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121. India–Japan Defense Partnership in the Indo-Pacific: Geopolitical Prospects and Challenges Under Trump

Author:
Yen Pham Thi
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:
Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:
This article examines the India–Japan defense partnership in the Indo-Pacific, focusing on its geopolitical prospects and challenges under the Trump administration. Strengthened by shared concerns over China’s rising influence and the convergence of their Indo-Pacific strategies, the partnership has evolved beyond symbolic engagement to include joint exercises, technology sharing, and defense dialogues aimed at preserving a free and rules-based regional order. At the same time, India’s reliance on Russian defense equipment, Japan’s dependence on US security guarantees, and the “America First” policy under Trump pose significant constraints. To sustain and deepen cooperation, both nations must enhance bilateral mechanisms, pursue strategic autonomy, expand multilateral engagements, and promote regional norms. These steps are essential for building a resilient, sustainable, and strategic partnership in the Indo-Pacific amid a shifting US foreign policy landscape.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Partnerships, Geopolitics, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Japan, China, India, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

122. The consequences of the Trump trade war for Europe

Author:
Julian Hinz, Isabelle Mejean, and Moritz Schularick
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
• Using the KITE model suite, we study the economic costs of the Trump tariff policy for Europe, and analyze the potential for trade diversion from China. • If the current tariff regime stays in place, trade between the U.S. and China would fall dramatically, hurting mainly the U.S. and the Chinese economies. The direct economic impact for Europe appears limited. • The expected rerouting of Chinese and U.S. exports to third countries is likely to intensify competition between European and Chinese producers in key markets. European consumersstand to benefit from lower prices.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Tariffs, Trade Wars, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
China, Europe, North America, and United States of America

123. The Great Equalizer: Effects of Chinese Official Finance on Economic Complexity across Recipient Countries

Author:
Jan Denninger and Lennart Kaplan
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
This paper analyzes whether Chinese aid and other forms of official finance affect structural transformation in low- and-middle income countries. Specifically, we employ an instrumental variables (IV) approach to causally analyze the effect on the Economic Complexity Index of 98 recipient countries over the 2002-2016 period. Economic complexity is defined as the diversity and sophistication of the goods an economy produces. The results reveal that Chinese official financing (OF) does not have statistically significant effects at the aggregate level; however, its effectiveness varies across sectors and recipients. A sectoral perspective shows that Chinese OF to recipients’ production sectors has a significantly negative effect on their economic complexity. These effects are most pronounced for high-complexity recipients, suggesting that China primarily targets industries below existing levels of complexity, thereby impeding potential structural transformation. In contrast, low-complexity recipients experience positive complexity effects from Chinese social sector projects, especially from those related to education. Given that China is known for its demand-driven approach of lending, recipients should push for an adjustment in the composition and allocation of Chinese OF to render structural transformation more likely.
Topic:
Economics, International Trade and Finance, Foreign Aid, and Complexity
Political Geography:
China and Asia

124. Geostrategic thinking and quantum technology: How promises of quantum technology breakthroughs shape Sino-US rivalry

Author:
Markus Holmgren
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Disruptive technologies have emerged as key arenas of strategic competition between the United States and China, and, alongside artificial intelligence, quantum technologies are key among them. By influencing current strategies and policies, their implications begin even before innovations materialize. Uncertainty about the future and the promised benefits of these technologies have implications for both nations’ build-up efforts, resilience strategies, and potential for pre-emptive actions. China has made rapid technological advancements in many fields, narrowing the gap with the United States. Examples include the release of an AI application by the Chinese company DeepSeek and China’s lead in quantum communication technologies. Beyond civilian applications, quantum technology promises significant breakthroughs in military applications, such as codebreaking, signal-free submarine navigation, and intrusion-proof communications.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, Strategic Competition, Geoeconomics, and Quantum Computing
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

125. China Maritime Report No. 44: Dirty But Preparing to Fight: VADM Li Pengcheng's Downfall Amid Increasing PLAN Readiness

Author:
Christopher Sharman and Andrew S. Erickson
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
Although corruption runs deep in the PLA Navy (PLAN) and across China’s armed forces, disciplinary-related removals appear not to have a major impact on naval capabilities or operations. The fight against corruption within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has General Secretary Xi Jinping’s attention and appears to be picking up steam for 2025. The Standing Committee of the 14th National People’s Congress (NPC) issued a report on 25 December 2024 identifying Vice Admiral Li Pengcheng (李鹏程) as one of eight NPC deputies removed for “serious violations of discipline and the law.” Li was an officer on the fast track and identified early in his career by PLA press as one to watch. He had the unprecedented distinction of having command of two separate Gulf of Aden anti-piracy escort task force deployments, extensive international maritime experience, and involvement in some of the PLAN’s most significant international navy accomplishments. Li’s career and his operations in the Mediterranean Sea had the personal attention of Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman Xi. Vice Admiral Li Pengcheng replaced Vice Admiral Ju Xinchun (鞠新春) as the Commander of the Southern Theater Command (STC) Navy roughly a year ago. Admiral Ju suffered Admiral Li’s same fate. Comparing and contrasting two consecutive PLAN STC commanders serving in the same capacity, sacked one year apart, provides a revealing dataset to analyze the impact of sacking the commander, and of corruption more broadly, on PLAN operational capabilities and how they affect the force. The PLAN may be playing high-stakes musical chairs with its leadership, but it has a deep enough talent pool to do so without prohibitive problems. When one leader is purged, another is on deck. Politicized corruption investigations and their imposition of costs are fundamentally a speedbump rather than a showstopper. Regardless of corruption’s pervasive persistence, PLAN operational capabilities continue to improve, and cutting-edge, lethal weapons systems regularly enter service. Corruption may contribute to inefficiencies, but it does not curtail PLAN advances. Related removals are neither an indicator of prohibitive incompetence nor a self-defeating constraint on operational capabilities.
Topic:
Corruption, Leadership, Navy, People's Liberation Army (PLA), Ju Xinchun, Southern Theater Command, and Readiness
Political Geography:
China and Asia

126. China Maritime Report No. 45: The PLA Navy's Hospital Ship Fleet: Concerns, Developments, and Future Prospects

Author:
Jonathan Robinson
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
The PRC’s hospital ship ecosystem comprises at least 17 vessels. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) operates 13 ships, while the state ship building sector has developed (or is developing) at least four civilian hospital ships for domestic and foreign clients. PLAN hospital ships serve two main missions: (1) Provide medical support to PLA personnel, especially those stationed around the mainland or on Chinese-occupied islands in the South China Sea. (2) Support maritime global health engagement, chiefly through missions conducted by the Peace Ark hospital ship. Almost a third (21) of the Peace Ark’s 71 port visits since 2010 have been in Melanesia and East Africa. A further fifth (12) of all visits have been to ports in the northeast Indian Ocean and West Africa. The launch of the Silk Road Ark in 2023 may increase the PRC’s maritime global health engagement capacity in the coming years. In the event of a conflict, some PLAN hospital ships would not be in compliance with international conventions on the proper identification and uses of these vessels. They lack the required markings, potentially possess armaments, or are not exclusively used as hospital ships. This could complicate the decision making of China’s opponents, especially during wartime. China’s private sector construction of hospital ships could potentially provide the PRC with the skills and knowhow to rapidly expand the PLAN’s hospital ship fleet during a conflict. U.S. Navy planners should consider how the PLAN may use its hospital ships in a conflict and how these vessels may link with other humanitarian activities seen in these settings, such as maritime humanitarian corridors, exchange of prisoners, or civilian humanitarian capabilities.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Navy, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Hospital Ship
Political Geography:
China and Asia

127. Come and (Re)discover China: Staunchly Patriotic, Sincerely Religious, and Eager to Further Engage with the World

Author:
Bart Dessein
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
While elderly women and men are happily singing and dancing on the shores of Hangzhou’s famous West Lake, grandparents are taking their grandchildren out for a stroll and a boat trip on the lake. Buddhist monasteries in the vicinity of Ningbo, a coastal city south of Shanghai that has recently been elevated to a ‘new first-tier city,’ are teeming with monks who have retreated from every-day life and devote themselves to the word of the Buddha. On a daily basis, tens of thousands of ordinary citizens visit Putuoshan, an insular sanctuary just off the coast of Ningbo, devoted to Avalokitesvara, the Buddhist god(ess) of compassion. In a small place in the neighborhood of Ningbo, the local monastery has newly built the ‘Avalokitesvara’s Dharma-world,’ a temple complex in full marble, ornamented with precious stones and gold leaf, venerating the same Buddhist god(ess). Also in early morning Beijing, hundreds of people are queuing up, waiting for the gates of the Lama temple to open, so that they can enter to pay their respect to the Buddhist deities. Meanwhile, the number of European tourists – despite the extended visa free travel possibilities of up to one month for many European citizens – can be counted on the fingers of one hand. Even in cities such as Shanghai where, judging from the attendance in the breakfast room of an international hotel, the foreign guests are of Indian or Near-Eastern descent, and where shops that have closed down business and commercial spaces for rent in newly built high-rise buildings catch the eye. Also in Hangzhou (equally a new first-tier city), top-end restaurants and small street stalls alike are waiting for customers. This picture is repeated in Anyang, a provincial town in Henan Province, where waitresses and waiters brave the freezing cold to lure customers into their restaurants.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nationalism, Religion, and Tourism
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia-Pacific

128. Summits and Sanctions, War and Peace: Is the EU Still in the Game?

Author:
Sven Biscop
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
As I set out for Beijing in early July, to teach my annual summer course on grand strategy and great powers, I knew in advance what all my Chinese interlocutors would make fun of: Mark Rutte’s and Donald Trump’s embarrassing “Daddy moment” at the NATO Summit in The Hague, epitomising European subservience to the United States. While I was still in Beijing, the EU-China Summit produced the expected non-result. That didn’t seem to bother my Chinese contacts, or so they pretended. And shortly after returning to Brussels, Ursula von der Leyen and Trump announced the EU-US trade deal – a bad deal whose main merit is that it avoided an even worse one. Even the EU’s claim to be a strong and unified economic player, as opposed to its often divided diplomatic and military posture, begins to sound hollow. One has to wonder: is the EU still in the game of great power politics?
Topic:
Sanctions, European Union, Grand Strategy, Trade, and Great Powers
Political Geography:
China and Europe

129. Stepping up Engagement in the Sahel: Russia, China, Turkey and the Gulf States

Author:
Nina Wilén
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Over the past five years, since the latest wave of coups began in 2020, states in the Sahel have strategically realigned and shifted external partnerships. Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger suspended their security collaboration with their long-term ally, France, following their respective coups between 2020 and 2023, and demanded for the immediate withdrawal of French troops while advancing a new narrative of sovereignty. In 2023 Mali’s regime ousted the decade-long, 13,000 troops-strong UN peacekeeping mission in the country, MINUSMA, while Niger expelled the EU’s two security and defense missions, one of which had been deployed since 2012. A few months later, Niger also broke off a decade-long defense partnership with the US. In a second wave of expulsion, yet different in manner and context, Chad, Senegal and Ivory Coast also suspended military collaboration with France in 2024. This recent expulsion of Western and multilateral partners has been accompanied by a turn by Sahelian states to old and new, predominantly authoritarian, actors. This shift reflects an effort by the military regimes to project independence, diversify their partners and ultimately maintain their hold on power. Traditional partners like China and Russia have intensified economic and security relationships with their Sahelian partners during the past few years, while newer partners like Turkey and the Gulf states have increased their presence and influence in the region through infrastructure projects, arms exports and natural resource deals. At the same time, the exit by the AES states from the regional organisation ECOWAS has resulted in both new partnerships and new tensions among member states, profoundly reshaping the regional landscape. This article, the second in a two-part series examining the security and political context in the Sahel, explores these evolving partnerships with non-Western actors, focusing in particular on the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. It examines the broader lines of cooperation and engagement by Russia, China, Turkey and the Gulf states and identifies both similarities and important differences in their approaches. The aim is to provide a clearer overview of the Sahel’s shifting international relationships and to deepen our understanding of the dynamics, tensions and strategic choices among non-Western partners. differences and tensions between the non-Western partners. With a growing number of external actors competing for influence in the Sahel, Europe must base its recalibrated (re)engagement on a solid understanding of these dynamics.
Topic:
Politics, Coup, Engagement, and Security Partnerships
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Turkey, Asia, Sahel, and Gulf Nations

130. Aligning global military posture with U.S. interests

Author:
Jennifer Kavanagh and Dan Caldwell
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The Pentagon should revise the U.S. global military posture to be consistent with protecting vital national interests based on a grand strategy of realism and restraint. This will mean reducing the size of the military footprint in certain regions and changing the mix and location of military forces in others. A review of the U.S. global military posture should focus on four priorities: defending the homeland, preventing the rise of a rival regional hegemon in key areas, burden shifting to allies and partners, and protecting U.S. economic security. The current military posture in Europe is too large, encouraging free-riding by European allies and preventing them from taking more responsibility for their own security. U.S. troop levels should be reduced to approximately where they were before Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine. This will involve the withdrawal of some ground combat units, multiple fighter squadrons, and several destroyers. Likewise, the military posture in the Middle East is too large given limited U.S. interests and the region’s lack of an existential military threat to the U.S. homeland. Air and naval assets deployed after the 2023 attacks on Israel should be removed, post-9/11 legacy deployments in Iraq and Syria should be ended, and troops in Kuwait and Qatar should be fully withdrawn. The U.S. military posture in East Asia should be realigned to focus on balancing Chinese power and protecting U.S. interests. Recommended changes include removing most ground forces and two fighter squadrons from South Korea, moving U.S. forces away from the Chinese coast, and shifting more frontline defense responsibilities to allies like Japan and the Philippines.
Topic:
Grand Strategy, Strategic Interests, Military, and Pentagon
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

131. Will the U.S. go to war over Taiwan?

Author:
Jennifer Kavanagh
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The small island of Taiwan is often at the center of U.S. foreign policy discourse. This is thanks to the threat of a Chinese invasion and fears over a resulting loss of U.S. military and economic power in the region. A recent survey by Defense Priorities shows there is substantial disagreement among experts as to how the United States should and would respond to a Taiwan conflict. This suggests the U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity toward Taiwan is working. The experts surveyed largely agreed that China is unlikely to invade Taiwan, a departure from political and military leaders who have inflated the possibility. They also tended to agree that China is unlikely to strike U.S. military bases in East Asia ahead of a Taiwan invasion, which would grant U.S. leaders flexibility in how they respond to this scenario. These experts are divided, however, on what that response should look like. Some say the United States should use direct military force in Taiwan while others argue it should only send military aid. Very few think the U.S. should stay out completely. Even as they acknowledge that a successful seizure of Taiwan would not offer China significant military or economic benefits and recognize the enormous risks and costs to the United States of entering a Taiwan conflict, some experts continue to support a U.S. intervention. This tension is perhaps best explained by a lingering attachment to the pursuit of U.S. hegemony.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Strategic Ambiguity
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

132. Target Taiwan: Challenges for a U.S. intervention

Author:
Lyle Goldstein
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
China could attack Taiwan, attempting a fait accompli before the United States could mobilize sufficient forces in theater to defend it. Chinese advantages of proximity and will suggest that the U.S. would pay a heavy price in this scenario. U.S. ground forces would struggle to enter the combat theater in the relevant time because of uncertainties related to the air and sea campaigns. Attempts to insert U.S. ground forces in peacetime could ignite the very conflict they would intend to deter. Chinese missile, air, and drone assaults could damage U.S. airfields in the region and slow U.S. air support, acutely degrading U.S. maritime operations and Taiwan’s ground defenses. Because U.S. Navy surface forces, including aircraft carrier battle groups, are vulnerable to China’s A2/AD systems, combat in a Taiwan scenario would likely be disproportionately borne by the U.S. Navy submarine force. While these submarines could do damage to the Chinese Navy, they probably lack sufficient firepower to affect the overall outcome of a war. Surging forward U.S. air and naval power in a Taiwan scenario would entail incredible risks, including nuclear escalation. Any war or even intensive militarized rivalry between the U.S. and China would entail enormous risks in exchange for little gain.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Armed Forces, Military Intervention, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

133. Target Taiwan: Prospects for a Chinese invasion

Author:
Lyle Goldstein
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
In a scenario where China attempts an amphibious invasion of Taiwan and the United States does not fight, the invasion will likely succeed assuming Beijing is willing to bear heavy casualties. Taiwan’s vulnerability to China is due to its proximity, since it is located well within range of Chinese missiles, airpower, rocket artillery, helicopters, and paratroopers. All this will reduce Taiwan’s ability to prevent an amphibious landing. Due to its air superiority and the geography of Taiwan, which is mostly urban and mountainous, China can plan for an infantry fight, at least initially, not one dominated by heavy armor. Hence, civilian vessels, including small craft of all types, can help ferry most troops ashore. While an operation to seize Taiwan would be a highly risky endeavor that could result in heavy Chinese losses, Beijing would likely be motivated to bear such costs, since it views national unification as a core interest. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan thus cannot be discounted and Taiwan should prepare by boosting its defense spending, emphasizing its own self-reliance, and engaging in diplomacy.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Armed Conflict, Vulnerability, and Invasion
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

134. Keep NATO focused on Europe, not China

Author:
Thomas P. Cavanna
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
During the Trump I and Biden presidencies, the United States applied growing pressure on NATO to turn against China. Although focused on protecting Europe, these efforts also attempted to expand the alliance’s prerogatives into the Indo-Pacific. Should this expansion continue, it could distract NATO from Russia, the only real threat that Europe faces. It could also delay the emergence of a more autonomous Europe able to defend itself, thereby perpetuating current U.S. overstretch and reducing Washington’s ability to concentrate on the China challenge in Asia. NATO’s turn against China might generate undue tensions with the PRC, deepen Sino-Russian cooperation, and cause controversy in the Global South, all of which would work against U.S. interests. Instead of trying to fold Europe and Asia together to counter the Sino-Russian axis along the Eurasian rimland, the U.S. should keep NATO focused on Russia and encourage European strategic autonomy. It should refocus its own efforts on the Indo-Pacific and reduce the risk of escalation with Beijing.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, and Expansionism
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Europe, and Asia

135. China can’t dominate the Middle East

Author:
Rosemary Kelanic
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
A common argument for the United States to remain in the Middle East is that it needs to counter Chinese expansionism. The U.S. is embroiled in a new cold war, this line of thinking goes, and if it withdraws from the Middle East, Beijing will fill the power vacuum and expand its influence. This fundamentally misreads China’s modest aims in the region, which have more to do with hedging against U.S. threats to Chinese oil access. Unlike the Soviet Union, which was proximate to the Middle East, China lacks the military wherewithal to threaten the region. And whereas it was very plausible that the Soviet Union could have captured and weaponized Middle Eastern oil production, China almost certainly could not capture the oil, and even if it did, couldn’t withhold it from the global market. In the Middle East, the United States faces less of a military and economic threat from China than it did from the Soviet Union. It should respond by finally withdrawing from the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Oil, Strategic Competition, and Expansionism
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Asia, and United States of America

136. Why the ‘Reverse Nixon’ Strategy Will Fail: The Illusion of Decoupling

Author:
Sanshiro Hosaka
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The second Trump administration has undertaken a peace deal with Russia. This policy may not simply reflect Donald Trump’s personal affinity for Moscow and deal-making style but is also likely informed by a certain strategic perception of the US-China-Russia triangle.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Donald Trump, Strategic Interests, and Decoupling
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

137. More Than a Systemic Rival: China as a Security Challenge for the EU

Author:
Tauno Tõhk
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The EU's ties with China rank just behind its transatlantic ones in significance. With China being a major trading partner, the focus has long been on economic opportunities. In recent years, there has been a shift in how the EU frames its relationship with China. Yet, despite increasing emphasis on systemic rivalry and economic security, security risks remain underrepresented in EU China policy.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

138. Obscurity By Design: Competing Priorities for America’s China Policy

Author:
Tanner Greer
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Few notes of concord survive contact with Donald Trump. Trump’s election in 2016 upended settled assumptions; one by one he knocked down the pillars of consensus and convention that held up decades of American diplomacy. The strongest and most consequential of these pillars concerned China. For more than forty years, American diplomats and statesmen worked to integrate China into an American-led economic order. By doing so, they hoped to align Beijing’s behavior (and, if lucky, the entire Chinese political regime) with liberal norms. Their hopes proved in vain. China did not moderate or liberalize. The new president, rejecting both the means and ends of engagement, pushed for a less cataleptic strategy. That was five years ago. Those who see Trump as a champion of the new hawkish “bipartisan consensus on China” have been nonplussed by the first moves of his second administration. Trump invited Xi Jinping—but no other foreign leader—to attend his swearing-in. One of his first acts as president was an executive stay of the TikTok ban. Trump publicly browbeat a dozen countries with threats and blandishments in the week that followed—but not the People’s Republic of China. Contrary to expectation, Trump’s inaugural address barely glanced at China. It does not outline, or even hint at, what Trump’s approach to America’s greatest challenger might be. This obscurity is by design. Trump sees no advantage in giving advance notice. Quite the opposite: he clearly believes that the more inscrutable and erratic he seems, the better off the United States will be. This attitude was expressed neatly when the editorial board of the Wall Street Journal asked Trump about the approach he would take toward Taiwan if elected president. Trump replied that the Chinese would not dare attack Taiwan under his watch. After all, “[Xi Jinping] knows that I am f—ing crazy.” Like Richard Nixon before him, Trump is ready to play the lunatic.[1] If this is one reason Trump’s campaign never published or endorsed any detailed policy proposals regarding China, there are others. As one member of Trump’s transition team puts it, “Trump is a pragmatist, not an ideologue. He does not like tying his hands. He prefers to have strong personalities underneath him with conflicting views. He wants them to fight it out. He wants to pick the winner of each battle.” If this risks strategic incoherence, then so be it: “If you want to see what an ideologically unified administration looks like, look back at Bush and Cheney. That is the sort of disaster we want to avoid.”[2] This leadership style should be considered by any analyst who forecasts the new administration’s future. Trump positions himself as the kingmaker among competing centers of power. He encourages a certain level of disagreement in the ranks. This report provides a framework for thinking about these disagreements—especially in regard to the United States’ relationship with China.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

139. Partners or Rivals? Areas of Convergence and Divergence of Interests in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Alexander Korolev and Thomas J. Shattuck
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China announced that their friendship had “no limits” and “no ‘forbidden’ areas of cooperation” in 2022.[1] That summit between President Vladimir Putin and Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping occurred before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but the two leaders have since doubled down on their cooperation and partnerships. However, the limits of their “no limits” partnership have not necessarily been tested, particularly within the context of the Indo-Pacific region. How close are the two countries’ priorities and interests in the Indo-Pacific? Are the two partners or prospective rivals? Do their interests converge or diverge? The Foreign Policy Research Institute’s report series for the US European Command’s Russia Strategic Initiative has utilized the instruments of statecraft to analyze the interests, influence, and relationships of Moscow and Beijing across the vast Indo-Pacific region. The first report provided a general overview of the strengthening of the bilateral relationship and specific and joint interests in the region. The second report focused specifically on China’s diplomatic, military, and economic interests across the Indo-Pacific region and gave Moscow’s perspectives on these interests. The third report homed in on the two countries’ relationship with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the prospect of the three forming a trilateral axis, concluding that such an arrangement is unlikely to occur. The fourth report analyzed Russia’s use of diplomatic, military, and economic instruments of statecraft to advance its interests in the Indo-Pacific region and examined how China perceived it. This report seeks to bring the elements of the series together and provide a forward-looking approach to Moscow and Beijing’s foreign policy trajectory in the Indo-Pacific region. It will first analyze how there is a systemic convergence of joint interests at the global level. Given the context of the Ukraine war and a general Western anti-China push, the two countries and their interests are quite close at the systemic level. However, at the regional level, some divergences emerge in the security and economic realms. Russia’s historic relationships with Vietnam and India, in particular, could put Moscow and Beijing at odds, and the negative historical memories and economic imbalances of their own relationship have the potential to create new cleavages among their populations and hinder alignment formation. The report will then attempt to investigate the future trajectories of the bilateral relationship and where convergences and divergences may emerge. While specific tensions may erupt at the regional level, such as those related to a greater Russian defense presence in Southeast Asia or a Taiwan conflict, the deep structural interests and convergences will likely prevail.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Rivalry, Strategic Interests, Regional Politics, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Indo-Pacific

140. Russia-China-North Korea Relations: Obstacles to a Trilateral Axis

Author:
Elizabeth Wishnick
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Russia and China have had diplomatic relations with North Korea and each other for more than 75 years, but Russian and Chinese relations with North Korea could not be more different. North Korea is China’s sole military ally, but—as PRC historian Shen Zhihua has cautioned—since the normalization of ties between Beijing and Seoul, the PRC-North Korea alliance was really just a “scrap of paper.”[1] By contrast, Sino-Russian military ties have been deepening; however, both countries claim they are uninterested in replicating Cold War era alliances and have committed instead to a priority partnership “for the new era.”[2] In June 2024, Russia and North Korea signed a strategic partnership agreement with a mutual defense clause. China’s 1961 treaty with North Korea (renewed most recently in 2021) also contains a mutual defense clause, raising questions about the existence of a trilateral axis. Claims about the existence of such an axis also point to the anti-Western positions these states share and their potential to undertake coordinated action directed against Western interests.[3] Critics of this view argue that there is scant evidence for the existence of such an axis beyond the current (albeit very different) assistance by China and North Korea (plus Iran) for the Russian full-scale war in Ukraine.[4] They also contend that trilateralism will not endure beyond this war.[5] Others argue that such an axis would not be in Chinese interests.[6] What is lacking in this discussion is an understanding of the indicators of a China-Russia-North Korea axis. How do we know if they are choosing to form an axis? Or not? This paper begins by examining the history of Russia-China-North Korea interactions, highlighting Sino-Russian differences in emphasis regarding North Korea prior to the full-scale war in Ukraine. To assess whether a trilateral axis formed after 2022, the paper examines evidence of institutionalized cooperation, coordination of Chinese and North Korean military aid to Russia for Ukraine, and Russian and Chinese expert perspectives. The paper then addresses the obstacles to the formation of a trilateral axis. Although authoritarian states share an overriding interest in regime security and political survival, this does not necessarily mean that we should expect solidarity among similarly disposed regimes or believe that they would inevitably form an anti-Western axis. Considerable research has been done on the reasons why authoritarian states choose to support one another,[7] but it is important to understand what factors might limit their cooperation.[8] This paper examines how the historical experience of trilateralism, reputational concerns, foreign policy considerations, and domestic factors make a new China-Russia-North Korea axis unlikely.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, Regional Politics, and Trilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and North Korea