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1. What is Serbia’s “Project 5000” and why Should we be concerned?

Author:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
This paper examines the potential consequences and concerns surrounding Serbia’s “Project 5000,” emphasizing why it warrants attention not just from neighboring states in the Western Balkans but also from NATO. Given the geopolitical landscape, any escalation of conflict within this region directly impacts NATO’s strategic interests, considering its significant presence in the Balkans. Moreover, Russia’s overt military backing of Serbia and its advocacy for a militaristic approach towards Kosovo are of particular concern. This stance by Russia can be interpreted as an attempt to embolden Serbia to adopt a military intervention in Kosovo, serving dual purposes for Russia: shifting international focus from the brutal invasion of Ukraine and undermining NATO’s credibility and influence in the region. The unfolding situation underscores a broader strategy by Russia to exploit regional tensions, thereby challenging the Euro-Atlantic integration process. Such maneuvers not only threaten to destabilize the Western Balkans but also aim to fracture European unity and weaken NATO’s strategic coherence, particularly as it pertains to its eastern flank and broader engagement in conflict resolution and peacekeeping efforts.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Geopolitics, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe and Serbia

2. The Europeanisation of the Energy Transition in Central and Eastern EU Countries: An Uphill Battle that Can Be Won

Author:
Diana-Paula Gherasim
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Russia’s war in Ukraine, and the brutal decoupling from Russian fossil fuels, is a game changer for the Central and Eastern Europe region which was still heavily dependent on Russia for its energy supply. There are still a few oil, gas, and nuclear fuel supplies, but the sharp decline, and search for alternatives, lead to a shift in paradigm: deploying low-carbon technologies and energy efficiency is now a matter of national security and economic security. Hence, following the 2022 energy crisis, the understanding that the European Union’s (EU) energy security of supply means an acceleration in phasing out fossil fuels and deploying clean energies has become the newest European acquis in energy policy, increasing the importance of the Green Deal at EU, national and local levels. The risk that a carbon wall would be erected within Europe between the West and the Central and Eastern European Member States (CEECs) is no more valid. The concept of Europeanization is at the core of the analysis of the energy transition in the CEECs. The progress on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction observed in these Member States (MS) can be considered as a success of the Europeanization process in this region, as its timing coincides with the implementation of the 2020 agenda for climate and energy, to the establishment of which these countries were part of. Moreover, the Clean Energy Package and the Green Deal seem to have been successful in putting in place a mechanism of cognitive framing pertaining to the Europeanization toolbox, by setting a framework for all Europeans to move in the same direction, of a cleaner and healthier way of living, independently of their starting point. Given the status quo in the ten CEECs, the new ambitious objectives regarding transport decarbonization will translate into important transformation costs for the region, which in turn could increase the risk of renegotiation attempts, as the circular Europeanization theory predicts. The acknowledgment at the EU level that the transition must be just to succeed is one instance of bottom-up Europeanization, where the challenges brought forward by specific Member States shaped the European energy transition agenda and discourse. Large financial support for this end was a first condition for CEECs to support the climate neutrality agenda. The second condition is that CEECs plan to replace their coal fleet at least partially with nuclear power, be they reactor capacity expansions, lifetime extensions, large new reactors, or small modular reactors (SMRs). The third condition has been securing a role for the use of natural gas for the transition, which in 2022 turned out to be a costly choice. With the crisis, CEECs have all taken on board the necessity to boost renewables as a tool to rapidly decrease dependence on imported fossil fuels, to meet the 2030 targets, prepare for the progressive phase-out of free emission allowances while awaiting the new nuclear generation capacities due from 2035 onwards. This strategy is also supported by public opinion, while it remains to be seen how public acceptance of SMRs will be. This gives the CEE region a strong joint interest to push for the inclusion of nuclear energy in EU legislations, alongside France. On gas, countries have switched to liquefied natural gas (LNG) and diversified their pipeline supplies, and where possible, try to boost the domestic supply of natural gas and soon, biomethane. Although being relatively far from alternative gas entry points means that for some CEECs Russia remains, to a certain extent, a necessity, this cannot be used as an excuse for undermining EU unity and should push towards harder EU-level reflections on energy solidarity on which some progress was done during the 2022 energy crisis. It remains to be seen if a new line of fragmentation will not appear between Germany and Austria on the one hand and the CEEs on the other: following the Nord Stream betrayal and denial by Germany of Polish energy security concerns for example, CEECs are concerned about the extraterritorial outreach of Germany’s nuclear phase-out policies, and of Austria’s continued systemic opposition to nuclear. This plays in the hand of the United States, which is the ultimate gatekeeper to pressure Germany and secure the energy technology choices of CEECs through the export of US technologies. Of note is also the shared concern now over the dependence on Russian nuclear fuels and equipment, and efforts to reduce this. A last source of possible tensions comes from some new gas infrastructure investments which can strengthen resilience but risk locking in gas much longer than the EU trajectory allows for. Beyond nuclear energy, however, the interest in accelerating the deployment of renewables, and the concern over a just transition, the note shows that there is little in common between the CEECs which have all their specificities. Last but not least, this note argues that a new risk of fragmentation may emerge, related to the localization of innovation and the volume of state aids and subsidies to industries. While some CEECs appear to be a frontrunner in the deployment of battery cell gigafactories, their financial and budgetary capacities are much more limited compared to Western MSs, and their ability to develop comprehensive, coherent climate plans, and to mobilize EU tools and funding, is also limited. Without an EU Sovereignty Fund, the region will find it hard to keep pace with EU’s objectives in the Net-Zero Industry Act and the Critical Raw Materials Act due to limited fiscal space to be leveraged for state aid purposes, despite more favorable conditions.
Topic:
European Union, Renewable Energy, Fossil Fuels, Transition, and Energy
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, and Central Europe

3. How Sweden Can Use its EU Presidency to Build the Civilian Security Dimension of the Eastern Partnership

Author:
Michal Baranowski, Mikołaj Bronert, Maximilian Kaminski, and Elene Kintsurashvili
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) lacks a security dimension and this is an urgent reform need. In particular, the EU should become the leading provider of civilian security support in the EaP countries, particularly Ukraine. But significant weaknesses in this policy field inhibit its capability to do so. Sweden’s long-term focus on the EaP, its experience in augmenting domestic cyber and hybrid resilience as well as in placing the civilian aspect at the heart of its national security, and it its leading contribution to the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) missions put it in a unique position to be a champion of the security dimension of the EaP during its presidency of the Council of the EU. Sweden can do so by pushing for: a EU-NATO memorandum of understanding on the EaP; the provision of a rapid financing mechanism to assist EaP countries in nonmilitary defense; a more coordinated training, planning, and implementing process for CSDP missions between EU actors and the EaP countries; a more targeted approach towards EaP countries; and prioritization of deepening of cooperation with EaP countries in the domain of hybrid threats.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, and Partnerships
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, Sweden, and Central Europe

4. Economic Priorities in Post-war Ukraine

Author:
Dmytro Boyarchuk
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Social and Economic Research - CASE
Abstract:
Ukraine has been a stellar example of a little reform going a long way. First invaded by Russia in 2014, the Ukraine of 2022 was a different country, with more resilience, more ability, and more depth. As it pushes to repel the Russian aggressor, it is never too early to think about how Ukraine can continue its reform process and become a state that is free of Russia, economically strong, and a model for policy reform. The ways in which Ukraine can attain this goal are contained in the economic roadmap, “Economic Priorities in Post-war Ukraine,” produced by Ukrainian experts and world-class policy advisors under CASE-Center for Social Research and CASE Ukraine and funded by agencies from around Europe and the United States. This report focuses on the essential reforms that will help Ukraine with the post-war reconstruction, as well as enable progress in its efforts on the way to EU membership. Over 30 years of independence, Ukraine has launched almost all of the necessary reforms to build and develop a market economy. In 2014, Ukraine signed the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, and substantial progress has been demonstrated since then. However, the country fought against a legacy of start-stop reforms and inattention to major objectives such as building the rule of law and encouraging private sector competition. Before the full-scale Russian invasion, it had been making progress in institutional reforms but still had far to go. This report addresses many of the complex tasks that Ukraine needs to complete, with the main challenge being the rule of law, a problem lasting for three decades. Our team of experts propose specific mechanisms to make the transition to a country which respects the rule of law, including ways to improve the judiciary, respect property rights, and encourage private sector competition. The report also examines the question on how the Ukrainian government can attract funding and rebuild the country after the war is over, discussing ways in which the EU and the donor community can be involved. The eventual end of the war also provides Ukraine with a unique opportunity to leap ahead in the European integration process and to finish its institutional reforms. With Ukraine now a candidate for EU membership, the prospects of the integration process, the unprecedented support for integration with the EU in Ukrainian society and the continued support of the West, present Ukraine with a way forward and overcoming the obstacles that have delayed, stalled, or even caused the abandonment of reforms in the past.
Topic:
Development, Reform, Economy, Institutions, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

5. Russia's Influence in MENA After a Year of War in Ukraine

Author:
Matthew Czekaj, Iulia-sabina Joja, Alex Vatanka, Yörük Işık, Charles Lister, and Roger Kangas
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
MEI Managing Editor Matthew Czekaj speaks with scholars Iulia-Sabina Joja, Alex Vatanka, Yörük Işık, Charles Lister, and Roger Kangas on Russia's current standing in the Middle East a year since re-invading Ukraine. How has Russian aggression in Ukraine redrawn Moscow’s relationships in the MENA region? And as the Middle East increasingly becomes a key area of global great power competition, is Russia still a meaningful player there, politically, economically, militarily, and diplomatically?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Politics, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Middle East, Eastern Europe, and North Africa

6. Let’s Learn Judo with Putin. Sport, Power and Masculinity in 21st-Century Russia

Author:
Leo Goretti and Sofia Mariconti
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Dedication to sport and physical prowess have been key elements in the construction of Vladimir Putin’s image since his rise to the Presidency of Russia. Domestically, the Kremlin has promoted a public representation of the President as a strong, energetic, decisive leader who is ‘fit for the job’. Constant emphasis has been placed on how sports – especially judo and those harking back to the Soviet past, such as sambo – forged the manly qualities of Putin, turning him into the living paradigm of Russian hegemonic masculinity. At the international level, Putin’s vigorous and masculine leadership has been turned into a proxy for Russia’s restored status: in the early 2000s, to mark a neat break from the ‘decadence’ of the 1990s; subsequently, to suggest the return of Russia to its great-power status. Hostility against human – especially LGBT – rights in sport has become central to this discourse, not only because they are suggestive of alleged Western decadence, but also because they threaten the gender norms and public image on which Putin’s leadership has been built.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Sports, Leadership, and Masculinity
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Eastern Europe, and Balkans

7. Toward Inclusive Recovery in Ukraine: Engaging Women and Civil Society in Ukraine’s Relief, Recovery, and Reconstruction

Author:
Jess Keller
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security (GIWPS)
Abstract:
Women’s participation in the design and implementation of Ukraine’s recovery programs is critical to maximize the effectiveness of the reconstruction process, take into account differentiated needs, and bolster post-conflict development. Key recommendations: Promote women’s participation, leadership, and decision-making in Ukraine’s planning frameworks and recovery process. Ensure new funding enables women’s active participation in Ukraine’s recovery and advances gender equality. Establish a gender-sensitive monitoring mechanism for the Ukrainian government to report on recovery progress and collect and analyze sex-disaggregated data. Prioritize the re-establishment of critical social infrastructure and services. Integrate gender equality in Ukraine’s EU accession commitments.
Topic:
Civil Society, Reconstruction, Women, Recovery, Participation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

8. Little substance, considerable impact Russian influence in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro

Author:
Wouter Zweers and Niels Drost
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
This Clingendael report explores the role of the Russian Federation in Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. It examines Russia’s objectives in its relations with the three countries, as well the various sources of influence the Kremlin holds in each of the three countries. The report places this analysis within the changed geopolitical circumstances resulting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s main objectives for the Western Balkans are threefold. First, the Kremlin seeks to project great power status globally. Second, it seeks to obstruct the Euro-Atlantic integration of the region by advocating against NATO and EU integration and by raising instabilities. Third, the Kremlin uses the Balkans, especially the Kosovo issue, as an argument for its foreign policy agenda elsewhere, particularly when it comes to defending its perceived dominance over its near abroad. Instead of building a sustainable, all-encompassing, and meaningful relation with Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), and Montenegro, Russia instead pursues an opportunistic approach depending on fragmented entry points for influence in each country. The Kremlin displays moderate ambitions for building positive relationships with the three countries, which is reflected also in the instruments it uses to influence the region. It nurtures contacts with, and influence through, a wide range of individual politicians, the Orthodox Church, the media and malign proxy groups, making use of energy links as well as local tensions and historical memories. Moscow pursues this approach deliberately, and it has proven relatively successful. At the political level, Russia’s clout stretches especially to (pro-)Serb politicians, who often make use of similar narratives and use Russia as an external supporter to promote their own ideas. In particular, its position on Kosovo, Russian support for Republika Srpska leader Milorad Dodik and its Orthodox Church links remain important entry points for Russia’s political influence in the region at large. Of the three countries, entry points for Russian influence are most widespread In Serbia, followed by Bosnia and Herzegovina. Economically, Russia’s influence is outperformed substantially by that of the EU, especially in terms of trade. Russia’s far-reaching influence in the energy sectors of BiH and Serbia, however, yield substantial political leverage, even if its investments often prove economically inviable. When it comes to military influence, Russia seeks to maintain its military cooperation with its main partner, Serbia, while also supporting the militarisation of Republika Srpska. Belgrade is satisfied with its current degree of cooperation with Moscow but seeks to avoid becoming Russia’s foothold in the Balkans. Factually, Russia is only one of multiple security actors in the Balkans, overshadowed by NATO and challenged by China. While presenting itself as a partner to Serbia and Republika Srpska in particular, Russia also resorts to malign instruments which have often proven to be effective in shaping the political environment of the Western Balkans. Lacking a military presence in the region, Russia supports far-right nationalist figures and organisations, which generally better resemble organised crime groups than paramilitary organisations, to attain its goal of destabilisation by stirring up polarisation and anti-Western sentiment. The Kremlin is perhaps most successful in the field of media and disinformation. Russian propaganda penetrates Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina through Russian-funded portals, local media and social media. Russian disinformation and narratives have penetrated the region to such an extent that considerable sections of society hold a positive image of Russia and its political leadership. In all these fields, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has moderately affected but not fully altered Russia’s approach towards Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro. While the invasion has led to sharper dividing lines between Russia and the West and decreases in Russian financial and diplomatic capacities, we observe continuity in terms of Russian strategies and objectives. Russia’s sources of influence in the three countries have been moderately strained, among other causes as a result of BiH and Serbia’s first steps to diversify energy sources and Western pressure to diminish their political and security links with the Russian Federation. For the time being, this has not yet affected Moscow’s ability to act as a spoiler to the Euro-Atlantic integration of the three countries. The extent to which the European Union and NATO are effective in countering Russian influence in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro will be part of a follow-up Clingendael report to be published in fall 2023. As part of the same research project, analyses of societal and political perceptions towards Russia in the three countries will be published in summer 2023 by Clingendael partners the Atlantic Council of Montenegro, the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, and the Atlantic Initiative in BiH.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, Disinformation, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Eastern Europe, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina

9. Double-Edged Sword: How to Engage Returnee Networks in Migrant Reintegration

Author:
Victoria Rietig and Sophie Meiners
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Migrants increasingly have a say in migration policies. Diaspora and migrant associations rightfully step into the spotlight to bring their much-needed perspectives to policy development. But the work of associations of returned migrants has stayed in the shadows despite their having firsthand experiences that can guide the design of reintegration policies.
Topic:
Migration, Networks, Reintegration, and Immigration Policy
Political Geography:
Africa, Middle East, and Eastern Europe

10. Security Guarantees for Ukraine: Until NATO Membership, Extending the Joint Expeditionary Force Is the Best Option

Author:
Benjamin Tallis
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
There are no security “guarantees,” but NATO membership is as close as it gets – and has long proven its effectiveness in deterring ­Russian aggression. It is thus the only real option for Ukraine – and for wider European security. Addressing the lack of political will to recognize this, especially in Washington and Berlin, means finding an interim solution that provides credible, collective security in the meantime and fosters more durable, fairly delivered European ­security in the long term.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe