Political Geography: China - CIAO Search Results

351. Lessons from China: How Soon Could Iran Get the Bomb? (Occasional Paper 2404)

Author:: Hui Zhang
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:: It’s unclear when Iran might get the bomb. In July, Secretary of State Blinken revealed that Iran was only one to two weeks away from producing enough weapons grade uranium for several bombs. The New York Times quoted experts who estimated it would take Iran up to another year to make a missile-deliverable weapon. A conservative estimate would be no more than five months but could be much less. In the attached historical analysis of China’s nuclear weapons program, Hui Zhang pegs the number at three to five weeks, and possibly less. It makes for interesting reading, not only on what China was able to accomplish so quickly sixty years ago, but on what Iran may do.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Weapons, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:: China and Iran

352. War Game Reveals Chinese Attacks on Communications Could Paralyze Taiwan’s Efforts to Resist

Author:: Henry Sokolski
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:: Top security analysts have long noted that if China disables Taiwan’s underseas cable and disrupts its microwave, cell and space-based communications systems, Beijing could secure a smokeless victory over the island. Over the last five to 10 years, however, private commercial space-based communications and internet services have grown dramatically in importance. The critical role of Starlink in supporting Ukrainian military operations amply demonstrates this point. This prompts several policy questions: What national security roles should governments require commercial space service providers to play during a security crisis or war? Should governments set minimum standards for cyber and physical hardening for commercial satcom providers to meet in order to be eligible to compete for government contracts? What is the proper response to repeated “accidental” or deniable assaults on commercial and military space systems? To find out, the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center conducted a space war game that focused on a near-term Taiwan-China scenario. It utilized the talents of current and retired officials, congressional staff, and outside experts to play the game. In the game, China cut communications cables, disrupted microwave and cellular services, attacked Taiwan’s electrical supply system locally and jammed its satellite communications. The United States and its space-faring allies acted slowly. Private space service providers were no quicker. Finally, the President of the United States authorized covert cyberattacks against China’s Beidou satellite ground stations. China responded by launching similar cyberattacks on U.S. GPS systems and the U.S., redoubling its attacks against the Beidou system. With U.S. naval forces closing in to disrupt a Chinese naval quarantine of Taiwan, Beijing called for a mutual ceasefire in exchange for bilateral talks to lock Taiwan’s future as a province of China. The U.S., allies and Taiwan rejected this offer, opening the door for further military escalation. In the hot wash, the players discussed three key findings: Washington, its space-faring allies and industry players must clarify how they might backfill Taiwanese communication systems well before China might try to disable them. The US and its allies must address Taiwan’s lack of legal recognition, which leaves it uniquely vulnerable to offensive Chinese space and terrestrial military actions against Taiwan’s communications systems. Washington and its space-faring allies must develop additional military space options with plausible deniability to deter and counter similar Chinese capabilities. The recommendations paired with each of these findings. Taiwan needs to be more vocal about its communications systems’ vulnerabilities and consider developing mechanisms to disable China’s satellites temporarily, in a deniable manner. The United States should lower the classifications associated with its non-kinetic anti-satellite systems and create an operational working group on space security that includes Taiwan.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Communications, Nonproliferation, and War Games
Political Geography:: China and Taiwan

353. Green Soft Power? Checking in on China as a Responsible Stakeholder

Author:: Agnieszka Nitza-Makowska, Kerry Anne Longhurst, and Katarzyna Skiert-Andrzejuk
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:: Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:: By assuming a proactive role in international environmental regimes and extending the ‘green’ dimensions of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has been seeking to promote itself as a leader and responsible stakeholder in global environmental governance. This article examines this development concerning the notion of China’s ‘soft power’ and, more specifically, the notion of ‘green soft power’ – which aims to bridge the traditional concept of soft power with a state’s behavior on environmental and climate issues. China presents an interesting case since it has accrued a considerable amount of green soft power through its multilateral environmental diplomacy practiced at the Conferences of the Parties (COPs), the high-profile annual United Nations Climate Change Conferences, but its patchy deployment of environmental standards in the bilateral engagements under the BRI highlights the contradictions in referring to China as a green soft power. With these ideas in mind, this article holds that in the search to understand the evolving nature of China’s responsible stakeholder role, attention should be given to exploring the notion of green soft power.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Environment, Soft Power, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

354. The Future of NATO’s Nuclear Posture and Arms Control in Today’s More Dangerous World

Author:: Miles Pomper, David Santoro, and Nikolai Sokov
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:: Since the late 1960s, NATO has sought to balance two objectives—maintaining a strong nuclear deterrent while supporting efforts to buttress strategic stability through arms control and advance nonproliferation and disarmament through the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty process. The success of this strategy was most evident in the dual-track strategy of deployments and negotiations that led to the signing and implementation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987. The end of the Cold War also led to substantial cuts in U.S. and Russian strategic systems. Since then, NATO Allies have regularly voiced their support for continuing to pursue these two objectives, including supporting the goal enunciated by U.S. President Barack Obama in 2009 “to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.”1 In the last decade, however, Russia’s malign behavior has undermined NATO arms control efforts to the point that it appears traditional arms control will be effectively dead when the New START agreement—already suspended by Russia—expires in 2026. Russian’s invasion of Ukraine, its repeated nuclear saber-rattling in that conflict, and the deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons to Belarus has also forced the alliance to look to ways to enhance its deterrence, including its nuclear deterrence. Meanwhile, the massive increase in China’s nuclear arsenal and its growing partnership with Russia, is generating additional pressure to increase U.S. nuclear forces as well as questions about the ability of the U.S. to provide extended deterrence simultaneously to Allies in Europe and Asia. Those doubts have been reinforced by political developments in the United States—and in the war in Ukraine—that have raised anxieties about a decoupling of European and U.S. deterrence and defense and led to fresh discussion of a potential “Eurodeterrent.” Meanwhile, developments in North Korea and Iran—and their increasingly close ties with Moscow—further threaten the viability of the already shaky nuclear and missile nonproliferation regimes and have eroded longstanding cooperation between Washington and Moscow to manage nuclear nonproliferation risks in third countries. In response to these developments, Allies and experts, such as the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, have proposed various adaptations to the alliance’s nuclear posture, including to its nuclear sharing arrangements. This report examines these deterrence proposals, particularly considering how they support the alliance’s other longstanding objectives of arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation. The paper begins with some background on US/NATO nuclear policy from the end of the Cold War to the further invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. It then delves into changes in Russian nuclear doctrine, Moscow’s nuclear behavior during the Ukraine War, and the Kremlin’s views on future arms control. The report next discusses China’s nuclear modernization and views on arms control and the reaction among NATO and Asian Allies and the international community to these changes. It then discusses potential future U.S. and NATO posture options, including those already being undertaken by NATO or proposed by the US. Congressional Strategic Posture Commission and the State Department’s International Security Advisory Board. It concludes with an analysis of the potential impact of various options on arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation and offers some policy recommendations.
Topic:: NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

355. Nuclear China in the Twenty-First Century: Status and Implications for the World and Europe

Author:: David Santoro
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:: In August 2021, shortly after new evidence surfaced that China might be expanding its nuclear arsenal much more extensively and rapidly than previously assumed, Admiral Charles Richard, Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, described Beijing’s military investments as a “strategic breakout.” He underscored that the “explosive growth and modernization of [China’s] nuclear and conventional forces can only be what I describe as breathtaking,” adding that “that word, breathtaking, may not be enough.” Since then, several senior officials in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere have echoed that message and the final report of the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States published in October 2023 concluded that at its current pace, China “will reach rough quantitative parity with the United States in deployed nuclear warheads by the mid-2030s.” The result has been the emergence of work, including by this author, to understand this unprecedented development. This work is in its infancy, however, and more is needed to grasp the scale and scope of Chinese nuclear modernization (especially given that much of it is shrouded in secrecy) as well as its implications for strategic stability, deterrence, and arms control and risk reduction. Existing work has focused primarily on the implications for the United States and, to some extent, the United States and Russia. Yet it is also important to grapple with the implications for Europe, especially the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and reflect on actions that Europeans, individually or with others, should take in response.
Topic:: NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, and Modernization
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

356. Beyond Target: Indirect Impacts of Antidumping

Author:: Sébastien Jean and Kevin Lefebvre
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:: This paper investigates the bilateral impacts of antidumping measures, beyond directly targeted products and exporting firms. It focuses on the country whose exports are most exposed to such measures, China. Productlevel analysis shows that export volumes are negatively affected for products similar to a product targeted by an antidumping case, i.e. belonging to the same tariff heading. Using firm-level data, we show that this impact is driven by within-firm contagion: targeted firms not only cut their exports of targeted products, they also reduce significantly their exports of non-targeted products. The decrease is half as large for the latter than for the former, but the total impact on bilateral trade is far larger, because the value of export flows affected by these indirect impacts is ten times larger than the value of directly targeted export flows. In addition, interestingly, this effect is more pronounced for small and private firms.
Topic:: Business, Exports, Trade, Spillovers, and Antidumping
Political Geography:: China and Asia

357. ‘Self-Revolution’ Suggests Stronger CCDI Mandate

Author:: Arran Hope
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Xi Jinping addressed the perennial dilemma of corruption within the CCP, pronouncing “victory” in a decade of anti-corruption efforts but simultaneously warning that the situation remains “grim and complex.” In the short term, anti-corruption crackdowns are expected to continue, with Xi targeting sectors with concentrated power, capital-intensive industries, and resource-rich areas. The military, particularly the Strategic Support Force, might face increased scrutiny. The third plenary session of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) of the twentieth party congress took place on January 8, emphasizing “courage in [performing] self-revolution” as a distinctive character and advantage of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
Topic:: Corruption, Political Parties, Xi Jinping, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

358. State Goals, Private Tools: Digital Sovereignty and Surveillance Along the Belt and Road

Author:: Che Chang, Lian Huang, and Athena Tong
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Beijing promotes digital sovereignty in its engagements with other countries but with the caveat that it can maintain access to partner countries’ digital systems. Leaked documents from cyber contracting firm iS00N indicate a focus on One Belt One Road partner countries, targeting critical systems, including telecoms, government ministries, and financial institutions. A new paradigm of using nominally private firms allows Beijing to put distance between its inclusive rhetoric of “win-win cooperation” while companies hack partner countries’ infrastructure at the direction of its security services.
Topic:: Cybersecurity, Surveillance, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Digital Sovereignty
Political Geography:: China and Asia

359. The Shapeshifting Evolution of Chinese Technology Acquisition

Author:: Matthew Brazil
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Smuggling, a critical tool of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to acquire technology to enhance its defense industrial base, is reemerging in the wake of the US Government’s technology controls. Diversion—falsifying the end-user—is another common tactic that the Party has successfully used to acquire critical technology, including dual-use items that it would have been otherwise unable to obtain. Talent attraction is an underrated part of technology acquisition that the CCP has promoted in academia as well as in the corporate sector to help advance its technology ambitions. Foreign businesses have been willing to engage in technology transfer in return for potential access to the PRC market. This tradeoff frequently has not paid off for these firms.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Trade, Smuggling, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:: China and Asia

360. The Power Vertical: Centralization in the PRC’s State Security System

Author:: Edward Schwarck
Publication Date:: 11-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Centralizing reforms to the Ministry of State Security probably constitute the most important development in China’s civilian intelligence system since its establishment in 1983. These reforms instituted “vertical leadership,” under which the MSS is empowered to control local bureaus’ personnel affairs, budgets, and oversight. Structural changes that began in 2016–2017 mean that local state security bureaus are no longer subject to the authority of local party committees, and so are freer to impose a security-first agenda on other government agencies, leading to a more oppressive political environment. The ministry is now better able to direct joint operations between bureaus, exploit pockets of regional expertise, and ensure that local activities serve the strategic intelligence and security requirements of the central government. The reforms are part of Xi Jinping’s broader efforts to ensure that the “party center has supreme authority over state security.” The state security system’s further empowerment suggests it is likely to remain a powerful and durable interest group in PRC politics beyond the Xi era.
Topic:: Security, Intelligence, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and Centralization
Political Geography:: China and Asia

361. The Art of War: PRC Weaponizes Culture to Galvanize the People

Author:: Arran Hope
Publication Date:: 11-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: The Party sees culture as a tool to achieve its strategic ambitions both inside and outside the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Speeches, articles, and conferences portray it as central to achieving national rejuvenation. Party discourse on culture is shot through with militaristic terminology. Not just echoing Mao-era rhetoric, this reflects Beijing’s desire to “engineer souls” in pursuit of a strong nation. Artists, culture workers, and academics are perceived as pawns in a project to present the PRC globally as peaceful and prosperous, but the Party is aware of the deficiencies of its soft power.
Topic:: Arts, Culture, Soft Power, Academia, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

362. Xi Jinping’s Quantitative Easing Unlikely to Save Economy

Author:: Willy Wo-Lap Lam
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In an apparent U-turn, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has initiated stimulus policies that have boosted the stock market and are attempting to jump-start key sectors and meet the annual GDP growth target of 5 percent. In the last week of September, the central bank announced a package worth at least 2 trillion Renminbi (RMB; $280 billion), cut the banks’ reserve requirement ratio by 50 basis points, and hinted at further measures. The domestic and international response has been underwhelming, in part because the package leaves the economy even more overleveraged than before. President Xi Jinping’s attempts to enhance the PRC’s global stature, including through a recent ICBM test and by deepening support for Russia’s war in Ukraine and for other countries willing to denounce the United States and the West, will not help the domestic economic woes as they discourage foreign investment.
Topic:: Monetary Policy, Economy, Economic Growth, Investment, and Quantitative Easing
Political Geography:: China and Asia

363. Understanding the PRC’s Selective Use of Military Hotlines

Author:: Augusto Leal Rinaldi
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: The PRC’s strategic use of and reluctance to establish military hotlines reflect a calculated approach to escalation risk, which can be seen in crises ranging from the accidental bombing of its embassy in Belgrade in 1999 to the present day. There is a recognition that hotlines offer tactical benefits, but they are not viewed as a solution to the broader challenges in US-PRC relations. The PRC is largely skeptical of military hotlines, believing that they lack utility and could potentially undermine its national security. Defense scholars fear that the existence of a mechanism to de-escalate crises could embolden adversaries to take more risks, and doubt that hotlines can help mitigate long-term mistrust in bilateral relations. Beijing also perceived some benefits of military hotlines. These include enhancing safety and crisis management, enabling the political signaling of intentions, and improving the PRC’s reputation as a responsible power, as well as allowing it to control narratives and influence other states’ actions.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Military Affairs, Crisis Management, and Deescalation
Political Geography:: China and Asia

364. Beijing’s Soft Power Push with African Nations

Author:: Arran Hope
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has successfully used its hosting of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation to burnish its soft power and its credentials to be seen as the leader of the Global South. Close political alignment on core issues, including African states affirming support for the PRC’s positions on Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Tibet, and unification with Taiwan are indicative of the PRC’s diplomatic gains. Politics was central to the event, with the promotion of exchanges and cooperation announced between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and African political parties, between the PRC’s Supreme People’s Court and the Court of Justice of the African Union, and between the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and regional organizations, alongside numerous training programs in various domains. Africa joined a “community of common destiny,” which entails a rejection of the Western approach to modernization. The West in general and the United States explicitly were heavily criticized throughout the forum.The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has successfully used its hosting of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation to burnish its soft power and its credentials to be seen as the leader of the Global South. Close political alignment on core issues, including African states affirming support for the PRC’s positions on Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Tibet, and unification with Taiwan are indicative of the PRC’s diplomatic gains. Politics was central to the event, with the promotion of exchanges and cooperation announced between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and African political parties, between the PRC’s Supreme People’s Court and the Court of Justice of the African Union, and between the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and regional organizations, alongside numerous training programs in various domains. Africa joined a “community of common destiny,” which entails a rejection of the Western approach to modernization. The West in general and the United States explicitly were heavily criticized throughout the forum.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Global South, Soft Power, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:: Africa, China, and Asia

365. Kubernetes: A Dilemma in the Geopolitical Tech Race

Author:: Sunny Cheung
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: US-sanctioned Huawei has significant influence in the Cloud Native Computing Foundation and its open-source platform Kubernetes, which underpins US military platforms, including F-16 fighter jets and nuclear infrastructure. The use of open-source technologies in critical systems raises concerns. Despite US efforts to mitigate risks, Kubernetes remains tempting to exploit for attackers. Open source fosters global innovation, from which the United States benefits. But this same openness also strengthens US competitors. The United States should therefore develop a clear framework to understand and mitigate the challenges posed by open source.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Sanctions, Geopolitics, Innovation, Strategic Competition, and Huawei
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

366. Kursk Incursion Draws Delayed Response From Beijing

Author:: Arran Hope
Publication Date:: 08-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Official media in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has finally begun to comment on the Ukrainian operation in Russia’s Kursk oblast, which began on August 6. It gives Ukraine low odds of success, emphasizes Russia’s strength and successes elsewhere in the conflict, and has started amplifying Russian propaganda about US involvement and potential Ukrainian attacks on the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant. For the two weeks after Ukrainian forces invaded Russia’s Kursk Oblast on August 6, PRC state media either ignored the developments or provided minimal reporting, mostly recycling statements from Russian officials and media. The PRC’s muted coverage follows a pattern of delayed responses to surprising events and volatile situations, also seen at the outbreak of the war and during Prigozhin’s mutiny in June 2023. This can be taken as evidence that authoritarian systems are not necessarily capable of responding quickly to developments, especially when decision making is highly centralized.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Propaganda, Russia-Ukraine War, and Incursion
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and Asia

367. Economic and Technological Zones: Economic Strategy in the Tibet Autonomous Region

Author:: Devendra Kumar
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: New Economic and Technology Development Zones (ETDZs) in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) are focused on pockets of the Han population, which will exacerbate tensions within the region. The Tibetan economy is already largely under Han control (except for in the agriculture and livestock sectors), and Han people constitute the majority group in many of Tiber’s urban centers. The TAR government has set up the zones to import practices from elsewhere in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and shift the region’s economy away from traditional sectors and toward export-oriented industries, construction, and even high-tech manufacturing. The TAR’s external trade is currently limited to Nepal, due to ongoing border tensions with India. Meanwhile, infrastructural challenges hampering the development of the Sichuan-Tibet railway or national highways connecting the TAR with other provinces suggest that further integration with the rest of the PRC remains some way off. In a related policy, the PRC has developed border towns strategically located near land border ports that it has built along its borders with India, Nepal, and Bhutan. Infrastructure buildup on the border could also serve a dual-use purpose in the case of a conflict, as has been the case in India in recent years.
Topic:: Economics, Science and Technology, Manufacturing, Trade, and Autonomy
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Tibet

368. PRC Advances New International Order In Astana

Author:: Arran Hope
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: The People’s Republic of China (PRC) sees the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as an important part of a wider strategy to construct a new international order. Beijing projects soft power through promoting norms, discursive constructs, and policy preferences in the SCO which member states officially endorse. These include language about comprehensively reforming the UN and supporting all PRC efforts to achieve “national reunification” with Taiwan. Military exercises that take place via the SCO provide the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) unique opportunities to gain practical experience outside its borders and normalizes basing of Chinese forces in other countries through international treaties.
Topic:: Treaties and Agreements, Military Affairs, Soft Power, and International Order
Political Geography:: China and Asia

369. PRC Transfer of Military and Dual-Use Technology: the Case of the International Conference on Defence Technology

Author:: Matthew Bruzzese
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: The International Conference on Defence Technology (ICDT), held biannually since 2018, exemplifies an approach by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to leverage defense technology from Western researchers. The conference features participation from PRC defense entities and Western scientists, facilitating direct transfer of advanced defense technology insights to the People’s Liberation Army. The Military-Civil Fusion development strategy has increased the absorption of foreign S&T knowledge for military purposes. Research with any PRC institution operates under the premise that anything with potential military applications will be utilized for defense purposes. Despite increased awareness of PRC’s tech transfer efforts, Western researchers continue to attend PRC-hosted conferences with military affiliations, exposing them to risks of being probed for sensitive information and potential espionage activities.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Defense Industry, and Dual Use Infrastructure
Political Geography:: China and Asia

370. New Textbook Reveals Xi Jinping’s Doctrine of Han-centric Nation-Building

Author:: James Leibold
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Another cultural revolution is in full swing in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This is not the purported class revolution Mao advocated in the past, but rather a wave of Han cultural and racial nationalism. Xi’s new approach to ethnic minority policy repudiates the Party’s past promise to allow minority nationalities to exercise political and cultural autonomy, becoming “masters of their own house.” Following more than ten years of incremental change, a new textbook from scholar-officials articulates the discourse, ideology, and policies associated with a new Han-centric narrative of China’s past and future. In this conception, the sovereignties and homelands of the Tibetan, Uyghur, Mongol, and other indigenous minorities are erased and replaced with a seamless teleology of the Han colonial and racial becoming.
Topic:: Education, Culture, Political Parties, and Xi Jinping
Political Geography:: China and Asia

371. Foreign Fixations at the Heart of Chinese-style Modernization

Author:: Arran Hope
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: A new report from two high-end PRC think-tanks details the country’s path to modernization in anticipation of July’s Third Plenum but suggests that any shifts in policy direction will be muted. The report emphasizes the triumph of Chinese-style modernization over the Western model and provides substantial criticisms of the failures of the West. It also argues that the PRC’s model contains lessons for other developing countries. The report leverages Western individuals and institutions to buttress its arguments for the superiority of Chinese-style modernization, which suggests that the West is still perceived as (or can be instrumentalized as) a source of legitimacy by the PRC. The report asserts the core message that only Party-led Chinese-style modernization can bring about national rejuvenation, and that this will occur through an economic program that is focused on “seizing the commanding heights in a new round of global scientific and technological revolution and industrial transformation.”
Topic:: Development, Modernization, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

372. Planned Obsolescence: The Strategic Support Force In Memoriam (2015-2024)

Author:: Joe McReynolds
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Strategic Support Force likely was designed principally as a transitional structure meant to provide a home for disparate space, cyber, and informatization forces until their force structure could be developed enough to stand as independent branches. The successor branches of the SSF, the new Space Force, Cyber Force, and Information Support Force, likely maintain the units, capabilities, and mission areas previously held under the SSF. These branches can be best understood as rough PLA equivalents to US functional combatant commands, non-geographically defined joint-force structures intended to support services and military theaters by providing critical capabilities and operations in strategic domains of warfare. The creation of the branches also has the benefit of bringing critical resources and capabilities under the direct oversight of the Central Military Commission. This design feature is likely motivated by a desire to have greater control and more closely shape broader PLA modernization. It is in part also a response to controversies and international incidents associated with the SSF’s current leadership.
Topic:: Military Affairs, Cybersecurity, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

373. Xi Signals Firm Strategy but Flexible Tactics at China’s Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference

Author:: Neil Thomas
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: The readout from the Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference (CFAWC) at the end of December indicated an emerging strategy of countering US leadership by mobilizing the support of Global South countries while dividing the West on contentious global issues. Recent changes in official discourse and new language that now forms part Xi’s messaging to visiting politicians makes clear Beijing’s enhanced conviction of the need to actively shape and influence world events. The CFAWC meeting signaled a turn away from the more abrasive forms of “wolf warrior” diplomacy. Xi’s desired shift in rhetoric does not mean that PRC diplomats will be less assertive in communicating their preferences overseas.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Global South, and Xi Jinping
Political Geography:: China and Asia

374. Foreign Intelligence Hackers and Their Place in the PRC Intelligence Community

Author:: Matthew Brazil
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Leaked files from iS00N reveal deep insights into the PRC’s intelligence operations, highlighting an intensified global security offensive as well as issues within the intelligence community. iS00N’s growth is tied to Xi Jinping’s aggressive policies and demonstrates the importance of private contractors in fulfilling the PRC’s increased intelligence and security needs. The leaks expose employee dissatisfaction and underscore iS00N’s critical role in intelligence gathering and job provision, reflecting the contractor’s complex relationship with the PRC government. The exposure raises questions about the role and regulation of hacking contractors in the PRC, potentially leading to investigations and reforms that could affect the PRC’s intelligence strategy and international relations.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Intelligence, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:: China and Asia

375. National Defense Mobilization: Toward A Clear Division of Labor between the PLA and Civilian Bureaucracies

Author:: Yu-Ping Chang
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: As the result of the ongoing military reform, the military’s guiding and leadership role over civilian bureaucracies seems to be strengthened. Meanwhile, the responsibilities of the State Council and local governments on NDM have been substantiated, and the administrative work which the PLA used to undertake has been transferred to local governments. A clearer division of labor between the military and civilian bureaucracies allows the PLA to focus on the development of combat capabilities without being distracted by administrative work, while more attention and resources devoted to national defense projects by civilian bureaucracies are likely to improve NDM work. National defense mobilization is an area where the PLA and civilian bureaucracies need to cooperate closely during peacetime to allow an effective generation and mobilization of national resources during wartime. The national defense mobilization system (NDM system), composed of civilian bureaucracies and the PLA bureaucracies, used to be characterized by a bureaucratic structure in which the military sat above local governments and both guided and administered a significant portion of administrative work related to national defense development.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Affairs, Reform, Bureaucracy, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

376. Implications of Article 23 Legislation on the Future of Hong Kong

Author:: Eric Y. H. Lai
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Hong Kong’s Article 23 legislation will integrate the PRC’s national security framework into Hong Kong’s legal system, impacting the city’s rule of law and foreign business interests. Broad and vague definitions of national security will create challenges for Hong Kong’s common law system. It will likely contribute to the erosion of legal certainty and judicial independence. Proposed offenses such as “theft of state secrets” and “espionage” are ambiguously defined, creating uncertainty. This may cause issues for foreign businesses collecting information for due diligence and will further chill freedom of expression in the city. The legislation aims to isolate Hong Kong further from the liberal democratic world, granting extensive powers to the government for political control and undermining public oversight and due process rights.
Topic:: National Security, Rule of Law, Legislation, and Due Process
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Hong Kong

377. Civil Society Defense Initiatives

Author:: Marco Ho Cheng-hui
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Civic groups are enhancing “social resilience” by forming self-training organizations focused on preparing for potential conflict impacts beyond just military engagement. These groups address a broad range of issues including civil defense, emergency rescue, disaster preparedness, cyberattack responses, and infrastructure maintenance. Civil society advocates for the use of civilian technologies in defense, such as drones and AI, reflecting a proactive stance on Taiwan’s security. Kuma Academy exemplifies practical action in civil defense education, offering courses and activities to thousands, alongside other groups focusing on specific preparedness aspects. Taiwan’s civil society is urging government and political parties to implement defense reforms, over concerns about the country’s level of defense in the face of threats from the PRC.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Civil Society, and Reform
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

378. PLA Personnel Shakeups And Their Implications

Author:: Ying Yu Lin
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Dong Jun’s appointment as Defense Minister and changes in the PLA Rocket Force leadership mark a strategic shift towards bolstering military diplomacy, particularly with Russia, and enhancing combat and technological readiness, reflecting Dong’s significant role in shaping future military strategy. The leadership overhaul within the PLA highlights a concerted effort to root out corruption, critical for maintaining the military’s operational integrity and effectiveness. This move is partly inspired by the need to avoid the operational pitfalls seen in the Russian military’s performance in Ukraine. The hiring of PLA officers from services outside the Rocket Force, as well as those with personal connections to Xi Jinping, indicates a desire to start afresh, while also suggesting the extent of corruption within PLARF. Analysts believe the ousting of officials like Li Shangfu will not necessarily directly weaken the PLA’s combat capabilities, given the defense minister’s primarily diplomatic role. However, it also suggests that Li, with his technical background, was perhaps not well-suited to his role. Nonetheless, it prompts speculation about future military diplomacy and technological focus.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Corruption, Military Affairs, Leadership, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

379. Next-Generation Perspectives on Taiwan: Insights from the 2024 Taiwan-US Policy Program

Author:: Bonnie S. Glaser, Joshua Stone, Alicja Bachulska, Viking Bohman, and Francesca Ghiretti
Publication Date:: 08-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: The papers in this compendium were written by 11 members of the 2024 Taiwan-US Policy Program (TUPP) delegation: Alicja Bachulska, Viking Bohman, Francesca Ghiretti, Heather Hwalek, Leland Lazarus, Lauren Racusin, Friso Stevens, Joshua Stone, Brian Volsky, Theresa Winter, Adrienne Wu. Transatlantic attention to Taiwan has surged in recent years for several reasons. First, Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has led to increased concern in the United States and Europe that Beijing’s growing military capabilities and declining confidence in its ability to achieve peaceful reunification will soon lead the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to attempt a takeover of Taiwan by force. The cost of such a war would carry a price tag of around $10 trillion, equal to about 10% of global GDP, according to Bloomberg Economics, far higher than the economic impact of the 2008 global financial crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the war in Ukraine. The devastating impact of a Taiwan Strait conflict has provided a wake-up call for leaders in Europe who now echo the Biden administration’s warnings to PRC leader Xi Jinping to refrain from using violence to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. In addition, Taiwan is now a regular agenda item in the US-EU Consultations on the Indo-Pacific and the US-EU Dialogue on China. Second, intensifying US-China strategic competition has increasingly focused on technology with chips at the center. Taiwan produces more than 60% of the world’s semiconductors and more than 90% of the most advanced ones. A single company, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC), manufactures most of those chips. Recognition of Taiwan’s dominant role in the semiconductor supply chain has provided another reason to bolster deterrence. It has also sparked interest in “friendshoring” and “onshoring” semiconductor manufacturing. TSMC plans to start production at its first fab in Arizona in 2025 and will break ground on another in Dresden at the end of 2024 with an estimated completion date of 2027. Recognizing the rising geopolitical risks and their own strategic dependencies, the United States and the EU have made building resilient supply chains a priority, especially in semiconductors. In its 2021 Indo-Pacific Strategy, Brussels explicitly committed the EU to engaging with Taiwan in creating resilient supply chains. Third, rising concern in the United States and Europe about election interference and disinformation have sparked interest in learning from Taiwan’s experience in combatting such threats. In the run-up to the January 13, 2024, presidential and legislative elections, PRC attempts to interfere in Taiwan’s politics surged to unprecedented levels through economic coercion, direct political meddling, displays of military force, and manipulation of social media. As the United States and many European countries prepare for their own national elections this year, they are engaging with experts from Taiwan to better understand PRC tactics and the tools that Taiwan successfully employed to counter PRC interference. Fourth, the United States and Europe increasingly recognize that Taiwan’s vibrant and successful democracy is under threat from an authoritarian regime. Taiwan has received high marks for protecting political rights and holding free and fair elections. Taiwan’s democratic achievements are even more impressive when set against the backdrop of a deterioration in freedom worldwide. Like other industrialized democracies, Taiwan faces a multitude of challenges that are especially difficult to address in the face of PRC efforts that prevent Taiwan’s government and its people from interacting with the world. Taiwan’s exclusion from international organizations also hampers the world’s ability to develop effective solutions to myriad problems. The Taiwan-US Policy Program (TUPP) was launched in 2017 to encourage young professionals from the United States to include Taiwan in their research and help Taipei expand its global networks. In 2022, TUPP was expanded to include young professionals from Europe in support of GMF’s mission of promoting transatlantic cooperation. TUPP enables future leaders to acquire a deeper understanding of Taiwan and its relations with the United States through meetings with officials and experts in Washington, DC, followed by a visit to Taiwan to gain first-hand exposure to its politics, culture, and history. Experiencing Taiwan influences how these future leaders approach their work and their writing. It impacts their worldview by imbuing them with an appreciation for Taiwan’s history and commitment to the principles of democracy and human rights that undergird the existing international order. It also reinforces the importance of maintaining robust bilateral relations and strengthening international support for maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. The 2024 TUPP cohort traveled to Taiwan in February for an intense week of meetings and activities. Each participant gained insights into Taiwan and its role in their respective fields. This year’s delegation comprised five Americans and five Europeans. Over time, TUPP seeks to create a body of global experts with firsthand knowledge of Taiwan who support sustaining and expanding its international ties. I am grateful to the Henry Luce Foundation, the Global Taiwan Institute, and the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy for their support of this goal. The contributions here, written by the entire 2024 TUPP delegation, underscore the importance of deeper study and understanding of Taiwan. I sincerely hope that they stimulate continued transatlantic and global interest in Taiwan and its future.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, Geopolitics, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Taiwan, Asia, Poland, Germany, Latin America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

380. Protecting Undersea Infrastructure in the North American Arctic

Author:: Heather A Conley, Sophie Arts, Kristine Berzina, and Frida Rintakumpu
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: In response to recent incidents damaging undersea energy infrastructure and communication cables in the Baltic Sea and High North, NATO countries have intensified their focus on critical undersea infrastructure (CUI) protection on the national, bilateral, and multilateral levels. Allies in the North American Arctic can build on important NATO initiatives but, given distances and the unique operating environment in this theater, the responsibility for protecting CUI assets in territorial waters will fall primarily to the United States, Canada, and the Kingdom of Denmark. CUI in the North American Arctic is currently limited. But climate change, the green energy transition, and greater reliance on artificial intelligence (AI) will increase the demand and opportunity to expand communication cables and energy infrastructure in the region. At the same time, increased traffic and resource exploration heighten the vulnerability of these assets, especially to deliberate attack from Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Both powers rely on dual-use assets that increase plausible deniability, and they continue to develop undersea warfare capabilities. To enhance resilience and protect CUI in the North American Arctic, the United States and its NATO allies are strongly encouraged to: • urgently upgrade US as well as NATO allies’ situational awareness and presence in the air, space, and undersea domain, cooperating closely with the private sector • prioritize and upgrade the role of NATO’s Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM) to conduct CUI threat assessments and identify assets that are especially vulnerable due to their strategic importance, location, complicated ownership structure, or symbolic value • expand US and NATO response options to counter hybrid threats and deter CUI attacks; consider establishing an additional maritime high-readiness force • increase NATO’s presence to protect and defend nearby assets during and after Russian and PRC naval maneuvers • build on NATO’s Digital Oceans Initiative to enhance and integrate unmanned systems and AI information processing tools into exercises and operations • identify counterparts in other national governments to ensure quick and seamless information sharing following CUI incidents • deepen public-private cooperation as well as government oversight over privately owned CUI to incentivize the private sector’s CUI resilience (e.g. fortifying cables, integrating monitoring capabilities, and ensuring adequate repair capabilities) • clarify responsibilities of CUI protection and defense across the civil, military, and private sectors, including the transition of responsibilities from the Department of Homeland Security to the Department of Defense in crisis situations • train and exercise crisis decision-making processes with the involvement of all relevant actors (including the private sector and state and local authorities) on the national, bilateral (Canada and the Kingdom of Denmark), minilateral, and multilateral levels • clarify and enhance legal frameworks to respond to CUI incidents in territorial and international waters, and share best practices across all sectors • use pro-active strategic communication to outline legal and military authority in responding to CUI incidents, attributing attacks, and enhancing deterrence against future threats.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Infrastructure, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:: China, North America, Arctic, United States of America, and Baltic Sea

381. Is the G7 still relevant?

Author:: Raffaele Trombetta
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: In the first of our new Expert Analysis series, former Italian Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Raffaele Trombetta, draws on his career experience to answer the question of whether the G7 is still relevant in today’s international order. Detailing a narrative of the G7’s history, confronting its challenges, and addressing its common criticisms, this paper deals with the alternatives (G20 and BRICS), as well as where the G7’s interests should lie in future relations with China and the African nations.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, G20, G7, BRICS, and International Order
Political Geography:: Africa, China, Europe, and Asia

382. China in Africa: The Nuanced Reality of Belt and Road

Author:: Hank Cohen
Publication Date:: 11-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: China’s growing presence in Africa has been the subject of significant criticism. The popular understanding in the US of China’s role on the continent has been that the People’s Republic, via the Belt and Road Initiative, has offered African countries a raw deal: shoddy infrastructure projects in exchange for loans they know their partners cannot repay. The approach is commonly described as debt-trap diplomacy, garnering unfavorable comparisons to organized crime behavior. But the reality of China’s presence in Africa is more nuanced.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Infrastructure, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:: Africa, China, and Asia

383. The Problem with Power: Taiwan in the Era of Great Power Competition

Author:: Joey Ching Aracena
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: The United States and the PRC hold opposing positions on the “Taiwan Question.” The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act affirms U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s defense by providing weapons and services to promote Taiwan’s self-defense capability.” The Act also considers “any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means...a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.” Conversely, the PRC emphasizes that Taiwan “reunification” is a strategic priority that “cannot be dragged on generation after generation.” At the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), PRC President Xi Jinping stated, “We will continue to strive for peaceful reunification… but we will never promise to renounce the use of force.” Despite the PRC’s coercive behavior and sharpened rhetoric, Taiwan refuses to accept “reunification” under the PRC’s proposed “One Country, Two Systems” model. Nevertheless, the United States and the PRC both discourage Taiwan’s independence. Both states understand that if Taiwan were to formally declare independence, it would compel both parties to respond, potentially escalating towards military conflict. By attempting to influence Taiwan’s behavior, both great powers implicitly recognize Taiwan’s role in making or breaking their respective strategies. In this way, Taiwan maintains a powerful point of leverage in the “Triangular Relationship,” as it could take actions that trigger future conflict between the United States and the PRC.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Territorial Disputes, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

384. Chinese Export of Restricted High Priority Battlefield Items to Russia

Author:: Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:: The Institute for Science and International Security has reviewed more than 295,000 commercial import-export trade manifest records from May 2022 through the end of December 2023, detailing exports of restricted Tier One Harmonized System Codes (HS Codes) items on the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Common High Priority List (CHPL) being exported by Chinese companies to Russian importers. The BIS CHLP applies trade restrictions to Russia on the most sensitive and sought-after Western electronics and other commodities that Russia requires to build its war machine. Tier One covers key items that Russia cannot domestically produce and that have limited manufacturers and constitutes four HS Code chapter 84 codes (8542.31, 8542.32, 8542.33, and 8542.39) detailing the most important electronics which Russia needs to build drones, missiles, and other weapon systems. Russia depends on illicit import practices and networks to acquire these goods from overseas, mainly Western goods via China. Without these critical commodities, Russia would be crippled in its ability to produce the advanced missiles, drones, and other combat systems it needs to wage its war of aggression in Ukraine. More than $1.5 billion worth of restricted Tier One commodities were found being exported from China to Russia during the assessed period. The shipments contained electronics designed and produced by Western firms, but shipped by often obscure and little-known Chinese companies to Russian firms. Shipments containing Western brands found in the trade data include Texas Instruments, XILINX, Analog Devices, Intel, NVIDIA, ST Microelectronics, and other major sought-after designers and producers of electronics. Many of these companies’ products have been frequently found in Russian weapons used in Ukraine, especially in drone systems such as the Shahed 136 and the Lancet kamikaze drones, and Kometa anti-jamming equipment. For example, XILINX field programmable gate arrays (FPGA) and microcontrollers, all of which were found in the assessed trade data, are essential components in the Shahed 136, hundreds of which are being launched at Ukraine each month. 1 NVIDIA Jetson AI modules play a key role in how the Lancet—another drone launched by Russia at Ukraine in the thousands—autonomously identifies, tracks, and engages targets. 2 These amounts of drones, as well as other weapon systems like missiles and other drones, demand a huge quantity of Western Tier 1 goods to keep up production rates and meet the Russian military’s operational needs.
Topic:: Weapons, Exports, Trade, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

385. Russian Company Elmak Procures “High Priority” Items for Russia’s War Efforts via China

Author:: David Albright and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:: Russian weapons, including bombs, missiles, and drones, depend on crucial electronic components, such as field programmable gate arrays (FPGA) and microcontrollers, many of which cannot be made by Russia. In many cases, produced only by Western companies, these essential components are being sourced by Russian electronics importers and trading companies in large quantities from, foremost, China. The Russian trading company Elmak LLC, aka Kometa LLC, has imported over $5 million of Western electronic goods, almost entirely via China. Over 90 percent of the items fall under Tier 1 of the Bureau of Industry and Security and European Union List of Common High Priority Items banned for export to Russia and at heightened risk of being diverted to Russia illegally due to “their importance to Russia’s war efforts.” China’s lack of action to prevent these sales justifies NATO’s recent labeling China as a “decisive enabler of Russia’s war against Ukraine,” 1 adding weight to calls for the application of more sanctions against Chinese suppliers and enabling banks. But U.S. and other Western companies need to do more. They should not ship to China any electronics known to be used in weapons against Ukraine. U.S. companies should show greater due diligence on the final use and end users of their products and simplify supply chains to prevent unauthorized transfers of electronics with restricted Harmonized System (HS) codes. At the very least, companies should agree not to export the most important electronic items to China, which have been identified in Russian weapons downed in Ukraine. Otherwise, as the war continues, with more U.S and other Western manufacturers’ electronics found in Russian weapons in Ukraine after causing casualties and destruction, these manufacturers look increasingly insensitive and powerless against their own complicity in supporting Russia’s illegal war.
Topic:: Sanctions, Weapons, Trade, Imports, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and Ukraine

386. Beijing’s Passive-Aggressive Middle East Policy

Author:: Michael Singh
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: The real threat to U.S. interests in the region isn’t rising Chinese influence, but the erosion of Washington's influence. Will China broker a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? It is a question nobody is asking, because the answer is obvious—not a chance. Yet after Beijing hosted Iran-Saudi talks that led those two rivals to re-establish diplomatic relations in March 2023, some observers wondered if China had supplanted the U.S. as the Middle East’s diplomatic broker. Since Hamas’s Oct. 7 massacre, China has put such illusions to rest: its conduct shows that it is less interested in the success of its own initiatives than in the failure of Washington’s. The real threat to U.S. interests in the Mideast isn’t rising Chinese influence, but the erosion of our own...
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, and Asia

387. North Africa in an Era of Great Power Competition: Challenges and Opportunities for the United States

Author:: Anna Borshchevskaya, Louis Dugit-Gros, Ben Fishman, Sabina Henneberg, and Grant Rumley
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Washington can demonstrate its decisive edge in areas like climate change remediation and economic development, while highlighting the many dangers posed by partnership with Russia and China. This week, Tunisia’s President Kais Saied will be among the leaders attending the tenth China–Arab States Cooperation Forum in Beijing. The event deserves U.S. attention, even as foreign policy minds remain focused on Ukraine and Gaza, because North African countries are strategically significant to U.S. defense and economic interests. Viewed through the lens of great power competition, China generally advances its economic interests by developing local infrastructure (e.g., ports), whereas the other main U.S. competitor—Russia—favors a security-based approach, supporting whatever actor it believes will help advance its goals (e.g., Gen. Khalifa Haftar in Libya). Such inroads threaten American interests and require responses that address the region both holistically and state-by-state. In this Policy Note, five experts argue for more robust U.S. engagement in North Africa against the anti-liberal designs of Beijing and Moscow. An effective approach, they contend, would amplify the benefits of cooperation in areas like climate change remediation and economic development, while highlighting the dangers posed by America’s rivals to national growth, freedom, and—especially in the case of China—sovereignty.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, Sovereignty, Strategic Competition, and Great Powers
Political Geography:: Russia, China, North Africa, and United States of America

388. Determinants of Leader Visits: A Review and Future Directions in Scholarship

Author:: Ali Balci
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies
Institution:: Sakarya University (SAU)
Abstract:: A recent surge in studies on high-level leader diplomacy has the potential to evolve into a fruitful research field. While the current literature predominantly focuses on the leader visits of two great powers, the U.S. and China, this emerging field requires both broadening and deepening in its scope. We lack data on leader visits from the vast majority of countries, and many existing hypotheses do not adequately explain the determinants in various cases. The more countries that are covered and the more refined our hypotheses become, the more insightful this field will be in understanding interactions among states and international organizations. This article aims to present the current state of the literature on leader visits and suggests potential areas of interest for future research.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Leadership, and Research
Political Geography:: China and United States of America

389. China’s Assertive Foreign Policy and Global Visions Under Xi Jinping

Author:: Zekeriyya Akdağ
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Academic Inquiries
Institution:: Sakarya University (SAU)
Abstract:: China, which has made a major economic breakthrough, has become one of the most important actors in international politics by increasing its military power in recent years. China's increasing power and influence in the international arena arouses increasing curiosity about the country's foreign policy. With Xi Jinping becoming president, China began to display a more assertive attitude or behavior on many issues. This study basically seeks an answer to the question of what differences Xi Jinping brought to Chinese foreign policy. What kind of changes do these differences lead to in Chinese foreign policy? In this study, the general tendencies and directions of Chinese foreign policy during the Xi Jinping period are discussed. The assertive foreign policy approach that Xi Jinping is trying to implement is analyzed. In this context, the visions of "Chinese dream", "new type of great power relations", "new type of international relations", “Belt and Road Initiative" and "a community with a common future for humanity", which reflect Xi's assertive foreign policy approach, are examined. At the same time, challenges to the assertive foreign policy implemented under Xi Jinping are discussed. The study mainly questions the extent to which Xi Jinping's assertive foreign policy approach is successful. The study concludes that Xi Jinping's active foreign policy approach has not increased China's sphere of influence in the international arena to the extent expected. As China becomes more visible in the international arena, the country's foreign policy challenges seem to be increasing.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Xi Jinping, and International Politics
Political Geography:: China and Asia

390. Impacts of Trade Diversion from China in the United States Market on Wages in a Third Country: Evidence from Thailand

Author:: Kazunobu Hayakawa and Sasatra Sudsawasd
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:: Since the latter half of the 2010s, China’s exports to the United States (US) have gradually decreased due to the US-China trade war and other factors, such as lockdown measures in China to combat COVID-19. This decrease has resulted in increasing exports from third countries, including Thailand, to the US market by substituting China’s exports, i.e. trade diversion. Against this backdrop, this study empirically investigates how the changes in exports to the US driven by the change in China’s exports to the US affect wages in Thailand. Especially, we examine the heterogeneous effects according to workers’ characteristics. To this end, we conduct regression analyses using individual-level quarterly data from the first quarter of 2017 to the second quarter of 2023. Our main finding is that the wage gap between low- and middle-skilled workers decreased, whilst the gap between middle- and high-skilled workers increased. Namely, the increased exports to the US caused ‘wage polarisation’ in Thailand. We also find that the increase in exports to the US contributed to expanding the wage gap by age but narrowing it by gender.
Topic:: Markets, Trade Wars, Exports, and Wages
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Thailand, and United States of America

391. City Amenities and Internal Migration: Evidence from Chinese Cities

Author:: Karma Wangdi and Shandre Mugan Thangavelu
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:: This paper provides new empirical evidence of city amenities’ role in China’s internal migration using a unique city-level dataset. The results highlight the positive effects of city amenities such as education, public facilities, transportation, environment, and climate conditions in attracting migrant workers to cities. In our study, migrant workers are more likely to move to cities with better education, more public facilities, higher coverage of urban pensions, and a cooler climate with more precipitation. Moreover, they prefer to migrate and live in cities with larger service agglomeration and employment, higher average wages, more job opportunities, and lower house prices
Topic:: Development, Labor Issues, Cities, Internal Migration, and Amenities
Political Geography:: China and Asia

392. Have Dynamic Spillovers and the Connectedness of Trade Policy Uncertainty Changed During the COVID-19 Pandemic and Sino–US Trade Frictions?

Author:: Chien-Chiang Lee and Farzan Yahya
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:: In this paper, we examine the spillover and connectedness between the trade policy uncertainty (TPU) of the United States (US), China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (henceforth, Korea) under global geopolitical risk (GPR), infectious disease equity market volatility (EMVID), and GPR from North Korea (GPRNK) using a relatively novel time-varying parameter vector autoregression (TVP-VAR) approach. Additionally, method of moments quantile regression is utilised to estimate the asymmetric effect of GPR, GPRNK, and EMVID on TPU. Our findings suggest that there is a high total and directional spillover amongst underlying variables during Sino–US trade friction that further elevated during the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic period. The US is a net receiver of spillover from the TPU of all economies, while the Chinese TPU receives spillover from EMVID. The results further confirm that both the TPU of China (TPUCN) and the TPU of the US (TPUUS) are vulnerable to EMVID, but the effect is stronger for Chinese TPU in the higher quantiles. Although Japanese TPU is less vulnerable to GPR and EMVID, it is significantly exposed to GPRNK. Korean trade shows resiliency and immunity to pandemic-induced volatility and GPRNK.
Topic:: Trade Wars, Trade Policy, COVID-19, and Spillovers
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

393. COVID-19 and Firm Response: Evidence from China

Author:: Dongmin Kong, Chen Liu, and Mengxu Xiong
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:: This paper explores the effects of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic on firm response. Using a novel COVID-19 sentiment index, our estimation shows that the pandemic significantly reduced the overseas revenue and profits of firms listed on the Chinese A-share market. Moreover, we observe that an increase in loans, and a drop in debt financing cost and trade credit, were prominent during the pandemic. We contend that reduced cash flows, which damaged firm operations; government support, which provided more financing channels; and increased default risks, which placed barriers on trade credit, are the plausible mechanisms through which the COVID-19 pandemic affects firm performance. Profit contraction was more pronounced for firms with a lower ratio of domestic content in exports and state-owned enterprises, while external financing was easier for firms subject to stringent financial constraints despite their lowered trade credit.
Topic:: Trade, COVID-19, and Firms
Political Geography:: China and Asia

394. Foreign Direct Investment, Brand Value, and Economic Performance: A Multinational Analysis

Author:: Tuba Yıldız, Ünal Arslan, Zeynep Ökten, Yıldız Sağlam Çelıköz, and Hale Kırmızıoğlu
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Istanbul Journal of Economics
Institution:: Istanbul University Faculty of Economics
Abstract:: The visibility and dependability of multinational corporations’ products increase with the fact that they introduce their goods to markets in other nations through foreign direct investments. The method for presenting products to international markets through foreign direct investments reveals the product’s reputation and therefore the brand’s development value. This study examines the relationship between foreign direct investments and brand value in Australia, Canada, China, France, India, Japan, Spain, the USA, and the UK for the period 2007-2023. The majority of studies in the literature attempt to explain the impact of brand value on foreign direct investments. However, very few studies explain the impac foreign direct investments on brand value and 1st generation unit root tests were generally used. Unlike existing studies, In this study, the second-generation unit root test, Durbin-Hausman cointegration, and Common Correlated Effects Mean Group estimation methods were used. As a result, it is anticipated that this study will contribute to the literature in this regard. The findings show that increases in foreign direct investments boost brand value.
Topic:: Economics, Foreign Direct Investment, Multinational Corporations, Data, and Branding
Political Geography:: Japan, China, United Kingdom, Canada, India, France, Spain, Australia, Global Focus, and United States of America

395. Selective Migration Policies With Chinese Characteristics

Author:: Rey Koslowski and Sheng Ding
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal on Migration and Human Security
Institution:: Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:: This article examines China’s recruitment of high-skilled migrants within a broader comparative analysis of selective migration strategies and adds the neglected Chinese case to the comparative immigration policy literature. China adopted certain selective migration polices from other countries, such as Canada and the United States, but its selective migration strategy does not fit established categories. Beginning in 2013, the Chinese communist government enacted new laws and issued new regulations to attract foreign talent and better regulate the entry, residence and employment of foreigners. The contours of China’s distinctive selective migration policy became more defined as Beijing established a point system combined with a job offer requirement; reformed the Z visa, which is issued to those with a college degree who intend to work in China; established the R visa for exceptionally high-skilled migrants; and adopted more liberal policies on permanent residency for the highly skilled. These policies, combined with the opportunities presented by China’s rapidly growing economy, attracted growing numbers of university graduates and propelled China, to become, for a brief period before the COVID-19 pandemic, a major destination for high-skilled migrants.
Topic:: Migration, Employment, Migration Policy, and Skilled Migration
Political Geography:: China and Asia

396. Rethinking Democracy ep. 4: China's growing presence in the Middle East with Dr. F. Gregory Gause and Dr. Jon Alterman

Author:: F. Gregory Gause, Jon B. Alterman, and Gonul Tol
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:: About the series: This is a critical year for the future of democracy. Half the world’s population will go to the polls in 2024, at a time when citizens in America and across the globe are losing faith in democratic institutions. We often view the rollback of democracy and threats to the liberal international order as separate problems, but in reality they are closely interlinked. Through a new limited podcast series, MEI’s Gonul Tol seeks to examine the interplay between democracy’s domestic and international foes as well as how to counter them. In this episode: China has made significant inroads in the Middle East through diplomacy, trade, investment, and infrastructure projects. Beijing advertises the benefits of its authoritarian development model and presents itself as a responsible alternative to the United States. What does this mean for MENA autocracies? Dr. F. Gregory Gause and Dr. Jon Alterman join Gonul Tol to discuss China’s growing presence in the Middle East.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Elections, Democracy, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Institutions
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, and Asia

397. Securitization of China Pakistan Economic Corridor Amid India China Rivalry

Author:: Muhammad Babar and Muhammad Umar
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: China Pakistan economic corridor (CPEC) is the flagship project of the Belt and Road initiative (BRI). The project has been considered the guarantor of Pakistan‟s economic development and has the potential to significantly improve the Pakistan gross domestic product and to transform Pakistan economy from import driven to export driven. Since the project has been under various impediments particularly in the domain of security, there have been several attacks on the Chinese personal working on the projects and its installations, majorly prompted by the Indian backed proxies and non-state actors in Pakistan. The Potential threats to the success of CPEC have been enhanced due the growing and intensifying India china rivalry. The securitization of the CPEC from all potential threats is a matter of national interest and ensuring national and economic security. This paper highlights the importance of CPEC for Pakistan‟s economy, potentials threats to the CPEC emanating from the Indian backed-proxies, discuss security measures taken to address these concerns and suggests a strategic path forward for the project securitization.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Non State Actors, Borders, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Exports, Economic Development, Rivalry, Securitization, and Proxy Groups
Political Geography:: China, South Asia, India, and Asia

398. R2P Monitor, Issue 68, 1 March 2024

Author:: Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Abstract:: R2P Monitor is a quarterly publication applying the atrocity prevention lens to populations at risk of mass atrocities around the world. Issue 68 looks at developments in Afghanistan, Central Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger), China, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Haiti, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Myanmar (Burma), Nicaragua, Nigeria, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, Venezuela, Cameroon, Central African Republic, South Sudan and Yemen.
Topic:: Human Rights, International Law, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and Atrocity Prevention
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, China, Sudan, Ukraine, Israel, North Korea, Yemen, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Palestine, Nicaragua, Haiti, Syria, Venezuela, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Myanmar, South Sudan, Cameroon, Sahel, Central African Republic, and Global Focus

399. China's "Second Battlefield": Political Warfare in Combat Operations

Author:: Kerry K. Gershaneck
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: This article addresses how the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will conduct political warfare against the U.S. Marine Corps in combat operations. The PRC has inextricably intertwined political warfare in its naval and maritime strategies to set the conditions for success in such a kinetic war. If the PRC perceives that political warfare alone will not achieve its goals, it threatens to achieve them through armed conflict, which may result in U.S. Marine Corps operations as a counter. This article examines key aspects of PRC political warfare in combat operations, to include a brief historical overview; goals, objectives, strategies, and tactics employed; targeting of U.S. and allied combat units, military base communities, and overseas Chinese; and the likely progression of political warfare operations throughout the combat campaign.
Topic:: Maritime, Gray Zone, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), political warfare, Hybrid Warfare, Coast Guard, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Cognitive Warfare
Political Geography:: China and Asia

400. Fires From the Shore: Supporting the Fight for Sea Control

Author:: Shaun Callahan
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: The struggle to obtain, maintain, and exploit sea control during a campaign is an inherently Joint endeavor requiring a multi-Service, cross-domain application of firepower and maneuver. Maritime strikes from the land domain provide a critical offset to the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) growing strength at sea and enable Joint force maneuver in the Western Pacific. To have a meaningful impact on the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) surface action groups and contribute to a Joint force objective to gain sea control in the Western Pacific as part of a coordinated campaign, the U.S. Army’s maritime strike capability must be aggregated into effective salvos by the supported maritime component commander. If deterrence fails in a strategically near future, naval operations in the Western Pacific will need to incorporate the U.S. Army’s multidomain task forces and their maritime strike capability to defeat the PRC’s antiaccess, area-denial (A2/AD) strategy.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Army, People's Liberation Army (PLA), Sea Control, and Joint Force Maneuver
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS