, such as with Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Iran; but it can also spark conflicts of different degrees of intensity, such as with Turkey’s Eastern Mediterranean neighbors and Iraq. Beyond its immediate neighborhood, Ankara’s gas diplomacy is consequential for relations with Russia—with which Turkey has been strengthening its energy relations beyond hydrocarbons—and with Europe. On the demand side of Ankara’s natural gas market equation, European countries are thirsty for non-Russian hydrocarbons in the short and medium term and for green energy in the longer term. Turkey has the potential to provide both, as long as it comes up with strong policies that support these energy transitions. To do so, the Turkish government will need to shift its approaches not only to energy but also to geopolitics. Ankara will have to present itself as a reliable energy partner for Europe and ramp up its investment in clean energy technologies. Delinking Turkey’s economic development from its dependence on hydrocarbons will benefit Ankara financially while bringing it closer to its European allies. Building a long-lasting energy partnership with Europe remains one of Turkey’s greatest challenges.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Climate Change, and Economy
Political Geography:: Russia, Iraq, Europe, Iran, Turkey, Caucasus, Middle East, Libya, North Africa, and Egypt

279. Charting the Radical Right’s Influence on EU Foreign Policy

Author:: Rosa Balfour and Stefan Lehne
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: The political landscape in the European Union (EU) is changing rapidly. For decades, the traditional mainstream parties of the center right and center left have been losing ground, while antiestablishment parties have been gaining support. According to research by the University of Amsterdam, 32 percent of voters opted for antiestablishment parties in 2021, up from 12 percent in the early 1990s.1 Radical-right parties make up about half of this share, and their support has risen faster than that of any other group. Many of the fourteen parties examined in this study have achieved vote shares of 20 percent or more. The radical right is now in government, or supports the government, in Finland, Hungary, Italy, Slovakia, and Sweden. In the Netherlands, it is likely that Geert Wilders’s Party for Freedom (PVV) will be part of a governing coalition. In other countries, these parties have become the leading opposition groups. In France, Marine Le Pen’s National Rally (RN) has been carefully preparing to win the 2027 presidential election. Setbacks for the radical right in Poland and Spain in the second half of 2023 have shown that the relentless rise of these parties is not a foregone conclusion. However, current polling for several national elections and the June 2024 European Parliament elections indicates a strong likelihood of their continuing electoral success.2 Chega (Enough), a recently established party that shot to 18 percent of the vote in Portugal’s March 2024 election, ended the country’s exceptionalism as one of the few European nations without a right-wing populist party.3 The June 2024 Belgian federal election may see the Flemish nationalist party Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest), which so far has been strong in Flanders but kept out of national politics, break through at the federal level. Polling for Austria’s September 2024 parliamentary election suggests a surge in support for the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ).4 In contrast with populism, which has a thin ideology focused mainly on fomenting the anger of the so-called pure people against corrupt elites and which has risen on both the left and the right of the political spectrum, the radical-right parties of the 2020s have a more distinct ideological profile.5 All have national specificities, such as rural origins in Northern Europe or ethnonationalism in Central Europe. Several parties are rooted in postwar fascism, such as the FPÖ, RN, Brothers of Italy (FdI), the Alliance for the Unity of Romanians (AUR), and the Sweden Democrats (SD). For some groups, strong connections with society and well-developed party structures compensated for their marginal impact in national politics. Before its landslide victory in Italy’s 2022 parliamentary election, support for FdI hovered at around 5 percent, as it did for the party’s predecessor throughout the period since World War II.6 Other parties, such as Hungary’s Fidesz, gained ground as classic populist or even mainstream parties and benefited from an aura of respectability even as they shifted toward ethnonationalist or nativist positions. Since the 1990s, liberal-democratic parties have started to adopt some of the ideas of the radical right while keeping the parties themselves out of government. In the 2000s, the radical right became normalized, in some countries becoming part of the political mainstream. During this process, as political scientists Cas Mudde and Jan-Werner Müller have argued, liberal-democratic parties have shifted toward the radical right in the hope—mostly in vain—of keeping their traditional electorates. Yet, in practice, this approach has led voters to prefer the real radical right to its imitators. In other words, the tactic of chasing the radical right has not paid off electorally. Voters have moved toward the radical right as a consequence, not as a cause, of liberal-democratic parties’ attempts to contain it.7 Today, the far right is dominated by the radical right, which, unlike the extreme right, accepts the essence of democracy but rejects its liberal elements: minority rights, the rule of law, and the separation of powers.8 The radical-right parties selected for this study all share deep antimigration sentiments, often determined by race or religion; a nationalism that makes these parties Euroskeptic and opposed to what they see as a Brussels-based dictatorship; and skepticism of climate change policies. Many of these parties also espouse deeply conservative family values that go against women’s and LGBTQ rights. Foreign policy is usually not the strong suit of these parties, apart from their keen interest in the external dimension of migration policy. These parties pay close attention to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine but are sharply divided on this issue, with positions ranging from deep mistrust of Russia to close alignment with the Kremlin’s arguments. A future Donald Trump administration could lead to new divisions in the EU, as some member states are likely to align with the United States under any circumstances. This would mean that many of the EU’s current foreign policy positions, such as support for Ukraine, would come to an end. As radical-right parties rise to prominence at the national and the EU level, they are developing views on a range of foreign policy issues, building increasingly influential international networks and think tanks, and learning from each other’s successful tactics in solidifying their control of the state and propagating their values.9 For some radical-right parties that have been established in government, such as Fidesz and, until October 2023, Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS) party, the upgrading of foreign policy on their political agendas can be inferred by the fact that all diplomatic postings in the EU are political appointments. Hungary’s foreign policy machinery is under the direct control of the prime minister.10 Diplomatic colleagues of the Hungarian representatives in Brussels know that the country’s negotiating positions are micromanaged in Budapest.11 Other countries, such as Italy and Finland, have chosen to rely on the credibility of career diplomats to navigate the Brussels machinery, preferring compromise over confrontation and isolation. For a long time, European politicians and EU institutions have assumed the radical right could be contained. Now, the challenge of the radical right needs to be addressed more seriously. Just as this phenomenon has eroded democracy and the rule of law in some EU member states, so foreign policy may become affected at a time when collective action is most needed to address international issues. As the radical right challenges the EU’s attempts to navigate a dangerous world, European politics can no longer afford complacency.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Migration, European Union, Democracy, and Far Right
Political Geography:: Europe, France, and Germany

280. Farmer Protests Across Europe

Author:: Nichita Gurcov, Nicola Audibert, and Cristian Vlas
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:: Farmer demands for more economic protection and less regulation have led to a surge in protests across Europe in the past thre emonths, and especially in the past three weeks. It is the largest wave since the Dutch farmers' protests against their government's plan to cut nitrogen pollution in July 2022.
Topic:: Climate Change, Economics, Protests, Political Movements, and Farmers
Political Geography:: Europe

281. What works for working couples? Work arrangements, maternal labour supply, and the division of home production

Author:: Ludovica Ciasullo and Martina Uccioli
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Nottingham Interdisciplinary Centre for Economic and Political Research (NICEP)
Abstract:: We document how a change to work arrangements reduces the child penalty in labor supply for women, and that the consequent more equal distribution of household income does not translate into a more equal division of home production between mothers and fathers. The Australian 2009 Fair Work Act explicitly entitled parents of young children to request a (reasonable) change in work arrangements. Leveraging variation in the timing of the law, timing of childbirth, and the bite of the law across different occupations and industries, we establish three main results. First, the Fair Work Act was used by new mothers to reduce their weekly working hours without renouncing their permanent contract, hence maintaining a regular schedule. Second, with this work arrangement, working mothers’ child penalty declined from a 47 percent drop in hours worked to a 38 percent drop. Third, while this implies a significant shift towards equality in the female- and male-shares of household income, we do not observe any changes in the female (disproportionate) share of home production.
Topic:: Economics, Labor Issues, Women, Work, and Home Production
Political Geography:: United Kingdom and Europe

282. Dying Abroad: The Political Afterlives of Migration in Europe

Author:: Osman Balkan
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:: On any given day, the remains of countless deceased migrants are shipped around the world to be buried in ancestral soils. Others are laid to rest in countries of settlement, sometimes in cemeteries established for religious and ethnic minorities, where available. For immigrants and their descendants, perennial questions about the meaning of home and homeland take on a particular gravitas in death. When the boundaries of a nation and its members are contested, burial decisions are political acts. Building on multi-sited fieldwork in Berlin and Istanbul – where the author worked as an undertaker – Dying Abroad offers a moving and powerful account of migrants' end-of-life dilemmas, vividly illustrating how they are connected to ongoing political struggles over the stakes of citizenship, belonging, and collective identity in contemporary Europe.
Topic:: Migration, Refugees, Identity, and Death
Political Geography:: Europe

283. EU-LAC inter-regionalism as a driver to achieve the environmental Sustainable Development Goals

Author:: Bruno Theodoro Luciano and Miguel Ayuso
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
Institution:: Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
Abstract:: This article assesses how environmental issues have been incorporated into the strategic association between the European Union and Latin America and the Caribbean. It analyses whether the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals are reflected in the EU-CELAC declarations, and what bi-regional programmes and projects have been developed in relation to the environmental SDGs. The analysis shows how the environment has become a key priority in both the political dialogue and development cooperation pillars, although it has only recently been included in the trade pillar, and in an incipient way.
Topic:: Environment, European Union, Sustainable Development Goals, Regional Integration, and Trade
Political Geography:: Europe

284. The Realist debate in the context of the War in Ukraine: balancing dynamics, international change and strategic calculus

Author:: Layla Ibrahim Abdallah Dawood and Eugenio Pacelli Lazzarotti Diniz Costa
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
Institution:: Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
Abstract:: The article discusses Mearsheimer’s interpretation of Russia’s use of force against Ukraine based on concepts and categories of Offensive Realism. It is argued that external balancing lost its place during unipolarity. However, Russian internal balancing is one of the factors that enabled the current conflict, and Russia’s rapprochement with China diminishes the prospects for conflict in Asia, allowing Russian military efforts to be concentrated in the European theater. Additionally, the decision to use force will be analyzed in its strategic dimension. It is concluded that Russia’s activities against Ukraine are entirely consistent with Offensive Realism, despite of Mearsheimer’s allegations contrarywise.
Topic:: International Relations, Realism, Russia-Ukraine War, and Balance of Power
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

285. The EU’s Response to the Gaza War Is a Tale of Contradiction and Division

Author:: Martin Konečný
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:: School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:: Since the Hamas attacks on October 7 and the start of Israel’s retaliatory offensive in the Gaza Strip, European Union (EU) member states have broadly split into three camps. At one end are those who have professed to stand “on the side of Israel”, flying its flag on government buildings, backing its military campaign, and avoiding criticism even after the Israeli army flattened most of Gaza and killed thousands of Palestinian civilians. The Czech Republic, Austria, and Hungary stand out in this camp, followed by Germany. At the other end of the spectrum are governments that proclaim to stand “on the side of peace” and, while strongly condemning Hamas, have been calling for a ceasefire and openly criticizing Israel for violating international humanitarian law. Belgium, Spain, and Ireland are the most vocal members of this moderate camp, followed by France and several others. The third, middle camp, is made up of those who are somewhere in between the first two groups: siding with Israel but in less absolute terms than the first camp. It would be wrong to label the moderate camp as “pro-Palestinian”. The fact is that there is no pro-Palestinian camp at the level of EU governments: none of them has hoisted Palestinian flags or primarily condemned the Israeli occupation or its devastating Gaza offensive, as many countries in the so-called Global South have done. The only vocal exception may be Spain’s Deputy Prime Minister Yolanda Díaz of the leftwing Sumar party who has denounced “Israeli apartheid” and called for sanctions and an arms embargo against Israel. However, her statements do not represent the position of the government as a whole.
Topic:: European Union, Hamas, Israeli–Palestinian Conflict, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:: Europe, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

286. The inflation surge in Europe

Author:: Patrick Honohan
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:: For most of the decade before the COVID-19 pandemic, undershooting rather than overshooting had been the main inflation problem of the European Central Bank (ECB). During 2020, consumer prices in the euro area were falling; by the end of that year, average inflation since the introduction of the euro two decades earlier stood at only 1.6 percent per year. Things began to snowball in 2021. The 12-month inflation rate steadily accelerated. It reached double digits in the final quarter of 2022—more than twice the level it had ever reached since the euro’s introduction in 1999. Four striking features emerge from a review of the unexpected surge in European inflation since 2021: (1) The ECB’s monetary policy response lagged behind that of the US Federal Reserve, reflecting the more gradual evolution of inflation in the euro area and its distinct pattern of causes; (2) the range of inflation rates across different euro area countries has been unprecedented. This largely reflects the differential impact of war-related energy shocks (especially for natural gas piped from Russia) as well as the differential fiscal response by national governments partially insulating consumers from these shocks; (3) not all households were net losers from the inflation, with some benefiting from the fact that inflation reduced the real value of their indebtedness; and (4) the speed with which inflation was returning toward target during 2023 prompted concerns that the ECB’s monetary tightening might have been pushed too far, prolonging the output slowdown.
Topic:: Monetary Policy, European Union, Inflation, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Europe

287. Trade policy, industrial policy, and the economic security of the European Union

Author:: Chad P. Bown
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:: Out of fear about its economic security, the European Union is transitioning to a new form of international economic and policy engagement. This paper explores some of the major trade issues surrounding the bloc’s economic security, the role of trade and industrial policies in achieving its objectives, and some of the economic costs of doing so. It begins by explaining why economic security is suddenly playing such a prominent role and providing early evidence to motivate these government interventions. It then turns to a case study—new policies associated with China’s exports of electric vehicles and graphite—that highlights the difficult choices and practical challenges the European Union faces in tailoring policy to address concerns over economic security. The paper then introduces the domestic policy instruments that the European Union, its member states, and other governments are pursuing to address economic security, including stockpiling and inventory management, investment or production subsidies, tariffs, export controls, and regulations on foreign investment, as well as the scope for selective international cooperation over such policy instruments. The paper concludes with some caveats about abandoning interdependence and lessons from history.
Topic:: Security, Industrial Policy, European Union, Trade Policy, and Economic Security
Political Geography:: Europe

