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161. China in Iraq

Author:
Ingrid D'Hooghe, Vera Kranenburg, and Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
China’s main objective in Iraq is to ensure a reliable supply of oil that diversifies Beijing’s imports without making it dependent on Baghdad. China has a large economic footprint in Iraq, moderately strong diplomatic ties and is marginally relevant from a security perspective. Specifically, 50-67% of Iraq’s oil production comes from fields where Chinese companies are involved as investors, producers or in field servicing roles. Iraq’s political elites welcome Chinese engagement as its foreign policy is less intrusive and more respectful than the United States, its presence creates alternatives and its economic deals are profitable on Iraqi terms.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Oil, Bilateral Relations, and Imports
Political Geography:
China, Iraq, Middle East, and Asia

162. The First 90 Days of Trump 2.0

Author:
Rachel Tausenfreund, Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff, Claudia Schmucker, Aylin Matlé, and Stefan Meister
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
This report examines the first 90 days of the Trump 2.0 administration and offers strategic recommendations for the new German government and its partners in Europe and beyond. DGAP experts analyze the administration’s priorities and methods across key policy areas and explore how best to respond. The opening chapter outlines the ideological foundations of Trump’s new coalition and their foreign policy implications, concluding with key insights and policy takeaways.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, Climate Change, Migration, Science and Technology, Trade, Donald Trump, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, Germany, and United States of America

163. Towards a Trade War in 2025: Real Threats for the World Economy, False Promises for the US

Author:
Antoine Bouët, Leysa Maty Sall, and Yu Zheng
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:
Using the MIRAGE-Power model, we simulate a trade war initiated in 2025 by the new US administration. The central scenario consists in a 60 percentage point tariff increase on all US imports from China, a 10 percentage point tariff increase on all products from other partners, except Canada and Mexico, and reciprocal tariff retaliation. World GDP and world trade decrease respectively by 0.5% and 3.4% in volume, with significant losses for the US and China, and gains for Canada and Mexico. A substantial reallocation of bilateral goods trade flows is taking place at global level. Additional scenarios show that: details of the tariff reform matter; the discriminatory tariff treatment of China benefits other trading partners; trade retaliation increases US economic losses; if Non-Tariff Measures are included in this trade war, the consequences are worse; if Canada and Mexico are included in the trade war, both experience significant losses in terms of GDP and trade. Last, we show that the US will not be able to replace the federal income tax with tariff revenues, even with a revenue-maximizing tariff.
Topic:
GDP, Economy, Tariffs, Trade Wars, Trade, and Retaliation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

164. Deep Down in the Stack: China's Entrenchment in Serbia's Technology Landscape

Author:
Sharinee Jagtiani
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Serbia, a land-locked nation with a population of under seven million, has emerged as a key player in the PRC’s Digital Silk Road (DSR) initiative within the Western Balkans. Its strategic location, connecting Southeastern Europe to Central and Western Europe, coupled with its role as a regional hub for internet traffic, has positioned Serbia as a valuable springboard for the PRC to market its technologies to the EU. Since 2012, Serbia has been an EU accession candidate and has prioritized digital transformation in its international engagements, notably with the PRC. The country’s commitment to digital advancement is also evident through its participation in the European Commission’s Digital Agenda for the Western Balkans in 2018 and the Digital Europe Program in 2023. Building on previous research conducted at GMF, this report delves into the evolution of the PRC’s DSR in Serbia, employing a technology stack (tech stack) framework to analyze the PRC’s presence. This framework encompasses five layers: network infrastructure, data infrastructure, device, application, and governance. By mapping the involvement of PRC-based entities within each layer, the report offers a detailed overview of the PRC’s technological engagement in Serbia, complete with illustrative examples. The report finds that the PRC and its affiliated entities have emerged as key players in Serbia’s rapid digitalization and modernization of its technology ecosystem. Many PRC technology firms such as Huawei, Nuctech, NetDragon, and BGI (formerly Beijing Genomics Institute)—are present across Serbia’s tech stack. Huawei, in particular, has made notable inroads into Serbia’s foundational network infrastructure. This includes its partnership with Serbia’s largest internet service provider (ISP), the state-owned Telekom Srbija and its positioning as a key partner in the country’s 5G rollout anticipated in 2026. Huawei’s involvement also extends to Serbia’s national and municipal data infrastructure—as a commercial tenant in the national data center and as a financer in Kragujevac’s city data center. These roles, coupled with limited transparency regarding the data stored in state-run facilities, have raised alarm among journalists, activists, and civil society actors about data security and the potential for state-enabled digital surveillance. These concerns have deepened with the introduction of surveillance systems supplied by PRC vendors, particularly under Serbia’s smart and “safe city” initiatives. The PRC’s deepening technological engagement exists in the context of weak implementation of Serbia’s data protection regulation. Serbian political leaders have consistently praised the PRC’s role in supporting their country’s technological ambitions, reflecting a broader strategic partnership that now also includes military cooperation—evident in the procurement of PRC-manufactured military drones and related technology transfers. The PRC’s growing technological footprint also coincides with Serbia’s democratic backsliding, as evidenced by its declining democracy score and its reclassification by Freedom House in 2019 as a “transitional or hybrid regime,” down from a “semi-consolidated democracy”. Collectively, these developments, have created an enabling environment for the emergence of digital surveillance in Serbia.
Topic:
Science and Technology, European Union, Democracy, Digitalization, and Democratic Backsliding
Political Geography:
China, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Serbia

165. Russia and China in Central Asia’s Technology Stack

Author:
Dylan Welch
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Central Asia’s role as a geopolitical battleground among Russia, China, Europe, and the United States has grown in recent years as Western countries seek trade and digital connectivity routes that bypass Russian infrastructure. While Western discourse on a “Middle Corridor” through Central Asia has focused on railways, ports and pipelines, China’s Digital Silk Road is quietly reshaping the region’s digital landscape and deepening strategic dependencies on Beijing. At the same time, Central Asian governments are drawing primarily on PRC technologies and Russian regulatory models to strengthen their own digital authoritarian regimes, risking joint domination by the increasingly aligned governments in Beijing and Moscow. China’s increasing control over the region’s “technology stack” could have an outsized impact on the future of digital connectivity, cybersecurity, and geopolitical competition across Eurasia. Russia’s regulatory influence on the region’s governments could shape digital governance norms across Eurasia. For Central Asian actors and Western policymakers invested in preserving the region’s strategic autonomy, it is crucial to understand these vulnerabilities and offer viable alternatives in the information and communications technology (ICT) sector. Ensuring a resilient and diversified digital landscape in Central Asia is therefore not only a regional concern but a vital issue for global security. This report seeks to shed light on the influence of Russia and China on the ICT sectors of three Central Asian countries: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. It uses the “technology stack” method adapted from two previous reports by GMF’s Alliance for Securing Democracy (ASD) on the future internet and the digital information stack released in 2020 and 2022. The framework is used to examine one country’s presence in and penetration of another country’s technology and regulatory ecosystem. The analysis of the resulting dependencies provides an indicative, rather than exhaustive overview of Russia and China’s technological footprint in Central Asia, offering key examples and highlighting areas where policymakers can focus their attention with the goal to de-risk digital technologies and governance in Central Asia.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Democracy, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Central Asia, Eurasia, and Asia

166. U.S. and Chinese Dual Citizen Engineer Pleads Guilty to Stealing Missile Launch and Detection Technology

Author:
Jessica Kim and Sarah Burkhard
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Case Study
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
During and shortly after his employment at a large U.S. defense contractor, a Chinese-US dual citizen downloaded thousands of export-controlled and proprietary files from the company’s secure server onto multiple hard drives, some of which remain at large. The files included manufacturing specifications and test results for two sophisticated types of sensors used for space-based detection and tracking of threats, suitable for tracking ballistic and hypersonic missiles. The files included assembly designs and engineering specifications for a specialized vacuum-sealed, cooling enclosure to further protect the radiation-hardened sensors in space. While it is not explicitly stated that he acted at the direction of the Chinese government, it appears likely that Gong intended to utilize the information he stole to benefit the Chinese military.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Intellectual Property/Copyright, Missile Defense, Exports, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
China, North America, and United States of America

167. Leveraging the Gaps in Russia and China’s Complex Relations with Iran

Author:
Richard Nephew
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Far from signaling a strong trilateral alliance, their history of often transactional cooperation reveals strategic gaps that Washington can leverage to help curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions. For all the hoopla that preceded it, the trilateral China-Iran-Russia meeting on Tehran’s nuclear program did not appear to generate anything of great significance. The joint statement issued after the March 15 Beijing gathering largely echoed previous such documents, from condemning “unlawful unilateral sanctions” against Iran to reiterating a mutual desire for a diplomatic solution. That said, the mere act of holding the meeting may have been the objective, to signal to the world that the three countries stand together. This show of unity could have immediate practical effects given the partial expiration of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2025—including the “snapback” provision that permits the UN to reimpose full sanctions on Iran if a JCPOA participant triggers the mechanism. At the same time, the three governments still have diverging historical and strategic interests on a range of issues—differences that will not dissipate just because they hold a joint meeting and share friction with the United States. If Washington hopes to exploit these fault lines, however, it must properly understand them.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Sanctions, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, and Middle East

168. Setting Up the Next Phase of U.S.-UAE Nuclear Cooperation

Author:
Noam Raydan
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
With the U.S. point man on energy development touring the Gulf and Chinese and Russian nuclear initiatives on the rise, the Trump administration should consider how best to replicate the responsible Emirati model elsewhere in the region. To kick off his first official tour of the Middle East, U.S. energy secretary Chris Wright arrived in the United Arab Emirates this week, where he has been meeting with key stakeholders and is expected to make a timely visit to the Barakah civil nuclear power plant in al-Dhafra. The plant visit comes amid growing global enthusiasm about nuclear energy, both to meet decarbonization targets and to address tech company plans for more data centers and artificial intelligence initiatives that require substantial amounts of nonstop power. Yet Wright also has an opportunity to underscore the importance of solid nuclear policy in a region where such technology is usually associated with proliferation risks.
Topic:
Development, International Cooperation, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Middle East, United Arab Emirates, and United States of America

169. China Flexes Its Soft Power in the KRI

Author:
Winthrop Rodgers and Sardar Aziz
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
In the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, signs of Chinese soft power are increasingly visible to residents of an area with longstanding ties to the United States. As the world’s largest nation without a state of their own, Kurdish politicians in Iraq have long prioritized robust and visible relationships with foreign powers as a means to ensure the leaders and interests of Iraq’s Kurdistan Region (KRI) remain relevant amid changing geopolitical tides. For foreign governments, this welcoming atmosphere provides an opportunity to nurture the green shoots of soft power, often in the most ordinary ways. Given the longstanding role of U.S. foreign aid in the KRI, Chinese soft power efforts and the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG)’s response may provide a bell weather for how other longstanding U.S. allies respond to the shift in American attitudes towards aid and its attendant soft power.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Geopolitics, and Soft Power
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, United States of America, and Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)

170. Navigating Indo-Pacific Waters: Maritime Governance and Integrating Whole-of-Government and Nation Approaches in the Philippines

Author:
Ivy Ganadillo
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
The Philippines faces mounting challenges in its maritime domain. This includes geopolitical tensions, criminal activities, environmental degradation, and socio-economic vulnerabilities in coastal communities. Institutional fragmentation and outdated policies further complicate these issues by hindering effective governance. To address these pressing concerns, revising and modernizing the National Maritime Security Policy and Strategy (NMSPP) is more than an administrative necessity. It is a strategic imperative. This policy overhaul can serve as the foundation for safeguarding maritime sovereignty, fostering innovation in ocean-based industries, and ensuring the sustainability of the Philippines’ critical marine ecosystems. As an archipelagic nation with over 7,600 islands, the Philippines’ strategic location amplifies its vulnerability to maritime challenges. Competing territorial claims in the West Philippine/South China Sea strain limited resources, while illegal fishing, marine pollution, piracy, smuggling, and human trafficking are just some of the many threats that pose risks to both national security and livelihoods. The NMSPP, previously known as the National Marine Policy (NMP), was designed as a framework for integrating maritime issues into the national agenda. However, it has struggled to keep pace with evolving realities. In 2024, President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. issued Executive Order No. 57 (EO 57), which renamed and reorganized the National Coast Watch System into the National Maritime Council (NMC), reflecting the administration’s intent to unify governance. However, realizing this vision demands a comprehensive update to the NMSPP.
Topic:
Governance, Geopolitics, Maritime, Vulnerability, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Philippines, and Indo-Pacific

171. Net-Zero and Nonproliferation: Assessing Nuclear Power and Its Alternatives

Author:
Henry D. Sokolski
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
Six years ago, NPEC ran a mock execution of a law Congress passed in 1978 but that the Executive refused to implement —Title V of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978. Title V called on the State and Energy Departments to conduct country-specific analyses of how developing states might best meet their energy needs without nuclear power. It also called for the creation of an energy Peace Corps and an assessment of what our government was spending on energy development aid-related projects. When NPEC started its efforts, the staff on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee asked to see what NPEC produced to use it to pressure the Executive finally to implement the law. NPEC commissioned a number of studies on how Iran, Saudi Arabia, China, and Taiwan might best meet their energy requirements without nuclear power. The center also contracted studies on the history and intent of Title V and on what government programs were already in play that aligned with Title V‘s stated objectives. As soon as NPEC’s project was completed, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff prepared a letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton asking the Secretary finally to implement Title V and file the reports required by law. Then, something unexpected occurred. The committee’s legal counsel discovered that the Secretary was under no obligation to comply: Congress had eliminated Title V’s reporting requirements along with several hundred other Congressionally mandated reports back in 1995. Flummoxed, I quietly set the book manuscript aside. Why, then, release it today? Because it is again timely. In October, the Biden Administration announced it is still considering extending civilian nuclear cooperation with Riyadh that would allow the Kingdom to enrich uranium — a process that can bring states within weeks of acquiring the bomb. Administration officials no longer question if Saudi Arabia really needs nuclear energy to meet its energy requirements. Shouldn’t they? Meanwhile, Taiwan’s presidential election this coming Saturday will, among other things, decide if Taiwan will build more nuclear reactors or not. Again, is new nuclear Taiwan’s best energy bet? As for China, the Pentagon has become increasingly concerned that the two “peaceful” fast breeder reactors and plutonium reprocessing plants Beijing is building will be used to make hundreds of bombs worth of weapons plutonium. One of the two fast breeder reactors is already operating. The question these dangerous nuclear activities raise is just how necessary they are to meet China’s energy requirements. Then, there’s Iran, which is intent on building reactors of Iranian design. It plans on expanding its nuclear power program from roughly one gigawatt electrical capacity to 11. Given Iran’s renewables potential and oil and gas reserves, how much sense does this make? Finally, in its efforts to achieve net zero, the Biden Administration has joined 20 other nations in pledging to triple global nuclear generation by 2050. Again, how practical is this? This volume’s aim is to help provide answers. Of course, in light of how long our government has ignored Title V, demanding it be implemented now would be odd. Creating a clean energy Peace Corps, comparing the costs of different types of energy, and trying to determine what investments would reduce emissions quickest and cheapest, however, all should be discussed. It’s my hope that the release of Net-Zero and Nonproliferation: Assessing Nuclear Power and Its Alternatives today might prompt such discussion.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Nuclear Power, Nonproliferation, Legislation, Energy, and Net Zero
Political Geography:
China, Iran, Middle East, Taiwan, Asia, Saudi Arabia, North America, and United States of America

172. German Ports and China: How to Reconcile Openness, Resilience and Security?

Author:
Marie Krpata
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Case Study
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Germany is dependent on its ports for the smooth running of its open economic model and has benefited from globalization in recent decades when the internationalization of its value chains strengthened its competitiveness. Yet, with today’s hardening geopolitics, the vulnerabilities of Europe’s leading economic power are becoming apparent. Germany’s ports are an indispensable interface between its production base and its export markets, as well as for its sources of supply. Crucial to its competitiveness, Germany’s ports are becoming increasingly indispensable for energy supplies given the country’s decoupling from Russian hydrocarbons, and they are essential for the deployment of military equipment to Europe’s eastern flank. This is why particular vigilance is required in ports such as Hamburg, where the Chinese shipping company COSCO has acquired a stake in the company operating the Tollerort terminal. This transaction would scarcely have worried anyone in the past. But now it is the subject of bitter discussions, with the Zeitenwende (“change of era”) announced by Olaf Scholz in reaction to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Increased caution seemed to gain a foothold in order not to repeat past mistakes –until the German Chancellor decided in favor of the acquisition. Given closer ties between China and Russia, China’s assertive stance on the international stage, and increased pressure on Germany from its American ally to clarify its position with regard to its main trading partner, Germany is seeing its room for maneuver shrink. Today, we need a more European approach that goes beyond short-term, profit-driven concerns. But to achieve this, we need to put in place a range of resources to be deployed in a resolutely cooperative approach.
Topic:
Security, International Trade and Finance, Sports, Trade, Industry, and Resilience
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Germany

173. Xi Jinping’s Visit to France: Stumbling Blocks Pile Up on the Path of Bilateral Cooperation

Author:
Marc Julienne
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
On May 6 and 7, Chinese President Xi Jinping will pay a state visit to France, his first to Europe since 2019 and the Covid-19 pandemic. Emmanuel Macron and Xi Jinping will celebrate Franco-Chinese friendship and the sixtieth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between their two countries. It comes at a time when the bilateral relationship is officially perceived as positive on both sides, especially after the French President’s visit to China in April 2023. However, beneath the diplomatic varnish, obstacles are piling up, and the space for cooperation between the two countries is receding. Of the four major areas of cooperation on the visit’s agenda – Ukraine, economic relations, human and cultural exchanges, and global challenges – the first three are already facing significant limitations. Beyond the strictly bilateral relationship, the two heads of state have radically different visions of and for Europe. Finally, there is a number of issues that remain absent from the discussions, which are not likely to ease tensions: the Taiwan Strait, nuclear arms control and Chinese interference in Europe. They will need to be addressed sooner or later.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Emmanuel Macron, and Xi Jinping
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and France

174. Power and Financial Interdependence

Author:
Brad Setser
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The link between financial self-reliance and geopolitical power has long been debated. The unbalanced Sino-American trade relationship has created asymmetric financial ties which generate potential sources of leverage for both parties and will not quickly disappear. Absent a clarifying major crisis, it will be difficult to definitively determine which party has greater leverage. Many in the United States (US) are concerned about indebtedness to its primary strategic rival, and the risks posed by a sudden Chinese withdrawal from US financial markets. US policymakers actively sought to encourage China’s top leadership not to withdraw financing from the market for US Agency securities in the run-up to the global financial crisis. Yet China also sees risks in this unbalanced financial relationship. Chinese policymakers have expressed concern about the domestic political consequences of losses on either their Treasury or Agency holdings and actively have sought to diversify China’s reserves – including by substituting the risk of lending to developing economies for the visibility associated with large holdings of Treasuries in US custodians. China increasingly worries that its dollar holdings and the dollar’s global role increase its vulnerability to potential financial sanctions. Both parties thus worry about the possibility that financial interdependence can be weaponized yet find it hard to extricate themselves from the inevitability of financial interdependence absent a clean break from an entrenched pattern of trade imbalances.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Bilateral Relations, Finance, and Interdependence
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

175. Seeking Safer Shells: An Analysis of Interpretations, Justifications, and Rationales Behind Decisions on North Korean Defectors’ Right to Asylum

Author:
Megumi Faith Mallari and Saleh Naas
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Public and International Affairs (JPIA)
Institution:
School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA), Princeton University
Abstract:
Despite their known and indisputable need for protection, North Koreans often have their applications for asylum rejected. This paper outlines the differing interpretations of North Koreans’ right to asylum and investigates the rationales and justifications behind them through the case studies of the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany, France, the Netherlands, and China (PRC). The paper argues that the rationale of the European countries analyzed is based on their generally restrictive view on asylum, independent from their political positioning on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Contrastingly, the rationales of the United States and the PRC are grounded in interests directly related to the Korean peninsula and Cold War narratives.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Asylum, and Refugee Policy
Political Geography:
China, United Kingdom, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, France, Germany, Netherlands, and United States of America

176. Emerging Powers and the Future of American Statecraft

Author:
Christopher S. Chivvis and Beatrix Geaghan-Breiner
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The structure of international politics is changing in ways that are not fully appreciated in Washington. The United States has paid a great deal of attention to the rise of China in the last decade but much less to emerging powers whose rise will also shape the operating environment for American statecraft. No single emerging power will have an impact tantamount to China’s, but they will have a significant impact collectively due to their geopolitical weight and diplomatic aspirations. America has limited ability to influence the trajectory of these emerging powers, identified in this report as Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Thailand, and Türkiye. They have taken stances that contrast or directly clash with U.S. positions on China and on Russia over the past few years. Nearly all have voiced concerns about Washington’s approach to the war in Ukraine, even as they criticized Moscow’s invasion. Almost none would line up with the United States in a confrontation with China. Instead, they are likely to pursue highly self-interested foreign policies. Washington should expect that they will increasingly challenge some of its policies, sustain relationships with its adversaries, and press their own agendas on the global stage. The emerging powers’ statecrafts are shaped in large part by their drive for economic security. But their geographies, different preferences for world order, domestic politics, and defense relationships also play a role. Concerns about the strength of democracy in other countries, which has played an animating role in U.S. foreign policy for decades, are a lower priority for them, no matter how democratic they are. It will be a mistake for the United States to frame its relations with these emerging powers primarily as part of a competition for influence with China and Russia, however tempting it may be to do so. These powers are not swing states that will tilt decisively toward either side in a global great power competition. Most will resist any efforts to bring them into a U.S.-led camp as in the Cold War. Trying to make them do so would also risk strategic overreach by embroiling the United States too deeply in the emerging powers’ domestic politics or by expending its resources in pursuit of building ties that never materialize. A better approach for the United States would be to focus on negotiating interest-based deals with emerging powers while cordoning off areas of disagreement. These might include tailored market access and investment agreements, agreements on technology manufacturing, energy transition initiatives, efforts to combat deforestation, efforts to build public health infrastructure, and infrastructure investments. It would be wasteful of the United States to offer these countries security guarantees, but in some cases providing security assistance can serve its interests. Washington should accept that most of these countries will maintain close diplomatic, economic, and sometimes security relationships with China and probably Russia. Over the longer term, it will serve U.S. interests to strengthen the sovereignty of emerging powers when possible and cost-effective to do so. This will provide a bulwark against the undue expansion of China’s power and influence and help ensure that, even if they do not side with the United States, they are not drawn closely into the orbit of its major geopolitical competitors. Strengthening emerging powers’ sovereignty will also help boost their development as constructive powers with a stake in sustaining a peaceful world order conducive to global economic growth.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sovereignty, Strategic Competition, and Emerging Powers
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, China, Middle East, Asia, Latin America, and United States of America

177. Tracing the Roots of China’s AI Regulations

Author:
Matt Sheehan
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
In 2021 and 2022, China became the first country to implement detailed, binding regulations on some of the most common applications of artificial intelligence (AI). These rules formed the foundation of China’s emerging AI governance regime, an evolving policy architecture that will affect everything from frontier AI research to the functioning of the world’s second-largest economy, from large language models in Africa to autonomous vehicles in Europe. U.S. political leaders often warn against letting China “write the rules of the road” in AI governance. But if the United States is serious about competing for global leadership in AI governance, then it needs to actually understand what it is competing against. That requires examining the nuts and bolts of both China’s AI regulations and the policy process that shaped them. This paper is the second in a series breaking down China’s AI regulations and pulling back the curtain on the policymaking process shaping them. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese government started that process with the 2021 rules on recommendation algorithms, an omnipresent use of the technology that is often overlooked in international AI governance discourse. Those rules imposed new obligations on companies to intervene in content recommendations, granted new rights to users being recommended content, and offered protections to gig workers subject to algorithmic scheduling. The Chinese party-state quickly followed up with a new regulation on “deep synthesis,” the use of AI to generate synthetic media such as deepfakes. Those rules required AI providers to watermark AI-generated content and ensure that content does not violate people’s “likeness rights” or harm the “nation’s image.” Together, these two regulations also created and amended China’s algorithm registry, a regulatory tool that would evolve into a cornerstone of the country’s AI governance regime. Contrary to popular conception in the rest of the world, China’s AI governance regime has not been created by top-down edicts from CCP leadership. President Xi Jinping and other top CCP leaders will sometimes give high-level guidance on policy priorities, but they have not been the key players when it comes to shaping China’s AI regulations. Instead, those regulations have been the product of a dynamic and iterative policymaking process driven by a mix of actors from both inside and outside the Chinese party-state. Those actors include mid-level bureaucrats, academics, technologists, journalists, and policy researchers at platform tech companies. Through a mix of public advocacy, intellectual debate, technical workshopping, and bureaucratic wrangling, these actors laid the foundations for China’s present and future AI regulations. This paper traces the progression of these regulations through the “policy funnel” (see figure 1) of Chinese AI governance. For both recommendation algorithms and deep synthesis rules, the initial spark for the regulation came from long-standing CCP concerns about the creation and dissemination of online content. For the former, the rise of the algorithmically driven news app Toutiao threatened the CCP’s ability to set a unified narrative and choose which stories are pushed to readers. In the case of deep synthesis, online face swap videos grabbed the attention of the Chinese public and led government regulators to consider the threat of deepfakes. Over the course of 2017–2020, these concerns made their way through China’s bureaucracy. Regulators took a series of stopgap measures in specific applications, while also tasking policy analysts and government-adjacent technical organizations with exploring different regulatory interventions.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Governance, Regulation, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
China, East Asia, and Asia

178. The risk of artificial intelligence: China edition

Author:
Filip Jirouš
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for the Opening and Development of Latin America (CADAL)
Abstract:
We should be worried about China’s AI capacities, not only because it enhances the powers of the Party-state, but also because it is exporting its population control technology and policy abroad.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Governance, Authoritarianism, Surveillance, Artificial Intelligence, Social Control, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:
China and Asia

179. Starr Forum: China: The Rise and Fall of the EAST

Author:
Yasheng Huang and Will Knight
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Speaker: Yasheng Huang, Epoch Foundation Professor of Global Economics and Management, MIT Sloan School of Management, and faculty director of the MIT-China Program at the Center for International Studies. Discussant: Will Knight, senior writer, Wired magazine, covers artificial intelligence and other emerging technology. He was previously a senior editor at MIT Technology Review, where he wrote about fundamental advances in AI and China’s AI boom.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Geopolitics, and Autocracy
Political Geography:
China and Asia

180. US Hegemony in Latin America: Think Tanks and the Formation of Consensus about the Chinese Presence

Author:
Luciana Wietchikoski and Livia Peres Milani
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
Institution:
Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
Abstract:
In recent years, U.S. government agencies have defined the Chinese presence in Latin America as a challenge, which has organized foreign policy towards the region. Departing from a neo-Gramscian approach, this paper investigates the bibliographical production of U.S. think tanks and seeks to understand the construction of consensus about the Chinese presence in Latin America. The methodology is based on content analysis and we identified two main narratives: in the first, the Chinese presence is presented as a threat to U.S. regional hegemony; in the second, the Chinese adaptation to liberal precepts is sought. There are therefore nuances in how the Chinese power is perceived, although the discourses remain restricted to the promotion of capitalism and neoliberalism under U.S. leadership.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Hegemony, and Think Tanks
Political Geography:
China, Latin America, North America, and United States of America