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71. Unpacking China’s 2025 Retail Data: Provincial Divergence and Three Structural Challenges

Author:
Lizzi C. Lee, Huiyan Li, and Shengyu Wang
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Despite overall lackluster growth, China’s 2025 retail data shows signs of a structural shift, a redistribution of domestic demand from the coastal to central and western regions, and from first-tier to lower-tier cities. Demographic structure and migration patterns shape consumption. Provinces with balanced age profiles and slower aging outperform other provinces, underscoring the role of demographic vitality in sustaining demand. Consumption upgrading is diffusing geographically but remains uneven. Higher-quality consumption and domestic brand strength are spreading beyond top-tier cities, yet purchasing power and innovation capacity remain concentrated in coastal hubs. Household income growth is a necessary foundation for stronger consumption, but not sufficient. The Beijing case — rising incomes alongside falling retail sales — shows how wealth effects can break the income-to-consumption link. The property sector remains the central structural drag. Although price declines have moderated in some regions, weak transaction volumes and uneven recovery sustain negative wealth effects. Local initiative and bureaucratic KPI design will shape the outcome. Subnational experimentation has generated promising cases for stimulating demand, but durable rebalancing depends on incentive reform. Rigid outcome-based targets risk distorting behavior and undermining the very reforms they seek to advance. A more household-driven growth model could gradually reduce export dependence and ease trade pressures. Yet current progress is limited and uneven. Core structural imbalances remain unresolved.
Topic:
Economy, Economic Growth, Retail, Consumer Behavior, Income, and Property Market
Political Geography:
China and Asia

72. Guided Autonomy: America Watching in Xi’s China

Author:
Guoguang Wu
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
U.S.–China relations have undergone significant changes in the past decade, moving from deep interdependence to strategic rivalry, and, meanwhile, China’s policy toward the United States has transformed under Xi Jinping. China’s policymaking mechanism has also evolved, and understanding this shift is critical to understanding the broader U.S.–China relationship. This article examines China’s U.S. policymaking and policy consultation system under Xi Jinping. How does policy consultation on foreign relations work in China? What are the most influential policy research institutions in China's America watch? How do they influence China's U.S. policy?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Xi Jinping, Strategic Competition, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

73. The Gen Z Movement and the Future of Nepa2026l

Author:
Rishi Gupta
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Nepal is scheduled to hold snap elections on March 5, 2026, to elect members of the House of Representatives—the lower house of parliament —which will culminate in a new administration and a new Prime Minister. As election day draws closer, the country is experiencing a monumental challenge: choosing between a new generation of Nepalese politicians and an old guard that is seeking reelection. The forthcoming elections are certain to test Nepal’s 17-year-long democratic journey and could pave the way for a “New Nepal” grounded in the aspirations of the country’s youth. In September 2025, Nepal attracted global attention when the nation’s Generation Z population united to protest a government-imposed social media ban—a move that was widely viewed as an attack on freedom of expression, a disruption of free and open communication, and a threat to young people’s main source of financial earnings through online content creation. Besides the implications for digital connection, the ban brought to the fore larger frustrations among Nepalese youth with rampant nepotism, corruption, unemployment, and political instability in the country. As the protests gained strength, so did the Gen Z movement’s push for change, culminating in the resignation of Prime Minister K. P. Sharma Oli. These developments proved significant, as nowhere in the world had a social media ban prompted the fall of an elected government before. This paper unpacks Nepal’s historic Gen Z movement by understanding and assessing its drivers and their implications. It also provides a nuanced understanding of the movement’s contributions to Nepal’s relations with neighboring India and China. As a way forward, the paper presents several post-election scenarios and identifies four key challenges facing Nepal’s next government.
Topic:
Reform, Elections, Social Media, Protests, and Generation Z
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, and Nepal

74. What Happened at China's Two Sessions in 2026?2026

Author:
Neil Thomas, Lizzi C. Lee, and Lyle Morris
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Last week, Beijing wrapped up its annual Two Sessions — the parallel meetings of China’s legislature, the National People’s Congress (NPC), and its top political advisory body, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). Highlights of this year’s gathering included Premier Li Qiang’s Government Work Report, several closely watched appearances by President Xi Jinping, the removal of several officials from civilian posts and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) ahead of the meeting, and the release of China’s 15th Five-Year Plan (FYP), a blueprint for the country’s development from 2026 to 2030. Below, experts from the Center for China Analysis (CCA) assess the key takeaways across several issue areas. Last week, CCA also co-hosted a webinar on the Two Sessions with the South China Morning Post featuring Lizzi C. Lee, Lyle Morris, and Neil Thomas.
Topic:
Government, Domestic Politics, Xi Jinping, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

75. Digital infrastructure in South Asia: China’s role and the potential for Australia–India cooperation

Author:
Shruti Jargad
Publication Date:
08-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Digital infrastructure development in South Asia is gathering pace. It is central not only to economic growth and public service delivery, but also to national and regional security as well as geopolitical competition, particularly between China and India. China has emerged as a significant supplier of digital infrastructure and technology across the region. Through the Digital Silk Road, Chinese entities have become deeply embedded across South Asia’s digital ecosystem, spanning telecommunications, fibre-optic networks, submarine cables, data centres, cloud services, smart cities, surveillance technologies, digital payments and e-commerce. While Chinese investment has helped accelerate connectivity and digital development, it has also created long-term risks like technological dependence, vendor lock-in, unsustainable financing, poor transparency, threats to cybersecurity and strategic autonomy. This report argues that the central challenge for South Asian states is not Chinese involvement in itself, but it is the combination of limited alternatives and weak institutional capacity to address the long-term risks and threats mentioned above. It examines China’s digital engagements across the region, including in strategic locations, maps its presence across different layers of the digital ecosystem and assesses the implications. The report also explores how Australia and India can support more resilient and inclusive digital development in South Asia, despite structural limitations. India brings extensive experience in deploying digital public infrastructure at scale, while Australia offers expertise in e-governance, cybersecurity, infrastructure financing, institutional capacity building and regulatory cooperation. Rather than advocating decoupling from Chinese technology, the report proposes a pragmatic approach centred on diversification, local ownership and institutional resilience. It identifies practical avenues for Australia–India cooperation, including facilitating international financing, digital public infrastructure, sharing governance experience, human capital development, private-sector investment and leveraging regional and multilateral partnerships. By broadening the range of credible partners and strengthening institutional capacity, Australia and India can help ensure that South Asia’s digital transformation is secure, sustainable and responsive to the priorities of regional states.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Cybersecurity, Artificial Intelligence, Emerging Technology, Information Technology, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, and Asia-Pacific

76. Polar security: Strategic competition at the ends of the Earth

Author:
Elizabeth Buchanan
Publication Date:
07-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The Arctic and Antarctica were strategic theatres in which the Cold War played out, but they were also regions in which concerted efforts were made to bring together the rival superpowers. The polar regions became beacons of global cooperation, Cold War East-West dialogue and best practice statecraft. Today, the polar regions host new ‘players’ or stakeholders and are shaped by increasingly novel forces. The dynamics at the ends of the earth have clearly changed, and the fragile status-quo born from our Cold War system of managing state power (and ambitions) is incredibly brittle. Our polar regions require a modernised system or framework to manage strategic competition, to facilitate the ebbs and flows of geopolitics: the organic state of play between powers. Canberra has enduring, albeit under recognised, national security interests in the polar domains. Australia’s strategic interests in the polar regions will only be protected through enhanced physical presence, deeper security partnerships, and credible investment in deterrent capabilities. Blind faith in liberal institutionalism is no longer an option; indeed, as this report argues, this approach increasingly appears to sustain competitor national interests at the expense of our own. In the Arctic and Antarctica, Canberra confronts a more assertive, and broadly revisionist, strategic climate. Business as usual at either end of the earth will not suffice in this new normal. We need a more holistic approach. With fragmentation and erosion of the specific governance forums and systems in place in the polar regions, it is crucial Canberra leads middle power stakeholders in mounting a collective stand to salvage and ideally, modernise the status quo for Antarctica and the Arctic. Resource insecurity, renewed strategic competition, and environmental change are converging at the poles, determining the future of the Arctic and Antarctica and this Report illustrates why this trinity matters for Canberra.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Cold War, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, South Korea, Asia-Pacific, Arctic, United States of America, and Antarctica

77. The Sino-Russian partnership: why it matters for Australian security and defence

Author:
Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The Sino-Russian ‘no limits’ partnership has become central to an emerging anti-Western axis that aims to weaken the West and counter the liberal international order that has buttressed Australia’s post-1945 peace, prosperity and security. Even though it is not a formal alliance, the depth and breadth of strategic cooperations between China and Russia—across military, economic, defence, diplomatic and technological domains—makes the partnership the most important bilateral one for both, and one that has severe strategic consequences for Australia. The partnership between these two totalitarian states is not new, but Beijing and Moscow have intensified their cooperation since the announcement of a ‘no limits’ partnership in February 2022. Their collaboration encompasses joint military exercises including naval, air and combined arms, technology transfers, coordinated propaganda affecting social cohesion and stability, efforts at building alternative parochial technological and economic coalitions. Russia’s combat experience and defence technology transfers have been particularly helpful in accelerating China’s military modernisation, which in turn have exacerbated regional insecurities in the Indo-Pacific. The Sino-Russian partnership is also a critical subset of a wider authoritarian grouping that includes Iran and North Korea, whose combined military power, including nuclear capabilities, have the potential to further destabilise regional and global security. Within this, China has emerged as the decisive enabler of Russia’s and now Iran’s military operations. Overall, the Sino-Russian partnership is durable, gaining more strategic and military muscle power and thus directly threatens Australia’s strategic environment, prompting sustained investment in national defence and foreign alliances. This ASPI report examines the contemporary trajectory and drivers of China-Russia partnership. This will be followed by a detailed analysis of China-Russia defence and security cooperation, which has seen qualitative and quantitative enhancement in the last decade. The final section charts the current trendlines into the future, drawing out the implications for Australia, the liberal international order and strategic stability, while identifying possible pragmatic choices for Canberra to boost its security and defence.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, United Nations, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and Australia

78. Disruption and opportunity: Australia and critical minerals in a changing global order

Author:
Ian Satchwell
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
In a world defined by accelerating geo‑economic competition aimed at reducing China’s control of critical‑minerals markets and supply chains, Australia’s critical‑minerals ambitions hinge on a powerful but tenuous assumption: that the nation will evolve into a major supplier to the US—its largest investment partner and most consequential strategic ally. Yet today’s market dynamics, policy fragmentation among partners and the US’s own inward‑looking minerals strategy mean that outcome is far from guaranteed. What is clear, however, is that Australia enters this contest with world‑leading geological endowments, a global footprint of successful mining operations, and hard‑won capabilities built over more than 60 years of modern mining and processing. Australian companies aren’t just domestic producers—they’re global investors, operators and technology leaders. Demand for their products is only rising as the energy transition, digitisation, automation and defence modernisation accelerate. But market opportunity alone is no longer enough. Australia’s ability to convert its mineral strength into strategic advantage is being tested by volatile global prices—often shaped by market manipulation—contradictory policies among like‑minded nations and rising competition from other mineral‑rich nations. Domestically, high construction and energy costs, an uncompetitive company tax system, acute skills shortages, regulatory uncertainty and long approval timelines threaten to blunt Australia’s competitive edge. At the same time, commercial and security partners across Europe, Asia and North America increasingly look to Australia not only for resources but also for leadership—technical, environmental, commercial and strategic. Many countries, along with the EU, have signed agreements with Australia to build more secure, sustainable and diversified critical‑minerals supply chains. This report argues that Australia must now pivot from signing partnerships to fully activating them. That means prioritising the like-minded partners and markets where real supply‑chain integration and volume markets are achievable. China, however, will remain an indispensable market for Australian minerals. Crucially, Australia must recalibrate its approach to onshoring. Policies built solely around domestic downstream ambitions risk underestimating the reality of global supply chains and overestimating Australia’s cost competitiveness. The more strategic path is to position Australia as a dominant force across multi‑node critical‑minerals supply chains—linking Australian concentrates and intermediate products, production of Australian companies operating abroad, trusted partners’ processing, manufacturing and technology ecosystems, and of course end users. To seize this moment, Australia should also restore the predictability and competitiveness of its own investment environment. Ultimately, the choice before Australia isn’t whether to be a critical‑minerals superpower—it’s whether to be an indispensable node in the world’s most important supply chains. That requires ambition, disciplined policymaking, deeper strategic partnerships and a relentless focus on execution.
Topic:
European Union, Artificial Intelligence, Research and Development, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Australia, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

79. Gone with the West: How the transatlantic split helps China and forces Europe to rethink its Indo-Pacific strategy

Author:
Andreas Bøje Forsby
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The erosion of transatlantic unity under a renewed America First strategy has weakened collective Western responses to China and left Europe vulnerable to coercive diplomacy from both Beijing and Washington. Caught between an unreliable America and an assertive China, Europe must strengthen its strategic autonomy by building deeper relationships with like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific region. Like-mindedness, previously the linchpin of Western unity, no longer appears to play much of a role in building geostrategic coalitions in the Indo-Pacific region.1 Instead, as the Trump administration jettisons the liberal rules-based international order, Europe is fundamentally reconsidering its partnership with America and consequently its approach to the Indo-Pacific. Even the prevailing transatlantic consensus on China – viewed as a “systemic challenger” that should be tackled together – is now unravelling.2 Against the wider backdrop of a return to an era of great power prerogatives and spheres of influence, Europe therefore finds itself in a tight spot in the Indo-Pacific region – unwelcome to both Washington and Beijing. However, given its economic dynamism and critical manufacturing industries, the Indo-Pacific is far too important to be left to Washington and Beijing’s devices. Indeed, many Indo-Pacific countries share not only Europe’s advocacy of free trade, multilateralism, liberal institutions and a rules-based order, but also its unease about relying too much on either China or the US, which together may foster a renewed sense of like-mindedness with Europe. For its part, Europe urgently needs to extend and deepen its own set of strategic relationships with countries in the Indo-Pacific region in the face of growing Chinese and American assertiveness. The proposed new EU security strategy will hopefully address this as a geostrategic priority.3
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Transatlantic Relations, and Global Economy
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

80. Military minerals: Europe's new defense industrial capacities demand reliable supply chains

Author:
Luke Patey
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The geopolitical upheaval of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine coupled with the return of US President Donald Trump to the White House have kick-started massive new defence spending commitments across the European Union. Yet even where EU member states overcome longstanding policy gridlock and red tape to advance rearmament plans, new industrial defence capacities require reliable supply chains for critical minerals and defence materials to ensure future production. The reopening of a mothballed ammunition factory in Denmark offers a window into understanding the political, bureaucratic and supply chain single points of failure that could upend new industrial defence capacities in Europe.
Topic:
European Union, Defense Industry, Supply Chains, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:
China and Europe