288. Tackling the UK's regional economic inequality: Binding constraints and avenues for policy intervention

Author:: Anna Stansbury, Dan Turner, and Ed Balls
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:: This paper analyzes binding constraints to productivity growth in the United Kingdom’s regions outside London and the greater South East. These analyses challenge a number of common arguments about the UK’s regional economic inequality problem. The authors find little evidence consistent with the hypotheses (i) that low shares of university graduates remain the primary constraint on growth for the UK’s regions; (ii) that there is a generalized issue with access to finance for firms outside the South East; or (iii) that low or falling regional migration rates are to blame for the persistence of the UK’s regional economic inequalities. Instead, they find evidence consistent with (i) a specific relative shortage of STEM degrees; (ii) binding transport infrastructure constraints within major non-London conurbations; (iii) a failure of public innovation policy to support clusters beyond the South East, in particular through the regional distribution of public support for research and development (R&D); and (iv) missed opportunities for higher internal mobility due to London’s overheating housing market. The authors also find some suggestive evidence consistent with constraints on access to early-stage equity financing for high growth-potential small and medium-sized enterprises in certain regions.
Topic:: Finance, Economic Growth, Economic Inequality, and Productivity
Political Geography:: United Kingdom and Europe

289. False promises: The authoritarian development models of China and Russia

Author:: Joseph Lemoine, Dan Negrea, Patrick Quirk, and Lauren Van Metre
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Are authoritarian regimes more successful than free countries in offering prosperity to their people? The answer is decidedly no, yet China and Russia actively advertise the “benefits” and “promise” of their authoritarian development model. Beijing and Moscow contend that their governance model—rooted in central control of political, social, and economic life—delivers for their people. The facts prove exactly the opposite and show that countries characterized by repression and concentrated control are far less successful across all metrics of human development than are free societies. That free societies are better for the people residing in them is not an ideological position; it is a statement of fact backed by substantial evidence, including, but not limited to, the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Indexes. This paper aims to showcase why and how the authoritarian development model is inferior to that of free societies. The first section documents democratic backsliding and the reversal of freedom’s fortunes. The second section presents data on how authoritarian regimes have failed to deliver prosperity for their people. The third section outlines how free societies have done the opposite—delivered sustained prosperity for their citizens. The final section offers the conclusion that authoritarian regimes, despite their claims, cannot deliver democratic progress or prosperity for society at large.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, Diplomacy, Politics, Authoritarianism, Reform, and Democratic Transitions
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

290. Who’s a national security risk? The changing transatlantic geopolitics of data transfers

Author:: Kenneth Propp
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The geopolitics of transatlantic data transfers have been unvarying for the past decade. European governments criticize the US National Security Agency (NSA) for exploiting personal data moving from Europe to the United States for commercial reasons. The US government responds, through a series of arrangements with the European Union, by providing assurances that NSA collection is not disproportionate, and that Europeans have legal avenues if they believe their data has been illegally used. Although the arrangements have not proven legally stable, on the whole they have sufficed to keep data flowing via subsea cables under the Atlantic Ocean. Now the locus of national security concerns about international data transfers has shifted from Brussels to Washington. The Biden administration and the US Congress, in a series of bold measures, are moving aggressively to interrupt certain cross-border data flows, notably to China and Russia. The geopolitics of international data flows remain largely unchanged in Europe, however. European data protection authorities have been mostly noncommittal about the prospect of Russian state surveillance collecting Europeans’ personal data. Decisions on whether to transfer European data to Russia and China remain in the hands of individual companies. Will Washington’s new focus on data transfers to authoritarian states have an impact in Europe? Will Europe continue to pay more attention to the surveillance activities of its liberal democratic allies, especially the United States? Is there a prospect of Europe and the United States aligning on the national security risks of transfers to authoritarian countries?
Topic:: National Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Geopolitics, Economy, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

291. The Gini Trade Index: What Can We Learn from A New Trade Indicator?

Author:: Lucian Cernat
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: This Policy Brief introduces the Gini Trade Index (GTI) as a new trade synthetic key performance indicator capable of capturing the different distribution of trade values across firm characteristics and across countries. The new indicator replicates the well-known features of the traditional Gini Index, a widely used metric for the skewness of several socioeconomic indicators, in particular income inequality. The Policy Brief calculates the Gini Trade Index for all EU member states and contrasts the case of Slovakia and Cyprus, the EU countries situated at the opposite ends of the Gini Trade Index. The paper finds that the GTI has increased over time in most EU countries and offers a tentative range of optimal GTI values. The final section offers several examples of trade policy initiatives that can reduce trade concentration and lead to greater participation of small and medium enterprises in global trade.
Topic:: European Union, Trade, and Socioeconomics
Political Geography:: Europe, Cyprus, and Slovakia

292. Regulating the Working Conditions of Platform Work: What Can We Learn from EU Member States?

Author:: Oscar Guinea, Elena Sisto, and Oscar du Roy
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: Policymakers in Estonia, France, Greece, and Spain share the common objective of enhancing the working conditions of platform workers. However, variations in their labour markets, legal frameworks, and political landscapes have led to four distinct approaches in achieving this goal. Predominantly, the Spanish regulation has been geared towards attempting to reclassify platform workers from self-employed to employees. In contrast, the regulatory strategies in France and Greece have focused on retaining the sector within the realm of independent work, while simultaneously improving the working conditions of platform workers. Estonia adopted a broader perspective, emphasising the enhancement of working conditions for all freelancers, not exclusively those categorised as platform workers. This Policy Brief offers a comprehensive evaluation and comparison of the regulatory frameworks governing platform work in four European countries. The comparative analysis draws upon research conducted by the OECD and the World Economic Forum (WEF) on the principles of good regulation. Adapting this research to the context of digital platforms, three key principles for assessing the regulation of working conditions on these platforms were identified: (i) the consistency with the policy objective of improving the working conditions of platform workers; (ii) the feasibility of implementing the regulatory requirements; (iii) the presence of regulatory dialogue and appeal mechanisms. The evaluation of the four countries’ regulations against the three outlined principles offers valuable insights into the regulation of platform work. In Spain, the primary aim of the regulation regarding platform workers was not solely the improvement of working conditions but predominantly the reclassification of platform workers from self-employed to employees. This distinction is crucial, as platform workers highly value the benefits of self-employment, such as access to work, income opportunities, flexibility, and autonomy. Evidence presented in this study suggests that a majority of Spanish delivery workers preferred to maintain their self-employed status, while only about one-third expressed a desire to be classified as employees. Moreover, the Spanish regulation is characterised by a broad formulation of the conditions defining employment for digital delivery workers. This lack of specificity has led to an uncertain application of the regulation, with digital platforms adopting diverse strategies to achieve compliance. Ultimately, the Spanish regulatory framework has been marred by a profound disregard for the interests of, and a notable lack of communication with, those directly impacted by the regulation: the digital platforms and the platform workers. Greece has demonstrated that it is possible to enhance working conditions for platform workers while preserving the advantages of self-employment. The Greek regulation mandates that digital platforms adhere to the same welfare, health, and safety obligations for platform workers as they would for employees. Additionally, Greece has established clear criteria to define the presumption of self-employment for platform workers. This clarity offers legal certainty and enabled platform workers to accurately assess their employment status. Consequently, there has been a notable reduction in court cases regarding the classification of platform workers. France has progressively developed a comprehensive legal framework that has systematically enhanced the rights of platform workers. This development culminated in six pivotal agreements, addressing some of the most challenging aspects of working conditions on digital platforms, such as account deactivation and minimum revenue. These agreements were reached under the auspices of the Autorité des Relations Sociales des Plateformes d’Emploi (ARPE), a public entity instrumental in facilitating effective social dialogue between digital platforms and trade unions. The establishment of clear administrative procedures governing the negotiations within ARPE has been crucial in formulating measures that digital platforms can effectively implement. Estonia’s primary focus is on ensuring adequate working conditions for all freelancers, including platform workers. A considerable number of platform workers in Estonia engage in a contract-for-services (töövõtuleping) with digital platforms. This contract offers a social safety net, including unemployment benefits, sick pay, and healthcare services, while retaining the self-employed status of platform workers. Moreover, this framework provides clarity regarding the rights and responsibilities of both platform workers and digital platforms, facilitating the implementation of a clear and unambiguous regulatory system.
Topic:: Labor Issues, European Union, Regulation, Digital Economy, and Labor Market
Political Geography:: Europe

293. EU Autonomy, the Brussels Effect, and the Rise of Global Economic Protectionism

Author:: Matthias Bauer and Dyuti Pandya
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: The Brussels Effect, once emblematic of the EU’s alleged influence in shaping global regulations, has now become a factor contributing to global regulatory fragmentation. The EU must recalibrate its trajectory towards a liberal and rules-based trading order, prioritising widespread regulatory liberalisation to counteract the risks of global protectionism and regulatory spirals. A holistic approach, both internally and globally, is crucial to prevent regulatory and subsidy spirals on a global scale. This recalibration is essential to keep global markets open and enhance the EU’s own economic and technological competitiveness. In response to the 2008 financial crises, the EU underwent a shift in its approach to global trade, transitioning towards Strategic Autonomy. However, this gradual move away from a liberal global trade order has led to increased regulatory burdens and regulatory fragmentation, impacting businesses within and beyond the EU. The Brussels Effect, as denoted in this paper, highlights the EU’s signalling effect on other governments in considering and implementing regulations. This effect has contributed to increased trade restrictiveness and regulatory fragmentation globally. The EU’s insistence on “autonomy” and “European values” not only empowers others to follow suit, contributing to the rise in global protectionism, but also contradicts the EU’s historical support for open trade principles and its commitment to a highly competitive social market economy. A wealth of EU regulatory data reveals a stagnation and, in many cases, a regression in regulatory cooperation within the Single Market. This is evident from rising trade restrictiveness and a tendency towards increased legal fragmentation instead of convergence across the EU. The evolving regulatory acquis of the EU, coupled with insufficient cooperation and stalled trade agreements, poses risks beyond its borders. The EU’s paradigm shift towards autonomy contributes to global regulatory spirals and protectionist measures, particularly evident in services trade. Despite the EU’s historical commitment to harmonisation and liberalisation, many sectors, such as transport and logistics, telecoms, and digital services, have witnessed the imposition of new laws and rules that hinder trade. With the EU’s share of global GDP expected to decrease to 9% by 2050, there is a critical need for EU governments to enhance its regulatory capabilities and foster innovation. To wield influence in global economic diplomacy, EU policymakers must prioritise policies that unleash the collective ingenuity of individuals and businesses that help to maintain high levels of productivity, competitiveness, and prosperity.
Topic:: Globalization, European Union, Economy, Autonomy, Protectionism, and WTO
Political Geography:: Europe

294. German Industrial Competitiveness and the Metaverse

Author:: Hosuk Lee-Makiyama and Robert Baker
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: The metaverse is the next iteration of the internet as an immersive, 3D, virtual, shared world where activities can be carried out with the help of extended reality services. But it is much more than headsets and virtual games. The metaverse is increasingly conceptualised in tandem with other advanced technologies, including AI, IoT, automation, and blockchain. Combined, these Industrie 4.0 innovations will be at the centre of German productivity growth over the next decade. The IMF and the OECD both expect Germany to be the worst-performing leading economy in the world in 2023. Beyond recent shocks, German competitiveness is being “steadily eroded” by structural factors like “rising labour costs and a lack of digitisation” (Arnold, 2023). In this context of sclerotic growth, immersive technologies show much promise. The economic dimension of the new Digital Strategy should be guided by three simple “I’s” – immersive, industrial productivity, and internationalisation of German technologies. Specifically, the metaverse is driving productivity gains in manufacturing, engineering, financial services and retail – it could add €71 billion to German GDP by 2035. As well as enhancing the productivity of existing operations, immersive technologies and smart factories can enable the reshoring of profitable activities back to the German economy, particularly in technology and engineering. But these economic gains are not inevitable. Neglecting immersive technologies would have a significant effect on Germany’s remaining competitive advantages. For example, late adoption of the metaverse and digital twins by the German auto industry would lead to a 10% loss in exports, equating to more than €12 billion each year. The costs of late adoption are only underscored by the current salience of global competition. US firms have a strong track record of successfully integrating internet products into industry, while China and its own technology giants are developing strategic initiatives to capitalise on the metaverse. While much of the metaverse remains under development, companies are already showcasing a range of commercial partnerships and innovative use cases. German companies like Siemens are at the forefront of digital twins which allow automakers and other manufactures to replicate their physical facilities in virtual worlds, drawing on real-time data and simulations to optimise their operations. In insurance, the same digital twins are facilitating underwriting and expedited claims via remote monitoring. Meanwhile, in medical devices and healthcare, a metaverse of medical technology and AI (MeTAI) is facilitating the refinement of AI-based medical practices. This is the future of medical imaging technology, diagnosis, and therapy.
Topic:: European Union, Digital Economy, Industry, and Competition
Political Geography:: Europe and Germany

295. Calling on the EU-US Trade and Technology Council: How to Deliver for the Planet and the Economy

Author:: Oscar Guinea, Vanika Sharma, Philipp Lamprecht, Dyuti Pandya, and Oscar du Roy
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: This Policy Brief proposes the establishment of an agreement on conformity assessment between the EU and the US that covers machinery and electrical equipment. The initiative aims to increase the number of European and US conformity assessment bodies authorized to test and certify EU and US machinery and electrical equipment for exports into each other’s markets, without recognizing the equivalency or otherwise altering the product requirements in regulation, standards, or other normative documents on either side. While this study focuses on the economic effects of an agreement on conformity assessment that includes machinery and electrical equipment, the scope of such an agreement could potentially be extended to several additional product categories, particularly those that are subject to requirements for mandatory third-party conformity assessment in both the EU and the US. The increase in the number of conformity assessment bodies is expected to reduce the costs and the time required to demonstrate conformity. If this policy succeeds as expected in achieving a reduction in trade costs between 2 and 6 percent, US exports to the EU are projected to increase between US$ 11 billion and US$ 32.5 billion while EU exports to the US are estimated to grow by between US$ 13.8 billion and US$ 42.2 billion. In percentage terms, US firms are anticipated to experience a larger increase in exports of machinery and electrical equipment than their EU counterparts. The increase in trade flows as a result of this agreement is estimated to be larger than the rise in trade flows achieved in other Free Trade Agreements signed by the EU or the US. Moreover, as an increasing number of EU regulations begin to mandate third-party conformity assessment, US firms will increasingly benefit from this agreement when exporting to the EU. Given China’s status as the largest supplier of machinery and electrical equipment to both the EU and the US, the implementation of an EU-US agreement on conformity assessment would not only improve conditions for transatlantic trade but also lead to reduced trade dependence for the EU and the US on China. The reduction in trade costs between the EU and the US on machinery and electrical equipment due to the agreement could lower Chinese exports to the EU and the US by between US$ 6.5 billion and US$ 19.4 billion. Importantly, machinery and electrical equipment are crucial inputs for some of the key technologies in which the EU and the US Administrations have identified trade dependencies on China. However, in contrast with other policies aimed at reducing reliance on Chinese imports, an agreement on conformity assessment for machinery and electrical equipment will not require public subsidies or impose any financial burden on taxpayers. This agreement also has the potential to benefit the environment. Machinery and electrical equipment are essential inputs for green technologies. Therefore, a reduction in the cost and time of conformity assessment in these industries will accelerate the adoption of green technologies. An agreement on conformity assessment between the EU and the US covering green goods and clean technologies could increase transatlantic exports between US$ 3.1 billion and US$ 9.2 billion. While this increase in exports is significant, broadening the scope of the agreement to include the entirety of machinery and electrical equipment, rather than just a subset, is projected to lead to trade effects eight times larger. Moreover, as green technologies rapidly evolve, an agreement on conformity assessment has the potential to serve as a dynamic instrument that evolves to accommodate future regulatory and economic developments on climate and the environment on both sides of the Atlantic.
Topic:: Science and Technology, European Union, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

296. Openness as Strength: The Win-Win in EU-US Digital Services Trade

Author:: Matthias Bauer, Dyuti Pandya, and Oscar du Roy
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: The discourse surrounding the EU’s supposed over-reliance on digital services imports from non-EU countries, particularly the US, has been a recurrent topic among some political circles. However, this viewpoint tends to oversimplify and misrepresent the nuanced and complex reality of the EU’s status within the global Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector and digitally enabled trade. A thorough analysis of trade data and trends clearly illustrates that the EU’s engagement with foreign (non-EU) digital services, notably from the US, represents a strategic economic advantage, bolstering Europe’s competitiveness and fostering productivity growth. Below we underline the critical importance of openness to foreign innovation and technology diffusion for the EU’s economic future.
Topic:: European Union, Digital Economy, Strategic Competition, Imports, and Productivity
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

297. ICT Beyond Borders: The Integral Role of US Tech in Europe’s Digital Economy

Author:: Matthias Bauer and Dyuti Pandya
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: Contrary to political assertions about the vulnerability of digital services provided by non-EU companies, the strong presence and sunk costs associated with US tech companies’ investments in data centres, skilled workforce development, and research facilities in Europe act as significant barriers to exit, highlighting the inherent symbiosis between US tech investments and Europe’s digital and non-digital sectors. These investments underscore a mutual inter-dependency that strengthens European economies, making the notion of “sudden cessation” of digital services by US companies implausible. Corporate data show a significant investment gap of approximately USD 1.36 trillion between US and EU ICT companies, attributing a competitive edge to US firms due to their heavy investment in ICT, cloud solutions, and R&D. Forecasted increases in ICT investments by US corporations outline a benchmark beyond reach for EU businesses. The notion of EU firms aligning with this growth path is rather fantastical, as it would call for immense government investment, ultimately draining financial resources from essential public services, such as healthcare, housing, and environmental policies. Substantial ICT investments across EU Member States together with a long-term commitment to the European market present an opportunity for the EU to leverage US continuous technological advancements, underscoring the potential for transatlantic collaboration to drive the EU’s digital transformation and innovation. EU-US partnerships not only fuel the EU’s digital transformation but also align with shared political values, reinforcing the significance of transatlantic collaboration in shaping a competitive and innovative digital future.
Topic:: Communications, European Union, Digital Economy, Investment, and Information Technology
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

298. Time to Rethink Export Controls for Strengthened US-EU Cooperation and Global Trade Rules

Author:: Matthias Bauer and Dyuti Pandya
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: The escalation of broad export controls by the US, under the guise of national security and the aim to curb technological transfers to potential adversaries,[1] marks a new epoch of bureaucratic oversight. The US push for broad export controls also underscores a critical juncture in US-EU relations and global trade rules. Broad export restrictions not only challenge the very foundation of free trade but also contribute to the erosion of Western technology leadership.[2] Unilateral export controls may start strong but eventually lose effectiveness and become counterproductive,[3] pushing non-US companies, particularly in the semiconductor sector, to find alternatives to US components.
Topic:: International Cooperation, European Union, Regulation, Exports, Trade, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:: Europe and United States of America

299. Trading Up: An EU Trade Policy for Better Market Access and Resilient Sourcing

Author:: Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, Philipp Lamprecht, Oscar du Roy, Elena Sisto, and Renata Zilli
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: Europe’s competitiveness could be substantially improved by a trade policy that facilitates more trade and other forms of cross-border exchange. The evidence is clear: the EU trades less with the rest of the world than would be expected given the size of its economy. With 85 percent of global growth happening outside of the EU – and with an increasing share of all new technologies, innovations, patents, human capital, and R&D expenditure emerging in other parts of the world than Europe – the EU needs to find better ways to integrate with international markets. It is now becoming urgent for the EU to revive its international trade policy. Europe’s increasing detachment from global markets lead to two major economic concerns: deteriorating market access and less capability to build economic resilience. Market access can be defined as an export challenge, as EU firms face increasing trade barriers that hinder their ability to sell products and services abroad. These barriers ultimately limit the EU’s ability to scale up production, specialise, and increase R&D spending. Economic resilience is an import challenge. To become more resilient, the EU must diversify its sources of supply, particularly for critical raw materials, and secure a stable and frictionless access to foreign high-end goods, services, and technologies. The next five years present a critical opportunity for the EU to address the challenges limiting the contribution of international trade to EU’s competitiveness. This Policy Brief outlines seven trade policy recommendations that tackle the lack of market access and address the need for economic resilience. These policy recommendations are there for the EU to take: they are realistic and achievable. The EU has the power to make these seven policy recommendations a reality.
Topic:: Markets, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, Trade, and Resilience
Political Geography:: Europe

300. Keeping Up with the US: Why Europe’s Productivity Is Falling Behind

Author:: Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, and Oscar du Roy
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: The European Union stands at a crossroads. For decades, the EU’s productivity growth has consistently lagged the United States, leading to slower growth in living standards and decline in global economic power. While short-term factors like the strong US fiscal expansion have widened the gap in nominal GDP growth in recent years, the fact is that Europe has trailed the US economic development for several decades and the root of the problem lies in deeper structural issues within the European economy. Four major forces fuel this productivity divide. Firstly, the EU’s investment in research and development (R&D) pales in comparison to the U.S., leading to fewer patents and a slower pace of technology-fuelled innovation. Secondly, Europe trails America in the stock and growth of intangible capital investments, which are crucial for adopting and diffusing new technologies that drive productivity. Thirdly, the EU market exhibits slower business creation and destruction compared to the US. This rigidity hinders the flow of resources towards the most productive firms. Lastly, despite boasting higher levels of trade openness, the EU attracts less Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) than the US, curbing its access to cutting-edge global technologies and expertise. To close the gap, European policymakers should implement a comprehensive strategy for faster productivity growth. The first step is turning up the dial on R&D spending, targeting 4-5 percent of GDP by 2040. Next, Europe should prioritise investments in intangible assets and lay down the digital infrastructure that will underpin future growth. Revitalising the single market is also crucial: reducing internal and external market barriers for services, the primary vehicle for trading intangible assets. Moreover, the EU should foster a market environment that encourages entrepreneurship and facilitate the entry and exit of firms so resources cascade towards the most productive sectors. By harnessing the strengths of the single market and implementing these recommendations, European policymakers can propel the EU towards a more competitive and prosperous future.
Topic:: Markets, European Union, Productivity, and Economic Competition
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS