Political Geography: China - CIAO Search Results

351. Russia and China in Central Asia: Potential For Direct Competition

Author:: Maximilian Hess
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: China is now undisputedly the leading economic partner for the Central Asia region, with trade and investment continuing to increase despite Beijing’s economic slowdown. Russia is still the dominant political partner for the region, but its influence and ability to strong-arm Central Asian states has been significantly dented by the impact of Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Central Asian states are now able in tacitly criticize Putin’s actions without significant cost and some have taken advantage of the negative impacts of Russia’s international isolation and sanctions to strike beneficial deals, in particular Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Moscow remains content in its position, knowing that the lack of democracy in the region and dominance of elite networks in business and politics mean that regional states are still willing to turn to Moscow for political support, as witnessed in the Kyrgyz Republic in particular since President Japarov came to power in 2020. Tensions between Beijing and Russia have failed to emerge, at least publicly, although if the current trends continue the potential for direct competition may increase.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, Strategic Competition, and Regional Power
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Central Asia, and Asia

352. China, Russia, and Power Transition in Central Asia

Author:: Robert E. Hamilton
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: Since the days of Thucydides, scholars have written about—and policymakers have wrestled with—the dangers of power transition, which occurs when a rising power challenges the previously dominant power in a system. In the 5th Century BCE, this dynamic led to decades of war between alliance systems led by Sparta and Athens. Though Sparta eventually defeated Athens in the Peloponnesian War, the real winner was the Persian Empire, which snatched up territory from the exhausted states of the Hellenic system after the war ended. Much scholarship on the so-called Thucydides Trap focuses on the United States and China, asking if the powers two can negotiate the latter’s rise without conflict. But there is another, more acute power transition underway: that between Russia and China in Central Asia. In the last decade, and especially since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, Russia’s power and legitimacy in Central Asia has declined in absolute terms. The erosion of Russian power relative to that of China, however, is more important than the decline in Moscow’s absolute power. Power transitions are notoriously hard to navigate and can strain even amicable relationships, turning erstwhile partners into competitors, or worse. The China-Russia partnership is a relatively recent phenomenon after centuries of mostly competitive relations. This means that Beijing and Moscow do not have a reservoir of goodwill built over decades to draw on as they navigate the erosion of Russian power in a region critically important to both. While this power transition is unlikely to lead to outright war between China and Russia over Central Asia, it is already leading to competition between the two, especially in the economic realm. Competition between Beijing and Moscow is made both more likely and more consequential by several unique features of the region. First, it is geographically contiguous to both. Next, both have high-order political, economic, and security interests at stake there. Finally, the US footprint in the region is light, removing a strong incentive for Chinese-Russian cooperation there. The United States is in many ways the binding agent between China and Russia: Where it is present, their shared resistance to Washington’s influence gives them a focal point for cooperation. Where the United States is absent—as it is in Central Asia, at least with respect to China and Russia—that focal point is removed. This report first analyzes Chinese and Russian influence and interests in Central Asia. It then examines how each pursues its political, military, and economic goals in the region. It concludes with an analysis of how and where their interests are most convergent and divergent and the implications for their overall relationship. If Beijing and Moscow can negotiate their power transition in Central Asia and maintain their overall partnership, this implies that the partnership is deep and durable. But it is Central Asia, more than anywhere else in the world, that will test Chinese-Russian ties.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, Strategic Interests, and Regional Power
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and Central Asia

353. The Realignment of the Middle East

Author:: Lior Sternfeld
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: In the Middle East, reality can change in the blink of an eye. Misconceptions and misrepresentations that dominate the public discourse have it that the region has been embroiled in war since time immemorial. Still, even its most recognizable conflict—the Israel-Palestine dispute—has been going on for only a century. This report will not focus on the history of that conflict but instead will try to analyze the realignment of the key players in the region and beyond and point out several pathways to build on in securing peace. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been the sole global superpower. The change in world politics and the demise of the Soviet Union did not end the perception of alliances as zero-sum games. The War on Terror, the debacle of Iraq and Afghanistan, the rise of movements such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, the Arab Spring, and the collapse of old state structures, somehow fortified this approach over a more nuanced and pragmatic approach. Since the early 1990s, China entered as a secondary force and slowly gained a different status. This report examines the changes the Chinese doctrine might bring to the geopolitics in the region. Furthermore, it will examine the role China has played in the reshaping of the Middle East as a multipolar region, the transformation in the American role, and identify areas where the United States can take advantage of the new multipolarity in the region in light of Chinese activity.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, History, and Realignment
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, and United States of America

354. Paralysis versus Obedience: China’s Local Policymakers’ Strategic Adaptation To Political centralization

Author:: Jessica C. Teets
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: Under the concept of “top-level design,” President Xi Jinping has repurposed institutions to eliminate problems caused by local discretion such as corruption and policy implementation gaps. Increasing centralization of policy and strict penalties for lack of compliance is resulting in local officials no longer experimenting with policy to solve local governance problems and instead focusing more on documenting procedures. These strategic adaptations lead to erratic policy swings between paralysis and overcompliance at the local level, and an increasingly rigid and unresponsive policy process. Although these institutional changes are resulting in less corruption and more standardized governance (rule by law), they also reduce the local feedback and policy autonomy that constructed a more durable system than normally seen in authoritarian regimes (so-called “resilient authoritarianism”).
Topic:: Corruption, Xi Jinping, Centralization, and Strategic Adaptation
Political Geography:: China and Asia

355. Russia and China in Central Asia

Author:: Bruce Pannier
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:: The two countries that have the greatest influence in Central Asia are Russia and China. Moscow and Beijing have common interests in Central Asia, foremost are security interests connected to sharing long borders with a mainly Muslim region that itself borders Afghanistan. However, both these giant neighbors view Central Asia differently. Russia and China each have their own purposes in Central Asia, some of which do not affect the other, but some that at the least make the other country uncomfortable. Since Russia launched its full-scale war in Ukraine, these Sino-Russian rifts are becoming more pronounced. Russia and China want the current status quo in Central Asia, and that is the reason both countries have been concerned by the three revolutions in Kyrgyzstan since 2005. Moscow and Beijing know the top people in the Central Asian governments and have established security and business ties in all five countries. Neither China nor Russia want their relationships with individual Central Asian states to change, and neither wants to see the arrival of strong outside competitors for influence in Central Asia as was the case when the United States and its allies suddenly increased their presence in Central Asia for the campaign in Afghanistan in the years after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Strategic Interests, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Central Asia, Eurasia, and Asia

356. Critical Minerals and Great Power Competition: An Overview

Author:: Jiayi Zhou and André Månberger
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:: With global politics increasingly fractured, states are rushing to secure critical and strategic mineral supply chains. Each state conceptualizes mineral security differently, driven by a mix of imperatives that range from national development and industrial policy to technological and military dominance. Great power competition pervades all of these issue areas, and that competition may also pose risks at the global level: risks for the pace of green transition, risks of geoeconomic escalation and risks of conflict. This report provides an insightful overview of the mineral security policies of four key powers: China, the European Union, Russia and the United States. It describes the distinct ways in which they conceptualize mineral security, comparing their priority lists of critical and strategic minerals. It considers the wider imperatives that motivate their policies and assesses the implications for developing countries. The report concludes by reflecting on the need to mitigate the worst of the resultant risks through expanded dialogue with a wider set of stakeholders. The goal is a form of mineral security that can serve more broad-based, global developmental interests.
Topic:: European Union, Strategic Competition, Green Transition, Critical Minerals, and Great Powers
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

357. Cyber Risk Reduction in China, Russia, the United States and the European Union

Author:: Lora Saalman, Fei Su, and Larisa Saveleva Dovgal
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:: This report provides an overview of cyber risk reduction terminology and regulatory measures within China, Russia, the United States and the European Union. It finds, among other things, that China and Russia excel at clear visuals and steps, yet they also tend to lack linguistic clarity. China, the USA and the EU possess interagency and public–private sector coordination, while facing jurisdictional overlap. All four actors are securing their supply chains, yet China and Russia face challenges with burdensome penalties for non-compliance, and the USA and the EU confront obstacles to enforcement at the state and member-state levels. This report is intended to provide a baseline for engagement among China, Russia, the USA and the EU on their respective approaches to cyber risk reduction.
Topic:: European Union, Cybersecurity, Public-Private Partnership, and Risk Assessment
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

358. Understanding and Countering China’s Global South Strategy in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: John Lee
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: While the United States and advanced economies and democracies in Europe and Asia are hardening their views of and position against China, the latter is gaining much ground with respect to the developing economies of the Global South. Indeed, China increasingly demands that developing nations base their discourse and policies on approaches that Beijing supports, and many Global South nations are increasingly complying. In other words, a growing number of these nations have started to alter and adopt discourse and policies that better align with Chinese demands and preferences. In the Indo-Pacific, a region that will largely determine the future shape of the global strategic landscape, evidence shows that developing nations are absorbing Chinese norms and preferences and gradually adjusting their thinking and behaviors accordingly. China’s progress vis-à-vis the Global South—especially in the Indo-Pacific—relies on what material inducements and opportunities Beijing can offer. These are most successful when they prioritize rapid development and regime security over liberal economic rules and individual rights. Meanwhile, regardless of where the fault lies, many developing nations do not believe they have benefited as much materially or institutionally from the US-led order as they would like or expect. Members of the Global South often believe the Chinese narrative about the alleged failure of US-led globalization in the post-colonial and post–Cold War periods. For this reason, many in developing economies believe that the interests and values of these nations (or at least those of the regimes in power) better align with what China is promising than with what Washington is delivering. The US and allies such as Japan and Australia have to accept and respond to this reality. This report analyzes and assesses why and how China is making worrying progress when it comes to shaping and influencing the policies and actions of developing economies in the Indo-Pacific. It explains why this is a significant problem for the US and its allies. It then offers some recommendations to counter the Chinese Global South strategy in the region. In offering six recommendations, this report argues that the US can complicate China’s bid for leadership within the Global South, increase the cost and risk for Beijing, challenge and change narratives and discourse favoring China in the Global South, and compete more effectively in the normative and institutional context.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: China, Global South, and Indo-Pacific

359. Deterring China: Imposing Nonmilitary Costs to Preserve Peace in the Taiwan Strait

Author:: John Lee and Lavina Lee
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: The United States, Australia, and other allies have spent decades downplaying the prospect of conflict with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), offering Beijing incentives and concessions to assuage its ambitions, and managing their differences with China by seeking to deescalate tensions when they arose. In more recent times, when there is an emerging consensus that the decades-long approach to China has failed, policymakers have elevated deterrence as the urgent priority. This report makes the following key points. First, the case for urgency in the context of deterring Chinese force against Taiwan is clear.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, Sanctions, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Australia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

360. Strengthening Implementation of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act

Author:: Olivia Enos
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Since 2017, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has carried out a comprehensive campaign against the Uyghurs, a Muslim minority group predominately based in Xinjiang, China. Beijing is holding an estimated 1.8 million Uyghurs in political reeducation camps, subjecting more than 3 million to some form of forced labor, and seeking to reduce the Uyghur population through forced abortions and sterilizations. Because of this and other evidence, the United States issued an atrocity determination declaring that Uyghurs face ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity. The atrocity determination was incredibly important as it spurred follow-on action from the US and other governments. The passage of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) was one of the more powerful actions following the US determination. The UFLPA created a “rebuttable presumption” stating that the government would bar all goods produced “wholly or in part” with Uyghur forced labor from entering US markets. The UFLPA was signed into law in December 2021 and enforcement provisions went into effect in June 2022. Now, more than two years after its passage, trendlines are emerging, and policymakers can now evaluate the law’s effectiveness and ascertain new means for mitigating Uyghur forced labor. The CCP has not stopped targeting Uyghurs, and in fact has subjected even more of them to forced labor. Today, the CCP operates what some analysts believe is the largest state-sponsored forced labor program in the world. Given the CCP’s ongoing exploitation, the onus is on the US and the international community to curtail this egregious practice. At a minimum, democratic leaders need to ensure that citizens of the free world are not inadvertently supporting the continuation of these abuses. For the UFLPA to be maximally effective, Washington should complement it with comprehensive sanctions implementation and a secondary sanctions regime that targets entities aiding and abetting in the CCP’s enslavement of Uyghurs. Moreover, other countries need to close their markets to goods produced with Uyghur forced labor. To that end, the US and other countries can coordinate better to implement strong measures similar to the UFLPA. Perpetrators of Uyghur forced labor need to pay financially for their crimes through fines and forfeiture. Finally, the US should offer financial remedies to help survivors of the CCP’s ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity. While the UFLPA was a notable development in the fight against Uyghur forced labor, more has to be done to ensure the end of Uyghur forced labor. The international community needs to join together to hold the CCP accountable and protect Uyghur rights.
Topic:: Legislation, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Uyghurs, Freedom of Religion, Forced Labor, and Implementation
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

361. The Global Impact of China’s Water and Related Environmental Problems

Author:: Thomas J. Duesterberg
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: The quantity, location, and quality of water resources in China have long been a distinguishing and even defining characteristic of its history. Records at least as far back as the Ch’in era in the third century BC note the presence of massive waterworks such as irrigation and transportation canals. Terraced rice fields in hilly areas in central and southern China remain iconic images of Chinese civilization. During a contentious and important debate in the mid-twentieth century, geographers and political scientists asked whether the erection of a “hydraulic society” was the explanation for what political scientist Karl Wittfogel identified as “oriental despotism.”1 The German-trained academic argued that the existential requirement to contain endemic flooding and move water from the massive rivers of central and southern China to agricultural areas necessitated an authoritarian system for deploying labor on the scale required for hydraulic engineering projects spanning the continent. Chairman Mao Zedong drily noted at the beginning of his reign that “there is a lot of water in the south and not much water in the north . . . borrowing some water would be good.”2 Mao was soon to unleash the massive workforce of China to renew and expand efforts over the centuries to get water to farmland, control flooding, and reengineer the landscape of modern China. Even without exaggerating the centrality of water issues for historical China, in the modern era water resources are clearly still vital to the country’s economic and ecological health. And hydraulic engineering projects have become increasingly important, both to China’s Asian neighbors and to the global environment. An important new survey of the “ecological history” of modern China concludes that “in growing from impoverished giant to wealthy superpower in seventy years, China has sacrificed whatever resilience its ecosystem once possessed. It has polluted and poisoned its air, water, and soil . . . it has turned forests into plantations and seen deserts expand . . . and has seen lakes come to resemble green paint.”3 Unfortunately, China’s ecological problems have increasingly had negative impacts outside its borders. China’s unprecedented geoengineering to move water from the south to the north is now imperiling both the water resources available downstream from Tibet and the Hindu-Kush mountains, and the economy and ways of living of literally billions of people. China needs ever more land to grow higher quality food and produce higher yields, which frees up land for housing its population. These efforts have led to deforestation not only in China but also in South America and South Asia. And the consistent choice of Beijing’s leadership to drive economic growth at the expense of environmental health has led to dangerous levels of water pollution and poor soil health in China. Environmental degradation has become a growing political issue in China, and its export of this problem has incited considerable international concern. This study explores these issues with a focus on water resources, and it outlines the regional and global impacts of Chinese policy. The study concludes with a discussion of China’s ability and ambition to address these problems as well as how affected countries can help move Chinese leadership toward a more constructive and cooperative effort to develop a solution.
Topic:: Economics, Environment, and Water
Political Geography:: China and Asia

362. The Western Innovators of the Mobile Revolution: The Data on Global Royalty Flows to U.S. and Europe and Why It Matters

Author:: Adam Mossoff
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: The mobile revolution has radically altered our world in ways that were imagined only as science fiction a mere thirty years ago. Western innovators launched this revolution in creating its foundational telecommunications technologies; thus, it is unsurprising that private companies in the United States and Europe receive payments for the use of their telecommunications technologies, which is compensation for the billions in investments and decades of research and development of these inventions. The majority of the commercial implementers—the companies that make and sell consumer products that use these telecommunications technologies like smartphones or connected cars—are in Asia. China in particular has an increasingly growing share of these implementers across all sectors of the global innovation economy. This explains in part China’s domestic industrial policies that seek to lower the royalties paid by its national companies like Huawei or Oppo. Evidence-based policymaking should guide U.S. and European laws and regulations. Data confirm the critical role of reliable and effective patent rights, the rule of law, and courts using due process to resolve disputes have been essential for Western innovators creating the modern world—and will drive the technologies of tomorrow in the internet of things (IoT) and artificial intelligence (AI).
Topic:: Science and Technology, Intellectual Property/Copyright, Innovation, and Telecommunications
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and United States of America

363. Trust and trade-offs: How to manage Europe’s green technology dependence on China

Author:: Alexander Lipke, Janka Oertel, and Daniel O'Sullivan
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: “De-risking” is the guiding motif of the EU’s new approach to China, particularly in green technologies where Chinese companies are striving for full dominance. For Europe, these same industries are supposed to generate future prosperity, enable the green transition, and enhance security through greater energy independence. As economic growth, climate goals, and national security cannot all be maximally achieved together in these sectors, European policymakers need to weigh these up and decide which to prioritise, when, and how. Instead of individually using incentives and trade tools ad hoc, at random, and in insufficient doses, member states should revolutionise their approach with: a real push in political leadership, enhanced coordination at the EU level, and clear prioritisation backed up by credible arguments. Policymakers need to define politically where the risks are greatest and what constitutes a tolerable dependency, actively seek partners in the world to preserve competition, and communicate clearly about the necessary trade-offs. A key question for Europeans to ask immediately is whether they trust Chinese companies to form the backbone of Europe’s green transition. The answer will determine the options available to them.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Green Technology, Trust, and Green Transition
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

364. Material world: How Europe can compete with China in the race for Africa’s critical minerals

Author:: Sarah Logan
Publication Date:: 11-2024
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: In the last two decades, China has come to dominate global supply chains for critical raw materials and the green energy and other technologies they enable. This increases competition and economic risks for Europe. In an effort to build CRM supply chains insulated from China, the EU has signed strategic partnerships with several politically friendly countries around the world, including in Africa. However, the EU will only realise its de-risking ambitions if the European private sector invests in CRM supply chains in partner countries in Africa and elsewhere. Yet the incentives for European companies to enter mining and processing operations in these markets are too weak. The example of Namibia shows that the EU’s strategic partnership with the country has borne little fruit – and may even be benefitting Chinese firms at European expense. To address this, the EU must enhance support to European companies to invest in securing access to critical raw materials. This should include new financial incentives and measures to protect against China manipulating prices on international markets.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, European Union, Strategic Competition, Supply Chains, Strategic Partnerships, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:: Africa, China, Europe, Asia, and Namibia

365. Nuclear Danger and the NPT

Author:: Henry Sokolski
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Book
Institution:: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:: Next month, the second Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) preparatory review conference will meet in Geneva. In anticipation of this international conference, NPEC is releasing Nuclear Danger and the NPT, an edited volume of research on what nuclear dangers await and how proper enforcement of the NPT can help. The hope is that the volume’s analysis will prompt constructive debate. It certainly is needed. Within ten years, there is a distinct possibility South Korea, Japan, the UAE, Egypt, Turkey, and Iran may decide to acquire nuclear weapons. After that, Algeria, Finland, Sweden, Ukraine, and Australia may be sorely tempted to do the same. More could follow. What is fueling these grim prospects? Several things: Growing Russian, Chinese, and North Korean nuclear capabilities and threats; Russian forward basing of nuclear weapons in Belarus; waning allied confidence in U.S. nuclear security guarantees; and an increasing acceptance of dangerous civilian nuclear activities that bring states to the brink of bomb-making. Legally, the NPT is supposed to prevent these troubles. The question is will it? Much depends on what major nuclear powers choose to do regarding their NPT commitments and how smaller, nonnuclear nations view the treaty. Nuclear Danger and the NPT is designed to help clarify what that requires. Earlier this year, NPEC released an occasional paper on the challenges of creating a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East. Such challenges will surely be considered at the upcoming NPT review conference, but there will be more issues up for discussion. Attendees will likely debate the future of U.S. and Russian nuclear sharing arrangements, as well as the limits of what should be considered “peaceful” under the NPT. Iran’s threatened withdrawal from the treaty will also be a concern, as will China’s worries over the potential for Washington to redeploy nuclear weapons to South Korea or for Seoul to acquire its own nuclear weapons. The U.S. delegation is likely to raise complaints about China’s nuclear weapons build up and Beijing’s unwillingness to enter into good faith negotiations on effective nuclear controls. Finally, Russia’s assaults on Ukraine’s civilian nuclear systems and the legitimacy of such assaults are likely to be discussed. Nuclear Danger and the NPT covers all of these topics in depth. For hawks and doves, Washington insiders, and simply concerned citizens, it’s worth reading.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, Nuclear Energy, and Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Iran, South Korea, Global Focus, and United States of America

366. China, Russia, and the Coming Cool War

Author:: Henry Sokolski
Publication Date:: 11-2024
Content Type:: Book
Institution:: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:: As the dust settles on the election, one thing is certain: there is going to be increased interest in expanding America’s nuclear arsenal. Whatever the merits of what that move might be, it’s hardly a complete strategy to cope with a long term strategic contest, Russia, China, and their proxies. That will require far more than any adjustment of our nuclear arsenal. What’s required? At the request of several national security officials and outside experts, NPEC is sharing its answer with today’s release of China, Russia, and the Coming Cool War available as an Amazon book. It consists of four chapters. The first sketches out what a long-term contest with China, Russia, and its proxies will demand. Although building up military might and using threats of massive destruction against our enemies were critical to winning the Cold War, in the coming cool contest, they will no longer serve as our top ace in the hole. Instead, the key levers will be keeping our key military, political, and commercial functions immune to attacks and communicating, protecting, sharing, and analyzing essential information on an unprecedented scale. Wars may be waged against nations but the aim increasingly will be to disable them without physically obliterating them. What, though, should we do about the growing nuclear threat? That’s the focus of the book’s next chapter, “Xi and Putin Are Building More Nukes: How to Compete.” It, in turn, is followed by “What Missile-driven Competition with China Will Look Like,” which was first released three years ago. The Pentagon recently confirmed this chapter’s predictions about China’s development of intercontinental conventional missiles by 2030. The chapter’s other forecasts and military and diplomatic proposals are still timely. This brings us to the book’s last chapter, “Can Self-Government Survive the Next Convulsion?” It examines the domestic political, economic, and social implications of pursuing this volume’s recommendations. What’s needed most is a geographic distribution of America’s critical military and financial infrastructure and demographic capital. Fortunately, this has already begun, driven by the COVID-19 pandemic, and aligns with America’s bent to spread and increase political power and wealth domestically. The book’s final section is an appendix consisting of an introduction Thomas Cochran and I co-authored for “China’s Civil Nuclear Sector: Plowshares to Swords?” — a three-year NPEC study of China’s nuclear weapons production potential. The Pentagon has cited this research in each of its annual Chinese military power assessments for the last three years running. The Pentagon has used the study to help explain why China is likely to acquire as many nuclear weapons in a decade as the United States currently has deployed. It was this projection, perhaps more than any other, that caused national security analysts to focus on what is likely to be a long-term strategic contest with China and its new ally, Russia. Paul Bracken, author of The Second Nuclear Age, reviewed the book: “China and Russia’s military buildups have far-reaching political and strategic consequences. Yet the US is not remotely prepared to cope either intellectually or with appropriate hardware. Henry Sokolski takes a major step forward here by analyzing these challenges and what we need to do about them.”
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, Strategic Competition, and AUKUS
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and United States of America

367. Lessons from China: How Soon Could Iran Get the Bomb? (Occasional Paper 2404)

Author:: Hui Zhang
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:: It’s unclear when Iran might get the bomb. In July, Secretary of State Blinken revealed that Iran was only one to two weeks away from producing enough weapons grade uranium for several bombs. The New York Times quoted experts who estimated it would take Iran up to another year to make a missile-deliverable weapon. A conservative estimate would be no more than five months but could be much less. In the attached historical analysis of China’s nuclear weapons program, Hui Zhang pegs the number at three to five weeks, and possibly less. It makes for interesting reading, not only on what China was able to accomplish so quickly sixty years ago, but on what Iran may do.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Weapons, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:: China and Iran

368. War Game Reveals Chinese Attacks on Communications Could Paralyze Taiwan’s Efforts to Resist

Author:: Henry Sokolski
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:: Top security analysts have long noted that if China disables Taiwan’s underseas cable and disrupts its microwave, cell and space-based communications systems, Beijing could secure a smokeless victory over the island. Over the last five to 10 years, however, private commercial space-based communications and internet services have grown dramatically in importance. The critical role of Starlink in supporting Ukrainian military operations amply demonstrates this point. This prompts several policy questions: What national security roles should governments require commercial space service providers to play during a security crisis or war? Should governments set minimum standards for cyber and physical hardening for commercial satcom providers to meet in order to be eligible to compete for government contracts? What is the proper response to repeated “accidental” or deniable assaults on commercial and military space systems? To find out, the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center conducted a space war game that focused on a near-term Taiwan-China scenario. It utilized the talents of current and retired officials, congressional staff, and outside experts to play the game. In the game, China cut communications cables, disrupted microwave and cellular services, attacked Taiwan’s electrical supply system locally and jammed its satellite communications. The United States and its space-faring allies acted slowly. Private space service providers were no quicker. Finally, the President of the United States authorized covert cyberattacks against China’s Beidou satellite ground stations. China responded by launching similar cyberattacks on U.S. GPS systems and the U.S., redoubling its attacks against the Beidou system. With U.S. naval forces closing in to disrupt a Chinese naval quarantine of Taiwan, Beijing called for a mutual ceasefire in exchange for bilateral talks to lock Taiwan’s future as a province of China. The U.S., allies and Taiwan rejected this offer, opening the door for further military escalation. In the hot wash, the players discussed three key findings: Washington, its space-faring allies and industry players must clarify how they might backfill Taiwanese communication systems well before China might try to disable them. The US and its allies must address Taiwan’s lack of legal recognition, which leaves it uniquely vulnerable to offensive Chinese space and terrestrial military actions against Taiwan’s communications systems. Washington and its space-faring allies must develop additional military space options with plausible deniability to deter and counter similar Chinese capabilities. The recommendations paired with each of these findings. Taiwan needs to be more vocal about its communications systems’ vulnerabilities and consider developing mechanisms to disable China’s satellites temporarily, in a deniable manner. The United States should lower the classifications associated with its non-kinetic anti-satellite systems and create an operational working group on space security that includes Taiwan.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Communications, Nonproliferation, and War Games
Political Geography:: China and Taiwan

369. Green Soft Power? Checking in on China as a Responsible Stakeholder

Author:: Agnieszka Nitza-Makowska, Kerry Anne Longhurst, and Katarzyna Skiert-Andrzejuk
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:: Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:: By assuming a proactive role in international environmental regimes and extending the ‘green’ dimensions of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has been seeking to promote itself as a leader and responsible stakeholder in global environmental governance. This article examines this development concerning the notion of China’s ‘soft power’ and, more specifically, the notion of ‘green soft power’ – which aims to bridge the traditional concept of soft power with a state’s behavior on environmental and climate issues. China presents an interesting case since it has accrued a considerable amount of green soft power through its multilateral environmental diplomacy practiced at the Conferences of the Parties (COPs), the high-profile annual United Nations Climate Change Conferences, but its patchy deployment of environmental standards in the bilateral engagements under the BRI highlights the contradictions in referring to China as a green soft power. With these ideas in mind, this article holds that in the search to understand the evolving nature of China’s responsible stakeholder role, attention should be given to exploring the notion of green soft power.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Environment, Soft Power, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

370. The Future of NATO’s Nuclear Posture and Arms Control in Today’s More Dangerous World

Author:: Miles Pomper, David Santoro, and Nikolai Sokov
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:: Since the late 1960s, NATO has sought to balance two objectives—maintaining a strong nuclear deterrent while supporting efforts to buttress strategic stability through arms control and advance nonproliferation and disarmament through the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty process. The success of this strategy was most evident in the dual-track strategy of deployments and negotiations that led to the signing and implementation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987. The end of the Cold War also led to substantial cuts in U.S. and Russian strategic systems. Since then, NATO Allies have regularly voiced their support for continuing to pursue these two objectives, including supporting the goal enunciated by U.S. President Barack Obama in 2009 “to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.”1 In the last decade, however, Russia’s malign behavior has undermined NATO arms control efforts to the point that it appears traditional arms control will be effectively dead when the New START agreement—already suspended by Russia—expires in 2026. Russian’s invasion of Ukraine, its repeated nuclear saber-rattling in that conflict, and the deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons to Belarus has also forced the alliance to look to ways to enhance its deterrence, including its nuclear deterrence. Meanwhile, the massive increase in China’s nuclear arsenal and its growing partnership with Russia, is generating additional pressure to increase U.S. nuclear forces as well as questions about the ability of the U.S. to provide extended deterrence simultaneously to Allies in Europe and Asia. Those doubts have been reinforced by political developments in the United States—and in the war in Ukraine—that have raised anxieties about a decoupling of European and U.S. deterrence and defense and led to fresh discussion of a potential “Eurodeterrent.” Meanwhile, developments in North Korea and Iran—and their increasingly close ties with Moscow—further threaten the viability of the already shaky nuclear and missile nonproliferation regimes and have eroded longstanding cooperation between Washington and Moscow to manage nuclear nonproliferation risks in third countries. In response to these developments, Allies and experts, such as the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, have proposed various adaptations to the alliance’s nuclear posture, including to its nuclear sharing arrangements. This report examines these deterrence proposals, particularly considering how they support the alliance’s other longstanding objectives of arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation. The paper begins with some background on US/NATO nuclear policy from the end of the Cold War to the further invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. It then delves into changes in Russian nuclear doctrine, Moscow’s nuclear behavior during the Ukraine War, and the Kremlin’s views on future arms control. The report next discusses China’s nuclear modernization and views on arms control and the reaction among NATO and Asian Allies and the international community to these changes. It then discusses potential future U.S. and NATO posture options, including those already being undertaken by NATO or proposed by the US. Congressional Strategic Posture Commission and the State Department’s International Security Advisory Board. It concludes with an analysis of the potential impact of various options on arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation and offers some policy recommendations.
Topic:: NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

371. Nuclear China in the Twenty-First Century: Status and Implications for the World and Europe

Author:: David Santoro
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:: In August 2021, shortly after new evidence surfaced that China might be expanding its nuclear arsenal much more extensively and rapidly than previously assumed, Admiral Charles Richard, Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, described Beijing’s military investments as a “strategic breakout.” He underscored that the “explosive growth and modernization of [China’s] nuclear and conventional forces can only be what I describe as breathtaking,” adding that “that word, breathtaking, may not be enough.” Since then, several senior officials in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere have echoed that message and the final report of the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States published in October 2023 concluded that at its current pace, China “will reach rough quantitative parity with the United States in deployed nuclear warheads by the mid-2030s.” The result has been the emergence of work, including by this author, to understand this unprecedented development. This work is in its infancy, however, and more is needed to grasp the scale and scope of Chinese nuclear modernization (especially given that much of it is shrouded in secrecy) as well as its implications for strategic stability, deterrence, and arms control and risk reduction. Existing work has focused primarily on the implications for the United States and, to some extent, the United States and Russia. Yet it is also important to grapple with the implications for Europe, especially the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and reflect on actions that Europeans, individually or with others, should take in response.
Topic:: NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, and Modernization
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

372. Beyond Target: Indirect Impacts of Antidumping

Author:: Sébastien Jean and Kevin Lefebvre
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:: This paper investigates the bilateral impacts of antidumping measures, beyond directly targeted products and exporting firms. It focuses on the country whose exports are most exposed to such measures, China. Productlevel analysis shows that export volumes are negatively affected for products similar to a product targeted by an antidumping case, i.e. belonging to the same tariff heading. Using firm-level data, we show that this impact is driven by within-firm contagion: targeted firms not only cut their exports of targeted products, they also reduce significantly their exports of non-targeted products. The decrease is half as large for the latter than for the former, but the total impact on bilateral trade is far larger, because the value of export flows affected by these indirect impacts is ten times larger than the value of directly targeted export flows. In addition, interestingly, this effect is more pronounced for small and private firms.
Topic:: Business, Exports, Trade, Spillovers, and Antidumping
Political Geography:: China and Asia

373. ‘Self-Revolution’ Suggests Stronger CCDI Mandate

Author:: Arran Hope
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Xi Jinping addressed the perennial dilemma of corruption within the CCP, pronouncing “victory” in a decade of anti-corruption efforts but simultaneously warning that the situation remains “grim and complex.” In the short term, anti-corruption crackdowns are expected to continue, with Xi targeting sectors with concentrated power, capital-intensive industries, and resource-rich areas. The military, particularly the Strategic Support Force, might face increased scrutiny. The third plenary session of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) of the twentieth party congress took place on January 8, emphasizing “courage in [performing] self-revolution” as a distinctive character and advantage of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
Topic:: Corruption, Political Parties, Xi Jinping, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

374. State Goals, Private Tools: Digital Sovereignty and Surveillance Along the Belt and Road

Author:: Che Chang, Lian Huang, and Athena Tong
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Beijing promotes digital sovereignty in its engagements with other countries but with the caveat that it can maintain access to partner countries’ digital systems. Leaked documents from cyber contracting firm iS00N indicate a focus on One Belt One Road partner countries, targeting critical systems, including telecoms, government ministries, and financial institutions. A new paradigm of using nominally private firms allows Beijing to put distance between its inclusive rhetoric of “win-win cooperation” while companies hack partner countries’ infrastructure at the direction of its security services.
Topic:: Cybersecurity, Surveillance, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Digital Sovereignty
Political Geography:: China and Asia

375. The Shapeshifting Evolution of Chinese Technology Acquisition

Author:: Matthew Brazil
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Smuggling, a critical tool of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to acquire technology to enhance its defense industrial base, is reemerging in the wake of the US Government’s technology controls. Diversion—falsifying the end-user—is another common tactic that the Party has successfully used to acquire critical technology, including dual-use items that it would have been otherwise unable to obtain. Talent attraction is an underrated part of technology acquisition that the CCP has promoted in academia as well as in the corporate sector to help advance its technology ambitions. Foreign businesses have been willing to engage in technology transfer in return for potential access to the PRC market. This tradeoff frequently has not paid off for these firms.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Trade, Smuggling, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:: China and Asia

376. The Power Vertical: Centralization in the PRC’s State Security System

Author:: Edward Schwarck
Publication Date:: 11-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Centralizing reforms to the Ministry of State Security probably constitute the most important development in China’s civilian intelligence system since its establishment in 1983. These reforms instituted “vertical leadership,” under which the MSS is empowered to control local bureaus’ personnel affairs, budgets, and oversight. Structural changes that began in 2016–2017 mean that local state security bureaus are no longer subject to the authority of local party committees, and so are freer to impose a security-first agenda on other government agencies, leading to a more oppressive political environment. The ministry is now better able to direct joint operations between bureaus, exploit pockets of regional expertise, and ensure that local activities serve the strategic intelligence and security requirements of the central government. The reforms are part of Xi Jinping’s broader efforts to ensure that the “party center has supreme authority over state security.” The state security system’s further empowerment suggests it is likely to remain a powerful and durable interest group in PRC politics beyond the Xi era.
Topic:: Security, Intelligence, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and Centralization
Political Geography:: China and Asia

377. The Art of War: PRC Weaponizes Culture to Galvanize the People

Author:: Arran Hope
Publication Date:: 11-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: The Party sees culture as a tool to achieve its strategic ambitions both inside and outside the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Speeches, articles, and conferences portray it as central to achieving national rejuvenation. Party discourse on culture is shot through with militaristic terminology. Not just echoing Mao-era rhetoric, this reflects Beijing’s desire to “engineer souls” in pursuit of a strong nation. Artists, culture workers, and academics are perceived as pawns in a project to present the PRC globally as peaceful and prosperous, but the Party is aware of the deficiencies of its soft power.
Topic:: Arts, Culture, Soft Power, Academia, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

378. Xi Jinping’s Quantitative Easing Unlikely to Save Economy

Author:: Willy Wo-Lap Lam
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In an apparent U-turn, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has initiated stimulus policies that have boosted the stock market and are attempting to jump-start key sectors and meet the annual GDP growth target of 5 percent. In the last week of September, the central bank announced a package worth at least 2 trillion Renminbi (RMB; $280 billion), cut the banks’ reserve requirement ratio by 50 basis points, and hinted at further measures. The domestic and international response has been underwhelming, in part because the package leaves the economy even more overleveraged than before. President Xi Jinping’s attempts to enhance the PRC’s global stature, including through a recent ICBM test and by deepening support for Russia’s war in Ukraine and for other countries willing to denounce the United States and the West, will not help the domestic economic woes as they discourage foreign investment.
Topic:: Monetary Policy, Economy, Economic Growth, Investment, and Quantitative Easing
Political Geography:: China and Asia

379. Understanding the PRC’s Selective Use of Military Hotlines

Author:: Augusto Leal Rinaldi
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: The PRC’s strategic use of and reluctance to establish military hotlines reflect a calculated approach to escalation risk, which can be seen in crises ranging from the accidental bombing of its embassy in Belgrade in 1999 to the present day. There is a recognition that hotlines offer tactical benefits, but they are not viewed as a solution to the broader challenges in US-PRC relations. The PRC is largely skeptical of military hotlines, believing that they lack utility and could potentially undermine its national security. Defense scholars fear that the existence of a mechanism to de-escalate crises could embolden adversaries to take more risks, and doubt that hotlines can help mitigate long-term mistrust in bilateral relations. Beijing also perceived some benefits of military hotlines. These include enhancing safety and crisis management, enabling the political signaling of intentions, and improving the PRC’s reputation as a responsible power, as well as allowing it to control narratives and influence other states’ actions.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Military Affairs, Crisis Management, and Deescalation
Political Geography:: China and Asia

380. Beijing’s Soft Power Push with African Nations

Author:: Arran Hope
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has successfully used its hosting of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation to burnish its soft power and its credentials to be seen as the leader of the Global South. Close political alignment on core issues, including African states affirming support for the PRC’s positions on Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Tibet, and unification with Taiwan are indicative of the PRC’s diplomatic gains. Politics was central to the event, with the promotion of exchanges and cooperation announced between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and African political parties, between the PRC’s Supreme People’s Court and the Court of Justice of the African Union, and between the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and regional organizations, alongside numerous training programs in various domains. Africa joined a “community of common destiny,” which entails a rejection of the Western approach to modernization. The West in general and the United States explicitly were heavily criticized throughout the forum.The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has successfully used its hosting of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation to burnish its soft power and its credentials to be seen as the leader of the Global South. Close political alignment on core issues, including African states affirming support for the PRC’s positions on Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Tibet, and unification with Taiwan are indicative of the PRC’s diplomatic gains. Politics was central to the event, with the promotion of exchanges and cooperation announced between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and African political parties, between the PRC’s Supreme People’s Court and the Court of Justice of the African Union, and between the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and regional organizations, alongside numerous training programs in various domains. Africa joined a “community of common destiny,” which entails a rejection of the Western approach to modernization. The West in general and the United States explicitly were heavily criticized throughout the forum.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Global South, Soft Power, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:: Africa, China, and Asia

381. Kubernetes: A Dilemma in the Geopolitical Tech Race

Author:: Sunny Cheung
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: US-sanctioned Huawei has significant influence in the Cloud Native Computing Foundation and its open-source platform Kubernetes, which underpins US military platforms, including F-16 fighter jets and nuclear infrastructure. The use of open-source technologies in critical systems raises concerns. Despite US efforts to mitigate risks, Kubernetes remains tempting to exploit for attackers. Open source fosters global innovation, from which the United States benefits. But this same openness also strengthens US competitors. The United States should therefore develop a clear framework to understand and mitigate the challenges posed by open source.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Sanctions, Geopolitics, Innovation, Strategic Competition, and Huawei
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

382. Kursk Incursion Draws Delayed Response From Beijing

Author:: Arran Hope
Publication Date:: 08-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Official media in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has finally begun to comment on the Ukrainian operation in Russia’s Kursk oblast, which began on August 6. It gives Ukraine low odds of success, emphasizes Russia’s strength and successes elsewhere in the conflict, and has started amplifying Russian propaganda about US involvement and potential Ukrainian attacks on the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant. For the two weeks after Ukrainian forces invaded Russia’s Kursk Oblast on August 6, PRC state media either ignored the developments or provided minimal reporting, mostly recycling statements from Russian officials and media. The PRC’s muted coverage follows a pattern of delayed responses to surprising events and volatile situations, also seen at the outbreak of the war and during Prigozhin’s mutiny in June 2023. This can be taken as evidence that authoritarian systems are not necessarily capable of responding quickly to developments, especially when decision making is highly centralized.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Propaganda, Russia-Ukraine War, and Incursion
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and Asia

383. Economic and Technological Zones: Economic Strategy in the Tibet Autonomous Region

Author:: Devendra Kumar
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: New Economic and Technology Development Zones (ETDZs) in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) are focused on pockets of the Han population, which will exacerbate tensions within the region. The Tibetan economy is already largely under Han control (except for in the agriculture and livestock sectors), and Han people constitute the majority group in many of Tiber’s urban centers. The TAR government has set up the zones to import practices from elsewhere in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and shift the region’s economy away from traditional sectors and toward export-oriented industries, construction, and even high-tech manufacturing. The TAR’s external trade is currently limited to Nepal, due to ongoing border tensions with India. Meanwhile, infrastructural challenges hampering the development of the Sichuan-Tibet railway or national highways connecting the TAR with other provinces suggest that further integration with the rest of the PRC remains some way off. In a related policy, the PRC has developed border towns strategically located near land border ports that it has built along its borders with India, Nepal, and Bhutan. Infrastructure buildup on the border could also serve a dual-use purpose in the case of a conflict, as has been the case in India in recent years.
Topic:: Economics, Science and Technology, Manufacturing, Trade, and Autonomy
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Tibet

384. PRC Advances New International Order In Astana

Author:: Arran Hope
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: The People’s Republic of China (PRC) sees the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as an important part of a wider strategy to construct a new international order. Beijing projects soft power through promoting norms, discursive constructs, and policy preferences in the SCO which member states officially endorse. These include language about comprehensively reforming the UN and supporting all PRC efforts to achieve “national reunification” with Taiwan. Military exercises that take place via the SCO provide the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) unique opportunities to gain practical experience outside its borders and normalizes basing of Chinese forces in other countries through international treaties.
Topic:: Treaties and Agreements, Military Affairs, Soft Power, and International Order
Political Geography:: China and Asia

385. PRC Transfer of Military and Dual-Use Technology: the Case of the International Conference on Defence Technology

Author:: Matthew Bruzzese
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: The International Conference on Defence Technology (ICDT), held biannually since 2018, exemplifies an approach by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to leverage defense technology from Western researchers. The conference features participation from PRC defense entities and Western scientists, facilitating direct transfer of advanced defense technology insights to the People’s Liberation Army. The Military-Civil Fusion development strategy has increased the absorption of foreign S&T knowledge for military purposes. Research with any PRC institution operates under the premise that anything with potential military applications will be utilized for defense purposes. Despite increased awareness of PRC’s tech transfer efforts, Western researchers continue to attend PRC-hosted conferences with military affiliations, exposing them to risks of being probed for sensitive information and potential espionage activities.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Defense Industry, and Dual Use Infrastructure
Political Geography:: China and Asia

386. New Textbook Reveals Xi Jinping’s Doctrine of Han-centric Nation-Building

Author:: James Leibold
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Another cultural revolution is in full swing in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This is not the purported class revolution Mao advocated in the past, but rather a wave of Han cultural and racial nationalism. Xi’s new approach to ethnic minority policy repudiates the Party’s past promise to allow minority nationalities to exercise political and cultural autonomy, becoming “masters of their own house.” Following more than ten years of incremental change, a new textbook from scholar-officials articulates the discourse, ideology, and policies associated with a new Han-centric narrative of China’s past and future. In this conception, the sovereignties and homelands of the Tibetan, Uyghur, Mongol, and other indigenous minorities are erased and replaced with a seamless teleology of the Han colonial and racial becoming.
Topic:: Education, Culture, Political Parties, and Xi Jinping
Political Geography:: China and Asia

387. Foreign Fixations at the Heart of Chinese-style Modernization

Author:: Arran Hope
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: A new report from two high-end PRC think-tanks details the country’s path to modernization in anticipation of July’s Third Plenum but suggests that any shifts in policy direction will be muted. The report emphasizes the triumph of Chinese-style modernization over the Western model and provides substantial criticisms of the failures of the West. It also argues that the PRC’s model contains lessons for other developing countries. The report leverages Western individuals and institutions to buttress its arguments for the superiority of Chinese-style modernization, which suggests that the West is still perceived as (or can be instrumentalized as) a source of legitimacy by the PRC. The report asserts the core message that only Party-led Chinese-style modernization can bring about national rejuvenation, and that this will occur through an economic program that is focused on “seizing the commanding heights in a new round of global scientific and technological revolution and industrial transformation.”
Topic:: Development, Modernization, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

388. Planned Obsolescence: The Strategic Support Force In Memoriam (2015-2024)

Author:: Joe McReynolds
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Strategic Support Force likely was designed principally as a transitional structure meant to provide a home for disparate space, cyber, and informatization forces until their force structure could be developed enough to stand as independent branches. The successor branches of the SSF, the new Space Force, Cyber Force, and Information Support Force, likely maintain the units, capabilities, and mission areas previously held under the SSF. These branches can be best understood as rough PLA equivalents to US functional combatant commands, non-geographically defined joint-force structures intended to support services and military theaters by providing critical capabilities and operations in strategic domains of warfare. The creation of the branches also has the benefit of bringing critical resources and capabilities under the direct oversight of the Central Military Commission. This design feature is likely motivated by a desire to have greater control and more closely shape broader PLA modernization. It is in part also a response to controversies and international incidents associated with the SSF’s current leadership.
Topic:: Military Affairs, Cybersecurity, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

389. Xi Signals Firm Strategy but Flexible Tactics at China’s Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference

Author:: Neil Thomas
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: The readout from the Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference (CFAWC) at the end of December indicated an emerging strategy of countering US leadership by mobilizing the support of Global South countries while dividing the West on contentious global issues. Recent changes in official discourse and new language that now forms part Xi’s messaging to visiting politicians makes clear Beijing’s enhanced conviction of the need to actively shape and influence world events. The CFAWC meeting signaled a turn away from the more abrasive forms of “wolf warrior” diplomacy. Xi’s desired shift in rhetoric does not mean that PRC diplomats will be less assertive in communicating their preferences overseas.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Global South, and Xi Jinping
Political Geography:: China and Asia

390. Foreign Intelligence Hackers and Their Place in the PRC Intelligence Community

Author:: Matthew Brazil
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Leaked files from iS00N reveal deep insights into the PRC’s intelligence operations, highlighting an intensified global security offensive as well as issues within the intelligence community. iS00N’s growth is tied to Xi Jinping’s aggressive policies and demonstrates the importance of private contractors in fulfilling the PRC’s increased intelligence and security needs. The leaks expose employee dissatisfaction and underscore iS00N’s critical role in intelligence gathering and job provision, reflecting the contractor’s complex relationship with the PRC government. The exposure raises questions about the role and regulation of hacking contractors in the PRC, potentially leading to investigations and reforms that could affect the PRC’s intelligence strategy and international relations.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Intelligence, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:: China and Asia

391. National Defense Mobilization: Toward A Clear Division of Labor between the PLA and Civilian Bureaucracies

Author:: Yu-Ping Chang
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: As the result of the ongoing military reform, the military’s guiding and leadership role over civilian bureaucracies seems to be strengthened. Meanwhile, the responsibilities of the State Council and local governments on NDM have been substantiated, and the administrative work which the PLA used to undertake has been transferred to local governments. A clearer division of labor between the military and civilian bureaucracies allows the PLA to focus on the development of combat capabilities without being distracted by administrative work, while more attention and resources devoted to national defense projects by civilian bureaucracies are likely to improve NDM work. National defense mobilization is an area where the PLA and civilian bureaucracies need to cooperate closely during peacetime to allow an effective generation and mobilization of national resources during wartime. The national defense mobilization system (NDM system), composed of civilian bureaucracies and the PLA bureaucracies, used to be characterized by a bureaucratic structure in which the military sat above local governments and both guided and administered a significant portion of administrative work related to national defense development.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Affairs, Reform, Bureaucracy, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

392. Implications of Article 23 Legislation on the Future of Hong Kong

Author:: Eric Y. H. Lai
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Hong Kong’s Article 23 legislation will integrate the PRC’s national security framework into Hong Kong’s legal system, impacting the city’s rule of law and foreign business interests. Broad and vague definitions of national security will create challenges for Hong Kong’s common law system. It will likely contribute to the erosion of legal certainty and judicial independence. Proposed offenses such as “theft of state secrets” and “espionage” are ambiguously defined, creating uncertainty. This may cause issues for foreign businesses collecting information for due diligence and will further chill freedom of expression in the city. The legislation aims to isolate Hong Kong further from the liberal democratic world, granting extensive powers to the government for political control and undermining public oversight and due process rights.
Topic:: National Security, Rule of Law, Legislation, and Due Process
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Hong Kong

393. Civil Society Defense Initiatives

Author:: Marco Ho Cheng-hui
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Civic groups are enhancing “social resilience” by forming self-training organizations focused on preparing for potential conflict impacts beyond just military engagement. These groups address a broad range of issues including civil defense, emergency rescue, disaster preparedness, cyberattack responses, and infrastructure maintenance. Civil society advocates for the use of civilian technologies in defense, such as drones and AI, reflecting a proactive stance on Taiwan’s security. Kuma Academy exemplifies practical action in civil defense education, offering courses and activities to thousands, alongside other groups focusing on specific preparedness aspects. Taiwan’s civil society is urging government and political parties to implement defense reforms, over concerns about the country’s level of defense in the face of threats from the PRC.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Civil Society, and Reform
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

394. PLA Personnel Shakeups And Their Implications

Author:: Ying Yu Lin
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Dong Jun’s appointment as Defense Minister and changes in the PLA Rocket Force leadership mark a strategic shift towards bolstering military diplomacy, particularly with Russia, and enhancing combat and technological readiness, reflecting Dong’s significant role in shaping future military strategy. The leadership overhaul within the PLA highlights a concerted effort to root out corruption, critical for maintaining the military’s operational integrity and effectiveness. This move is partly inspired by the need to avoid the operational pitfalls seen in the Russian military’s performance in Ukraine. The hiring of PLA officers from services outside the Rocket Force, as well as those with personal connections to Xi Jinping, indicates a desire to start afresh, while also suggesting the extent of corruption within PLARF. Analysts believe the ousting of officials like Li Shangfu will not necessarily directly weaken the PLA’s combat capabilities, given the defense minister’s primarily diplomatic role. However, it also suggests that Li, with his technical background, was perhaps not well-suited to his role. Nonetheless, it prompts speculation about future military diplomacy and technological focus.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Corruption, Military Affairs, Leadership, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

395. Next-Generation Perspectives on Taiwan: Insights from the 2024 Taiwan-US Policy Program

Author:: Bonnie S. Glaser, Joshua Stone, Alicja Bachulska, Viking Bohman, and Francesca Ghiretti
Publication Date:: 08-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: The papers in this compendium were written by 11 members of the 2024 Taiwan-US Policy Program (TUPP) delegation: Alicja Bachulska, Viking Bohman, Francesca Ghiretti, Heather Hwalek, Leland Lazarus, Lauren Racusin, Friso Stevens, Joshua Stone, Brian Volsky, Theresa Winter, Adrienne Wu. Transatlantic attention to Taiwan has surged in recent years for several reasons. First, Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has led to increased concern in the United States and Europe that Beijing’s growing military capabilities and declining confidence in its ability to achieve peaceful reunification will soon lead the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to attempt a takeover of Taiwan by force. The cost of such a war would carry a price tag of around $10 trillion, equal to about 10% of global GDP, according to Bloomberg Economics, far higher than the economic impact of the 2008 global financial crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the war in Ukraine. The devastating impact of a Taiwan Strait conflict has provided a wake-up call for leaders in Europe who now echo the Biden administration’s warnings to PRC leader Xi Jinping to refrain from using violence to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. In addition, Taiwan is now a regular agenda item in the US-EU Consultations on the Indo-Pacific and the US-EU Dialogue on China. Second, intensifying US-China strategic competition has increasingly focused on technology with chips at the center. Taiwan produces more than 60% of the world’s semiconductors and more than 90% of the most advanced ones. A single company, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC), manufactures most of those chips. Recognition of Taiwan’s dominant role in the semiconductor supply chain has provided another reason to bolster deterrence. It has also sparked interest in “friendshoring” and “onshoring” semiconductor manufacturing. TSMC plans to start production at its first fab in Arizona in 2025 and will break ground on another in Dresden at the end of 2024 with an estimated completion date of 2027. Recognizing the rising geopolitical risks and their own strategic dependencies, the United States and the EU have made building resilient supply chains a priority, especially in semiconductors. In its 2021 Indo-Pacific Strategy, Brussels explicitly committed the EU to engaging with Taiwan in creating resilient supply chains. Third, rising concern in the United States and Europe about election interference and disinformation have sparked interest in learning from Taiwan’s experience in combatting such threats. In the run-up to the January 13, 2024, presidential and legislative elections, PRC attempts to interfere in Taiwan’s politics surged to unprecedented levels through economic coercion, direct political meddling, displays of military force, and manipulation of social media. As the United States and many European countries prepare for their own national elections this year, they are engaging with experts from Taiwan to better understand PRC tactics and the tools that Taiwan successfully employed to counter PRC interference. Fourth, the United States and Europe increasingly recognize that Taiwan’s vibrant and successful democracy is under threat from an authoritarian regime. Taiwan has received high marks for protecting political rights and holding free and fair elections. Taiwan’s democratic achievements are even more impressive when set against the backdrop of a deterioration in freedom worldwide. Like other industrialized democracies, Taiwan faces a multitude of challenges that are especially difficult to address in the face of PRC efforts that prevent Taiwan’s government and its people from interacting with the world. Taiwan’s exclusion from international organizations also hampers the world’s ability to develop effective solutions to myriad problems. The Taiwan-US Policy Program (TUPP) was launched in 2017 to encourage young professionals from the United States to include Taiwan in their research and help Taipei expand its global networks. In 2022, TUPP was expanded to include young professionals from Europe in support of GMF’s mission of promoting transatlantic cooperation. TUPP enables future leaders to acquire a deeper understanding of Taiwan and its relations with the United States through meetings with officials and experts in Washington, DC, followed by a visit to Taiwan to gain first-hand exposure to its politics, culture, and history. Experiencing Taiwan influences how these future leaders approach their work and their writing. It impacts their worldview by imbuing them with an appreciation for Taiwan’s history and commitment to the principles of democracy and human rights that undergird the existing international order. It also reinforces the importance of maintaining robust bilateral relations and strengthening international support for maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. The 2024 TUPP cohort traveled to Taiwan in February for an intense week of meetings and activities. Each participant gained insights into Taiwan and its role in their respective fields. This year’s delegation comprised five Americans and five Europeans. Over time, TUPP seeks to create a body of global experts with firsthand knowledge of Taiwan who support sustaining and expanding its international ties. I am grateful to the Henry Luce Foundation, the Global Taiwan Institute, and the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy for their support of this goal. The contributions here, written by the entire 2024 TUPP delegation, underscore the importance of deeper study and understanding of Taiwan. I sincerely hope that they stimulate continued transatlantic and global interest in Taiwan and its future.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, Geopolitics, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Taiwan, Asia, Poland, Germany, Latin America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

396. Protecting Undersea Infrastructure in the North American Arctic

Author:: Heather A Conley, Sophie Arts, Kristine Berzina, and Frida Rintakumpu
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: In response to recent incidents damaging undersea energy infrastructure and communication cables in the Baltic Sea and High North, NATO countries have intensified their focus on critical undersea infrastructure (CUI) protection on the national, bilateral, and multilateral levels. Allies in the North American Arctic can build on important NATO initiatives but, given distances and the unique operating environment in this theater, the responsibility for protecting CUI assets in territorial waters will fall primarily to the United States, Canada, and the Kingdom of Denmark. CUI in the North American Arctic is currently limited. But climate change, the green energy transition, and greater reliance on artificial intelligence (AI) will increase the demand and opportunity to expand communication cables and energy infrastructure in the region. At the same time, increased traffic and resource exploration heighten the vulnerability of these assets, especially to deliberate attack from Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Both powers rely on dual-use assets that increase plausible deniability, and they continue to develop undersea warfare capabilities. To enhance resilience and protect CUI in the North American Arctic, the United States and its NATO allies are strongly encouraged to: • urgently upgrade US as well as NATO allies’ situational awareness and presence in the air, space, and undersea domain, cooperating closely with the private sector • prioritize and upgrade the role of NATO’s Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM) to conduct CUI threat assessments and identify assets that are especially vulnerable due to their strategic importance, location, complicated ownership structure, or symbolic value • expand US and NATO response options to counter hybrid threats and deter CUI attacks; consider establishing an additional maritime high-readiness force • increase NATO’s presence to protect and defend nearby assets during and after Russian and PRC naval maneuvers • build on NATO’s Digital Oceans Initiative to enhance and integrate unmanned systems and AI information processing tools into exercises and operations • identify counterparts in other national governments to ensure quick and seamless information sharing following CUI incidents • deepen public-private cooperation as well as government oversight over privately owned CUI to incentivize the private sector’s CUI resilience (e.g. fortifying cables, integrating monitoring capabilities, and ensuring adequate repair capabilities) • clarify responsibilities of CUI protection and defense across the civil, military, and private sectors, including the transition of responsibilities from the Department of Homeland Security to the Department of Defense in crisis situations • train and exercise crisis decision-making processes with the involvement of all relevant actors (including the private sector and state and local authorities) on the national, bilateral (Canada and the Kingdom of Denmark), minilateral, and multilateral levels • clarify and enhance legal frameworks to respond to CUI incidents in territorial and international waters, and share best practices across all sectors • use pro-active strategic communication to outline legal and military authority in responding to CUI incidents, attributing attacks, and enhancing deterrence against future threats.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Infrastructure, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:: China, North America, Arctic, United States of America, and Baltic Sea

397. Is the G7 still relevant?

Author:: Raffaele Trombetta
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: In the first of our new Expert Analysis series, former Italian Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Raffaele Trombetta, draws on his career experience to answer the question of whether the G7 is still relevant in today’s international order. Detailing a narrative of the G7’s history, confronting its challenges, and addressing its common criticisms, this paper deals with the alternatives (G20 and BRICS), as well as where the G7’s interests should lie in future relations with China and the African nations.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, G20, G7, BRICS, and International Order
Political Geography:: Africa, China, Europe, and Asia

398. China in Africa: The Nuanced Reality of Belt and Road

Author:: Hank Cohen
Publication Date:: 11-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: China’s growing presence in Africa has been the subject of significant criticism. The popular understanding in the US of China’s role on the continent has been that the People’s Republic, via the Belt and Road Initiative, has offered African countries a raw deal: shoddy infrastructure projects in exchange for loans they know their partners cannot repay. The approach is commonly described as debt-trap diplomacy, garnering unfavorable comparisons to organized crime behavior. But the reality of China’s presence in Africa is more nuanced.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Infrastructure, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:: Africa, China, and Asia

399. The Problem with Power: Taiwan in the Era of Great Power Competition

Author:: Joey Ching Aracena
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: The United States and the PRC hold opposing positions on the “Taiwan Question.” The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act affirms U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s defense by providing weapons and services to promote Taiwan’s self-defense capability.” The Act also considers “any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means...a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.” Conversely, the PRC emphasizes that Taiwan “reunification” is a strategic priority that “cannot be dragged on generation after generation.” At the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), PRC President Xi Jinping stated, “We will continue to strive for peaceful reunification… but we will never promise to renounce the use of force.” Despite the PRC’s coercive behavior and sharpened rhetoric, Taiwan refuses to accept “reunification” under the PRC’s proposed “One Country, Two Systems” model. Nevertheless, the United States and the PRC both discourage Taiwan’s independence. Both states understand that if Taiwan were to formally declare independence, it would compel both parties to respond, potentially escalating towards military conflict. By attempting to influence Taiwan’s behavior, both great powers implicitly recognize Taiwan’s role in making or breaking their respective strategies. In this way, Taiwan maintains a powerful point of leverage in the “Triangular Relationship,” as it could take actions that trigger future conflict between the United States and the PRC.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Territorial Disputes, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

400. Chinese Export of Restricted High Priority Battlefield Items to Russia

Author:: Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:: The Institute for Science and International Security has reviewed more than 295,000 commercial import-export trade manifest records from May 2022 through the end of December 2023, detailing exports of restricted Tier One Harmonized System Codes (HS Codes) items on the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Common High Priority List (CHPL) being exported by Chinese companies to Russian importers. The BIS CHLP applies trade restrictions to Russia on the most sensitive and sought-after Western electronics and other commodities that Russia requires to build its war machine. Tier One covers key items that Russia cannot domestically produce and that have limited manufacturers and constitutes four HS Code chapter 84 codes (8542.31, 8542.32, 8542.33, and 8542.39) detailing the most important electronics which Russia needs to build drones, missiles, and other weapon systems. Russia depends on illicit import practices and networks to acquire these goods from overseas, mainly Western goods via China. Without these critical commodities, Russia would be crippled in its ability to produce the advanced missiles, drones, and other combat systems it needs to wage its war of aggression in Ukraine. More than $1.5 billion worth of restricted Tier One commodities were found being exported from China to Russia during the assessed period. The shipments contained electronics designed and produced by Western firms, but shipped by often obscure and little-known Chinese companies to Russian firms. Shipments containing Western brands found in the trade data include Texas Instruments, XILINX, Analog Devices, Intel, NVIDIA, ST Microelectronics, and other major sought-after designers and producers of electronics. Many of these companies’ products have been frequently found in Russian weapons used in Ukraine, especially in drone systems such as the Shahed 136 and the Lancet kamikaze drones, and Kometa anti-jamming equipment. For example, XILINX field programmable gate arrays (FPGA) and microcontrollers, all of which were found in the assessed trade data, are essential components in the Shahed 136, hundreds of which are being launched at Ukraine each month. 1 NVIDIA Jetson AI modules play a key role in how the Lancet—another drone launched by Russia at Ukraine in the thousands—autonomously identifies, tracks, and engages targets. 2 These amounts of drones, as well as other weapon systems like missiles and other drones, demand a huge quantity of Western Tier 1 goods to keep up production rates and meet the Russian military’s operational needs.
Topic:: Weapons, Exports, Trade, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

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