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31. The Eurozone crisis: A debt shortage as the final cause

Author:
Andrea Terzi
Publication Date:
04-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
This paper proposes a different interpretation of the Eurozone crisis, seeing as its “final” cause European policies which have forced private savings down too low. Neither fiscal profligacy nor capital flows are the “final” cause of the Eurozone political and institutional failure that thwarts the growth of output and jobs. The sovereign debt crisis and the capital flight of 2010-12 were triggered by the vulnerable position of creditconstrained local governments in a monetary union and of a fragmented banking system with no credible deposit insurance. If member countries were to comply from now on with present fiscal and macroeconomic rules, real growth and job creation would not be restored. The final cause of economic drag in the Eurozone must be searched for within those same rules. The paper first offers a critical review of the notion of savings in orthodox theory as the source of funds available for investment. It finds that in a monetary economy, financial saving can be stored only in the form of a financial claim and requires an act that reflects on others. This means that an act of financial saving requires funding and must be associated with a corresponding act of another unit issuing debt. Savings do not fund. They need to be funded. The paper then elaborates on a simple (“T-shirt”) model of private job creation in a monetary economy, where this is a function of the actual and the intended stock of gross private savings. When savings are in excess of the intended amount, private spenders create jobs, and when savings are short of the intended amount, private spenders destroy jobs. Assuming intended savings as a given, and because the ultimate source of savings is debt, then any policy that inhibits the formation of debt also inhibits the formation of financial savings and jobs. If debt (private, public, or foreign) is the final fuel for spending, then Eurozone rules that put a cap on public debt inhibit one major source of savings. Differences in economic units’ financial balances are the ordinary condition of a monetary economy, and policy should be aimed at supporting those differences that best work towards policy goals, not forcing a reduction of such differences by treating them as “imbalances”. Current fiscal rules leave the Eurozone with two fragile and risky alternatives: building up more private debt or counting on a permanently high flow of net exports.
Topic:
Debt, European Union, Finance, and Capital Flows
Political Geography:
Europe

32. Laid Low: The IMF, The Eurozone and the First Rescue of Greece

Author:
Paul Blustein
Publication Date:
04-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
As Greece descended into a financial maelstrom in the spring of 2010, a small group of staffers at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) held top-secret talks with officials from the German and French finance ministries to discuss the idea of restructuring Greece’s debt. Many independent analysts believed a restructuring was inevitable because the country’s debt burden appeared unsustainable. But instead, the “Troika” — the tripartite group of lenders that included the IMF, the European Commission and European Central Bank — attempted to resolve the crisis by giving Athens bailout loans of unprecedented magnitude, piling debt atop debt. The idea considered in those secret talks would come to fruition only much later, in March 2012, when Greece received the largest debt relief in history. In the meantime, the rescue effort would go terribly awry, with consequences that continue to reverberate today as the euro area struggles with weak growth and a rekindled crisis in Greece. This paper tells the story of the first Greek rescue, focusing on the role played by the IMF. A detailed look back at this drama elucidates significant concerns about the Fund’s governance and its management of future crises. The Fund has come under attack for yielding to the clout of European policy makers and lending its credibility to a rescue that some of its senior staffers viewed with grave misgivings. The result, critics lament, tarnished the Fund’s reputation for technocratic judgment, rendering it less effective at promoting international stability. The 2010 rescue enabled Greece to avoid default at that point, which might well have sparked a global conflagration akin to the 2008 bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. European banks holding Greek bonds continued receiving payments of interest and principal for quite a long time thereafter, from the money lent by the Troika. But the interests of the Greek people were arguably sacrificed, and among economists there is widespread agreement that the country’s debt should have been restructured much sooner. In addition to shedding new light on what happened, this chronicle of events highlights the importance of the IMF’s acceptance, as a condition of its participation in the rescue, of a “junior partner” role in the Troika. This step is judged in the concluding section as being particularly ill-boding for the IMF’s ability to manage future crises, and policy recommendations are offered for alleviating the harm.
Topic:
Debt, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Fiscal Policy, Eurozone, and IMF
Political Geography:
Europe and Greece

33. Sovereign Debt Crisis Management: Lessons from the 2012 Greek Debt Restructuring

Author:
Miranda Xafa
Publication Date:
06-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:
The 2012 Greek debt exchange was a watershed event in the euro area debt crisis. It generated fears of contagion and was viewed as a threat to the euro itself. Although it achieved historically unprecedented debt relief, amounting to €106 billion (55 percent of GDP), it was “too little, too late” in terms of restoring Greece's debt sustainability. There is a heated debate as to whether the debt restructuring should have taken place sooner, when Greece's adjustment program was agreed to in May 2010. This paper argues that a deep haircut up front, under threat of legislative action, would have been seen as unnecessary and deeply coercive. But delaying the restructuring beyond mid-2011, when it became clear that Greece's debt was unsustainable, was unjustified. The delay reduced the stock of privately held debt subject to a haircut, possibly making an official debt restructuring inevitable down the road. Initial fears that the Greek debt restructuring would pose a serious threat to the euro area's financial stability proved to be exaggerated. On the contrary, it demonstrated that an orderly default involving a pre-emptive debt restructuring is possible in a monetary union, provided appropriate firewalls are in place to limit contagion risks. With crisis management institutions and procedures now in place in the euro area, and with much stricter fiscal surveillance, the Greek experience is likely to remain unique in the history of debt restructurings; however, some lessons can be learned from its specific features.
Topic:
Debt and Governance
Political Geography:
Europe and Greece

34. Was the ECB's Comprehensive Assessment up to standard?

Author:
Willem Pieter De Groen
Publication Date:
11-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
The Comprehensive Assessment conducted by the European Central Bank (ECB) representsa considerable step forward in enhancing transparency ineuro-area banks' balance sheets. The most notable progress since the previous European stress test has been the hamonisation of the definition of non-performing loans and other concepts as well as uncovering hidden losses, which resulted in a €34 billion aggregate capital-chargenet of tax. Despite this tightening,most banks were able to meet the 5.5% common equity tier 1 (CET1) threshold applied in the test, whichsuggests that the large majority of the euro-area banks have improvedtheir financial position sufficiently to no longer constrainthem in financing the economy.Our own estimation based on the detailed results, however,provide a more nuanced picture, with a large numberof the banks still highly leveraged and in many cases unable to meet the regulatory capital requirementsthat will be introduced in the coming years underthe adverse stress test scenario.
Topic:
Debt, Economics, International Trade and Finance, and Global Recession
Political Geography:
Europe

35. Germany and the Future of the Eurozone

Author:
Sebastian Plóciennik
Publication Date:
01-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Although the euro has survived the most severe phase of the current crisis, its future is still uncertain. The fate of the common currency will depend not only on the condition of the European economy, but also the priorities of its biggest player—Germany. So far that country has been strong enough to enforce its own vision of integration based on neoliberal reforms and austerity measures. Since the side effects of this prescription have been rising costs and risks, Berlin's new government will consider a range of different solutions, including in extremis a controlled and partial break-up of the Eurozone. For Poland, this volatility creates a challenging environment with risks, but also creates chances for Warsaw to increase its influence over the evolution of EU integration in this field.
Topic:
Debt, Economics, Monetary Policy, Financial Crisis, and Reform
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

36. The IMF's Preferred Creditor Status: Does It Still Make Sense After the Euro Crisis?

Author:
Susan Schadler
Publication Date:
03-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:
Throughout the history of IMF lending, the institution has had PCS — that is, distressed countries borrowing from the IMF are expected to give priority to meeting their obligations to the IMF over those to other (private or official) creditors. This status is a defining characteristic of the IMF's role in financial crises: it provides a high degree of confidence that IMF resources are safe even when other creditors of the distressed country face substantial uncertainty about whether they will be repaid in full. In other words, the IMF, which lends to some of the riskiest countries in the world, faces minimal risk that its resources could be compromised by a debtor country's difficulties in servicing its debt. It does so, however, with the confidence that comes from its role in helping to formulate and monitor a program of policies that are strongly expected to return the country to stability.
Topic:
Debt, Economics, International Monetary Fund, Monetary Policy, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe

37. 'Broken and Can't Be Fixed': The Impact of the Economic Crisis on the Greek Party System

Author:
Susannah Verney
Publication Date:
03-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The International Spectator
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The Greek election of May 2012 failed to produce a government, resulting in repeat elections six weeks later. This shock outcome was a symptom of a broader delegitimation of the national political system. Over the past decade Eurobarometer data show a much more extensive loss of confidence in political institutions in Greece than in the European Union as a whole. In a first phase, rising political discontent was managed within the traditional political framework through alternation in power between the two major parties. In contrast, the second phase, following the outbreak of the Greek sovereign debt crisis, led to the dramatic fragmentation of the party system and changed the mode of government formation. This process is not reversible and entails serious democratic dangers.
Topic:
Debt, Economics, and Government
Political Geography:
Europe and Greece

38. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: Ambitious but Achievable

Author:
Garrett Workman and Tyson Barker
Publication Date:
04-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
As leaders in the United States and Europe prepare for the formal launch of Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) talks, the Bertelsmann Foundation and the Atlantic Council have conducted a survey of trade policy experts from the public and private sectors on both sides of the Atlantic to gauge their expectations for the results of negotiations. This policy brief examines the results of this survey and analyzes its policy implications in three possible scenarios. The United States and Europe have discussed a transatlantic free trade area in various guises for decades. But as negotiations for a new Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) begin, this time seems different. Both sides recognize the need to stimulate their stagnant economies in the aftermath of the financial and Eurozone crises. In an age of austerity, as debt and deficit problems have led to a major loss of market confidence in the United States and Europe's ability to recover in a sustainable manner, a deepened trade relationship marks a path forward without adding to national debt levels. Furthermore, the rise of the emerging markets—particularly China—which often subscribe to a different economic model focused on state-owned enterprises and government directed investment decisions, marks a historic decision-point for the transatlantic community.
Topic:
Debt, International Trade and Finance, and Reform
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, and Atlantic Ocean

39. The Greek Debt Restructuring: An Autopsy

Author:
Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Christoph Trebesch, and Mitu Gulati
Publication Date:
08-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
The Greek debt restructuring of 2012 stands out in the history of sovereign defaults. It achieved very large debt relief— over 50 percent of 2012 GDP—with minimal financial disruption, using a combination of new legal techniques, exceptionally large cash incentives, and official sector pressure on key creditors. But it did so at a cost. The timing and design of the restructuring left money on the table from the perspective of Greece, created a large risk for European taxpayers, and set precedents—particularly in its very generous treatment of holdout creditors—that are likely to make future debt restructurings in Europe more difficult.
Topic:
Debt, Economics, Monetary Policy, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe and Greece

40. Why the ECB should cut borrowing costs in periphery

Publication Date:
06-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Oxford Economics
Abstract:
The European Central Bank has postponed any plans to introduce targeted measures to reduce the cost of borrowing for small and medium-sized businesses in the credit-starved peripheral Eurozone economies. Given the widening gap between the lower costs of borrowing for companies in Germany and France and the higher costs in the periphery, we think that there is a strong case for the ECB to take action. Simulations using our Global Macroeconomic Model show that if half the tightening in credit conditions seen since 2008 were to be reversed within two years, Eurozone GDP would be 0.7% higher by the end of 2017 than under our baseline forecast. There would be over 400,000 fewer people unemployed. This would be particularly beneficial for peripheral Eurozone risk assets.
Topic:
Debt, Economics, International Trade and Finance, Markets, and Monetary Policy
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany