Political Geography: China - CIAO Search Results

401. China’s Cooperation with Southeast Asia to Support More Ambitious Clean Energy Transition by 2030

Author:: Asia Society Policy Institute
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: Southeast Asia stands at a critical juncture in its energy transition, grappling with the need to foster clean energy development while confronting infrastructure and investment challenges. A series of engagements in 2023 organized by the Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI) brought together key stakeholders to strategize on enhancing China's role in the region's shift towards renewable energy, focusing on targeted investments and policy synergy with regional initiatives. This policy report, China’s Cooperation with Southeast Asia to Support More Ambitious Clean Energy Transition by 2030, introduces the "Clean Prosperity Plan," a blueprint advocating socio-economic and climate resilience through joint China-Southeast Asia efforts. The plan highlights project-specific recommendations, green industrialization, and renewable energy projects expedited by policy support, poised to catalyze investment and job creation, thereby sparking a positive feedback loop that could amplify regional clean energy ambitions.
Topic:: Climate Change, Development, Regional Cooperation, Infrastructure, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Southeast Asia

402. The geopolitics of water: how the Brahmaputra River could shape India–China security competition

Author:: Neely Haby
Publication Date:: 08-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: This report assesses the geopolitical impact of a possible dam at the Great Bend of the Brahmaputra. In particular, it exams the dam as a potential source of coercive leverage China may gain over India. A dam there would create four likely strategic effects: it would very likely consolidate Beijing’s political control over its distant borderlands; it would create the potential for massive flooding as a tool of violence; it may affect human settlement and economic patterns on the Indian side of the border, downstream; and it would give Beijing water and data that it could withhold from India as bargaining leverage in unrelated negotiations. To mitigate those challenges and risks, the report provides three policy recommendations for the Indian Government and its partners in Australia and the US. First, it recommends the establishment of an open-source, publicly available data repository, based on satellite sensing, to disseminate information about the physical impacts of the Great Bend Dam. Second, it recommends that like-minded governments use international legal arguments to pressure Beijing to abide by global norms and conventions. Third, it recommends that the Quad—the informal group comprising Australia, India, Japan and the US—use its humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) guidelines to begin to share information and build capacity for dam-related contingencies.
Topic:: Water, Geopolitics, Rivers, Competition, Regional Security, and Brahmaputra River
Political Geography:: China, India, and Asia

403. Ice panda: navigating China’s hybrid Antarctic agenda

Author:: Elizabeth Buchanan
Publication Date:: 08-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: Antarctica is often overlooked in strategic discussions, but its role in geopolitical competition deserves attention. This report assesses the continents importance to Australian security, China’s hybrid Antarctic activity, and the need for Australia to develop a balancing strategy capable of bolstering the Antarctic Treaty and ‘pushing back’ against growing Chinese power in Antarctica. Antarctica offers significant strategic advantages for the People's Republic of China (PRC). Although Beijing's actions in Antarctica may not overtly violate the Antarctic Treaty (AT), they effectively undermine its principles and, by extension, Australia's strategic interests. Currently, the PRC is adeptly navigating the AT System to challenge the status quo without explicitly breaching the treaty. China's domestic policies, which merge civil and military sectors, appear to contravene the spirit of the AT's military prohibitions, even if they have not yet resulted in direct military activity on the continent. This evolving dynamic underscores the pressing need for Australia to safeguard the existing Antarctic status quo. With robust Australian foreign and security prioritization, the AT can counter Beijing's growing ambitions, which may directly impact Australian interests. We must protect and uphold the principles of the AT. With diverse domestic and international priorities, Australia must not neglect Antarctica, as Beijing continues to exploit the strategic gap left by our limited focus. Australia, with its rich history and commitment to Antarctica, must assert its role as an Antarctic claimant and clarify that China's presence is contingent on Australian and other claimants' cooperation. It's time for Australia to lead in Antarctica and protect our strategic interests.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, Australia, Asia-Pacific, and Antarctica

404. Chinese foreign policy in 2024: crisis management and global governance

Author:: Thomas Eder
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: This Trend Report examines key aspects of Chinese foreign policy in 2024, emphasizing three critical questions: the Taiwan situation, China’s stance in the Ukraine conflict, and its global governance reform proposals. The analysis suggests that the likelihood of a Chinese invasion or blockade of Taiwan remains low due to electoral outcomes and various deterrent factors. China is expected to intensify non-physical threats. Economic considerations, including reliance on exports and partnerships with Europe, deter China from escalating support for Russia. The "Global South" is likely to support China’s global governance reforms, driven by resentment against perceived US double standards. European decision-makers are advised to align strategies with China’s nuanced approach, emphasizing reassurances on Taiwan, clear red lines on Russia, and increased engagement with the "Global South" while upholding UN principles.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Governance, Crisis Management, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: China and Asia

405. The European Union can go green and lower dependencies on China

Author:: Luke Patey
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: Some Western pundits see the ongoing policy push from the European Union to de-risk supply chain dependencies on China as a threat to gains from decades of economic globalisation. Others regard Chinese industrial strengths in green technologies as unbreakable and see attempts to diversify the EU’s reliance as setting back global efforts to fight climate change. Yet, diversifying sources of critical minerals away from China and other large suppliers is a necessity in today’s volatile geopolitical climate. As well as actively pursuing new partnerships overseas to lower large dependencies on single sources, EU member states should fully harness new regulatory tools, such as the Critical Raw Materials Act, to diversify sources of critical minerals and exploit the Net-Zero Industry Act to support the production of green technologies and leverage European resources, capabilities and know-how. Contrary to conventional thinking, Europe is not starting from scratch when it comes to developing strategic supply chains in green, digital and defence technologies. Over time, there is ample potential for de-risking critical minerals to have a positive impact on the EU’s supply chain resilience and its contribution to lowering global emissions.
Topic:: European Union, Green Technology, Supply Chains, Energy Transition, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:: China and Europe

406. Forecasting Chinese expansion into Central Asia

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: In early April 2024, China signed a two-year enhanced security cooperation agreement with Uzbekistan, which was reached during a meeting between Chinese Minister of Public Security Wang Xiaohong and Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Interior Minister Pulat Bobojonov in Tashkent. Some believe this pact was prompted by escalating international and regional competition for Central Asia, mainly because it came amid moves by international and regional powers in the five countries. Moreover, as China expands activities in this region to capitalize on cooperation potentials and opportunities, its influence in the five Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, is steadily rising, mainly encouraged by Moscow's preoccupation with its war in Ukraine. The development is raising questions about the future of China's presence in Central Asia in the coming years.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Strategic Competition, and Cooperation
Political Geography:: China, Central Asia, and Asia

407. Xi Demands Fealty Despite Domestic And Foreign Woes

Author:: Willy Wo-Lap Lam
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: The Politburo held a “democratic life meeting (民主生活会)” on December 21–22, 2023, in which President Xi Jinping gave an internal, unpublished speech. According to accounts provided to the author by three officials at the rank of department head or above, Xi admitted that he had repeatedly postponed the Third Plenum of the 20th Central Committee (which according to Party norms should have taken place in October) because he “could not offer any viable solution for the nation’s problems.” Xi, who is general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and commander-in-chief, went on to blame the other 23 Politburo members and other senior cadres, not only for failing to give him good advice but also for demonstrating signs of disobedience. Reports of Xi’s frank admission of the dire straits of the Party’s leadership were widely circulated on social media. The official Xinhua read-out of the Politburo meeting also cited Xi as demanding “unison of thought” among top-tier officials. This entails adhering closely to the instructions of the “core leadership”—in other words, to Xi himself (Xinhua, December 25, 2023). The supreme leader raised the “two safeguards (两个维护),” a slogan that refers to “safeguarding the authority of comrade Xi Jinping as core of the party” and “safeguarding Xi Jinping Thought on socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era.” President Xi also admonished his close advisors to “take a firm grip on the internal laws of developments [of issues]; accurately distinguish between events and trends, crises and opportunities, and benefits and harms … and effectively combat risks and take action on the basis of stability” (People’s Daily, December 23, 2023). This instruction tallies with caveats given by Xi throughout the past year, in which he has warned that China faces unprecedented challenges and that the party-state apparatus must ready itself to tackle “black swans and gray rhinos.”
Topic:: Financial Crisis, Leadership, Xi Jinping, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and Banking
Political Geography:: China and Asia

408. CCP Ideological Indoctrination, Part 2: The New Plan for Training Party Cadres

Author:: John Dotson
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: On December 29, 2023, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping addressed a gathering of People’s Republic of China (PRC) diplomatic personnel in Beijing’s Great Hall of the People. He instructed his audience to compose a “diplomatic iron army (外交铁军)” representing China’s interests. Notably, Xi emphasized the need for correct political thinking: asserting that they must “persist in our revolution (坚持自我革命),” “be steadfast in political conviction (政治信念坚定),” and “build a sturdy ideological line of defense (筑牢思想防线)” about themselves in the performance of their work (Yang Guang Wang, December 30, 2023). These comments are the latest example of an extensive series of efforts by the CCP leadership in late 2023 to reinforce ideological regimentation within the Party. On October 16, 2023, the CCP Central Committee promulgated a new document titled the National Cadre Education and Training Plan (2023-2027) [全国干部教育培训规划 (2023-2027年)] (hereafter “2023 Cadre Plan”), which laid out extensive new requirements for ideological study on the part of CCP officials (PRC Government, October 16, 2023). This move had been signaled at a CCP Politburo meeting at the end of August, which was reportedly convened to deliberate on new draft documents related to ideological training for Party members. The official coverage of the August meeting emphasized that forthcoming Party directives would further scrutinize “political judgment (政治判断力)”—signifying loyalty and obedience to the central Party leadership—and “strengthen political gatekeeping (加强政治把关)” for cadre reliability (PRC Government, August 31, 2023).
Topic:: Ideology, Political Parties, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and Indoctrination
Political Geography:: China and Asia

409. Xi’s New Year’s Speech Dismisses Difficulties

Author:: Arran Hope
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: On New Year’s Eve, a prerecorded address from Chinese President Xi Jinping was broadcast across the Party’s global network of official media outlets (Youtube, December 31, 2023). The speech is an annual tradition, delivered from behind a wooden desk in rhetoric that is at once paternalistic and triumphalist, in which Xi surveys the high points of the outgoing year and looks to the year ahead. The form of this year’s set-piece was no different, but the content departed from previous years in ways that are indicative of Xi’s shifting priorities, and the Party’s growing concerns about the state of the nation. The most significant section of the speech addressed the economic difficulties that China has weathered in the last year: “On the road ahead, trials and hardships [lit. ‘wind and rain’] will be the norm. Some enterprises are facing pressures, some of the masses are encountering difficulties finding jobs and meeting basic needs, and some places have hit by floods, typhoons, earthquakes, or other natural disasters (有风有雨是常态。一些企业面临经营压力，一些群众就业、生活遇到困难，一些地方发生洪涝、台风、地震等自然灾害).”
Topic:: Domestic Politics, Ideology, Xi Jinping, and Rhetoric
Political Geography:: China and Asia

410. China’s Anti-Corruption Efforts Gain Momentum in Finance and Healthcare

Author:: Alexis Brown
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: On September 27, Chinese President Xi Jinping presided over a meeting of the Politburo, where he announced the end of the current round of finance inspections but suggested that more were to follow (Xinhua, September 27). The authorities may have chosen to focus on financial corruption to coincide with the restructuring of financial regulators in March, in which a central finance commission was created to give the Party center more direct control over the finance sector. This move indicates that the Party has taken a greater interest in the sector. So far in 2023, China’s anti-corruption organs, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI, 中国共产党中央纪律检查委员会) and the National Supervisory Commission (NSC, 中华人民共和国国家监察委员会), have intensified investigations across both the healthcare and finance sectors. Authorities have investigated at least 180 hospital chiefs and 80 senior employees in financial institutions between January and early September. [1] By comparison, the CCDI and NSC only targeted 12 hospital leaders from 2019-2022 (CCDI). Through the anti-corruption campaigns, the party leadership is likely to bolster support among certain demographics, eliminate political opponents, and address some real instances of graft. However, due to the absence of robust institutions and transparency, systemic corruption will persist after the current drives wind down. The Party and state organs carry out anti-corruption in healthcare regularly, but in 2023 they have elevated the importance of this work. This is the first time the CCDI and NSC were involved in the National Health Commission’s annual conference on anti-corruption, where a national centralized campaign to crack down on graft was launched. The campaign will continue until mid-2024 (National Health Commission, July 21). [2] One motivation may be to address public frustrations with healthcare from the COVID-19 pandemic. There was an uproar over incidents like hospitals turning away ER patients for not having negative Covid tests and testing centers generating huge profits but producing fraudulent test results (Joint Prevention and Control Mechanism of the State Council, December 9 2022 Credit China, December 23 2022). Another reason may be to combat illegal healthcare charges in order to boost household consumption, one of the government’s top economic targets for 2023 (Xinhua, March 14).
Topic:: Corruption, Finance, Public Policy, and Healthcare System
Political Geography:: China and Asia

411. Global IR Research Programme: From Perplexities to Progressions

Author:: Deepshikha Shahi
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:: Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:: Our basic expectations vis-à-vis ‘the international’ have turned our phenomenal existence into two seemingly irreconcilable cognitive prisons: ‘one world’ with homogenizing propensities (dominated by the West) and ‘many worlds’ with heterogenizing predispositions (embodied by the non-West). Every so often, these cognitive prisons—oscillating between the extreme homogenizing propensities of the West and heterogenizing predispositions of the non-West— become obstacles in implementing effective global partnerships that are required to tackle the challenges thrown by global crisis-situations, e.g., the likelihoods of world war, financial crisis, climate change, pandemic, and the like. The agenda of the ‘Global IR research programme’ has emerged to demolish these cognitive prisons. To this end, this agenda finds rational support from multiple auxiliary theories that derive stimulus from hitherto denigrated knowledge-forms thriving in different corners of the world: e.g., Tianxia (all-under-heaven) from China, Advaita (non-duality) from India, and Mu No Basho (place of nothingness) from Japan. Nevertheless, the conditioned reflexes of many IR researchers compel them to receive the emergent knowledge-forms by correlating their ‘source’ and ‘scope’: generally, the knowledge-forms having their source in the West are granted a global scope, whereas the knowledge-forms having their source in the non-West are given a local scope; it is often suspected that the local non-Western knowledge-forms cannot grasp the larger global scenario. Philosophically, these conditioned reflexes emanate from Kantian dualism, which forms disconnected opposites of phenomena-noumena, science-metaphysics, West–non-West etc. This article reveals how the Global IR research programme—inspired by the Chinese, Indian and Japanese cosmovisions—strives to demolish the cognitive prisons of ‘one world versus many worlds’, thereby ensuring the prospective progressions of this research programme.
Topic:: International Relations and Research
Political Geography:: Japan, China, India, and Global Focus

412. Western-Centric Moments in Homegrown IR Theories: Dependency, Chinese and African Schools

Author:: Engin Sune
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:: Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:: The modern international system has been shaped by long-standing historical practices of unequal power relations, which have positioned the Western world at the center of the political universe. Due to the centrality of the Global North in the international system, any IR theory that aims to portray a true picture of the “globe” necessarily situates the West at the center of scientific inquiry. Furthermore, the form of universality generated by Western hegemony has been diffused throughout the world over centuries, spreading Western political institutions, economic structures, and ideological norms in an uneven setting. As a result, the social structures of the Global South have developed through an uneven form of relationship and dialectical interaction with the West. Therefore, homegrown IR theories, which uncover local political, philosophical, or cultural motives as sources for theory-making, in fact, concentrate on stratified forms of the universal reality that is diffused through the uneven spread of Western social structures. In this sense, there is a Western-centric moment in any homegrown IR theory. Accordingly, this article develops a scientific realist account of the structure/agent relationship in order to analyze the material grounds of Western-centrism in the field of international politics and to evaluate the role of non-Western actors. Additionally, it critically evaluates distinctive homegrown theories produced on three different continents to reveal the aforementioned Western-centric moments in these theoretical initiatives. Namely, the Dependency School of Latin America, the Chinese School of International Relations, and the African School are respectively scrutinized to disclose the embedded Western-centrism in these theoretical initiatives.
Topic:: International Relations and International Relations Theory
Political Geography:: Africa, China, and Global South

413. China’s Role in the Middle East

Author:: John Calabrese and Yun Sun
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:: The Middle East Institute (MEI) hosted an on-the-record briefing to discuss China’s role in the Middle East amid rising regional tensions and growing threats to both international security and the global economy.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, International Security, and Economy
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, and Asia

414. The Party and the People: Chinese Politics in the 21st Century

Author:: Orhan Çifçi
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: In his book, The Party and the People: Chinese Politics in the 21st Century, Bruce Dickson, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University, thoroughly scrutinizes China’s domestic political system and the inner structure of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Dickson largely limits his primer to the post-Mao period, with each of the book’s sections answering specific research questions: “What Keeps the Party in Power?”, “How Are Leaders Chosen?”, “How Are Policies Made?”, “Does China Have a Civil Society?”, “Do Political Protests Threaten Political Stability?”, “Why Does the Party Fear Religion?”, “How Nationalistic Is China?” and “Will China Become Democratic?”. Each question he seeks answers to sheds light on the relationship between the CCP and Chinese society. Dickson argues that the CCP has exercised unopposed authority throughout the country since 1949 despite many elite conflicts, economic catastrophes and social unrests. Nevertheless, the party has not always resorted to repressive methods to stay in power. Rather, it is the author’s main argument that the main survival policy is the party’s ability to be responsive to the demands of Chinese people. For Dickson, the repression-responsiveness dichotomy is the core strategy that made it possible for the CCP to rule China as a single party for decades.
Topic:: Politics, History, Book Review, and Political Parties
Political Geography:: China and Asia

415. The Future of the Belt and Road in Europe: How China’s Connectivity Project is Being Reconfigured across the Old Continent – and What It Means for the Euro-Atlantic Alliance

Author:: Nicola Casarini
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has entered the twilight zone in the old continent, following a deterioration of bilateral relations between the EU member states and China over the last years. Italy’s official exit from the BRI at the end of 2023 was a further blow to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy. Yet, the BRI in Europe is being reconfigured rather than being terminated. In Western Europe, the BRI is moving away from physical infrastructure projects and investment in industrial assets – the latter being increasingly protected from Chinese takeovers by both national and EU legislation – to financial and monetary connectivity. This shift is welcomed by various European actors, including some policymakers at the national level, eurozone institutions and major banks. Concurrently, most of Eastern European countries continue to promote BRI projects and seek to attract Chinese investments, suggesting that there is a two-speed Europe when it comes to China, both in terms of geography and sectors.
Topic:: Infrastructure, Foreign Direct Investment, European Union, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Currency
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and Italy

416. Sino-Russian relations in a geopolitical Europe

Author:: Pierre Andrieu
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: The close relationship between Russia and China is by no means a solid, long-term alliance, but rather a temporary rapprochement, that has been strengthened by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The fragility of this relationship, based on history and structural imbalances, persists and reinforces mutual mistrust. For the European Union, while all discussions with an aggressive and threatening Russia have disappeared, China remains both “a cooperation and negotiation partner, an economic partner and a systemic rival” with whom we need to maintain a sustained dialogue, commensurate with a Europe that has begun to assert its geopolitical dimension in the last two years.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, Rapprochement, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and Europe

417. China's Trade Strategies and Korea-China Cooperation Plans

Author:: Seung Shin Lee, Sang Baek Hyun, Su Yeob Na, and Young Sun Kim
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: As uncertainties in the global trade environment expand, China's trade strategy is changing, and these changes are expected to have a significant impact on our trade environment with China. This paper analyzed China's policies on new trade issues such as supply chain reorganization, digital trade, climate change response and proposed policy implications.
Topic:: Climate Change, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Trade, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and South Korea

418. EU's “Open Strategic Autonomy” and its Implications for Korea

Author:: Youngook Jang
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: This brief explores the shifting global trade landscape characterized by weakening globalization and rising protectionism, exacerbated by events such as the US-China trade disputes, COVID-19 pandemic, and Russia's invasion of Ukraine. It discusses how these factors have prompted a trend towards 'Open Strategic Autonomy' (OSA) in the European Union (EU), as evidenced by newly suggested industrial and trade policies. The EU's experiences during the pandemic and energy dependence on Russia have emphasized the need for resilient supply chains. The analysis draws from Jang et al. (2023) to examine how the EU's OSA has evolved in response to these changes, offering insights for policy implications for Korea.
Topic:: European Union, Trade, Supply Chains, Strategic Autonomy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

419. Analyzing South Korea’s Semiconductor Industry: Trade Dynamics and Global Position

Author:: Hyung-gon Jeong
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: U.S. sanctions on China's semiconductor industry are causing major shifts in the global supply chain, affecting South Korea's industry due to its reliance on Chinese manufacturing. The Biden administration's increased sanctions, combined with global trends towards semiconductor self-sufficiency, are putting South Korea's semiconductor position at risk. Countries such as the U.S., China, and Japan are building up their domestic semiconductor industries, potentially affecting South Korea's position in the global market. Deeply integrated with China, Korean companies, face the challenge of reducing this dependence and adapting to the evolving supply chain landscape. This paper examines the import and export trends of the South Korean semiconductor industry over the last five years to assess its global standing, identify challenges, and suggest strategic directions. Using data from the Korea Customs Service from 2019 to 2023, the study analyzes trade patterns and supply chain configurations within South Korea's semiconductor industry. The industry is divided into six main categories and 33 subcategories, based on the analysis of 381 semiconductor-related items categorized under the Harmonized System at the 10-digit level. This detailed classification allows for an in-depth examination of trade trends, supply chain structures, and associated risks within the South Korean semiconductor industry. Moreover, this research uses the classification method described and UN Comtrade statistics to create a dataset on global semiconductor trade. This dataset is used to analyze the international presence of the South Korean semiconductor industry and its market shares in China across different segments.
Topic:: Trade, Supply Chains, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and South Korea

420. North Korea’s 2023 Trade with China: Analysis and Forecasts

Author:: Jangho Choi and Yoojeong Choi
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: This article analyzes North Korea-China trade trends and statistics in 2023 to evaluate the extent of North Korea's trade normalization and its performance. North Korea's trade with China increased by more than 120% compared to the previous year as the country declared a COVID-19 Endemic and gradually eased border controls, but did not recover to 2018-19 levels, the year before the outbreak of COVID-19. Imports to China recorded 2.00 billion, 124.1% higher than the 0.89 billion in 2022. North Korea's imports from China in 2023 are estimated to be the maximum achievable given the lack of a full resumption of over-land trade. However, as the negative impact of UN sanctions on the North Korean economy is ongoing, making it difficult to normalize industrial production. North Korea mainly imported raw materials for processing trade (textile and garment raw materials), staple foods (rice and sugar), agricultural materials (fertilizer), and construction materials from China in 2023. North Korea’s exports to China stood at 0.29 billion, up 118.4% from 0.13 billion in 2023. Exports remain at the 16.9% of the level before the tightening of UN sanctions on North Korea, as the country has failed to diversify its products and expand exports of major export items. Exports were highly dependent on specific products, wigs and false eyelashes, a labor-intensive industry, accounting for 57.1% of total exports. In spite of increasing wigs export, North Korea failed to further expand its amount and diversify the export items in the second half of the year. According to the analysis of trade statistics, the main goals of North Korea's 2023 US foreign economic policy are: (1) resuming smuggling trade in textiles and clothing, (2) building irrigation canals in preparation for summer floods, (3) implementing state-led grain distribution, (4) building living houses in a rural area, and (5) increasing metal production for Russian arms exports. Despite the increase in imports from China in the transition to the coronavirus pandemic, it is difficult to say that it has yet led to the recovery of industrial production and economic development. The future of North Korea's trade with the rest of the world in 2024 will be determined by whether North Korea fully opens its borders and improves its relations with China. In 2024, both North Korea's exports and imports are expected to be slightly higher than in 2023. North Korea's exports are unlikely to increase significantly, as North Korea-Russia military cooperation is expected to continue and China is likely to maintain its checks on the growing Sino-Russian alignment. Increased imports will lead to a larger trade deficit, but it will be within North Korea's ability to manage for one to two years.
Topic:: Economics, Border Control, Trade, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and North Korea

421. Deterrence Gap: Avoiding War in the Taiwan Strait

Author:: Jared M. McKinney and Peter Harris
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Book
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: The likelihood China will attack Taiwan in the next decade is high and will continue to be so, unless Taipei and Washington take urgent steps to restore deterrence across the Taiwan Strait. This monograph introduces the concept of interlocking deterrents, explains why deterrents lose their potency with the passage of time, and provides concrete recommendations for how Taiwan, the United States, and other regional powers can develop multiple, interlocking deterrents that will ensure Taiwanese security in the short and longer terms. By joining deterrence theory with an empirical analysis of Taiwanese, Chinese, and US policies, the monograph provides US military and policy practitioners new insights into ways to deter the People’s Republic of China from invading Taiwan without relying exclusively on the threat of great-power war.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, International Security, Deterrence, and Cross-Strait Relations
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

422. International Competition in the High North: Kingston Conference on International Security 2022

Author:: Michael E. Lynch and Howard Coombs
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Book
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: The 16th annual Kingston Consortium on International Security conference, “International Competition in the High North,” took place on October 11–13, 2022, in Kingston, Ontario, Canada. The conference examined the Arctic region in the context of ongoing climate change and against the backdrop of war in Ukraine. Over the past several years, the United States has acknowledged the growing importance of the Arctic as a strategic region, and the Department of Defense and each of the US military services have published Arctic policies or strategies. In addition, the Department of Defense has created a new regional study center, the Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies in Alaska. Canada and the other Arctic Council nations have also acknowledged the growing importance of the Arctic region and revised strategic frameworks and changed institutional approaches to ensure Arctic security challenges arising from great-power competition and other threats, like those to the environment, are addressed. This volume captures these ideas for the United States and its allies so all can benefit from this experience.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Climate Change, Indigenous, Strategic Competition, Arctic Council, Military, Dual Use Infrastructure, Environmental Security, and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)
Political Geography:: China and Arctic

423. Arming Allies and Partners: How Foreign Military Sales Can Change the China Problem

Author:: Brennan Devereaux
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: Allies and partners are “a center of gravity” for the DoD National Defense Strategy in the Indo-Pacific.1 But are regional nations building military capacity to help the United States prepare for and deter a potential clash with the People’s Republic of China, or are they solely focused on defending their own territories? Although regional nations’ aims may often overlap, they also diverge in some cases. Partner-capacity development must therefore reflect the distinction between deterrence and territorial defense. The US military has been diligently building relationships and developing partner capacity in the Indo-Pacific region for years, conducting dozens of exercises annually and recently establishing the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center.2 These efforts in the Indo-Pacific region have increased with the US military’s attempt to shift away from the Middle East, and President Joe Biden’s declaration that China is “the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.”3 Regardless of efforts in the region, not all relationships with partners are equal; the potential assistance each partner would be willing to provide the US military in a conflict with China will vary for myriad reasons. Although each nation’s support requirements and development goals are distinct, assistance through military sales is a foundational aspect of building capacity, providing allies and partners a venue for acquiring military equipment. The Foreign Military Sales program, often critiqued for its inefficiencies, is being revamped by the US Department of State and Department of Defense.4 Partner nations purchasing US military equipment will remain focused on their own national interests, which for many partners remain security and the defense of sovereign territory. Updates to how the United States approaches military sales can also be tailored to support US military interests more effectively. In other words, US strategic objectives should underpin the prioritization of sales to specific countries, and US efforts should extend beyond financial benefits or the intangibles of building partnerships. To account for the unique and distinct challenges the US military faces in the Indo-Pacific theater, the modernization of Foreign Military Sales should aim to provide the United States with a relative military advantage over China by tailoring the program’s approach to arming allies in a way that complements US military efforts in the region. Modernizing Foreign Military Sales begins by categorizing nations based on their expected roles in a potential clash between the United States and China.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Partnerships, and Arms Sales
Political Geography:: China, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

424. A Baseline Assessment of the PLA Army's Border Reinforcement Operations in the Aksai Chin in 2020 and 2021

Author:: Dennis J. Blasko
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: This report analyzes the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) border reinforcement operation throughout the Aksai Chin and adjacent areas from summer 2020 to early 2021. It is based largely on analysis of Google Earth imagery and provides a baseline for further analysis of the PLA deployment along the entire Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Aksai Chin. Chinese Army units appear ready to remain in a defensive posture near the LAC the Aksai Chin indefinitely. This effort is the land domain equivalent of Chinese military maritime operations in the South China Sea and air and sea deterrent operations directed toward Taiwan.
Topic:: Armed Forces, Military, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China, India, Xinjiang, and Aksai Chin

425. War with China: A View from Early 2024

Author:: Marco J. Lyons
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: US defense analysts are overdue for a fundamental reassessment of the strategic factors that would shape a future Sino-American war. The United States may lower the overall risk of sparking a war between Washington and Beijing by more formally committing advanced US capabilities in intelligence collection and targeting, long-range fires, and theater air and missile defense to Japan and South Korea and by initiating bilateral planning to introduce such capabilities in Taiwan in the future. The US defense community still lacks a broad and integrated national strategy for successfully managing the rivalry with China. A clear-eyed assessment of a possible United States-China war could lead to a national strategy.
Topic:: Security, Intelligence, Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Taiwan, Asia, United States of America, and South China Sea

426. Decisive Decade: PRC Global Strategy and the PLA as a Pacing Challenge – 2023 PLA Conference

Author:: George R. Shatzer and Joshua Arostegui
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Book
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: The US Army War College’s 2023 Conference on the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was held February 22 to 24, 2023, at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The conference, entitled “Decisive Decade: PRC Global Strategy and the PLA as Pacing Challenge,” featured presentations on PRC global and regional strategy, and the PLA’s enabling role by experts from a wide range of academic, media, and government agencies and organizations. The conference papers better defined the notion of the PLA as a pacing challenge as evidenced by PRC strategies and activities in various regions to build a much stronger appreciation of how PLA operations in these locations matter to each other and the whole of the PRC’s broader national strategy. The event also included presentations on Chinese military deterrence and potential justifications for a cross-Strait conflict following US House Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022. Specific topics included the PRC’s acceleration of military reforms and its extending reach; how the PRC can use various regional crises to justify military action against Taiwan; countering PRC military strength in Northeast Asia; and the PRC’s growing economic and security engagements with Latin America, Africa, South Asia, Russia, and Europe.
Topic:: Security, Bilateral Relations, Military, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and Asia

427. Episode 04: Exporting the War on Terror: Islamophobia in Asia

Author:: Sahar Aziz and Khaled A. Beydoun
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Center for Security, Race and Rights (CSRR), Rutgers University School of Law
Abstract:: Host Sahar Aziz and Arizona State University Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law Professor Khaled Beydoun discuss the latest legal and political developments in the troubling rise of global Islamophobia in India, China, and other Asian countries. The conversation is informed by Professor Beydoun’s new book The New Crusades: Islamophobia and the Global War on Muslims.
Topic:: Politics, Law, Discrimination, Islamophobia, War on Terror, and Muslims
Political Geography:: China, India, and Asia

428. The Russia Factor in China’s Relations with the West

Author:: Klaus W. Larres and Lea Thome
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: Tension between China and the Western world has been a characteristic of global affairs for the better part of the last decade. Notwithstanding Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the United States continues to view China as its greatest global rival and competitor. In fact, many policymakers in Washington (though by no means all of them) view China as an existential threat to America’s global influence and predominance. As the European Union and its 27 member states are not among the world’s superpowers, the Europeans have a somewhat more relaxed attitude toward China. Still, according to an important policy statement issued by the EU Commission in 2019, Brussels has come to see Beijing not only as a “partner and competitor” but also as a serious “systemic rival.” This refers less to geopolitical concerns but very much to global governance issues and geoeconomic, trade, and investment relations with China. The EU is deeply concerned about the continuing lack of reciprocity of market access, intellectual property theft, and China’s frequently state-subsidized competition regarding cutting-edge technology products, including solar panels, EV vehicles, and many other products, which may soon swamp the EU market. The EU Commission has launched an investigation into China’s production of EV vehicles and also Beijing’s shipbuilding industry, which it suspects may well work on the basis of rather unfair and highly subsidized support from the Chinese state.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Markets, Geopolitics, Economy, Strategic Competition, and Production
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

429. Digital Governance: Technology Tensions with China and Implications

Author:: Alex He and Robert Fay
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:: As a superpower that is deeply integrated in global supply chains, China is becoming an economic giant, but its use of technology to capture data using methods that may pose cyber- and national security risks is raising concerns. While some view China’s motivations as an attempt to advance its status from an upper-middle-income economy to a developed economy, others see more nefarious intentions behind its authoritarian, top-down governance model. Further complicating the situation is the growing technology competition between China, the United States and Europe over the control of data, the technologies that use this data and the values upon which they should be used. The Centre for International Governance Innovation’s second annual conference on Digital Governance in China explored these and other issues related to the global implications of China’s governance model in the digital age.
Topic:: Development, Science and Technology, Governance, Economy, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:: China and Asia

430. Defining Peace: A content analysis of Brazil's, China's, and the European Union's discourses on the Ukraine War

Author:: Luis Gouveia Junior
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:: Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:: Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, many political leaders have vowed to settle this conflict. Although Brazil, China, and the European Union were among these voices, some have accused these international actors of propelling the war. This study offers a content analysis of the speeches proffered by Lula da Silva, Ursula Von der Leyen, and Xi Jinping, the political leaders of these three actors. This analysis concluded that Ursula Von der Leyen mentions peace fewer times, accounts solely for Russia’s responsibility for the war, and presents a perspective akin to International Relations neoliberal theory. Meanwhile, Lula da Silva provides some views closer to Johan Galtung’s theories. Nevertheless, the Brazilian president does not clearly explain the beginning of the war, affirming that negotiation is the pathway to peace. Finally, Xi Jinping stresses his Global Security Initiative and avoids calling “war” what is happening in Ukraine.
Topic:: International Relations, European Union, Peace, Russia-Ukraine War, and Discourse Analysis
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Brazil

431. Is Guanxi Changing? Referral Hiring and Social Networks in China

Author:: Elena Obukhova and Yao Lu
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: What is the role of guanxi in China today? To answer this question, Professor Elena Obukhova examines the relationship between social networks and referral hiring. In the first study, she compares China and the US. In the second study, she explores differences between China’s provinces. This event is part of the 2023-2024 lecture series on “Labor Market Transformations in China" and is hosted by the Weatherhead East Asian Institute and cosponsored by Columbia's China Center for Social Policy.
Topic:: Markets, Labor Issues, Social Networks, and Hiring
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

432. Wuhan: How the COVID-19 Outbreak in China Spiraled Out of Control

Author:: Dali Yang, Qin Gao, Junyan Jiang, and Xiaobo Lü
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: The Covid-19 pandemic, which began as an outbreak in Wuhan in late 2019, has claimed millions of lives and caused unprecedented disruptions. Despite its generation-defining significance, there has been a surprising lack of independent research examining the decisions and measures implemented in the weeks leading up to the Wuhan lockdown, as well as the missteps and shortcomings that allowed the novel coronavirus to spread with minimal hindrance. In this book talk, Wuhan: How the COVID-19 Outbreak in China Spiraled Out of Control, Dali L. Yang scrutinizes China's emergency response to the Covid-19 outbreak in Wuhan, delving into the government's handling of epidemic information and the decisions that influenced the scale and scope of the outbreak. Yang's research reveals that China's health decision-makers and experts had an excellent head start when they implemented a health emergency action program to respond to the outbreak at the end of December 2019. With granular detail and compelling immediacy, Yang investigates the political and bureaucratic processes that hindered information flows and sharing, as well as the cognitive framework that limited understanding of the virus's contagiousness and hampered effective decisions and enabled the outbreak to spiral out of control.
Topic:: Government, Crisis Management, Bureaucracy, COVID-19, Decision-Making, Zero-COVID, and Emergencies
Political Geography:: China and Asia

433. China and Latin America: A New Assessment

Author:: Parsifal D'Sola Alvarado and Xiaobo Lü
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: Parsifal D'Sola, a MARSEA alum, will deliver a presentation offering a general overview of the current state and prospective trends in China-Latin America relations. The talk will explore the evolving interactions and strategic dynamics between China and Latin American countries, highlighting developments over the past two decades. Key areas of discussion include the impact of the Belt and Road Initiative in Latin America and the peripheral effects of US-China tensions on the region. An important aspect of the presentation will be examining the diverse perceptions of China across Latin American countries and how these views influence bilateral relations and policy decisions. D'Sola will also share his thoughts on future trends, offering a broad perspective on the likely course of China's engagement with Latin America in the coming years. Speaker's Bio: Parsifal D’Sola is the founder and executive director of the Andres Bello Foundation – China Latin America Research Center in Bogota, Colombia. He is a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub. Parsifal is a Chinese foreign policy analyst specializing in Sino-Latin American relations with a focus on Venezuela. Between 2019 and 2020, he acted as Chinese foreign policy advisor to the Foreign Affairs Minister of the Interim Government of Venezuela. He holds a BS in Telecommunications Engineering from Universidad Católica Andrés Bello, an MA in East Asian Studies from Columbia University, an MSc in International Politics from the School of Oriental and African Studies, London University, and an advance language diploma from Beijing Language and Culture University.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Latin America

434. The White Crane of Alagśa: Legends of the Sixth Dalai Lama in Mongolia

Author:: Sangseraima Ujeed and Gray Tuttle
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: The Sixth Dalai Lama Tsangyang Gyatso (1683-1706/46) was recognized in secrecy, lived in controversy, and passed out of history in mystery. The popular tradition holds that he died whilst travelling to Beijing. Yet in some parts of Mongolia, it is believed that the exiled Sixth Dalai Lama escaped his captors and lived out his life in the dessert Gobi region of Alagśa, Inner Mongolia. To this day in Alagśa, the figure of the Sixth Dalai Lama still serves as a central pillar of the Alagśan identity, religion, and cultural pride among the local Mongolian population. Based on new materials in the form of oral histories, local legends, folk songs, poems, and textual sources which I collected about the Sixth Dalai Lama and the reincarnation of the Desi Sanggye Gyatso in Alagśa during a research trip in 2019, this paper will explore the formation of religio-cultural identity and the invention of tradition in the Alagśa during the early eighteenth century. This is not a paper that tries to solve the mystery of Tsangyang Gyatso’s death, but rather, one that explores the role Tsangyang Gyatso played for the Alagśa Mongols in creating narratives of identity and their realm Alagśa as an authentic Buddhist central place. This is a story of how Tsangyang Gyatso, his identities, and his interpersonal relationships were reborn in Alagśa and the role he played in consolidating Alagśa’s place within the wider geopolitical spheres of the cosmopolitan Buddhist world that spanned the Himalayas, Inner Asia, and the Qing.
Topic:: Religion, History, Geopolitics, Identity, Tradition, Dalai Lama, and Reincarnation
Political Geography:: China, Mongolia, and Asia

435. Freedom Undone: The Assault on Liberal Values and Institutions in Hong Kong

Author:: Michael Davis and Junyan Jiang
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: A lot has been written about the 2019 protests in Hong Kong and the aggressive police crackdown offered in response. Much less has been written about the more severe assault on liberal values and institutions that followed. In his new book Professor Davis takes a forensic look at both the growing Beijing intervention in Hong Kong affairs from the handover forward and its culmination in the more severe crackdown that followed the 2019 protest, the 2020 passage of the National Security Law, and the 2021 Beijing imposition of a patriots-only electoral system. This talk will highlight the comprehensive impact of these developments on Hong Kong’s rule of law, its criminal justice system, and the many freedoms for which the vibrant city was long known—often previously ranking among the highest in the world. The diminution of basic freedoms has touched nearly all sectors of society, including education, the media, public broadcasting, civil society organizations, legal services, and so on. The city long known for a vibrant public debate, its vigorous media landscape, and some of the largest non-violent protests in the world has gone silent. The sheer comprehensiveness of this imposition raises questions not only for Hong Kong but for liberal democratic values globally, as autocratic regimes such as the PRC seek to advance their illiberal agenda.
Topic:: Protests, Institutions, Liberalism, and Autocracy
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Hong Kong

436. Outsourcing Repression: Everyday State Power in Contemporary China

Author:: Lynette Ong and Junyan Jiang
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: How do states coerce citizens into compliance while simultaneously minimizing backlash? In Outsourcing Repression, Lynette Ong examines how the Chinese state engages nonstate actors, from violent street gangsters to nonviolent grassroots brokers, to coerce and mobilize the masses to pursue its ambitious urbanization project. She draws on ethnographic research conducted annually from 2011 to 2019--the years from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping, a unique and original event dataset, and a collection of government regulations in a study of everyday land grabs and housing demolition in China. Theorizing a counterintuitive form of repression that reduces resistance and backlash, Ong invites the reader to reimagine the new ground state power credibly occupies. Everyday state power is quotidian power acquired through society by penetrating nonstate territories and mobilizing the masses within. After the book’s publication, Lynette has extended the arguments to explain the success, failure, and implications of China’s Zero-Covid Policy in the Journal of Democracy, Foreign Affairs and the Economist etc. Outsourcing Repression has won the American Sociology Association’s Distinguished Contribution to Scholarship in Political Sociology, and the Human Rights Best Book Awards from the American Political Science Association, the American Sociological Association, and the International Studies Association.
Topic:: Non State Actors, Governance, State, Coercion, Zero-COVID, and State Power
Political Geography:: China and Asia

437. China’s Responsibility, and Ours: The Persecution and Neglect of Stateless North Korean Children

Author:: Rob York, Hannah Cole, and Kaylin Kim
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: What happens to the children of North Korean women who are born in China? What happens when they remain in China, or when they escape to other countries? It is believed that as many as 300,000 North Koreans have fled the country—most of them since the famine of the 1990s, and most of them women. To address China’s “bare branches”—its much larger population of young men than young women—North Korean women are often sold to young Chinese men as brides. The children of these brides will be born stateless, lack legal rights, and face the ever-present danger of their mothers’ deportation back to North Korea because they are considered illegal immigrants in China. These unique challenges persist, despite China being a party to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, among other international treaties. Even those children that eventually escape to third-party countries are haunted by their status, as their statelessness caused legal hindrances to their ability to settle and, specifically in South Korea, deprives them of government assistance. This study documents the treatment of “stateless” children born to North Korean and Chinese parents. It delineates the factors that contribute to their mistreatment—China’s unwillingness to anger the North Korean government, South Korea’s growing disinterest in North Korean defectors, and a lack of formal networks for North Korean defectors elsewhere. It further finds that, with China openly hostile toward “meddling” in its internal affairs, the most likely source of relief for these children will be a change in attitudes among South Koreans, the United States, and their allies and partners, resulting in conscious effort by their governments and civil societies to help them, both financially and in assisting with their assimilation.
Topic:: Human Rights, International Law, Children, and Statelessness
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and North Korea

438. Gender in Strategic Competition: A Non-Traditional Strategy for Building Resilience in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: Charity Borg
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Today’s era is defined by strategic competition with “autocrats [who] are working overtime to undermine democracy and export a model of governance marked by repression at home and coercion abroad.”[1] The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is the leading autocratic force, operating with both the intent to reshape the democratic rules-based international order and the resources to advance those aims. States interested in upholding the international rules-based order must enhance their ability to withstand PRC coercion and invest in cultivating a values-based security alliance against the spread of authoritarianism. International collaboration on the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda offers a low-cost, high-return opportunity to bolster national and regional resistance to authoritarian coercion while building a coalition of like-minded allies and partners. Increasing national resilience and building alliances that center on enhancing the security of women is a data-backed approach that ensures elevated state stability, democracy, and economic prosperity while increasing the likelihood of a coalition’s willingness to defend the current international rules-based order from those who seek to dismantle it. An overwhelming body of empirical analysis demonstrates a significant correlation between the security of women and the democratic or authoritarian tendencies of a state. That same analysis also finds that women’s security is a precondition for a state’s level of democracy. Otherwise stated, countries with higher levels of gender equality are more democratic, less corrupt, and more stable. Whereas “states with higher levels of violence against women are less peaceful [internally and] internationally, less compliant with international norms, and less likely to have good relations with neighboring states,” they are also more likely to align with autocratic governance structures.[1] Authoritarian states such as the PRC understand the benefits of empowered societies, which is why their actions on domestic and international fronts actively seek to suppress women. They fear that like-minded allies and partners will successfully improve security for fifty percent of the population and, as a result, will ultimately tip the scales of power and influence to preserve the values-based international order they desire to uproot. Interest and investment in the WPS agenda are growing around the globe, but not fast enough. Thus far, 18 Indo-Pacific states and one regional organization have sought meaningful engagement and integration of the WPS agenda by various means, opening a door for cooperation across the spectrum of civil, diplomatic, and military security cooperation engagements.[2] However, several transformative policy and operational measures must be implemented to achieve the desired end states. To be transformative and enable lasting change in governmental and national behavior, the thoughtful implementation of the WPS agenda at all levels, from national and subnational to the community and household, is required. First, domestic and international policymakers need to clearly define the security of women as a national security imperative. Second, implementing WPS in the defense sector should focus on training defense personnel to apply a gender perspective to enhance mission effectiveness. Last, those advancing WPS must take an inclusive, context-specific, and localized approach to its integration. To defend the current rules-based international order, like-minded countries must accelerate change and follow through by investing in women’s security.
Topic:: Security, Investment, Strategic Competition, Resilience, Gender, Women, Peace, and and Security (WPS)
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

439. Enhancing the Cooperation between the US and Its Allies in the Mekong Subregion

Author:: Sach Nguyen
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The Mekong subregion is experiencing heightened geopolitical competition between the US and China, representing a clash between the international rules-based order and a China-led order. While the US and its allies advocate for the rules-based order, China’s intentions for its own order in the region are debated. China’s increased presence and influence in the Mekong subregion, particularly through upstream control of the Mekong water, reflect its pursuit of this order. In response, the US and its allies, such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia, have strengthened cooperation with one another to promote a rules-based system. Despite existing coordination, there is potential for further collaboration to enhance their role in mainland Southeast Asia. Stability and prosperity in the Mekong subregion are being challenged. Weakening international norms in governing transboundary waters threaten downstream countries’ security and livelihoods, exacerbated by climate change-induced droughts. China’s growing engagement in the region aims to establish its sphere of influence, primarily through economic development projects like dams and railways, raising concerns over environmental impacts and expanding Chinese influence. Additionally, non-traditional security threats such as the COVID-19 pandemic, cyber security, and human trafficking further complicate the region’s situation. The engagement of the US and its allies in the Mekong subregion is multifaceted, driven by various interests but united in countering China’s growing influence. The US, through initiatives like the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) and later the Mekong-US Partnership, seeks to maintain its relevance and preeminence in the region. Japan, South Korea, and Australia also engage with the subregion, for economic interests and to counterbalance China. Japan, for instance, aims to establish production bases and balance China’s influence through high-standard infrastructure projects. South Korea focuses on economic development and diversification of trade amid US-China tensions, while Australia prioritizes promoting a rules-based order and addressing non-traditional security threats. Despite differences in approach, the US and its allies collaborate through platforms like the Friends of the Mekong and initiatives such as the Trilateral Partnership for Infrastructure Investment in the Indo-Pacific, aimed at countering China’s Belt and Road Initiative. However, challenges remain in realizing these initiatives, particularly in engaging the private sector and ensuring concrete outcomes amidst competing interests and complex negotiations. Recommendations for enhancing cooperation between the US and its allies in the Mekong subregion include strengthening international norms and rules, expanding economic infrastructure projects, focusing on non-traditional security issues, and fostering track 1.5 and track 2 diplomacy to promote mutual understanding and collaboration among all stakeholders, including governments, academia, businesses, and civil society organizations. These efforts, facilitated by the US and its allies, can contribute to a more stable and prosperous Mekong subregion.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, Geopolitics, International Order, and Competition
Political Geography:: China, Asia, United States of America, and Mekong River

440. A Subdued Environment and Missed Opportunities

Author:: Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Chinese diplomacy toward the Korean Peninsula in late 2023 sputtered forward, driven more by a calendar of bilateral anniversaries with North Korea and multilateral gatherings involving South Korea than any sense of strategic purpose. Both relationships seemed preoccupied with off-stage developments such as the September summit between Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin and the momentum of US-Japan-South Korea trilateral relations, rather than any inherent dynamism of their own. Still, regular Sino-North Korean bilateral exchanges ahead of the 75th anniversary of the bilateral relationship and Sino-South Korean bilateral economic dialogues provide opportunities to overcome resistance and sustain progress in the face of deepening major power rivalries. Senior-level dialogues between China and North Korea occurred on North Korea’s 75th founding anniversary in September, with the visit of Chinese Vice Premier Liu Guozhong to Pyongyang, a visit that occurred against the backdrop of the second US-South Korea Nuclear Consultative Group meeting, North Korea’s first successful indigenous satellite launch, and North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Pak Myong Ho’s visit to Beijing. Meanwhile, ministerial and working-level economic dialogues on issues such as supply-chain stability, export controls, and trade facilitation continued between China and South Korea, punctuated by a notable bilateral exchange between Chinese President Xi Jinping and South Korean Prime Minister Han Duck-soo in late September on the 19th Asian Games in Hangzhou. But these exchanges did not generate the traction necessary for South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol to have substantive bilateral meetings with President Xi on the sidelines of the APEC meeting in San Francisco in November. Bilateral and trilateral foreign ministerial meetings in Busan between South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin and counterparts Wang Yi and Kamikawa Yoko—the first in four years—failed to generate sufficient momentum to set a date for the resumption of China-Japan-South Korea summitry. Instead, the resumption of China-South Korea or China-Japan-South Korea summitry will depend on developments in 2024.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Dialogue, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: China, South Korea, and North Korea

441. Taiwan Voters Choose Independence

Author:: David J. Keegan and Kyle Churchman
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Taiwan’s election campaign has concluded. Voters went to the polls on Jan. 13. As has been the case in almost every election, cross-Strait relations with China were the central issue, a secondary issue being President Tsai Ing-wen’s management of the economy. The outcome of the election will largely dictate the course of Taiwan-China relations over at least the next four years. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate and President Tsai Ing-wen’s chosen successor, William Lai Ching-te, the eventual winner, proclaims that Taiwan is already independent as the Republic of China. It should continue to diversify economic linkages away from China, strengthen military deterrence, and hope that China will eventually offer talks without one-China preconditions. The opposition Kuomintang candidate, Hou Yu-ih, called for expanded cross-Strait economic ties and dialogue with China under the one-China banner to reduce tensions while Taiwan also builds its military deterrence. China has deployed economic sticks, gray-zone military intimidation, and fake news to influence the election. Washington has expanded its support for Taiwan’s self-defense, though less vigorously than Republican critics in Congress would like. Taiwan and the US have continued to expand trade ties in ways that will benefit Taiwan businesses though without tariff concessions that Taiwan eagerly wants. Now that Taiwan voters have elected William Lai, as the polls predicted, China will likely respond with increasing coercion. Had Hou Yu-ih been victorious, his challenge would have been to navigate between Beijing’s pressure for cross-Strait concessions and Washington’s suspicions of any such steps by Taiwan.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Sovereignty, Voting, and Presidential Elections
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

442. Biden-Xi Woodside Summit and the Slow Rehabilitation of US-PRC Ties

Author:: Sourabh Gupta
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The “guardrails” that President Biden and President Xi envisaged in Bali in November 2022 began to be emplaced at their November 2023 summit in Woodside, California. In-person, leader-led communication was deepened, reassurances exchanged, and practical—albeit modest—“deliverables” locked down on several fronts, including restarting mil-mil communications, cracking down on fentanyl precursors, addressing the national security harms of artificial intelligence (AI), and increased people-to-people exchanges. The establishment of numerous bilateral working groups will ensure an almost full plate of across-the-board consultations in 2024 as well as the means to troubleshoot irritants on short notice. As stabilizing as the Woodside summit was, it failed to deflect the US-PRC relationship from its larger overall trajectory of “selective decoupling” across a range of advanced technologies and frontier industries (microelectronics; quantum; AI; biomanufacturing; clean energy). Strategic trade controls and other competitive actions were doubled down upon. With a pivotal US presidential election looming in 2024, questions abound on the longer-term durability of a rehabilitating US-PRC relationship.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Trade, Xi Jinping, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

443. Beijing Moderates Criticisms Selectively

Author:: Robert G. Sutter and Chin-Hao Huang
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Beijing in this reporting period moderated often shrill rhetoric of the past two years criticizing Joseph Biden administration advances and regional governments cooperating with the US. Emphasizing China’s positive contributions to regional economic growth, Beijing stressed its flexibility, said to be different from Washington in not pressing regional states to choose between the US and China, even as it demonstrated ambitions to develop a new regional and global order favorable to itself. Nevertheless, glaring exceptions included egregious pressures to compel deference to China’s claims in the South China Sea, harsh criticism of the Philippines and Japan cooperating closely with the United States, as well as authoritative foreign policy statements giving regional governments little choice between two paths forward: cooperation with an avowedly beneficial China or America’s purported exploitative, divisive and destructive initiatives. Regarding the Philippines, an unprecedented show of support by the US for the territorial claims of its treaty ally resulted in an equally unprecedented pushback from Beijing.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, Rivalry, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Southeast Asia

444. Taiwan and China—Steady As She Goes

Author:: David J. Keegan and Kyle Churchman
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: As 2024 dawned, Chinese President Xi Jinping reiterated in his New Year Address that Taiwan must unify with China. In her New Year Address, Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen, with the election of her successor only 14 days away, repeated her offer to meet China on the basis of equality, mutual respect, and without preconditions, echoing themes dating back to her first inaugural address in 2016. On Jan. 14, Tsai’s chosen successor, Vice President Lai Ching-te, won an unprecedented third successive term for the Democratic Progressive Party, promising to uphold the independence of the Republic of China, but the party lost its majority in the legislature. A month later, two Chinese fishermen operating illegally near Kinmen Island died when their boat capsized as they were pursued by the Taiwan Coast Guard. Five days later, a Chinese Coast Guard vessel boarded and inspected a Taiwanese tour boat near Kinmen. Tensions grew but they did not boil over. On Jan. 30, China unilaterally moved its M503 civil aviation flight route closer to the median line of the Taiwan Strait. Premier Li Qiang included the obligatory call for Taiwan reunification in his Work Report to China’s National People’s Congress (NPC). Some analysts found that and other NPC references to Taiwan more strident than in recent years, but any change in tone was subtle. In apparent retaliation for Lai’s electoral victory, China persuaded Nauru to switch diplomatic ties from Taiwan to China even as Taiwan continued to strengthen unofficial relations with larger powers. These Taiwan efforts were supported by US President Biden, who used a trilateral meeting with Japan and the Philippines to call for cross-Strait stability. Taiwan’s continuing negotiation with the US of a 21st Century Trade Initiative and TSMC’s decision to expand new facilities under construction in Arizona exemplified Taiwan’s continuing diversification of economic linkages away from China. President-elect Lai will be inaugurated on May 20; his inaugural speech and China’s response could portend the future course of cross-Strait relations.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Regional Security, and Cross-Strait Relations
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

445. China’s New Foreign Policy Moderation—Mixed Regional Implications

Author:: Robert G. Sutter and Chin-Hao Huang
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Incorporating major foreign policy initiatives of leader Xi Jinping, Beijing completed its effort from the past two years with instructions in January on China’s new approach to foreign affairs to Chinese foreign policy officials and others concerned. The new approach added authority and momentum to Beijing’s emphasis since Xi’s summit with US President Joe Biden last November on greater Chinese moderation and restraint as a “responsible” great power pursuing peace and development in dealing with Southeast Asian neighbors and elsewhere. Nevertheless, Beijing remains selective in how it applies moderation, and the record of the past two years shows great swings between moderation and truculence in its approach to foreign affairs, depending on circumstances which remain subject to change. The success of China’s regional importance showed in Singapore’s Institute of Southeast Asian Studies annual survey of regional elites with China viewed as both the leading economic and political-security power, overshadowing the United States, and the judgment that if forced to choose between them, more respondents would select China than the United States. Caveats to these positives for China include continuing strong regional concerns over China’s ambitions in Southeast Asia and the fact that the survey came during the height of the war in Gaza by Israel, which is supported by the US and viewed very negatively in the region. Meanwhile, the defiance of the Philippines, with strong military and political support from the United States, Japan, Australia, India, and other allies and partners, against coercive measures in the disputed South China Sea represented a major test of China’s avowed “restraint” in dealing with foreign differences.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Territorial Disputes, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: China and Southeast Asia

446. Ties Stabilize While Negative Undercurrents Deepen

Author:: Sourabh Gupta
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: US-China relations were marked by a paradox during the first trimester of 2024. On the one hand, a distinct stabilization was evident in ties. The two sides made concerted efforts to translate their leaders’ ‘San Francisco Vision’ into reality. Cabinet officials exchanged visits across the Pacific, working groups and dialogue mechanisms met in earnest and produced outcomes, functional cooperation was deepened, sensitive issues such as Taiwan were carefully managed, and effort was devoted to improving the relationship’s political optics. On the other hand, the negative tendencies in ties continued to deepen. Both sides introduced additional selective decoupling as well as cybersecurity measures in key information and communications technology and services sectors, with US actions bearing the signs of desinicization—rather than mere decoupling—of relevant supply chains. The chasm in strategic perception remained as wide as before. In sum, the “new normal” in US-China relations continued to take form, one piece at a time. What a difference a year makes. At this time in late-April last year, the US and China were barely communicating, still smarting from the balloon incident of February 2023. It was not until US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and CPC Central Foreign Affairs Commission Director Wang Yi met in Vienna in mid-May 2023 that a semblance of normality began to be restored to the relationship. Twelve months on, there has been an almost across-the-board restoration of communication channels, a deepening of functional cooperation across issues areas, and a concerted effort to manage the political optics of the relationship for the better – this, despite deep differences in strategic perception between the two sides.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

447. Understanding Muslim Countries’ Support for China’s Actions in Xinjiang: A Qualitative-Comparative Analysis

Author:: Bruno Hendler, Marcelo Corrêa, and William Wuttke Martins
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Contexto Internacional
Institution:: Institute of International Relations, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro
Abstract:: This study examines why 23 Muslim-majority countries supported China at the United Nations Human Rights Council (UN/HRC) in 2019, despite allegations of human rights abuses against the Uyghurs in Xinjiang. Using a fuzzy-set qualitative-comparative analysis (fsQCA), we compared the factors that led Muslim-majority and non-Muslim countries to support China. Our analysis found that Political Regime Affinity (PRA) was a necessary but not a sufficient condition for Muslim-majority countries to support China, while China’s Foreign Aid (ODA) was a necessary but not sufficient condition for non-Muslim countries. These findings suggest that ideological factors, related to the autocratic political regime (PRA), played a significant role in Muslim-majority countries’ decision to support China in the UN/HRC in 2019. However, it is important to note that other factors may have also been involved. These findings have important implications for understanding the complexities of international relations and the factors that shape states behaviour.
Topic:: International Relations, Diplomacy, UN Human Rights Council (HRC), Uyghurs, and State Behavior
Political Geography:: China and Xinjiang

448. Chinese Double Effect on Brazilian Foreign Policy (2003-2018)

Author:: Yuri Bravo Coutinho and Júlio César Cossio Rodriguez
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Contexto Internacional
Institution:: Institute of International Relations, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro
Abstract:: This research examines contemporary Brazilian foreign policy, and its central concern is to explore how China’s global rise has impacted the general guidelines of Brazilian foreign policy from 2003 to 2018. We argue that China has had a double impact on Brazilian foreign policy: (i) restraining its scope due to the restrictive nature of Sino-Brazilian relations, primarily via commerce and political divergence, and (ii) enhancing Brazil’s autonomous insertion in the international system due to the structural gaps produced by Chinese diplomatic support in the global sphere and from the convergence of specific agendas. A case study on Sino-Brazilian relations is conducted with typologies on foreign policy actions elaborated by Schweller (1994). Then, we propose that Brazilian foreign policy, through the ‘bandwagoning for profit’ strategy, sought to interpret a Jackal position within the international system. Our variables are defined based on Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell (2016), considering the structural stimulus of China’s rise as the independent variable, the permissiveness, and clarity of the international system as the intervening variable, and the behaviour of Brazilian foreign policy as a dependent variable.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Neoclassical Realism
Political Geography:: China, Brazil, and South America

449. Between State Capitalism and Economic State Craft: China INC.

Author:: Sadia Rahman
Publication Date:: 08-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: China’s economy underwent regulatory, structural as well as spatial makeovers since the increase of opening up and reforms in 1978. Intermittent policy interventions have been implemented by the Chinese state to ensure that the economy plays a vital role. Relatedly, the Communist leadership’s economic perspective was shaped by two key attributes: ideology and functionality (pp. 8, 11, 42, 119, 148, 313, 314). From an ideological perspective, the legacy of reforms was as crucial as the equitable principle of Communist rule in China, as both ensured the party’s survival and its control over the state. From a functional perspective, the state’s performance remained an essential indicator for China to achieve economic growth and improve the living conditions of its people. In his book, Between State Capitalism and Economic State Craft: China INC, China expert Aravind Yelery captures the systemic reflections of these transitions, mapping how the state fused growth and encouraged further opening to help China manifest its rise. The book delves into China’s growth models examining how these contradictions are ‘chosen ones’ and how China aims to rally its economic statecraft globally. The central crux is the Communist Party of China’s (CPC) authority retention over the economy by preventing the state from giving up control over important sectors and industries. State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) played a vital part in achieving this goal in China’s economy, allowing the CPC to control governance. Thus, the chapters are significantly interconnected enlightening on the ascendancy of capitalist approaches in the CPC, exploring how China managed to defy the decline experienced by previous communist regimes. The explanation of SOEs is presented as a key factor in establishing effective domestic economic controls, ultimately enabling China to exert its dominance in global economic affairs.
Topic:: Economics, Regulation, and State Capitalism
Political Geography:: China and Asia

450. Contemporary China in Anglo-American and Chinese Perspectives: Making Sense of a Rising China

Author:: Batuhan Ay
Publication Date:: 08-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: In the book Contemporary China in Anglo-American and Chinese Perspectives: Making Sense of a Rising China, Emre Demir aims to analyze China’s rise by displaying the differences and similarities in scholarly discourse in Western and Chinese scholarship. The book examines a collection of 14 approaches from scholars of mainstream United States (U.S.), critical Western, mainstream Chinese, and critical Chinese approaches and seeks to reveal their relevant power-knowledge nexuses and region-centric characteristics in knowledge production, with a particular focus on the current power structure in knowledge production in Chinese and U.S. societies. Demir indicates that every approach occupies a position within the three-layered structure of knowledge production: core, semi-periphery, and periphery. Currently, the U.S. assumes the core (hegemonic) position within social sciences knowledge production, which enables it to dominate the means of knowledge production and direct the ways in which knowledge is produced. Therefore, the U.S. can globally reproduce its own theories, which it benefits from, under the guise of universal validity. Moreover, Demir advocates the diversification of intellectual knowledge in the social sciences, a human-centric approach instead of a region-centric one, a focus on the colonial histories of societies, and the decolonization of International Relations (IR).
Topic:: International Relations, Hegemony, Geopolitics, and Knowledge Production
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and England

Search

Search Constraints

Search Results

Refine your search

Topic

Political Geography

Content Type

Journal

Publishing Institution

Author

Publication Year

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS